

Government of Madras.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

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¹⁰²⁸
G.O., No. 1027, 28th July 1903.

Special Police Reserves.

Addressing the Government of India on the subject of the formation of — to be composed of Europeans and Eurasians.

CONFIDENTIAL

Recd.

} 1908.

Enclosures

Regd.

Spare copies

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GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

READ—the following papers:—

I

Letter—from Sir HERBERT RISLEY, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department (Police).

To—the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras.

Dated—Calcutta, the 11th March 1908,

No.—329-Confid.

I am directed to observe that the Government of India have recently had under consideration the following two questions:—(1) the sufficiency, in respect both of numbers and armament, of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times, and (2) the arrangements that would be required to secure the presence of an adequate force of mobilised police at a time of a great emergency such as a serious frontier war. The second of these questions is not, the Government of India consider, at the present moment a very pressing one, though it is desirable that they should be in possession of a skeleton scheme showing the arrangements which would be possible and necessary in such an emergency. The first question is, however, in their opinion of urgent importance, and it is with special reference to this matter that I am now to address the Government of Madras.

2. I am to forward confidentially, for the consideration of the Government of Madras, the enclosed copy of a memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, I.C.S., Officiating Director, Criminal Intelligence, which contains proposals for the enrolment of special police reserves to be composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians, and to request that the Government of India may be favoured with the views of the Governor in Council upon the probable value of the force suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore and the manner in which it should be armed.

ENCLOSURE.

Proposal for the enrolment of provincial special police reserves composed mainly of Eurasians and Europeans.

The strength and constitution of the district armed police reserves has recently come under consideration both in connection with the Army Reorganisation Scheme and as a result of the Police Commission's proposals.

The principles laid down in 1860 regarding the functions of the police were as follows:—

- (1) The civil police must protect the community against all local criminal classes and put down all riots and local disturbances.
- (2) When riot becomes rebellion the functions of the police end and military bodies must step in.
- (3) While the police must be drilled and disciplined, only that portion of the force necessary for duties such as guarding treasuries and jails, escorts and quelling all ordinary disturbances should carry arms, the rest carrying batons only.

Such were the principles laid down when the lessons of the mutiny were fresh in men's minds. In 1886 Lord Dufferin suggested, in consequence of certain disturbances which had occurred in Northern India between Hindus and Muhammadans, the desirability of keeping at certain centres, such as large towns, a reserve of semi-military police armed and disciplined on the same principle as the Irish Constabulary, and Sir Anthony Macdonnell writing as Home Secretary in June 1887 sketched a scheme for such a reserve, allowing for first-class districts two companies of 160 men, for second-class districts $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies of 120 men and for third-class districts one company of 80 men. Objections were, however, taken to these proposals in Council on

disturbances and ready or capable of being removed of all escort duties for any purposes and reserves should form part of the district staff and in more recent times, however, it has been generally found in practice that escort and similar duties are so heavy that no reserve force was available for emergencies unless stringent orders were passed setting aside a part of the force for the purpose. Consequently the Police Commission, while recommending the formation of a body of armed police to be called the head-quarter force available for the performances of all guard, orderly and escort duties, added that a proportion of this force, which might be fixed at 25 constables under one head constable, should be kept in reserve for despatch anywhere at a moment's notice. Events which have occurred since Police Commission sat, however, would seem to justify the view that those proposals did not go quite far enough.

2. Under the Army Reorganisation Scheme, the functions and responsibilities of the police have been very materially extended. According to the principles laid down in 1860 when riot became rebellion, the functions of the police end, but under the new scheme, in the event of mobilisation taking place, the police will share with the garrison troops and moveable columns the responsibility of maintaining internal order. The services which both the civil and military authorities would now require from the armed police were duly considered by the Government of India, and their proposals were set out in despatch No. 8 of December 1904 and received the Secretary of State's sanction in due course. The police force required for mobilisation in each province is given in the following statement:—

Province.	Total police.	Total required for military mobilisation.	Sources from which they came.	
			Head-quarters force.	15 per cent. reserve.
Madras	26,754	3,500	2,492	4013.1
Bombay	23,596	2,500	4,686	3539.4
Bengal	23,411	4,400	4,696	3511.65
United Provinces	33,115	5,150	4,848	4967.75
Punjab	20,642	3,300	2,650	3096.3
Central Provinces	11,919	2,400	1,233	1787.85
Eastern Bengal and Assam	10,658	..	?	1603.7

The police force required for the Punjab was originally fixed at 4,000 by the military authorities, but the Local Government showed that 3,300 was the largest number that could possibly be made available and this reduction was accepted. Even on the figures as they stand, it is clear that the Punjab, Central Provinces and Bengal would (*ceteris paribus*) experience most difficulty and Bombay least difficulty in finding the requisite number of men, but in the case of every province some rather formidable assumptions underly these statistics.

3. So long as civil Government lasted a very large portion of the head-quarters staff could not be relieved of guard and escort duty for purposes of concentration. Indeed it is more probable that such guards would have to be increased considerably and strengthened. Ordinary guard and escort duty is so heavy that it is quite a common experience to have no constables at all except the emergency reserve (if there is one) in the head-quarter barracks, and it was this consideration which led the Police Commission to recommend that a reserve of this nature should always be kept. Again so long as a district officer could retain charge of his district he would strenuously, and probably successfully, resist any attempt to deprive him of his reserves. There is, however, a still more serious cause which would operate to reduce the available reserves. A lesson which must be learnt from recent events is that any serious trouble outside our borders would inevitably be accompanied by internal agitation of a better organised and more widespread character than we have hitherto had any reason to anticipate. It is idle to hope that the police would escape the contamination which we know to have reached those who are much better protected against it, and it would not be safe to rely on the adherence of more than half the present police force at the most. As has been shown, a very heavy demand would be made on them for guards and similar police duties; thus the margin left to meet military requirements would in my opinion be very fine indeed and it is probable that recruitment of raw material from any section of the community which remained loyal would have to be largely resorted to.

4. While submitting that the police reserves available would probably be found inadequate for military requirements, it is, however, to the requirements of the civil authorities that I wish to invite particular attention in this note, my view being that recent experiences in Eastern Bengal and the Punjab prove the strength of the district armed reserves prescribed for most provinces to be insufficient to perform the duties which it may now be reasonably anticipated will be required of them.

in military assistance which the emergency requires. The military should not be called out until that has been reached where a very short and sharp lesson is required and can be justified. It has, however, often been complained that in practice the habit has grown up of relying on the military arm to quell civil disturbances and after the Tallah riots in the neighbourhood of Calcutta in 1897 when the police force was found insufficient to deal with the situation, in addition to an increase in the force of the town police of Calcutta and Howrah, an extra company of military police (special reserves) was sanctioned with the expressed object of having a body of trained men always ready to deal with disturbances among the large population of mill hands on the banks of the Hooghly, without having undue recourse to the military for assistance.

6. Now the recent unrest has clearly indicated that the problem of maintaining internal peace in India is going to be very much more difficult in the future than it has been in the past. Hitherto the police have for the most part been called upon to deal with spasmodic and ill-organised disturbances of mainly local concern, but now conditions are in process of undergoing an entire change.

Political agitators of all shades are never tired of preaching the absolute necessity of more elaborate organisation and of extending their political campaign to the villages and this is an end for which moderates and extremists alike are both working through the agency of the boycott and of local supporters, itinerant lecturers, school boys and travelling *sadhus* (both real and fictitious) and it must be admitted that in Eastern Bengal a considerable degree of success has been attained. Barisal district can be mentioned as an example. Through the activity and ability of Aswini Kumar Dutt, an organised campaign of boycott has been carried on throughout nearly the whole of this district and as an example of the success obtained it may be mentioned that even Police officers have in some cases been compelled to pay large fines to the *Swadeshi* fund in order to escape social ostracism. Another subject sought after, particularly by the extremists, is a more secret system of working. The practice of reporting seditious speeches in newspapers has in many instances been discontinued, religious and social ceremonies are made the pretext of holding political meetings and the people are urged to form secret societies on the basis of those which it is alleged were formed in Italy by Mazzini and in the Deccan by Shivaji and in both instances led to the overthrow of the existing Government. To what extent this movement will spread remains to be seen, but it is already certain that it is much more difficult than it was to get inside information. That active political agitation has come to stay cannot be doubted; it is equally certain that the extreme section will lose no opportunity which presents itself of inflaming the public mind with the result that disturbances will from time to time occur, disturbances which for the reasons stated are less likely to be foreseen in time to be prevented and more likely than hitherto to be on well organised and comprehensive lines.

7. The important question for consideration then is—are our police reserves sufficient for the duties which may be reasonably anticipated that they will be called upon to perform? This question should be considered on the light of the actual experiences obtained in Eastern Bengal and the Punjab during the recent unrest.

8. In Eastern Bengal, owing mainly to good political organisation, disturbances were not confined to a few important towns in one or two districts, but spread to almost all the trade centres in the province. An emergency armed reserve exists in every district already and in the large ones it numbers fifty men, but they were apparently found quite insufficient to deal with the situation and it is fortunate that in the Gurkha military police the Local Government had an ideal agency with which to supplement them. The extent to which the military police were used will be gathered from the following table:—

District where employed.	Name of battalion from which drawn.					
	Lakhimpur battalion.	Naga Hills battalion.	Silechar battalion.	Lushai Hills battalion.	Garo Hills battalion.	Total.
Dacca	105	105
Tipperah	100	100
Mymensingh	91	50	141
Barisal	100	..	100
Fabna	25	25
Rajshahi	25	25
Total	496

Thus in this province it has been found necessary to employ a force of 500 men over and above the ordinary police force in order to deal with the situation for many phases of which ordinary British troops at least would not have been found suited. For the occasions were

46 were employed at Tarak.

Some of these were men of the

employed at Sarajgunj at one time and it is believed that bodies of these men were from time to time employed similarly in the interior of the Tippera and Barisal districts, though details are not forthcoming. In addition to the Gurkha police about 150 men of the United Provinces and Bengal armed police reserves were, I believe, lent to Eastern Bengal and Assam. The question naturally arises had the Gurkha military police (who exist, it must be mentioned, to perform duties of a different kind) not been available what agency could have been employed in their place? It is certain that no agency so suitable could have been found and considerable difficulty would have been experienced in securing any police agency at all. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam have recently submitted to the Government of India proposals for raising another battalion of military police consisting of 400 men for service at Dacca and Chittagong, and in their letter No. 1409, dated 5th April 1907, in connection with this subject explained that recent events had fully demonstrated the necessity of immediately strengthening the Dacca police and that in order to meet the requirements of Comilla and Dacca it had become necessary to obtain from two battalions of the Assam military police men who are primarily intended and required for the important duty of guarding the frontier. In regard to the Chittagong division the Local Government considered the available force of military police to be quite insufficient and recommended the immediate recruitment of a force of a 100 men for Chittagong adding "There are, moreover, several other districts in which disturbances might occur such as would render the presence of a body of military police necessary in addition to the local armed reserves which are sufficient only to deal with a single compact mob, but are not sufficient to cope with disturbances occurring over a considerable rural area or in different parts of a large town."

In face of the opinions and facts stated above, the inadequacy of the existing district armed police reserves in this province would hardly seem to admit of question and yet the police agency available for dealing with sudden outbreaks is on a far more liberal scale in this province than in the Punjab, where they are likely to prove very much more serious.

9. The methods adopted for dealing with the situation in the Punjab will now be considered. On the second riot occurring in Lahore 250 men were moved in from other districts. The whole of the emergency armed reserve consisting in each case of only 25 men was brought in from eight districts and 50 were taken from the Phillaur training school. One of the districts denuded was Rawalpindi and when the disturbance subsequently occurred there, its emergency reserve was away in Lahore. This reserve was promptly sent back and was strengthened by 100 more men—50 from two districts and 50 from the Phillaur training school, but the evil had then been done.

When disturbances are in their initial stages it is exceedingly difficult to foresee when and where the actual outbreaks will occur and where the feeling of unrest is widespread, the removal of the reserves from a district may furnish the very reason for the outbreak occurring there. What is required in the earlier stages of trouble is sharp and prompt repression without dislocation of the existing district police arrangements. The population of Lahore and also of Delhi is over two lakhs. In each there is an emergency reserve of 28 (including officers) and 30 mounted men in the former and 20 in the latter. The population of Rawalpindi is 87,000 and of Amritsar double that number, and in these cities also the emergency reserve is 28 men only. These reserves seem to be very inadequate. In Bengal where the population is much less dangerous the emergency reserve force of each of these cities would consist of 50 men and a reference to the detailed statement annexed and to a subsequent part of this note will show how very small is the provision made for emergency armed police in the Punjab as compared with United Provinces, e.g., Cawnpore and Benares with about the same population as Lahore and Delhi are allowed over 130 men each. The Government of the United Provinces in reporting on the proposals of the Police Commission in connection with the subject (No. 1021, dated 16th July 1904) write "The urgent need of a strong armed force was prominently brought to notice by the Etawah riots of 1886. Since then there have been several serious riots, in Benares in 1891 and 1895, in the eastern districts over cowkilling in 1893 and in Cawnpore in 1900. The presence of an efficient armed police force has unquestionably on many occasions prevented serious rioting. Hostility between Hindus and Muhammadans is deeply rooted. The classes and persons interested in disorder are learning to co-operate. In short, it is essential for the maintenance of order and good government that there should be an efficient force of armed policemen, drilled, under discipline and in readiness to move at a moment's notice." The situation in the Punjab but for the action taken by the Government of India under the regulations of 1818 would have speedily become infinitely more serious than anything which has hitherto occurred in the United Provinces and it is not certain that all danger of trouble in the near future is at an end. The armed reserves available for immediate action in case of emergency are, however, too small to be worth account and on an infinitely narrower scale than is regarded as essential in the United Provinces and even in Bengal where the population generally is mild and the Presidency town is policed by a special force. Apart altogether from the proposals embodied in the note, the strengthening of the emergency armed reserves in the chief districts of the Punjab seems to me to be in practice.

spread of disorder such reserves furnish a most valuable supplement to the bodies of police which must be organised to deal systematically with widespread and more organised disturbances.

11. The nucleus of a force of constabulary, such as is here proposed, exists already in some provinces of India. Both Burma and Eastern Bengal and Assam have considerable bodies of military police. Their primary duty is to control tribes across the frontier, but in the latter province they have proved invaluable, as has been shown, in vindicating authority and securing internal peace.

In Bengal and the Central Provinces bodies of semi-military police are already maintained whose sole duty is to preserve internal order. In Bengal there are three companies of these special reserves, one to control the employes of the mills on the banks of the Hooghly, one at Ranchi to deal with aboriginal tribes which are apt to give trouble and one at Bhagalpur in reserve. Though differently constituted to the Assam and Burma military police battalions they are armed with rifles, have one or more European officers and are subjected to military discipline. They are always ready to be drafted into disturbed areas and have within my personal knowledge rendered most valuable service on the occurrence of mill and railway strikes. They consist mainly of Rajputs and up-country Muhammadans and though a valuable agency for dealing with ordinary trouble I do not anticipate that their loyalty would be sufficiently strong to withstand clever and insidious attacks systematically made on it by political agitators. There are two similar companies in the Central Provinces which are, I believe, kept at Nagpur. I have no personal knowledge of the services rendered by them, but they are evidently appreciated since the local Administration proposed in connection with the Police Reorganisation Scheme to increase the strength. One of the companies was drafted to Amraoti when trouble was apprehended there a short time ago and this precautionary action passed without public comment. When on the other hand troops were despatched to Cocanada after the riot there, the action of the Madras Government was criticised by the native press as minatory or due to panic. In the latter case special reserves would have been equally effective and their employment would not have attracted so much criticism.

12. The table annexed shows the strength of the emergency armed reserves, district by district, of each province as they will stand when the reorganisation schemes which emanated from the Police Commission's proposals are complete—also the population of the big towns where it exceeds 50,000 souls. The total population of each province, the number of towns with a population over 50,000 and the total strength of (a) the emergency armed reserves, (b) the special armed reserves (where they exist) will stand as follows:—

Province.	Population in round millions.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Emergency armed reserves.		Special reserves.	Percentage of total of columns 4, 5 and 6 to—		Remarks.
			Officers.	Men.		Total population omitting two zeros.	Total police force.	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Eastern Bengal and Assam.	28	2	100
Bengal	46	7	144	1,175	330	35	6.9	..
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.	48	18	417	2,496	..	60	8.79	..
Punjab	20	8	87	725	..	40	3.9	..
Bombay	19	6	52	475	..	27	2.23	..
Madras	38	11	102	891	..	26	3.7	..
Central Provinces and Berar.	16	2	200

A glance at the last two columns of this table indicates, I venture to think, that the provision made for dealing with sudden outbreaks is dangerously insufficient in the provinces of the Punjab, Bombay and Madras. In Punjab and Madras the proportion of the police force set apart to deal with emergencies is about 4 per cent., while in Bombay it is only about half this proportion. In Bengal and the United Provinces on the other hand the figure is about 7 per cent. and nearly 9 per cent., respectively. In the Punjab the emergency reserve bears a proportion to the population of $\frac{1}{3}$ less than in the United Provinces and its percentage is little greater than that of Bengal even where the population is very much less virile and where big towns are one less in number. In

light of recent events can reasonably be expected.

earlier stages of trouble great risk is incurred and in the event of external trouble great difficulty would be experienced at any rate for some time in mobilising the number of police provided for in the army mobilisation scheme. These are the main reasons which impel me to recommend the general introduction of a system of special police reserves into every province and this recommendation can be made with the more confidence since analogous bodies which now exist have given ample proof of their utility.

14. If this proposal is accepted, the most important question which arises for consideration is from what sources are these special reserves to be recruited. As has been shown, one of the objections taken to the constitution of a large native police force armed with rifles was that in order to preserve the proper balance between British and native, the number of British troops might require to be increased. The scheme which I sketch later would involve the enrolment of about 1,100 extra men armed with rifles and though they would be scattered over a large area this objection is one which requires to be given due consideration. Moreover, if Gurkhas are excepted, native police do not command the confidence of Europeans on the occasion of widespread political unrest, and it is of the most serious importance to prevent these conditions arising which would result in the civil population falling into a state of panic. The supply of Gurkhas is limited and in some places climatic conditions would not admit of their employment, consequently the special reserves would have to be drawn from the European or Eurasian community, for there is no other class on whose loyalty absolute reliance can be placed under all circumstances.

15. In order that an estimate may be formed of the suitability in other respects of the Eurasian element for this class of employment it is desirable to sketch the history of the proposals which have been made from time to time to recruit them for service in the Indian army. This has been one of the chief recommendations of those who have from time to time urged on Government the necessity for improving the social and material condition of that class. The proposal to form an Eurasian corps was last taken up officially by the Government of India in 1899 and a

M. D. Pro. A., Nov. 1899, Nos. 1949-1953.

history of the question is given in their despatch No. 55 of the 30th March of that year.

During the mutiny three local corps were formed, viz., Lahore Light Horse, the East India¹² regiment and the Eurasian battery of artillery. They were disbanded after a short existence—the 1st in 1864, the 2nd in 1865, the 3rd in 1870 on the grounds—

- (1) that the Eurasian corps cost as much as British troops;
- (2) that while the same confidence was not felt in them as in British troops, they could not take up the duties of native troops and required all the elaborate commissariat arrangements necessary for British soldiers;
- (3) that it was impossible to obtain sufficient recruits to maintain even three small corps aggregating less than 700 men;
- (4) that the enforcement of discipline in these corps (indeed the very existence of such corps) was of doubtful legality.

Inefficiency or unsuitability for military service was not a ground advanced for the action taken. On the contrary Lord Canning, Sir Hugh Rose and Lord Napier of Magdala were strongly in favour of the employment of Eurasians in the military system of India and the excellent services rendered by them during the mutiny and in the Bhutan campaign were freely acknowledged by Government. The evidence furnished in the note which Captain Deane wrote in 1879 and the testimony of Major Barnes' personal observation furnish ample evidence of the Eurasian corps having been well disciplined and efficient.

16. The various Anglo-Indian and Eurasian associations in India have attempted on several occasions since the disbandment of these corps to induce Government to throw open military service to their community. In 1875 the Anglo-Indian Aid Association of Bangalore and Mysore made a proposal to this effect which was negatived by the Secretary of State on the advice of the Government of India. In 1879 the Calcutta Association took the matter up and memorialised the Government in that year, in 1883 and in 1884. In 1883 the Allahabad Association also submitted a representation on the subject and in 1884 similar representations came from Madras. In 1892 the Pauperism Commission which set in Calcutta put forward the formation of an Anglo-Indian regiment as one of the remedies which they suggested for relieving the impoverished condition of the Anglo-Indian community. In 1894 the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal recommended that selected Eurasians should be admitted to British regiments, "it having been ascertained that there is in Calcutta a fairly large number of suitable Eurasians who it is believed would gladly enlist and who it is believed would make good soldiers". Finally in July 1897 a deputation of the various Anglo-Indian Associations which was received by the Secretary of State at the India Office made the formation of an Anglo-Indian regiment one of the chief reliefs for which they prayed. None of these representations met with any success though they evoked a fair share of sympathy and support for those who were called upon to advise on

17. In 1901 Lord Curzon, in view of the additional burden which would be imposed on the Indian revenues by increasing the strength of the British troops so as to render the country independent of reinforcements from home for a time on the occurrence of external troubles, suggested the enlistment of time-expired men with the pick of Eurasians as an Indian garrison reserve. Sir

M. D. note No. 128 of 1901.

B. Duff, when noting on this proposal, wrote "Viewed from a military standpoint our need

is a second line of Europeans and Eurasians, distinct from our field troops, discharging other duties in times of peace but available on emergency to replace these troops should their services be called for beyond the frontier. It is certain that in any such proposal expense will be the stumbling-block, and it is therefore essential that until the emergency arises this second line be employed so as to make their upkeep the smallest possible burden to the country. To attain this end I think they should be essentially police as opposed to militia or garrison battalions. They must therefore be a civil rather than a military body and, though fully organised and drilled and armed with the best possible weapons, they must be under the civil and not the military authorities in ordinary times." Lord Curzon's suggestion was considered by a conference in August 1901 at which the Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab and Bengal were present and it was generally agreed that a mixed European and Eurasian force raised primarily for garrison duties would not be of service to the Local Governments for police work. It would partly overlap and partly usurp the functions of the existing police, could not perform ordinary police duties in cities and as a body would be unsuited for the purpose. The suggestion was therefore dropped; the proposal that the garrison militia should be a military body was analogous to that negatived by the Secretary of State in 1900 and was on that account not proceeded with.

