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USE OF GANGES WATER BY MUSLIM RULERS FROM A.D. 1300 TO 1800

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The *Caraka Samhitā*,¹ the oldest extant treatise on Indian Medicine deals in a Special Chapter² with the properties of different kinds of water. Referring to the waters of rivers the author observes that the waters of rivers having their origin in the Himalayas are holy and wholesome.³ As the river Ganges has its origin in the Himalayas, Caraka's remarks are applicable to the Ganges water, which was then regarded as holy on account of its association with gods and Sages and also wholesome.

1. Vide p. 506 of Keith's *Sanskrit Literature*, 1928. Caraka, according to tradition was the physician of Kaniṣka, whose wife he helped in a critical case.

2. This Chapter is called *ambuvarga* (Vide p. 159-160 of the *Caraka-Samhitā*, N.S. Press, Bombay, 1922) verses 191 to 212—this chapter begins with the verse—

“ जलमेकविधं सर्वं पतस्येन्द्रं नमस्तलात् ।
तत्पतत्पतितं चैव देशकालावपेक्षते ॥ १७१ । ”

3. Ibid, verse 205—

“ नद्यः पाषाणविच्छिन्नविश्वध्वामहितोदकाः ।
हिमवत्प्रभवाः पथ्याः पुण्या देवर्षिसेविताः ॥ २०५ ॥

Cakrāpanidatta (about 1060 A.D.) observes that the Ganges water as it comes from the Himalayas is wholesome (“ यथोक्तलक्षणहिमालयमवत्वादेव गाङ्ग पथ्यम् ”). It is evident that Caraka includes *Gāṅga* or Ganges water in the expression “ हिमवत्प्रभवा उदकाः ”. Caraka also refers to waters flowing from the *Malaya* mountain (मलयप्रभवाः), the *Pāriyātra* (पारियात्रप्रभवाः), the *Vindhya* and the *Sahya* mountains (विन्ध्यसह्यप्रभवाः). *पारियात्र* is same as *पारिपात्र* Western part of Vindhya range etc. (See p. 149 of Nundo Lal De., *Geographical Dictionary*, 1927).

From the earliest medical treatise we now proceed to the latest treatise¹ on Dietetics of the 18th century, which contains a Section² on the properties of waters of different rivers³ in India. In this Section we have the following verse regarding the properties of the water of the river Bhāgīrathī or Ganges:—

Folio 75 (Bhojana kutūhala) —

“ अथ नादेयम् ॥

नद्या नदस्य वा नीरं नादेय मिति कीर्तितम् ॥

1. Vide *Bhojanakutūhala* M.S. No. 594 of 1899-1915 in the Govt. M.S.S Library at the B.O.R. Institute, Poona. This M.S. is dated A.D. 1803. The Section on Waters is called *Jala-prakaraṇa*. It records severally the properties of waters of the river Bhāgīrathī (Ganges), *yamunā*, *Narmadā*, *Sarasvātī*, *Candrabhāgā*, *Madhumatī*, *Satadru*, *Vipāsā*, *Sindhu*, *Tapī*, *Vetravatī*, *Payoṣṇī*, *Vitastā*, *Sarayū*, *Gomātī*, *Godāvarī*, *Kṛṣṇā* *Kṛṣṇavenī*, *Malapraharā* (= *Malaprabhā*), *Bhīmarathī*, *Ghaṭapraharā* (= *Ghaṭaprabhā*), *Tungabhadra* and *Kāverī*. The author gives the above names of the rivers unlike Caraka, who only names the mountains from which apparently rivers flow down to the Seas.

2. See also *Toyavarga* of the *Aṣṭāṅgahrdaya* of Vāgbhaṭa (8th or 9th Century A.D.) *Sūtrasthāna*, Chap. V. (pp. 61 ff) N.S. Press, 1939. P. 61—“ गङ्गाम्बु ” mentioned in verse 2 is explained by Hemadri (A.D. 1260) as “ आकाशगङ्गातोयं मेघैः आनीतम् ” while Aruṇadatta (C. 1220 A.D.) explains it as “ वस्त्रादिगृहीतं गाङ्गं ”. Vāgbhaṭa repeats Caraka's opinion in his line “ हिमवन्म लयोद्भूताः पथ्यास्ता एव च स्थिरा ; (v. 10) The term “ गङ्गाम्बु ” is used to exclude the Sea-water as observed by Hemadri (“ लङ्गाम्बु इति सामुद्रस्य व्यावृत्त्यर्थम् ”) but it does include the water of Ganges river.

3. Vide *Geographical Essays* by B.C. Law, 1937, pp. 42, 84, 85—“ The holy river Gaṅgā is often mentioned in *Pāli* and *Sanskrit* Buddhist sources. More than once the Bodhisattva arrived on the Ganges ; on one occasion the river was full to the brim (*Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 407, also cf. *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 201). According to the *Purāṇas* the Gaṅgā is one of the rivers issuing from the Himavat, (See *Mārka. Purāṇa*, p. 57, 16-18). The *Vāyu* and *Matsya* as also *Viṣṇu*, *Bhāgavata* and *Padma Pūrāṇas* describe the descent of the Ganges. In the *Mahābhārata* as well as in the *Purāṇas*, the Gaṅgā is invariably qualified as *tripathagā* or flowing in three directions. On the banks of the Ganges Vidura listened to *Srīmadbhāgavata* read out by the sage Maitreya (p. 218) The *Mahāvamsa* Commentary mentions *Gaṅgā* among the rivers of Ceylon (p. 74)

तथ भागीरथ्याः—

सीतं स्वादु स्वच्छमत्यंतरुच्यं
पथ्यं पाक्यं पाचनं पापहारि ।
तृष्णामोहध्वंसनं दीपनं च
प्रज्ञां धत्ते वारि भागीरथीयम् ॥”

The water of the Ganges as described in the above verse is white (सीतं), sweet (स्वादु), clear (स्वच्छं), very tasteful (अत्यंतरुच्यं), wholesome (पथ्यं), fit for cooking (पाक्यं), digestive (पाचनं), capable of removing all sins¹ (पापहारि), capable of removing thirst (तृष्णः) and delusion (मोहः), stimulating (दीपनं), and last but not least it promotes intellect (प्रज्ञां धत्ते).

I believe, this description of the Ganges water represents in brief the uptodate Hindu belief about this water sustained from the time of Caraka to the present day through no less than 2000 years. There would be no dearth of references to the virtues² of the Ganges water in the Indian literature and it

1. The *Subhāṣitaratnabhāṇḍāgāra* (N. S. Press, Bombay, 1911) p. 131 records the effects of a Sultan's trumpets on the wives of his enemies as follows :—

“गङ्गाम्भसि सुरत्राण तव निःसाणनिस्त्रनः ।

स्नातीवारिवधूर्गर्भपातनपातकी ॥ २९ ॥”

These wives of the enemy, sinful on account of the abortions caused by the terrific sound of the Sultan's trumpets are represented as washing themselves in the water of the holy Ganges as if with a view to wash away their sinfulness. Evidently the enemy of the Sultan is some Hindu King. (For other *Subhāṣitas* regarding Gaṅgā, vide verses 123 to 134 on p. 9 of this compilation).

Saint Tukārām (A.D. 1608-) addressed a letter to the Ganges (*abhaṅgas* 4320-4322 of Madgaonkar's edn. Bombay 1886) in which he calls भागीरथी or Ganges as “महादोषनिवारणी”

2. Jagannātha Panditarāya of Shah Jahan's time sums up the virtues of the Ganges-water in the following stanza of his immortal *Gaṅgālaharī* :—

(continued on next page)

would be worth while collecting all of them in a special monograph as a tribute to the sacred river of the Hindus. What concerns me, however, in the present paper is the estimate of the Ganges water by people of foreign culture like the Muslims and the value they attached to this water in the daily conduct of their lives. As I don't claim a close knowledge of the Muslim Sources which are likely to throw more light on this problem than I can do in this paper, I must rest content with an appeal to Muslim scholars to put together all historical references to the use of the Ganges water at least during the last 1500 years say from A.D. 500 onwards.

Though the Muslims¹ may not have believed in the spiritual qualities of the holy Ganges water, there is possibility of their having entertained a high regard for its medical properties conducive to their physical well being as noted in early medical treatises like *Caraka*, *Suśruta*, the *Aṣṭāṅga Saṁgraha*, the *Aṣṭāṅgahrdaya* and the like. It is also possible to find some references to the properties² of the Ganges water in the treatises on Medical Science composed by Muslims.

“ जडानन्धान्यं गुणप्रकृतिबाधिरातुक्ति विकलान्
ग्रहग्रस्तानस्ताखिल दुरित निस्तारस्तरणीन ।
निलिम्पैर्निर्मुक्तानपि च निरयान्तर्निपततो
नरानम्ब भातुं त्वामेह परमं भेषजमपि ॥ १५ ॥

(Vide p. 21 of *Marathi Life of Pandita Jagannatharāya with Sangītā Gangālaharī*—Sāyaji Sāhityamālā No. 127 by Ramrao Martand Bhamburkar, Baroda, 1928).

1. Cf. *Memoirs of Baber*, London, 1826, p. 315, of Erskin's Edition—"In Hindustan if you except the rivers, there is little running water. Now and then some standing water is to be met with. All these cities and countries derive their water from wells and tanks in which it is collected during the rainy season." Baber was very fond of fountains and tanks and directed some reservoirs to be built during his conquests in Hindustan (e.g. see p. 370). He refers to one Syed Dekni Sherāzi in his employ, who was a water-finder (or hydraulic engineer) in charge of artificial waterworks (p. 388).

2. Cf. Gondal *Aryan Medical Science*, London, 1896—p. 204 "The Indian writers have described the medical properties of waters of the principal rivers, lakes, wells, and mineral springs of the country and their power to cure various diseases. This clearly shows that hydrotherapy was known in India long before it was dreamt of in Europe".

With these preliminary remarks about the importance of the Ganges water recorded in Indian medical texts let us turn to some historical references about its use by Muslims.

In Ibn Battuta's *Travels*¹ in Asia and Africa (A.D. 1325-54) he describes the postal service then current in India and mentions Couriers carrying post in a rapid manner over long distances. In this context he observes :—

“This post is quicker than the mounted post. It is sometimes used to transport fruits from Khurásán which are highly valued in India ; they are put on plates and carried with great speed to the sultan². In the same way they transport the principal criminals ; they are each placed on a stretcher and the carriers run carrying the stretcher on their heads. The Sultan's drinking water is brought to him by the same means when he resides at Dawlat Abád from the river Kank (Ganges) to which the Hindus go on a pilgrimage and which is at a distance of forty days' journey from there.”

This reference to the use of the Ganges water by Muhammad Taghlakh at Daulatābad in the Deccan appears to me to be curious and important as it illustrates the value set upon the Ganges water by a non-Hindu in the first quarter of the 14th century. In the article on the Ganges in the Marāthi Encyclopædia called the *Jñānaśa*³ no information about the

1. Ed. by H.A.R. Gibs, Broadway Travellers, London, 1929 p. 183. Battūta reached Indus on 12th September 1333. He set out for China as ambassador on 22nd July 1342. He dictated his travels from memory in A.D. 1353. He was born on 24th February 1304. Vide my paper on “Identification of Kutul Khan mentioned by Jinaprabhasūri in his Vividha-Tirtha-Kalpa (Rangaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, 1940, pp. 345-350).

2. Muhammad Taghlakh (A.D. 1324-1351) See p. 300 of *Mohammadan Dynasties* by S. Lane-Poole (1925).

3. Ed. by Dr. S.V. Ketkar, Poona, 1925, Vol. XII,—“॥ ५ ” This article is based on the following sources :—(1) Atkinson's *Himalayan Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1882-84, (2) Dowson's *Hindu classical Dictionary* ; (3) Skinner's *Excursion in India*, London, 1838, (4) *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and (5) *Māhābhārata*. The Ganges is referred to in the R̥gveda only twice (Maṇḍala IV and X). It had

Ganges water of a historical¹ or medical nature has been recorded, and it would be interesting to record in this paper such information in the interest of the historical aspects of Indian Culture.

Whether this fondness for Ganges water displayed by Muhammad Taghlakh was continued by Muslim rulers of the 15th century in Gujarat, Bengal and the Deccan, I cannot say at present, as I have not searched for references to it in the contemporary sources. I find, however, that it appears again at the Court of Emperor Akbar in the 16th century as will be seen from the extract from the celebrated *Ain-i-Akbari*² :—

“His Majesty (Akbar) calls this source of life (Ganges water) ‘*the water of immortality*’ and has committed the care of this department to proper persons. He does not drink much, but pays much attention to this matter. Both at home and on travels he drinks Ganges water. Some trustworthy persons are stationed on the banks of that river who dispatch the water in sealed jars. When the court was at the capital Agra and in Fatehpore Seekree the water came from the district of Sarūn, but now that His Majesty is in the Punjab water is brought from Hardwar. For the cooking of the food, rain water or water taken from Jamnah and Chenale is used, mixed with a little Ganges water. On journeys and hunting parties His Majesty from his predilection for good water appoints experienced men as water-tasters.”

assumed much importance during the *Mahābhārata* period, It was through Megasthenes () that the western people came to know of it. There is a temple of the Ganges at Haridvāra. There are images of the Ganges in South India also.

1. Shivaji the Great at the time of his Coronation at Raigadh fort in A.D. 1674 (June) used Ganges water for his bath and gave Gāgā Bhaṭṭa 5000 *hons* (Vide p. 274 of *Shivaji* by Sir Jadunath Sarker, Calcutta, 1919).

2. Vol. I, p 55—This extract has been quoted on p. 221 of *Bernier's Travels* (constable) & Co.) London, 1891 in a footnote. “The Mogul Emperors were great connoisseurs in the matter of good water.” The *Ain-i-Akbari* refers to “the department of State, the *Abdurkhana*, which had to do with the supply and cooling of drinking water, also with the supply of ice, then brought in the form of frozen snow from the Himalayas”.

It may be argued that the use of the Ganges water by Emperor Akbar, as vouched by the *Ain-i-Akbari* may have been due to his sympathy¹ for Hindu religion and culture. One is, however, surprised to find that the Grand Mogol, Aurangzeb, a hater of Hindu religion and culture maintained the tradition of Akbar in the use of the Ganges water as will be seen from the contemporary remarks of Bernier² in his *Travels*. While describing the expenditure incurred by the Great Mogol Bernier States :—"He (Aurangzeb) keeps in Dehly and Agra..... kitchen apparatus, *Ganges-water* and all the other articles necessary for the camp, which the Mogol has always about him, as in his capital, things which are not considered necessary in our kingdoms in Europe." Speaking of his own use of the Ganges water Bernier observes :—

PAGE 356—"I shall not be exposed to any of these inconveniences and dangers, as my Nawab has with marked kindness ordered that a new loaf of his own household bread and a *Sonrai* of *Ganges water* (with which, like every person attached to the court, he has laden several camels) should be presented to me every morning. A *Sourai* is that tin flagon of

1. Cf. R.C. Kak : *Ancient Monuments of Kashmir*, London, 1933 pp. 33 ff.—Zain-ul-abidin (A.D. 1421-1472) the Muslim king of Kashmir was a great patron of Hindu religion and Culture. He studied the philosophy of the *yogavāsistha* and devoted a considerable part of his time to the study of Sanskrit. Though a Muslim ruler he married a single wife and remained faithful to her throughout his life. This contrasts with the large harems of Oriental rulers of his time.

2. Edited by Archibald Constable and Co. London, 1891—Vol, page 221. Some dates regarding Bernier's biography may be noted here —Born on 25th or 26th 1620 ; Travels in Northern Germany, Poland, Switzerland and Italy (A.D. 1647-1650) ; Matriculates in A.D. 1652 at the University of Moutpellier and later becomes Doctor of Medicine : A.D. 1654—Visits Palestine and Syria : A.D. 1655—Tends the philosopher Gassendi and is present at his death : A.D. 1656-1658—Goes to Egypt ; A.D. 1659—Visits India and accompanies prince Dara as his physician : A.D. 1663—In Delhi : A.D. 1665—Voyages to Bengal with Tavernier and parts company with him in A.D. 1666 ; A.D. 1667—at Golkonda ; at Siraz in Persia 4th October 1667 ; A.D. 1669—At Marseilles ; April 25th (1670)—Date of French King's licence for the printing of his book ; A.D. 1685 Visits England ; A.D. 1688—Dies at Paris at the age of 68 years.

water covered with red cloth which a servant carries before his masters horse."

It appears from the foregoing remarks that the use of the Ganges water for daily consumption was a common practice in the Mogol aristocratic circles at Aurangzeb's court. In his letter written at Lahore on *25th February 1665* which describes the magnificence of the Mogol Camp. Bernier again refers to the *Ganges water* while describing the different tents:—

PAGE 365—"The fruits, the sweetmeats, the *Ganges water*, the saltpetre with which it is cooled and the betlé are kept in four other tents. *Betlé* is the leaf (of which I have spoken elsewhere), which after it has undergone a certain preparation is given as a mark of royal favour (like Coffee in Turkey) and which when masticated, sweetens the breath and reddens the lips."

It appears from these observations that the Ganges water had assumed the same status as a drink at Aurangzeb's court as *tea* or *coffee* at garden-parties given by Governors of our provinces at the present day. I wonder if any of our congress ministers thinks of reviving this healthy custom in the interest of national health much to the satisfaction of the orthodox patriots, who condemn tea and coffee with all their heart!

From the 17th Century we now turn to the 18th Century and are surprised to find that a Muslim ruler of a petty principality like *Savannr* should have maintained the Mogul habit of drinking the *Ganges water* during the latter half of the 18th Century. The evidence on this point is recorded by Captain Edward Moor who paid a visit to this Nawab of Savannr (or "Shahnvor" as Moor calls it) between A.D. 1790 and 1794. A description of this visit occurs in Chapter XVIII of Moor's *Narrative*¹ published in London in 1794. Describing the personality of the Nawab, Moor observes as follows:—

1. *Narrative of the Operations of Capt. Little's Detachment and of the (Maratha Army commanded by Purseram Bhaw (against Tipoo Sultan) by Edward Moor on the Bombay Establishment, London, 1794.*

Page 248—“Although no language but Hindui, or Moors, was spoken, he is doubtless skilled in the learned and polite languages.....His hookah, which is his constant companion appeared to be of English glass, curiously cut. There were several other pieces of glass of European manufactory, about the room : Asiatics greatly admire the glass of Europe. He never drinks anything but *water of the Ganges* ; all other kinds, he says disagree with him ; and he has several camels and *abdars* constantly employed in bringing water from that river ”

Moor's note on the use of the Ganges water by the Nawab of Savanur may be reproduced here as it makes interesting reading :—

“The Ganges¹ being a sacred river, its waters are highly revered by pious Hindoos ; and in every city in India, Yogees are seen carrying about the streets the water of this river, which is readily purchased by the simple Hindoos, as a purification. A very little is efficacious, being similar in its Sin-expelling power to the *holy water of the Catholics*. Eminent pagodas, however distant are supplied from this stream of sanctity, with water for the idol's ablutions.² We read in Dow (*History of*

1. The *Arthāśāstrā* states that the Ganges shall be worshipped during drought (vide p. 235 of Sham Sastry's edn. 1929). The officer in charge of the city (*nāgaraka*) shall make a daily inspection of reservoirs of water (p. 164). The king shall construct reservoirs of water (p. 46). According to the *Prākṛta-Śabda-Mahārṇava* (p. 354). The river *Gaṅgā* is mentioned in the *बृहत्कल्पसूत्र* (Ed. by Schubring Leipzig, 1905), the *सप्तवायंगसूत्र* (p. 27 of Agamo. Samiti, Bombay 1918), the *कल्पसूत्र* (Jacobi Peipzig, 1879) and as a goddess in Malayagiri's comm. on *आवसूत्र* (MS).

*2. The *Bibliography of Sex Ritis and customs* (by Roger Goodland, George Routledge, London, 1931) records the following references regarding the use of the Ganges water (pp. 90 and 144).—

- (1) *Ganges-water* poured over *lingam* on Mitra Saptimi festival (Vide p. 107 of Buck ; *Faiths, Fairs and Festivals of India*—Thacker Shink & Co., Calcutta, 1917)
- (2) *Ganges-water* used on important *lingams* (Vide p. 278 of *Indian Antiquary*, XXXIX (1910). Artich on Religious Song from Northern India by William Crooke (1848-1923).

Hindustan, Vol. I, page 76) that Soonnat, the famous divinity in the temple of that name in the peninsula of Gudjarat, was washed morning and evening with fresh water from the Ganges, although that river is alone one thousand miles distant.¹

It must not, however, be understood, that the Nawab drinks it from motives of piety : it is with the Mooselmans, in no more religious esteem than any other river ; but by many it is constantly drank in consequence of its reputed medical properties, and considerable sums are expended to procure it (See Tavernier's *Indian Travels*, p. 52)."

The evidence recorded above regarding the use of the Ganges water by Muslim rulers, say from A.D. 1300 to 1800 is purely of a contemporary character and hence reliable to a very great extent, unless contradicted by a stronger evidence of a contemporary character. The chronology of this evidence may be tabulated as follows :—

1. The *Ākāśabhairava Kalpa* (MS. No, 43 of 1925-26 B. O. R. I.) which I have proved to be a source for Vijayanagar history (*Karnatak History of Review*, Vol. V, Part I, pp. 7-18) prescribes that Ganges-water should be used in the worship of साम्राज्यलक्ष्मी :—

Page 40—“ गंगादिसरिदानीतं गाङ्गेय कलशस्थितम् ।

साम्राज्यलक्ष्मि सलिलमिदमाचम्यतां त्वया ॥

Muslim rulers using Ganges water.	Regnal Period A.D.	Evidence of.	Remarks.
Muhammad Tughlakh	1325—1351	<i>Ibn Battūtā</i> in India between A.D. 1333 and 1342.	Ganges water taken to Daulatabad or Devagiri by <i>Couriers</i> .
Akbar	1556—1605	<i>Ain-i-Akbari</i>	Ganges water used at Agra, Fatehpur Seekree and even in Panjab for drinking and cooking—Brought on <i>Camels</i> .
Aurangzeb	1658—1707	<i>Bernier</i> in India between 1659 and 1667.	Ganges water used regularly in the camp and the Capital for drinking and cooking. Even <i>Bernier</i> got it daily from his <i>Nawab</i> . Brought on <i>Camels</i> .
Nawab of Savanur	1792	<i>Edward Moor</i> .	The Nawab drank no water but the Ganges water, brought on <i>Camels</i> .

We have seen above that Edward Moor refers in his account of the Ganges water to *Tavernier's Travels*. On a reference to an edition¹ of these *Travels* available to me I find some valuable historical information in *Tavernier's* remarks regarding the use of the Ganges water, not by the Muslims but by the Hindus in the middle of the 17th Century as will be seen from the following extracts:—

PAGES 230-231—Pagoda of Benares.

1. Edited by V. Ball, Macmillan & Co., London, 1889, Vol II, pp. 225-243, where *Tavernier* describes the temples at Jagannath, Benares, Muthra, Tirupathy (Tripathy).

“ But above all things, they (the Brahmins) ardently desire to drink the water of the Ganges, because as soon as they have drunk it, they believe, as I have said, that they are cleansed from all their sins. Every day large numbers of these *Brahmins* are to be seen going to the clearest part of the river to fill this water into round, small-mouthed, earthen pots, which hold about a bucketful. When they are full, they are taken to the chief priest, who directs the mouth to be covered with a very fine cloth of fire-colour, in three or four folds upon which he applies his Seal. The Brahmins carry this water at the end of a stick,¹ which is flat like a lath, from which hang six small cords and to each of them one of these pots is attached. They rest themselves by changing the shoulder frequently and they sometimes travel three or four hundred leagues of country with this load, and then sell it, or make a present of it, but only to the richest persons, from whom they expect a liberal reward. There are some of these Idolators who, when they celebrate any festival,—especially when their children are married—drink this water at a cost of 400 or 500 *écus*. It is only drunk at the end of the repast, as we drink hypocras, or muscat in Europe, each (guest) receiving a cup, or two, according to the liberality of the host. The principal reason why this water of the Ganges is so highly esteemed is that it never becomes bad, and engenders no vermin; but I do not know whether we should believe what is said about

1 These are *Kāvaḍīs* of Ganges water (Vide letter No 37 of Peshwa Dattar Selection No. 18) Sadāshiv Naik, the father of Balraj Naik Joshi, mentions in his letter 4 *Kāvaḍīs* of Ganges water sent with Brahmins from Benares for the use of Bājirao Peshwa. The writer wishes that as a result of drinking the holy water of the Ganges the Peshwa would be free from his debts (“ श्रीतीर्थसेवन करून महाराजचि कर्तपरिहार ह्वावा etc”)—Letter No. 128 (Before A.D 1753)—Rādhabai writes to Nana Sahib Peshwa that he has received 5 *Kāvaḍīs* of *Gaṅgodaka* or Ganges water sent by Dayārām Purohit from God Mukteśvara Letter No. 129 dated 24-4-1758—17 *Kāvaḍīs* of Ganges water brought to Poona from Haridvāra

this, taking into consideration the number of bodies which are constantly being thrown into the Ganges.”¹

Speaking of marriage ceremonies Tavernier remarks :—

PAGES 253-254—“ But one of the principal outlays is in the *Ganges water* for those who are sometimes 300 or 400 leagues distant from the river ; for as this water is considered sacred and is drunk from religious motives, it has to be brought from a great distance by the Brahmins in earthen vessels² glazed inside which the Grand Brahmin of Jagannath has himself filled with the cleanest-water in the river, and has subsequently placed his seal upon it. This water is not given except at the end of the repast, as I have before said ; for each of the guests three or four cupfuls are poured out, and the more of it the bridegroom gives them to drink so is he esteemed the more generous and magnificent. As this water comes from so far, and the chief *Brahmin* charges a certain tax on each pot, which is round and holds about one of our buckets there is sometimes 2000 or 3000 rupees worth of it consumed at a wedding.”³

1. In a footnote the editor observes :—

“ The reader will do well not to believe this story, but rather to conclude that much of the water when drunk is in a very un-wholesome condition, and is the cause of disease ” (p. 231).

2. Cf. *John Marshall in India* (Notes and Observations in Bengal 1668—1672) ed. by Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Oxford University Press pp 157—158 :—“ At this place Hājipur when Hindoos come to wash, which is about November they all carry away some water in potts out of the river Ganges to their friends though 4 or 500 course (KOS) or 1000 miles, and with that water wash their parents who are old or friends that cannot come, and think thereby that all their sins are forgiven for that years. At this meeting of such a great concourse of people and all washing on one morning and endeavouring to wash as much as they can in the place where these two rivers meet several are yearly crowded to death. Into this river Ganges the Hindoos throw most of their dead corps after a little burnt, esteeming it a holy river ”.

3 As contrasted with the use of the Ganges water at marriages ceremonies here described by Tavernier compare the use of the *Gangodaka* at Vijayanagata court in A.D. 1525 .—

“ According to an inscription of Tirumaladeva, Son of Kṛṣṇarāya dated

(continued on next page)

From Tavernier's account of the 17th century we may go to the 18th century and record here the remarks of a Muslim historian about the use of the Ganges water by the Hindus. This historian composed a *History of Bengal* between A.D. 1786-88. While describing certain features of the country of Bengal at the commencement of his work² he devotes almost a page to the description² of the Ganges and its tributaries and towards the close of this description observes :—

“ And Hindus have written volumes on the sanctity of these rivers. Considering the water of these rivers sacred they fancy that bathing there washes off the sins of a lifetime ; especially bathing at certain *ghāṭs* of the Ganges, such as Benares, Allahabad, and Hardwar, is regarded as very sacred. The rich among the Hindus getting their supplies of the Ganges water from long distances³ take particular care of it and on certain auspicious days, worship the same. The truth of the matter is that the *water of the Ganges, in sweetness,*

Śaka 1446.....(1525 A.D.) a certain Konappa Nāyaka is said to have administered *Gaṅgodaka* to *Kṛṣṇarāya*. If is customary among the Hindus of the South to offer a spoonful of pure water to a dying man and this water is usually called *Gaṅgodaka* (water of the Ganges) ” “ *Kṛṣṇarāya* seems to have fallen ill about 1525 A.D. and his condition became so critical that his life was despaired of, even the last rite of offering *Gaṅgodaka* was performed but he evidently recovered etc.” (Vide p. 5 of *Vijayanagar : Third Dynasty* by N. V. Ramanayya, 1935.

1. *Riyazu-s-Salātin*, (Trans. from the Original Persian by Manlavi Abdus Salam) R. A. Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1902—Fasc. I. The author of this work is Ghulām Husain Salam.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

3. Cf. the following information is recorded by Mr. N. G. Chapellar in his book *पेशवाईच्या सावलीत* (Poona, 1937) —

Page 165—Brahmins at the different *Kṣetras* obtained much *dakṣiṇā* by providing their *yajamānas* with Ganges water

In the month of Phālgun of the year Śaka 1679—A.D. 1757 an expenditure of Rs. 1565 is recorded. The expenditure of bringing 24 *Kāvaḍis* of Ganges water from Benares to Poona is shown as Rs. 480 at Rs. 20 per *Kāvaḍi* for 24 *Kāvaḍis*. The expenditure of taking these *Kāvaḍis* from Poona to Rameśvara is shown as Rs. 960 at Rs. 40 per *Kāvaḍi* for 24 *Kāvaḍis*. In A.D. 1779 some money was paid to a *purohita* for bringing Ganges water from Hāridvāra.

lightness and tasteness has no equal and the water of this river, however long kept, does not stink. There is no river bigger than it in Bengal."

