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

PART I

THE TENTH ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE
TIRUPATI

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

PANDIT MADAN MOHAN MALAVIYA

(Delivered on 21-3-1940)

नमो नमस्तेऽखिलमन्त्रदेवताद्रव्याय सर्वक्रतवे क्रियात्मने ।
वैराग्यभक्त्यात्मजयानुभावितज्ञानाय विद्यागुरवे नमो नमः ॥

श्रीमद्भागवत ३, १३, ३१.

Chairman of the Reception Committee, Mr. Vice-Chancellor, Delegates and Members of the Conference :—

It is hardly possible for me to express adequately my sense of deep disappointment at not being able to be present amidst your learned gathering, not so much to guide your deliberations as to enjoy the great happiness, which one feels when in the company of distinguished and disinterested votaries of the Goddess of Learning. When Rao Bahadur Rangaswami Aiyangar kindly took the trouble of coming down to Benares to convey to me the request of the Executive Committee that I should accept the Presidentship of this session of the Conference, I first expressed my inability to do so, as I felt that I had neither the time nor the energy to discharge the duties of a high office, that was adorned by such distinguished scholars as Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, Dr. Sylvain Lévi and Dr. K. P. Jayaswal. I was also apprehensive that my weak health may not permit me to undertake the long journey from Benares to Tirupati. Eventually, however, being pressed very hard, I agreed to accept the Chairmanship of the Conference,

as it appeared that my health might improve in the interval between that time and the time of the Conference. That hope, however, was not realized, and ill-health has compelled me to abandon my long-cherished hope of once more offering worship at the shrine of Śrī-Veṅkaṭeśvara and participating in your deliberations. I trust that you will, under these circumstances, generously excuse my absence. It is possible for me to send only a short address. I have, however, no doubt that through the grace of Lord Veṅkaṭeśvara, your Conference will be a great success and mark the beginning of a new era of fresh activity, which would throw welcome light on oriental learning and culture, and advance our knowledge thereof in diverse new and useful ways. It is needless to say how grateful I feel for the great honour that you have done to me by electing me President of this session of the All-India Oriental Conference.

The Oriental Conference is this year meeting in South India and under the auspices of Śrī-Tirupati Devasthānam. One can hardly think of more inspiring auspices. Sanskrit learning owes a deep debt of gratitude to the Dravidians ; they have preserved it in the darkest periods of its history. In the medieval times, the lamp of learning was kept burning even at Benares through the efforts of the Deccanese Pandits. I have no doubt that the delegates assembled at Holy Tirupati will carry home inspiring reminiscences from their association with the scholars of South India.

The trustees of the Temple of Tirupati are to be congratulated on founding the Śrī-Veṅkaṭeśvara Oriental Institute and convening this Conference under its auspices. They have thereby shown that they are earnestly endeavouring to revive the admirable old tradition whereunder every temple, mosque or church of repute used to be a centre of higher learning. In South India in particular, this tradition was firmly established and continued down to the beginning of the last century. We get ample evidence to show that celebrated temples in this part of the country used not only to maintain

Sanskrit schools and colleges, but also to educate, feed and clothe the poor students free. It is to be earnestly hoped that the glorious example of the trustees of the Tirupati temple would be followed by the managements of other shrines, *maṭhas*, and mosques. If this is done, a very great impetus would be given to the study of Hindu and Islamic cultures and literatures. This in its turn would lead to the preservation and popularization of the best thought and culture of the East.

This Conference was started about 21 years ago in Poona, and it would, therefore, be not inopportune to take a general survey of oriental studies and scholarship during this period. Before the Conference began its work, Western countries were regarded, and rightly too, as the centres of Indological studies and research. They set the standards of research, which were being followed by a handful of scholars in our country. There were hardly any reputed journals of research at that time. The *Indian Anitiquary* and the *Epigraphia Indica* did exist, but they were mostly under non-Indian editorship.

Things have been transformed almost out of recognition during the last generation since the Oriental Conference began its work. The rate at which high-class research work is being done and published in India at the different Universities and research Institutes is undoubtedly very creditable. The number of research journals of first-class standard is increasing every year, and the papers published in them are throwing much greater light on the different problems of Indology than those published in foreign periodicals. India is thus fast becoming, as it ought to become, the centre of Indological studies and researches.