18. The discussion in 1889 and 1901 furnished the first occasion on which the question of employing Eurasians or Europeans for the armed police was mentioned and then the matter was considered mainly from the point of view of military requirements. That Eurasians would prove an efficient agency as special police reserves if the right class were attracted I have personally no doubt whatever. The records show that officers who were in close personal contact with the Eurasian regiments which did service in the mutiny gave them a high character for discipline and efficiency. Present day schools pay considerable attention to their physical training and there is good reason to believe that an equally serviceable class of Eurasians would be forthcoming now. At the same time the agency would undoubtedly be an expensive one and limited in number.

19. In Government of India despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 55, dated 30th March

M. D. Pro. A. November 1899, Nos. 1949-53.

1899, it was estimated that the cost of an Eurasian company of garrison artillery would

be Rs. 1,06,571 per annum as against Rs. 1,68,450, the cost of a European company or say $\frac{1}{4}$ less.

In paragraph 12 of the resolution No. 2263, dated 8th August 1892, on the report of the

M. D. Pro. A., May 1893, Nos. 2165-66.

Pauperism Committee, dated 8th February 1892, an estimate of the relative cost of maintaining

a regiment of British, Eurasian and native troops was furnished. The result obtained were—cost of European regiment Rs. 4,00,326; cost of Eurasian regiment Rs. 2,94,495; cost of native regiment Rs. 1,61,340. Thus a Eurasian regiment would cost about a quarter less than a European regiment and about double a native regiment. With a view of obtaining an idea of the pay which would prove sufficiently attractive to the class of Eurasians whom it is sought to employ, I consulted the principals of certain schools unofficially and confidentially and their replies are summarised below:—

La Martiniere, Calcutta.—It costs about Rs. 11 a head to feed boys of 17 or 18 years of age. The boys who rise to the higher forms can command at once pay of Rs. 50 a month. The boy with more physique than brains might be attracted if he got "all found" and some pocket-money during training and Rs. 50 rising afterwards. If recruited for five years, assurance must be given of employment afterwards.

La Martiniere, Lucknow.—Food would cost somewhat over Rs. 8-8 per head. Expenditure on salary would have to be rather heavy. Very ordinary boys can get Rs. 75 rising to Rs. 100 in one year in the mills of Cawnpore. Suggests Rs. 50 rising to Rs. 70 in five years with board and subsequent employment guaranteed.

St. Xavier's College, Calcutta.—The cost of feeding should come to about Rs. 18 a head. Boys can get employment in the trades on Rs. 50 to Rs. 75 a month and rise in five years to Rs. 100 or Rs. 150. The police would not prove attractive and if recruited from the lower

pay for ticket collectors on his line. They are ...

On appointment
On passing ticket collectors' pocket guide	40
On passing booking clerks, parcel and luggage clerks' duties	45
On passing guards' examination	50
On passing stationmasters' examination	60
On passing telegraphy	65

Gunner guards get from Rs. 50 to Rs. 100 and the 'Traffic Manager' adds that he does not think reliable, decently educated Eurasians can be got for much less than Rs. 60 with prospects. Railway servants of course find their own board and lodging and get no pensions though they enjoy the benefits of a provident fund.

20. The extension of railways and industrial developments which have occurred in India within recent years have greatly enlarged the avenues of employment for the Anglo-Indian community and in view of the above details I am of opinion that the supply of Eurasians which it is sought to tap is limited and that they are not likely to be attracted to police service unless they receive in addition to board and lodging about Rs. 20 a month while under training, Rs. 25 when efficient rising to Rs. 40 within five years and a fairly definite assurance of employment on discharge. This is a low estimate. It would perhaps be possible to recruit Eurasians for long service in a lower pay than is here suggested if they were accepted from orphanages and similar institutions, but we should, I fear, experience great difficulty in getting men with the necessary physical and moral qualifications. Such is evidently the opinion of the Principal of St. Xavier's College, Calcutta.

21. The scheme which would seem to give the best promise of success is one which would aim at securing young Eurasians of 17 or 18, who have been educated at good schools and whose physical qualifications are superior to their mental. They should engage for five or six years (one of which will ordinarily be spent on training) on the pay suggested above with the option of engaging for another five years on Rs. 45 to Rs. 50 a month with a small gratuity on discharge. Those who took their discharge on the expiry of the first term would receive no gratuity, but arrangements should be made to secure employment for them under the Railway Board and other Government departments. There should be no difficulty in this for the period of discipline undergone by them would certainly enhance their value. No married quarters would be provided for those serving the first term. A limited number could be provided for those who extend it.

22. The cost of a company of special reserves of native police in Bengal is about Rs. 20,000 per annum, and in Eastern Bengal and Assam about Rs. 30,000. It can be said that the cost of a similar company composed of Eurasian police will be about Rs. 60,000 to Rs. 70,000 per annum. This figure could no doubt be materially reduced if a lower class of Eurasians were recruited. It is quite possible that a lower class would serve the purpose, but I have very strong doubts, though in the absence of actual experiment it is hard to form a definite opinion. If, however, the above estimate of cost is accepted, the advantages of enrolling a limited number of companies of Eurasian police are in my opinion sufficiently great to justify the expense. The advantage of finding another avenue for the employment of the Eurasian community must be regarded as purely incidental for the police is one of the last departments to be treated as a charitable institution, but one or two companies of police recruited for this class would strengthen very considerably the hands of a Local Government, for their loyalty could be relied on absolutely while their knowledge of the people and the language would render them very useful for work in small bodies in the interior. The latter was an advantage on which those with mutiny experiences fresh in their minds laid great stress.

23. According to the last census the number of Eurasians in India is as follows :—

Punjab	2,309	{ Lahore 752).
United Provinces	5,218	{ Allahabad 711). { Lucknow 734).
Bengal including Eastern Bengal	20,893	{ Calcutta 14,482). { Howrah 762).
Bombay	6,820	{ Bombay 3,258). { Madras about 8,000).
Madras	26,185	{ Calicut 972). { Trichinopoly 808).

Bengal and Madras would be the two chief recruiting grounds, but I think it unlikely that suitable material will be found in sufficient quantity to fill more than four companies and these could be most suitably posted to Eastern Bengal and Assam, Bengal, Madras and Bombay and to

Eastern Bengal and Assam	...	2 companies	...	1 Eurasian. 1 European.
Bengal	...	3 companies	...	1 Eurasian. 1 European. 1 Gurkha (recruited from Darjeeling).
United Provinces	...	2 companies	...	European.
Punjab	...	2 companies	...	European.
Bombay	...	2 companies	...	1 Eurasian. 1 European.
Madras	...	3 companies	...	1 Eurasian. 1 European. 1 Moplah.
Central Provinces	...	2 companies	...	1 Eurasian. 1 Native.
Total	...	16 companies	...	4 Eurasian. 9 European. 3 Native.

The Bengal and Central Provinces companies already exist though differently constituted. It is proposed therefore to raise 11 entirely new companies, and these would be additional to the existing police force except perhaps in the United Provinces where the existing strength is on a more liberal scale than elsewhere. It is for consideration whether any of the companies should be mounted; I think not, because the special reserves would have to be ready to travel at a moment's notice by train and horses would render them less mobile. Most large cities have a force of mounted police whose duties should be confined to serve within them. The special reserves should have large cyclist and fire extinguishing sections. Three companies are suggested for Bengal and Madras because of the small number of troops quartered within them and of the large industrial population of the former and the large area of the latter. One company in each can consist of natives. One company in the Central Provinces where the area affected by political propaganda is very restricted can be similarly constituted. The two companies of Eastern Bengal and Assam can be worked into the scheme now before the Government of India for enrolling a battalion of military police for Dacca.

25. The European police would be recruited for long term service. Particular attention would require to be paid to instructing the European police in the language and in knowledge of the people. Thereby one of the most serious objections to employing Europeans on police work in India would be largely met. The pay should be so fixed as to make the service attractive to time-expired soldiers of the British army and the European Inspectors and Sergeants required for ordinary police work would usually be selected from the special reserves. If one lakh is assumed to be the annually recurring cost of one company, the total cost of nine companies would be about $8\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs after deducting the cost of two existing native companies replaced. The cost of an extra native company required for Madras would be about Rs. 25,000. At a rough estimate therefore the total annual cost of these proposals would amount to about $11\frac{1}{4}$ lakhs of rupees.

26. Under these proposals each province would have two or more companies of semi-military police well armed and disciplined, mobile and available to be sent where required at a moment's notice. The hands of the Local Governments would be very much strengthened thereby. The companies would naturally be located in centres where the danger of disturbances is greatest, but would not be attached to any particular district and could be speedily transported elsewhere should occasion arise.

Government should be able to take a strong line of action and to avoid the risk involved in dislocating district police arrangements at a time when such action is most effective and such risk is greatest, that is to say, on the first outbreak of lawlessness and violence. In the event of disturbances being widespread in one province only, other provinces would have ready means of reinforcing it. It was remarked in an article in the *Pioneer* discussing the Punjab riots "Such seriousness as they (the riots) have is due rather to the frequency with which the rabble have succeeded in taking the authorities at a disadvantage than to any alarming features which have been revealed." The establishment of special police reserves is in my opinion the most effective and at the same time the cheapest means of strengthening the weak point in the administrative machinery here disclosed.

8,496,382	Dacca (90,542) Imphal (67,093)	Dacca .. Tipperah. Mymensingh. Barisal. Pabna. Rajshahi.			
28,496,382	2	6	396	..	100

Bengal.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.		Special reserves.	Remarks.
			Officers (inspectors, sergeants, head constables).	Constables.		
46,248,484	Howrah (157,594)	Burdwan	3	25	300	
		Birbhum	3	20		
		Bankura	3	20		
	Calcutta (847,796)	Midnapur	6	50		
		Hooghly	6	50		
		Howrah	6	50		
	Patna (134,785)	24-Parganas	6	50		
		Nadia	3	20		
		Murshidabad	6	50		
	Bhagalpur (75,760)	Jessore	3	20		
		Khulna	3	20		
		Patna	6	50		
	Cuttack (51,364)	Gaya	6	50		
		Shahabad	3	25		
		Saran	3	25		
	Gaya (71,288)	Champaran	3	25		
		Muzafferpur	6	50		
		Darbhanga	3	25		
	Darbhanga (66,244)	Monghyr	3	25		
		Bhagalpur	3	25		
		Purnea	6	50		
		Darjeeling	6	50		
		Santhal Parganas	6	50		
		Cuttack	6	50		
		Balasore	3	25		
		Puri	3	25		
		Angul	6	50		
		Sambalpur	3	25		
		Hazaribagh	3	25		
		Ranchi	6	50		
		Palaman	3	25		
		Manbhum	3	25		
		Singbhum	6	50		
46,248,484	7	33	144	1,175	300	

Lucknow (264,049).	Dehra	1	5	12
	Saharanpur	1	6	43
	Muzaffarnagar	1	8	37
Banares (209,331) ..	Meerut	2	11	81
	Bulandshahr	1	10	39
	Aligarh	2	13	71
Cawnpore (197,170).	Muttra	1	9	35
	Agra	2	28	171
	Farrukhabad	1	8	51
Agra (188,022) ..	Mainpuri	1	8	49
	Etawah	2	12	42
	Etah	1	7	37
Allahabad (172,072).	Bareilly	2	11	26
	Bijnor	1	5	23
	Budaon	1	5	35
Bareilly (131,208) ..	Moradabad	1	4	37
	Shahjahanpur	1	5	26
	Philibhit	1	5	119
Meerut (118,129) ..	Cawnpur	2	14	26
	Fatehpur	1	6	36
	Banda	1	13	25
Mirzapur (79,862) ..	Hamirpur	1	9	146
	Allahabad	2	24	133
	Jhansi	3	32	77
Rampur (78,758) ..	Jalaun	1	16	116
	Benares	2	16	24
	Mirzapur	1	5	29
Shahjahanpur (76,458).	Jaunpur	1	5	37
	Ghazipur	1	9	36
	Ballia	1	5	80
Moradabad (75,128).	Ghorakpur	1	11	42
	Basti	1	8	40
	Azamgarh	1	3	41
Fyzabad (75,085) ..	Garkwal	1	15	162
	Lucknow	4	23	32
	Unao	1	5	38
Koel (70,434) ..	Rae Bareilly	1	7	41
	Sitapur	1	8	41
	Hardoi	1	8	30
Farrukhabad (67,338).	Kheri	1	8	25
	Fyzabad	2	16	21
	Gonda	1	4	35
Saharanpur (66,254).	Bahraich	1	4	30
	Sultanpur	1	7	30
	Partabgarh	1	6	
Gorakhpur (64,148).	Bara Banki	1	10	
Muttra (60,042).				
Jhansi (55,724).				

47,691,789

18

46

60

357

2,496

population.	a population of over 50,000.	Districts.				
20,330,339 ..	Delhi (208,575) ..	Hissar	* 3	25		* The total 3 in this column is made up of 1 sub-inspector and 2 head constables.
		Rohtak	3	25		
		Gurgaon	3	25		
	Lahore (202,964) ..	Delhi	3	25		
		Karnal	3	25		
		Ambala	3	25		
	Rawalpindi (87,688) ..	Simla	3	25		
		Hoshiarpur	3	25		
		Jullundur	3	25		
	Multan (87,394) ..	Ludhiana	3	25		
		Kangra	3	25		
		Perozepore	3	25		
	Ambala (78,638) ..	Montgomery	3	25		
		Lahore	3	25		
		Amritsar	3	25		
	Jullundur (67,735) ..	Gurdaspur	3	25		
		Sialkot	3	25		
		Gujranwala	3	25		
	Sialkot (57,966) ..	Lyallpur	3	25		
		Jhang	3	25		
		Multan	3	25		
		Mazzaifargarh	3	25		
		Dera Ghazi Khan	3	25		
		Gujrat	3	25		
		Shahpur	3	25		
		Jhelum	3	25		
		Rawalpindi	3	25		
		Attock	3	25		
		Mianwali	3	25		
20,330,339 ..	8	29	87	725		

Bombay Presidency.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.		Remarks.
			Officers, H.C.	Men C.I.	
18,515,587 ..	Bombay (776,006) ..	Ahmedabad	3	30	
		Broach	2	15	
		Kaira	2	15	
	Ahmedabad (185,889) ..	Panoh Mahal	2	20	
		Surat	2	15	
		Thana	4	35	
	Hubli (60,214) ..	Ahmednagar	3	30	
		East Khandesh	3	30	
		West Khandesh	3	30	
	Poona (153,320) ..	Nasik	4	35	
		Poona	3	30	
		Satara	3	25	
	Sholapur (75,288) ..	Sholapur	3	30	
		Belgaum	3	25	
		Bijapur	3	30	
	Suart (119,306) ..	Dharwar	3	30	
		Kanara	2	15	
		Kolaba	2	20	
		Ratnagiri	2	15	
18,515,587 ..	6	19	52	475	

		Emergency reserves.				Special reserves.	Remarks.
population.	with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Officers.		Constables.		
			Sergeant.	Head constable.			
38,199,162..	Madras (509,346) ..	Ganjám	1	3	40		
		Vizagapatam	1	3	30		
	Madura (105,984) ..	Jeypore	4	40		
		Górávari	1	4	53		
	Trichinopoly	Kistna	1	3	30		
	(104,721).	Guntúr	1	2	25		
	Calicut (76,981) ..	Nellore	1	2	25		
		Kurnool	1	4	40		
	Salem (70,621) ..	Bellary	1	4	40		
		Anantapur	1	3	30		
	Kumbakónam	Cuddapah	1	4	40		
	(59,673).	North Arcot	1	4	40		
	Bellary (58,247) ..	Chingleput	1	4	40		
		South Arcot	1	3	30		
	Tanjore (57,870) ..	Salem	1	4	50		
		Tanjore	1	5	53		
	Negapatam (57,190).	Trichinopoly	1	4	50		
		Madura	1	4	50		
	Coimbatore (53,080).	Tinnevely	1	5	60		
		Coimbatore	1	4	40		
	Cuddalore (52,216).	Malabar	1	3	30		
		South Canara	1	5	55		
38,199,162..	11	22	21	81	891		

Central Provinces and Berar.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.			Special reserves.	Remarks.
				
14,627,045 ..	Nagpur (127,734) ..	Nagpur	200	
	Jubbulpore (90,316) ..	Jubbulpore.					
		Saugor.					
		Nimar					
		Raipur.					
		Amraoti.					
14,627,045 ..	2	6				200	

Previous papers :

<i>Letter</i>	1010, <i>Judicial, 2nd July 1904.</i>	<i>G.O., 1724, Judicial, 15th Oct. 1906.</i>
<i>G.O., 1123, 1124</i>	" 27th "	" 1849 " 10th Nov. "
" 1922	" 30th Nov. 1905.	" 2034 " 10th Dec. "
" 207, 208	" 5th Feb. 1906.	" 1102 " 19th June 1907.
" 1036	" 19th June "	" 1204 " 4th July "
" 1152	" 10th July "	" 1753 " 11th Oct. "

Demi-official—from D. W. G. COWIE, Esq., I.C.S., Inspector-General of Police.
To—the Chief Secretary to Government.

Dated—Madras, the 23rd March 1908.

" At Fawcett's request I forward herewith a note asking for instructions on two points. I have made some notes in the margin. Special instructions hardly appear to be needed, but this being a Special Branch matter I send up the papers."

Note by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department.

There are two points upon which I will be glad to be favoured with definite instructions :—

(1) relates to the responsibility of the Criminal Investigation Department for supplying the Government with information.

(2) relates to important occurrences being reported to the Criminal Investigation Department at once by telegram.

2. With regard to (1) please see the Order in Council, dated 23rd June 1899, copies of which

On the present occasion the District Superintendent of Police kept Criminal Investigation Department fully informed up to the day on which the riot took place.

D. W. G. COWIE.

are in the file. These papers were written after the "anti-Shanar" riots in Tinnevely in 1899. Government found the Special Branch defective in that it supplied no information as to what was in the air in Tinnevely and wished "to place it (the Special Branch) and its agency for obtaining information on a sounder footing not only in Tinnevely but also in other districts in order to avoid in future the possibility of Government being left in ignorance of matters of moment likely to occur when there are local signs that trouble is brewing." The wishes of Government on this point have been communicated to the Criminal Investigation Department in the following letters among others. They are in the file :—

(a) From the Under Secretary, dated the 15th June 1907. To keep a careful watch over certain agitators and report all speeches.

(b) From the Chief Secretary, dated the 15th June 1907. Impresses the necessity of Criminal Investigation Department subordinates watching all travelling seditious lecturers and reporting their movements. Prosecution where possible.

(c) From the Chief Secretary, dated the 17th June. To enquire who are the wire-pullers in Sódávári.

(d) From the Chief Secretary, dated the 19th June. To get the names of Government servants engaged in sedition.

(e) From the Chief Secretary, dated the 21st June. Utmost importance that all seditious meetings be watched and this can be best done through the Criminal Investigation Department by means of detectives who should go to villages and find out what is going on.

It is obvious that the view of the Government as to functions of the (Special Branch of the) Criminal Investigation Department remains unchanged.

3. I invite the favour of your attention to the withdrawal of the Criminal Investigation Department men sent to the Tanjore district to enquire for me about sedition and seditionists. I am, I think, familiar with the details, so the correspondence is not put up. You will remember to my informing Mr. Bedford that a small party of Criminal Investigation Department men had been sent to his district he objected strongly and the men were withdrawn. He did not think there was any sedition in the district and thought the local Police should make all the necessary enquiries about it. As a matter of fact Mr. Bedford objected, it is true, but this, I understand, is partly at least due to a want of tact on Mr. Fawcett's part.

D.W.G.C.

men found Negapatam to be in much the same condition as regards political feeling as

Magistrate had accepted the conclusion of any affair in order to the Criminal Investigation Department was right or coming trouble beforehand, and the question is whether the Criminal Investigation Department is to be held responsible for giving the information. It may be said that no Criminal Investigation Department men were sent to the Tinnevely district lately as they were not asked for, and the District Magistrate apparently accepted all responsibility. If the Criminal Investigation Department is to be held responsible, the staff should be continually enquiring about sedition and seditious agitators. But should this be done secretly even without the knowledge or against the wishes of the District Magistrate? It could scarcely be done against his wish. Nor would it be possible or practicable to await his decision always whether Criminal Investigation Department men should or should not be sent to his district: events might be marching fast and the District Magistrate might be in an out-of-the-way part of his district, say, in the Agency. Government.