Evidently the Muslim author of the above remarks believes only in the chemical properties¹ of the Ganges water and not in its spiritual properties.

1. My friend Prof. D.D. Kosambi has kindly supplied me the following information about the properties of the Jamna water :—

F. D'Herelle : *Le Bacteriophage et Son Comportement*

2nd edition, Paris 1926.

Page 10 : [translation]

Hankin [ref. Annales del' Institut Pasteur 1896, 10,511] shows that he has confirmed the fact that certain rivers of India possessed an extremely marked antiseptic action against bacterial in general and the cholera vibrio in particular. Thus, the water of the Jumna contains, when leaving the city of Agra, more than 100,000 bacteria per cubic centimete three miles lower it contains no more than 90 or 100.

As regards the cholera vibrio in particular, laboratory experiments have given him the following results [the first line gives results for Jumna water filtered through a porcelain candle, these of the second the same water filtered and boiled ; the water used for the experiment was sowed with a culture of cholera germs] :

Number of germs after :

	0	1	2	3	4	25	49 honrs.
1. 2500	1500	1000	500	0	0	0	
2. 5000	4000	6000	10000	6000	10000	36000	

The antiseptic action of the water of these rivers was usual, but not constant.

It is to this antiseptic action that Hankin attributes the fact that no one has ever been able to incriminate the ingestion of the water of one of these rivers as being the origin of a case of cholera. Neither have these rivers ever been vectors of any epidemics :

Hankin proves that the antiseptic principle is destroyed by boiling and it would follow from his experiments that it is volatile..... The next page continues with the discussion, and suggest that some Indian bacteriologist should recommence the experiments of Hankin to determine definitively whether the action shown is or is not due primarily to the presence of a bacteriophage.

ŚRĪ VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA
ON
THE BUDDHISTIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT¹

DR. K.C. VARADACHARI, M.A. PH. D.

Śrī Vedānta Deśika traces the growth of Buddhistic thought as a critical outcome of the Materialistic school but which in doing so has not any the whit made philosophic understanding better. On the contrary, its several steps of nihilism, subjective idealism, representationalism and realism (presentationalism) have not been able to rescue it from the catastrophe of negation. The causal theory accepted by the schools is forsaken by the doctrine of momentariness and that doctrine annihilates all that is granted by causality. Causality becomes a myth, and one finds that all the superb analyses made by Buddhistic schools have been utterly pointless. Even orthodox schools that might accept these schools in one way or other, openly or otherwise, are subject to these criticisms. Śrī Vedānta Deśika holds that thought that is untrue to ordinary consciousness is bound to lead to extravagant hypotheses. All faults and illusions arise from this fruitful source.

ŚRĪ VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA
ON
THE MĀDHYAMIKA DOCTRINE

We have refuted the Lokāyata doctrine which holds that there is no inference. Now we proceed to refute amongst the buddhists who are their (cārvāka's) close allies, the Mādhyamikas,² who refuse to recognize both perception and

1. VII—X Chapters of the *Paramata-Bhanga*.
2. Translated by some as the *mediocre* (Gough),

inference. So as to refute (our) counter-attacks against Perception (accepted by the materialists who have been refuted in the previous chapter) what he says is this :

What Buddha who has been acclaimed (by his disciples) as the well-known Sarvajña (all-Knower) says is alone truth (pramāṇa). He (Mādhyamikan) establishes universal Negation (*sarva-śūnyatva*) as the foundation of the doctrine of Buddha (*Sugata*) by a progressive negation of (i) permanence (of objects) (ii) of things that are perceived (iii) of external objects, (iv) of relationship between quality and substance etc., even like the example of the sannyāsin who slowly stretches his limbs.¹ Further, as in the passage,

“*I Know This*”: All groups of things which are held to be the knower, the knowledge and the known, are found to be other than all the four countings such as (1) existent, (2) non-existent, (3) existent non-existent, (4) other than existent-nonexistent.

This (therefore) is the essence (of the doctrine of the Buddha).

Not existent, not non-existence, not existent-nonexistence, (but that which is) beyond these four-fold countings (koṭis) is what the Mādhyamikan knows to be the truth (*tattvam*).

By discrimination of these (countings), their (objects etc) nature is not known. Therefore that undiscriminated thing is known to be without any nature. In this manner the doctrine (of Mādhyamikas) is explained.

(This being the truth), therefore when the dream-creation-like objects of waking-consciousness are known to be chimeri-

1. *Sarvadarśana samgraha* : “by a show profession like the intrusive steps of a mendicant.” The absolute extreme nature of the doctrine of Nihilism can only be taught by stages, and conversion is a slow process of leading a disciple. To accept the common-sense position and then to refute it is Socratean method. Buddha was the forerunner of the method. The sannyāsin slowly stretches his legs because of old age or other causes.

cal like the sky-flower, then there is no need to seek the other-worldly things like heaven and liberation. All the activities of the sense-world, like dream-activities, move on pleasantly so long as they are not contemplated upon. This is all.

Mokṣa (according to Mādhyamikas) is said to be that which follows from the triumph over the delusion of existence in all things, (that all things exist permanently or temporarily) and the realization of absolute eternal Non-being.

REFUTATION

1. We say that all these (theories) have their source in self-delusion, because (i) these make even Sarvajña, like a barren woman's son, (a realized non-existent being!) (ii) because the mere name all-knower given to him (on the basis of which you seek to make him an absolute authority, *pramāṇa*), cannot make him that, even like the mere name 'big tree', given to a mere plant (cannot make it big in fact), and (iii) because it cannot be said that this (theory) is superior to the others (also taught by Buddha such as the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra), and (iv) since there is no saying definitely as to which (amongst these)—(as there is no criterion by which to judge)—is the fundamental intention of one who has uttered (so many) mutually contradicting doctrines (so as to suit his mixed audience).

2. Their doctrine that truth is that which is *beyond* the four countings is wrong. In regard to things proved by perception, these four countings can take place (and are sufficient), because a thing is existent at one place and time and non-existent at *another* place and *another* time, and because of this (it may be said to be) existent and non-existent with regard to *those* places and times, and (such things being many) they are different from one another (*sad-asad-vyatirikta*), and as such they are distinguished by the characteristic of mutual differentiation.

1. One and the same thing cannot be at two places at the same time

Is it not only to those theories which hold that a thing is absolutely existent, absolutely non-existent, absolutely existent non-existent without any reference to space-time, and absolutely other than existent-non-existent, that there would happen contradiction? Because also of the difference in time and place (*ākārabheda*), our countings¹ do not suffer from the defects of the Jaina *sapta-bhaṅgi* (seven-fold predication.)

3, If it be said that (i) when certain causes arise to bring about the indescribable (posterior) non-existence, non-existence would apply to those causes (according to the rule that non-existence can cause only non-existence and *vice versa*), and (ii) because there would have to be annihilation to everything that owes its existence to a cause (that is, everything born must perish also), and (consequently) (iii) because this (occurrence of annihilation of created objects) by itself is indifferent to destruction (being itself destruction), there cannot occur annihilation to the indescribable posterior non-existence, and since (iv) what are distinguished as anterior and posterior non-being are eternal (according to the definitions already mentioned that what has no beginning can have no end and what has no end could have had no beginning), and (v) since all objects are in their very nature enveloped by non-being at all times (*svabhāvagrastha*), does it not follow that their existence is merely mental construction (*kalpana-mātram*)? **we reply**, there is no indescribability (*nirupākhyatva*) regarding that non-existence which is got at by a change of state (*bhāvāntara*) and by becoming quite opposed to its existence (*atirikta*). The indescribability that is presumed because of the change of form of a thing is not contradictory to the (existence of its) causes and effects. Because this is so, and the perceptual evidence (*pramāṇa*) for origination of non-existence and destruction of non-existence is available for Non-existence, a thing's *present* existence in the middle period, is not contradictory to its prior

1. Our countings are only two, not four or five. Either a thing exists or it does not, The law of the excluded middle is absolutely applicable. Other countings are neither definite nor logical, and only seek to confuse.

non-existence and to its postecedent non-existence (*prādhvamsābhāva*),

4. The non-determination of a thing's existence during the period of discrimination is due to one's own mental defect. Self-contradiction and contradiction with the sources of knowledge happen to him (only), who says that a thing has characteristics of existence and non-existence (at the same time and place), that it is indescribable and unspeakable having no intrinsic nature of its own (*nisvabhāva*).

5. If it be asked that because a thing has been previously non-existent, having been without any self-existence at that time, how it could afterwards have contact with existence or knowability of itself? **we reply**, at that time to a thing which exists for itself and which has been known through sources of knowledge what has been attributed to it being only that *prior* to its non-existence and non-being, that thing previously was not existent as non-existent. It is only if *this non-existence* of the effect has *existence*, it would possess a contradictory nature. It can be asked as to how then the effect existed prior to its own being if it were different from its nature? If it be replied, that it did not exist, that it was *other than* what it is, how can this be a reply (to the question asked)? **we reply**, that only if we can affirm that that effect *existed* in some form or other *prior* to its being (as at present) such a question (as to how it existed either as undifferentiated or indescribable *non-existence* or otherwise) would ever require an answer. Since the purport of that question is only regarding the *existence* of the effect that was non-existent at that time, this can be the legitimate reply (to it). To a person who, postulating Devadatta's existence, asks as to the place where he is, to him (**we reply**) that it is only if such a person *is existent* that *his* place can be asked. In the same way to one who postulates that a thing exists as a pot previous to its existence, and then asks us as to what nature it has, we reply thus : at that time, as that had no existence at all, there is no possibility of raising the question about its nature.

(Only to an existent thing can we address a question, and not to any thing that is non-existent), Therefore is also refuted *Khandana's*,¹ prattle (*jalpa*) that “Non-existent pots are not not-pots” (i.e., they are pots).

6. (If it be said that) in the passage “The effect exists in this place and in this time,” if the meaning of *exists* (*asti*) is identical with the effectuated thing (*kārya*), then it would be redundant. It (existence) would get the quality of being predicated and negated in place and time (regarding a thing's existence) (*vidhi-niṣeda-sādhāraṇam*). If, on the other hand, it (existence) is different from the thing (*svarūpātirikta*), then it is impossible to relate the two ; (**we reply**) since existence which is of the form of relationship with place and time, is itself a regular predicate (*svabhāva-viśeṣaṇa*) of a thing, it is possible to say that a thing *exists*. Since relations do not need other relations² (to relate them to one another, the very purpose of a relation being to relate as is seen in experience), there is no fault of infinite regress either. Even the doctrines of non-existence, which Mādhyamikas uphold, have to accept the subject-predicate relationship (between a thing and its existence or non-existence) (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya*), in ordinary experience for the sake of activities of the phenomenal reality (*samvṛti-satta*). If this is not accepted, then, the attributes such as Non-existence etc., declared in passages “All are non-existent,” “indescribable,” can in no manner be predicated at all (of anything).

7. If it be said that Non-existence that happens to a thing in place and time is the non-existence of the relationship (*sambandhābhāva*), then that relationship should itself be thought to be non-existent in place and time, **we reply**, then such a non-existence according to *atiriktābhāvins* (i.e., those who hold non-existence to be a substance other than its existence) will stand as such, (since they, the naiyayikas, believe

1. Khandana-Khandana-Khaḍya of Śrī Harṣa.

2. Since they are *sva-para-nirvāhaka*.

that each thing, relation etc., has an independent and separate non-existence, *abhāva*), and according to the *bhāvāntarā-bhāvins* (that is those who hold non-existence to be merely other than existence), as testified to by actual experience, the non-existence which is other than and contradictory to its nature will remain.

Therefore the verse

“If the cause is made to possess existence within it, then it becomes non-existence. If existence is not made to inhere in the cause, then too it becomes non-existent” is wrong. It has to be read as amended thus :

“If cause is made to imply within it existence then it is existent. If the cause is not so made to imply it, then too it is existent.”

8. If it be said that what appears as effect was existent before origination, then there would be no need for any causes to bring it about ; if on the other hand it were non-existent, like the earthen pots which are always earth, since it would have to be non-existent, there is no use in having causes ; **we reply**, since a substance is eternally existent,¹ there will be need for causes to bring about the changes of state in it.

9. If it be asked, were these states previously existent or non-existent, (as in that case the dilemma will recur in respect of *avasthas* if not in *dravya*) ? **we reply**, since it is seen in actual experience that the previously non-existent becomes existent by means of causes, and later on, is made non-existent by (other) causes, this is no refutation of those who speak up to what they perceive. This (objection you have raised) affects only those who hold that the perceived is non-existent.

1. *Eternally existent* means [that which is qualified by terms of existence (i.e., space and time) at all times and which is perceptually or otherwise verifiable,

10. If it be asked, how can Non-existence become existent? If oneness (*tādātmya*) is declared between two contradictory things, would it not become the Jaina view that "its own prior non-existence is its cause"?

We reply, it is no contradiction to say that there happens non-existence or existence to a thing due to differences in time and place.¹

11. If it be said, (1) by giving up previous non-existence, there will be abandonment of one's own nature (*svabhāva parityāga*): (2) if it is not given up, will there not arise existence from non-existence? (In which case, *tuccād utpattou tuccameva syāt*, will be refuted)? **We reply**, since the quality (*dharma*) past non-existence, *pūrvakāla-asat*, is at no time being given up,² there is no abandoning of one's own nature, nor is there contradiction with *present existence*.

12. If it be asked, that if existence and non-existence become qualities what is then the (*dharmi*) substance? **we reply** that it is the substrate (*āśraya*) of these two (qualities) is perceptually evident to all.

13. If it be asked, will there not happen to that attributed existence which has come about (*vanderi*) newly, prior existence or non-existence, contradiction or infinite regress (*anavastha*) respectively? (and) if (to avoid this predicament) that form is said to be different from both existence and non-

1. It is not past non-existence and past existence that are coeval and identical. It is the *past non-existence* that is now *present existence*. The Jaina view in speaking of Non-existence being its own *cause* is self-refuting, as a cause is *pūrvakāla-sat*, and not *pūrvakāla-asat*, but the cause is in reality a prior existence not non-existence. Hence the contradiction between *pūrvakāla-asat* and *pūrvakāla-sat*. In Śrī Deśika's view there is no contradiction between *pūrvakāla-asat* and *uttarakāla-sat*, consequent existence. By avoiding reference to time and place which is the fundamental characteristic (*ākāra*) of existence, the Jaina view ends in self-contradiction.

2. That is, the judgment regarding a man that he was non-existent prior to his birth, is valid for *all time*. It is true now and for ever. But the judgment "A is non-existent for all time" will refute the statement that he is at present existing.

existence (*asad-sad-vilakṣana*), when it is unchanging or changing, then it would be incapable of being spoken of (*anirvacanīya*), without being either the non-existence that is given up (*parityājya-sattva*) or achieved existence (*prāpya-sattva*)? If this coming of existence by giving up, the indefinable nature is a contradiction; even if it were born, it would be an indescribable, and thus, will there not arise the futility of all origination (*utpatti vaiyartham*)? **we reply**, the opposition to the (present) existence is its previous non-existence which is its temporally prior opposite attribute (*pūrva-kālavartī viruddha dharma pratiyogī*). (The other questions do not arise because we do not accept the *sad-asad vilakṣana* existence etc. divisions.)

14. Existence is its own authority. If we accept our Common-Sense experience, there will not arise the faults of contradiction and infinite regress in respect of a thing, which whilst demonstrating another's existence assures its own (*sva-para-nirvāḥakam*) (as existence, relations, genus, are categories which do not require another existence, relation or genus to make them exist, relate or inhere). If a thing originates from itself, it need not be born at all, as it is already existent. In its period of non-existence, it will get contradiction in regard to its existence.

15. If it be said that it is born out of something *other than* itself *because* of the general quality (*jāti*) of otherness (*paratva-viśeṣattāle*), should not all things be born out of all *others*? Suppose it is replied that it is born from both (i.e., from itself as well as from the *otherness*, will there not arise both the faults of *svasattavirodham* as well as that all things should be born from all *other* things, i.e., any thing may be born from anything else.)? **We reply** it is only if we say that '*otherness*' alone (or as such) is the cause, then this fault will arise. To speak of causality in regard to a thing which has been determined by experience of invariable agreement and difference and by (*ākāra*, that is, time and place and genus and quality etc.), means the unity

of mutual interrelatedness of all the several causes which bring about the effect. In which case the faults¹ (mentioned by you) will not arise.

16. If it be contended that, accepting a certain observed cause (by the method of invariable agreement and difference) and achieving a result, if one draws any inference, it can only be of the form "Since the *til* seeds from which *til* oil is got is the cause (invariably), and since other seeds than those *are not seen to be causes* (of the *til* oil) should we not reject the inference that *all til seeds give til oil*,² **we reply** that we have already answered this. We can infer by the perception of the presence of generality (*sāmānya*) that the *genus til* is the cause of *til oil* in the particulars (*viśeṣas*), (since we always infer through the generality in the particulars, and the method of agreement and difference *anvaya-vyatireki* is possible only with respect of enumerated particulars which are instances, i.e., belonging to a particular class). Since in the origination of *til* oil, the causality of both 'otherness' and *tilatvam* is perceptively demonstrated by the method of agreement and difference, there is no way by which we can accept one of these (as cause) and reject the other. 'Otherness' is found to be in all particulars (i.e., it is a general causal factor); *Til*-seedness etc., are special causes. This is all the difference (between the two types of causes).

In the same manner, to those who say thus :

"For Non-existence there is no relationship with the cause which is related to existence, and as to the birth of the unrelated, there is no possibility of determination,"¹ we have already given any answer.

To say that for an effect, conjunctive (*samyoga*) relation-

1. A totality of causes bring about the effect, a *kāraṇa samsthāna* causal configuration is a unity, and none of the several components individually can bring about the effect.

2. The point is that exhaustive enumeration alone can satisfy perfect induction. But this is an impossibility.

ship with the cause is necessary, will mean the acceptance of an unnecessary entity (*ayuktāṅga svikaraṇam*).

17. If it be said that (1) the mutual relationship between the causes, and (2) that to regard the cause as the effect's previous existence which has been determined by *anvayaavyatireki* in observation, are not sufficient relationships (i.e., conditions for determining causality), then, the result will be the abandonment of the essential conditions (*yuktāṅgaparityāgam*).

18. The refutation of the dichotomy made between *vikṛti* and *avikṛti* (changing and unchanging) (by which questions whether the effectuation took place from the changing or the unchanging, that if it was from the modified whether and whence that modification arose and how and other regresses arise) can be learnt from the *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa*. (Śrī Bhāṣya II. i. 15 ff).

19. The view that regarding those things which do not get origination and destruction (viz., the *eternal* things), non-existence must be affirmed, like the horns of the hare for example, is refuted, because they (eternal things) have been affirmed to be eternal existents by (scriptural) authority.

20. Those persons who describe all things as Non-existence (*asat*), False (*alika*), Void (*śūnya*), Chimerical (*tucca*), Indescribable (*nirūpākhyā*), having no intrinsic or essential nature (*nisvabhāva*), Illusion (*mithya*), for these, since there can be no unconditional negation if looked at from the point of view of actual experience, it is necessary to accept these as *other* than those place-time-formal determinations which have been negated. In which case, because of differences in place, the things (referred to by these terms) will possess reality (*satta*).

21. If the view of origination as determined by actual experience is not paid heed to, these will have neither any power to instruct nor any power to negate anything regarding anything.

22. The sentences "Son of a barren woman" etc., (horn of a hare, sky-flower), will not convey instruction about the otherwise-determinations (*pratiniyatārtha*) available by giving up the actual things which are results of experience (*vyutpattisiddha*). [i.e., the son is a real entity, so also a barren woman. We have definite meanings for these words. It is the compound of these two words or meanings that yields nonsense, that is, the compound does convey an instruction, and this instruction whilst *apparently* trying to convey an impression of a *real* thing because of the conjunction of real entities, is self-contradicting, because son and barren woman are internally incompatible.]

In accepting meanings which have come into being in this manner, the demonstration by incompatibility and inadmissibility between the irreconcilable terms referring to non-existent things, there are conveyed instructions regarding the qualified (real) existences alone.

23. If it be said that at one time or at one place or in a particular manner that which exists as negated should not exist at another time, at another place or in another manner, as is seen in the (example of) the hairs of the tortoise (which no where, at no time exist), and therefore that in all places no thing exists in its own nature as an object as such because of the resulting opposition (to its antecedent non-existence), should we not therefore accept Nihilism? **we reply**, if it is sought to predicate of the *seen* world non-existence, we may, in the same manner, predicate what is actually perceived in the world, of that eternal non-existence (and perhaps more legitimately too).

24. Both the alternatives would affect those who deny that there is no distinction between authority and non-authority. If it is sought to prove with the help of fallacious reasoning (*hetvābhāsa*) such as, just like sky-flower all things are chimerical, like dream-knowledge knowledge has no object which is its locus (*āśraya*), then, these reasonings get refuted by the faults of *svarūpāsiddha* and *dṛṣṭāntāsiddha* with res-

pect of the Mādhyamikan himself. [That is, the nature of non-existence is itself disproved by these reasonings, and because of the non-applicability of the examples of sky-flower etc., which are themselves false-entities.]

25. If the refutation of the *reality-view* (that all exist) is right, then because of the destruction of that, the *unreality-view* would get established (as *real*) ! If the refutation of the *unreality-view* is right, then the *reality-view* must be accepted.

No third view is permissible. A thing is either real or unreal, it cannot be both. (It is either true or false, it cannot be both). To those who (like ourselves) revere authority, those refutations which are made (by you, the Mādhyamikas) against other further divisions such as *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa* etc.) contradictory to authority, are not only acceptable but also helpful. Because of this (reason), there is no meaning in speaking about a fifth counting leaving aside ordinary perception. (cf. see 1).

26. To those (Mādhyamikas), if the authority which establishes their thesis is ultimate truth, then, the theory of Unconditional Negation (to which they appeal) cannot avail. It would also be self-contradictory, (since in this respect, at least, there is no negation). If, on the other hand, it is said to be false, then also, their view cannot be sustained even if it (the false ultimate) be *named samvṛti-satyam*, phenomenally true, (i.e. true but with a qualification, a qualification that takes away all that the qualified intends). Since in no manner we could predicate to ignorance non-existence, there is no way by which we could determine these experiences (which we have), to be results of ignorance, to be results of *samvṛti*. to be results of delusion. Because of its yielding a false ultimate, the method of proving its own view can without any difficulty be used to prove all other systems too (which they have denounced as holding on to false ultimates), (In which case, how is it that the Mādhyamikan's claims to correctness solely are valid ?) It is thus necessary to know the distinction between

the true and the false ultimate reality in giving the reasons for refuting other systems.

(The Viśiṣṭādvaitic disciple here questions thus) :—

27. Addressing a person who says that all things do not exist, in case we address a refutation to him, if he says that all these (refutations) have no applicability to him (as all things are non-existent, himself, the proof and the refutation etc.) what then? **We reply** that these proofs and refutations have occasion only in respect of one who agrees to the definitions of conduct in argumentation, such as, what are fallacious and what are not etc. With one who does not agree, there can be no argumentation at all. As in the case of stones, cows, animals, children and madmen (idiots), for that person also there is no right for argumentation: this is what is to be told the followers. That is all. This has been expressed effectively:

“There is no right for the Nihilist to take part in argumentation, since there is no means by which he could : *anupāyatvāt.*”

He who has himself known that all are chimerical, *tucca*, if he does not perform activities with reference to perceived objects, he has no need to refute the activities of those who seek Heaven and liberation (which are all non-existent to him). Since the eternally realized non-existence (*śunya**tva*) is not something that has to be realized (in the future) (as it has already been achieved), even one's own system is of no utility. Since even the delusion that all are unreal is itself chimerical, there is no need to get rid of it. This Mādhyaṃika-view is refuted by the author of the *Vedānta-sūtras* by his sūtra :

“In all respects it is untenable” (II. ii. 30)

The Ālvar (Nammālvār) with his verse “*Ulanenulan.....*”¹

1. *Tturuvoymoḷi* I. i. 2.

“Whether said to be existing or non-existing, He is having both the existing and the non-existing as His qualities, He is having those that have form and those that have no form as his gross and subtle bodies, He having these two natures pervading all is Absolute (*pūrṇa*) (Existence).

which states that the Ultimate Being exists having all things as its body, refutes the nihilistic doctrine. The śloka "*Pratī-tiscadhīṣṭa.....*"¹ (*Śrī-Rangarājastava* II. 6) should also be referred to in this context.

ŚRĪ VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA ON THE YOGĀCĀRA SYSTEM (BUDDHISTIC SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM)

"Here the Yogācārin declares that the world does not exist, the Sautrāntikan declares that the world is apprehended through inference through the modifications of consciousness. As for the Vaibhāṣika, he says that the perceived world is momentary. These three declare also that the knowledge-self is being destroyed every moment. These do we refute."—(*Śrī-Rangarāja stava : II. 7.*)

1. We now proceed to refute the Yogācāras who seeking to avoid the faults of the cārvakas, who deny the cause-effect relation, and the Mādhyamikas, who affirm universal non-existence, accept only Knowledge self (*Jñānātma*), within which they seek to implicate the cause-effect relation (as existing between the knowledge-continuum), and postulate multiple consciousness-continua (*Jñānasantāna*). They say thus :

" Knowledge-self (consciousness), even though undifferenced, is seen as if differenced into subject and object consciousness by those knowers who are deluded—*avibhāgopi buddhyātma viparyāsita darśanaiḥ grāhya-grāhaka samvitti bhedaṅvān iva lakṣyate.*"³

1. *Śrī-Rangarājastava : II. 6.*

If it be said that all is non-existent (is Void), the fact of being non-existent cannot apply to all things, for *who* is to refute? (He at least must be existent). Therefore unconditional negation is unacceptable. The negation "It is not here" means only that *another* is here, as in the case of the pot which breaking the potsherd results. In the doctrine which rejects reality (*prama*) even the authority of the Veda triumphs,

2. Dharmakīrti's verse,

and "Because of the invariable togetherness (lit. supporting) both blueness and its (idea), they are identical."¹

Those who approve of the above say also thus :

"In our system, as for the supreme substance it is Pure self (consciousness). Therefore, due to confusion in the beginningless samsāra owing to manifold causes, by the tendencies manifested manifoldly, which are due to modifications, by being according to its own nature (as consciousness-self), the blueness and others (the subject and object distinctions, or blueness and its (idea), which are subject and object are given up. No other substance is being sought."

"Matpakṣe yadyapi svacchojñānātma paramārthataḥ, tathāpy anādou samsāre pūrvajñāna-prasūtibhiḥ. citrābhis citrahetutvād vāsānābhir upaplavāt, svānurūpeṇa nīlādi grāhya grāhaka dūṣitam, pravibhaktamivotpannam nānyamartham apekṣate.

This doctrine he establishes by means of perceptual efficacy and inference.

The liberation, *mokṣa*, he mentions, is the attainment of idea of non-existence of mental series due to influence of objectivity. The means (*upāya*) to attain this state consists in knowing in this manner.²

REFUTATION.

2. He (the Yogācārin) cannot substantiate his claim that his acceptance of cause-effect relation distinguishes him from the cārvakas. Because, if he proves his cause-effect relation on the basis of the principle of *momentary self-nature of the particulars*³ (*svalakṣana vyakti*), it would lead to the statement

1. Cf. *Sarvadarśana Sangraha*, p. 25 (Gough's trans).

2. "To know is to attain" or 'to know is to be' seems to be at the bottom of the concept of knowledge as dynamic cf Bergson. Prof. Stcherbatsky shows that the meaning of truth lies in its efficacy.

3. *Svalakṣana* is the nature of a particular that has been apprehended in the first perception, the advaitic *nirvikalpa*. It is translated by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky, as 'manifestation', in accordance with the dynamic view of Buddhist thought. This is the truth of the thing. This is found to be

that a donkey and smoke stand in the relation of cause and effect. In which case, it would also follow that all the prior instants will be causes of all the latter instants, and thus the inference that has been accepted (in regard to cause-effect) would get contradicted.¹ Nor is it possible to determine anything regarding the (nature of the) identity of the series (*santānaikya*) (either as due to *jāti*, class, or place, *deśa*). Therefore the compared and the comparison in the following passage

“In which series alone karma-vāsana inheres, therein alone the fruits are realized, even like the redness in cotton”,²

cannot apply.

3. The acceptance of causes etc., by means of the principle of generality (*sāmānya*) determined by the method of agreement and differences (*anvaya-vyatireka-siddha*) and the understanding of the form of generality and its invariable concomitance character (*vyāpti*) cannot happen in so far as a unitary knower (who is not momentary) is not admitted.

Since the cause-effect relation itself, the existence of consciousnesses, the non-existence prior and after and future existence, are merely illusory imaginary creations (mental constructions), either the Māyā-vādins eternal and unchangingness or the Mādhyamikan's chimericalness (*tuccatva*) cannot but be predicated of the (subjectivistic) consciousness.

4. If consciousness (*jñāna*) is self-knowing (*alone*) (*svayamprakāśatva*), since it cannot reveal its self-knowingness, its non-knowing-anything-else-ness and its momentariness

momentary since the second moment it ceases to be *svalakṣaṇa* but *kalpana*. Hence its momentary nature has to be accepted. But the implications of this position refute causality.

1. This argument is repeated under Vaibhāṣika. Sec. 11.

2. The example here is that when red colour is treated to the roots of a plant, cotton in this case, it is said to finally show itself not in the intermediate stages but in the final stage on the flower of that treated plant. The differences in karma-tendencies thus will show themselves not immediately in the following moments but at some future moment and by chance.