We must not, however, remain content with our achievements, creditable as they are. India must not only become and remain the centre of Indological studies, but must also attract a continuous stream of scholars from abroad, as it did in the days of Nālandā and Vikramaśilā. It must be confessed that

our scholars have not yet acquired the status and reputation necessary for this purpose. But, I have no doubt that if we all strive hard, we shall undoubtedly succeed in this object.

Research work is a very costly affair, and if we aspire to establish centres of research which should attract students from all the world over, we shall have to plan truly and well. It would not be practicable or useful to prosecute research in all the branches of Indology at every University or Research Institute. Different centres should specialize in different activities. Some of them should specialize in collecting old manuscripts and bringing out critical editions of the important ones among them. I cannot help observing, in passing, that if speedy and comprehensive steps are taken to publish the important manuscripts still lying unpublished in our Bhāṇḍāras and Manuscript Libraries, what a great light would be thrown on many studies of oriental studies. Some centres should specialize in Islamic studies, others in ancient Indian Iranian ones. The study of philosophy should be cultivated in some places, that of linguistics in others. Some institutes should specialize in epigraphy, numismatics and ancient Indian history. I do not mean to say that the different Universities should not include these subjects in their post-graduate curricula. By all means they should. But the necessary facilities for the highest type of research in the different branches of Indology can be given only at a few centres.

We shall have to build much bigger libraries at different centres of research than those which exist to-day. Our greatest library, the Imperial Library at Calcutta, hardly possesses one-tenth the number of volumes that adorn the shelves of the British Museum Library. It would be hardly possible to create such libraries at every centre of research. We would therefore distribute the work in the different branches of Indology at different centres, each of which should possess all the available literature on the subject. As a preliminary step to the achievement of this ideal, the Copyright Act will have to be amended, making it compulsory for every publisher to

send one copy of his work to the Central Library in our country.

There is, however, another and greater difficulty in creating in this country centres of research in Indology of world-wide reputation. Much of the material for research in Indology in the form of manuscripts, copper-plates, sculptures, coins and historic papers does not now exist in this country. It exists in centres like Oxford and London. I was delighted to read the other day how the new Governor of Bengal, Sir George Herbert, brought back a copper-plate from the British Museum and presented it to the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. I however, think, that it is now time that all the copper-plates, coins, manuscripts and papers, which are useful for the study of Indology, should now be returned back to India. We are grateful to Great Britain for having carefully preserved these objects of priceless historic importance. But, they should now be kept in the country to which they belong, and where they can be most utilized. India has now become the real centre of Indological studies and researches; the number of scholars who would be utilizing these sources of history, when transferred to India, would be more numerous than those who are using them in Great Britain.

Your different sectional presidents, I think, will give you a review of the research work done in different sections. I have had neither the time nor do I possess the ability for doing this work. May I, however, as a layman draw your attention to some lines of study and research that seem to be rather neglected? The fascinating study of the spread of Indian culture to Insul-India and Central Asia ought to attract much greater attention of scholars than it has hitherto done. In India, Bengal has done pioneer work in this line. The study of this subject has a vital bearing on the problems of the present day world; it will show how a culture can succeed in propagating itself without the help of the sword or the bomb, if it possesses inherent merit. The history of the spread of Hindu and Buddhist cultures to Indian Archipelago, and Central and

far-off Asia, ought to be a subject of study in every College and University of India. The Dutch and French languages in which much of the literature on the subject exists, ought to be more widely studied in this country. Our scholars ought to visit these countries in large numbers and carry on the exploration and research work on the spot. Non-Indian scholars have so far led the way in this field, and we ought to be very grateful to them. But, we must now step forward to undertake a work, which is primarily our own. We can discharge our debt to our ancestors who had Indianized culturally the greater part of Asia, only by reconstructing the history of their glorious achievements.