D.W.G.C.

ment have increased the staff of the Criminal Investigation Department in accordance with the Chief Secretary's letter of the 21st June though not to the extent we asked, and should anything serious take place without warning it may happen that the Criminal Investigation Department will be blamed for not giving the warning. It does not seem at all necessary to give the Criminal Investigation Department such a roving commission.

The District Magistrate should be consulted and the Criminal Investigation Department and local Police must co-operate.

D.W.G.C.

and the District Superintendent of Police to whom I showed the reports of my staff were glad that enquiry *sub-rosa* had been made. I will be glad if Government will be pleased to consider this matter and issue instructions.

5. As regards (2) the facts are as follows. On the 11th May last the Director of Criminal Intelligence wired urgently to the local Criminal Investigation Department saying that the Government of India wished to be kept informed by telegram of the latest information regarding agitation and requested that arrangements should be made to obtain prompt telegraphic reports from all districts of every occurrence of any importance. In accordance with this request cipher wires were despatched to every District Magistrate and District Superintendent on the 12th May, and the fact was reported to the Chief Secretary by demi-official letter. As the Criminal Investigation Department telegrams asked not only for telegraphic reports of important occurrences but also for reports of the then state of public opinion regarding agitation, replies were expected from officers addressed. So many officers treated the matter with indifference that the matter was brought to the notice of Government who issued G.O., Mis. No. 1102, Judicial, dated 19th June 1907 calling on District officers to report without delay upon every political movement taking place in their jurisdiction. The instructions to officers were that their reports should be as full and descriptive as newspaper telegrams. These orders were to a certain extent disregarded in the Cocanada disturbance, reports received in that case not being as full as could be desired. Another instance of the disregard of these orders was brought to the notice of the Chief Secretary by the Deputy Inspector-General in his demi-official letter, dated 15th June. Copy attached. Orders have now again been totally disregarded in connection with the Tinnevely disturbances.

6. No information has been sent by the District officials to the Criminal Investigation Department. The following are the facts of the case.

D.W.G.C.

The riots began in Tinnevely on the morning of the 13th. At 5-8 P.M. that day the District Superintendent of Police forwarded telegram to the Inspector-General of Police which was communicated to me by the Assistant Inspector-General the next morning at office.

Later the same day (14th) another telegram was received by the Inspector-General communicated at once to the Criminal Investigation Department.

No information whatever was received by the Criminal Investigation Department on 15th; so in the afternoon urgent wires were sent to the District Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent, Tuticorin, requesting them to send full telegraphic information. Or

trouble and went to Mr. Sweeting. The best plan seems to be for the Superintendent to telegraph the news, sending a copy to the Criminal Investigation Department. He could mark on the original that a copy is to be sent to "Intellierim." Unless this is done the wishes of the Government of India cannot very well be fulfilled as telegrams may very well be received on holidays and many hours might well be lost before a telegram addressed to the Inspector-General would be seen by the Criminal Investigation Department.

7. With reference to the G.O., No. 1102, dated 19th June 1907, it is particularly noted that no communication of any kind about the recent disturbances in Tinnevely and Tuticorin has been received from the District Magistrate.

8. It is requested that this note (but not the letters) be forwarded to the Chief Secretary with your remarks. Please return the Chief Secretary's letters to me.

F. FAWCETT—21-3-08.

Hon'ble Mr. Bradley, C.S.I., and Circ.—

I took these papers to Council on Tuesday, but did not read them. They can only be disposed of in circulation.

2. Mr. Fawcett brings up two points for orders :—

(i) Is he to be allowed a free hand to send his men anywhere without communicating with or asking permission of the District Magistrates? He quotes the case of Tanjore, from which his men were withdrawn on the protest of the District Magistrate, and he justifies his action in having sent his men there on the ground that they located sedition in Negapatam.

3. It is true that according to the Criminal Investigation Department reports, Mr. Fawcett's men did discover that there was a small nest of sedition or quasi-sedition in a bookseller's (?) shop in Negapatam. But so far as I remember it was a very small affair, such as probably exists in every town where there are vakils. My impression on reading the papers was that if there was nothing more to be ferreted out in Negapatam, the place was remarkably free from objectionable politicians.

4. The Criminal Investigation Department also discovered—that must have been known by everyone—that a circus was being boycotted.

5. Mr. Fawcett refers to the case of Tinnevely : "It may be said that no Criminal Investigation Department men were sent to the Tinnevely district lately as they were not asked for and the District Magistrate apparently accepted all responsibility." This surely is not a sufficient case for the Criminal Investigation Department not having men on the spot, when things are so obviously working up to a crisis, and when a competent detective might have been able to give the District Magistrate at least some hours previous warning of the riot on 13th. That must have been engineered, it was not unpremeditated, and though it was probably devised by the day or may be two days beforehand, a clever detective would have been able to give the District Magistrate warning in time to wire for extra police, or soldiers, and to prepare.

6. It is no excuse to say that Criminal Investigation Department men were not asked for ; there is no justification for the inference that the District Magistrate had "apparently accepted all responsibility." I greatly doubt whether the District Magistrate knew that there were no Criminal Investigation Department men in his district. On the other hand the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, *did* know this ; and it seems to me clear that

I doubt whether he did see.

H. B[RADLEY].

when he saw the tension of affairs at Tuticorin he should have at the least asked the District Magistrate whether he would like some men sent there, even if he would not undertake the responsibility of sending them himself.

7. I think he should be told so ; and further I think general rules should be laid down that the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, should ask all District Magistrates whether they object to Criminal Investigation Department men working generally in their

Mr. Fawcett as Deputy Inspector-General of the Criminal Investigation Department should be in touch with all District Magistrates. But he is not, and is not prepared to be. He is not in touch with the Commissioner of Police, nor will he work with the ordinary Police. The result is that when we do get information from the Criminal Investigation Department it is very often unreliable. The present position is very unsatisfactory and it is absolutely necessary that some change should be made which will have the effect of keeping the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, in touch with District Magistrates and the Commissioner of Police.

2. Mr. Fawcett says in paragraph 6 of his note that no information has been sent to the Criminal Investigation Department by the District officials. Admittedly there were no Criminal Investigation Department men in the district. How then did the Criminal Investigation Department get the information which was published in the Secret Abstract of what took place at Tuticorin before the riots? In paragraph 4 he asks should the Criminal Investigation Department enquire "without the knowledge or against the wishes of the District Magistrate." I cannot understand Mr. Fawcett. So far as I understand the orders (not put up) the Criminal Investigation Department have to send copies to the District Magistrate for remarks of all they publish in their Abstracts. How then without breach of the rules can the District Magistrate be kept ignorant of what the Criminal Investigation Department is doing?

3. I do not know the facts about Mr. Bedford refusing to have the Criminal Investigation Department men in his district. I reserve my opinion until I am better informed. It seems wrong that Mr. Bedford should do so. Mr. Fawcett has certainly no justification for saying that the existence of sedition at Negapatnam was found to be a fact. If this is true, why have we not heard of it and why have we not at any rate had the opportunity of deciding whether steps should be taken to prosecute? All the definite information we have is that a circus was unsuccessfully boycotted.

4. Mr. Fawcett wishes the Criminal Investigation Department to be treated as a sort of water-tight compartment of the Police, and I submit that this is wrong. I consider that it cannot work usefully unless it is working in touch both with the District Magistrate and the superior officers of the Police, and that this fact must be recognized by Mr. Fawcett. I would therefore allow Mr. Fawcett a perfectly free hand in sending his men to districts, but I should require him to inform the District Magistrate in advance of what he is doing and insist on his keeping the District Magistrate informed of all information that may be obtained except information relating to the detection of crime.

5. Mr. Fawcett's explanation with regard to Tinnevely is ridiculous. So far as I know Wynne never objected to the Criminal Investigation Department men going there and never relieved Mr. Fawcett of any responsibility, and Jey Singh and others were actually in Tuticorin shortly before the riots, so that Mr. Fawcett actually did send his men to the district whether with or without Mr. Wynne's knowledge. If Mr. Fawcett reads newspapers (he gets quite enough), he must have known that there was tension at Tuticorin some time before the riots, he ought not to have sat still for a fortnight or more throwing the responsibility on Mr. Wynne. If he had written to the latter and the latter had assumed the responsibility, no fault could be found with Mr. Fawcett, but as matters were Mr. Fawcett cannot be relieved of responsibility.

6. I would allow no District Magistrate to wash his hands of the Criminal Investigation Department unless and until he can prove it useless or injurious. I should give him no choice and should require all District Magistrates to work harmoniously with the Deputy Inspector-General and if it turns out that District Magistrates generally cannot get on with the Deputy Inspector-General, I should assume that the fault lies with the Deputy Inspector-General and put him in another post in which he can do good and useful work. But if most District Magistrates can work with the Criminal Investigation Department, I think it clear that the Criminal Investigation Department methods are wrong.

7. With regard to the second point raised by Mr. Fawcett, I can only say that repeated telegrams are idiotic and useless when two officers do their work in the same building. Mr. Fawcett is the Inspector-General's subordinate and they have their offices together. I should lay down that unless the sender of a telegram knows that the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, is not in Madras, and also knows where he is, it is unnecessary to do anything but wire to the Inspector-General. The Inspector-General will send the wire on to the Deputy Inspector-General's office.

H. B[RADLEY]—30-3-08.

All the above notes proceed on the notion that we have a *tabula rasa* to write on and that we can define the position of the Criminal Investigation Department and the Inspector-General and the District Magistrates as we please. This does not accord with my recollection of the position of the Criminal Investigation Department as laid down by the Government of India. I am not prepared at all to endorse the above notes till I know what the position referred to is. Please therefore set out in a note the orders which have issued from India subsequent to the Police Commission's report in regard to the position and work of the Criminal Investigation Department and its relation to the Inspector-General and the Criminal Investigation Department in Simla. My recollection is that the correspondence is largely demi-official and is in the Chief Secretary's safe and in the office of the Inspector-General.

G. S[TOKES]—31-3-08.

Chief Secretary—

Below the current file will be found a collection of papers dealing with the Criminal Investigation Department. The office has not been able to find any other correspondence dealing with the matter.

It is unnecessary to summarize the Police Commission's recommendations (*vide* paragraphs 1-4 *seq.*) which the Government of India accepted in their entirety (*vide* paragraph 87 of Home Department resolution, dated 21st March 1905). They deal very slightly with the points raised by Mr. Fawcett.

3. The first order of importance is G.O., No. 1373, Judicial, dated 14th August 1906. By order the work which used to be done by the Special Assistant with Government was transferred to the Personal Assistant with the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department. But no orders were laid down as to the relations of District officers with the Criminal Investigation Department.

In G.O., No. 1724, Judicial, dated 15th October 1906, will be found the instructions issued by Mr. Home and Mr. Fawcett for the guidance of Criminal Investigation Department officers. The first point to be noted is that no Criminal Investigation Department officer can be used without the Deputy Inspector-General's orders (rule 3 of instructions on page 2 of the above Government Order). Next, the existence of the Criminal Investigation Department in no way relieves the District Police of responsibility (rule 4). Lastly, Criminal Investigation Department officers are on free-lance (see Mr. Fawcett's rules at pages 4-6 of the Government Order), but are merely at the disposal of the local Police, on specific orders, in a cordial manner.

In G.O., No. 1849, Judicial, dated 10th November 1906, the Government approved Mr. Fawcett's proposals that reports should be sent direct to the Criminal Investigation Department through the District Magistrate and District Superintendent of Police. This was affirmed in G.O., No. 2834, Judicial, dated 10th December 1906, which also again affirmed the responsibility of the District Magistrate for the peace of his district.

It is apparent that the orders recited above do not help much in answering the Hon'ble Mr. Fawcett's questions in his note of the 31st March. Perhaps Chief Secretary may have some suggestions. One point is, however, clear; the Criminal Investigation Department have no "commission" and their aid is given only on application; whose, is not stated (*vide* G.O., No. 1724, Judicial, dated 15th October 1906). If it is the District Magistrate's responsibility of employing the Criminal Investigation Department apparently. But this is not at all clear.

At these papers some time, but I had intended raising the question whether the Criminal Investigation Department should not again be attached to the Chief Secretariat. Mr. David, I know, is very anxious that it should be, and I have also thought so more and more strongly since Mr. Fawcett's presence in the Presidency. The Special Branch officer's presence with Government is antagonistic in very many ways, especially at Ootacamund, and it is often of the Government that Government should receive reports at first hand. This is a matter which is outside the question raised in the present papers and it is unnecessary to discuss it. If Chief Secretary thinks the matter worth consideration, it can be taken

C. A. SOUTER—17-4-08.

Assistant Secretary—

Two papers referred to by Mr. Fawcett in his note and which were not given to Assistant Secretary with the collection of papers are now put up—G.O., No. 1102, dated 19th June 1907, and G.O., No. 1204, Judicial, dated 4th July 1907. Perhaps Assistant Secretary may like to refer to the second paper in the note, before it is submitted to Chief Secretary.

H.T.—20-4-08.

Chief Secretary—

These two further Government Orders do not help much. They are general orders pointing out that District Magistrates must keep in touch with political feeling in their districts.

C.A.S.—21-4-08.

I find no correspondence in my safe on the subject. Ask Inspector-General for a list of papers, official and demi-official, thereon that have come to him from Government, and send this file back.

J.N.A.—21-4-08.

Draft Official Memorandum submitted.

H.T.—22-4-08.

Issue.

C.A.S.—22-4-08.

[Issued as Official Memorandum No. 2587, dated 23rd April 1908—**I**.]

File resubmitted as directed.

H.T.—23-4-08.

Chief Secretary—

It may await reply from the Inspector-General.

C.A.S.—24-4-08.

J.N.A.—27-4-08.

II

From the Inspector-General of Police, dated 2nd May 1908, No. T.C.-563/Govt.

Submitted.

G.O., 1373, Judicial, 14th August 1906.

2. The paper quoted by the Inspector-General of Police has already been put up in file.

H.T.—7-5-08.

Chief Secretary—

The Inspector-General has been unable to find any correspondence.

C.A.S.—7-5-08.

Hon'ble Mr. Hammick, C.S.I.—

Hon'ble Mr. Stokes, C.S.I.—

The only papers on the subject of the Criminal Investigation Department are those to in Mr. Souter's note on page 5 above.

As Mr. Cowie will take charge of the Criminal Investigation Department off Mr. Fawcett's absence on leave, we might perhaps ask him to draft a set of rules for by the Criminal Investigation Department of its duties.

J.N.A.

I have been in close touch with all the papers and the proceedings about the Police since the Commission sat, and I was present at several conferences at which the Criminal Investigation Department and its methods was discussed at Simla and orders have been issued by the Government of India on the matter, and the point generally the relation of the Local Government to the Imperial Criminal Investigation and the relation of the local Criminal Investigation Department to the Inspector-General.

1 | But all through and always, great stress was laid on the necessity for confidence between the Imperial Criminal Investigation Department and the local Criminal Investigation Department and District officers.

I don't think we need make too much of Mr. Fawcett's complaints: it is his duty, as soon as he had information from the local Inspectors and the Superintendent that there was unrest there, to send his men down or to ask the District Magistrate wanted more help or wished to consult him. It is absurd for him to blame the Criminal Investigation Department to advise the District Magistrate to advise the Criminal Investigation Department.

As for Mr. Fawcett sending men into district for detective purposes, of course he must do so when he pleases. But when he does so, he must advise the Superintendent and the District Magistrate of what he is doing and order his men when the opportunity offers to report themselves to the District Magistrate and Superintendent and tell them what they are doing.

Certainly the Criminal Investigation Department should not send men into any district (unless of course they are following up some special crime) without keeping the Superintendent and District Magistrate thoroughly informed.

As to telegrams to the Inspector-General—the Inspector-General and Mr. Fawcett have offices in the same building and the Assistant to the Inspector-General is always at head-quarters—telegrams and information should, when sent to the Inspector-General, be of course communicated at once to the Deputy Inspector-General by the Inspector-General or the Assistant Inspector-General if the Inspector-General is out.

I don't suppose any District Magistrate would object to the Criminal Investigation Department men being in their district as long as they are kept informed of what is going on. But certainly a District Magistrate would have every right to complain if the Criminal Investigation Department had detectives in his district working away and getting information about sedition and so on and keeping the District Magistrate in the dark about it all. Such a position is absurd. The District Magistrate is the trusted representative of Government in the district and must be in complete confidence with the Police of all kinds.

As the Inspector-General, Frontier Province, said the other day (he is a particularly able Police officer), there is considerable danger of the Criminal Investigation Department developing into an insufficiently controlled secret Police and we must do everything to stop any tendency that way. Mr. Fawcett will be very apt to work his own mysterious ways and treat the local District Magistrates and Superintendents as persons to be kept in the dark and not trusted. But the Inspector-General must insist on his following proper lines and working in harmony with all District officers.

Mr. Fawcett was working in the city the other day unknown to Mr. Wilkieson. Such a course as that should never be permitted.

We should not have any definite rules drawn up. They will give room for difficulties. But I think the Inspector-General should be given instructions in general terms of the kind I have suggested above and should be told to convey them to Mr. Fawcett.

I don't blame Mr. Fawcett much; it is of course a great temptation when you have secret information and secret agents to keep it all to yourself and think yourself much wiser than other people: I have seen much of that feeling in my police experience. But it is fatal, and this kind of secret working must be stopped.

G. S[TOKEs].

Mr. Fawcett should be told that when he thinks that it is advisable to send his agents into a district for enquiry he must give the District Magistrate all the information in his power and tell them exactly what he is doing, i.e., the number of men he is sending, the objects they and he must also be told that he is not to wait for the District Magistrates to advise him, but he is to advise the District Magistrates.

Covered by 2 above.

G. S[TOKEs].

I agree with Mr. Hammick on the points which I have numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 above. But it is at once evident that if you make the Criminal Investigation Department men public property their usefulness is gone. I don't think they should be required to report themselves in any district. If the District Superintendent of Police know they are there and what they are doing, quite enough.

M. H[AMMICK]—13-5-08.

G. S[TOKEs]—14-5-08.

The orders, regarding which Honourable Members are in agreement, should be issued. The Criminal Investigation Department is special machinery provided by the Government dealing with widespread dangerous movements and serious crimes and a District Magistrate should not be able to stop the machinery working.

As regards information—

1) There should be full and prompt interchange between the District Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate on the one part and the Criminal Investigation Department on the other. All part of any information regarding political movements, criminal gangs and other matters dealt with in Criminal Investigation Department which should be watched by officers of the Criminal Investigation Department should be sent to the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police in Madras City at the same time as they are sent to the officers' superior in the Criminal Investigation Department.

(2) All *important* information should be reported *promptly* by Criminal Investigation Department to Government through the Chief Secretary. This would not debar a District Magistrate from addressing the Chief Secretary direct of course. The District Magistrate should know what the Criminal Investigation Department reports to Government regarding matters affecting his district.

It should be pointed out that the information supplied by Criminal Investigation Department to Government has not been always satisfactory in its nature, accuracy or completeness and that undue delay sometimes occurs in its communication to Government.

For instance, in the matter of seditious speeches and agitation—

(1) it is for the Police, especially the Criminal Investigation Department, to inform the Government and District Magistrates what are the real facts and what evidence can be produced in Court to prove the alleged facts;

(2) it is for the Law Officers to advise whether the evidence is sufficient probably to prove the facts and whether the facts constitute an offence;

(3) it is for Government (or the District Magistrate in the case of security cases) to decide what action is to be taken. If a prosecution is ordered, the Criminal Investigation Department should be prepared either to prosecute or to assist the prosecution with full information if the prosecution is not left to the Criminal Investigation Department.

As regards the information supplied by the Criminal Investigation Department, care should be taken to discriminate between (1) rumours and (2) facts of which proof exists. In the case of (1) rumours, the report of the rumour should be accompanied by a statement of the steps being taken to verify it. If a rumour is worth reporting, it is probably worth verifying if possible; the verification would sometimes rest with the Criminal Investigation Department, sometimes with other officers of Government. When (2) facts are reported, the report should contain a statement of the evidence which will be forthcoming in Court, if required, to prove them. The statement should be sufficiently complete to enable the report to be sent by Government or the District Magistrate at once, without further reference to Criminal Investigation Department, to Law Officers for their advice.

The necessity for promptitude in reporting should also be insisted on. For instance, reports of seditious speeches, for which it may be desirable to prosecute or bind over the speakers, should, without having recourse to long telegrams, be in the hands of the District Magistrate and Government within 2 or 3 days at the outside; now I think it is sometimes a month before the reports reach Government and action is practically barred by the lapse of time.

If the Criminal Investigation Department is not strong enough to carry out its duties efficiently, it should be strengthened without delay.

I doubt whether it is desirable to have the Criminal Investigation Department or Special Branch back in the Secretariat. The Criminal Investigation Department ought to work under the Inspector-General and not under the Chief Secretary direct.

Draft carefully.

A. L. [AWLEY]—22-5-08.

J.N.A.—23-5-0

Under Secretary—

A draft order is submitted.

No mention has been made in the draft of the strengthening of the Criminal Investigation Department. The Government recently sanctioned certain addition to the executive and clerical staff of the department. Please see G.O., No. 1753, Judicial, dated 11th October 1907. Inspector-General of Police will no doubt come up to Government if he thinks that the work of the department on the lines sketched in the draft will necessitate an increase to the staff.