(which are all different from the self), and since it must know these only by means of a consciousness which grasps all that are *other than itself*, its (Yogācāra) position that it grasps only its own being is a self-contradiction. That the other series and the consciousness (*jñāna*) that shows them in one series are prior and latter moments are truths contradicting its own self-nature, (and) are implications of this position.

5. When the other series are not grasped, the relation between the teacher and the taught, friend and foe, arguers for and against, activities of life cannot happen; and therefore, one must be forced to remain either in a single (fluxional) stream (absolutely), or, as the Advaitin says, in one single unchanging Consciousness.

6. All the false arguments advanced to refute other doctrines (by these thinkers) so as to make them unacceptable, will be refutations of their own doctrine! To him who seeking to establish his thesis, says in regard to his own doctrine that that is true, our refutation of the Mādhyamikan cannot be escaped.

7. The statement that we do not perceive any difference between the knowing and the known, is also refuted by statements vouchsafed for by the experiences of all persons and by one's own, such as "*This I Know*", which reveals the three terms (knower, known and knowing).

8. If this be not accepted, it is impossible (for the Yogācārin) to substantiate (the passage already quoted) "that consciousness though undifferented is seen *as if* distinguished into subject and object consciousness by those cognizers who are deluded".

The attempt to reduce the number of terms which are experienced with the help of the above deduction to Knowing alone is also refuted.

9. As between that which has been agreed upon by all of us (*sampratipannam*) and that which has not been so agreed

upon *vipratīpannam*), to say that knowing alone is that which of accepted by all of us, is a perverse statement (*viparītam*).¹

Since an object is that which is accepted by all persons (*sampratīpannam*), and since, in the apprehension of that (object), knowing cannot be had except as a *function* of a knower, it is impossible to annul these two (knower and the known) by merging them in Knowing (*jñāna*) which is proved by them. At this point, (we have also to say) that it is agreed to by all thinkers that what is not accepted by all (*vipratīpanna*) cannot be a refutation. [i.e. refutations must proceed on agreed principles. Mere refutation based on private fancy or peculiar creed that does not claim veracity or approval from world experience cannot be a refutation at all. It can refute nothing].

To refute in this manner, by means of false arguments the knower and the known, will lead finally to the refutation of Knowing itself on the basis of Mādhyamika-logic (of indefinability).

10. If it be said that since the Vedāntins themselves say that there is no authority for the acceptance of objects which have parts, since there is no substance called a compound (*sanghāta*) other than the *sanghāti* (the parts) of which it is the compound, when these parts are probed into (that is, analysed) there remain the atoms (*parama-āṇu*), and these themselves must possess distinctions into six faces² (as combi-

1. The point here is that on the one side we accept three terms of which knowing is one. The Yogācārin accepts only knowing. Knowing thus is accepted by all of us, the common denominator of acceptance by all, so to speak, however much we may differ regarding the other two. Therefore, this is most real, because most agreed upon. Śrī Vedānta Deśika points out that *sampratīpannam* and *vipratīpannam* have reference not to the combatants or disputants but to the world at large. Consensus of Opinion must be measured in terms of all world-experience, and therefore, when a reference is made to that, we find that the so-called agreement is valueless and is contradictory to the world-experience, hence *viparītam*.

2. Cf. *Bodhicharyāvatāra* Verse 503. *Ṣaṭkoṇa yugaḥadyogāt-paramā-noṣṣadśatā śaṇṇām samānadeśatve piṇḍaḥ syād-ānumātrakaḥ*. The six faces are the four sides, above and below. Quantity means extraneity, and

nation is impossible with other atoms in order to yield bigger sizes unless contact is linear and directional and not merging) and so on *regressus ad infinitum* (till we arrive at that atom which has no faces at all, which is impossible), and since these (atoms) are not perceptible, therefore, the perception of a outer object cannot be treated as authority, (**we reply**) it is only if we treat the *paramāṇu* (atom) as that which is perceptible (minutest thing as the mote in the sun-beam) according to actual experience, that they do possess faces; and since, in them, due to combination there occur all the peculiar qualities available in the Universe, and differences in knowledge (*upālambha*), and since, there is no effort made to *imagine* the imperceptible atom, and since, all the sciences of sculpture and social science (ethics and economics and politics) etc, accepting the perceptible atoms, only *imagine* the other ones, and in them (the *śāstras*) the imperceptible divisions spoken of by them are not facts which have any value (to their sciences, that is, being mere theory), they are not results of authority (*āpta-vākya-siddha*).

11. Even when they have accepted the imperceptible atom, it is just possible that it (atom) might in combination (with others) (due to summation) become perceptible.¹ Since this view is upheld on the strength of the scriptures, we can say that, as in the case where the unmanifest primordial Prakṛti and other evolutes are imperceptible, (when unmanifest) but when manifesting, the elements and objects (arising from them) become perceptible to the senses, it is not impossible for the outer objects and their qualities to become objects of right knowledge (under different conditions).

this is possible only through contact not coalescence. Even gross coalescence involves in the arrangement of the parts contact, and displacement of sides and arrangement.

If the atom has no size and no faces, then it cannot be combined also. If it has it is divisible still further till it has no sides. This is the antinomy of infinite divisibility. *Sarvadarśana Sangraha* Trans. Gough. p. 25. According to Buddhist thought however see. *Central Conception of Buddhism*. p. 14 and *Abhidharmakośa*, ii. 22,

1. Cf. Leibniz's view.

Whether the self is atomic or cosmic (*vibhu*), its I-ness cannot be refuted ; as in the case of cognitive consciousness (*jñāna*), so even the I-ness has to be accepted as reality (*satya*). Further, where it is said that because of being together, the knowing and the known are identical, there happens self-contradiction in one's own speech, in one's own knowledge, in one's own doctrine. *sva-vacana*, *svapratipatti*, *sva-siddhānta*. If the knower and the known are made identical with cognitive consciousness (*jñāna*), there results identity between truth and falsity, and consequently, the theory will end in Nihilism or in the doctrine of manifold predication (of the Jainas).

12. If it be said that there will result too-wide application (*atiprasaṅga*) if the cognitive consciousness, *jñāna*, were to reveal that which is *other* than itself (i.e. knower and the known) (on the principle that consciousness alone can be revealed by consciousness, nothing else), it will be seen that according to actual experience (*yathā-darśana*), that this perception of objects is *seen* in true objects even as in dream-creations (which are said to be mental).

13. By this is also refuted the view that we do not perceive any objective character in the cognitive consciousness.

14. The effort to establish non-existence of all (objective) knowledge on the basis of the example of dream-cognitions contradicts the experiences of all persons and also one's own statements; since to these dream-cognitions objectivity is assured by means of (God) willing the truth or creating the truth etc., now (*tādātāvika*) or at some previous time, this comparison is unacceptable.

If it be said that, as in the passage

“ To a sanyāsin, a Lover, and a dog, an identical buxom lady appears in three (different) ways : as a corpse, as a fit object of amour, and as a prey ”,¹

1. Quoted also by *Sarvadarśana Sangraha*, p. 23 (Gough).

(so also) since in outer objects mutually contradictory attributes take their rise,¹ therefore they must be non-existent, **we reply**, that even cognitive consciousness itself, since it appears to different thinkers as having a hundred attributes of truthness, chimericalness, inconscientness, self-luminosity, momentariness and eternality, would become non-existent.

In one and the same thing, contradictions do not happen in the nature of the thing itself, since all attributes of contradictory genders, number and causality etc., are *relative* to particular conditions (*sopādhika*).²

When this (*sopādhika* attribution of contradictory attributes) is not accepted, each and every cognitive-consciousness (*jñāna*) being forced to possess in itself contradictory attributes (unconditionally, such as having largeness (of content) and smallness (of content), effectness and causeness blueness and yellowness, thus becoming an illusion, will seek refuge under Nihilism.

1. *i.e.*, the definition of reality is surely non-self-contradiction, but contradictory attributes take their rise from what? in what lies contradiction does it affect the nature of the substance? or is the contradiction merely (*apparent*?)

2. Woman has two genders in Sanskrit, they are the natural feminine in *Strī* and the masculine in *Dāra*. The contradictions do not affect the substance, because, in the one case, it is relative to the husband, and in the other case, it is not so. Regarding Number, the reality of Brahman is *Ekam*, as also *trayam*, in the one case, it is relative to the three entities (*tattvas*) and in the other case, it refers, to the Unity of the three under the One that is their self. A thing is at one cause and effect just like a man who is a father of one and son of another, here the contradictory attributes can inhere in one and the same thing *because* these attributes have reference to conditions such as two different persons, as in the example cited above. A man cannot be father and son of a particular identical individual even though from two different stand-points—a vicious fault of the *Bheda-abheda* doctrine, and of *Jaina sapta-bhaṅgī* with which it is related by Deśika, according to Deśika.

Equally manyness and oneness (*saṃkhyā*) can also inhere in the case of a man with many sons. In all these cases, the object experienced actually is *one* only, the conditions, *upādhis*, or points of reference of the attributes apparently contradictory but not essentially contradicting one another, can be predicated of it.

15. In the same manner the refutation of all small mischiefs such as *Bādhītānuvṛtti*,¹ and others have to be made.

16. Since portions of yellow-consciousness stream (*pīta-jñāna-santāna*) will be unconscious to a certain (other) blue-consciousness-stream (*nīla-jñāna-santāna*) because it illuminates itself alone, and portions of consciousness-stream will be unconscious to a certain (other) yellow-consciousness-stream (2) and even, as in the case of differences in dream-consciousness-streams, differences in the blueness and yellowness which do not have reference to outer objects are said to arise alternately (and exclusive of one another, because of the manifestation of the unquestioned (*aparyānuyojya*) beginningless tendencies (*vāsanās*), (3) since for this tendency (*vāśana*) no permanent thing is accepted as its support (*ādhāra*), (4) since no such quality as tendency (*vāśana*) [other than consci-

1. Cf. *Sarvārtha Siddhi*, p. 443 (Pandit Chowkamba ed.)

Bādhītānuvṛtti in Buddhism means something different from what it is in Advaita. The Buddhist position is this: In the perception of the second moon in the case of one who is suffering from the fault of double-moon-vision (*timiradośa*), even though this knowledge (that there are two moons) is sublated, it yet persists. In this case there is really no locus for this (second) moon (outside), nor is any cause (of its existence) perceived by us. Therefore, the correct view is that the locus, *alambana*, of this knowledge and the causality of the nearby (*samantara*) space is fit to be taken as *imagined*. This is fallacious. The *thisness* (of the moon) is what has been ascertained by the method of agreement and difference, and it is the locus of the first (*i.e.*, prior to having the knowledge that there is only one moon) illusion alone, the illusion of the fallacious continuance (after knowing that there is one and not two moons) is due to that cause alone, and the cause of the continuance (of the illusion) is due to the outer object's locational causality, and is not due to inner imagination of the object (by the subject). The real question then is what about the first or the real amongst the two moons? Further, there are contradictory attributes of one and the many in one cognition. Hence the whole is frustrated, and must end in nihilism. Śrī Vedānta Deśika shews that a real object outside is the cause and locus, *adhisthāna*, of the illusion, and the continuance of the illusion must be traced to organic defect rather than to knowledge itself. If it is knowledge that creates it then there arises contradiction that leads to absurdity (*bādhita*). In case, on the other hand, the three terms are accepted, defects in the organism can explain the duality. The predication would be conditioned by the defect.

ousness, is accepted, (because consciousness is said to be devoid of any quality other than self-luminosity), after having stated that the tendency itself is only the continuous flow of pure individual consciousness (*svalakṣaṇa*,¹ things in themselves) and (5) since in the beginningless *samsāra*, all individual knowledges (*svalakṣaṇas*) must be of the form of all tendencies, giving up exclusive differences of blue and yellow etc.. each pure individual becoming the cause of all differentiations, each knowledge-series would have to become an all-knower (*sarvajña*).

17. By this (non-acceptance of knower and known and the giving up of particular causality), even Sugata's view that to foster good mental tendency (*citta-vāsaṇa*) is *dharma*, will have to be given up, such that it will imperil the śāstraic injunctions and conduct which are established through instruction, (because *citta* is not a thing but a *vāsaṇa* a tendency, a *svalakṣaṇa*, in which all things good and bad have their place, and as such, there is no question of having only good or right tendencies alone). If those are given up, then, the establishment of the doctrine of liberation, Mokṣa, hearing it and instructions in it etc., become worthless.

18. If it be said that all (the consequences above mentioned) will follow *only* when liberation has been attained in the beginning, then (**we reply** that) there will result the contradiction with the view accepted by all thinkers that "By ignorance and knowledge, bondage and liberation (respectively) (are produced)" (since you have the knowledge of reality already, it must always be realized). If it be said that it is only when the ultimate knowledge happens without any cause or effort¹ these consequences will follow, **we reply**, then by renouncing

1. That is, we cannot say definitely why one thing should come into being at any one moment rather than at any other, since all are there in the matrix of *svalakṣaṇa* which is identical with *vasāṇa* which is beginningless flow. Secondly, the claim that one series is unconscious of the other will impugn the statement that one can be *sarvajña*). Thirdly, the view that there is no definite causality will impugn the much claimed for theory of dependent origination, *pratītya-samutpāda*).

well-defined practices like hearing (scripture) etc., you will come to the view similar to the view that all results happen without any cause,¹ in which case there is no other place for you except to stand on the side of either the materialist (Cārvāka) or the nihilist (Mādhyamika).

19. Therefore (we conclude) (1) since we have to accept in the cognition 'This I Know' in which we perceive three terms, amongst which two have reality (viz. the self and knowing) and in the object (the third term), reality regarding its essential substrateness (*adhīsthānatva*), and in regard to that portion which is predicated of it (*āropita*), reality due to difference in place and (2) since we have to accept in these (three terms) the division into permanent and changing (i.e. the subject as permanent, the 'knowing as contracting and expanding, and the object as changing) according to actual experience, (3) since like consciousness itself, on the knower and the known arising, consciousness does not appear like a momentary-series (*kṣanika-santati*), (4) since the liberation that these (yogācārins) speak of is not testified to by sources of right knowledge (*apramāṇika*), (5) since we have already refuted by means of arguments in the *Samudāyādhi-kāra* (chapter V of this work) that these have that causes in the anti-vedic form and conduct and method (*jñāna-yoga*), like the Cārvāka and Mādhyamika doctrines, the Yogācāra doctrine also, is contradictory to all ideals of man (*puṣārthāḥ*) such as Heaven and Beatitude (*svargāpavarga*).

20. This school has been refuted by the (Vedānta) Sūtra-kāra in the following two sūtras "*Nābhāva upalabdheḥ*" Not non-existence on account of consciousness" (II. ii. 27) and "*Vaidharmyācca nasvapnādivat*: And on account of difference in nature (they are) not like dream." (II. ii. 28).

ŚRI VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA

ON

THE SAUTRĀNTIKA (REPRESENTATIONALISTIC),
SYSTEM.

1. We now proceed to refute the Sautrāntikan thinker who, having seen that the Yogācārin who holds that outer objects are non-existent, is an object of ridicule of all persons, declares that there are objects which are named outer objects (*bāhyārtha*), but that these are not objects of perception (*pratyakṣa*), that only the representations received from them are apprehended in consciousness, and that therefore the outer objects are *inferred*.

2. Even where he has accepted the outer objects (as objects of inference rather than as perception), rejects the compounds (constituted by the atoms) (*avayavi-saṅghātāḥ*) as non-things (*avastu*). He treats the atoms (*paramāṇu*) as without parts (*niramaśa*), for fear of infinite regress etc., (in finite divisibility and other antinomies), which assails objects possessing parts (*sāvayava*). He declares that in the contact (*saṃyoga*) between the atoms we do not have either total contact (*kṛtsna-saṃyoga*) with one another (in which case only one atom will result), or contact at any one point (*ekadeśa*), but that it is due to *vikalpa*, imaginative construction. He has said that it is due only to some inherent characteristic within them (*svalakṣana-viśeṣa*), when there arises the illusion of contact (*saṃyoga*) that there also arises the talk about combination (*saṃyukta-saṃbandha*). Since to the finite atoms, even as in the case of pots, we have to affirm several sides (*pārśvāḥ*), as when the sides are not accepted as in the case of *ākāśa*, space, all things will become illimited. And, doubting that contact can only happen when there are sides, for the sake of overcoming these defects, he (Sautrāntikan) affirms that there is no ultimate quality as infinitismalness capable of being predicated of the atoms. We see the finiteness such as this-much-ness which is the grouping of

atoms (a grouping that is itself) a product of illusion (*bhrama-siddha*). That is space (*ākāśa*). That too is mere consciousness. That is not a substance. In this manner, in the groupings (of atoms), therefore the momentary infinitesimal atoms which alone are of the form of outer objects are inferred.

(We reply to the above contentions thus): To him, who thus holds that between the atoms there is only illusion of contact (*saṃyoga-bhrama*), that there is illusion due to limitation in the form of space, there is no other way except to accept the perceptibility of the groupings of the atoms (at least) which the Vaibhāṣika speaks to, or to accept the perceptibility of the permanent (things) which others (like us) aver.

3. To the consciousnesses which have objects of the extremely distant past and future, it cannot be said that there will occur the granting of form (*ākāra-samarpaṇa*), by the causal objects.

Even the example that is utilized by him that, as in the case of the inference drawn from the characteristics of perceived objects as to the nature of other (unperceived) objects, we can infer the outer objects with the help of perceived representations in consciousness, cannot be availed of by one who declares that *all* objects are inferred.

4. Nor is it admissible for any one who instead of inferring that there is such a thing as real space from the cognition of space (even as a representation), to try to shew that space as such is chimerical (*tucca*). Where is similarity of cognition (with respect of pots and space) (*pratiti-tulyam*), if one of them is reduced to non-existence with the help of (falacious?) reasons? Then it may be said even blueness etc., are chimerical, having respect to what the Mādhyamikan has said. If he declares that non-existence of obstructions (*āvaraṇābhāva*) is space (*ākāśa*),¹ for him there is no way of

1. "Points of Controversy" Aung and Rhys Davids p 193 "That 'what lies between' any two visible objects, in the absence of other visible objects is 'space'. This is an act of ideation, not of sense-cognition."

including this (kind of *abhāva*, non-existence) under any one of the (known) countings distinguished as reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) and *samsargā-bhāva* (prior and later non-existence.)

5. Nor is there any possibility of applying the attributes of nearness and farthness etc., (in regard to objects) in the mid-space (*madhyākāśa*) (if space itself is non-existence).

6. If it be said that by constructing distances etc., characterized by groupings in the substratum of non-existence (*alikāntaralattile*), there arise the differences in imagining these (distances etc.), (**we reply**) only on the basis that if you grant that space to be real, is it possible to affirm these as delusive (spatial) differentiations in that (space) by means of grouping of qualities which are results of imaginations that are equivalent to dream images) (*svapna-jñānatulya*). In which case, the substrate (space) which is clearly perceived etc., is strongly acceptable to both parties. The author of the Vedānta-Sūtras states this in the Sūtra "And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference" (*Ākāśecāviśeṣāt* ") (II. ii. 23).

7. To this (school which seeks to affirm, the causality of the outer objective manifold (*artha-vaicitrya*) in respect of the (experienced) manifold in consciousness (*jñāna-vaicitrya*), there is no way at all of grasping their invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) inhering in the consciousness (about which alone one knows). Having not apprehended 'invariable concomitance' (*vyāpti*), for him, there is no way by which outer objects could be determined to exist, much less is it possible for him to discover the invariable concomitance in the outer objects. If this invariable concomitance is apprehended by taking these manifold differentiations in consciousness (i.e., representations) as causes, later on there is no need to postulate in another cognition (*jñāna*) an outer object as its cause.

8. If it be asked by him (Sautrāntikan) who argues for the existence of the *inferred outer objects* thus: when the

stream of blue cognitions is going on, the eyes etc., and blueness and yellowness remain as general characteristics of the streams. When, later on, the cognition of yellow happens (i.e., interferes with the blue stream) should there not be an external object nearby (which causes it)? If not so, will not the blue-cognition-stream continue (its flow without any interruption by other cognitions)? **(we reply)** To one who holds that when in dreams, the blue cognition and the yellow cognition streams alternate, there are no outer objects but (these alternations) are governed by impressions (*vāsanās*). There is no other way except to affirm with the Yogācārin that even in waking states, all (*manifoldness*) of experiences come about due to peculiar manifold characteristics of the impressions (*vāsanās*).¹

This person (Sautrāntikan) who replied to the Yogācārin who repudiates the possibility of 'grasping' or apprehending any outer object, in the following manner

"If it be asked how there can be apprehension if it (the object) belongs to a different time (from that of cognition), it can be apprehended, declare the knowers of reasons, only by being the cause able to grant its form to consciousness,"

to say that at the moment of contact with the sense-organs (*indriya-samprayoga*) it is existent, (and) at the moment of producing its cognition we (only) grant a *name* to the outer object which grants its own form to it, is also unacceptable, (because) he accepts a form (*ākāra*) of an outer object which is made to be devoid of its own nature (*svarūpa*) (by being made to give up its form to another, which is impossible as the *ākāra* cannot exist apart from its substrate). Even though we accept (such a form without a substrate), it cannot enter into a consciousness-that-is-going-to-come (i.e., in the future) leaving its own substrate (or locus, *svāśraya*).²

1. Representationalism must end in solipsism, there is no other way open to it.

2. A floating idea is possible, but a regular form abandoning its locus and awaiting author *locus*, a phantom form, is impossible, or is it a "wandering double?"

[It may be replied that what is intended is like die-stamping of the form].

9. Nor will the object itself *remain till* its own effect, which is its cognition (i.e., of its own form), comes into a existence, (since if it did remain, it would be, firstly, non-momentary, secondly, it might then be said that it can give its form to its effect in consciousness namely the representation). When both these are without any object, to say that there arises the modification similar to it (in the consciousness) is also untenable. If it is said that in the pure consciousness there is reflection of the object's form, **we reply** that according to laws of reflection as determined by all people, there is needed the existence of *both the reflected and the reflector at the same time (samakāla)*.

10. For these reasons, the examples of iron in fire, black-ink in a pile of black beans, Kadamba-bird amidst blue-lotuses, get rejected.¹

11. To say that there is the same form (*akāra*) in both the prior and latter, object and its cognition (respectively), even like the *jāti*² (class-concept) that is accepted by others (especially Nyāya), is contradictory to observation, proof and one's own tenets (*upālambohapaṭṭi-svasiddhānta-virodha*).

12. The view that like the red colour produced by the combination of lime and turmeric, the form (*ākāra*) which is neither in the outer object nor in the cognitive consciousness comes into being is also refuted, since there can be no connection between those that are prior and those that are later.

1. Cf. *Sarvārtha Siddhi*, p. 451, which omits the first example of iron in fire, (*taṭṭayapinda*).

2. *Jāti* as abstract universal is not accepted by Buddhism as real. Cf. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, p. 184.

(The example does not apply, secondly, the object and its cognition must belong to the same time *samakāla*). This being thus, there is no third way; either we have to accept that the outer form is an *object of perception* (not one of inference only) or else we have to hold that there being no outer objects, these representation arise by the power of the (*vāsanās*) impressions (just as in the Yogācāra school of thought), (since we do not know the nature of the grouping of atoms that produce these representations of colour etc., in consciousness).

13. Further by such a person as this, since momentary eatable and enjoyable things cannot be perceived but only *inferred as having existed*, they cannot become objects that could be utilized for eating etc. To eat or chew the representation (*jñāna-ākāra*) is impossible.

14. The 'inferred' characteristics even though causative of fear do not exist the next moment. (e.g., a serpent inferred to exist outside does not exist even by the time it is inferred since the serpent is a momentary thing).

15. If it be said that they, being, streams which are enjoyable and which are fear-causing, their later moments are like their previous moments, (we reply that) all consciousness-streams being unable to grasp the wonderful diversity in the momentary objects (*vaicitryam*), their doctrine that diversity of cognitions happen due to objective diversity will (also) fall to the ground. This theory, since it makes the perceived outer objects the 'inferred,' against all the observations of oneself and of all persons, being a joke without any consistency (*trastari*),¹ is extremely ridiculous. This system is refuted by the author of the Sūtras in the Sūtra "*Nāsatodṛṣṭatvāt*" H. ii. 25. "Not from non-entity, this being not observed."

1. Cf. *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, p. 670 (Pandit).

ŚRĪ VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA

ON

THE VAIBHĀŚIKA (REALISTIC) DOCTRINE

[The Vaibhāṣikas are followers of the 'Abhidharma-vibhāsa-śāstra which, in its turn, is but a commentary on the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivādin school' This school is one of the earliest, if not the earliest of Buddhist sects].¹

1. We now refute the Vaibhāṣikan who, trying to escape from the faults of the three previous schools of Buddhism, affirms that along with the cognition (of the outer object) the outer object is *perceived* (directly), that both the cognition and the object of cognition are of the form of unqualified (*nirviśeṣa*) momentary (*kṣanika*) stream (*santāna*), that the knower (*jñāta*) is only imagined (*kalpitam*).

2. He has already affirmed that the momentary atoms are not perceptual (objects) (as such); when he affirms that there occurs perception (of them) at the time of their grouping (only) he has declared that the group is the ultimate object of perception, but he has not offered any reason for the grouping to occur such as *samyoga* (conjunction) or (even) unspacedness (*nairantarya*),

3. He who affirms that the qualities of momentariness and self-manifestation (*svalakṣana*)² having appeared through indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*), become objects and determinate perception due to the grouping (*puṇja*), cannot make indeterminate perception the source of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for determining that these (qualities) appeared in this manner in indeterminate perception, (because) (i) qualities are non-existent in it, and (ii) since *savikalpaka* is confusive being additive of *samskāra* and thus false.)

1. *The Central Conception of Buddhism* : Prof. T. Stcherbatsky.

2. Prof. Stcherbatsky translates *Svalakṣana* as manifestation as against Gough's trans. of the same as *self-characteristic*,

4. Having stated that *vikalpa* (determinate perception) is confused (due to impregnation with impressions, *vāsana*), since it reveals that which is not true, (and since it is) incapable of being proved by any other instrument of right knowledge (*asamvāda*), and that

in *vikalpa* "in that form which appears as outside as if it is one (selfidentical) thing, and for other (reason) as if it is distinguished, that is without reality, because it is not subject to examination (*parikṣāṅga*),"

they affirm that determinate perception and inference are superimpositions, and that these also cannot (obviously) reveal the ultimate substance. Thus to one who affirms that *vikalpa* is not a source of right knowledge, there is no way of accepting the indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*), which is itself determined to exist by determinate cognition alone, as a right source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

5. To the inference which denies the authoritativeness of determinate perception, there happens the fallacy of *anai-kāntya* (the fallacy of non-application of the *vyāpti*, concomitance).

6. To one who holds that all discussions which have their roots in determinate perception (*vikalpa*) are imaginations (*kalpita*), there will result the contradiction with the words of one's own school. Therefore the non-existence of proofs for establishing one's own system equal those of the Mādhyamikan

7. If it be said that in the consciousness as well as in that which it cognizes, therefore, there is a self-nature (*svabhāva*) which is real (*satyam*), and that its modifications (alone) are unreal (*mithya*), this division (into one's own nature and *vikāra* as its modification which are deemed to be real and false respectively) cannot be made.

8. Since the grouping (of atoms) which is determined by perception (*vikalpa*) that appears to be the qualified permanent thing, is said to be of the form of illusion (*bhrānti*), since this is (said to be) due to the strength of the impressions (*vāsana*) as

the Yogācārin affirms, there is no way by which he (*Vaibhāṣikan*) can say that the outer object is *pratyakṣa*, perceived.

9. Between the cognition and the object of cognition there is needed no other connection. Due to the quality of one's own nature (*svabhāva-viśeṣa*) there comes about this subject-object relation (*viśaya-viśayībhāva*), and the object of cognition being true, this is being said.

10. If it be said that because the previous instant (the object) which is the cause, through the contact with sense-organs, by that relation with the later instant (cognitive moment) cognizes the previous instant, then, this is also refuted by the need for existence at the same time (*samakāla*) (of the cognized and the cognition) to reveal the object, a fact which has been determined by the experience of all.

11. In accord with those who declare that (i) the secondary cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) perceives the first cognition (*vyavasāya*) along with its objects which might belong to the past or the future, and (ii) that the perception of the thing that has attained the state of destruction outlasts the destruction of that thing by just a moment, even if it said that the previous moment (the thing) can be made to be the object of the later moment (the cognition), then, it would happen that the previous moments in all the worlds can become objects (of the cognition of the later moment, i.e. they can all be causes of the later-moment-cognition).

12. If it be said that in regard to this (particular) cognition, they cannot be causes, then objectivity (*viśayatva*) will have to be affirmed (also) of the sense organs (*adhipati*), helping cause (*sahakāri*), and nearby momentary objects (*samantara*) which are all like the outer object (*ālambana*). When the causes are all of equal importance (*tulya*), if it is said that a different time (*bhinnā-kāla*) is perceivable on account of the specific quality of the nature (*svabhāva*) of the self-manifestation (*svalakṣaṇa*) only, then due to the arising of the specific quality of the

nature of that, the objects that are of extremely distant past and extremely distant future (*ciraviprakṛṣṭa*) and at great distances (*dūrastha*) could be perceived.

13. Those who accept the special characteristic (*svabhāva-viśeṣa*) of the object (*ālambana*) (to produce cognition at the next moment even whilst ceasing to be before that moment arises), need not at all postulate the need for sense-organs (*adhipati*) and helping (*sahakāri*) etc., causes.