The epoch-making discoveries of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro have opened quite a new vista before the eye of the historian. New inscribed seals are being discovered every year, but they are still a sealed book to us. A few scholars are working at the problem of their decipherment, but their number must considerably increase. It has now beeome clear that in the dim, distant past, the cultures of Egypt, Sumer, Elam, Iran and India were in close contact with each other. Egyptology and Assyriology therefore ought to be properly and assiduously studied in this country if we are to understand our own history at the dawn of civilization. Western scholarship has made considerable progress in this field; we have not yet made even a beginning. India can hardly become the real centre of Indological research unless the above branches of study are also simultaneously developed.

I am a Paurāṇika by heredity, and I cannot therefore help observing that the study of the Purāṇas, and of their contribution to religion, culture and social philosophy has not attracted the attention it deserves. There is a general tendency to underrate their importance, which I regard as most unfortunate. I would urge you not to accept second-hand estimates of these works, made by unsympathetic critics. Study them and weigh them before you pronounce your opinion. I have no doubt that your studies will show you that the Purāṇas have done

very great service to the cause of the preservation and popularization of Hindu religion and culture. It is high time that the work of bringing out their critical editions should be undertaken. This is necessary to facilitate their proper study. The Purāṇas are encyclopaedias of ancient and medieval Hindu culture and religion, and we can hardly get the proper perspective for solving the problems of present-day Hinduism without their proper study.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the sphere of the Oriental Conference does not end with the ancient period, but comes down to the modern age. The study of Sanskrit, Prakrit, Arabic and Persian will naturally loom large in the Conference. But the period between the time when these languages ceased to be actively cultivated, and the advent of the modern age is covered by a long period of about 800 years, during which extensive literature flourished in different vernaculars in the different provinces of India. The study of these languages and literatures ought to be assiduously cultivated. Researches into the structures of these languages would yield good results. But the study of their literatures, I think, is still more important. It will give us a glimpse of the Indian Society in the middle ages, of which we have very little correct perception at present. It will also enable us to know how our mediæval saints were re-interpreting the message of the earlier sages in order that it might be intelligible to the people as a whole. Their poems and songs, fervent with a devotion and sincerity that cannot but appeal to every heart, will certainly show to the sceptics of the new generation that religion is something genuine, positive and dynamic, and not merely an opiate invented by a crafty priest-hood to keep down the ignorant and the oppressed.

The literature of this period is in different vernaculars, and so its appreciation would not become possible for a large number unless we offer special facilities for the purpose. We should therefore publish selections from each vernacular, arranged both chronologically and topically which would give

a knowledge of its special contribution to the development of religion, philosophy and culture. These selections should be accompanied by their translation in Hindi and English. This would enable different provinces to appreciate one another's cultures and viewpoints, and arrest the growth of provincialism, which is threatening to develop fissiparous tendencies at the present time.

In these selection Books, the Hindi rendering of the original vernacular passages will of course be printed in the Devanagari script, in the case of languages which are derived from Sanskrit, or which have a vocabulary which is largely based upon Sanskrit. There is no doubt that the Devanagari script is known to a larger section of Indian population than any other script current in India. It is a great desideratum that the knowledge of this script, which is universally admitted to be the most scientific and perfect one, should become universal among the speakers of the Sanskrit-derived languages. These languages are really very much akin to each other; even Dravidian languages like the Telugu and Tamil have got a vocabulary largely derived from Sanskrit. It would therefore be very easy for a cultured person to get a working knowledge of a number of vernaculars and their literatures, if only they are written in a script which they can read. In the interest of wider appreciation of provincial cultures and literatures, it is therefore desirable that the use and knowledge of the Devanagari should become universal among the people, who speak languages derived from or largely influenced by Sanskrit. Persian and Urdu will continue to be written in the Perso-Arabic script until such time when their users may voluntarily decide to adopt a more scientific script in favour of a less perfect one.

The progress of Archæological studies and excavations is intimately connected with the progress of Indology. It is indeed unfortunate that the work of new excavations should have suffered for want of funds. It should not be necessary to remind the Government and the legislators that it is very

undesirable to starve the Archæological Department into inactivity. I would therefore urge the Government to start a comprehensive policy of excavation. It is, however, very necessary that the excavations of some Vedic and epic sites should be undertaken in right earnest. It is indeed strange that these sites should have been practically neglected thus far. Unless some of them are properly and completely excavated, much of our ancient history and culture will continue to be shrouded in obscurity.