H.T.—2-3-08.

Chief Secretary—

The draft is for approval.

C.A.S.—3-6-0.

Hon'ble Mr. Hammick, C.S.I.—

Hon'ble Mr. Stokes, C.S.I.—

His Excellency the Governor—

Draft submitted for approval.

J.N.A.—4-6-0.

Approved.

M. H. [AMMICK]—6-6-0

I regret that there are two points in paragraph 3 of this draft of which I must ask reconsideration.

2. I fully concede and am strongly of opinion that the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police must be kept fully and promptly informed of the inquiries which Criminal Investigation Department is making in their districts. The question is how to be done.

The draft lays down:—

(a) "To effect these copies of the diaries of Criminal Investigation Department officers working in a district should be sent to the District Magistrate and in the Madras City to the Commissioner of Police.

(b) "The Deputy Inspector-General of the Criminal Investigation Department should order his men when opportunity offers to report themselves in person to the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police and to tell these officers what they are doing.

I think points (a) and (b) are both objectionable as they stand.

3. I do not mean to say that the course laid down is not possible in some cases without evil result, but it seems to me obvious that there are inquiries in which the revelation of the identity of the detective, especially in India, would be fatal to anything being found out; yet neither (a) nor (b) can be carried out without the connection of the detective with the magistracy and the Police being evident and suspicion being at once thrown on him.

I would therefore urge the omission of these instructions and would insert in the draft a provision that it will be the duty of the Deputy Inspector-General of the Criminal Investigation Department to keep the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police fully and promptly informed as to inquiries which he is making in their districts and of the progress of the investigation; and that Government will regard him as personally responsible that this is done; but I would leave it to him to determine both the time and the manner in which the information is to be communicated, adding that it would probably be convenient to send the District Magistrate and District Superintendent of Police the diaries of the officers working, or if unobjectionable, to instruct the men to report themselves in person to the officers concerned.

G. S[TORES]—16-6-08.

I think that the draft order amended by the omission of the paragraphs to which the Hon'ble Mr. Stokes takes exception should amply suffice to define the position of the Criminal Investigation Department *quâ* District officials.

A. L[AWLEY]—17-6-08.

Hon'ble Mr. Hammick, C.S.I.—

Hon'ble Mr. Stokes, C.S.I.—

Re-submitted.

I will not object to the draft as amended.

J.N.A.—18-6-08.

I accept the draft in its amended form.

M. H[AMMICK]—18-6-08.

G. S[TORES]—19-6-08.

From the Criminal Investigation Department, dated 20th May 1908.

Extract from weekly report of District Superintendent of Police, Kistna, for week ending 16th May 1908, received in Criminal Investigation Department office on 20th May 1908, regarding a meeting at Masulipatam. Submitted for information.

le Mr. Hammick, C.S.I. and Circ.—

I. E. DAVID—20-5-08.

It was hardly worthwhile sending this up. The report of the speeches is obviously very imperfect and the Criminal Investigation Department's attention might be drawn to the fact.

Yes.

A. L[AWLEY]—25-5-08.

J.N.A.—21-5-08.

Yes. I agree.

M. H[AMMICK]—22-5-08.

G. S[TORES]—23-5-08.

Draft please.

J.N.A.—27-5-08.

The following draft demi-official to Mr. David is submitted:—

"With reference to your note, dated the 20th instant, forwarding a copy of an extract from weekly report of the District Superintendent of Police, Kistna, regarding a meeting at Masulipatam, I am directed to draw your attention to the very imperfect nature of the reports of speeches which would be of no use whatever for evidential purposes. The Government consider that arrangements should be made to secure full and accurate reports in all such cases."

Y.—28-5-08.

C.A.S.—28-5-08.

J.N.A.—30-5-08.

Demi-official—from I. E. DAVID, Esq., Personal Assistant to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department.

To—the Chief Secretary to Government.

Dated—the 7th June 1908.

"With reference to your demi-official letter of the 2nd instant, I have written to Mr. Cumberland, District Superintendent of Police of Kistna district, drawing his attention to the imperfect nature of the report of the speeches and stating that Government expect arrangements to be made to secure full and accurate reports in all such cases. With reference to your remark that the report sent by him would be of no use whatever for evidential purposes, I do not quite follow it and think that there has been some misunderstanding.

"2. The report to which you refer (it is printed in paragraph 685 (b), current Secret Abstracts) is an extract from District Superintendent of Police's Special Branch weekly report and could of course never be of any value for evidential purposes. Such reports would no more be evidence in a case of sedition than a District Superintendent of Police's ordinary weekly report would be in a case of murder. The evidence necessary to prove seditious speeches would be the statements of the Police officers attending the meeting corroborated (or otherwise) by any notes jotted down at the time or reports written immediately after the meeting while the speeches were fresh in their memory. Nothing that the District Superintendent of Police writes or omits to write in his Special Branch weekly report (which he sends to Criminal Investigation Department for the information of Government) can affect the evidence in any way. In important cases, such as Krishna Aiyar's speeches at Karur, as soon as I receive the District Superintendent of Police's report I send for the original reports of the witnesses to examine them and see what they are worth in anticipation of an order from you to find out what evidence exists. It was this point that I thought I had made clear to you one Sunday when the sanction of Government was given for the prosecution of Chidambaram Pillai and Subramania Siva. The point is so important that I write at length about it. The printed abstracts do not and cannot contain copies of original evidence (except in most rare cases when a *verbatim* report of a speech has been obtained and is reproduced), and the opinion of the Advocate-General if obtained on a page of the Secret Abstracts is not an opinion formed on the evidence at all but an opinion formed on a précis of the evidence prepared by a District officer. The danger lies in the fact that some men can précis accurately while others cannot."

Previous papers submitted.

H.T.—11-6-08.

Chief Secretary—

There is a clear distinction between the portions of District Superintendent of Police Special Branch weekly reports which deal with sedition and other portions. For it rests with Government to take action in sedition cases. Accordingly when a speech is *prima facie* seditious it is submitted that as full a report as possible of the speech and circumstances should invariably be submitted to the Criminal Investigation Department either as part of the weekly report separately. Government cannot, in most cases, decide on a précis, however careful; the evidence in full is wanted. Mr. David has written to the District Superintendent of Police, Kistna, in full is wanted. Mr. David has written to the District Superintendent of Police, Kistna, it is submitted that it would be well to issue orders to all District Superintendents of Police

A. GALLETTI—11-6-

Honourable Member—

I submit that orders may be issued as proposed above. It is most important that Government should at the earliest possible date be in a position to decide whether to prosecute or not. If the District Superintendent of Police submits a full report to the Criminal Investigation Department, it can be passed on at once for the orders of Government, and be condensed as necessary for the Secret Abstract.

J.N.A.—12-6-

The difficulty is that the local Police very often fail to judge properly as to what is sedition and what not. But it would no doubt be a good thing in cases where speeches are seditious the Superintendent would submit at once as full report as possible of the speech and evidence he has to substantiate his report. All Superintendents might be instructed to the

M. H[AMMICK]—13-6-

Draft.

J.N.A.—15-6-

* Para. 6 of the G.O.

Draft * submitted.

H.T.—17-6-08.

Does paragraph 4 drafted by me conflict with any orders already issued?

A.G.—17-6-

Under Secretary—

Submitted that a file on the subject of the relations between the District Magistrate, District Superintendent of Police, and the Criminal Investigation Department with regard to Police reports on political agitation and other matters is now in circulation with a draft order. Perhaps the return of the file may be awaited. The file is now with the Hon'ble Mr. Stokes, and has been seen both by His Excellency and the Hon'ble Mr. Hammick.

H.T.—19-6-08.

Chief Secretary—

I have not seen the old orders, but Chief Secretary will know whether there is any overlapping.

2. Draft submitted.

A.G.—19-6-08.

Before issuing see two other files regarding Criminal Investigation Department—delay in the Karur case, and one from Mr. Bedford I think. Does this draft cover those cases, or should it be amplified; or those cases disposed of separately?

Chief Secretary—

J.N.A.—20-6-08.

Submitted that the orders in the three cases may be embodied in one Government order. The draft in this file deals with the general question of the relations of the Criminal Investigation Department with the district officers. The draft already put up for the two other files deals with the special case of the relations of the Criminal Investigation Department with the District officers in the matter of seditious speeches. Submitted that the subsidiary instructions in regard to seditious speeches (I have put the draft in this file) may be made one paragraph of the draft in this case and entered between paragraphs 5 and 6.

Hon'ble Mr. Hammick, C.S.I., & Circ.—

A.G.—21-6-08.

I venture to circulate this file and the draft again, as it will be convenient to embody in the draft the orders connected with the two linked files.

I think the draft on those two files prepared by Mr. Galletti, which will be found immediately below the original passed draft, may be approved and inserted after paragraph 5.

Yes. I agree to the proposed paragraph 6.

J.N.A.—22-6-08.

I agree to paragraph 6.

M. H[AMMICK]—24-6-08.

Please ask the Inspector-General demi-officially* whether he considers that the Criminal Investigation Department is strong enough to effectively carry out these orders or whether it needs strengthening.

* Action taken separately.

Yes. This is an important consideration.

G. S[TOKES]—26-6-08.

Now paragraph 6 should be inserted.

A. L[AWLEY]—29-6-08.

Now issue; and draft a demi-official to Inspector-General as directed above.

J.N.A.—30-6-08.

[G.O., No. 913, Judicial, dated 2nd July 1908.]

II

Official Memorandum—from the Hon'ble Mr. J. N. ATRINSON, C.S.I., I.C.S., Acting Chief Secretary to Government.

To—the Inspector-General of Police, Madras.

Dated—the 20th March 1908.

No.—1684-1, Judicial.

The letter from the Government of India, together with a copy of the memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, is forwarded to the Inspector-General of Police for early remarks on the proposals of the Government of India.

III

Letter—from D. W. G. COWIE, Esq., I.C.S., Inspector-General of Police, Madras.

To—the Chief Secretary to Government.

Dated—the 4th June 1908.

No.—12-Confld.

I have the honour to reply to Judicial department Memorandum No. 1684-1, dated 20th March 1908, forwarding to me for remarks Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore's proposal for the enrolment of special provincial police reserves composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians.

2. As pointed out by the Home Secretary to the Government of India in his covering letter, the question for consideration is the sufficiency, in respect both of numbers and of armament, of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times and Mr. Stevenson-Moore has shown clearly that Madras is one of the provinces where (to quote his words) the provision made for dealing with sudden outbreaks is dangerously insufficient—paragraph 12 of his letter. His remark in the same paragraph to the effect that in this presidency there is a strong establishment of City Police is discounted by the fact that the Madras City Police force possesses no fire arms.

3. Mr. Stevenson-Moore has not, I think, laid sufficient stress upon the fact that the Presidency is very poorly provided with troops, there being, south of a line drawn west from Madras, only one British and two Native Battalions, and on or near the East Coast no troops whatever. It may be advisable to refrain from employing troops on the occasion of ordinary civil disturbance, but it is certain that the mere existence of a Cantonment has a very sobering effect on the population of a big town or turbulent district, and as an instance of this, I may say that, when District Magistrate of Bellary, I repeatedly had reason to believe that but for the presence of the garrison seriously active opposition would have been offered to the plague preventive measures.

4. The armed reserves in this presidency have been strengthened in accordance with the proposals of the Police Commission, but it is not easy to mobilize them without disturbing the ordinary police work of the districts or to move them without affecting the safety of the large head-quarter towns in which the ordinary force is small and for the most part unarmed. To show the weakness of our armed reserves I may mention the recent riots in Tinnevely district. On that occasion, owing to the presence of a Special force of police at Sivakasi, it was possible to strengthen Tuticorin before the riots occurred and immediately afterwards parties of reserve police were drafted into the district from force of the other southern districts; but, had there been even slight disturbances in these districts, not a man could have been moved and, as it was, no men could be spared to assist in preserving order in the outlying portions of the Tinnevely district. Much the same thing occurred in 1907 after the riot at Cocanada, parties of reserve police being sent to that town from the Northern Circars, but it should be borne in mind that in each case the disturbance was confined to one district and the continued mobilization of the reserves seriously affected the ordinary police work. Had the disturbances been at all widespread, no district could have done more than see to itself.

5. When the events of the last twelve months are considered, and in the present state of political unrest which is not likely to be lessened in the near future, it is necessary to form some estimate of the force available for the maintenance of order,

and here it must be admitted that Mr. Stevenson-Moore is only too correct in saying that it would not be safe to rely on the adherence of more than half the present police force at the most (in my opinion he is rather oversanguine) and that the only classes whose loyalty could be absolutely relied upon are the Europeans and Eurasians. Having clearly shown the absolute necessity for such a force, he proposes for this province three special companies of 100 men each, one company each of Europeans, Eurasians and Moplahs. This force would, I think, be sufficient for the object in view, though two of the Deputy Inspectors-General, whom I have consulted, would place the minimum at 400 men. This estimate is, of course, quite apart from the question of the military garrison of the province which is one that calls for careful attention at the present time.

6. Of the three special companies, one should be placed at Coimbatore, one at Madura and the third at Rajahmundry or Waltair. None is needed in the Ceded districts so long as Bellary continues to be garrisoned by troops, but the Northern Circars which have no troops nearer than Secunderabad should have a company, while the country to the south of Trichinopoly which comprises the troublesome districts of Madura and Tinnevely requires additional protection, whether the military garrison of Trichinopoly is added to or not. The third company may well be placed at Coimbatore whence it can easily be moved to the West Coast, to any of the Tamil districts on the broad gauge line of railway or (*via* Erode) to the south.

7. All three companies should, I consider, consist of Eurasians and Europeans (mainly country bred), for what is wanted is a force on whose loyalty complete reliance can be placed, and it would not be safe to count on the Moplahs who, though no doubt now loyal and in many respects a race apart from the bulk of the population of the province, are ignorant, fanatical and notoriously difficult to handle. A Moplah company would, of course, be less expensive than a third company of Europeans and Eurasians, but I can see no other reason for preferring it. At the same time, it may be stated that, should it be decided to form a company of Moplahs, we already have a nucleus for it in the men now serving in the Tinnevely Punitive Force and there are several hundred Moplah ex-sepoys now in Malabar from whom it would be easy to select an efficient body of men.

8. Madras, Bangalore and the Lawrence Asylum would form the recruiting ground for the three companies proposed, and there should be no difficulty in filling the ranks with men of sufficiently good physique, a certain proportion being old soldiers. I would suggest enlistment for twenty-one years with a certainty of pension, as I do not think it likely that short terms of service such as those proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore would be attractive. If men of a good stamp were enlisted, the best of them would form a valuable source from which to draw Eurasian and European Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors for the ordinary police and the prospect of such advancement would tend to make service in the special force popular.

9. It would appear advisable not to have separate European and Eurasian companies. Both classes serve together in the army, notably in the artillery, and I can see no reason for making any invidious distinction such as must arise if the classes are to be separately enrolled.

10. Each company should be commanded by an officer of the Indian Army (a senior Subaltern or junior Captain) specially selected and seconded for a definite period, say five years. This would be in every way preferable to placing the local District Assistant Superintendent of Police in command, for when the company went on service, he must either leave his sub-division or the company pass at the most critical time into the hands of a stranger. In any case an officer of the army would be a more suitable commandant than a Police officer, the duties of the appointment being almost entirely military.

11. With regard to armament, Martini-Henry rifles and bayonets should be provided. Cyclist and fire-extinguishing sections and signallers would, of course, be trained, while inducements might be offered to the men to learn telegraphy and perhaps the execution of simple railway repairs.

12. I have no remarks to make as regards Mr. Stevenson-Moore's rough estimates of the cost of the proposed force except to point out that (as he says himself) they are probably rather over than under the mark. I regret the delay in replying to the

official memorandum, which is due to my having consulted the Deputy Inspectors-General.

Order—No. 1027, Judicial, dated 28th July 1908.

The Government of India will be addressed.

[Here enter letter No. 1028, Judicial, dated 28th July 1908.]

(True Extract.)

J. N. ATKINSON,
Ag. Chief Secretary.

18
CONFIDENTIAL.

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
No. 1028.

From

THE HON'BLE MR. J. N. ATKINSON, C.S.I., I.C.S.,
Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras,
Judicial Department,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
HOME DEPARTMENT.

Dated Ootacamund, the 28th July 1908.

SIR,

I am directed to reply to Home department letter No. 329, dated the 11th March 1908, on the subject of the sufficiency in respect both of numbers and armament of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times.

2. The Government of India forward, for the consideration of this Government, a memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, I.C.S., Officiating Director of Criminal Intelligence, containing proposals for the enrolment of special police reserves to be composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians and the views of the Governor in Council are asked upon the probable value of the force suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore and the manner in which it should be armed.

3. The Governor in Council has no hesitation in accepting Mr. Stevenson-Moore's conclusion that this Presidency shares, along with other provinces, the danger of being inadequately provided with the means of dealing with a sudden outbreak of internal disturbance. He also agrees that such an event, if it does occur, may bring to light the fact that the loyalty of the ordinary police is not altogether unimpeachable. Further, the urgent necessity for augmenting the forces available for maintaining order is accentuated by the fact that this Presidency is virtually denuded of European troops. After careful consideration His Excellency in Council is of the opinion that the constitution of a special police reserve of the nature proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore will be the best method of attaining the object in view, and that a force of three companies of 100 men each will suffice for the Madras Presidency.

4. In the matter of the composition of the companies, the Governor in Council considers that, as what is wanted is a force on whose loyalty complete reliance can be placed, it would not be safe to count on the Moplahs, who, though no doubt now loyal, and in many respects a race apart from the bulk of the population of the Presidency, are ignorant, fanatical and notoriously difficult to handle. The Governor in Council,

Type

however, sees no reason why separate companies of Europeans and Eurasians should be formed. Both classes serve together, with success, in the army, notably in the artillery. This Government therefore consider that mixed companies of Europeans and Eurasians could be formed without difficulty, thus avoiding any necessity for invidious distinctions which must arise if the classes are to be separately enrolled. Three such mixed companies are urgently needed for this Presidency.

5. With regard to the terms under which Eurasian recruits should be drafted, the Governor in Council considers that enlistment for 21 years with a certainty of pension is necessary, as it is not likely that short terms of service such as those proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore would be attractive. If men of a good stamp were enlisted, the best of them would form a valuable source from which to draw Eurasian and European Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors for the ordinary police and the prospect of such advancement would tend to make service in the special force popular. Madras, Bangalore and the Lawrence Asylum at Ootacamund would form the chief recruiting grounds and there should be no difficulty in filling the ranks with men of sufficiently good physique.

6. The Government consider that it would be advisable that each company should be commanded by an officer of the Indian Army (a senior Subaltern or junior Captain) specially selected and seconded for a definite period and put entirely under the orders of the local Inspector-General of Police. This would be preferable to placing the local District Assistant Superintendent of Police in command, for, if the company went on service, he must either leave his sub-division or the company must pass at the most critical time into the hands of a stranger. Moreover, the Assistant Superintendent of Police has his district work to attend to and some one is wanted who can give his whole time to the work of training these special companies.

7. The Governor in Council considers that the men should be provided with Martini-Henry rifles and bayonets, that cyclist, fire extinguishing and signalling sections should be trained, and that inducements should be offered to the men to learn telegraphy and perhaps the execution of simple railway repairs.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. N. ATKINSON,
Ag. Chief Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL.

NOTES CONNECTED WITH G.O., No. 1027, JUDICIAL, DATED
28TH JULY 1908.

[SUBJECT.—Police Forces in the Madras Presidency.]

Previous papers :

G.O.,	595-96,	Judicial,	7th Mar. 1888.	G.O.,	2053-53A,	Judicial,	22nd Dec. 1905.
"	1806-07	"	28th Aug. "	"	937	"	2nd June 1906.
"	2508	"	5th Dec. "	"	1056	"	23rd "
"	764	"	30th April 1889.	"	1074	"	26th "
"	2039	"	27th Nov. "	"	758	"	1st May 1907.
"	890	"	27th May 1890.	"	1254	"	13th July "
Letter,	1112	"	25th July 1904.	"	1336-7	"	29th "
G.O., 1045A,	1046	"	1st " 1905.	"	1803	"	21st Oct. "
"	1452	"	12th Sept. "	"		"	

I

From the Government of India, Home Department, dated 11th March 1908, No. 329.

Extract from a demi-official from—H. F. WILKIESON, Esq., Commissioner of Police.

To—the Chief Secretary to Government.

Dated—the 16th March 1908.

"I would while on the subject point out that the police in the city are unarmed and any serious repressive measures would have to be done with the help of the Military. My reason for writing this letter now is that if anything is to be done this is the best time to do it."

To be circulated with Government of India's letter.

J. N. ATKINSON—17-3-08.

[Advance copies circulated, dated 18th March 1908.]

Assistant Secretary—

Submitted that the letter from the Government of India may be forwarded at once to the Inspector-General of Police for early remarks on the proposals of the Government of India. Draft official memorandum submitted.

H.T.—19-3-08.

Chief Secretary—

This may issue.

C. A. SOUTER—19-3-08.

Issue.

J. N. ATKINSON—19-3-08.

[Issued as Official Memorandum No. 1684-1, Judicial, dated 20th March 1908—II.]

III

From the Inspector-General of Police, dated 4th June 1908, Confal. No. 12.