14. Even if they are there, when there is not that special quality of the nature (*svabhāva-viśeṣa*) (in the thing), it cannot be made to become an object of direct perception. When the specific quality of the nature is there, even if these (*adhipati-sahakāri*-causes) are not available, it can be made to become an object.

15. If it be said that the momentary self-manifestation (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is characterized by the special quality of its nature (*svabhāva-viśeṣa*) does not appear without them (i.e. these *adhipati* etc. causes), there is no way of establishing this invariable concomitance (mentioned above).

16. If it be said that it does not appear to another individual-stream (*santānāntaram*), then, because of the necessity in the nature (*svabhāva*) of the two moments of the blue cognition and the object, such (an objection) is over-ruled. [In other words, it is enough if you merely said that *svabhāva* is the all-solver. We can trace this seeking refuge in the *nature* of a thing also in the *lokāyata darśana*].

17. The affirmation of the Vaibhāṣika and the other three schools that all the objects they have (individually) accepted are momentary (*kṣanika*), is contradictory to the well-established uncontradicted observations of Recognition by all persons.

18. If it be said that as in the actually observed (candle) flame-stream (which constantly perishes), due to the arising of grouping (of atoms) from (prior) groupings, even the pots

etc., having similarity with causes in the cognition-stream also, the illusory recognition happens, therefore the permanence of the object is imagined (*kalpitam*), **we reply**, that as in the case of the flame which is differentiated by the absolute necessary differences in the instruments etc., (for the production of change etc.,) here there is no way of refuting Recognition.

19. If all things are (of) momentary (duration), since there is no person (cognizer) to discover the identity etc., between the prior (object-moment) and later (cognition-moment), even the illusory recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) or remembrance cannot arise.

20. In the same way, in the doctrine of momentariness there will arise *atiprasaṅga*, (over-stepping in conduct) by the doers of good and evil deeds, since enjoyment of their results cannot accrue (to them), and since another person alone will be enjoying them. Even the example: "In which series alone *karmavāsana* inheres, therein alone the fruits are realized even like the redness in cotton" mentioned by you is untenable.¹

21. That which has come about as a result of activities of the impression-supporting permanent entities (*vāsanādhāra-sthira-dravyānuvṛtti*) cannot be said to belong to the momentary stream (*kṣanika-santāna*).

In the doctrine of the destruction without residue (*niravaya-vināśa*)², there is no possibility of determining the unity of the stream (*santāna*).

22. By *presuming* that there is perceived destructing without residue in the (candle or oil) light, it cannot be main-

1. Cf. sec. 2 on Yogācāra doctrine

2. Cf. *Central Conception of Buddhism*; Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky p. 12 who quotes in footnote five. *Abhidharma-kośa*. i. 37 and the Yaś. comment *mytasaya ananuvrtteh*, and that this is a point of analogy with the *linga-śarīra* of the Sāṃkhya. Also p. 38. Refutations of the *Niravaya-Vināśa Vedānta-Sūtra*. II. ii. 6. *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra* 1 45 which point out that Buddhists seek to controvert existence in this way.

tained that this destruction without remainder is true in regard to pots etc.,. It is more appropriate to affirm that, as in the case of pots etc, wherein we perceive destruction that leaves residue, so there is in the light (*dīpam*) also, destruction with residue. For the parts of the light become extremely subtle (when they disintegrate), even like the parts of bubbles.

23. If it be said that all things are momentary, like a cloud¹, **we reply** that such examples which take inferences drawn from existence (*satvādyanumāna*) cannot be applied to establish momentariness in all things.

24. (If it be said that the division of continuous infinite time into small bits of time such as moments, *kṣanas*, is possible only by assuming the existence of things having momentary duration which (existence) thereby becomes a *kṣanikatva-upādhi*, the moment-limiting adjunct, and therefore all things must be of this kind, we reply thus): Such a limiting momentary duration can be established by reciprocal (or differential) divisioning of permanent things (without having recourse to the doctrine of universal momentariness.)²

25. By the irrefutable (validity of) recognition (*pratya-bhijñā*) the inferences of momentariness get refuted.

26. (To the question how a thing namely a seed can be productive when in the field and unproductive when in the granary, in which case if the seed were to be permanent it would have two contradictory attributes predicated of it, *karāṇa* and *akarāṇa*, we reply) To the equally permanent thing, the capacity to produce an effect and the incapacity to produce any effect (*akurvadsvabhāva*) happens, because of

1. Cf. *Sarvadarśana-samgraha*. p 20. trans. Gough.

2. A moment is a point instant of the meeting of all causes without exception which as soon as they colligate produce the effects. This is the reciprocal divisioning of time by the several permanent entities none of which need be of momentary duration, though none may be eternal, cf. *Central Conception of Buddhism*. p. 41. "We call a moment, the point when an action is fully achieved." "It is a motion constant during an infinitesimal interval."

the relationship or non-relationship with helping causes (*sahakāri - sambandhā - sambandah*). Since these two (seed-stream and *sahakāri*-stream) are being determined by their own individual instrument-streams (*sāmagrī-pravāha*) by being distinguished by their different times (*kālabheda*), there is no contradiction.

27. Objection: (A thing cannot exist both in the past and the future).

For the thing during its own life-time to exist during the non-existence (prior or later) of *other* things is not a contradiction. [A thing can exist even whilst others perish and are born, their births and deaths and life-spans do not contradict its life-span]. What we do deny is that this (self-same object) does not exist during its own life-time.

23. Since perception (*pratyakṣa*) perceives only that which is in the present time (*vartamāna-kāla*), if it be said that therefore 'it shows the thing's prior and posterior non-existence', **we reply** that it reveals *only the present existence* of the thing; beyond that it cannot show its own non-existence (or existence) at other times.

29. The inference that affirms the absolute necessity (*dhruvabhāvitva*) of destruction of all things without any cause whatsoever (*ahetuka-vināśa*) is vitiated by the fault of straying (*vyabhicāra*).

"To a causeless being, since it has no dependence on any other, either eternal non-existence or existence (happens), because of having dependence, existence happens to things at some time." this saying of Dharmakīrti in the context of '*Discussion on Existence*' can equally apply to Destruction also. This destruction, if it is said to be without any cause (*ahetuka*), will become beginningless (*anādi*); when a thing loses its being, this destruction too should be deemed to be *tucca* chimerical (as it is also causeless); then, even to this thing, non-existence (*parāvadhi*) will have to be given up.

30. If, in these ways, all sources of right knowledge are scrutinized, since some things are found to be transitory (*anitya*), for the sake of declaring that the body (*śarīra*) (one has) and etc., are not permanent abodes (of the self), (so as to inculcate renunciation) what the Scripture on Self-knowledge (*Adhyātma-śāstra*) has done is only to compare these with lightning and bubbles (which represent extreme transitoriness.)

31. If destruction can happen without any cause, there is no purpose in prescribing the duties of non-killing etc. The instruction to any one not to destroy either the conscient self or its body etc., could only be given if destruction can happen through another agency (not otherwise).

If it be said that the prescribing of Non-killing only means the desisting from bringing about quite alien brood (*visabhāga-santāna*) in the continuous stream (of life) or the desisting from creating peculiar mental conditions which are of the form of pain, **we reply** that for one who knows that the self (*ātma*) is momentary consciousness, there can be no possibility of observing laws which prescribe duties and prohibit action etc. If the cause which is invariably concomitant (*anvaya-vyatireki*) with destruction, is made the cause of the various streams only which are sundered (*visabhāga*), and it is said that the incidental *vināśa* comes about without any cause whatsoever, then it would follow that even as in the case of our friend Cārvāka, the existences would have to be uncaused (and only come about by chance).

32. Finding that no one will accept *all* things to be momentary, the *vibhajya-vaibhaṣikan*¹ (he who distinguishes between things eternal and non-eternal) declares that there is an entity which is eternal. In this school what is assented to as eternal in the following passage of Buddha :

1. Cf. *Central conception of Buddhism* : p. 43, note 3, also *Points of Controversy* : Aung and Rhys Davids, p. xxxviii and xl ff, for the *vibhajya-vādins* who are said to be midway between Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas. The above verse is not traceable so far anywhere. No mention is made of this school in *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*. The fact that Buddha was a *vaibhajyavādin* mentioned above is accepted by Buddhists also.

“O Bhikkhus! An uncreated thing is. When the living being's eternal nature (*sattvam*) is non-existent, then there will happen non-existence of mind”,¹ is very clearly shewn to be based on fallacious reasoning. Because he accepts a permanent substance, it cannot be an answer to all our refutations against his other doctrines of momentariness and illusion of definite perception. The inference from existence (*satvādyanumāna*) to prove momentariness will contradict anyone who accepts any substance to be eternal. For it will then happen that by taking the accepted eternal substance as example, the inference from existence itself can be made to prove that all other things are also permanent.

33. If it be said that momentariness can be proved (on adequate grounds such as) in respect of only those that are created, this reason will be *bhagāsiddha* (unacceptable divisioning) to us, the opponents (to your doctrines). In the same manner, can also be found those faults in the reasons which seek to dichotomize things.

34. If it be said that leaving aside all reasons, if on the strength of scriptures (*upadeśa*) alone do we declare that only one thing is eternal and all else are momentary, (we retort) since such instructions have their roots in delusion, they can never be believed in. If it were not so, even the Jainas by taking their scriptures alone could establish their own theses. We have already stated in the *Refutation of Other Systems in General*:² that there should be no discrimination (of true and untrue) as between any two human authorities, (that is, all of them are fallible).

35. (If it be said that the Advaitins do make this discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, **we reply**),

Atthi bhikkhave akada-am jayi natthi edassa jantuno sattam, mānassa sannavatthā sampajjai”

1. *Asti bhikṣoḥ akṛitakam yadi nāsti yetasya jantoh sattvam mānasa śūnyāvasthā sampādyate.* (Sanskrit version in Mysore ed.) *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* with *Bhāva-Prakāśika*.

2. (*Samudāyādhikāra*),

the discrimination between eternal and non-eternal made by disguised-buddhists will be refuted in the following chapter. Therefore what results (from the examination of this system) is that all things have their essence as eternal (*svarūpa-nityam*), and only the several states (*avasthas*) which come about get destroyed (*anitya*).

36. What is said by these (*Vaibhāṣikas*) about space that it is the limitation which is made by the manifold groupings of imaginary objects, and that this is as chimerical like the sky-flower, is refuted by the fact of its parity with the other elements such as earth etc., which are accepted by them according to their own words, which we have already stated in the relevant context under the Sautrāntika system. If limitation is an illusion, to the atoms as well as to their groupings, infinitude (of dimension) will result, as some others (*Bhāskara*?) say. By saying that limitation even in respect of the momentary consciousnesses is illusory, according to the principle of moving flame (*jvālā-sancāraṇa*), since there will not obtain what has been said regarding the abandonment of the previous body and the entry into a new womb, it would be necessary to postulate omnipervasiveness in respect of all consciousnesses.

37. For the three schools of Buddhism (omitting Mādhyamika who denies all) who hold that the self is the stream of cognitions (*buddhi-santāna*), to say that the cognition that arises from 'Aham' 'I', the substance, as that substance itself, will be contradictory to all experience. If a division into the stream of cognitions and storehouse of impressions (*ālāya-vijñāna*) is made (to overcome the above criticism) (we point out) that there is no intrinsic reciprocal relationship between these two (streams).

38. To say that Mokṣa consists either in the arising of the pure consciousness-stream, or in the destruction of the passions in the stream of cognitions is refuted by the refutation (already made) of the (doctrine of) momentary existence.

39. Their use of their five-fold *skandas*, twelve *āyatanas*, four *artha-satyas*, eighteen *dhātus* etc.,¹ are technical terms which having no authority (*pramāṇa*), and are baseless, like a garland without the string.

40. This Vaibhāṣika doctrine has been refuted by the author of the Vedānta Sūtras under the sūtra “*Samudāya-ubhaya-hetukepi tadaprāptih*,” (II. ii. 17). “Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.”

1. Cf. *Central Conception of Buddhism*: Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky p. 27 footnote 4. *Abhidharmakośa*, IX and p. 96ff.

THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS*

(AS ANALYZED BY BHARATA IN THE NATYA ŚĀSTRA, AND AS
PORTRAYED IN THE CHIDAMBARAM TEMPLE SCULPTURES)

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Contemporary psychology has thrown illuminating beams of light on the true motives to human action. The sociologist, the political theorist, the literary critic, the industrial worker, the social reformer and the politician stand to gain by the recent discoveries in psychology. The new psychology emphasizes the active side of human nature, the side wherein emotions and sentiments play a leading role. The recent experimental studies of the emotions are marvellous examples of what the psychologist can achieve in his new field of work. We shall concern ourselves, in this paper, only with one aspect of the recent studies of the human emotions, namely, with their *expressions*.

An emotion is the central, invariable, affective counterpart of the functioning of the instinctive structure of the human mind. It has also been defined as the subjective or exclusively mental concomitant of the natural impulse. But, for our purposes, we may accept the definition which refers to the subjective experience, and stresses at the same time the objective manifestations. It is a pity that, in Hindu aesthetics, there is no term which may be applied to the emotions as such. All the available expressions are just wide of the mark. They refer either to the excitants or the expressions of the emotions, but do not touch the central core of our affective experience.

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An emotion is pre-eminently mental, but there are certain bodily changes which form an integral part of the total emotive experience. The excitation of an emotion leads to very profound and wide-spread physiological changes, some of which are visible to an outside observer, but many of which are not. We may, therefore, distinguish between the external and the internal expressions of an emotion. Prof. Cannon studied very carefully the visceral and somatic changes in some of the major emotions. The changes relate to blood pressure, heart-beat, breathing rate etc. In addition to these, we have to note the discharges of the various glands, specially of the endocrines. Of late, experimental, psychologists have also investigated another type of bodily change in emotions not visible to the eye the psycho-galvanic and thermionic reflexes. These changes have been used to detect slight emotional excitations even in the most stolid and apathetic of human beings. Their diagnostic value has also been investigated by psychology. The external changes, or changes visible to the eye of an outside observer, have been the subject of investigations, both popular and scientific, for many centuries. One may say that man, from the moment he became a social creature, observed and profited by his observations of, the 'expressions' of emotions in the face and limbs of his fellow beings. But the first systematic and scientific study of these 'expressions' of emotions was made by Darwin. In his remarkable book. '*The Expressions of Emotions in Man and Animals*' he analyzes fear, disdain, hatred, anger, determination, joy, devotion, tender feeling, anxiety, grief, despair and suffering, and several minor varieties of these important emotions. His work, is however only descriptive, because he was interested in a certain hypothesis which sought to assess the survival value of the expressions of emotions. Modern sociologists have gone deeper into the problem than Darwin did. They have devised several lines of experimental attack, and have gathered very valuable data relating to the 'expressions' of the emotions. Taking facial expression alone two impor-

tant groups of experiments have been conducted, one dealing with the study of the changes in the isolated facial muscles and organs, and other relating to the identifications of emotions depicted in typical photographs. Allport, whose work may be taken to be representative of the best that has been done in this field, has studied the movements of the forehead, brows, eyes, nose, mouth, lips, lower jaw and head in fear, anger, pain, disgust and pleasure. Taking anger, for example, we find that when the organism is under the sway of this emotion, that brows and forehead are lowered, knitted and wrinkled, the eyes are wide open, the nose is dilated, the mouth is opened out, rigid and rectangular, exposing the lower teeth, the lips are depressed and tense, the lower jaw is raised and the head advanced. The other manifestations of anger, such as flushing of the face, raising of the hair etc., are not mentioned in this context, but they have all been studied in detail.

We are no doubt grateful to the modern psychologist for the work he has done, but our wonder is unbounded when we turn to the pages of the *Nāṭya Śāstra* and find therein a very detailed and exhaustive description of all the fundamental emotions. Bharata's chief aim was the portrayal of these emotions through dance-poses. Consequently we find no mention, in his work, of the visceral changes. The outer changes, visible to an external observer, have been catalogued exhaustively, and classified methodically. Starting from the head and working down to the toes the *Nāṭya Śāstra* gives us a marvellous series of descriptions of the ways in which the various limbs and organs may be moved to indicate a given emotion or sentiment. The eye-brows, eye-lids, eyes, the nose, the lower lip, the cheeks, the jaws, the head and neck, the shoulders, the arms, the fingers, the trunk, the hip, the thighs, calf, legs feet and toes have all received separate treatment at the hands of Bharata. The *danseuse* is carefully instructed as to the different ways in which these parts of the organism may be manipulated.

Not only are the movements carefully analyzed and described, but accurate prescriptions have been made out as to how they should be combined in order to depict to the audience a particular mental state. Bharata knew well how simulation of an emotion would tend to induce it sympathetically in the minds of the audience.

Darwin, after weighing the available evidence very carefully came to the conclusion that 'the far greater number of the movements of expression, and all the more important ones, are innate or inherited, and cannot be said to depend on the will of the individual.' It is several decades since Darwin wrote his great work, and now we have further evidence to prove that not only the 'expressions', but the elements of mental structure whose functioning produces these expressions are also inherited. Therefore, the expression, when skilfully simulated in a drama or dance, induces similar feelings in the onlooker.

The dance is dynamic and fluid, and is performed against a rich, colourful background of music, lighting effects, stage setting etc. And in a whole dance sequence, the various delicate nuances of feeling may be adequately portrayed. It is a very difficult art, but it can be mastered by many. The modern ballet, founded on the Russian ballet, is a splendid example of what a dance ought to be.

Let us now turn our attention to the hard, cold, lifeless, granite walls flanking the passages in the great temple of Chidambaram. What meets our eyes is bound to take away our breath in unbounded admiration. The sculptor has caught just one static aspect of the whole dynamic dance series, but in that single aspect he has managed to distil the very quintessence of the entire sequence. The sculptured *karana* transcends the limitations imposed upon it and conveys to us, very vividly indeed, the living emotions as effectively as the exhibition of the *danseuse* in flesh and blood. This is truly marvellous. Admiration rises to awe, and even to reverence as one contem-

plates the wonderful miniature sculptures in hard, intractable, colourless granite, depicting the myriad colourful changing throbbing emotions and sentiments of the human heart. Fresco painting in colour, carving in marble, miniature carving in ivory and painting in silk and the chiselled figure in large blocks of granite are wonderful, each in its own way. They are beautiful works of art, indeed, requiring skill of the highest type. But to depict the sentiments and emotions of men and women in miniature granite sculptures is an art which excels art. It is a miracle in stone. Divine must have been the gift of the *Rṣis* of old who prescribed rules for carving in stone, and stupendous the capacity of the artists who executed them in granite !

All the 108 *Bharata Nāṭya* poses are carved on the walls of the *gopurams* of our Temple. We may choose a few typical examples for study in this paper. There is, for instance, a remarkable series of poses depicting Fear (*Bhaya*) *Bhujangatrāsita*, *Bhujangatrasta Recita*, *Bhujangañcita*, and *Ghūrṇita*—. The facial expressions are wonderfully true to life, and the bodily poses are faithful representations of the various types of the fear-reaction. Flight, reeling in fright and other actions suitable to the emotion are vividly portrayed. Anger (*krodha*) as an elemental emotion does not appear as such in the scheme, but it is treated under passion and intoxication in a short series of four poses *Mattallī Ardha Mattallī Madaskhalita* and *Nāgāpasarpita*. The swinging arms, and the stamping feet are well depicted, but here again it is the facial expression which is most striking. The ludicrous is depicted most forcibly in two poses—*Uromaṇḍala* and *Catura*. So provokingly funny is this pair that one cannot but burst into laughter at the sight of the ridiculous posture assumed by those dancing figures. Self-assertion, wonder, sympathy and other fundamental emotions are fittingly portrayed. The sentiments, which are the result of the blending of the fundamental emotions, have also been represented in the primary dance scheme. Pride, self adulation, haughtiness and overbearing gait receive

extensive portrayal. Some of these tiny figures are so powerful and dynamic in their suggestiveness that one forgets for the moment that what one is looking at is only a stone image. There is one little figure in particular which is a realistic picture of the hauteur of the new rich. Envy and jealousy, pity and sympathy, perplexity, supplication insult, humiliation and other sentiments are represented in the general scheme. Let us take one of these at random, supplication, for instance. The *karana*, portaying the sentiment is called *Lina*. The hands are folded as in our traditional way of reverential salutation—*namaskār*—the body is shrinking in, the head droops, and there is just a flicker of a smile on the face. The whole pose is a beautiful representation of the attitude of the suppliant. The most significant example of an expressive *karana* is *Kuñcita*, the pose depicting the ecstasy of a devotee lost in the passionate adoration of his *Iṣṭa devatā*. The kneeling legs (like *Garuda* bearing Lord Viṣṇu), the folded hands, the face suffused with tender emotion, submission and a slight touch of timidity, and the whole bearing of the figure constitute a marvellous portrait of ecstatic joy.

The few poses that I have chosen for discussion reveal the genius of the sculptors who worked at these dancing *karana*s. The whole temple is so full of these dance sculptures as well as of others depicting purāṇic legends that we may well look upon our fane as a veritable museum of iconography. One ought to see them with one's own eyes before one can realize the full significance of the statement that the great 'ṛṣi artists have made the cold hard lifeless stone spring into life and dance with joy, weep with sorrow and express in a myriad different ways the throbbing emotions of the human heart.'

ŚABDADHĀTUSAMĪKṢĀ :
A LOST WORK OF BHARTṚHARI

K. MADHAVA KRISHNA SARMA, M. O. L.,
ADYAR LIBRARY.

Somānandanātha, the first known exponent of the Idealistic Monism of the Śaiva school, devotes the second Āhnika of his *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* to a criticism of the Sphoṭavāda or the Śabdā-daitavāda as expounded by Bhartṛhari in his great work—the *Vākyapadīya*. After introducing the topic of discussion as—

अथास्माकं ज्ञानशक्तिर्या सदाशिवरूपता ।

वैयाकरणसाधूनां पश्यन्ती सा परा स्थितिः ॥ (२-१)

and explaining the position taken up by Bhartṛhari with quotations from the *Vākyapadīya*, among which—

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥ (२-९)

the *locus classicus* of the Śabdavivartavāda is also found, the author subjects it to a criticism from the Śaivaistic point of view, in verses beginning with—

आदौ तावदिन्द्रियत्वे स्थिता वाक्कर्मसंज्ञिते ।

तस्यात्मता ब्रह्मता वा वक्तुं शक्या न साधुभिः ॥ (२-१२-१३)

The Vaiyākaraṇas hold that the study of Vyākaraṇa leads to Mokṣa, the *summum bonum* of life, which, to them consists in the realization of Śabdabrahman which alone is the Real and of which One Real all this phenomenon is but a Vivarta. The assumption of Varṇa, Prakṛti, Pratyaya, Pada, etc., in Prakriyā-daśā is only a means to that end, even as the postulation of

the Pañcakośas is only an Upāya to one's awakening to the Real Self. This *Siddhānta* of the Vaiyākaraṇas has been beautifully summarized by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.

तस्मादेकः क्रमविरहितः कल्पितासद्विभागो
वाक्यस्फोटो जनयति मतिं तादृशीं स्वाभिधेये ।
वर्णास्त्वेते प्रकृतिलघवः कल्पनैकप्रतिष्ठा
स्तस्मिन्नर्थे विदधति धियं नेत्यलं तत्कथाभिः ॥

(P. 304, Benares ed.)

According to Vaiyākaraṇas, Vyākaraṇa is thus a Mokṣasāstra *par excellence*. Says Bhartṛhari :

आसन्नं ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसामुत्तमं तपः ।
प्रथमं छन्दसामङ्गं प्राहुर्व्याकरणं बुधाः ॥ (१-११)
प्रातरूपविभागाया यो वाचः परमो रसः ।
यत्तत्पुण्यतमं ज्योतिस्तस्य मार्गोऽयमाञ्जसः ॥ (१-१२)
तद्वारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् ।
पवितं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ॥ (१-१४)
इदमाद्यं पदस्थानं सिद्धिसोपानपर्वणाम् ।
इयं सा मोक्षमाणानामजिह्वा राजपद्धतिः ॥ (१-१६)
उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामपलापनाः ।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥ (२-२४०)

Referring to this Vaiyākaraṇa view, Somānanda says that by indulging in philosophic speculations as the above, the Vaiyākaraṇas forget their business which it is only to teach correct words.

वैयाकरणां त्यक्त्वा विज्ञानान्वेषणेन किम् । (२-७२)

Incidentally the author remarks that the learned Bhartṛhari has maintained this view not only here (in the *Vākya-pādiya*), but also in his *Samikṣā*.

भवतामप्रस्तुतेन न केवलमिहोदितम् ।

विज्ञानाभासनं यावत्समीक्षायामुदाहृतम् ॥ (२-७२-७३)

On this Utpala comments :

अर्थप्रतीतिहेतुसाधुशब्दानुशासनव्यापारमेव वैयाकरणत्वं त्यक्त्वा मोक्ष-
प्रयोजनैः शास्त्रैर्यत्सम्यग्ज्ञानमनुसरणीयं तदन्वेषणेन भवतां करणीयत्वेनाप्रस्तुतेन
न किञ्चित् ; न केवलं चात्रैव पश्यन्त्यभिधानेन सम्यग्ज्ञानाभास एव उक्तो याव-
च्छब्दधातुसमीक्षायामपि विद्वद्भर्तृहरिणा—

दिक्कालादिलक्षणेन व्यापकत्वं विहन्यते ।

अवश्यं व्यापको यो हि सर्वदिक्षु स वर्तते ॥

दिक्कालाद्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तचिन्मात्रमूर्तये ।

स्वानुभूत्येकमानाय नमः शान्ताय तेजसे ॥

इति लक्षणेन दिग्देशकालैरवच्छेदो विशिष्यमाणता निषिद्धा ॥

Somānanda thus informs us that Bhartṛhari has written another work called *Śabdadhātusamikṣā*. This is the only reference to it that I have come across so far. Perhaps the work has been lost, long back. Of the two verses quoted by Utpala as from the *Śabdadhātusamikṣā*, the second is now found beginning the *Subhāṣitatriṣaṭi* where, as may be gathered from the foregoing, it is clearly an interpolation from the former. Vallabhadeva quotes this and ascribes it to Bhartṛhari. If the ascription is to the anthologist, it must have been interpolated long before him. Whether the anthology has come to pass under Bhartṛhari's name on account of having this verse at the beginning or whether its author also is called Bhartṛhari, it is difficult to know definitely. However,

the following points are certainly against his being identified with the grammarian.

(1) The anthology has not been mentioned by Itsing as one of the works of the illustrious author of the *Vākyaṭīya*. *Argumentum ex silentio* can be of merit when it is supported by other arguments.

(2) The anthology has assumed its present form after passing through many textual vicissitudes. It has now become almost a compilation of elegant extracts from various works. In his introduction to the *Subhāṣitāvalī* of Vallabhadeva, Peterson points out that some of the verses attributed to Bhartṛhari by that anthologist are not found in the *Subhāṣita-triṣaṭi*, while some of those now found in it are attributed to others by him. Kṣemendra in his *Suṣṛttilaka* ascribes the following verse to Bhartṛhari; but it is not found in our anthology.

भवन्तो वेदान्तप्रणिहितधियामत्र गुरवो
विचित्रालापानां वयमपि कवीनामनुचराः ।
तथाप्येवं ब्रूमो नहि परहितात्पुण्यमपरं
न चास्मिन्संसारे कुवलयदृशो रम्यमपरम् ॥

(P. 52, Kāvya-mālā Series)

So also the following verses attributed to him in the *Sūktiratnahāra*.

हा धिक्कष्टमहो गतः स नृपतिः सामन्तचक्रं च तत्
पार्श्वे तस्य च सा विदग्धपरिषत्ताश्चन्द्रबिम्बाननाः ।
उद्रिक्तः स च राजपुत्रनिवहस्ते बन्दिनस्ताः कथाः
सर्वं यस्य वशात्स्मृतेः पदमगात् कालाय तस्मै नमः ॥

(P. 56, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series)

जीर्यन्ति जीर्यतः केशा दन्ता जीर्यन्ति जीर्यतः ।

चक्षुः श्रोत्रे च जीर्यन्ति तृष्णैका तरुणायते ॥

(P. 224)

यथार्चिषोऽग्नेः पवनस्य वेगा मरीचयोऽर्कस्य नदीषु चापः ।

गच्छन्ति चायान्ति च सन्ततास्तु तद्वच्छरीराणि शरीरिणां च ॥

(P. 264)

यूयं वयं वयं यूयमित्यासीन्मतिरावयोः ।

किं जातमधुना येन यूयं यूयं वयं वयम् ॥

(P. 269)

The following is therein quoted as from the *Sarasvatī-kanthābharāṇa*.

दुर्जनः परिहर्तव्यो विद्यालङ्कृतोऽपि सन् ।

मणिनालङ्कृतः सर्पः किमसौ न भयङ्करः ॥

(P. 41)

This is now included in the *Niṭiśataka* (P. 27, N. S. ed.). Puṇyarāja quotes the verse मणिः शाणोल्लीढः etc. (2.86-89), but does not attribute it to Bhartṛhari. It now forms part of the *Niṭiśataka*. Further textual divergences are shown by ¹ Mss. of the work, which do not at all agree on the number of verses. For the reasons stated below, the anthology could not, even in its original form, have been the work of the grammarian.

(3) The anthologist, as he himself says, is a staunch Śaiva - a Śivādvaitavādin, while the grammarian is a Śabda-brahmavādin.