The sites to be excavated are so numerous that the resources of the Government alone would not be sufficient for the purpose. I would therefore urge our industrial magnates and rich zamindars to follow the excellent example of the late Sir Ratan Tata and give generous donations for excavations. The law of the land now permits private excavations; it is sad to think that they should mostly have been started under the auspices of foreign societies.

It is a matter of great satisfaction that a number of Indian States should have started their own Archæological Departments, which have been doing good work. But there are still many, which have not yet done the needful in the matter. May I urge them to do their duty in this connection?

Another way to promote the cause of research is to encourage the establishment of museums at every important centre. I should think that it is the duty of every Municipality and District Board to have a local museum of its own to house the antiquities, manuscripts and historical papers of its own locality. It is only by creating in this way an active interest in each locality in the history and culture of its past that an interest for research work can be created on wider lines. There is so much of historical material in the shape of sculptures, images, inscriptions, coins, manuscripts and historic documents lying scattered and uncared for in the country that no one provincial museum can look after and house it. If all this material is to be saved from destruction, brought to light

and utilized, we must encourage the establishment of new museums in every district.

In the Baroda Session of the Oriental Conference, the late Dr. Jayaswal had urged that it was high time that an Indian History of India by Indians should be undertaken on a comprehensive scale. He had discussed the scheme with me and was preparing his plan to carry it out when the cruel hand of death carried him away from our midst. I am glad to notice that this idea has been warmly received by scholars. I, however, regret to notice that there are several schemes in the field, apparently competing with one another. This is somewhat unfortunate. I would therefore urge the different scholars and conferences, that are contemplating such a history, to work together. Then only shall we be able to bring out an Indian History of India, which would command respect in all quarters.

Ladies and Gentlemen, research work in the abstract is of great value and should be appreciated and encouraged for its own sake. Nevertheless, we should not forget that we study the past in order that it may be of some use and guidance to us for the present and the future. The average cultured man is not so much interested in the details of history, as in the general causes that lead to the rise and fall of cultures and civilizations. The country would therefore naturally look to an august body like the All-India Oriental Conference for an authoritative exposition of the rise and decline of Hindu, Buddhist and Jain cultures and religions, and the steps that should be taken to restore them to their pristine glory. The questions involved in the above enquiry are difficult ones and would require absolute impartiality in the investigators, if we are to succeed in tackling them. Some organizations must undertake the work and which is more competent to do it than this Conference? If India is to rise once again as a united and homogeneous nation, Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, Parsis, Muslims and Christians must learn each other's history and

appreciate each other's culture. I believe that the All-India Oriental Conference, where the devotees of many of these religions meet on a common platform, can pave the way in this respect by publishing authoritative works on the subject.

The aim of the Oriental Conference should be not only to study and reconstruct oriental philosophy and culture, but also to spread their message in and outside India. This is very necessary and desirable. We are meeting today in the midst of a world catastrophe, and I fear that it will recur again and again, as long as the fundamental principles of our ancient religion and philosophy are not appreciated by humanity. Are different ideals, cultures and religions, which need have no aggressive designs against others, to be permitted to live peacefully in this world, or is one or more of them to dominate or wipe out the rest under one specious plea or another, is the fundamental question lying at the root of the struggles that are now going on in the different parts of the world in different forms. The spirit of intolerance and national selfishness is getting the upper hand in most places, because matter is allowed to dominate over spirit, and the claims of *śreyas* or the spiritually desirable are being superseded in favour of *preyas* or the worldly attractive. This is happening not only in the West and the Far East but, I am sorry to say, in our own Mother-land also, whose children have not been acting up to the best spirit of our ancient religion, philosophy and culture. There cannot be any peace in this world unless humanity learns to prefer *śreyas* to *preyas* and accepts the ideal of multi-cultural development and allows even the numerically weak to work out their own cultural ideals without any let or hindrance from the numerically or physically strong. We must not only cultivate tolerance, but learn to appreciate views different from our own, if they are honestly held. This, as I understand it, is the message of our ancient culture and philosophy. About 2200 years ago, the great Aśoka had exhorted humanity in the following words :—

ये हि केचि अतपाषंडा पुनाति पलपाषंडा वा गलहति षवे अतपाषंड-भतिय वा, किंति अतपाषंडं दीपयेम, शे षवे पुना तथा कलंतो बाढतलं उपहति अतपाषंडम्हि । ..... । पूजेतविया चु पलपाषंडा तेन तेन कालेनेन ।

" One who honours his own religion and culture and condemns those of another, with the hope that he may thereby render his own religion and culture refulgent, really does the greatest injury to his own culture and religion. Another's religion and culture should be honoured on suitable occasions."