In the first current read above the Government of India state that they have had under consideration the following two questions:—

(1) *The sufficiency in respect both of numbers and armament, of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times, and*

(2) *the arrangements that would be required to secure the presence of an adequate force of armed police at a time of great emergency such as a serious frontier war.*

2. They consider that the second of these questions is not at the present moment a very pressing one, but that the first question is of urgent importance and forward, for the consideration of Government, a memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, I.C.S., Officiating Director of Criminal Intelligence, containing a scheme for the enrolment of special police reserves composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians.

The views of this Government are invited on—

- (1) *the probable value of the force suggested in the memorandum, and*
- (2) *the manner in which it should be armed.*

These proposals were referred to the Inspector-General of Police for remarks, and his remarks on the details of the scheme are set out below the details of the scheme as formulated by Mr. Stevenson-Moore, in the following paragraphs.

3. In paragraph 12 of his memorandum Mr. Stevenson-Moore shows by statistics the dangerously small provision that exists in the Madras Presidency for dealing with sudden outbreak especially now that "the recent unrest has clearly indicated that the problem of maintaining internal peace in India is going to be very much more difficult in the future than it has been in the past—the proportion of the police force set apart to deal with emergencies being about 4 per cent.

4. The sanctioned strength of the armed reserves in the Madras Presidency is shown in paragraph 9 (6) of this Government's letter to the Government of India, No. 1255, dated 13th July 1907, and this Government have asked the sanction of the Government of India to raise the armed reserve force in this Presidency to 269 head constables and 2,545 constables, the strength sanctioned by the Government of India being 250 head constables and 2,492 constables.

Of these figures the "emergency force" in each district will be allocated according to the scheme submitted by the Inspector-General of Police in his letter No. 2559, dated 31st May 1905, and approved by Government in G.O., No. 1452, Judicial, dated 12th September 1905. The emergency force in the Madras Presidency showing the figures for each district has been tabulated by Mr. Stevenson-Moore on page 19 of his memorandum.

5. Mr. Stevenson-Moore considers that the state of affairs described in paragraph 3 above can only be obviated by the "introduction of a system of special police reserves into every province".

6. In paragraphs 14 *et seq.* of his memorandum, Mr. Stevenson-Moore sketches a scheme for the formation of special reserves. He considers that the most important question which arises in this connection is from what sources the special reserves are to be recruited. He concludes that the reserves would have to be drawn from "the European or Eurasian community for there is no other class on whose loyalty absolute reliance can be placed under all circumstances." The scheme however includes three native companies to be composed of Gurkhas and Moplahs. The number of companies and the distribution suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore are as follows:—

Eastern Bengal and Assam	2 companies	...	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1 Eurasian. 1 European. 1 Eurasian. 1 European. </div> </div>
Bengal	3 companies	...	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1 Gurkha (re- cruited from Darjeeling). </div> </div>
United Provinces	2 companies	...	European.
Punjab	2 companies	...	European.
Bombay	2 companies	...	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1 Eurasian. 1 European. 1 Eurasian. </div> </div>
Madras	3 companies	...	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1 European. 1 Moplah. 1 Eurasian. </div> </div>
Central Provinces	2 companies	...	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 1 Eurasian. 1 Native. 4 Eurasian. </div> </div>
Total	16 companies	...	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> 9 European. 3 Native. </div> </div>

The Inspector-General of Police considers that the three special companies of 100 men each proposed for the Madras Presidency would be sufficient for the object in view though two of the Deputy Inspectors-General of Police whom he has consulted would place the minimum at 400 men. He considers that three companies should consist of Europeans and Eurasians as it would

Para. 7 of his letter.

be safe to count on the Moplahs, though they would be less expensive.

7. As regards the employment of Moplahs as police, please see this Government's letter to the Government of India, No. 1336-1337, dated 29th July 1907, requesting the Government of India to move the Governments of Burma and the Straits Settlements to employ the men of the 78th Moplah Rifles who had been disbanded, as policemen. The Government of India replied that in view of the defects of character in the Moplahs the experiment of employing them in large numbers outside the Madras Presidency should not be attempted.

G.O., 1803, Judicial, 21st October 1907.

8. *The terms of recruitment and the training of the special reserves* are to be as follows:—

"The extension of railways and industrial developments which have occurred in India within recent years have greatly enlarged the avenues of employment for the Anglo-Indian community and in view of the above details I am of opinion that the supply of Eurasians which it is sought to tap is limited and that they are not likely to be attracted to police service unless they receive in addition to board and lodging about Rs. 20 a month while under training. Rs. 25 when efficient rising to Rs. 40 within five years and a fairly definite assurance of employment on discharge. This is a low estimate. It would perhaps be possible to recruit Eurasians for long service in a lower pay than is here suggested if they were accepted from orphanages and similar institutions, but we should, I fear, experience great difficulty in getting men with the necessary physical and moral qualifications. Such is evidently the opinion of the Principal of St. Xavier's College, Calcutta.

"The scheme which would seem to give the best promise of success is one which would aim at securing young Eurasians of 17 or 18, who have been educated at good schools and whose physical qualifications are superior to their mental. They should engage for five or six years (one of which will ordinarily be spent on training) on the pay suggested above with the option of engaging for another five years on Rs. 45 to Rs. 50 a month with a small gratuity on discharge. Those who took their discharge on the expiry of the first term would receive no gratuity, but arrangements should be made to secure employment for them under the Railway Board and other Government departments. There should be no difficulty in this for the period of discipline undergone by them would certainly enhance their value. No married quarters would be provided for those serving the first term. A limited number could be provided for those who extend it.

"The companies would be located in places where there is an assistant superintendent who would be commandant and to such companies would be attached two European ex-soldiers holding the rank of police inspector and sergeant, respectively. The annual recurring charge would be about 2½ lakhs.

"25. The European police would be recruited for long-term service. Particular attention would require to be paid to instructing the European police in the language and in knowledge of the people. Thereby one of the most serious objections to employing Europeans on police work in India would be largely met. The pay should be so fixed as to make the service attractive to time-expired soldiers of the British army and the European Inspectors and Sergeants required for ordinary police work would usually be selected from the special reserves."

The Inspector-General of Police offers the following remarks on the above proposals:—

"I would suggest enlistment for 21 years with a certainty of pension, as I do not think it likely that short terms of service such as those proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore would be attractive. If men of a good stamp were enlisted the best of them would form a valuable service from which to draw Eurasian and European Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors for the ordinary police and the prospect of such advancement would tend to make service in the special force popular. It would appear advisable not to have separate European and Eurasian companies. Both classes serve together in the army notably in the artillery, and I can see no reason for making any invidious distinction such as must arise if the classes are to be separately enrolled. Each company should be commanded by an officer of the Indian Army (a senior Subaltern or junior Captain) specially selected and seconded for a definite period, say five years. This would be in every way preferable to placing the local District Assistant Superintendent of Police in command for when the company went on service, he must either leave his sub-division or the company pass at the most critical time into the hands of a stranger."

9. With regard to armament the Inspector-General proposes that Martini-Henry Rifles and bayonets should be provided, that cyclist fire extinguishing sections and signallers should be trained, and that rewards should be offered to the men to learn telegraphy and the execution of simple railway repairs.

10. The Inspector-General considers that one company should be located at *Coimbatore*, the second at *Madura* and the third at *Rajahmundry* or *Waltair*.

Para. 6 of his letter.

Paras. 22-25 of his memo.

11. The annual recurring cost of the scheme adopting the figures given by Mr. Stevenson-Moore, so far as Madras is concerned, will be—

	RS.
One European Company	1,00,000
One Eurasian "	62,500
One Native "	25,000
Total	1,87,500

or roughly about 2 lakhs of rupees.

Chief Secretary—

The Inspector-General's remarks on Mr. Stevenson-Moore's proposals seem very sound. It is by far the safest course to have three companies of Europeans and Eurasians, and to have no native force. But unless the military force in the Presidency is increased, I submit that four companies should be asked for.

2. To command these men it seems obvious that the Assistant Superintendent of Police is not the best man. He has his district work to attend to, and some one is wanted who can give his whole time to the work.

C.A.S.—1-7-08.

Hon'ble Mr. M. Hammick, C.S.I., & cive.—

The Government of India ask this Government to favour them with their views on the probable value of the force suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore and the manner in which it should be armed.

There can, I submit, be no question as to the value, or rather the urgent necessity of having some such force as is proposed, more particularly considering the smallness of the military garrison of the Presidency. I think that the sanction of the Government of India might be sought to raise the force at once and I venture to think that four companies of 100 men each would be preferable to the three proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore. Mr. Cowie's acceptance of the three companies as sufficient is clearly influenced by the hope that the military garrison will be increased.

On other details, as to armament, composition of the force, its distribution, length of service, etc., I think Mr. Cowie's opinion may be accepted.

J.N.A.—2-7-08.

The proposal involves a heavy increase in recurring expenditure. However, I look upon some increase of the kind suggested as very necessary, if the Presidency is to continue as denuded of troops native and European as at present. The idea that each reserve is to always have

G.S. a small body of 25 to 30 men ready to go out in case of trouble has not worked successfully

and I do not think ever will. There is also the great and growing danger that in times of trouble disaffection may spread among the police. If at Cocanada last year, the police could have moved down a body of trained Eurasians from Vizagapatam at once the effect would probably have been far better than the introduction of sepoys into the town.

The formation of Eurasian companies may create alarm—and cause a panic, but I don't think this need be if the thing is done quietly. The Inspector-General will have to be careful.

As to Madras town—none of the police there are armed—and the Chingleput Reserve kept at the Mount is more used for guards and escorts than any other reserve in the Presidency. However we have in Madras the European troops and the native regiment at the Mount and they would be used if necessary. I do not think we need keep an armed police reserve in the city.

I don't think we need recommend more than *three* companies of 100 men each. We might do with *two* to begin with one at Trichinopoly and one at Vizagapatam. I don't think in any case we should for some time get sufficient Eurasians to fill more than two companies.

We should be better off with a company at Coimbatore, but we have in Malabar the Moplah force at Malappuram which suffices for keeping order in Malabar; with the help of the European troops there and so a company of Eurasian police at Coimbatore is not very pressing at the present time.

I doubt the advisability of getting a military officer to command and drill and manage a company of military police. I think myself it would be better to have a police officer (a smart young Assistant Superintendent) to do the work. But if a military officer is used he should be transferred completely for a period, say, of five years, and put entirely under the orders of the Inspector-General.

I would tell India that we agree to the suggestion made, and to begin with would recommend the formation of two companies of Eurasians and Europeans *mixed*—not in separate companies—that we do not wish to have any special Moplah company, that we should station the companies at Vizagapatam and Trichinopoly, that if successful we would probably later on require a third company to be kept at Coimbatore. The enlistment of the men for twenty-one years seems the best plan. We shall probably have to give Rs. 20 *plus* board and lodging rising to Rs. 40 or more. However, if the scheme is sanctioned the arrangements as to pay and service can be settled afterwards. We should have to build barracks for the men and houses for the officers (non-commissioned). Two companies such as are intended will probably cost two lakhs *per annum* at the outside. It might be done perhaps for one and a half lakhs. This would be for two companies of 100 in each company with an Assistant Superintendent of Police in command of each company and two non-commissioned officers in each.

I think India may be told accordingly.

M. H[AMMICK]—6-7-08.

I think Mr. Stevenson-Moore's paper a very able one and conclusive of the need for some such arrangement as is proposed. I have long felt the danger of the denudation of this Presidency of troops generally and especially of white troops and I welcome this suggestion as entirely necessary.

I agree with what Mr. Hammick has proposed above except that I would place three companies as what we want. Taking the cost of three companies at three lakhs, I think the money would be well spent. The details of pay, equipment and location may be fully discussed hereafter.

G. S[TOKES]—7-7-08.

I agree that we may propose three companies of mixed Europeans and Eurasians.

Personally I would put military officers in command but subject them to the Inspector-General.

I would select Madura, Coimbatore, and either Bezwada, Rajahmundry or Vizagapatam as the three centres.

I choose Madura as we have and shall continue to have troops at Trichinopoly.

Bezwada is a railway junction and therefore suitable strategically. However these points and those of pay, service, etc., can be settled later.

What we have now to do is to tell India that we favour the scheme and advise three companies of 100 men each (Europeans and Eurasians mixed) for this Presidency.

I think it would take some little time to raise 300 men for twenty-one years' service.

A. L[AWLEY]—13-7-08.

Draft please.

J.N.A.—14-7-08.

A draft letter to the Government of India is submitted.

2. The question regarding the arrangements that would be required to secure the presence of an adequate force of mobilised police at a time of great emergency has not been touched upon in these papers. It is not clear whether the Government of India expect any suggestions from local Governments on this matter at present.

J.N.A.

H.T.—20-7-08.

Chief Secretary—

C.A.S.—21-7-08.

Hon'ble Mr. Hammick, C.S.L., & cive.—

Draft submitted for approval.

J.N.A.—22-7-08.

I approve. It is of no use going into more detail until India sanctions the idea.

M. H[AMMICK]—24-7-08.

I approve the draft.

G. S[TOKES]—24-7-08.

Draft approved.

A. L[AWLEY]—26-7-08.

Issue.

J.N.A.—27-7-08.

[G.O., No. 1027, Judicial, dated 28th July 1908.]

[Letter No. 1028, Judicial, dated 28th July 1908.]

Read

I.

(C.No.1684) From the Govt. of India, Home Dept., No.329, d/- 11-3-08. A

II.

O.M. to the I. G. of Police, No. 1684-1, d/- 20- 3- 1908. A

III.

(C.No.3584) From the I.G. of Police, Conf. No. 128, d/- 4- 6- 1908. A

ORDER No. _____, dated July _____ 1908.
P.S.

P.N.

The Government of India will be addressed.

H.T.
20-7-08.

C.A.S.
21-7-08.

Print

21-8

letter

No

LETTER

P. T. &

LETTER:-

140 10285 28-7-0.

To

The Secretary to the
Government of India,
Home Department.

Sir,

I am directed to reply to Home Department letter No. 329, dated the 11th March 1908, on the subject of the sufficiency in respect both of numbers and armaments of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times.

2. The Government of India forward for the consideration of this government a memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. G. Stevenson-Moore, I.C.S., Officiating Director of Criminal Intelligence, containing proposals for the enrolment of special police reserves to be composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians and the views of the Governor in Council are asked upon the probable value of the force suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore and the manner in which it should be armed.

3. The Governor in Council has no hesitation in accepting Mr. Stevenson-Moore's conclusion that this Presidency shares, along with other provinces, the danger of being inadequately provided with the means of dealing with

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28 JUL 1908

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a sudden outbreak of internal disturbance. He also agrees that such an event, if it does occur, may bring to light the fact that the loyalty of the ordinary police is not altogether unimpeachable. Further, the urgent necessity for augmenting the forces available for maintaining order is accentuated by the fact that this Presidency is virtually denuded of European troops. After careful consideration His Excellency in Council is of the opinion that the constitution of a special police reserve of the nature proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore will be the best method of attaining the object in view, and that a force of 3 companies of 100 men each will suffice for the Madras Presidency.

4. In the matter of the composition of the companies, the Governor in Council considers, that, as what is wanted is a force on whose loyalty complete reliance can be placed, it would not be safe to count on the Moplahs, who, though no doubt now loyal, and in many respects a race apart from the bulk of the population of the Presidency, are ignorant, fanatical and notoriously difficult to handle. The Governor in Council however, sees no reason why separate companies of Europeans and Eurasians should be formed. Both classes serve together, with success, in the army, notably in the artillery

This Government therefore consider that mixed companies of Europeans and Eurasians could be formed without difficulty, thus avoiding any necessity for invidious distinctions which must arise if the classes are to be separately enrolled. Three such mixed companies are urgently needed for this Presidency.

5. With regard to the terms under which Eurasian recruits should be drafted, the governor in Council considers that enlistment for 21 years with a certainty of pension is necessary as it is not likely that short terms of service such as those proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore would be attractive. If men of a good stamp were enlisted, the best of them would form a valuable **source** from which to draw Eurasian and European Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors for the ordinary police and the prospect of such advancement would tend to make service in the special force popular, Madras, Bangalore and the Lawrence Asylum at Ootacamund would form the chief recruiting grounds and there should be no difficulty in filling the ranks with men of sufficiently good physique.

6. The Government consider that it would be advisable that each company should be commanded by an officer of the

the Indian Army (a senior Subaltern or junior Captain) specially selected and seconded for a definite period and put entirely under the orders of the local Inspector-General of police. This would be preferable to placing the local District Assistant Superintendent of police in command, for, if the company went on service, he must either leave ^{his} Sub-division or the company must pass at the most critical time into the hands of a stranger. Moreover, the Assistant Superintendent of police has his District work to attend to and some one is wanted who can give his whole time to the work of training these

Special companies.
7. The governor in council considers that the men should be provided with Martini-Henry rifles and bayonets, that cyclist, fire extinguishing and signalling sections should be trained, and that inducements should be offered to the men to learn telegraphy and perhaps the execution of simple railway repair

H.T.
20-7-08.

C.A.S.
21-7-08.

He 22.7.08



Judicial Department.

REMINDER.

Subject.

*Police in the Madras
Presidency*

THE undersigned is directed to invite attention to

No. *1684* the communication
dated *20.3.1908* noted on the margin
and to request that
information may be furnished, in the column
opposite, of the cause of delay in furnishing a reply
and of the approximate date on which a reply may
be expected.

It is requested that the reply to this reminder
may be sent not later than the *3rd*

June 1908.

Ch Santes

Under Secy. to Govt.

~~For Sr. Officer,~~
OOTACAMUND,

25th May 1908.

To

D. W. S. Bowie Esq I.C.S
Inspector General of Police
Madras

REPLY.

No. *191* Record, dated the *30th May* 1908.



1
2
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The subject is under
consideration & a
report will be despatched
shortly.

30.5.08
for J. S. P.

To

The Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras,

Judicial Department

.....*General*.....DEPARTMENT

G.O., No....., dated..... 190.....

Number of MS. pages sent { Correspondence.....^(b) 33
Notes.....^(b¹) 25

Brief subject. Place in the Indian Pan

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and orders

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FOR ISSUE. †

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Political Dept.....		
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(b¹) For rules regarding printing of notes, see rule 248 of the Office Manual.

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1027

NOTES CONNECTED WITH G.O., No. 10454, JUDICIAL, DATED

[SUBJECT.—Police Forces in the Madras Presidency.]

Previous papers:

G.O.,	595-96, Judicial, 7th Mar. 1888.	G.O.,	2053-53A, Judicial, 22nd Dec. 1905.
"	1806-07 " 28th Aug. "	"	937 " 2nd June 1906.
"	2508 " 5th Dec. "	"	1056 " 23rd " "
"	764 " 30th April 1889.	"	1074 " 26th " "
"	2039 " 27th Nov. "	"	758 " 1st May 1907.
"	890 " 27th May 1890.	"	1254 " 13th July "
Letter	1112 " 25th July 1904.	"	1336-7 " 29th " "
G.O. 10454,	1046 " 1st " 1905.	"	1803 " 21st Oct. "
"	1452 " 12th Sept. "		

I

From the Government of India, Home Department, dated 11th March 1908, No. 329.

Extract from a demi-official from—H. F. WILKINSON, Esq., Commissioner of Police.

To—the Chief Secretary to Government.

Dated—the 16th March 1908.

"I would while on the subject point out that the police in the city are unarmed and any serious repressive measures would have to be done with the help of the Military. My reason for writing this letter now is that if anything is to be done this is the best time to do it."

To be circulated with Government of India's letter.

J. N. ATKINSON—17-3-08.

[Advance copies circulated, dated 18th March 1908.]

Assistant Secretary—

Submitted that the letter from the Government of India may be forwarded at once to the Inspector-General of Police for early remarks on the proposals of the Government of India. Draft official memorandum submitted.

H.T.—19-3-08.

Chief Secretary—

This may issue.

C. A. SOUTER—19-3-08.

Issue.

J. N. ATKINSON—19-3-08.

[Issued as Official Memorandum No. 1684-1, Judicial, dated 20th March 1908—II.]

III

From the Inspector-General of Police, No. 12 dated 4th June 1908, Confid.

In the first current read above the Government of India state that they have had under consideration the following two questions:—

(1) The sufficiency in respect both of numbers and armament, of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times, and

(2) the arrangements that would be required to secure the presence of an adequate force of mobilised police at a time of great emergency such as a serious frontier war.

2. They consider that the second of these questions is not at the present moment a very pressing one, but that the first question is of urgent importance and forward, for the consideration of Government, a memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, I.C.S., Officiating Director of Criminal Intelligence, containing a scheme for the enrolment of special police reserves to be composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians.

The views of this Government are invited on—

(1) the probable value of the force suggested in the memorandum, and

(2) the manner in which it should be armed.

These proposals were referred to the Inspector-General of Police for remarks, and his remarks on the details of the scheme are set out below the details of the scheme as formulated by Mr. Stevenson-Moore in the following paragraphs.

3. In paragraph 12 of his memorandum Mr. Stevenson-Moore shows by statistics the dangerously small provision that exists in the Madras Presidency for dealing with sudden outbreak, especially now that the recent unrest has clearly indicated that the problem of maintaining internal peace in India is going to be very much more difficult in the future than it has been in the past—the proportion of the police force set apart to deal with emergencies being about 4 per cent.