महेश्वरे वा जगतामधीश्वरे जनार्दने वा जगदन्तरात्मनि ।

न वस्तुभेदप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति मे तथापि भक्तिस्तरुणेन्दुशेखरे ॥

(Vairāgya, 84, N. S. ed.)

(4) The grammarian is nowhere surnamed Yogindra or Yogeśvara - a title always seen going with the name of the compiler of the anthology.

(5) Lastly, it is difficult to believe that such a profound philosopher as the author of the *Vākyapadīya* wrote gnomic verses on the frivolities of life. Probably the Śatakas were originally the work of a Śaiva ascetic. When Itsing speaks of Bhartṛhari as having wavered between the world and its renunciation and died forty years before his visit, he is certainly not ¹ speaking of the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, but of some other Hari whom he confuses with the former.

1. Vide Dr. C. Kunhan Raja's article, Itsing and Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, *Krishnaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume*, pp 285 ff.

ŚAṆKARĀCĀRYA
ON
BUDDHIST IDEALISM

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The Idealistic school of Buddhism that was systematized by Ācāryas, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and established on a stronger basis by Ācāryas, Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti, has been referred to and criticized by several Ācāryas of the other schools of Indian Philosophy. It will be highly valuable to study those references along with their criticisms and to compare the same with the actual tenets of the system found in the works of those Buddhist authors. It is well-known that the two celebrated masters, Śaṅkara and Kumārila took prominent part in combating Buddhism in ancient days. In a previous paper I have studied the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara bearing upon the Realistic school of Buddhism (*sarvāstivāda*) and pointed out that Śaṅkarācārya has confused Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, despite his references and criticisms which are always based on some foundations.¹ Mention has also been made there that according to Śaṅkarācārya the aphorisms of Bādarāyaṇa, II. 2, 18—27 are a direct reply to the Realistic school of Buddhism and those II. 2, 28—32 to the Idealistic school. And for him Bādarāyaṇa did not formulate separate aphorisms to refute the Śūnyavāda of Mādhyamikas, because it is quite contrary to all means of knowledge. In the present paper we shall study all the references to the tenets of the Idealistic school of Buddhism found in the *Bhāṣya* on the aphorisms II. 2. 28—32 and see how they go hand in hand with the ideas of that system.

1. *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. XI, part I p. 27 ff.

The Bhāṣyakāra commencing the discussion on this subject, says in words of the Idealist Buddhists that the Buddha preached the system of reality of the external world in accordance with the attitude of some of his pupils who adhered to the external reality. But he at heart favoured only the system of pure ideas (*viññāna*) and none else. Each sect of Buddhists naturally tries to explain away in its own fashion all the scriptural passages that may contradict its own tenets, and contends that its own speculation alone is favoured by the Buddha. It is not strange to us that all the non-Buddhistic schools of Indian philosophy, especially the later schools of Vedānta strive to found their systems on the authority of the sacred scriptures in spite of many passages which speak quite contrary to them. According to Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna introduced the Madhyamaka system with a view to demonstrating a distinction in Buddha's teachings which are to be divided into two categories *neyārtha* and *nītārtha*.¹ Akṣayamatisūtra says that those discourses which are preached by the Buddha in order to introduce hearers into the path of practice, are called *neyārtha* and those which are preached with the intention of introducing them into the fruit (*phala*=*nirvāṇa*) are called *nītārtha*. According to Akṣayamati, therefore, only the doctrine of Śūnyatā is *nītārtha* and other theories, *viññānavāda*, etc. are only *neyārtha*. Vasubandhu, the first systematic exponent of the Buddhist Idealism says, on the other hand, that the Buddha preached the reality of the bases of matter and others to some of his pupils with some other intention (*abhiprāya*) of pure Idealism.² We have several other passages³ which clearly

1. *S. Madhyamakavṛtti* p. 41.

2. Vasubandhu's *Vṛṇsīkā* :

रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वं तद्विनेयजनं प्रति । अभिप्रायवशादुक्तमुपपादुकसत्त्ववत् ॥

Kar. 8.

3. *Lankāvatārasūtra* :

पुद्गलः संततिः स्कन्धाः प्रत्यया अणवस्तथा ।

प्रधानमीश्वरः कर्ता चित्तमात्रं वदाम्यहम् ॥

cited in *Bodhi-pani*. p. 484.

(continued on next page)

declare that the Buddha preached only one truth, either *viññāna* or *Śūnyatā* or some thing else and his other utterances are for some purpose (*sandhāya bhāṣā*). We are told that there is a tradition preserved in China and Japan that Buddha delivered in three periods three distinct doctrines, viz., in the first period the *Hinayāna* doctrine, in the second *Mahāyāna* and in the last period the subtle *Avatamsaka* doctrine.¹

Then the *Bhāṣya* goes: In the system of the Buddhist Idealists who deny the reality to the external things, all the current notions about the subject, object and result of a knowledge are so explained that they are arranged in the knowledge itself as its different aspects only. Even in the system of Realists who accept the reality of the external world those expressions regarding the subject, etc. of the knowledge cannot be satisfactorily explained without assuming some kind of mental arrangement² (*buddhyāroha*).

This part of the *bhāṣya* refers to a fundamental principle in the epistemology of the Buddhists. viz., the identity of the

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka :

एकं यानं नयश्च एकः एकाचेयं देशन नायकानाम् ।
उपायकौशल्य ममैव रूपं यत्तीणि यानान्युपदर्शयामि ॥

cited in *Advaya*. Sañ. p. 21.

Nāgārjuna :

धर्मधातोरसमेदाद्यानभेदोऽस्ति न प्रभो ।
यःनत्रितयमाख्यातं त्वया सत्त्वावतारतः ॥

Catustava. cited, *ibid.* p. 22, and in *Subhāṣitasāñ.* p. 14.

Āryadeva :

यद्यद्यस्य प्रियं पूर्वं तत्तत्तस्य समाचरेत् । नहि प्रतिहतः पात्रं सद्धर्मस्य कथञ्चन ॥
cited in *Madh. Avat.* p. 39. (Sanskrit text).

Candrakīrti :

एवं हि गम्भीरतरान् पदार्थान् न वेत्ति यः तं प्रति देशनेयम् ।
अस्त्यालयः पुद्गल एव चास्ति रक्न्धा इमे वा खलु धातवश्च ॥

Madh. Avat. VI. 43. Sanskrit text p. 39

See V. Bhattacharya, *Basic Concep. Buddhism* p. 31 ff.

1. McGovern: *Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*.

2. तस्मिंश्च विज्ञानवादे बुद्ध्यारूढेन रूपेण अन्तस्थ एव प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहारः सर्वं उपपद्यते । सत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे बुद्ध्यारोहमन्तरेण प्रमाणादिव्यवहारानवतारात् ।

cause and result of a knowledge. Ācārya Diñnāga who reformed the Buddhist logic not from the standpoint of the Idealists only, but from the point of view of Realists as well, tells us that in the process of cognition, the image of the object which is immanent in knowledge itself, plays part of the instrument and the self-feeling (*svasaṃvedana*) part of the result :

स्वसंवित्तिः फलञ्चास्य तादृप्यादर्थनिश्चयः ।

विषयाकार एवास्य प्रमाणं तेन मीयते¹ ॥

(*Pramāṇasam. I, 10.*)

According to Pārthasārathimīśra, this verse refers to the opinion of the Sautrāntikas, and therefore the cognizable (*prameya*) is the external thing.

But, for the Yogācāras, the Idealist Buddhists, who hold the external things as unreal, the cognizable will be, says Pārthasārathimīśra, the image of the object, blue, etc., which is imputed on originally pure knowledge by *anādi vāsanā*, and the grasping aspect (*svākāra*) and the self-feeling of the knowledge are regarded as instrument and result respectively. He cites in favour of this a verse from Diñnāga :

यदाभासं प्रमेयं तत् प्रमाणफलते पुनः ।

ग्राहकाकारसंवित्त्योक्त्यं नातः पृथक् कृतम् ॥

(*Pramāṇasam. I. 11.*)

Kamalaśīla speaking from the standpoint of the Idealists, assigns the rôle of the instrument of cognition to the efficiency of knowledge, and the rôle of the cognizable and of the result to the self and self-feeling respectively. The following verse is the authority for this arrangement:

तत्राप्यनुभयात्मत्वात् ते योग्याः स्वात्मसंविदः ।

इति सा योग्यता मानमात्मा मेयः फलं स्ववित्² ॥

1 This verse is quoted by Pārthasārathi-misra in his comment on *Ślokav. p 158*. The verse has been corrected by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, II, p. 384.

2. Comment on *Ślokav. p. 159.*

Again Kamalaśīla gives the following arrangement of the cause and result of a cognition from the standpoint of the upholders of the reality of the external things :

बाह्येऽर्थे प्रमेये विषयाधिगमः प्रमाणफलम् ।

सारूप्यं तु प्रमाणम् । स्वसंवित्तावपि सत्यां

यथाकारमस्य प्रथनात्¹ ।

If we, having this passage in view, read the aphorisms of Dharmakīrti तदेव प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं प्रमाणफलम् । अर्थप्रतीतिरूपत्वात् । अर्थसारूप्यमस्य प्रमाणम् । (*Tikā*, अर्थस्य प्रतीतिः अवगमः); we may conveniently surmise that Dharmakīrti is speaking there mainly from the viewpoint of Sautrāntikas. Compare Dharmottara's passage in his *Tikā* : अर्थवगतितरेत्र प्रमाणफलम् (p. 3, l. 9). Śāntarakṣita has summarily described the different arrangements adopted by Realists and Idealists as below :

विषयाधिगतिश्चात्र प्रमाणफलमिष्यते ।

स्वसंवित्तिर्वा प्रमाणं तु सारूप्यं योग्यतापि वा ॥

Thus we have shown that the Buddhist Idealists strive to adjust everything concerned with the theory of cognition in knowledge itself.

Now we may compare this theory with the comments which Vācaspatimiśra has made with his characteristic accuracy : स्वरूप- (Read स्वरूपं) विज्ञानस्य असत्याकारयुक्तं प्रमेयं, प्रमेयप्रकाशनं प्रमाणफलं, तत्प्रकाशनशक्तिः प्रमाणम् ।

Here *prameyaprakāśana* is equal to *svasamvedana*, because the cognizable (*prameya*) is the self-same nature of knowledge and *prakāśana-śakti* is *yogyatā* of Kamalaśīla. As regards the Sautrāntikas' arrangement, Vācaspatimiśra says: ज्ञानस्य अर्थसारूप्यमनीलाकारव्यावृत्त्या कल्पितनीलाकारत्वं प्रमाणं, व्यवस्थापनं हेतुत्वात् । अज्ञानव्यावृत्तिकल्पितं च ज्ञानत्वं फलं, व्यवस्थाप्यत्वात् ।

Here Vācaspatimiśra seems to have in mind, in saying that the *jñānatva* is the result (*phala*), the aphorism of Dharmakīrti: तदेव प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं प्रमाणफलम्.

Then he cites an oft-quoted passage from Diñnāga: नहि त्रिचिसत्तैव तद्वेदना युक्ता । तस्याः सर्वत्राविशेषात् । तां तु सारूप्यमाविशत् सरूपयत्तत् (Read सारूप्यवत्त्वं) घटयेत्¹ ।

The Commentator, introducing the bhāṣya, सत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे, etc. rightly remarks thus: बाह्यवादिनोरपि वैभाषिकसौत्वान्तिकयोः काल्पनिक एव प्रमाणफलव्यवहारोऽभिमत इत्याह ।

How even the *bāhyavādin*, Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas should assume only in imagination the different functions to be performed by the instrument and result of a cognition has been well explained in the order in the *Bhāmati*. The explanation in regard to Vaibhāṣikas runs as though an Idealist argues against a Vaibhāṣika realist. The following is the argument. A cause and result must be adjusted in one place. This principle will be violated if they both are separate entities and separately situated. A pure knowledge, a thing in itself, undifferentiated into parts and also incorporeal cannot be united with other corporal real objects as we witness the myrabolam in a pot (*kunde badaravat*). We must therefore imagine these two, cause and result, as existent in knowledge itself, thus its one aspect, the essence of cognition which is contrasted with non-cognition (*ajñāna*) plays the rôle of result and the other aspect, the illuminating efficiency which is contrasted with non-efficiency, the rôle of the instrument.²

Now we may see how the Vaibhāṣikas conceive the theory of cognition. They maintain, it is reported in the *Nyāyabindu ṭīkāṭīpṇi*, that the sense organs, eye, etc. serve

1. Also quoted by Pārthasārathi-miśra in *Ślokaṅgar* p. 274 with reading अविशेषप्रसङ्गात् for अविशेषात् and सरूपयितुं for सारूप्यवत्त्वं. Cited in *Prakarana-ṭīpāṇcīkā* p. 57 where we have the reading सरूपतां for सरूपयत् Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* II, p. 40, n 4 and p 359.

2. cp. *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p 256 in the *Buddhist Logic* II, p. 359 f.

as the instruments in the process of cognition. The eye sees and the intellect cognizes.¹ It is, of course, to be understood that other factors also take part in that process. When there arises a cognition in us, e.g., of a blue patch, there are three factors at work simultaneously, viz. the object, a blue patch (*ālambana-pratyaya*), the sight organ, eye (*adhipatipratyaya*) and the mind, a homogeneous cause, i.e., the preceding moment of the mind.² Through the co-operation of these three causes the visual cognition of blue arises. Though the genesis of visual cognition depends upon these three separate elements which interact according to the law of causation, yet there is no harm in calling it a visual perception owing to the prominence given to the sight organ,³ eye. We have to bear in mind that the interaction amongst the elements is not something like the action of one upon another, but they are simply appearing simultaneously and continuously in a proximity, and then the phenomenon of the visual sensation is felt. Here we may take note of some important passages quoted by Vasubandhu in his *Kośa* :

विभाषायामप्युच्यते । चक्षुःसंप्राप्तं विज्ञानं विजानाति पश्यतीत्यारव्यायते इति । तस्माच्चक्षुरेव पश्यति न तु विज्ञानमिति । विज्ञानं तु सान्निध्यमात्रेण (lit. सत्तामात्रेण) रूपं विजानाति । यथा सूर्यो दिवसकर इति । (यथा सान्निध्यमात्रेण सूर्यो दिवसं करोति इत्युच्यते) तथा विज्ञानं विजानातीत्युच्यते । कस्मात् । लोके तथा सिद्धत्वात् । Yaśomitra's comment, p. 88, 19) । सौत्रान्तिका आहुः । किमनेनाकाशधातुना (?) । चक्षुः प्रतीत्य रूपाणि च उत्पद्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानम् । तत्र को द्रष्टा । किं दर्शनम् । निर्व्यापारं हीदं, धर्ममात्रं, हेतुफलमात्रञ्च । तत्र (व्यवहारार्थं) छन्दत उपचाराः क्रियन्ते । चक्षुः पश्यति विज्ञानं विजानाति⁴ इति । नात्रासिनिबेष्टव्यम् । ...चक्षुः पश्यति श्रोतं शृणोति घ्राणं जिघ्रति रसना रसयति कायः स्पृशति चित्तं विजानाति इति काश्मीरवैभाषिकानां सिद्धान्तः (Tib. text, pp. 79, 13-80, 9).

We understand from this extract that the *Vaibhāṣikas* hold the sense-organs as instruments of sense-perception and

1. *ibid* p 311.

2. *Abhi-kośav.* p. 84,7,14.

3. *ibid*, p 92,6.

4. cp *Bhava Samkrānti Sūtra*, edited by me, § 12, p. 6.

that for the Sautrāntikas there is no difference whatever between the perception and the perceiver, nevertheless, there is no harm to say with the ordinary people that the eye sees and the intellect cognizes. And it seems that Sautrāntikas also hold that the expression "the eye sees" must be interpreted as "consciousness residing in the eye sees." This interpretation was accepted by all Vijñānavādins¹ and even by Vaibhāṣikas in special circumstances.²

Now, how "consciousness cognizes" or "grasps the object" is well explained by Vasubandhu in the words of Sautrāntikas as follows: When a consciousness appears in co-ordination with its objective elements, it is said to grasp its object. But in reality it does nothing. The expression "consciousness apprehends" is not inadequate, in as much as a continuity of conscious moments is the cause of every cognition. The agent here denotes simply the cause, the previous moment of the following one, just as in the current expression "the bell resounds." The bell is doing nothing, but every following moment of the sound is produced by the previous one.³

It is clear, therefore, that there is no real grasping or cognizing of the object by consciousness according to the Sautrāntikas. The object-element is appearing simultaneously with the flashing of consciousness, both an independent, but there is mutual correspondance, co-ordination⁴ (*sārūpya*), that is a reflex of the image of the object on the consciousness. This reflex of the image of the object is, for the Sautrāntikas, real and hence they argue that the reality of the external objects can possibly be inferred. This *sārūpya* theory has been accepted by all later Buddhist logicians, but the reality of the image evoked on the consciousness by the presence of the object was denied. Consciousness assumes different images owing to some force (*vāsanā*) potentially laid

1 *Abh. kosav.* p 84, 13.

2 *ibid.* p 85, 14 and *Nyāyabindu ṭīkā ṭippanī*, p. 27, 7.

3 Th. Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of Buddhists*, p. 935.

4 *ibid.* p. 957

down in it from immemorial time, and it is impossible, therefore, say the Idealists, to infer on that ground the reality of the external things.

Then Ācārya summarises the main arguments which the Idealists put forward in support of their theory that everything is pure idea.

ARGUMENT I

(Idealists say :) The external object which is accepted by you as real, must be either a simple atom or a body of atoms. The first alternative is not possible, because the object that is reflected in our cognition, bears the gross form and not the atomic form. Nor can the second alternative be accepted for the reason that the object which is merely a collocation of atoms is incapable of being described either as different from or identical with its constituent atoms.¹ We have to dispose off in this manner the categories such as universal, etc. (*jātyādi*).

This is the main argument set up by Diñnāga in his *Ālambanāparīkṣā* to disprove the reality of the external things. There he says :

The advocates of the external object hold it to be either atom or aggregate of atoms. The atom, though it plays the rôle of the cause for our sense-perception, cannot be its object, because our sense-perception does not bear the image of the atom ; sense organ, for example, is not considered to be the object of the perception even if it causes the latter. Nor can the aggregate be its object even though it is represented in our cognition; for, it does not give rise to the latter. The double moon is perceived by the eye-diseased person, but there is no double moon in the sky. Similarly the aggregate reflected in our consciousness is utterly unreal. Therefore

1. Vaibhāṣikas' view ' atom is different from the Saṅghāta Bhadanta Vasubandhu's view it is not different S. *Abh.*, *Kośav.* p. 89, 20. and *Vimśikā-bhāṣya*, p. 7, 11.

there is no object which would explain the genesis and the image of the consciousness satisfactorily. Thus Dinnāga concludes that the supposed objects, atoms or aggregates, are all nothing but ideas. (*Ālambanaparīkṣā*, my restored Sanskrit text p. 1. f.)

The same argument has been formulated by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.¹ We also find that Vasubandhu has discussed and established in his *Vimśikā*² the unreality of the external things by the argument somewhat similar to Dinnāga's one.

Vācaspatimiśra, supplementing the *bhāṣya* (न परमाणवस्तत्त्वादिप्रत्ययपरिच्छेद्या भवितुमर्हन्ति) remarks as follows :

The atom cannot be the object of our cognition. It always contains an image of one gross object such as blue, etc. and never that of the very subtle atom. Nor is it proper to assume that our cognition may be characterized with some image and some other thing may be its object. For, that will be a too wide assumption, and as everything may possibly become the object of our cognition despite some different image that has been reflected upon it, all of us may become omniscient. Nor may one argue that the gross form that is felt in our cognition is a property of the representation because of the following dilemma. Is the gross form accepted as the property of the representative consciousness or of the object while being represented in it ? If you adopt the first alternative, then it will amount to saying that the consciousness has its own part as object. In the case of the second alternative, the colour atoms while appearing simultaneously and in a close vicinity, and entering into a single consciousness, will themselves constitute the gross form. Now we cannot attribute an illusive character to any part of the above phrases and none of them is contradicted in experience. Those colour-atoms are indeed colour-atoms, they are indeed appearing simultaneously and in close vicinity, and they are indeed entering into a single con-

1. *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 551.

2. ed. S. Levi, kar. 11, p. 6.

sciousness. The gross form, therefore, need not be the property of the atoms like *nīlatva*, since it is not found in each atom. Nevertheless, atoms while entering into the stage of representation, may assume a kind of gross form which is, empirically true just as the number multitude (*bahutva*). Here Vācaspatiniśra cites two verses in emphasizing the above :

ग्रहेऽनेकस्य चैकेन किञ्चिद्द्रव्यं हि गृह्यते ।
 सांवृतं प्रतिभासस्थं तदेकात्मन्यसम्भवात् ॥
 न च तद्दर्शनं भ्रान्तं नानावस्तुग्रहाद्यतः ।
 सांवृतं ग्रहणं नान्यत् न च वस्तुग्रहो भ्रमः¹ ॥

This explanation of the second alternative is not correct. The representation of atoms as if they are appearing simultaneously and in close vicinity is illusive. Colour-atoms are combined not in purity and without heterogeneous atoms, but they are, on the other hand, intermixed with atoms of *gandha*, *rasa* and *sparsa*. Therefore our idea of gross form as related to atoms combined and with interspace (*sāntara*) is only illusive. We call, for example a forest, a great number of trees closely planted. But this idea is only illusion, since there is nothing corresponding to it. If we accept, therefore, that our cognition of pot, etc. cognizes only atoms as its hidden objects, then, though it is devoid of any construction, it is illusive (as it contains a gross form such as a pot, etc. which is absent in atoms) and hence not sense-perception, just like the cognition of yellow conch. This is the meaning intended in the passage of the *bhāṣya* "Atoms are not capable of being cognised by the cognition of the pillar and others.

According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, there was one school of thought which maintained that the reflection of the image (*ākāra*) in our cognition is due to the association of

1. The source of this quotation is not known.

consciousness with the external object, ie. atoms¹ (*samsarga-dharmākāra*).

We find from the *Tattvasan. pañjikā* that Bhadanta Śubha-gupta was the advocate of the atomic theory, and that he held the view that atoms always appear in association and never in isolation, therefore each atom is not represented in our cognition and our idea of a unity (*sthūla*) in it is only our mental illusion.² Kamala-śīla has recorded three views on atomic theory. According to the first view, atoms get combined one another (*samyujyante paramāṇavaḥ*), the second view is that they are in close vicinity but do not come into mutual contact (*sāntarā eva nityan na spṛśanti*) and the last one is that when they get combined without interspace, we call them combined (*nirantaratve tu spṛṣṭasamjñā*).³

ARGUMENT II

Although all our cognitions, so far as they are self-conscious, must be identical and with no difference whatever amongst them, we, however, experience them differentiated in respect of their objects, such as a pillar, pot, wall and so on. In order to account for these differences we ought to accept some differentiating element, some conformity between the object and its cognition (*viśayasārūpya*) in consciousness itself. That conformity being granted, it is useless to suppose that there are real different external objects corresponding to those varied cognitions ; for, we may explain them very well as merely consequences of the manifold images imputed upon consciousness itself.

1 *Sloka* Śūnyavāda 42 with comment of Pārthasārathi misra.

2. p 551,

प्रत्येकपरमाणूनां स्वातन्त्र्येणास्त्वसंभवः । अतोऽपि परमाणूनामेकैकाप्रतिभासनम् ॥

Again on p. 552,

यथा सदृशापरापरक्षणोत्पादात् विप्रलब्धस्य गृहीतेऽपि प्रत्यक्षेण शब्दादौ नित्यत्व-
विभ्रमः । तथा परमाणूनामविच्छिन्नदेशानां सजातीयानां युगपद्ग्रहणे स्थूल इति
मानसो विभ्रमो भवति ।

3. *Tattvasan. pañ.* p 556, 8, *Abh. kośabhāṣya* p. 82, 3, (Tib. Text).

Here the commentary after having elucidated this point very well quotes again in favour of *Sāruṇya* theory the well-known passage already once quoted, viz. न हि वित्तिसत्त्व वेदना, etc.

We have already spoken that both the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras are advocates of the image of consciousness, only difference between them being that the image is real for the former and unreal for the latter. Note that Bhadanta Subhagupta is reported to have held the theory of imageless consciousness.¹ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have strongly criticised the theory of real image-endowed consciousness² and finally established that those images reflected in our cognitions are untrue (*alika*), hence no real external objects could be inferred on that basis. Nor are they amenable to our senses. We experience by our senses only one image such as blue, etc. as a part of our cognition itself and we never experience two images, one as reflex in our cognition and the other evoking that reflex.³ The same has been said in the *Bhāmati* also :
एकश्चायमाकारोऽनुभूयते । स चेद्विज्ञानस्य, नार्थसङ्गावे किञ्चन प्रमाणमस्ति ।

ARGUMENT III

The following consideration also forces us to admit the identity between the object and consciousness. They, both the object and consciousness, are felt invariably identical. The object is never felt separated from consciousness and the latter is also never felt separated from the former. If they are different in nature, their invariable co-extensiveness (*sahopalambhaniyama*) will become inexplicable, because there is no logical connection between them other than identity. Thus we are forced to conclude that the external thing is nothing but our idea.

Vācaspatimiśra, having put this argument in a syllogistic form, quotes a verse from Dharmakīrti.

1. *ibid.* p. 561, 9 ff.

2. *ibid.* p. 571.

3. *ibid.* p. 574, 17 : नहि द्वे नीले कदाचित्संवेद्येते एकं ज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बकम् । अपरं तदर्पकमिति ।

सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्वियोः ।

भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्यतेन्दाविवाद्वये ॥

It seems that the argument of this type was first formulated by Dinnāga,¹ then elaborated by Dharmakīrti and then by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.²

FAVOURABLE EXAMPLES

We have many homogeneous examples favourable to this conclusion. Just as ideas in dreams, idea of water in the rays of the sun-light in a distant place and a notion of the city in the city-like form of clouds and other ideas contain no cognizer and cognized, so also our wakeful cognitions of different objects ought to be devoid of cognizer and cognized, because wakeful ideas cannot be distinguished from dreamy ideas in their own nature (*pratyayatvāviśeṣāt*) *Bhāmati* puts this in syllogism as below :

यो यः प्रत्ययः स सर्वो बाह्यानालम्बनः यथा स्वप्नमायादिप्रत्ययः । तथा चैष विवादाध्यसितः प्रत्यय इति स्वभावहेतुः ।

AN OBJECTION ANSWERED

Now Sautrāntikas ask this question. The real external things being not admitted by you, how could you explain the manifold and varied cognitions that arise in us as products of different corresponding things? Vijñānavādins answer as follows. The variety of cognitions is due to a variety of forces (*vāsanā*) deposited in consciousness from immemorial time. We do not contradict the variety of cognitions that we experience in daily life ; because we have established as a principle that in our beginningless mundane life, cognitions and forces are mutually dependent as causes and effects, just as seeds and sprouts are interdependent. Moreover, we have

1. Ibid. p. 567, 16 : ईदृश एव आचार्यीये सहोपलम्भनियमादित्यादौ प्रयोगे हेत्वर्थोऽभिप्रेतः ।

2. Ibid p. 567, 4 ff.

established by an invariable concomittance positive and negative that the varied cognitions are conditioned by *vāsanā* alone. And that *vāsanā* is the prime factor of many unfounded ideas in dream and other psychic phenomena must be accepted by both of us. But we, for our own part, do not hold that the variety of cognitions is brought about by the external things and not by *vāsanā* alone. Therefore the external things, for us, are non-existent apart from their ideas.

The principle that our cognitions and forces (*vāsanā*) are mutually related as causes and effects from immemorial time has been set up by Diñnāga in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā* as an ultimate explanation of his pure idealism. Jinendrabuddhi¹ also has made the principle clear in his comment on *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* I, kārikā II. A more detailed account can be gathered from the Bhāmati here of the standpoints both of the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras in regard to the reality and unreality of the external things. Śaṅkarācārya's criticism of all the arguments above stated will be dealt with in a separate paper.

1. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, p. 382 f.

A NOTE ON THE GODĀVARĪ GRANT

OF

PR̥THVĪMŪLA

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It is here proposed to examine afresh the Gōdāvarī grant¹ of Pr̥thvīmūla in general, and in particular the portion of it which refers to Indrādhirāja. The latter passage had been the subject of discussion by numerous scholars, and on its import no definite and satisfactory opinion had been expressed.

It is dated in the 25th year of the reign of some unspecified king, expressed both in words and numerical symbols; and this occurs at the very end of the record. (1. 34). The opening portion (11. 1-12) introduces the Parama-māhēśvara Pr̥thvīmūla-rāja, son of Prabhākara-Mahārāja, as informing all the Rāṣṭrakūta-pramukhas of the Tāḷupākaviṣaya that the village of Chūyipāka, situated in the centre of four other specified villages, had been made into an *agrahāra* and granted by him to 43 Brahmanas of various *gōtras*, at the request of a certain Indrādhirāja in order to secure merit for the latter's father and mother and that this grant must be protected by all, especially by *Hastikēśa* and *Virakēśa* (11. 21-27). Here we have to note that the suzerain lord of the region was some one whose name is not revealed, but in whose 23th regnal year the inscription is dated; (2) that Pr̥thvīmūla, son of Prabhākara, was a feudatory of that supreme ruler, otherwise there is no reason why the inscription should not be dated in his own regnal year; and (3) that the position of Indrādhirāja, who bears only the epithet *śrīmat*, was still lower, as is shown

1. For a full text of the record see *J. B. B. R. A. S.* Vol. XVI. pp. 144. ff.

by the fact that he had to petition to Pṛthvīmūla for a grant made to secure merit to his own parents.