The *Gita* goes a step further and declares that a man may follow any religion and worship any deity he likes; if he is sincere and devoted, he will reach salvation :—

ये त्वन्यदेवताभक्ता यजन्ते श्रद्धयान्विताः ।
तेऽपि मामेव कौन्तेय यजन्त्यविधिपूर्वकम् ॥

These excellent principles were followed in Ancient India, and so Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zorastrianism, Sikhism and Christianity lived side by side, each enriching the other by its own contribution to the common culture of the land. Islam also lived and prospered peacefully in the country in the 9th and 10th centuries A.D. in places where it was not backed by political power. We must once more create an atmosphere of mutual good will and harmony, not only in this country but throughout the world. This would be possible only by the spread of our ancient ideal, which asks us to supersede the claims of *preyas* in favour of *śreyas* and to allow each religion and culture to lead its own life undisturbed so that it may contribute its quota to the common culture of humanity. I would like the Conference to spread this idea far and wide, both in and outside the country. May it succeed in this mission. May its efforts redound to the glory of the Mother-land.

THE TENTH ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE
TIRUPATI

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

VEDIC SECTION

Mahāmahopādhya

PRAMATHANATHA TARKABHUSHAN

Gifts of the Vedic Literature to Humanity

The main distinctive feature of the Vedic Sanskrit language is its undated antiquity. That it is the oldest of all the languages known to the civilized world as still in some form living has been proved beyond a shadow of doubt. Its exact date has not yet been fixed and there is little hope of its being definitely fixed in the future.

There is no unanimity of opinion, among the antiquarians of the West, about the period of the composition of the *Ṛgveda* Samhitā, the oldest book in the Sanskrit language. It is variously regarded as composed between 1500 B. C. and 4000 B. C. Among Indian scholars who pursue western methods of investigation the late Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak placed it at about 4500 B. C.; on the other hand Dr. Abinash Chandra Das, goes so far back as 25,000 B. C.

All the orthodox philosophers of India, however, have held that it is a revelation (*apauruṣeya*) aud was not composed by any human being. It cannot be said that like the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, or any other book it was composed by some one and then brought to the knowledge of the people, for there was no time when the study and teaching of the *Veda* was absent in India.

In the midst of this controversy the fact that the *Ṛgveda* is the oldest book in the library of mankind has emerged and is recognized by all.

Though this ageless antiquity by itself suffices to give it a stamp of uniqueness yet its greatness does not rest on this factor alone.

Any attempt, therefore, at basing the greatness of the Vedic Sanskrit language on its antiquity along would be of little use. Like its antiquity, its immense variety of literary beauties, poetic and rhetorical, its ingenious devices of metre and rhythm to suit sentiment and occasion, its sweetness, vigour and perspicuity, the condensation of its thought, and other points of greatness have astonished many scholars. Yet these good qualities by themselves, singly, or collectively, have not made it immortal. What is it then that has raised it to the level of immortality ?

It has been the medium through which the gospel of the life beyond, the super-sensual existence has been most convincingly revealed. The highest thought of which it is the vehicle has made it immortal. The spirit or the soul being immortal has endowed the body or the language with everlasting life.

Man likes happiness ; he shuns misery. This primary liking for happiness and dislike of misery are the motive forces which determine his actions and inhibitions. These two are at the root of all human activities ; they are the primal impulses to human activity and civilization ; all his actions spring from what are known in our philosophical language as " desire " (राग) and " aversion " (द्वेष).