4. The sanctioned strength of the armed reserves in the Madras Presidency is shown in paragraph 9 (6) of this Government's letter to the Government of India, No. 1255, dated 13th July 1907, and this Government have asked the sanction of the Government of India to raise the armed reserve force in this Presidency to 269 head constables and 2,545 constables, the strength sanctioned by the Government of India being 250 head constables and 2,492 constables.

Of these figures the "emergency force" in each district will be allocated according to the scheme submitted by the Inspector-General of Police in his letter No. 2559, dated 31st May 1905, and approved by Government in G.O., No. 1452, Judicial, dated 12th September 1905. The emergency force in the Madras Presidency showing the figures for each district has been tabulated by Mr. Stevenson-Moore on page 19 of his memorandum.

5. Mr. Stevenson-Moore considers that the state of affairs described in paragraph 3 above can only be obviated by the "introduction of a system of special police reserves into every province".

Para. 13 of his memorandum.

6. In paragraphs 14 *et seq.* of his memorandum, Mr. Stevenson-Moore sketches a scheme for the formation of special reserves. He considers that the most important question which arises in this connection is from what sources the special reserves are to be recruited. He concludes that the reserves would have to be drawn from "the European or Eurasian community for there is no other class on whose loyalty absolute reliance can be placed under all circumstances." The scheme however includes three native companies to be composed of Gurkhas and Moplahs. The number of companies and the distribution suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore are as follows:—

Eastern Bengal and Assam	2 companies	...	<div> <div>1 Eurasian.</div> <div>1 European.</div> <div>1 Eurasian.</div> <div>1 European.</div> </div>
Bengal	3 companies	...	<div>1 Gurkha (recruited from Darjeeling).</div>
United Provinces	2 companies	...	European.
Punjab	2 companies	...	European.
Bombay	2 companies	...	<div>1 Eurasian.</div> <div>1 European.</div>
Madras	3 companies	...	<div>1 Eurasian.</div> <div>1 European.</div> <div>1 Moplah.</div>
Central Provinces	2 companies	...	<div>1 Eurasian.</div> <div>1 Native.</div>
Total	16 companies	...	<div>4 Eurasian.</div> <div>9 European.</div> <div>3 Native.</div>

The Inspector-General of Police considers that the three special companies of 100 men each proposed for the Madras Presidency would be sufficient for the object in view though two of the Deputy Inspectors-General of Police whom he has consulted would place the minimum at 400 men. He considers that three companies should consist of Europeans and Eurasians as it would not be safe to count on the Moplahs, though they would be less expensive.

Para. 7 of his letter.

7. As regards the employment of Moplahs as police (please see this Government's letter to the Government of India, No. 1336-1337, dated 29th July 1907 requesting the Government of India to move the Governments of Burma and the Straits Settlements to employ the men of the 78th Moplah Rifles who had been disbanded as policemen. The Government of India replied that in view of the defects of character in the Moplah the experiment of employing them in large numbers outside the Madras Presidency should not be attempted.

G.O., 1803, Judicial, 21st October 1907.

8. The terms of recruitment and the training of the special reserves are to be as follows:—

"20. The extension of railways and industrial developments which have occurred in India within recent years have greatly enlarged the avenues of employment for the Anglo-Indian community and in view of the above details I am of opinion that the supply of Eurasians which it is sought to tap is limited and that they are not likely to be attracted to police service unless they receive in addition to board and lodging about Rs. 20 a month while under training, Rs. 25 when efficient rising to Rs. 40 within five years and a fairly definite assurance of employment on discharge. This is a low estimate. It would perhaps be possible to recruit Eurasians for long service in a lower pay than is here suggested if they were accepted from orphanages and similar institutions, but we should, I fear, experience great difficulty in getting men with the necessary physical and moral qualifications. Such is evidently the opinion of the principal of St. Xavier's College, Calcutta.

"21. The scheme which would seem to give the best promise of success is one which would aim at securing young Eurasians of 17 or 18, who have been educated at good schools and whose physical qualifications are superior to their mental. They should engage for five or six years (one of which will ordinarily be spent on training) on the pay suggested above with the option of engaging for another five years on Rs. 45 to Rs. 50 a month with a small gratuity on discharge. Those who took their discharge on the expiry of the first term would receive no gratuity, but arrangements should be made to secure employment for them under the Railway Board and other Government departments. There should be no difficulty in this for the period

"of discipline undergone by them would certainly enhance their value. No married quarters would be provided for those serving the first term. A limited number could be provided for those who extend it.

"The companies would be located in places where there is an Assistant Superintendent who would be commandant and to such companies would be attached two European ex-soldiers holding the rank of police inspector and sergeant, respectively. The annual recurring charge would be about 2½ lakhs.

"25. The European police would be recruited for long-term service. Particular attention would require to be paid to instructing the European police in the language and in knowledge of the people. Thereby one of the most serious objections to employing Europeans on police work in India would be largely met. The pay should be so fixed as to make the service attractive to time-expired soldiers of the British army and the European inspectors and sergeants required for ordinary police work would usually be selected from the special reserves."

The Inspector-General of Police offers the following remarks on the above proposals:—

"I would suggest enlistment for 21 years with a certainty of pension, as I do not think it likely that short terms of service such as those proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore would be attractive. If men of a good stamp were enlisted the best of them would form a valuable service from which to draw Eurasian and European Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors for the ordinary police and the prospect of such advancement would tend to make service in the special force popular. It would appear advisable not to have separate European and Eurasian companies. Both classes serve together in the army notably in the artillery, and I can see no reason for making any invidious distinction such as must arise if the classes are to be separately enrolled. Each company should be commanded by an officer of the Indian Army (a senior Subaltern or junior Captain) specially selected and seconded for a definite period, say five years. This would be in every way preferable to placing the local District Assistant Superintendent of Police in command for when the company went on service, he must either leave his sub-division or the company pass at the most critical time into the hands of a stranger."

9. With regard to armament the Inspector-General proposes that Martini-Henry Rifles and bayonets should be provided, that cyclist fire extinguishing sections and signallers should be trained, and that rewards should be offered to the men to learn telegraphy and the execution of simple railway repairs.

10. The Inspector-General considers that one company should be located at Cambitore the second at Madura and the third at Rajahmundry or Waltair.

Para. 6 of his letter.

Paras. 22-25 of his memo.

11. The annual recurring cost of the scheme adopting the figures given by Mr. Stevenson-Moore, so far as Madras is concerned, will be—

	RS.
One European Company	1,00,000
One Eurasian	62,500
One Native	25,000
Total	1,87,500

or roughly about 2 lakhs of rupees.

I.T.—1-7-08.

Chief Secretary—

The Inspector-General's remarks on Mr. Stevenson-Moore's proposals seem very sound. It is by far the safest course to have three companies of Europeans and Eurasians, and to have no native force. But unless the military force in the Presidency is increased, I submit that four companies should be asked for.

2. To command these men it seems obvious that the Assistant Superintendent of Police is not the best man. He has his district work to attend to, and some one is wanted who can give his whole time to the work.

C. A. Souter—1-7-08.

Hon'ble Mr. M. Hanrick, C.S.I., & c. —

The Government of India ask this Government to favour them with their views on the probable value of the force suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore and the manner in which it should be armed.

There can, I submit, be no question as to the value, or rather the urgent necessity of having some such force as is proposed, more particularly considering the smallness of the military garrison of the Presidency. I think that the sanction of the Government of India might be sought to raise the force at once and I venture to think that four companies of 100 men each would be preferable to the three proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore. Mr. Cowie's acceptance of the three companies as sufficient is clearly influenced by the hope that the military garrison will be increased.

On other details, as to armament, composition of the force, its distribution, length of service, etc., I think Mr. Cowie's opinion may be accepted.

J.N.A.—2-7-08.

The proposal involves a heavy increase in recurring expenditure. However, I look upon some increase of the kind suggested as very necessary, if the Presidency is to continue as denuded of troops native and European as at present. The idea that each reserve is to always have a small body of 25 to 30 men ready to go out in case of trouble has not worked successfully and I do not think ever will. There is also the great and growing danger that in times of trouble disaffection may spread among the police. If at Coenada last year, the police could have moved down a body of trained Eurasians from Vizagapatam at once the effect would probably have been far better than the introduction of sepoy into the town.

The formation of Eurasian companies may create alarm—and cause a panic, but I don't think this need be if the thing is done quietly. The Inspector-General will have to be careful. As to Madras town—none of the police there are armed—and the Chingleput reserve kept at the moment is more used for guards and escorts than any other reserve in the Presidency. However we have in Madras the European troop and the native regiment at the Mount and they would be used if necessary. I do not think we need keep an armed police reserve in the city.

I do not think we need recommend more than three companies of 100 men each. We might do with two to begin with one at Trichinopoly and one at Vizagapatam. I don't think in any case we should for some time get sufficient Eurasians to fill more than two companies.

We should be better off with a company at Coimbatore, but we have in Malabar the Moplah force at Malappuram which suffices for keeping order in Malabar; with the help of the European troop there and so a company of Eurasian police at Coimbatore is not very pressing at the present time.

I doubt the advisability of getting a military officer to command and drill and manage a company of military police. I think myself it would be better to have a police officer (a smart young Assistant Superintendent) to do the work. But if a military officer is used he should be transferred completely for a period, say, of five years, and put entirely under the orders of the Inspector-General.

I would tell India that we agree to the suggestion made, and to begin with would recommend the formation of two companies of Eurasians and Europeans *mixed*—not in separate companies—that we do not wish to have any special Moplah company, that we should station the companies at Vizagapatam and Trichinopoly, that if successful we would probably later on require a third company to be kept at Coimbatore. The enlistment of the men for twenty-one years seems the best plan. We shall probably have to give Rs. 20 *plus* board and lodging rising to Rs. 40 or more. However, if the scheme is sanctioned the arrangements as to pay and service can be settled afterwards. We should have to build barracks for the men and houses for the officers (non-commissioned). Two companies such as are intended will probably cost two lakhs *per annum* at the outside. It might be done perhaps for one and a half lakhs. This would be for two companies of 100 in each company with an Assistant Superintendent of Police in command of each company and two non-commissioned officers in each.

I think India may be told accordingly.

M. H[AMMICK]—6-7-08.

I think Mr. Stevenson-Moore's paper a very able one and conclusive of the need for some such arrangement as is proposed. I have long felt the danger of the denudation of this Presidency of troops generally and especially of white troops and I welcome this suggestion as entirely necessary.

I agree with what Mr. Hammick has proposed above except that I would place three companies as what we want. Taking the cost of three companies at three lakhs, I think the money would be well spent. The details of pay, equipment and location may be fully discussed hereafter.

G. S[TOKES]—7-7-08.

I agree that we may propose three companies of mixed Europeans and Eurasians. Personally I would put military officers in command but subject them to the Inspector-General.

I would select Madras, Coimbatore, and either Bezvada, Rajahmundry or Vizagapatam as the three centres.

I choose Madras as we have and shall continue to have troops at Trichinopoly.

Bezvada is a railway junction and therefore suitable strategically. However these points and those of pay, service, etc., can be settled later.

What we have now to do is to tell India that we favour the scheme and advise three companies of 100 men each (Europeans and Eurasians mixed) for this Presidency.

I think it would take some little time to raise 300 men for twenty-one years' service.

A. L[AWLEY]—13-7-08.

Draft please.

J.N.A.—14-7-08.

K.W. , JUDICIAL, JULY 1908.

5

Draft letter to the Government of India submitted.

2. The question regarding the arrangements that would be required to secure the presence of an adequate force of mobilised police at a time of great emergency has not been touched upon in these papers. It is not clear whether the Government of India expect any suggestions from local Government on this matter at present.

H.T.—20-7-08.

Chief Secretary—

C.A.S.—21-7-08.

Hon'ble Mr. Hammick, C.S.I. & circ.—

Draft submitted for approval.

J.N.A.—22-7-08.

I approve. It is of no use going into more detail until India sanctions the idea.

M. H[AMMICK]—24-7-08.

I approve the draft.

G. S[TOKES]—24-7-08.

Draft approved.

A. L[AWLEY]—26-7-08.

Issue.

J.N.A.—27-7-08.

[G.O., No. L Judicial, dated 28th August 1908.]

1027
[Letter No 1028 dated 28.7.08] jug

CONFIDENTIAL.

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

READ—the following papers:—

I

Letter—from Sir HERBERT BISLEY, K.C.I.B., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department (Police).

To—the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras.

Dated—Calcutta, the 11th March 1908.

No.—329-Confid.

I am directed to observe that the Government of India have recently had under consideration the following two questions:—(1) the sufficiency, in respect both of numbers and armament, of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times, and (2) the arrangements that would be required to secure the presence of an adequate force of mobilised police at a time of a great emergency such as a serious frontier war. The second of these questions is not, the Government of India consider, at the present moment a very pressing one, though it is desirable that they should be in possession of a skeleton scheme showing the arrangements which would be possible and necessary in such an emergency. The first question is, however, in their opinion of urgent importance, and it is with special reference to this matter that I am now to address the Government of Madras.

2. I am to forward confidentially, for the consideration of the Government of Madras, the enclosed copy of a memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, I.C.S., Officiating Director, Criminal Intelligence, which contains proposals for the enrolment of special police reserves to be composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians, and to request that the Government of India may be favoured with the views of the Governor in Council upon the probable value of the force suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore and the manner in which it should be armed.

ENCLOSURE.

Proposal for the enrolment of provincial special police reserves composed mainly of Eurasians and Europeans.

The strength and constitution of the district armed police reserves has recently come under consideration both in connection with the Army Reorganisation Scheme and as a result of the Police Commission's proposals.

The principles laid down in 1860 regarding the functions of the police were as follows:—

- (1) The civil police must protect the community against all local criminal classes and put down all riots and local disturbances.
- (2) When riot becomes rebellion the functions of the police and military bodies must step in.
- (3) While the police must be drilled and disciplined, only that portion of the force necessary for duties such as guarding treasuries and jails, escorts and quelling all ordinary disturbances should carry arms, the rest carrying batons only.

Such were the principles laid down when the lessons of the mutiny were fresh in men's minds. In 1886 Lord Dufferin suggested, in consequence of certain disturbances which had occurred in Northern India between Hindus and Muhammadans, the desirability of keeping at certain centres, such as large towns, a reserve of semi-military police armed and disciplined on the same principle as the Irish Constabulary, and Sir Anthony Macdonnell writing as Home Secretary in June 1887 sketched a scheme for such a reserve, allowing for first-class districts two

companies of 160 men, for second-class districts 1½ companies of 120 men and for third-class districts one company of 80 men. Objections were, however, taken to these proposals in Council on the grounds that they might involve an increase of the British forces in India, that in times of peace and quiet these reserves would be of no use and that in extraordinary times they would be a source of danger. It was recognised nevertheless that the police reserve system was not so efficient as it might be, and the Government of India after consulting Local Governments reaffirmed the principles of 1860 and laid down, *inter alia*, that a sufficient reserve should be maintained, if possible, in every district, but at all events at convenient centres to put down all riots and local disturbances and ready or capable of being concentrated for extraordinary purposes and that the reserves should form part of the district staff and should not be relieved of all escort duties. In more recent times, however, it has been generally found in practice that escort and similar duties are so heavy that no reserve force was available for emergencies unless stringent orders were passed setting aside a part of the force for the purpose. Consequently the Police Commission, while recommending the formation of a body of armed police to be called the head-quarter force available for the performances of all guard, orderly and escort duties, added that a proportion of this force, which might be fixed at 25 constables under one head constable, should be kept in reserve for despatch anywhere at a moment's notice. Events which have occurred since Police Commission sat, however, would seem to justify the view that those proposals did not go quite far enough.

2. Under the Army Reorganisation Scheme, the functions and responsibilities of the police have been very materially extended. According to the principles laid down in 1860 when riot became rebellion, the functions of the police end, but under the new scheme, in the event of mobilisation taking place, the police will share with the garrison troops and moveable columns the responsibility of maintaining internal order. The services which both the civil and military authorities would now require from the armed police were duly considered by the Government of India, and their proposals were set out in despatch No. 8 of December 1904 and received the Secretary of State's sanction in due course. The police force required for mobilisation in each province is given in the following statement:—

Province.	Total police.	Total required for military mobilisation.	Sources from which they came.	
			Head-quarters force.	15 per cent. reserve.
Madras	26,754	3,500	2,492	4013-1
Bombay	23,596	2,500	4,686	3539-4
Bengal	23,411	4,400	6,695	3511-65
United Provinces	33,115	5,150	4,848	4967-75
Punjab	20,042	3,300	2,660	3096-3
Central Provinces	11,919	2,400	1,233	1787-85
Eastern Bengal and Assam	10,568	..	?	1603-7

The police force required for the Punjab was originally fixed at 4,000 by the military authorities, but the Local Government showed that 3,300 was the largest number that could possibly be made available and this reduction was accepted. Even on the figures as they stand, it is clear that the Punjab, Central Provinces and Bengal would (*ceteris paribus*) experience most difficulty and Bombay least difficulty in finding the requisite number of men, but in the case of every province some rather formidable assumptions underly these statistics.

3. So long as civil Government lasted a very large portion of the head-quarters staff could not be relieved of guard and escort duty for purposes of concentration. Indeed it is more probable that such guards would have to be increased considerably and strengthened. Ordinary guard and escort duty is so heavy that it is quite a common experience to have no constables at all except the emergency reserve (if there is one) in the head-quarter barracks, and it was this consideration which led the Police Commission to recommend that a reserve of this nature should always be kept. Again so long as a district officer could retain charge of his district he would strenuously, and probably successfully, resist any attempt to deprive him of his reserves. There is, however, a still more serious cause which would operate to reduce the available reserves. A lesson which must be learnt from recent events is that any serious trouble outside our borders would inevitably be accompanied by internal agitation of a better organised and more widespread character than we have hitherto had any reason to anticipate. It is idle to hope that the police would escape the contamination which we know to have reached those who are much better protected against it, and it would not be safe to rely on the adherence of more than half the present police force at the most. As has been shown, a very heavy demand would be made on them for guards and similar police duties; thus the margin left to meet military requirements would in my opinion be very fine indeed and it is probable that recruitment of raw material from any section of the community which remained loyal would have to be largely resorted to.

4. While submitting that the police reserves available would probably be found inadequate for military requirements, it is, however, to the requirements of the civil authorities that I wish to invite particular attention in this note, my view being that recent experiences in Eastern Bengal and the Punjab prove the strength of the district armed reserves prescribed for most provinces to be insufficient to perform the duties which it may now be reasonably anticipated will be required of them.

5. It is an accepted principle in theory at least that ordinary civil disturbances shall be dealt with by the civil police and that for political and other reasons it is a mistake to use military force to suppress them if this can possibly be avoided. The main grounds for this view appear to be that the military would not be available to quell civil disturbance at the very time when it is likely to be most serious and widespread, that is to say, when the army is engaged in meeting an external enemy; that the civil authority is naturally desirous of avoiding the extreme measure of calling in military assistance and is consequently apt to delay unduly to take the repressive action which the emergency requires and that the military should not be called out until that stage has been reached where a very short and sharp lesson is required and can be justified. It has, however, often been complained that in practice the habit has grown up of relying on the military arm to quell civil disturbances and after the Tallah riots in the neighbourhood of Calcutta in 1897 when the police force was found insufficient to deal with the situation, in addition to an increase in the force of the town police of Calcutta and Howrah, an extra company of military police (special reserves) was sanctioned with the expressed object of having a body of trained men always ready to deal with disturbances among the large population of mill hands on the banks of the Hooghly, without having undue recourse to the military for assistance.

6. Now the recent unrest has clearly indicated that the problem of maintaining internal peace in India is going to be very much more difficult in the future than it has been in the past. Hitherto the police have for the most part been called upon to deal with spasmodic and ill-organised disturbances of mainly local concern, but now conditions are in process of undergoing an entire change.

Political agitators of all shades are never tired of preaching the absolute necessity of more elaborate organisation and of extending their political campaign to the villages and this is an end for which moderates and extremists alike are both working through the agency of the boycott and of local supporters, itinerant lecturers, school boys and travelling *sadhus* (both real and fictitious) and it must be admitted that in Eastern Bengal a considerable degree of success has been attained. Barisal district can be mentioned as an example. Through the activity and ability of Aswini Kumar Dutt, an organised campaign of boycott has been carried on throughout nearly the whole of this district and as an example of the success obtained it may be mentioned that even Police officers have in some cases been compelled to pay large fines to the *Swadeshi* fund in order to escape social ostracism. Another subject sought after, particularly by the extremists, is a more secret system of working. The practice of reporting seditious speeches in newspapers has in many instances been discontinued, religious and social ceremonies are made the pretext of holding political meetings and the people are urged to form secret societies on the basis of those which it is alleged were formed in Italy by Mazzini and in the Decan by Shivaji and in both instances led to the overthrow of the existing Government. To what extent this movement will spread remains to be seen, but it is already certain that it is much more difficult than it was to get inside information. That active political agitation has come to stay cannot be doubted; it is equally certain that the extreme section will lose no opportunity which presents itself of inflaming the public mind with the result that disturbances will from time to time occur, disturbances which for the reasons stated are less likely to be foreseen in time to be prevented and more likely than hitherto to be on well organised and comprehensive lines.

7. The important question for consideration then is—are our police reserves sufficient for the duties which may be reasonably anticipated that they will be called upon to perform? This question should be considered on the light of the actual experiences obtained in Eastern Bengal and the Punjab during the recent unrest.