Now we shall take up the portion which speaks of Iddrādhirāja. The inscriptions give a description of his father and his place of residence, and states how he obtained unique fame. In doing so it records a historical even of great importance. The passage runs thus :—

Srut-ābhijana-vṛtta-sampat-prabhā-bhāsur-ōdāra - puruṣa-ratna-nikara-prasūti - hētu-prakhyāta-Maṇalkuḍi (ḍi)-vāstavya-dvijāty-anvaya - payōdhi-sambhūta - śītarasṁmēr-asakṛd-avāpta-saturddanta-saṁgrām-vijayasya Mitavarmanmaṇaḥ priya-tanayēna sarabhasam-Indra-bhaṭṭāraka-samutpātan-ābhilāṣa-samudita - pramudit - āśēṣa - nṛpati-kṛta-tumula - samar - ādhirūḍha-Supratik-ānēkap-ābhimukha samada-Kumuda-dvirada-nipatan-ādhighata-bhuvana-tala-vitata-vipula-viśuddha-yaśasā Śrīmad-Indradhirēna.

In the above passage, are mentioned two principal persons, one in the genitive case and the other in the instrumental. These are Mitavarman and his son Indrādhirāja. Of Mitavarman it is said that he was born in the family of a *dvija* resident of Maṇalkuḍi and that he obtained again and again victory in battle against the Caturdanatas. Mitavarman is not a name found in any of the genealogies of kings known so far, and Maṇalkuḍi is not celebrated as the capital of any sovereign or chief. Besides, there is absolutely nothing in the passage in this inscription that would raise him to the dignity of a king.

The epithets use for Indrādhirāja are *priya-tanayēna* and the long compound *sarabhasam.....viśuddha-yaśasā*. This second epithet informs us that a large number of kings desired to uproot Indra-bhaṭṭāraka, that in the ensuing combat, the elephant Kumuda advanced against the elephant Supratika, and that on this occasion Indrādhirāja obtained by overthrowing Kumuda, spotless fame that spread over the world.

The fact that a number of kings sought to overthrow Indra-bhaṭṭāraka shows that the latter had created enemies all round, probably by his aggressiveness. This at once rules out the Eastern Cālukya Indra-bhaṭṭāraka, who reigned only for a single week, within which time he could hardly have done anything to cause a confederacy to rise against him. Another Indra-bhaṭṭāraka known to us is of the Viṣṇukūṇḍin family. He might have been a thorn in the side of neighbouring powers for he is said to have fought hundreds of battles against the Caturdantas and to have successfully disposed of his *dāyādas*. His reign was also a long one. There is a likelihood that the confederacy was formed against him.

Now, leaving open this possibility, we proceed to note the other implications of the grant. It has been very ingeniously suggested that Caturdanta, Kumuda and Supratika represent the kings respectively of the Eastern, South-Western and North-Eastern directions. There seems to be no doubt about this.

The inscription is certainly not explicit as regards the result of the war, whether the coalition was successful in its aim or not. By associating the fall of the elephant Kumuda with the object of the coalition one may be led to think that the coalition was successful in its object. In this case Kumuda must represent Indra-bhaṭṭāraka, and he must be assigned a dominion in the South-Western region ; similarly, by associating Indrādhirāja, who overthrew it, with the elephant Supratika, against which Kumuda rushed, we may be led to suppose that Indrādhirāja was the king of the North-East. But there is nothing in the inscription to show that Indra-bhaṭṭāraka was a king of the South-west, and Indrādhirāja, the ruler of the North-east, and a member of the coalition. On the contrary, Indrādhirāja is described without royal attributes and in no wise connected with the formation of the confederacy ; he is said to have been the son of Mitavarman, who was a *dvija* resident of Maṇalkuḍi with no royal attributes of a king but

famous for several victories over the Caturdantas, a description that would fit a chief or an officer under a king and not a king himself. What the inscription tells us is that by the part played by Indrādhirāja in the war between the coalition of kings and Indra-bhaṭṭāraka,—viz. the overthrowing of the elephant Kumuda (i.e. the king of the South-west) when it rushed against Supratika (i.e. the king of the North-east),—he secured fame that spread throughout the world. From this it is plain that Supratika and Kumuda represent kings on opposite sides in the war. If then we suppose that Supratika represents Indra-bhaṭṭāraka and Kumuda one of the confederate kings, the coalition must be considered to have failed in achieving its object. Indradhirāja's part consisted only in overthrowing the advancing Kumuda and he must have been fighting under the banner of Indra-bhaṭṭāraka. It is natural to suppose that the confederates have commenced the action against Indra-bhaṭṭāraka, as is expressed by the statement that Kumuda marched against Supratika, and that, in the fight of one against many, wide-spread fame could only arise if the one had been successful against odds. Now the writer of the grant has skilfully indicated the complete failure of the confederacy against Indra-bhaṭṭāraka by simply stating that the fame of Indrādhirāja was spotless and world-wide; for there would be no cause for fame if a number of kings by conjoint effort had been able to overthrow one. The confederacy has been only incidentally introduced into the grant to show how Indrādhirāja earned his fame.

Indra-bhaṭṭāraka, if he is identical with the Viṣṇukunḍin Indrabhaṭṭāraka or Indravarman, is said to have fought hundreds of thousands of battles against the Caturdantas,¹ i.e. the king of the Eastern region. Our Gōdāvarī grant states that Mitavarman, the father of Indrādhirāja, gained many victories again and again, over the Caturdantas. It is not unlikely that he was a senior contemporary of Indra-bhaṭṭāraka and fought under his standard against the same enemy and

shared in his successes. While the position of Mitavarman and his son Indradhiraja may be considered to be one of subordination to Indra-bhaṭṭāraka, there was another great ruler of this period, who claims victory over the Caturdantas; this is the Eastern Ganga king of Kalinganagara who issued the Jirjingi plates in the 39th year of his reign. It is possible that he also fought on the side of Indra-bhaṭṭāraka in some of the latter's encounters with the king of the eastern region.

From what has been said above the following facts will be clear :—

- (i) Indra-dhaṭṭāraka mentioned in the Gōdāvarī grant cannot be the Eastern Cālukya king of that name.²
- (ii) He may be appropriately identified with his namesake of the Viṣṇukunḍin family who had a long reign, and is reported to have won many victories.
- (iii) The confederacy against Indra-Bhaṭṭāraka was not joined by Indrādhirāja the son of Mitavarman, and there is no warrent for treating this name as Adhirāja Indra and identifying him with any king of the Eastern Gaṅga dynasty of Kalinga.³
- (o) There are grounds for thinking that Indrādhirāja and his father held subordinate positions under Indrābhaṭṭāraka and served him in his wars.

By a reconsideration of the Gōdāvarī grant we have arrived at the conclusion that from the side of the confederacy of kings, Kumuda. i.e., the king of the South-western region, attacked Supratika. i.e. Indra-bhaṭṭāraka of the North-east and was overthrown by the latter's officer or chief Indrādhirāja.

Evidence from another source not only proves that the two families were on inimical terms even before, but also that the king of the South-west had good cause for his attack upon

1. J.A.H.R.S. Vol. III. p. 49 f.

2. See Fleet in *Md. Ant.* XIII. p 119 L. and Burgess in A.S.S.I, IV, 162.

3. as is done by Fleet, *ut supra*

Indrabhaṭṭāraka, who must be the Viṣṇukuṇḍin of that name. This proof comes from the *Janāśraya-Chandāviciti*, a work on Sanskrit prosody of the time of the Viṣṇukuṇḍin Mādhavavarman Janāśraya. The able editor of this work, Mr. M. Ramakrishna Kavi, has shrewdly remarked¹ that the verse in it commencing with the words 'āyāna prāṁsum' etc. compares Janāśraya with the God Kumāra. In this verse the epithet *taruṇa-ravi-saḍṛsa-vadanaḥ-mayūra-dvijah* is applied to Janāśraya and Kumāra, and the enemy overcome by them is indicated by *śaśi-kiraṇa-kumuda-saḍṛsam Krauñcasya-āgram-śaktyā bhinnam*. If, as we learn here, Kumuda had been shattered by the power of Mādhavavarman Janāśraya, it may well be that he brought about the confederacy to aid him against his enemy the Viṣṇukuṇḍin king, who at the time of the Gōdāvarī grant was Mādhavavarman's grandson Indrabhaṭṭāraka and was the first to commence action in the war. In view of Mādhavavarman's long reign of nearly half a century, there is very likelihood that his son Vikramēndravarmaṇ had a short reign and that Indrabhaṭṭāraka succeeded the latter very soon.

Having shown how the Janāśraya Chandāviciti gives proof of prior conflict between Kumuda, i.e. the king of the South-western region, and the Viṣṇukuṇḍin Mādhavavarman, and thus indicates a cause for the formation of the confederacy against Indrabhaṭṭāraka—thus establishing that Supratika must represent the Viṣṇukuṇḍin Indrabhaṭṭāraka, who was not far removed in date from Mādhavavarman and who, like him, pursued a policy of aggression,—we proceed to point out one other enemy of the Viṣṇukuṇḍins who might have joined the confederacy. This was the king of the Eastern region represented by the Caturdanta. The Pulōmburu grant² states that Mādhavavarman set out to effect the conquest of this region (*Prāg-dig-jigīṣaya-prasthītaḥ*). The Rāmatīrtham plates of Indravarmaṇ, i.e. Indrabhaṭṭāraka, tell us that in

1. Vol. I. p. 133 f.

2. C.P. No. 7 of 1913-14 and J.A.H.R.S. Vol. IV. p. 17f.

hundreds of thousands of battles he gained victories over the king of the Eastern quarter (*anēka-caturdanta-samara-śata-sahasra-saṁghaṭṭa-vijayī*). The same fact is also referred to in the Chikkulla plates of his son Vikramēndravarman in the words *anēka-caturdanta-samara-saṁghaṭṭa-dvirada-gaṇa-viṣula-vijayasya*. We have already noted that the claim of Mitavarman to have 'again and again obtained victories in battle over the Caturdantas' (*asakṛd-avāpta-caturdanta-saṁgrāma-vijayasya*) must be based upon the aid rendered by him in the numerous wars of his overlord, the Viṣṇukundin Indrabhaṭṭākara. Thus from all these we see that the kings of the Eastern quarter were unwilling to bear the yoke of the overlordship of the Viṣṇukundins and put up hard fights with them. And it is not at all unlikely that its king was one of the confederates who attempted to overthrow Indrabhaṭṭāraka.

சங்ககாலத்துப் பெண்பாற் புலவர்கள்.

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இரண்டாயிரம் ஆண்டுகளுக்கு முன் மதுரையில் தமிழரசர்களின் காப்பில் தமிழ்ச்சங்கம் இருந்ததென்றும், அதன் உறுப்பினர்கள் பலர் தம்முடைய பிற்காலத்தோர்க்கென இலக்கியச் செல்வமீட்டி வைத்தனரென்றும் நம்புவதற்குத்தக்க காரணங்களுள்ளன. சில நூறு புலவர்கள் எழுதிய செய்யுட்களை அகம், புறம் என்று பொருள்வாரியாகப் பிரித்துப் பிற்காலத்தார் எட்டு நூல்களாகத் தொகுத்தனர். அவற்றை எட்டுத்தொகை என்கிறோம். பத்து நீண்ட பாட்டுகளும், பதினெட்டுச் சிறு கண்க்கும் சங்கத்தார் செய்த மற்ற செய்யுட்களாகும்.

எட்டுத்தொகையில் நற்றிணை, குறுந்தொகை, பதிற்றுப்பத்து, அகநானூறு, புறநானூறு என்னும் நூல்களில் பெண்பாற் புலவர்களின் செய்யுட்கள் உள்ளன. அவர்களுடைய பாடல்கள் நூற்றைம்பதுக்கு மேலிருக்கலாம். அவர் இருபத்தைவருக்கு மேலுள்ளனர். அவர் தம் பெயர்கள் பழங்கால முறைப்படியுள்ள தமிழ்ப் பெயர்களும், திறமையாற்பெற்ற சிறப்புப்பெயர்களுமாக உள்ளன. இக்காலத்து அப்பெயர்கள் மிகவும் புதுமையாகத் தோன்றலாம். அப்பெயர்கள் பின் வருவன:—அஞ்சிலாந்தை மகள்நாகையார், அள்ளூர் நன்முல்லையார், ஆதிமந்தியார், ஒக்கூர் மாசாத்தியார், ஓளவையார், கச்சிப்பேட்டு நன்னாகையார், கழார்க்கோனெயிற்றிபார், காக்கை பாடினியார் நச்செள்ளையார், காமக்கணிப் பசுலையார், காவற் பெண்டு, குமிழி ஞாழார் நப்பசுலையார், குறமகள் இளவெயினி, நக்கண்ணையார், பாரிமகளிர், பூங்கணுத்திரையார், பெருங்கோப்பெண்டு, பேய்மகள் இளவெயினி, பொன்முடியார், போந்தைப் பசுலையார், மாற்பித்தியார், மாறோகத்து நப்பசுலையார், வெண்ணிக் குயத்தியார், வெள்ளிவீதியார்.

சில பெயர்கள் பெண்பாலாருடையவோ என்றெண்ண இடந்தருவன. அவை பொன்மணியார், நெட்டிமையார், நல்வெள்ளியார், சூப்பைக்கோழியார், பேயார், மதுரை ஓலைக்கடையத்தார் முதலியன.

ஒவையாரைப்பற்றி நாம் பல கதைகளறிவோம். ஒளவையார்கள் பலபேரிருந்தனர். புலமைவாய்ந்து பாடுந்திறமையும் பெற்றிருந்த பெண்பாலரிற் பலர் அப்பெயராற் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டிருக்கலாம். பிற்காலத்து ஒளவையின் ஆத்திசூடி முதலிய சிறு தூல்கள் அனைவருமறிந்தனவே. ஆனால் சங்க காலத்திலிருந்த ஒளவையாரைப்பற்றி நம் நாட்டவருக்கு நன்கு தெரியாது.

அவர் புலமையிற் சிறந்தவர் மட்டுமல்லர். சிறந்த அரசியல் மதிநுட்பம் உடையவராயிருந்தவர். பெருவள்ளலான அதிகமான் அஞ்சி, ஒளவை நெடுங்காலம் வாழின், நாட்டுக்கு நன்மை விளையும் என எண்ணி வாழ்நாளை நீட்டிக்கும் ஒப்பற்ற, கிடைத்தற்கரிய நெல்லிக்கனியைத் தானுண்ணாது அவருக்கு உண்ணக்கொடுத்தான். பகையாசனிடம் அதிகமானுக்காகத் தூது சென்ற ஒளவைக்கு அப்பகையாசன் தன் படைக்கலக் கொட்டிலைக் காட்டினான். அவன் ஆயுதங்கள் மிகவும் பளபளப்பாக மெருகிடப்பட்டு, பீலி சூட்டப்பட்டு மின்னிக் கொண்டிருந்தன. இவற்றைக் கண்டு ஒளவையார், அதிகமானிடம் சென்று தன்னோடு பொருது வெல்வதையலாதென்று கூறுவாரென அவன் நம்பினான். அஞ்சாத நெஞ்சமும் அளவற்ற அரசவன்பும், பழுதற்ற காரியத்திறமையும் உள்ள ஒளவை அதிகமானின் போர்த்திறனை அவனுக்கு விளக்கிய முறை மிகவும் வியக்கச் செய்வதாகும். அரசனே! என் தலைவனின் படைக்கலங்கள் பகைவரைக்குத்தி, கோடும் துனியும் சிதைந்து கொல்லனுலைக் கொட்டிலிலுள்ளன என்று ஒளவை கூறினார்.

ஒளவையின் பாடல்கள் மிகவும் சிறப்புடையன. அவை அவருள்ளத்தை யறிய மிகவும் உதவியாவன. இப்பாட்டி மிகவுஞ் சிறப்புடையாராய் அரசரோடு ஒப்ப வாழ்ந்தவர். தமிழ்நாடு முழுவதுஞ் சுற்றியறிந்தவர். பலபெரும் புலவர்கட்கு நெருங்கிய நண்பராயிருந்தவர். இவர் அதிகமானைப்பற்றி ஊரிலுள்ள சிறு குழந்தைகள் தன்கோடுகளைக்கழுவ நீர்த்துறையில் படியும் பெருங்களிறுபோல எமக்கு நீ இனியை; நின் ஒன்றார்க்கு இன்னாய்; என்கூறும் பாட்டு மிகவும்

மகிழ்ச்சி தருவது. இப்பேச்சில் பெண்பாற் புலவர் வாலாறுகளையோ அவர்களுடைய செய்யுட்களின் இனிமை பெருமைகளையோ சொல்லி முடித்தலியலாது. அஃது என் கருத்தும் அன்று. ஔவையைக் கதைகளாலறிவோம். அவர் பெயர் எல்லாக் குழந்தைகளும்றிந்தது. வேறு சில புலவர்களைப்பற்றியே இங்கு மிகுதியாகக் கூறுவதென் கருத்து.

பாரிமகளிர் ஒரே ஒரு செய்யுள் செய்துள்ளனர். இருவருஞ் செய்த செய்யுளது. அச்செய்யுள் அவர்களுடைய தந்தை யிறந்த சில நாட்களில் ஆக்கப்பட்டது. நிலாநன்கு பார்த்து ஒளி திகழ்கிறது. தங்கையுந் தமக்கையும் அதனைக் காண்கின்றனர். காணுமிடமோ அவர் தம் பறம்பு மலையன்று. அம்முழுநிலவு அதற்கு முந்திய முழுநிலவை நினை ஆட்டுகிறது. புலமை நிறைந்த உள்ளங்கள் துளும் பின. தங்களது நிலைமையில் சென்ற முழு நிலவுக்கும், இந்த முழு நிலவுக்கும் நடுவிலுண்டான மாறுதல்கள் புலமைக் கண்முன் காட்சி யளித்தன. நிலவோ அதேபோல்தான் இருக்கிறது. போன நில விற்போது தந்தை யிருந்தார். பறம்புமலை அவருடையதா யிருந்தது. எங்களுக்கு உரிமையாயிருந்தது. இன்றைய நிலவில் நாம் இங்குள் னோம். தந்தையிலோம். பறம்பு எங்கட்கு உரியதன்று. வேற்று வேந்தராற் கொள்ளப்பட்டுவிட்டது. இக்கருத்தமைத்து, தங்களுள் ளத்தை உலகுள்ளளவும் அறியப்பின்வருமாறு தெளிவாகச் சிறந்த பாடலையில் வார்த்தனர்.

அற்றைத் திங்களவ் வெண்ணிலவின்
எந்தையுமுடையே மெங்குன்றும் பிறர்கொளார்
இற்றைத் திங்களிவ் வெண்ணிலவின்
வென்றெறி முரசின் வேந்தரெங்
குன்றுங்கொண்டார் யாமெந்தையு மிலமே.

எல்லாச் சொற்களும் எளியசொற்கள். திங்கள் என்பது அக் காலத்தில் சந்திரனுக்குப் பெயராக வழங்கியது. அவர் தம் நிலைமையுணர்ந்து இப்பாடலைப் படிப்போர், இப்பாடலைப் புலமைக்கும், பாட்டுக்கும், ஒப்பற்ற எடுத்துக்காட்டாக எண்ணத்தவரார். தம்முள் ளத்தை இவ்வாறு வெளியிட்டு அந்நிலவில் செயலற்று மதி சோர்ந்து தந்தையையும், தம் நிலைமையையுமெண்ணி யமர்ந்திருந்தாரென நாம் நம் மனக்கண்முன் உருப்படுத்திக்கொள்ளலாம்.

கச்சிப்பேட்டு நன்னுகையா ரென்னும் புலவர் பாடல்கள் குறுங் தொகையிலுள்ளன. ஒரு பாட்டில் அக்காலத்தில் இரவில் குறிப் பிட்ட நேரத்தில் ஊர்க்காவலர் ஊருள்வருவீருளீரோ எனக்கேட்டு வாயிலடைத்தலைக் குறிப்பிட்டிருக்கிறார். கூதிர் காலத்தில் தனிமை யால் வருந்துந்தலைவி கூறுவதாக உள்ள பாட்டில் கூற்றம் கூதிராகிய உருவத்தோடு காதலர் பிரிந்த என்னைக் கொல்லுதலைக் குறித்துவரும் எனக்கூறுவர். தனிபையாய் மனம் வருந்தலை விளக்க ஏழு ஊர்கட்சுப்பொதுவாக ஒருரிலுள்ள கொல்லனது உலைத்துருத்தி போல, தலையும் முடிவுமில்லாது வருந்தும் என்று குறிப்பிடுகிறார். சிறந்த புலமை நயமும் பெண்மையுமுந்தோன்ற ஆக்கிய கீழ்வருங் கருத்துள்ள பாட்டு எவரையும் எண்ணி எண்ணி இன்புறச் செய்வ தாகும். தம் பாரம் பொறுத்து ஒதுங்கமாட்டாத மாத நிறைந்த பசுப்புளியை விரும்புகிற முதற்கூல் மகளிரைப்போல மேகம் நீர் கொண்டு விசம்பேற மாட்டாமல் ஒன்றோடொன்று சேர்ந்து குன் றம் நோக்கி ஏறும்.

வெறி பாடிய காமக்கண்ணியார் என்பவர்க்கு வெறி பாடிய என்னு மடைமொழி அத்துறையைப்பற்றிப் பாடும் திறமையால் வந் தது. வெறி என்பது, ஒருவனைக் காதலித்து ஒருத்தி உடலினைக்க, அவள் பெற்றோர் அந்நலிவு பிற காரணங்களால் வந்ததென்று கொண்டு அதனை நீக்குவதற்காகப் பலியிட்டுக் கடவுளைப் பாவுவது. வெறி பாடலாவது அக்காதலுற்றாளின் தோழி முதலியோர் அத னைப் பழித்துக் கூறுவதைப்பற்றிப் பாடுவது. இத்துறைப் பாட்டு களில் இவர் மிகச் சிறப்பான திறமுற்றது மிகவும் பொருத்தமான தல்லவா? காக்கை பாடினியார் நச்சென்னையார் என்னும் புலவர்க்கு, காக்கையைப்பற்றிப் பாடியதால், காக்கை பாடினியார் என்னும் அடைமொழி வந்தது. குறுந்தொகையிலுள்ள அவர் பாட்டிலிருந்து காக்கை கரைதலை விருந்தினர் வருவதற்கு முன்னறிவிப்பாக அக் காலத்தார் எண்ணியிருந்தமை தெரியலாம். காக்கை கரையுந்தோறும் இன்று தலைவர் வருவார் என்று சொல்லித் தலைவியை ஆற்றியிருந்த தோழி தலைவன் வந்தவுடன் விருந்துவரக் கரைந்த காக்கைக்குப் பல பசுக்களின் நெய்யும், வெண்ணெற் சோறும் கலங்கலமாகக் கொடுப் பினுந்தகும் என்று சொன்னதாகப் பாடியுள்ளார். பதிற்றுப் பத்தில் ஆறும்பத்தால் ஆடுகோட் பாட்டுச் சேரலாதனைப் பாடிப் பரிசு பெற்ற

வர். அவனது மேன்மையையும், வீரத்தையும் பற்றி இவர் கூறும் அப்பத்தின் ஒரு பாட்டு மிகவும் சிறப்புடையதாகும்.

பெருங்கோப் பெண்டு என்னும் புலவர் பூதப் பாண்டியன் என்னுமாசன் மனைவி. அவர் கணவனிறந்தவுடன் தீப்பாயச் சென்றதைத் தடுத்தவர்க்கு மறுமொழியாக ஒரு செய்யுள் செய்துள்ளார். இச்செய்யுளால் கணவனிறந்தவுடன் மகளிர் தீப்பாயும் வழக்கம் அக்காலத்திலிருந்தமையும், அவ்வழக்கம் கட்டாயமாயிருந்தில தென்பதும் நாமறிபலாவது.

பொன் முடியார் பாடல்கள் தமிழ்நாட்டுப் பெண் மக்களின் வீரங்காட்டுவன. ஒரு பாட்டில் தாய் தந்தை அரசன் இவர்கள் ஒரு வனுக்குச் செய்யவேண்டியன இவையென்பதும் அவனது கடமையும் மிகவும் திறம்படக் கூறியுள்ளார். ஆதிமந்தியார் புகழ்வாய்ந்த சோழன் கரிகாற்பெருவளத்தானின் மகளாவார். சோநாட்டு மன்னனை ஆட்டனத்தியின் மனைவியார். இவரும் இவர் கணவரும் கழாஅர் என்னுமூரில் காவிரித்துறையில் நடந்த விழவுக்காக வந்தனர். நீர் விளையாட்டின்போது காவிரி வெள்ளம் ஆட்டனத்தியை அடித்துச் சென்றுவிட்டது. உடனே ஆதிமந்தியார் மருண்ட சிந்தையராய்க் காவிரியோடும் வழியெல்லாம் அவனையே கூவிக்கொண்டோடிக் கடலருகடைந்தனர். இப்பெருந்துன்பங் குறித்த பாடல்கள் மிகவும் இரக்கந்தருவன. கடல் இவருடைய கணவரை இவரிடம் கொணர்ந்து ஒப்படைத்ததாகக் கூறப்படுகிறது. மற்ற புலவர்கள் கணவனைக்காணாது வருந்தும் மகளிருடைய வருத்தத்துக்கு இவருடைய வருத்தத்தை உவமை கூறுவர். இவர் பாடிய பாட்டில் விழவிலும் துணங்கைக் கூத்திலும் யாண்டும் அச்சிறந்தானைக் காணேன் என்று கூறியுள்ளார். வெள்ளி வீதியார் தம் செய்யுளொன்றில் காதலனைக்கெடுத்த சிறுமையோடு நோய்மிக்கு ஆதிமந்தி போலப் பித்துப்பிடித்து வருந்துவேனோ என்று கூறியுள்ளார்.

வெள்ளி வீதியாரென்னும் புலவர் கணவனது பிரிவுக்காற்றாது வருந்திக் காடும் மலையுங்கடந்து அவன் சென்றவிடத்துக்குச் தேடிச் சென்றவராவர். ஆற்றுமையோடு பிரிந்திருந்த காலத்துப் பாடிய செய்யுட்கள் மிகவுந்தெளிவாக அவரது ஆற்றுமையையும் புலமைத் தன்மையையும் பெண்மையையும் காட்டுவனவாம். எனது சிறந்த அழகு எனக்கும் ஆகாது. என் காதலற்கும் உதவாது. அதனைப்

பசுலேநோய் உண்ண விரும்புகிறது. இது நல்ல ஆவீன்பால் கலத்தினும் படாமல், கன்றும் உண்ணாமல் நிலத்துச் சிந்துவது போலிருக்கிறது என்று ஒரு பாடலெழுதுகிறார். இன்னோரிடத்தில் நம் எல்லோருக்கும் வாழ்க்கையில் நேரும் அனுபவம் ஒன்றைச் சிறந்த பாரதந் தோன்ற எடுத்துரைக்கிறார். யாரையாவது எதிர்பார்த்து நாம் இருக்கையில் எவர்வரினும் நாம் எதிர்பார்த்தவர்தான் என முதலில் எண்ணுகிறோம். எதிர்பார்த்தவர் வருவதற்குள் கண்ணும், மனமும் சலிப்புறுகின்றன. இப்புலவர் தன் காதலனோடு வீட்டிற் பெற்றோருடன் சொல்லாமல் சென்றுவிட்ட மகளைத் தேடிச்சென்ற செவிலித்தாய், நடுவழியிற் சென்றவிடத்தில் சொல்லுவதாகச் சொல்லியுள்ள பாட்டில் இவ்வனுபவத்தைக் குறிப்பிடுகிறார். கால்கள் நடந்து நடந்து நடக்க முடியாமல் தள்ளாடுகின்றன. கண்கள் உற்றுப்பார்த்துப் பார்த்து ஒளியிழந்தன. அகன்ற வானத்தில் தோன்றும் நட்சத்திரங்களைவிடப் பலர் இவ்வுலகத்துப் பிறரை நான் காண்கிறேன். என் மகளைக் காணேன்.

ஒக்சுர் மாசாத்தியார் பாடல்களில் வரும் சில உவமைகள் நமது மனத்துக்குப் பேருவகை தந்து சலிப்பை நீக்குவன. தம் பெண்மையையப் தோன்ற அவர் தளிரைப்போன்ற இயல்புடைய கிளி கருத்தோடு வளர்த்த சிறு கிளிப்பிள்ளையின் இறகுத் தூவிபோன்ற மழையால் வளர்க்கப்பட்ட பசிய பயிர்களையுடையது என்று முல்லை நிலத்தை வருணிக்கிறார். வண்டிச் சக்கரம் மழைபெய்து நனைந்த நிலத்திற் செல்லுகிறது. அது செல்லுந்தாரையில் தண்ணீர் ஊறி விரைந்தோடுவது பாம்போடுவது போல் இருக்கிற தென்கிறார்.

இவை இவர் தஞ்சிறப்புகள். குறமகள் இளவெயினி, வெண்ணிக் குயத்தியார் என்னும் பெயர்களால் எல்லாச் சாதியினரும் புலமைக்காக மதிக்கப்பட்டமை அக்காலத்து நாகரிக நிலையை நன்கு காட்டுவதாகும்.