The history of human civilization is really the multi-form outcome of man's continual struggle under these two impulses. History, philosophy, literature, asthetics, science, metaphysics and theology are but a few of the white crests of the waves that surge in this ever-agitated sea of human civilization.

The literature, history, mythology of civilized people in all parts of the world are but varied pictures of their activities prompted by their desires and aversions. In this respect there is a fundamental similarity among them all.

On what, then, does the uniqueness, imperishable excellence of the Vedic Sanskrit language depend ?

The answer briefly is that it is the only language which gives expression to that unsatisfied yearning which transcends all "desires" and "aversions," and the realization of which is the *summun bonum* of human existence.

The Vedic literature, the most ancient form of the classical languages, was also the first to announce to mankind the news of this longing :

न तं विदाथ य इमा जजानान्यद्युष्माकमन्तरं बभूव ।
नीहारेण प्रावृता जल्प्या चासुतृप उक्थशासश्चरन्ति ॥

"Oh human beings ! None of you know that Reality from which all beings have emanated. Between that and you all intervenes something else. All persons are enveloped in ignorance and give themselves upto empty talk ; they hanker after material gains, and crawl upon the surface of this earth clinging only to sacrificial rites. (X, lxxxii, 7)

यो नः पिता जनिता यो विधाता धामानि वेद भुवनानि विश्वा ।
यो देवानां नामधा एक एव तं संप्रश्नं भुवना यन्त्यन्या ॥

"All beings question about the Absolute One who is our Protector and Progenitor, who knows all the celestial regions along with all creations and Who after creating gave names to all Deities :" (X, lxxxii, 3).

These two mantras " clearly proclaim that the Creator of this Universe is not visible to the ordinary eye. He, though essentially One appears to different worshippers in different forms under different names. In spite of the presence of an

ardent longing to know Him, man cannot see Him as he is blinded by the haze of egoism.

Again,

एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति अग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानमाहुः ।

The One and the same Absolute Reality has been interpreted in many ways by the learned; some call Him Agni (Fire), others Yama, while yet others designated him as Mātariśvan (Wind). *Ṛgveda.* (I, cvxiv, 46)

This ardent longing to know Him who appears in diverse forms under diverse names, but is essentially the unchangeable, invisible one, this search after the Truth (तत्वजिज्ञासा), is the very life of the Vedic literature. Though it originates in the *Ṛgveda* Samhita, it has subsequently developed in many forms in the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads.*

The quest of the ultimate Truth (तत्वजिज्ञासा) is the keynote which sounds through the whole range of the Vedic Sanskrit literature. If it swells into the fifth note of the scale, so to say, in the life of the student, the Forest Dweller and the Recluse as depicted in the *Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads.* it attains the seventh in that of the Householder. A very apt illustration may be cited from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka.*

Maharṣi Yājñavalkya, the preceptor of Rājarṣi Janaka, about to renounce the world and to be a recluse, addresses his wife thus: "Maitreyī, I am going to adopt the ascetic life; but before I leave I would divide my property so that misunderstanding may not arise between you and your co-wife Kātyāyanī. Tell me, Maitreyī, which of my worldly effects you desire."

And Maitreyī replies :"My Lord, even though you give me the whole earth with all its treasures, shall I be able to escape Death thereby ?"

And the sage says: "Certrinly not, Maitreyī; you may thereby only become the mistress of the world, but cannot evade Death."

Maitreyī says : "Then I do not want money or jewels. Favour me with that, if you have it, which will save me from Death."

The spiritual yearning of Maitreyi which seeks to conquer Death points to the ideal mentality of the women of the Vedic age and is one of the main ingredients of the most ancient thought of our land. It is well nigh impossible to describe the innumerable ways and forms in which this spiritual bent of the race finds expression in the Vedic Literature.