8. In Eastern Bengal, owing mainly to good political organisation, disturbances were not confined to a few important towns in one or two districts, but spread to almost all the trade centres in the province. An emergency armed reserve exists in every district already and in the large ones it numbers fifty men, but they were apparently found quite insufficient to deal with the situation and it is fortunate that in the Gurkha military police the Local Government had an ideal agency with which to supplement them. The extent to which the military police were used will be gathered from the following table:—

District where employed.	Name of battalion from which drawn.					Total.
	Lakhimpur battalion.	Naga Hills battalion.	Silehar battalion.	Lushai Hills battalion.	Garo Hills battalion.	
Dacca	105	105
Tipperah	100	100
Mymensingha	91	60	141
Barisal	100	..	100
Pabna	26	26
Rajshahi	26	26
Total	496

Thus in this province it has been found necessary to employ a force of 500 men over and above the ordinary police force in order to deal with the situation for many phases of which ordinary British troops at least would not have been found suited. For the occasions were frequent on which small bodies of men had to be sent to centres and *hâls* in the interior to perform duties of a kind which would have probably led to collisions between authority and people had the force been entirely ignorant of the language and customs of those with whom it came in contact. I have not a complete record of such occasions, but, from information which Mr. Bonham-Carter, Inspector-General of Police, has given to me, it appears that in Mymensingh district 40 military police were sent to Jamalpur from April 22nd to 24th and between the 8th and 16th of that month 46 were employed at Tarakandu, 62 at Dewangunj, 36 at Dephalia and about 30 at Barigunj. Some of these were men of the district armed reserve. In Pabna district 50 military police were employed at Sarajgunj at one time and it is believed that bodies of these men were from time to time employed similarly in the interior of the Tippera and Barisal districts, though details are not forthcoming. In addition to the Gurkha police about 150 men of the United Provinces and Bengal armed police reserves were, I believe, lent to Eastern Bengal and Assam. The question naturally arises had the Gurkha military police (who exist, it must be mentioned, to perform duties of a different kind) not been available what agency could have been employed in their place? It is certain that no agency so suitable could have been found and considerable difficulty would have been experienced in securing any police agency at all. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam have recently submitted to the Government of India proposals for raising another battalion of military police consisting of 400 men for service at Dacca and Chittagong, and in their letter No. 1409, dated 5th April 1907, in connection with this subject explained that recent events had fully demonstrated the necessity of immediately strengthening the Dacca police and that in order to meet the requirements of Comilla and Dacca it had become necessary to obtain from two battalions of the Assam military police men who are primarily intended and required for the important duty of guarding the frontier. In regard to the Chittagong division the Local Government considered the available force of military police to be quite insufficient and recommended the immediate recruitment of a force of a 100 men for Chittagong adding "There are, moreover, several other districts in which disturbances might occur such as would render the presence of a body of military police necessary in addition to the local armed reserves which are sufficient only to deal with a single compact mob, but are not sufficient to cope with disturbances occurring over a considerable rural area or in different parts of a large town."

In face of the opinions and facts stated above, the inadequacy of the existing district armed police reserves in this province would hardly seem to admit of question and yet the police agency available for dealing with sudden outbreaks is on a far more liberal scale in this province than in the Punjab, where they are likely to prove very much more serious.

9. The methods adopted for dealing with the situation in the Punjab will now be considered. On the second riot occurring in Lahore 250 men were moved in from other districts. The whole of the emergency armed reserve consisting in each case of only 25 men was brought in from eight districts and 50 were taken from the Phillaur training school. One of the districts denuded was Rawalpindi and when the disturbance subsequently occurred there, its emergency reserve was away in Lahore. This reserve was promptly sent back and was strengthened by 100 more men—50 from two districts and 50 from the Phillaur training school, but the evil had then been done. When disturbances are in their initial stages it is exceedingly difficult to foresee when and where the actual outbreaks will occur and where the feeling of unrest is widespread, the removal of the reserves from a district may furnish the very reason for the outbreak occurring there. What is required in the earlier stages of trouble is sharp and prompt repression without dislocation of the existing district police arrangements. The population of Lahore and also of Delhi is over two lakhs. In each there is an emergency reserve of 28 (including officers) and 30 mounted men in the former and 20 in the latter. The population of Rawalpindi is 87,000 and of Amritsar double that number, and in these cities also the emergency reserve is 28 men only. These reserves seem to be very inadequate. In Bengal where the population is much less dangerous the emergency reserve force of each of these cities would consist of 50 men and a reference to the detailed statement annexed and to a subsequent part of this note will show how very small is the provision made for emergency armed police in the Punjab as compared with United Provinces, e.g., Cawnpore and Benares with about the same population as Lahore and Delhi are allowed over 130 men each. The Government of the United Provinces in reporting on the proposals of the Police Commission in connection with the subject (No. 1021, dated 16th July 1904) write "The urgent need of a strong armed force was prominently brought to notice by the Etawah riots of 1886. Since then there have been several serious riots, in Benares in 1891 and 1895, in the eastern districts over cowkilling in 1893 and in Cawnpore in 1900. The presence of an efficient armed police force has unquestionably on many occasions prevented serious rioting. Hostility between Hindus and Muhammadans is deeply rooted. The classes and persons interested in disorder are learning to co-operate. In short, it is essential for the maintenance of order and good government that there should be an efficient force of armed policemen, drilled, under discipline and in readiness to move at a moment's notice." The situation in the Punjab but for the action taken by the Government of India under the regulations of 1818 would have speedily become infinitely

more serious than anything which has hitherto occurred in the United Provinces and it is not certain that all danger of trouble in the near future is at an end. The armed reserves available for immediate action in case of emergency are, however, too small to be worth account and on an infinitely narrower scale than is regarded as essential in the United Provinces and even in Bengal where the population generally is mild and the Presidency town is policed by a special force. Apart altogether from the proposals embodied in the note, the strengthening of the emergency armed reserves in the chief districts of the Punjab seems to me to be in practice.

10. At the same time it must be recognised that it is not possible to keep in every town a reserve sufficiently big to deal unaided with widespread disturbance and in my opinion the proper remedy lies in every province having special reserves kept under military discipline and located in centres where trouble is most likely, but from which they can be transported quickly to any other place requiring their services. With such reserves Government is able, without attracting undue attention or dislocating police arrangements elsewhere and thus exposing other districts to danger, to deal promptly and sharply with a disturbance at its very outbreak. The advantages of such action are incalculable and even where prompt measures of the kind do not suffice to arrest the spread of disorder such reserves furnish a most valuable supplement to the bodies of police which must be organised to deal systematically with widespread and more organised disturbances.

11. The nucleus of a force of constabulary, such as is here proposed, exists already in some provinces of India. Both Burma and Eastern Bengal and Assam have considerable bodies of military police. Their primary duty is to control tribes across the frontier, but in the latter province they have proved invaluable, as has been shown, in vindicating authority and securing internal peace.

In Bengal and the Central Provinces bodies of semi-military police are already maintained whose sole duty is to preserve internal order. In Bengal there are three companies of these special reserves, one to control the employés of the mills on the banks of the Hooghly, one at Ranchi to deal with aboriginal tribes which are apt to give trouble and one at Bhagalpur in reserve. Though differently constituted to the Assam and Burma military police battalions they are armed with rifles, have one or more European officers and are subjected to military discipline. They are always ready to be drafted into disturbed areas and have within my personal knowledge rendered most valuable service on the occurrence of mill and railway strikes. They consist mainly of Rajputs and up-country Muhammadans and though a valuable agency for dealing with ordinary trouble I do not anticipate that their loyalty would be sufficiently strong to withstand clever and insidious attacks systematically made on it by political agitators. There are two similar companies in the Central Provinces which are, I believe, kept at Nagpur. I have no personal knowledge of the services rendered by them, but they are evidently appreciated since the local Administration proposed in connection with the Police Reorganisation Scheme to increase the strength. One of the companies was drafted to Amraoti when trouble was apprehended there a short time ago and this precautionary action passed without public comment. When on the other hand troops were despatched to Coacanda after the riot there, the action of the Madras Government was criticised by the native press as minatory or due to panic. In the latter case special reserves would have been equally effective and their employment would not have attracted so much criticism.

12. The table annexed shows the strength of the emergency armed reserves, district by district, of each province as they will stand when the reorganisation schemes which emanated from the Police Commission's proposals are complete—the population of the big towns where it exceeds 50,000 souls. The total population of each province, the number of towns with a population over 50,000 and the total strength of (a) the emergency armed reserves, (b) the special armed reserves (where they exist) will stand as follows:—

Province.	Population in round millions.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Emergency armed reserves.		Special reserves.	Percentage of total of columns 4, 5 and 6 to—		Remarks.
			Officers.	Men.		Total population omitting two zeros.	Total police force.	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Eastern Bengal and Assam.	28	2	190	
Bengal	46	7	144	1,175	330	25	6.9	
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.	48	18	417	2,496	..	50	8.79	
Punjab	20	8	87	725	..	40	3.9	
Bombay	19	6	62	475	..	27	2.23	
Madras	38	11	102	891	..	26	3.7	
Central Provinces and Berar.	15	2	200	

A glance at the last two columns of this table indicates, I venture to think, that the provision made for dealing with sudden outbreaks is dangerously insufficient in the provinces of the Punjab, Bombay and Madras. In Punjab and Madras the proportion of the police force set apart to deal with emergencies is about 4 per cent., while in Bombay it is only about half this proportion. In Bengal and the United Provinces on the other hand the figure is about 7 per cent. and nearly 9 per cent., respectively. In the Punjab the emergency reserve bears a proportion to the population of $\frac{1}{3}$ less than in the United Provinces and its percentage is little greater than that of Bengal even where the population is very much less virile and where big towns are one less in number. In Bombay and Madras the proportions are considerably less still, but it must be remembered that in all the three presidency towns there are strong establishments of special city police, over and above the provincial police here referred to, whereas no such force exists in the Punjab.

13. If the special reserves (where they exist) are left out of consideration there is no province except perhaps the United Provinces in which the ordinary district armed police reserve available for emergency is sufficient by itself to deal with sudden outbreaks of disturbance such as in the light of recent events can reasonably be expected. Moreover, in mobilising district police in the earlier stages of trouble great risk is incurred of denuding centres where outbreaks may have to be met and in the event of external trouble great difficulty would be experienced at any rate for some time in mobilising the number of police provided for in the army mobilisation scheme. These are the main reasons which impel me to recommend the general introduction of a system of special police reserves into every province and this recommendation can be made with the more confidence since analogous bodies which now exist have given ample proof of their utility.

14. If this proposal is accepted, the most important question which arises for consideration is from what sources are these special reserves to be recruited. As has been shown, one of the objections taken to the constitution of a large native police force armed with rifles was that in order to preserve the proper balance between British and native, the number of British troops might require to be increased. The scheme which I sketch later would involve the enrolment of about 1,100 extra men armed with rifles and though they would be scattered over a large area this objection is one which requires to be given due consideration. Moreover, if Gurkhas are excepted, native police do not command the confidence of Europeans on the occasion of widespread political unrest, and it is of the most serious importance to prevent these conditions arising which would result in the civil population falling into a state of panic. The supply of Gurkhas is limited and in some places climatic conditions would not admit of their employment, consequently the special reserves would have to be drawn from the European or Eurasian community, for there is no other class on whose loyalty absolute reliance can be placed under all circumstances.

15. In order that an estimate may be formed of the suitability in other respects of the Eurasian element for this class of employment it is desirable to sketch the history of the proposals which have been made from time to time to recruit them for service in the Indian army. This has been one of the chief recommendations of those who have from time to time urged on Government the necessity for improving the social and material condition of that class. The proposal to form an Eurasian corps was last taken up officially by the Government of India in 1899 and a

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history of the question is given in their despatch No. 55 of the 30th March of that year. During the mutiny three local corps were formed, viz., Lahore Light Horse, the East Indian regiment and the Eurasian battery of artillery. They were disbanded after a short existence—the 1st in 1864, the 2nd in 1865, the 3rd in 1870 on the grounds—

- (1) that the Eurasian corps cost as much as British troops;
- (2) that while the same confidence was not felt in them as in British troops, they could not take up the duties of native troops and required all the elaborate commissariat arrangements necessary for British soldiers;
- (3) that it was impossible to obtain sufficient recruits to maintain even three small corps aggregating less than 700 men;
- (4) that the enforcement of discipline in these corps (indeed the very existence of such corps) was of doubtful legality.

Inefficiency or unsuitability for military service was not a ground advanced for the action taken. On the contrary Lord Canning, Sir Hugh Rose and Lord Napier of Magdala were strongly in favour of the employment of Eurasians in the military system of India and the excellent services rendered by them during the mutiny and in the Bhutan campaign were freely acknowledged by Government. The evidence furnished in the note which Captain Deane wrote in 1879 and the testimony of Major Barnes' personal observation furnish ample evidence of the Eurasian corps having been well disciplined and efficient.

16. The various Anglo-Indian and Eurasian associations in India have attempted on several occasions since the disbandment of these corps to induce Government to throw open military service to their community. In 1875 the Anglo-Indian Aid Association of Bangalore and Mysore made

a proposal to this effect which was negatived by the Secretary of State on the advice of the Government of India. In 1879 the Calcutta Association took the matter up and memorialised the Government in that year, in 1883 and in 1884. In 1883 the Allahabad Association also submitted a representation on the subject and in 1884 similar representations came from Madras. In 1892 the Pauperism Commission which sat in Calcutta put forward the formation of an Anglo-Indian regiment as one of the remedies which they suggested for relieving the impoverished condition of the Anglo-Indian community. In 1894 the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal recommended that selected Eurasians should be admitted to British regiments, "it having been ascertained that there is in Calcutta a fairly large number of suitable Eurasians who it is believed would gladly enlist and who it is believed would make good soldiers". Finally in July 1897 a deputation of the various Anglo-Indian Associations which was received by the Secretary of State at the India Office made the formation of an Anglo-Indian regiment one of the chief reliefs for which they prayed. None of these representations met with any success though they evoked a fair share of sympathy and support for those who were called upon to advise on them. The joint representation of the various associations made in 1897 was finally dealt with by the Secretary of State in his despatch No. 6, Military, dated 18th January 1900, and was

M. D. Pro. B., Feb. 1900, Nos. 1253-1255.

negatived mainly on the ground that as the Eurasian regiment would have to be maintained in addition to and not in substitution for any part of the present garrison of India, the experiment would throw a heavy fresh burden on the revenues of India for which in the opinion of many of the highest military authorities, no commensurate return in the shape of increased military strength would be obtained.

17. In 1901 Lord Curzon, in view of the additional burden which would be imposed on the Indian revenues by increasing the strength of the British troops so as to render the country independent of reinforcements from home for a time on the occurrence of external troubles, suggested the enlistment of time-expired men with the pick of Eurasians as an Indian garrison reserve. Sir

M. D. Pro. B. No. 128 of 1901.

B. Duff, when noting on this proposal, wrote "Viewed from a military standpoint our need is a second line of Europeans and Eurasians, distinct from our field troops, discharging other duties in times of peace but available on emergency to replace these troops should their services be called for beyond the frontier. It is certain that in any such proposal expense will be the stumbling-block, and it is therefore essential that until the emergency arises this second line be employed so as to make their upkeep the smallest possible burden to the country. To attain this end I think they should be essentially police as opposed to militia or garrison battalions. They must therefore be a civil rather than a military body and, though fully organised and drilled and armed with the best possible weapons, they must be under the civil and not the military authorities in ordinary times." Lord Curzon's suggestion was considered by a conference in August 1901 at which the Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab and Bengal were present and it was generally agreed that a mixed European and Eurasian force raised primarily for garrison duties would not be of service to the Local Governments for police work. It would partly overlap and partly usurp the functions of the existing police, could not perform ordinary police duties in cities and as a body would be unsuited for the purpose. The suggestion was therefore dropped; the proposal that the garrison militia should be a military body was analogous to that negatived by the Secretary of State in 1900 and was on that account not proceeded with.

18. The discussion in 1889 and 1901 furnished the first occasion on which the question of employing Eurasians or Europeans for the armed police was mentioned and then the matter was considered mainly from the point of view of military requirements. That Eurasians would prove an efficient agency as special police reserves if the right class were attracted I have personally no doubt whatever. The records show that officers who were in close personal contact with the Eurasian regiments which did service in the mutiny gave them a high character for discipline and efficiency. Present day schools pay considerable attention to their physical training and there is good reason to believe that an equally serviceable class of Eurasians would be forthcoming now. At the same time the agency would undoubtedly be an expensive one and limited in number.

19. In Government of India despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 55, dated 30th March

M. D. Pro. A. November 1899, Nos. 1949-53.

1899, it was estimated that the cost of an Eurasian company of garrison artillery would be Rs. 1,06,571 per annum as against Rs. 1,68,450 the cost of a European company or say 1/2 less.

In paragraph 12 of the resolution No. 2263, dated 8th August 1892, on the report of the

M. D. Pro. A., May 1893, Nos. 2155-66.

Pauperism Committee, dated 8th February 1892, an estimate of the relative cost of maintaining a regiment of British, Eurasian and native troops was furnished. The result obtained were—cost of European regiment Rs. 4,00,326; cost of Eurasian regiment Rs. 2,94,495; cost of native regiment Rs. 1,61,340. Thus a Eurasian regiment would cost about a quarter less than a European regiment and about double a native regiment. With a view of obtaining an idea of the pay which would prove sufficiently attractive to the class of Eurasians whom it is sought to employ, I consulted the principals of certain schools unofficially and confidentially and their replies are summarised below:—

La Martiniere, Calcutta.—It costs about Rs. 11 a head to feed boys of 17 or 18 years of age. The boys who rise to the higher forms can command at once pay of Rs. 50 a month. The boy

with more physique than brains might be attracted if he got "all found" and some pocket-money during training and Rs. 50 rising afterwards. If recruited for five years, assurance must be given of employment afterwards.

La Martiniere, Lucknow.—Food would cost somewhat over Rs. 8-8 per head. Expenditure on salary would have to be rather heavy. Very ordinary boys can get Rs. 75 rising to Rs. 100 in one year in the mills of Calcutta. Suggests Rs. 50 rising to Rs. 70 in five years with board and subsequent employment guaranteed.

St. Xavier's College, Calcutta.—The cost of feeding should come to about Rs. 18 a head. Boys can get employment in the trades on Rs. 50 to Rs. 75 a month and rise in five years to Rs. 100 or Rs. 150. The police would not prove attractive and if recruited from the lower stratum, that is, the class which attends orphanages or free schools, the principal does not think we will get the class of men we want.

St. Joseph's College, Darjeeling.—Cost of feeding about Rs. 25 a month. The pay should be Rs. 150 a month. The school educates a better class of boys than is contemplated, but very little encouragement can be found in any of these opinions.

Mr. Dring, Agent, East Indian Railway, has furnished me with particulars of the grades of pay for ticket collectors on his line. They are as follows:—

	RS.
On appointment	35
On passing ticket collectors' pocket guide	40
On passing booking clerks, parcel and luggage clerks' duties	45
On passing guards' examination	50
On passing stationmasters' examination	60
On passing telegraphy	65

Gunner guards get from Rs. 50 to Rs. 100 and the Traffic Manager adds that he does not think reliable, decently educated Eurasians can be got for much less than Rs. 60 with prospects. Railway servants of course find their own board and lodging and get no pensions though they enjoy the benefits of a provident fund.

20. The extension of railways and industrial developments which have occurred in India within recent years have greatly enlarged the avenues of employment for the Anglo-Indian community and in view of the above details I am of opinion that the supply of Eurasians which it is sought to tap is limited and that they are not likely to be attracted to police service unless they receive in addition to board and lodging about Rs. 20 a month while under training, Rs. 25 when efficient rising to Rs. 40 within five years and a fairly definite assurance of employment on discharge. This is a low estimate. It would perhaps be possible to recruit Eurasians for long service in a lower pay than is here suggested if they were accepted from orphanages and similar institutions, but we should, I fear, experience great difficulty in getting men with the necessary physical and moral qualifications. Such is evidently the opinion of the Principal of St. Xavier's College, Calcutta.

21. The scheme which would seem to give the best promise of success is one which would aim at securing young Eurasians of 17 or 18, who have been educated at good schools and whose physical qualifications are superior to their mental. They should engage for five or six years (one of which will ordinarily be spent on training) on the pay suggested above with the option of engaging for another five years on Rs. 45 to Rs. 50 a month with a small gratuity on discharge. Those who took their discharge on the expiry of the first term would receive no gratuity, but arrangements should be made to secure employment for them under the Railway Board and other Government departments. There should be no difficulty in this for the period of discipline undergone by them would certainly enhance their value. No married quarters would be provided for those serving the first term. A limited number could be provided for those who extend it.

22. The cost of a company of special reserves of native police in Bengal is about Rs. 20,000 per annum, and in Eastern Bengal and Assam about Rs. 30,000. It can be said that the cost of a similar company composed of Eurasian police will be about Rs. 60,000 to Rs. 70,000 per annum. This figure could no doubt be materially reduced if a lower class of Eurasians were recruited. It is quite possible that a lower class would serve the purpose, but I have very strong doubts, though in the absence of actual experiment it is hard to form a definite opinion. If, however, the above estimate of cost is accepted, the advantages of enrolling a limited number of companies of Eurasian police are in my opinion sufficiently great to justify the expense. The advantage of finding another avenue for the employment of the Eurasian community must be regarded as purely incidental for the police is one of the last departments to be treated as a charitable institution, but one or two companies of police recruited for this class would strengthen very considerably the hands of a Local Government, for their loyalty could be relied on absolutely while their knowledge of the people and the language would render them very useful for work in small bodies in the interior. The latter was an advantage on which those with mutiny experiences fresh in their minds laid great stress.