வேறு நாடுகளில் இவ்வளவு பழைய காலத்து இத்துணைப் புலமைவாய்ந்த பெண்பாலார் பலர் இருந்தனர் என நாமறிபோம். அக்காலத்தில் படிப்பதற்கிருந்த வசதிகளோடே இத்துணைப் புலவர்களிருந்துள்ளனர். இத்தமிழ் நாட்டில் கனி துளும்பிப் பாடல் கொழித்த அக்காலத்தில் ஆண்களோடொத்த புலமை நிறைந்த இப் பெண்களிருந்துள்ளனர். இதன் பின்னர் இடைக்காலத்தில் சைவ

வைணவப் பெரியார்களில் காரைக்காலம்மையாரும், ஆண்டாளும் மிகச் சிறந்த புலமையுள்ளவர்களென்று நாமறிவோம். இக்காலத்தும் அத்தகைய புலவர்கள் இருக்கின்றனர் என்றெண்ண இடமில்லை.

தமிழ்நாட்டில் பாட்டுக்குச் சிறப்புத்தரும் வழக்கம் இன்று இருப்பதாகத் தோன்றவில்லை. தம் தாய்மொழியிலுள்ள இலக்கியச் செல்வங்களை நுகர்ந்து, இன்புற்று, அதன் வழியாக வேணும் உணர்ச்சி தோன்றி இலக்கியப் பெருக்கில் தலைசிறந்து நிற்கத் தமிழர் தலைப்படல் வேண்டுவதாகும். இப்பக்கமும் அப்பக்கமும் உள்ள நாட்டார்கள் தம்மொழிக்கும், தம்மொழியின் இலக்கியத்துக்கும் தலையான பற்றுச் செலுத்துவதைக் கண்டுகொண்டே தமிழர்வாளா விருக்கின்றும். எனவே இக்காலத்தில் அக்காலத்தைப்போன்ற இலக்கியங் காணாதல் அரிதாகிறது.

இங்கு விவரித்த இப்பெண்பாற் புலவர்களின் அரிய பாடல்கள் கற்றுணர்வோர்க்குப் பேரின்பமும், புத்துணர்வும், புத்துயிருந்தரு வனவாக என்றும் விளங்குவனவாகும்.

* இதை வெளியிட அனுமதித்த சென்னை அகில இந்திய ரேடியோ நிலையத்தார்க்கு நன்றியுரித்து. நா.

WORKS ON ARTHAŚĀSTRA IN TELUGU.

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Before the nature of works on the Arthaśāstra in Telugu is pointed out general remarks on the science in Sanskrit seem to be necessary for most of the works in Telugu have their genesis in Sanskrit literature.

The word Arthaśāstra is a common term applied to the state-craft as practised by a king with his counsellors and officers. It is said that Arthaśāstra sprang out of Arthaveda, one of the Upavedas, whose origin is traced to the four vedas:—

आयुषं धनुषं चैव गान्धर्वं चार्थमेव च ।

सर्वलोकोपकारार्थमुपवेदानृगादयः ॥

But the examination of the contents of the Arthaveda as detailed in Yāmalāshṭaka-tantra does not warrant the evolution of Arthaśāstra from Arthaveda which treats of the acquisition and accumulation of wealth, particularly of mineralogy and alchemy. Kauṭalya once used the term Arthaśāstra in the sense of Arthaveda. The commentary of Jayamangalā on Kauṭalya (I. 5) understands the word Arthaśāstra in the sense of Arthaveda in the sūtra पुराणमितिवृत्तमारव्यायिकोदाहरणं धर्मशास्त्र-मर्थशास्त्रं चेति—इतिहासः—the commentator says—धर्मशास्त्र मानवादि । अर्थसंबन्धि यत्किञ्चिद्वातुवादादिकं तदर्थशास्त्रमिह गृह्यते ।

That Arthaśāstra distinct from Arthaveda is a general term can be gleaned from Kauṭalya's words at the outset of his work : पृथिव्या लाभे पालने च यावन्त्यर्थशास्त्राणि पूर्वाचार्यैः प्रस्थापितानि तानि संहृत्यैकमिदमर्थशास्त्रं कृतम्, again in the last chapter of his work he says—मनुष्याणां वृत्तिरर्थः मनुष्यवती भूमिः, तस्याः पृथिव्या लाभपालनोपायभूतं

शास्त्रमर्थशास्त्रमिति. Thus it may be seen that the use of Arthaśāstra is much restricted in two words as योग and क्षेम which mean acquisition and protection, the elaboration of which extends respectively over I to V and VI to XIV Books of Kauṭalya. Later writers call it as Rājavidyā or Rājanīti. Kauṭalya himself calls it Rājavritti¹; which is a governing sūtra (Adhikāra-sūtra to I-2) covering all the matter in Chapters I to XIV.) Telugu writers call arthaśāstra as merely nīti which term is defined in Jayamangalā thus :— प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षानुमानलक्षणप्रमाणत्रयनिर्णयितायां फलसिद्धौ देशकालानुकूल्ये सति यथासाध्यमुपायसाधनलक्षणा क्रिया नीतिः तदर्थशास्त्रं कौटल्यभाष्यमित्यर्थः

The Telugu works under notice are Sakalanīti-sammata, Nītiśāstramuktāvali, Nītibhūshaṇa, Nītisāra, Nītitārāvali, Mudrāmātya, and the Purushārthasāra. Except the last two names, all the others use the word nīti meaning Rājavidyā or Arthaśāstra.

Sanskrit Literature was rich in extensive works on Artha-Sāstra but many of them have perished. The elaborate works of Brahma, Brihaspati, Sukra, Viśālāksha, Indra, have disappeared. Among the survivals, Chākshuṣhiya and Kauṭaliya are noteworthy. Compendia based upon the above works are available in fragments as Sukranītisāra, Bārhaspatya-sūtra etc. Kāmandaka follows mostly Kauṭalya. Mahabharata gives the gist of certain sections of the older

1. The word *rājavritti* has been construed with the previous chapter *śāstra sammuddeśa* both by Dr. Shama Sastri and Dr. Ganapati Sastri. But the commentators take it as *adhikāra-sutra* governing the matter in the subsequent chapters of the work. Jayamangala says.—

इदानीं निर्देशतः शास्त्रं प्रस्तूयते । तत्रेदं शास्त्रं किमधिकृत्येत्याह राजवृत्तिरिति अधिक्रियते सर्वमेतच्छास्त्रं राजवृत्तिः राजानेन वर्तते इति कृत्वा । यतः पुरुषकारो ज्ञानकर्मलक्षणः, ज्ञानपूर्वकं कर्म, ज्ञानं शास्त्रपूर्वकमिति । अमात्यादयोऽप्यनेन वर्तन्ते इति चेत्, न, तेषां राज्ञैवोद्यमानत्वात् । अथवा तन्त्रमाधिकृत्यायमाधिकारः कृत्स्नस्य शास्त्रस्य राजवृत्तिर्वेऽपि विशेषप्रग्रहं स्वकुटुम्बविषयव्यापनार्थम् । ... अथैतद्विजिगीषावृत्तिः .. । अथवेदमेवाधिकरणं प्रत्यधिक्रियते । साक्षाद्राज्ञो व्यापाराभिधानाद्विनयाधिकारिकस्य, अथवा विद्यासमुद्देशमेव प्रकरणं प्रत्यधिक्रियते प्राप्तिर्निरासार्थम् ... । अत आह राजवृत्तिराण्वीक्षकीत्यादि... ।

works now extinct. Among writers of compendia can be named Rājagupta, Masūrāksha, Rājavijayakāra, Vaiśampāyana, Sūdraka, Gaurasīrā etc.

Chākshushīya is the smallest work in the science embracing the whole field of Kauṭalya's work omitting Dharmasthīya, but it is only a mnemonic primer to remember the major entities. It has 67 sūtras with elaboration and *sangraha slokas* (recapitulatory verses) under each sūtra. The whole of Chākshushīya was laid under contribution by Kauṭalya who adapts passages from it.

Thus the only work fairly comprehensive and elaborate in details is Kauṭalya's Arthaśāstra. Most unhappily the available texts are replete with scribal errors¹ and the study of the mere text is fraught with much misconception owing to the technical nature of expression liable to be misunderstood by scholars who live in a different age of politics and literature. A good edition in the light of commentaries is a great desideratum. Dr. Śāma Sāstri gave us the best material he could in those days. Dr. Ganapati Sāstri has done much spade work in giving us the Sanskrit translation of the Malayalam epitome of Bhaṭṭasvami's commentary on Kauṭalya at least for Books I to VII and from VIII to XII Books he condenses Mādhavamiśra. There are other commentaries on Kauṭalya as of Bhikshu, Jayamangalā, of Yogdhama and of Bhoja though none of which are complete, and take us beyond XIIth Book. Bhikshu is the most reliable, Jayamangalā the most elaborate of the commentaries examined. Bhoja's work is not available in the original Sanskrit. Malayalam translation extends over the first seven books and its author seems to have utilised Bhikshu whose work appears to be the oldest of the available commentaries. Mal: commentary is probably called Nallurāi, for Jayamangalā frequently refers to *sad-vyākhyāna* not known otherwise.

1. Many scribal errors are left uncorrected in all the editions of the text. For example भूमिच्छिद्रविधानम् (the heading of II-2) ought to read भूमिच्छिद्रापिधानम्. All commentaries support this reading.

Bhaṭṭasvāmi's fragment of about 29 Chapters in Sanskrit and the first seven books in Malayalam compendium are available. The commentary is generally good though his interpretations frequently differ from those of Bhikshu and Jayamangala.¹ The various commentaries anticipate earlier commentaries.

Kauṭalya himself based his work on all previous writings and in exposition added what is called *samīkshā* (discussion) to *sūtra*, *Bhāshya* and *Sangraha-Sloka*. Bhaṭṭasvāmi treats the headings of *prakarṇas* as *sūtras* and the elaboration and discussion as *bhāshya* while Bhikshu treats portions of elaboration as *sūtras* and *Samīkshā* portion as *Bhāshya* while *Sangraha slokas* recapitulate the conclusions.²

What is the scope of the Arthasāstra and how for the Telugu writers are versatile in various topics are pertinent questions in dealing with Telugu works.

1. On II—36 पादः पञ्चघटीनां etc., (p. 145—line 3 of Dr. S. S. Edition) Bhaṭṭasvāmi says पञ्चघटीनामिति तत्रापि मध्यमासु पञ्चसु घटिकासु पादः पूर्वोक्त द्विगुणो दण्डः Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstri explains Bhaṭṭasvāmi saying सार्धद्वादशघटिकात ऊर्ध्व आसार्धसप्तदशघटिकात इत्यर्थः । but unhappily he ignored Malayalam rendering which reads illum dorum anju-kuḍam kurayāne nīrum, nīr vatuppām kumbhavum, koḍāli, muram, toṭṭi kaya-grahaṇi.....and which means five pots. Dr. Śhāmasāstri ridicules the great scholar rightly at least once at this place. Bhikshu explains प्रतिगृहमुदकपूर्णानां पञ्चघटादीनां अकरणे पणपरदोषदण्डः ।

Again in the same passage the sentence बहिरधिश्रयणं वा कुर्युः (II—36) was left out by Bhaṭṭasvāmi. Malayalam epitome explains as "nagaratta purat-taṭṭumādu cheydālum amayum" meaning that fire can be kindled outside the village if unavoidable. Bhikshu has तस्यामपि वेलायामवश्यकर्तव्येऽनौ ग्रामाद्विहिरधिश्रयणमुपनिपातप्रतीकारार्थमेवं कुर्युः । But Dr. Gaṇapati Śāstri explains as पटलानावृतावकाशाधिश्रयणं, which is quite consistent with modern idea but not with that of the early commentators. Such examples can be cited by hundreds.

2. Bhikshu begins भूतपूर्व (II—1. line 1.) as *sūtra* thus तत्र प्रकरणाकाराय सूत्रमाह भूतपूर्वमिति, which is *bhāshya* according to Bhaṭṭasvāmi. The real *sūtra* for Bhaṭṭasvāmi and Malayala author is जनपदनिवेश (II—1.) which is the heading of the *Prakarṇa*. According to the latter, the whole Kautaliya has 180 *sūtras* which are really *prakaraṇas*.

Bhoja analysing the contents of the science divides it into 10 sections :—

1. Vinaya-skandha—dealing with royal education, choice and qualification of royal officers and ambassadors.
2. Vārtāskandha—deals with the capitals, military camps, bridges, trade regulations, storage of valuables and necessities and agriculture etc. It is said that treatises were composed by Parāśara on agriculture and by Videharāja on commerce.
3. Vyavahāraskandha—Administration of Law to avoid mātsya-nyāya—the weak oppressed by the mightier.
4. Rakṣāskandha—protection and defence against internal and external menaces.
5. Mantraskandha—secret deliberations with ministers and self.
6. Upāyaskandha—modes of dealings with enemy.
7. Vikramaskandha — Decision to have recourse to punishment (war)..
8. Yuddhaskandha—Actual War.
9. Upaniṣat-skandha—Use of subterfuge against the enemies.
10. Praśamaskandha — Enjoyment of the acquired wealth without *fear*.

The foregoing analysis is probably based on the contents in the order of I to XIV Books of Kauṭilya and these topics illustrate the fourfold conception of Kauṭilya as Anvikṣhaki, Trayī, Vārta and Daṇḍanīti which are generally education, knowledge of justice, of trade etc., and exercise of power and acquisition of resources to punish the wicked and conquer enemies.

Among the Telugu works the most important is Sakalanītisammata of Maḍikisinganna who flourished in the city of Rāmagiri about 1400 A.D. His treatise is an anthology on Arthaśāstra gathered from about ten works most of which are

now extinct. But hundreds of verses quoted from each of those works enable us to conjecture the nature of them. The anthology covers about 35 topics which fairly represent the whole of Kauṭalya's Arthaśāstra except Book III of Dharmasthīya. The compiler adds his own verses from his other works. A notice of the works from which he quotes and which existed long before him, may be interesting. A few of them are translations from Sanskrit as Kāmandaka etc., but the others seem to be original works in Telugu.

Puruṣārthasāra is amply quoted on all the topics. It was composed by Śivadeva, the chief advisor in politics and religion to Ganapatideva, king of Warangal and to his daughter, Rudramadevi. Sivadeva was a great Śaivayogi and a Śaiva author. A number of inscriptions proclaim his gifts to temples and to *maṭhas*. He lived in about 1230 to 1280 A.D. His work Puruṣārthasāra as the name implies perhaps extends over fourfold arthas, viz., *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and *Mokṣa*. Arthaśāstra pretends to say that a study and practice of it can yield all the puruṣhārthas. Chāṅkṣuṣīya says:—

अथातः पुरुषार्थसाधनमर्थशास्त्रं प्रवक्ष्यामः, तद्यथा—Kauṭalya says at the end of his work धर्ममर्थं च कामं च प्रवर्तयति पाति च.

The Telugu writer of Mudrāmātya elaborates the same idea in extolling the study of Nītiśāstra.

సీ. నిత్య నై మి త్రిక నియనుమతాదుల

విపుల ధర్మంబు గావించునపుడు

కర్మనగోత్రజక్రయ విక్రయాదుల

చేత సర్వంబు లార్జించునెడల

స్మర కూచిమార పాంచాలాది మతములఁ

గామసౌఖ్యము లందుకాలములను

యమ నియమాది విఖ్యాతకారణములఁ

గై వల్య మార్గంబు గాంచు నెడల

మఱియు సూక్ష్మకావ్య మార్గః బులందును
 నధికమగుచు నున్న యట్టిపనుల
 వెరవు లేనియట్టిపురుషుండు నేర్పునే
 ఫలము నొంద నీతిపరుండు గాక

Here వెరవు is పడంగ బుద్ధి or అప్రాంగ బుద్ధి. Arthasāstra is here viewed as the chief guide in achieving Dharma, Artha, Kama and Moksha. Śivadeva as minister and scholar adapts Arthasāstra to practical needs.

Kāmandaka is of course the translation from Sanskrit work of that name. This Telugu work was quoted by a grammarian of about 1100 A.D., and hence it must have preserved an old recension. There is a later rendering in Telugu in 1580 A.D. The Sanskrit work as available now and according to different commentators presents us several recensions. The Telugu versions have in several places translated some of the interpretations of the commentaries. The verses in Telugu are simple and elegant.

Nītisāra from which about 100 verses are taken by Singanna is of unknown authorship. It is not Nītisāra of Kāmandaka, Chāṇakya or Rājagupta. For none of the verses from Telugu work have their counterpart in these works in Sanskrit. Singanna in his introduction names two unknown poets, Gajāṅkuśa and Kṣementra whose works, he says, supplied him with verses. One of them may be the author of Nītisāra. Gajāṅkuśa was probably a Kanarese poet also and he is named with honour by early Kanarese writers. Kṣemendra was a great Kasmerian Sanskrit poet and it is improbable that he wrote in Telugu. Kṣemendra as a Telugu poet was quoted in a Ms. of Kavivāg-bandhana (1250 A.D.)

Nītisāra was probably a translation of Bārhaspatyanīti which was rendered into Sanskrit verse by Sūdraka (according to the commentator of Vaiśampāyana's Nītiprakāśa). This Sanskrit work seems to have contained 3000 verses. Commen-

tators on Kauṭalya etc., quote verses under Bārhaspatya which appear to have been those of Sūdraka's epitome.

The Telugu Nītisāra contributes liberally to the understanding of the Arthasāstra.

Mudrāmātya is probably of the Telugu poet Kṣemendra whose work is found quoted in about 1250 A.D. Whether Kṣemendra was a title of the author modelled on the great name of the Kaśmerian poet or whether it is an independent coincidence of two names is not known. One or two verses suggest that the work was a history of a war between Rājarāja and his enemy probably a king of Kalinga. The term Mudrāmātya does not suggest much; some *mudrā* or seal played an important part in the story. It suggests immediately the name of Rākshasa, the rival of Chanakya as depicted in the drama of Mudrārākshasa. The word Mudrāmātya occurs in an inscription (S. I. Ins. IV p. 267) of Devaraya I. A.D.¹ It is not improbable that a minister of that title existed before the date of inscription. If the word means Rākshasa, the verses would represent his theories in Arthasāstra whose work must have perished. Even if the Tel: Mudramātya relates the conquests of Rājarāja presumably a Chalukyan or Chola emperor, it is important otherwise. The verses touch most of the topics dealt with by Singanna. Hence it may be a treatise on political science.

Nītibhūṣaṇa comes next in importance among the quoted works. Verses are given from the work only on ten topics.

One of the verses is quoted under Bhōjarāja-vibhūṣaṇa by a different author and it is heard from a Sanskrit scholar in Trivandram that he discovered a commentary on Kauṭalya written by Bhōja called Nītibhūṣaṇa. If his words are true the Telugu work was probably a translation of Bhōja's work which cannot be placed before 1062 A.D., the latest date for that royal poet.

1. నూదిం నౌరపదిం పాదశ్చైవేన ముద్రామాత్య యోగంధరా - ।

యదా చాణక్య సుమంత్రో ధీరశః పంఞం మంత్రీ లక్ష్మీధరం ॥

Nītisāstra-muktāvali of Bhadrabhūpāla shortened into Baddena-nītulu, is a small work quoted by Singanna now available to us. He bore several great royal titles and mentions the village of Gorantlabāvi, which place is now identified in a forest in Cudapah District where the ruins of a former town still exist. There is a town called Baddevolu—literally Beddena-prolu—the city of Baddena, which may perpetuate his memory. He was a king of the Telugu Choda family and may be assigned to 1000 A.D. It is doubtful whether he can ever be identified with the ancestor of Arikesari Guṇārṇava whose inscriptions proclaim him as a descendant of Chalukya—family who ruled over the northern part of the present Hyderabad State. Baddena's work is available in several recensions, one of them apparently incomplete extends over 3 cantos dealing with 15 topics in Arthasāstra. The ideas, excerpts as they are, are clothed in the most elegant expression. Some of the verses are translations of portions of Chāṇakyaśūtra and Nītisāra-samuchchaya in Sanskrit and hence it may be surmised that the poet prepared the Telugu book from various works in Sanskrit. He mentions in his preface the Sanskrit authors Chāṇakya, Bāhudantiputra (Indra) and Kauṇapadanta (Bhīṣma) whose works probably served him as models.

The chief features in Telugu treatises of Arthasāstra may be noted as the suppression of much crafty unjust ways of putting down an enemy as detailed by Kauṭalya which justly invoked the criticism of Bana.¹

Addition of matter like the consequences of anarchy..... is a notable feature. Sanskrit science is considered as Rāja-vidyā—education of a prince but the work in Telugu is treated as a political science for the welfare of the subjects; hence the difference in the treatment can be accounted for. Writers on Arthasāstra in Sanskrit applied the effect of the study of

1. किं वा तेषां सांप्रतं येषामतिनृशंसप्रायोपदेशनिर्वृणं ... सहजप्रेमार्द्रहृदयानुरक्ता भ्रातर उच्छेद्याः ... (काद-पूर्व)

it only to Dharma, Artha and Kama as the strict scope of the science extends. But the Telugu writers have declared that the fourth Puruṣārtha, that is, Mōkṣa is also the object of its study. Hence they have prescribed *dāna*, *tirthasēvana*, *Devālayanirmāṇa* etc., for the king's personal expiation of sins. This is of course contrary to the scope of the treatise if scientifically conceived.

Singanna in his anthology has culled verses on 35 topics ; the chief among which are the nature of the even *rājyāṅgas*, protection of *durga* (fortress), maintenance of royal control or power (*Ājñā*), how the subjects are to be ruled, income and expenditure, behaviour of the king (personal), punishment of the wicked, tests for ministers' conduct, Purohita and accountants—their functions and qualifications, seven *upāyas*, and *Shāḍgunya* (movement with friends and enemies), seven *vyasanas*, accumulation of military strength, war, and to ascertain enemy's strength on the battle-field.

Here the work completes its third canto and the two more cantos deal with the city-defences, pleasures for the king and the subjects, increase of commerce, protection of agriculture, construction of temples, tanks, towns etc., and travel to holy places. This portion of the work is missing in our Ms. copy.

The foregoing contents show that the arrangement of subject matter differs from that of Kauṭalya, and nothing is said about Dharmasthīya (administration of justice, Book III, in Kauṭalya).

Nītisāra and Kāmandaka contribute to every one of the above topics. Baddena's work treats of only 15 topics—a bad king, ways of the ministers, civil advisors, royal power, determination of action, *upāyas*, protection of the country, anarchy, maintenance of faithful servants, discerning faithless servants, evils under a bad ruler, munificence, discernment of good from bad, and common precepts.

A detail criticism and comparison with Sanskrit works may be reserved for a longer treatise in a separate book. A

few verses are quoted below to illustrate the Andhra mind in politics :—

BADDENA'S WORK.

1. క. సతికంటె నబల వసుమతి

సతి పతి లేకున్నఁ జెడదు సత్యము ధాత్రీ-

పతి లేనినాడు సద్య-

శ్చుతి వసుమతి కండ్లు నన్నెచోడనరేంద్రా ॥

Earth (kingdom) is weaker than a wife (a weaker vessel) who on the loss of her husband may not perish. Immediate destruction threatens the Earth (kingdom) when she has no ruler.

2. ప్రజఁ దల్లి పెంచుతెఱుగున

బ్రజలక్ బతి పెంచఁ బెరిగి పదపడి తల్లికొ

బ్రజప్రోవు నందియము పతిఁ

బ్రజప్రో పది నిక్కు-వంబు బద్దెనరేంద్రా

O King Baddena, as a mother brings up her *prajā* (children), so a king fosters his *prajā* (subjects); but having grown up it is doubtful whether the children (*prajā*) would protect the mother but undoubtedly *prajā* (subjects) protect the king.

3. పరశక్తియు నిజశక్తియుఁ బరికింపక తొడరుటెల్ల భంగమునకుఁ బ-

ట్టొరులందుఁ దిన్న నెఱుగుట పరమజ్ఞానంబు దలప బద్దెనరేంద్రా

O King Baddena, to oppose (an enemy) without understanding one's own strength and that of enemy will result in disgrace. It is the greatest knowledge to know oneself in others.

- 4 నయమునఁగాని భూమి ప్రజ నమ్మదు నమ్మినఁగాని యర్థసం-
చయమును దంత్రవృద్ధియును జాలదు చాలిన గాని శత్రులకొ
బయిఁ జని యోర్వరాదు ప్రతిపక్ష మశంగినఁగాని భూమి య-
క్షయముగ నేలరా దనిరి కార్యచతుర్ముఖ బద్దేభూపతీ.

O King Badde, who is equal to creator in the conception of duties, subjects have no confidence (in a king) without *naya* (statesmanship), unless the subjects have trust there is no gathering of wealth and increase of statecraft; without which a king cannot go against an enemy and defeat him and unless the enemies are suppressed he cannot rule the country without decline.

5. గనులు కృషిప్రపంచ మరి కప్పము సుంకము గోక్షలంబు నం-
దనవనముల్ జలస్థలపథస్థ వణిక్కయదుర్గ రక్షణం-
బునఁ గలయన్నిమార్గముల సర్థము రోయక కేవలంబ కాఁ-
పున పొలియించు రాజు సిరిఁ బొందునె రాజమనోజభూభుజా

O Rājamanojabhūbhujā (Cupid among kings), a king who does not seek income from all modes like mines, variety of cultivation, indemnity, tribute, customs, cattle, gardens, cess on the merchandise on roads and water-ways, on commerce, defence of durga (fortress), but oppresses only the farmer, can never gather wealth.

PURUSHARTHASARA.

పసరము పసరము పులి పులి
బిసరుహసంభవునిసృష్టి పెంపెంత మహిమ
బసరముఁ బులిఁ జేయఁ బులిం
బసరముగాఁ జేయునృపతి బల మది గాదే

In Brahma's creation the cow is a cow, the tiger is only a tiger; it is no wonder. But it is the royal power that causes wonder which makes the cow a tiger and the tiger a cow.

వెఱపించి చూచి యెందును

నెఱవక యున్నతని జేర వెఱతురు మదిలో

వెఱచిన దా బై పడఁగా

నుఱుకం గుక్కయును గ్రోతయును బగవాఁడున్.

People do not attack him who proves undaunted when encountered (by enemies); a dog, a monkey and an enemy will readily pounce upon one who loses courage.

NITIBHUSHANA.

తగ వేషట్టన లేక దుర్వ్యసనియై ధర్మక్రియాహీనుడై

తగువారుం బ్రజలున్ విరాగు లగుచేతల్నేయుభూపాలుపై

దగ దండెత్తిన రాజు గెల్పు నరికిం దా దండయై నిర్బిఁగాఁ

దగురా జచ్చట లేకయున్న దగు దద్రాజ్యంబును జేకొనన్.

A ruler, who goes against another king who abandons justice in everything, who immersed in pleasures, gives up his duties, and who does actions that estrange the just people and his subjects, can gain victory and he can obtain his kingdom if no other ruler can come to his (the weak man's) rescue.

కానలు దరికొనుపావకుఁ

డై నఁ బ్రభంజనుఁడు మిత్రుఁ డల్పత దీపం

బై నశిః నార్పుఁ గావున

హీనుం డగువాని కెందు నెక్కడిమిత్రుల్.

Wind helps fire if it rages against a forest but extinguishes the same in a small light. Similarly men of low position cannot expect succour from an associate.

NITISARA.

గొందఱ నారయంగ నిడి క్రుమ్మటి వచ్చుచుఁ బోవుచుండఁగాఁ
 గొందఱఁ బంచి వేడ్కఁయును గొందఱ నొండొరుపోక గానకుం-
 డం దగఁ బంచి చారులు బెడంగుగఁ జెప్పినచోట మువ్వు రే
 చందము సమ్మతించి రది చందముగాఁ గొనిపోవఁగాఁ దగున్.

One set of spies is reserved for enquiry, another for carrying news and messages; a different set is to observe the conduct of the other two groups without being recognised. A king should accept that which has the concurrence of opinions of the three sets.

Kaṭṭāya supplies the idea for this advice in I. 12. His Sūtras are :—

- (a) न चान्योन्यं संस्थास्ते वा विद्युः
- (b) त्रयाणामेकवाक्ये संप्रत्ययः (I-12)

Jayamangala's commentary on (a) and (b) is as follows :—

- (a) न चान्योन्यमिति न च संस्थास्ते संस्थान्तरं ते च संचारा न संचारान्तरं
 विद्युः संगायनपरिहारार्थम्, एकस्मिन्वा ज्ञाते माभूत्सर्वग्रहणमिति ।
- (b) त्रयाणामेकवाक्यत्वे संप्रत्ययः—सम्यगैकान्तिकी प्रतीतिरित्यर्थः ।
 कदाचिदेकस्य द्वयेर्वा परोपग्रहः सम्यगुपलब्धिर्वा स्यात् ।

REVIEWS

KAMSAVAHO : a prakrit poem of Rāmapāṇivāda, edited and translated by Dr. A. N. Upadhye. Cr. 8. vo. pp. 1. & 230. Hindi Grantharatnākara Kāryālaya, Bombay.

Rāmapāṇivāda is a well-known writer in Sanskrit, Prākṛit, and Malayalam of Kerala. He was born in A. D. 1707 and died about 1775. A. D. Some Malayalam scholars have indentified him with the famous Malayalam poet Kunjan Nambiār. Born in South Malabar, Rāma after serving many patrons ultimately became a poet at the court of the famous Travancore ruler Virā Mārthānda Varma and his successor, Rāma Varma.