23. According to the last census the number of Eurasians in India is as follows:—

Punjab	2,309	(Lahore 752).
United Provinces	5,218	{ Allahabad 711). (Lucknow 734).
Bengal including Eastern Bengal	20,893	{ Calcutta 14,482). (Howrah 762).
Bombay	6,820	{ Bombay 3,258). (Madras about 8,000).
Madras	26,185	{ Calicut 972). (Trichinopoly 808).

Bengal and Madras would be the two chief recruiting grounds, but I think it unlikely that suitable material will be found in sufficient quantity to fill more than four companies and these could be most suitably posted to Eastern Bengal and Assam, Bengal, Madras and Bombay and to start with the experiment could be tried most advantageously in Bengal and Madras. The companies would be located in places where there is an assistant superintendent who would be commandant and to such companies would be attached two European ex-soldiers holding the rank of police inspector and sergeant, respectively. The annual recurring charge would be about 2½ lakhs.

24. The smallest number of special reserve companies required in my opinion for the whole of India and the distribution which I suggest are as follows:—

Eastern Bengal and Assam	... 2 companies	... { 1 Eurasian. 1 European.
Bengal	... 3 companies.	... { 1 Eurasian. 1 European. 1 Gurkha (recruited from Darjeeling).
United Provinces	... 2 companies	... { 1 Eurasian. 1 European.
Punjab	... 2 companies	... { 1 Eurasian. 1 European.
Bombay	... 2 companies	... { 1 Eurasian. 1 European.
Madras	... 3 companies	... { 1 Eurasian. 1 Moplah. 1 Native.
Central Provinces	... 2 companies	... { 1 Eurasian. 1 Native.
Total	... 16 companies	... { 9 Eurasian. 3 Native.

The Bengal and Central Provinces companies already exist though differently constituted. It is proposed therefore to raise 11 entirely new companies, and these would be additional to the existing police force except perhaps in the United Provinces where the existing strength is on a more liberal scale than elsewhere. It is for consideration whether any of the companies should be mounted; I think not, because the special reserves would have to be ready to travel at a moment's notice by train and horses would render them less mobile. Most large cities have a force of mounted police whose duties should be confined to serve within them. The special reserves should have large cyclist and fire extinguishing sections. Three companies are suggested for Bengal and Madras because of the small number of troops quartered within them and of the large industrial population of the former and the large area of the latter. One company in each can consist of natives. One company in the Central Provinces where the area affected by political propaganda is very restricted can be similarly constituted. The two companies of Eastern Bengal and Assam can be worked into the scheme now before the Government of India for enrolling a battalion of military police for Dacca.

25. The European police would be recruited for long term service. Particular attention would require to be paid to instructing the European police in the language and in knowledge of the people. Thereby one of the most serious objections to employing Europeans on police work in India would be largely met. The pay should be so fixed as to make the service attractive to time-expired soldiers of the British army and the European Inspectors and Sergeants required for ordinary police work would usually be selected from the special reserves. If one lakh is assumed to be the annually recurring cost of one company, the total cost of nine companies would be about 8½ lakhs after deducting the cost of two existing native companies replaced. The cost of an extra native company required for Madras would be about Rs. 25,000. At a rough estimate therefore the total annual cost of these proposals would amount to about 11½ lakhs of rupees.

26. Under these proposals each province would have two or more companies of semi-military police well armed and disciplined, mobile and available to be sent where required at a moment's notice. The hands of the Local Governments would be very much strengthened thereby. The companies would naturally be located in centres where the danger of disturbances is greatest, but would not be attached to any particular district and could be speedily transported elsewhere should occasion arise.

Government should be able to take a strong line of action and to avoid the risk involved in dislocating district police arrangements at a time when such action is most effective and such risk is greatest, that is to say, on the first outbreak of lawlessness and violence. In the event of disturbances being widespread in one province only, other provinces would have ready means of reinforcing it. It was remarked in an article in the *Pioneer* discussing the Punjab riots "Such seriousness as they (the riots) have is due rather to the frequency with which the rabble have succeeded in taking the authorities at a disadvantage than to any alarming features which have been revealed." The establishment of special police reserves is in my opinion the most effective and at the same time the cheapest means of strengthening the weak point in the administrative machinery here disclosed.

The 6th August 1907.

C. J. STEVENSON-MOORE.

United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.			Special reserves.	Remarks.
			Sub-inspectors.	Head constables.	Constables.		
47,691,789	Lucknow (264,049).	Dehra Dun	1	5	12		
		Saharanpur	1	6	43		
		Muzaffarnagar	1	8	37		
	Banares (209,331) ..	Meerut	2	11	81		
		Bulandshahr	1	10	39		
	Cawnpore (197,170).	Aligarh	2	13	71		
		Muttra	1	9	35		
		Agra	2	28	171		
	Agra (188,022) ..	Farrukhabad	1	8	51		
		Mainpuri	1	8	40		
		Etawah	2	12	49		
		Etah	1	7	37		
	Allahabad (173,073).	Bareilly	2	11	87		
		Bijnor	1	5	25		
		Budaon	1	5	23		
	Bareilly (131,208) ..	Moradabad	1	4	35		
		Shahjahanpur	1	5	37		
		Philibhit	1	5	26		
	Meerut (118,139) ..	Cawnpore	2	14	119		
		Fatehpur	1	8	26		
		Banda	1	13	36		
	Mirzapur (79,862) ..	Hamirpur	1	9	26		
		Allahabad	2	24	146		
		Jhansi	3	32	133		
	Rampur (78,758) ..	Jaloun	1	16	77		
		Banares	2	16	116		
		Mirzapur	1	6	24		
	Shahjahanpur (76,458).	Jaunpur	1	6	29		
		Ghazipur	1	9	37		
		Ballia	1	6	36		
	Moradabad (75,128).	Ghorakpur	1	11	80		
		Basti	1	8	42		
		Azamgarh	1	3	40		
	Fyzabad (75,085) ..	Garhwal	1	16	41		
		Lucknow	4	23	162		
		Unao	1	6	32		
	Koil (70,434) ..	Rae Bareilly	1	7	38		
		Sitapur	1	8	41		
		Hardoi	1	8	41		
	Farrukhabad (67,338).	Kheri	1	8	30		
		Fyzabad	2	16	90		
		Gonda	1	4	26		
	Saharanpur (56,254).	Bahraich	1	4	21		
		Sultanpur	1	7	36		
		Farrukhabad	1	6	30		
	Gorakhpur (64,148).	Bara Banki	1	10	30		
	Muttra (50,042).						
	Jhansi (56,724).						
47,691,789	18	46	60	357	2,496		

Seth

Punjab.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.		Special reserves.	Remarks.
			Officers.	Constables		
20,330,339 ..	Delhi (208,575) ..	Hissar	* 3	25		* The total 3 in this column is made up of 1 sub-inspector and 2 head constables.
		Rohtak	3	25		
		Gurgaon	3	25		
	Lahore (202,964) ..	Delhi	3	25		
		Karnal	3	25		
		Ambala	3	25		
	Rawalpindi (87,688) ..	Simla	3	25		
		Hoshiarpur	3	25		
		Jullundur	3	25		
	Multan (87,394) ..	Ludhiana	3	25		
		Kangra	3	25		
		Ferozepore	3	25		
	Ambala (78,638) ..	Montgomery	3	25		
		Lahore	3	25		
		Amritsar	3	25		
	Jullundur (67,735) ..	Gurdaspur	3	25		
		Sialkot	3	25		
		Gujranwala	3	25		
	Sialkot (57,956) ..	Lyallpur	3	25		
		Jhang	3	25		
		Multan	3	25		
		Muzaffargarh	3	25		
		Dera Ghazi Khan	3	25		
		Gujrat	3	25		
		Shahpur	3	25		
		Jhelum	3	25		
		Rawalpindi	3	25		
		Attock	3	25		
		Mianwali	3	25		
20,330,339 ..	8	29	87	725		

Bombay Presidency.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.		Remarks.
			Officers, H.C.	Men C.I.	
18,515,587 ..	Bombay (776,006) ..	Ahmedabad	3	30	
		Broach	2	15	
		Kaira	2	15	
	Ahmedabad (185,889) ..	Panch Mahal	2	20	
		Surat	2	15	
		Thana	4	25	
	Habli (60,214) ..	Ahmednagar	3	30	
		East Khandesh	3	30	
		West Khandesh	3	30	
	Poona (153,320) ..	Nasik	4	35	
		Poona	3	30	
		Satara	3	25	
	Sholapur (75,288) ..	Sholapur	3	30	
		Belgaum	3	25	
		Bijapur	3	30	
	Suart (119,306) ..	Dharwar	3	30	
		Kanara	2	15	
		Kolaba	2	20	
		Ratnagiri	2	15	
18,515,587 ..	6	19	52	475	

pnc

Madras Presidency.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.			Special reserves.	Remarks.
			Officers.		Constables.		
			Sergeant.	Head constable.			
38,199,162..	Madras (509,346) ..	Ganjam	1	3	40		
		Vizagapatam	1	3	30		
	Madura (105,984) ..	Jeypore	4	40		
		Giddavari	1	4	53		
	Trichinopoly (104,721).	Kistna	1	3	30		
	Calicut (76,981) ..	Guntur	1	2	25		
		Nellore	1	2	25		
		Kurnool	1	4	40		
	Salem (70,621) ..	Bellary	1	4	40		
		Anantapur	1	3	30		
	Kumbakonam (59,673).	Chidambaram	1	4	40		
	Bellary (58,247) ..	North Arcot	1	4	40		
		Chingleput	1	4	40		
		South Arcot	1	3	30		
	Tanjore (57,870) ..	Salem	1	4	50		
		Tanjore	1	5	53		
	Negapatam (57,190).	Trichinopoly	1	4	50		
		Madura	1	4	50		
	Coimbatore (53,080).	Tinnevely	1	5	60		
		Coimbatore	1	4	40		
	Cuddalore (52,216).	Malabar	1	3	30		
		South Canara	1	5	55		
38,199,162..	11	22	21	81	891		

Central Provinces and Berar.

Total population.	Number of towns with a population of over 50,000.	Districts.	Emergency reserves.			Special reserves.	Remarks.
				
14,627,045 ..	Nagpur (127,734) ..	Nagpur	200	
	Jubbulpore (90,316) ..	Jubbulpore		
		Saugor					
		Nimar					
		Rajpur					
		Amraoti					
14,627,045 ..	2	6				200	

II

Official Memorandum—from the Hon'ble Mr. J. N. ATKINSON, C.S.I., I.C.S., Acting Chief Secretary to Government.

To—the Inspector-General of Police, Madras.

Dated—the 20th March 1908.

No.—1684—Judicial.

The letter from the Government of India, together with a copy of the memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, is forwarded to the Inspector-General of Police for early remarks on the proposals of the Government of India.

III

Letter—from D. W. G. COWIE, Esq., I.C.S., Inspector-General of Police, Madras.

To—the Chief Secretary to Government.

Dated—the 4th June 1908.

No.—12-Confld.

I have the honour to reply to Judicial department Memorandum No. 1684-1, dated 20th March 1908, forwarding to me for remarks Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore's proposal for the enrolment of special provincial police reserves composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians.

2. As pointed out by the Home Secretary to the Government of India in his covering letter, the question for consideration is the sufficiency, in respect both of numbers and of armament, of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times and Mr. Stevenson-Moore has shown clearly that Madras is one of the provinces where (to quote his words) the provision made for dealing with sudden outbreaks is dangerously insufficient—paragraph 12 of his letter. His remark in the same paragraph to the effect that in this presidency there is a strong establishment of City Police is discounted by the fact that the Madras City Police force possesses no fire arms.

3. Mr. Stevenson-Moore has not, I think, laid sufficient stress upon the fact that the Presidency is very poorly provided with troops, there being, south of a line drawn west from Madras, only one British and two Native Battalions, and on or near the East Coast no troops whatever. It may be advisable to refrain from employing troops on the occasion of ordinary civil disturbance, but it is certain that the mere existence of a Cantonment has a very sobering effect on the population of a big town or turbulent district, and as an instance of this, I may say that, when District Magistrate of Bellary, I repeatedly had reason to believe that but for the presence of the garrison seriously active opposition would have been offered to the plague preventive measures.

4. The armed reserves in this presidency have been strengthened in accordance with the proposals of the Police Commission, but it is not easy to mobilize them without disturbing the ordinary police work of the districts or to move them without affecting the safety of the large head-quarter towns in which the ordinary force is small and for the most part unarmed. To show the weakness of our armed reserves I may mention the recent riots in Tinnevely district. On that occasion, owing to the presence of a Special force of police at Sivakasi, it was possible to strengthen Tuticorin before the riots occurred and immediately afterwards parties of reserve police [were] drafted into the district from force of the other southern districts; but, had there been even slight disturbances in these districts, not a man could have been moved and, as it was, no men could be spared to assist in preserving order in the outlying portions of the Tinnevely district. Much the same thing occurred in 1907 after the riot at Cocanada, parties of reserve police being sent to that town from the Northern Circars, but it should be borne in mind that in each case the disturbance was confined to one district and the continued mobilization of the reserves seriously affected the ordinary police work. Had the disturbances been at all widespread, no district could have done more than see to itself.

GR

5. When the events of the last twelve months are considered, and in the present state of political unrest which is not likely to be lessened in the near future, it is necessary to form some estimate of the force available for the maintenance of order, and here it must be admitted that Mr. Stevenson-Moore is only too correct in saying that it would not be safe to rely on the adherence of more than half the present police force at the most (in my opinion he is rather oversanguine) and that the only classes whose loyalty could be absolutely relied upon are the Europeans and Eurasians. Having clearly shown the absolute necessity for such a force, he proposes for this province three special companies of 100 men each, one company each of Europeans, Eurasians and Moplahs. This force would, I think, be sufficient for the object in view, though two of the Deputy Inspectors-General, whom I have consulted, would place the minimum at 400 men. This estimate is, of course, quite apart from the question of the military garrison of the province which is one that calls for careful attention at the present time.

6. Of the three special companies, one should be placed at Coimbatore, one at Madura and the third at Rajahmundry or Waltair. None is needed in the Ceded districts so long as Bellary continues to be garrisoned by troops, but the Northern Circars which have no troops nearer than Secunderabad should have a company, while the country to the south of Trichinopoly which comprises the troublesome districts of Madura and Tinnevely requires additional protection, whether the military garrison of Trichinopoly is added to or not. The third company may well be placed at Coimbatore whence it can easily be moved to the West Coast, to any of the Tamil districts on the broad gauge line of railway or (*vis à* Erode) to the south.

7. All three companies should, I consider, consist of Eurasians and Europeans (mainly country bred), for what is wanted is a force on whose loyalty complete reliance can be placed, and it would not be safe to count on the Moplahs who, though no doubt now loyal and in many respects a race apart from the bulk of the population of the province, are ignorant, fanatical and notoriously difficult to handle. A Moplah company would, of course, be less expensive than a third company of Europeans and Eurasians, but I can see no other reason for preferring it. At the same time, it may be stated that, should it be decided to form a company of Moplahs, we already have a nucleus for it in the men now serving in the Tinnevely Punitive Force and there are several hundred Moplah ex-sepoys now in Malabar from whom it would be easy to select an efficient body of men.

8. Madras, Bangalore and the Lawrence Asylum would form the recruiting ground for the three companies proposed, and there should be no difficulty in filling the ranks with men of sufficiently good physique, a certain proportion being old soldiers. I would suggest enlistment for twenty-one years with a certainty of pension, as I do not think it likely that short terms of service such as those proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore would be attractive. If men of a good stamp were enlisted, the best of them would form a valuable source from which to draw Eurasian and European Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors for the ordinary police and the prospect of such advancement would tend to make service in the special force popular.

9. It would appear advisable not to have separate European and Eurasian companies. Both classes serve together in the army, notably in the artillery, and I can see no reason for making any invidious distinction such as must arise if the classes are to be separately enrolled.

10. Each company should be commanded by an officer of the Indian Army (a senior Subaltern or junior Captain) specially selected and seconded for a definite period, say five years. This would be in every way preferable to placing the local District Assistant Superintendent of Police in command, for when the company went on service, he must either leave his sub-division or the company pass at the most critical time into the hands of a stranger. In any case an officer of the army would be a more suitable commandant than a Police officer, the duties of the appointment being almost entirely military.

218

11. With regard to armament, Martini-Henry rifles and bayonets should be provided. Cyclist and fire-extinguishing sections and signallers would, of course, be trained, while inducements might be offered to the men to learn telegraphy and perhaps the execution of simple railway repairs.

12. I have no remarks to make as regards Mr. Stevenson-Moore's rough estimates of the cost of the proposed force except to point out that (as he says himself) they are probably rather over than under the mark. I regret the delay in replying to the official memorandum, which is due to my having consulted the Deputy Inspectors-General.

Order—No. L, Judicial, dated L July 1908. 28th

The Government of India will be addressed.

[Here enter letter No. L, Judicial, dated L July 1908.] 28th
(True Extract)

J. N. ATKINSON,
Ag. Chief Secretary.

socket.

Special Police Reserve

Addressing the Govt. of India
on the ^{Subject of the} formation of — the
composed of Europeans and
Eurasians.

CONFIDENTIAL.

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

No. 1028.

From

THE HON'BLE MR. J. N. ATKINSON, C.S.I., I.C.S.,
Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras,
Judicial Department,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
HOME DEPARTMENT.

Dated Ootacamund, the 28th July 1908.

SIR,

I am directed to reply to Home department letter No. 329, dated the 11th March 1908, on the subject of the sufficiency in respect both of numbers and armament of the provincial police forces to deal with disturbances in ordinary times.

2. The Government of India forward, for the consideration of this Government, a memorandum drawn up by Mr. C. J. Stevenson-Moore, I.C.S., Officiating Director of Criminal Intelligence, containing proposals for the enrolment of special police reserves to be composed mainly of Europeans and Eurasians and the views of the Governor in Council are asked upon the probable value of the force suggested by Mr. Stevenson-Moore and the manner in which it should be armed.

3. The Governor in Council has no hesitation in accepting Mr. Stevenson-Moore's conclusion that this Presidency shares, along with other provinces, the danger of being inadequately provided with the means of dealing with a sudden outbreak of internal disturbance. He also agrees that such an event, if it does occur, may bring to light the fact that the loyalty of the ordinary police is not altogether unimpeachable. Further, the urgent necessity for augmenting the forces available for maintaining order is accentuated by the fact that this Presidency is virtually denuded of European troops. After careful consideration His Excellency in Council is of the opinion that the constitution of a special police reserve of the nature proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore will be the best method of attaining the object in view, and that a force of three companies of 100 men each will suffice for the Madras Presidency.

4. In the matter of the composition of the companies, the Governor in Council considers that, as what is wanted is a force on whose loyalty complete reliance can be placed, it would not be safe to count on the Moplahs, who, though no doubt now loyal, and in many respects a race apart from the bulk of the population of the Presidency, are ignorant, fanatical and notoriously difficult to handle. The Governor in Council,

however, sees no reason why separate companies of Europeans and Eurasians should be formed. Both classes serve together with success in the army, notably in the artillery. This Government therefore consider that mixed companies of Europeans and Eurasians could be formed without difficulty, thus avoiding any necessity for invidious distinctions which must arise if the classes are to be separately enrolled. Three such mixed companies are urgently needed for this Presidency. 97

5. With regard to the terms under which Eurasian recruits should be drafted, the Governor in Council considers that enlistment for 21 years with a certainty of pension is necessary, as it is not likely that short terms of service such as those proposed by Mr. Stevenson-Moore would be attractive. If men of a good stamp were enlisted, the best of them would form a valuable source from which to draw Eurasian and European Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors for the ordinary police and the prospect of such advancement would tend to make service in the special force popular. Madras, Bangalore and the Lawrence Asylum at Ootacamund would form the chief recruiting grounds and there should be no difficulty in filling the ranks with men of sufficiently good physique.

6. The Government consider that it would be advisable that each company should be commanded by an officer of the Indian Army (a senior Subaltern or junior Captain) specially selected and seconded for a definite period and put entirely under the orders of the local Inspector-General of Police. This would be preferable to placing the local District Assistant Superintendent of Police in command, for, if the company went on service, he must either leave his sub-division or the company must pass at the most critical time into the hands of a stranger. Moreover, the Assistant Superintendent of Police has his district work to attend to and some one is wanted who can give his whole time to the work of training these special companies.

7. The Governor in Council considers that the men should be provided with Martini-Henry rifles and bayonets, that cyclist, fire extinguishing and signalling sections should be trained, and that inducements should be offered to the men to learn telegraphy and perhaps the execution of simple railway repairs.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. N. ATKINSON,
Ag. Chief Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Press
Please strike trend one
Sign copy on handmade
papers 133 sp. Copies &
keep type standing
20/12/08
GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

No. *L.*

1028

From

THE HON'BLE MR. J. N. ATKINSON, C.S.I., I.C.S.,
Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras,
Judicial Department,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
HOME DEPARTMENT.

Dated Ootacamund, the *L* July 1908. 28th

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I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. N. ATKINSON,
Ag. Chief Secretary.

ROSS.

RS.

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