Kaṃsavaho is a short poem dealing with the familiar episodes of the early life of Śrī Krishna ending with the killing of the maternal uncle tyrant Kaṃsa. Many writers have dealt with the theme including Māgha, whose *Śīsupāla-vadha* is rightly regarded by Dr. Upadhye as the model for this poem. *Kaṃsavaho* though written in Prākṛit is to be regarded as a literary exercise, attempted by a poet who was more at home in Sanskrit, but who wished to show his mastery of Vararuci's *Prākṛita-Prakāśa*. The distinction between Sanskrit and Prakrit is that between libery language and dialects. When the latter become as much a dead languages as the former, a composition in them loses its claim to naturalness. It is doubtfeul whether any extant Prākṛit poems beginning with *Gāthā-sapta-śati* and Pravarasena's *Setu-bandha* can be regarded as written in languages actually spoken.

Dr. Upadhye has spared no pains to make his edition of this poem of four cantos in 232 verses, as complete and self-contained as possible. He has provided the usual critical

apparatus, an account of Rāma and his books, a critical analysis of the poem, and a note on the authorship of the Chāya, which on irrefutable grounds, he attributes to Rāma himself. He has added a glossary and an appendix. To the students who study Vararuci's grammar and wish to see its rules exemplified in an independent poem, *Kaṃsavaho* should prove valuable. The poem has genuine merit. Dr. Upadhye's work as an editor is beyond praise—painstaking, thorough and judicial. I have noticed only a single slip which may be attributed to his getting his knowledge of Travancore history second-hand. The Nambūdīri dynasty which ruled at Campakasserī (Ambalapuzha) was a comparatively recent and short-lived one. Nevertheless, Dr. Upadhye refers to its kings as "liberal patrons of poets and scholars *from time immemorial*" (p. xvii).

The printing and get-up of the book are excellent. Its price is not specified.

K. V. R.

THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF ALL RELIGIOUS: Compiled by Bhagavān Dās M.A. D. Litt. (Benares). D. Litt (Allah). pp. lvi. 683 2nd ed. 1939, Kāshi Vidyā Pīṭha. Benares; Price 2/- net Rs. 2/8 post free.

Dr. Bhagavān Dās has been one of the foremost workers in the cause of Hindu culture and religion, and has been trying to work out a synthesis of her culture, religion, philosophy and politics. The first edition of the above work had an excellent reception as bringing into a focus similar literature in all religions and is fittingly admitted to be an excellent reference work. The notes and comments that are made in the book under review enhance the value of the same and give us an ideal and an incentive to go along the route with him.

After a considerable time spent on the problems pertaining to social reform and scientific progress and economic

upliftment, India is realizing that if she should survive in the conflict, or more correctly the Armageddon that is in progress at present, she has to turn to the inner riches of her ancient soul that never deserted her in all her history, and to which, she, despite greatest handicaps, has been adding on to her wealth. The wealth of India consists in her spiritual life; that ancient catholicism that made her the abode of all religions also helps her in the Synthesis of all religions that might one day discover the Soul of the world and make her the Mother of the world in a degree undreamt of by any thinker of the present age. Religion is the most important fact about India, and that is to say, that religion is the central fact about the self or the spirit of Man. Religion has been defined in a number of ways: psychologically, morally, socially, even physiologically. It has been equated with mysticism and psycho-theological attempts have not been wanting to give it new definitions. Under these circumstances the philosopher of Religion can do nothing but to start at the beginning, and to observe the identities that prevail in the observances and assumptions of religion in all climes and places and tabulate them. This is a laborious task requiring patience and understanding. Chance coincidences are always the pitfalls of the scientist, and these, when avoided, give us a body of facts to go upon. If the true principles of Religion have to be discovered, then, these principles must in one sense be disengaged from the lives of the founders themselves. But this will make for the loss of the very substance on which ordinary religion has built itself up. This further makes it impossible to restore to the texts quoted by the disciples with such assurance of their own wisdom, the *concrete setting* within which alone their utterances had the power and force of the living word. The decadence of religions has always been due to the forgetting of the context of the utterances, and loss of the power that was wielded by them during the life-time of the founders. It cannot be that these words had hypnotic power to sway the disciples during the founder's life-time only and that afterwards they

remained as the *abracadabra* of the logicians. The inevitable tendency of all scientific understanding is to relieve the principles as far as possible from the lives of the founders. It is true that these principles have no meaning, or shall we say as much of meaning, without the exemplifications in the conduct of the founder. Historical religion thus is faced with the problem of denouncing scientific investigation.

Not so, the suprahistorical religion which is not limited to any one set of teachers or any one teacher or any one set of books or any one book. It offers accordingly a wide range of examples illustrated from the lives of diverse seers and seekers, and founders and followers. Hindu Religion, if it claims to be the most wide and the most catholic religion, it is because it is prepared to consider all experiences, of all persons, of all times. Through this it has come to understand certain principles as elements of true religion. The Upaniṣads teach many doctrines, the Brāhmanas many practices, the Purāṇas comprise of an infinite range of experiences, and all these form the body of testament of the Hindu religion. And an essential unity of the teaching is available, despite the divergent trends that are stressed by certain self-arrogating disciples. Preferences of method are always due to individual fitness, *adhikāra*, preferences of truth there can never be. A hopeless confusion between the two has been the source of futile but not non-fierce wranglings between the several sects and sections of Hindu religion.

Dr. Bhagavan Das has attempted the task of focussing under modern conditions a more elaborate grouping so as to include the religions that are now capable of operating on the mind of man. The Theosophical teachers of the past three-quarter century have sought to bring about this understanding, and Dr. Bhagavān Dās, as one the famous band of theosophists, has rendered monumental service. The world has now become actually one, and no longer do barriers confront man and no division should divide man from his brother man. The last and fateful struggle of isolationism,

miscalled nationalism, is now very much under way and we can forecast without fear the utter collapse of its last bastion. The preparation for the coming conditions involves development of a mentality that can tolerate no division through ignorance between man and man all over this planet. A true League of Humanity, and a true league of nations that shall not be a league of robbers and self-seeking imperialisms, these are possibilities only on one condition and that is a true understanding of human life and its value. Religion whilst stressing on the unity-principle as philosophy does, does not annihilate the value of the individual. In the modern world there has been an utter failure to implement this truth. Idealistic philosophy is a failure, not so idealistic Religion. The realization during the present period of transition, that it is all right to speak about Monism but all wrong to follow it, has been amply exemplified. Religion involves a mono-theistic attitude and mono-theistic attitude does not involve abolition of individual value and worth ; what it may involve is the destruction of philosophic monism. Thus pluralistic philosophies grow under the impetus of the Mono-theistic tendency, whereas monistic philosophies seek to annihilate God himself. This feature has been clearly realized by bhakti-schools in India, therefore have there been enormous conflict between the schools of Vedānta. Despite the labours of the idealists of the type of Mackenzie and Muirhead and Christian Divines to find a synthesis between Religion and Monistic Absolutism, they have not been able to bring it about. For the simple reason, Religion assumes the reality of the individuals, their moral defect, their moral growth under the consciousness of the Divine Lord, and their attainment through grace of fullness and perfection. All these have no place even in the scheme of Objective Idealism that culminates in the Absolute. Neither the special theories of sin, nor fall, nor progress and emancipation, nor rebirth nor utter service of the Divine, nor the concept of Heaven or Hell have a place in the scheme of the Monistic Absolute. That these may well be surrendered as false and needless, is an alternative that may well

be contemplated : but without these, in one sense, the sythesis that is sought need not be undertaken at all. The difference between religion and philosophy is clear. Either we start with the direct intuition or revelations of the Religions and track down its manifold features as it realizes itself in the levels of thought, action and social life and organizations, or else we can never ascend to religion *via* thought. This it was that was proclaimed with supreme aptness by the author of the Vedānta Sūtra “*Śāstrayonitvāt*”. This it was that made the Vedānta Sūtras a synthesis that is essentially not philosophical but religious.

Dr. Bhagavān Dās has avoided the statements of philosophy, and in so doing has done signal service to the cause of Religion. It is impossible in the course of this review to describe the general excellence, and the thorough going catholicity of outlook and the mine of information that is given under the several chapters. The great theosophical outlook, *sub specie eterni*, pervades the collection even like the perfume of the flowers of offering at the altar of God.

It is priced cheap, too cheap indeed for the weight of its thoughts : Every student of Religion,—and who is not?—should have a copy of this work on his table, all the time.

K. C. VARADACHARI.

ŚRI AUROBINDO:—*LIFE DIVINE*: Vol. II in two Parts, pp. 1186. Price Rs. 16. Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.

The Philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo is one of the most epoch-making, and the *Life Divine* is a magnificent exposition of his Integral Philosophy. It is not likely that we shall come across a more thorough-going and systematic—within the limits possible to intellect—presentation of the inner truth of Life. The important point about his philosophy is not so much its details—indeed Indian Philosophy can claim as adequate a representation and incisive an investigation into the scheme of

reality as the western philosophers lay claim to—but its vision, the vision that is supramental. Intuitive thinkers have not been wanting in every clime, and India contains many a priceless gem of illuminated consciousness. But Aurobindo goes to the fountain of Indian aspiration, to the Vedic Seer, whose vision was integral and whole, unlike most of his successors. The voice and wisdom of the Vedic Seer is that which speaks to us through the Philosophy of Aurobindo.

The outlook, as we have said, is spiritual Vision, and the details fall into the Divine scheme of Unity which does not annihilate but only subordinates the many and diverse multi-planal existences. The spiritual thread of unity is all important, but the thread does not eat up the gems. It is the inner secret of all spiritual or occult unity that the unity appears to lose itself in the gorgeous many. The Seer rescues this unity, and understands the inner threading that it performs.

One of the important Indian efforts to see the many in a unity or unitary picture was made by Jainism, but its efforts, of *Syādvāda* and *Naya* only displayed a mechanical effort at juxta-positions but not inner unity. The efforts of that synthetic system were futile in the extreme also in so far as it refused to entertain the whole of Vedic thought, notwithstanding the later attempts to find in the *Syādvāda* the inclusion of the various types of Vedantism.

Nor were other efforts either all-sided or integral. The secret of Unity was constantly missed amidst violent emphases made by doctrinaires and intellectual mystics. The occult inner life of Unity of all-existence spreads from high downwards and seeks in the figures of the temporal and phenomenal, the eternal and the real. In doing so, it finds itself in a multiplanal movement, and as dynamic evolution which is the secret of Divine unfoldment and superior bliss of existence.

The figures of Existence and Non-existence, the Mortal and the Immortal, the Permanent and the Changing, *Puruṣa*

and Prakṛti, all find their inner complement in one another, not in the Hegelian fashion, but in an ascent to a divine nature that is not merely the so-called synthesis of opposites. Nor is the ascent into the Higher merely the dialectic of distincts, a mere mergence of lesser things in the higher, so much so, there is merely realization of the bigger wholes. Such intellectual devices to explain change or becoming are results that might with difficulty be said to apply to organic development, and even to cultural conflicts. But then, the plane does not exceed the plane in which it starts, and it is a horizontal operation rather than a vertical ascent. Spiritual life is conscious of the terms of growth, not in terms of horizontal extension or movement or even tangential off-shooting, but only in terms of ascent into wider vistas of consciousness till it reaches the peak of integral unity of all planes *in the single existence of man himself*. But such an intensity and height of consciousness would make man cease to be the mortal being he is, and the ignorant instrument of his unconsciousness which he has to outgrow.

Śrī Aurobindo states certain initial postulates, the non-recognition of which had led to the pitfalls of former philosophies.

"Our way of knowing must be appropriate to that which is to be known, otherwise achieve only a distant speculation, a figure of knowledge and not a veritable knowledge" (p. 43).

The second is : "An approach from the material end of existence cannot give us any certitude of validity for that hypothesis or for that matter for any other explanation of Nature and her procedure." (p. 18).

The entire scope of analogies fail in the presence of a new plane of life, and their very truth undergoes a transformation or rather deformation. The mechanically-minded materialist measuring with his rod and balance the scope of the transforming influence of the spiritual, is even oblivious of the higher planes of consciousness and reality and holds them

suspect ; but then the spiritual integral Seer cannot forsake the quantitative however much he might subordinate the same to spiritual height and quality. Quantity is as real as quality, and both must form and do form the truth of existence. Evolution itself is a fact of evaluation and transformation of the stuff of matter Progressively into terms which are vital, mental, over-mental, supramental, and Saccidānanda. Investigation, it is said, usually proceeds from either end, namely the spiritual end or the material end, whilst in fact it begins only with the meridian of existence, the waking-consciousness of ours, which is just a snatch of the integral, and proceeds downwards and upwards into realms unknown.

Śrī Aurobindo begins with the investigations of whole life from the supramental height undoubtedly, but he does not betray the trust in the ordinary or the sub-ordinary, and the Inconscient is revealed by him to be as much a reality as the highest supramental real. Only he shows, and rightly, that the meaning of the Inconscient lies in the supramental.

One other aspect of his thought that requires special mention is the trust in the truth of causality which he finds to be the essential rule of evolution. Loss of belief in this law or principle has entailed a host of unfortunate consequences, and intellectualists as well as intuitionists have suffered under them. The intelligibility of the universe and its evolution and multiplanal continuity depend on the principle of causality or causal sequence. Modern philosophy which in the guise of indeterminability or impossibility of prediction has reared up a principle of freedom and chance, makes all effort at a metaphysics impossible.

The supracosmic, terrestrial and cosmic, the superterrestrial, and the integral and synthetic, are the four ways of looking at reality, or rather these are the four alternative theories of reality. The supracosmic view abjures the reality of the terrestrial, whilst the cosmic-terrestrial abjures the supracosmic ; the one abjures Brahman, the other abjures the world. The superterrestrial view admits the reality of the material

cosmos and accepts the temporary duration of earth and human life as the first fact we have to start from : but it adds to it, a perception of other worlds or planes of existence which have an eternal or at least more permanent duration since it perceives behind the mortality of the bodily life of man the immortality of the soul within him (p. 576). "There arises from this view of things the idea that the true home of man is beyond, and that the earth-life is in some way or other only an episode of his immortality or a deviation from a celestial and spiritual into a material existence. But what then is the character, the origin and the end of this deviation?" (p. 570). There are several theories of fall and ascent, of *lila* and so forth, but all explanations of the deviation have three essential characteristics. "First, the belief in the individual immortality of the human spirit; secondly, as a necessary consequence the idea of its sojourn on earth as a temporary passage or a departure from its highest eternal nature and of a heaven beyond as its proper habitation, thirdly, an emphasis on the development of the ethical and spiritual being as the means of ascension and therefore the one proper business of life in this world of matter." (p. 578). The clamour of the supracosmic on the superterrestrial is insistent, and, in the words of the author, we can say that if "life is split into the spiritual and the mundane there can only be an abrupt transition, not a harmony or reconciliation of these parts of our nature. A Spiritual evolution, an unfolding here of the Being within from birth to birth, of which man becomes the central instrument and human life at its highest offers the critical turning-point, is the link needed for the reconciliation of life and spirit : for it allows us to take into account the total nature of man and to recognize the legitimate place of his triple attraction, to earth, to heaven and to the Supreme Reality" (p. 584-5).

The nature of the relationship between the supracosmic and the superterrestrial views reveals the fundamental nature of their truths, and yet they apparently belong to

two poles, wide and apart. The integral view reveals their unity, or rather, diunity. But it is only through vision, that is supramental, that this is achieved. God, exists in Himself, and not by virtue of the cosmos or of man, while man and cosmos exist by virtue of God and not in themselves. That is to say, God is the transcendent truth of these men and cosmos. The statement that without man God ceases to be God made by many men-minded philosophers like Ulrici and Pringle-Pattison Seth gets itself refuted from the stand-point of Śrī Aurobindo. But this is not to say that Śrī Aurobindo is not conscious of the inherent truth of anthropomorphism. For he says "But still they are manifestations of the power of God and even in His eternal existence their spiritual reality must in some may be present or implied, since otherwise there would be no possibility of their manifestation, or manifested, they would have no significance." (p. 603). This is as much to accept the integral unity in multiplicity of the Supreme, eternally and inalienably, and not merely, as in the Philosophy of Spinoza, the *natura naturans*.

Thus the truth of the integral view which Śrī Aurobindo emphasizes lays great stress on the dual aspect of the total All, the Supreme Being, and shows His utter transcendence and unity, comprehending and manifesting and self-finding itself in the multiplicity, implicit and explicit, in His eternal being. What is not in the eternal is no wise available in the temporal, and this is an important fact to bear in mind, since the dualisms and oppositions are usually raised on the basis of their incompatibility. Such then is the *Life Divine* that enfolds within it the significance of the Supramental Consciousness that displays in a vision, that is to say, beyond the grasp of the senses and mind that is limited to it, the Unknowable in the intimate grasp of its own purified and exalted and transmuted consciousness. The Saccidānanda consciousness is the peak, and it is apprehension from within and outside.

As a recent writer eminently correctly has written,

the inner truth or the *thing-in-itself* can only be grasped by inner vision, whilst external or objective condition of a thing is known through outer means or senses. That is to say, the inner truth of being, its *thing-in-itself* is known only when it is apprehended from within. It may well be asked whether such an inner knowing is possible? Is it possible to know a thing not as an object but as a subject, as it is to itself and in itself? The possibility of such a knowing, or rather intuiting, is envisaged by M. Henri Bergson. The mystic consciousness, on the other hand, does not go the length of Bergson's theory of sympathetic intellection or induction, but seeks to know the whole all within itself, since *what is in the macrocosm is in an eminent degree within the microcosm*. We can perceive in that case things-in-themselves not on the object-side of our cognition, but as subject in cognition. All lords and gods are within us, declares a mystic saying, and all things are seen within oneself in an eminent degree. This is possible not on the basis of giving connotations for the word 'self', such as Supreme self or Big self or Self with a capital S, nor by seeking to make out a distinction between *individual* and *absolute* self. Śrī Aurobindo points out that this distinction between the finite and infinite, ātman and Brahman, vanish in the unity that contains and unfolds and sustains the multiplicity in all planes and natures and expressions. In a profoundly literal sense, then, the unity of the Infinite is expressed, and we are enabled to perceive or 'see' the entire universe contained in the self, in *its* multiplicity. Leibniz's conception of mirroring of the entire universe within the individual monad gets profound verification, and shows the dazzling insight of that philosopher. But it is to be noted that it is not the mirroring that is here being espoused since such a mirror-theory lends itself to fatal objections of illusionism. The actual unity of the multiplicity is grasped and contained the fullest in measure. This is the ultimate significance of Śrī Aurobindo's doctrine of Unity, and is of tremendous consequence to Philosophy.

The knowledge of these truths is possible only by the attainment of the inner quiet of the mind that shall be receptive and capable of permitting us to move upward and downward in introspection. This *svasamvedana* it is, that makes it possible for us to inspect the inner dimensions of individuality. That it reaches down into the very marrow of existence and persists in the lowest stages of evolution such as not merely the protozoa and the unicellular organisms, but goes still further down in the metals and plants also, shows the fact that consciousness is there penetrating into its own utter contraction or involution, and appears as outer placidity. So too is the upward movement that makes it necessary for the mind to apprehend in the Yogic consciousness that high peak of intuitive consciousness, the Vijñāna, that is superior to the prajñāna, of our ordinary life. Over and above the planes of the Overmind are higher levels such as the Supermind and the Saccidānanda.

"It is only when we follow the Yogic process of quieting the mind itself that a profounder result of our self-observations becomes possible." (p. 20).

The truth of introspective vision is clearly enunciated by Sri Aurobindo in an exquisite manner, as it were, as a reply to the criticisms levelled by behaviorists against introspection as such, that it is an impossibility, incapable of catching up with our experiences except as reflection, that it is characterized by the features of individual imagination. The "dichotomy of the perceiver and the witness," the self-division of the subject into a two-fold nature of the silent seer and the dynamic perceiver is always present at every level.

"In overmind, in all the higher ranges of the mind we find recurring the dichotomy of a pure silent self, without feature or qualities or relations, self-existent, self-poised, self-sufficient and the mighty dynamics of a determinate knowledge-power of a creative consciousness and force which precipitates itself into the forms of the Universe." (p. 24.)

“The overmind gives us no final positive solution, it is in a supramental cognition beyond it that we are left to seek for an answer.”

Thus Yogic introspection which moves upward, results in the discovery of the fundamental truth of the omnipresent reality altogether with all its parts or aspects. The downward movement leads to involution of this supreme truth in the apparent fixity and mechanical uniformity of all things. Nonetheless it is knowledge that it gains.

“The determinations would not be demarcations in the series of the Supreme Existence, which as it were is the All Omnipervasive existence containing in itself a fundamental unity along with multiplicity.” “It is indeed a miracle that there is a positive co-existence or involved and implicated multiplicity within the Unity of the One Supreme Being, Brahman. The Absolute ceases to be a blank Void and a sum of negations. Nothing can manifest that is not justified by some self-power of the original and omnipresent reality, the supreme Mother or source and end of all things.” Well might Spinoza say that this is the supreme miracle of the infinite modes changing and moving in duration, and yet fundamentally and unalterably determined by the Self-existent Substance in which ‘all things live and move and have their being.’ But Aurobindo differs fundamentally from the great god-intoxicated geometrician in that he accepts not merely the full and absolute reality of all planes and existences but also gives them an irreconcilable reality that has been in some senses denied to the modes and attributes of Substance of the Spinozistic thought. Such then is the miracle of existence in an infinity of continuous planes of the One self-existent supreme *Omnipresent* reality. The miracle is not that that they move on the surface as illusory manifestations and appear as if real; the miracle is that they are held together in a continuity of self-determinations which are not ‘demarcations’ in the self-existence. Rightly then is reality to be regarded as the fundamental fact about all determinations, whatever the plane.

"The Brahman the reality is Ātman, is Puruṣa is Īśwara,"
 "since all these three have grown out of a root of intuition," says Śrī Aurobindo. (p. 44).

The logic of the supramental consciousness is not of the finite mind. On the contrary, it is more truly a logic, than the logic of the finite, and in the context of the Infinite, the logic of the finite falls into antinomy and self-contradiction, puerility and insufficiency and incoherency. Such then is the truth of the Infinite that it appears that all the workings of Nature are miraculous and magical.

"The Spirit that manifests things or manifests itself in them so obscurely, looks to our reason like a magician and his power or māyā a creative magic; but magic can create illusions or it can create astounding realities, and we find it difficult to decide which of the supra-rational processes faces us in this universe" (p. 49)
 And again "There is a logic in it because there are relations and connections infallibly seen and executed what is magic to our finite reason, a greater logic because it is more vast, subtle, complex in its operations." (p. 52).

The causal law is accepted by Śrī Aurobindo and there is nothing in the doctrine that refutes the causal theory in any plane. It is the one fully operative law, and *sat-kārya-vāda* is accepted absolutely. Witness the passage "The Absolute neither creates nor is created in the current sense of making or being made: we can speak of creation only in the sense of the being becoming in form and movement what is already is in substance and status." (p. 58).

This view is almost identical with the reading of the Viśiṣṭādvaita which holds that creation *Ṣṣṣṭi* means the becoming of the *cidacidviśiṣṭa*-Brahman from its subtle stage of being to the gross state of being or becoming. *Sūkṣmacidacidviśiṣṭa* becomes *Sthūlacidacidviśiṣṭa*. Thus the theory of *satkāryavāda* is fundamentally right just as the *sat-khyāti-vāda*,

and both these are absolutely of the reading of the logic of the Infinite. This is so, because "We can then realise that the infinite is infinite in quality, feature, power, but that no sum of qualities, features, powers can describe the infinite." (p. 61). The truth is that *Māyā* is the force of the Divine Infinite to manifest. What is this *Māyā*? "*Māyā* of Brahman is at once the magic and the logic of an infinitely variable oneness; if, indeed there were only a rigid monotone of limited oneness and sameness, there would be no place for reason and logic, for logic consists in the right preception of relations: the highest work of reason is to find the one substance, the one law, the cementing latest reality connecting and unifying the many, the different, the discordant and disparate." (p. 70).

The three possibilities of the Infinite Consciousness are :

1. The manifold states of consciousness permits infinite variability, whilst being universally conscious (of all of them),
2. The capacity to self-limit itself, in secondary formations,
3. The capacity to get self-absorbed or involved, into a state of existence that is self-aware but not a state of consciousness of self-knowledge or knowledge.

Brahman goes with *Māyā* as its force and self-manifestation, *Puruṣa*, the individual of this Brahman, goes with *Prakṛti* always and is its inner witness, the *adhyakṣa* so to speak, of the drama of conduct and experience, and finally we perceive in the Divine Fullness, the *Īśvara* who is the master and creator of the Universe, the Lord who goes with *Īśvari*.

"Here the supreme person, the being in its transcendental and cosmic consciousness and force, comes to the front, omnipotent, omniscient, the controller of all energies, the conscious in all that is conscient, pre-inconscient, the inhabitant of all souls, and minds and hearts and bodies, the ruler or overruler of all works, the enjoyer of all delight, the creator who has built all

things in his own being, the all-person of whom all beings are personalities, the power from whom are all powers, the self, the spirit in all, by his being the father of all that is, in his consciousness-force the Divine Mother, the friend of all creatures, the all-blissful and all-beautiful of whom beauty and joy are the revelation, the all-beloved and all-lower. (pp. 86-87).

An eternal infinite self-existence is the supreme reality, but the supreme transcendent eternal being, self and spirit an infinite person, we may say, because his being is the essence and source of all personality,—is the reality and meaning of self-existence: so too the cosmic self, being, person, is the reality and meaning of cosmic existence: the same Self, Spirit, Being or Person manifesting its multiplicity is the reality and meaning of individual existence." (p. 89).

The triunity of Brahman, Puruṣa and Īśvara find its equivalent in the Māyā, prakṛti and śakti, and this has a sanction in the Vedic scheme, as the Īśvarī occupies as high a place as the Supreme Īśvara. *Īśvarīm sarva bhūtānām* is as important a doctrine as the *Īśvara sarvabhūtānām hr̥ddeṣe tiṣṭate*. Thus the doctrine of Śrī Aurobindo accepts the validity of the Mother-concept. This gets a further exposition in his later work, *THE MOTHER*, which reveals the mansions or form or perfections of the Mother in her four forms of the Saraṣvati, Kālī, Lakṣmī and Maheśwari. He holds that Māyā is a function of the Mother in the world, a real power of the supreme and not Ignorance. *Māyā vāyunam* is an equation with which there can be no quarrel. Māyā thus is knowledge.

This view originates from the fundamental analysis of the notion of the spiritual nature of Brahman which includes its force and manifestation as Māyā in creation, as Matter in regard to the individual, and as the Īśvarī inseparable from the Īśvara. The duality or dichotomy that persists between Nature and God is resolved by Śrī Aurobindo by this integral unity of Brahman-Māyā, Puruṣa-Prakṛiti and Īśvara-Īśvarī. All

this is finely dealt with. The chapter on Cosmic Illusion is a thorough-going expose of the Māyāvāda and is an affirmation of the reality of existence. A point of difference between the Śrī Vaiṣṇava view and this lies in the fact that as Yāmūnācārya says "Māyā is the curtain which fascinates and deludes", and it is the power of the Supreme Śrī or Mother. Therefore Māyā is not the Mother but her veiling power and as such a grand illusor. But the view that Śrī Aurobindo has sketched here is a clear statement that even this delusiveness or illusion caused by Māyā as power of Brahman is not for the sake of illusion as such. Whilst it illudes the ignorant, it emancipates the knower who has surrendered to her in conscious-willing and knowledge. This is a view that makes the knower of that secret, a participator in the life of Brahman and Īśvarī. Knowledge it is that makes emancipation possible. Mother is all. Knowledge is granted by the Mother.

If, therefore, there is the principle of duality in unity affirmed between Mother and Brahman, there is at the same time equally a powerful multi-unity as between the souls and Brahman. This is the fundamental reality about Brahman, in all stages and planes. Thus reality pertains to multiplicity as well as to unity but as unity is the primary fact of which we are unconscious. A supraconscious perception of the Divine as the One supreme Deity in all makes for the utter revelation of the Oneness of all Existence. This alone would make true metaphysics not impossible.

The Mother-doctrine is an important feature of the system of Śrī Aurobindo, and in trying to explain the implications of the nature of the Mother there is evolved a thesis that is not unlike the theories now and then put forward by thinkers of the stamp of General Smuts as expressed in his British Academy lecture a few years ago. The originality in the thesis of Śrī Aurobindo is due to the combined influence of the Tantric and Vaiṣṇava doctrines, and to the discovery of the supreme dichotomy of the Supreme which exists as an Absolute which has within it the fullness and greatness of the Other

also, and the omnipowerfulness of the Mother as the power that can lead us on to the highest stretches of realization of the supreme Nature.

There is a section of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism which upholds the view that the Mother is a *nitya-mukta-soul* and the archetypal eternal feminine, but Śrī Aurobindo's view coincides with the other section that holds that Mother is equal yet closely united with the Lord, between whom there is neither in will nor grace nor creation nor knowledge and light any difference. The importance of the Mother in Sādhana has been very little recognized by certain thinkers, and the doctrine of the Mother shows that Mother is a metaphysical reality of the highest kind. Religions do not usually give any place to the concept of the Mother, and yet no *sādhana* is possible without the worship of the Mother, for we are of the Mother and belong to her and through her should we finally enter into the highest transcendence. It is maintained by certain Śrī Vaiṣṇava thinkers that the worship of the Mother alone is as much a danger as the worship of the Lord alone, and therefore, even as the Īśā-seer might say, we should know them together and practice Yoga of both at the same time. This makes for integral knowledge and transformation into Divine Nature. It is almost a full-fledged utterance of this idea that we get in the Philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo, independently vouchsafed for, and affirmed from his own inimitable puissant consciousness.

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