And likewise Gargi and Vachaknavi approach Yajñavalkya in the Court of Rajarsi Janaka under the urge of this obstinate longing to know the Truth. And the same impulse leads Devarṣi Nārada to the presence of Sanatkumar. And the royal sage gives a last of the Arts and Sciences that flourished in India in that hoary pāst, and most humbly confesses that though he has mastered them all, he yet lacks the one thing needful-the knowledge of Self:

ऋग्वेदं भगवोऽध्येमि यजुर्वेदं सामवेदमाथर्वणं चतुर्थमितिहासपुराणं पञ्चमं वेदानां वेदं पित्र्यं राशिं दैवं निधिं वाकोवाक्यमेकायनं देवविद्यां ब्रह्मविद्यां भूतविद्यां क्षत्तविद्यां नक्षत्रविद्यां संसर्पदेवजनविद्यामेतद्भगवोऽध्येमि ।

सोऽहं भगवो मन्त्रविदेवास्मि नात्मवित् श्रुतंह्येवमेभगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति-शोकमात्मविदिति सोऽहंभगवः शोचामि तं मां भगवान् शोकस्यपारं तारयित्विति-तंहोवाच यद्वै किंचैततदध्यगीषनामैवैतत् ।

"O Sire, I have studied Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda and also the fourth Atharva-veda. I have also read Itihāsa (History) and Purāṇa (Antique Lore) which are known as the fifth Veda. I have studied The Veda of Vedas (i. e., Grammar); I have studied treatises on obsequies ; I know the Science of prognastications of territorial, supernatural and celestial disturbances. I have studied Minerology, Logic Statecraft, Philology and Lexicography. I have also studied Physics, Archery, Astronomy, Astrology and Snakelore, and Dancing,

Music, and other fine Arts. With all these, I yet regard myself as a knower of " Mantras " only and not one who knows the Self (आत्मवित्); I have heard from sages like you that is he only, who has realized the Self, who can escape from misery. But I am still sunk in the sea of misery; be kind to me, lead me to Self-knowledge and thus help to me cross this sea. "

Sanatkumāra replies :

" O Narada, what you have learnt so far is useless, being names only. "

This shows that though Nārada had acquired all branches of knowledge which minister to the sense and their need and all that could remove miseries of Physical (आधिभौतिक) or divine (आधिदैविक) origin, yet they could not fill the spiritual void in any way. He supplicated to Sanatkumāra who had that knowledge which only can remove spiritual suffering through self-realization.

This search after the Truth (तत्वजिज्ञासा) without which man's soul cannot attain peace, was first brought home to the soul of Humanity by the Vedic Literature. This very truth has been transmitted from the remote past as by an unbroken tradition in all later Sanskrit Literature through all the phases of its development, Vedic, and Classical.

The search after Truth (तत्वजिज्ञासा) initiated in the Vedic literature is the fundamental basis of Indian Philosophy with all its schools and varieties of thought. It has given rise to Dualism and Monism, Qualified Monism and Pure Monism, the doctrine of Impermanency of Nature (क्षणभंगुरवाद) the theory of Idealism (विज्ञानवाद) the doctrine of the non-existence of anything, Dualomonism (भेदाभेदवाद) the doctrine of Agnosticism and many other theories and doctrines.

The different systems of philosophy in the world fall under one or other of the innumerable systems that originated and developed in India and found expression in the Sanskrit language.

Another important contribution of this literature is that it first laid the foundations of the socio-religious policy known as the *Varṇāśrama-dharma*, that is, the division of Society into four castes and life into four stages; and it has held up before mankind the true ideal of this dharma as practicably applied to actual social conditions. This *Varṇāśrama-dharma*, a unique and invaluable gift of the Vedic literature by its survival to the present moment has proved clearly how, under it, society can be so organized that all the members can live in concord, amity, love and friendliness, with individual freedom and independence within such limits as conduce to a happy life here, and at the same time ensure immortality of the soul, hereafter and save man from utter materialism.

Another achievement of the Vedic culture is the poetic theory that sentiment (रस) constitutes the soul of poetry and drama. With a pervasive sentiment no composition rises to the honour of poetry. The theoretic basis with the classification, characteristics and effects on the human soul of the different sentiments are worked out in detail in works on Rhetoric. Up to this point criticism in other literatures of a later origin resemble it; but in none of them do we find anything equivalent to the fundamental truth (रसो वै सः) (He is Emotion); in fact with irrefutable reasoning Indian philosophy traces the origin of this soul of poetry to one aspect of the Supreme Being, namely Bliss (आनन्द) and thus establishes that the individual human soul has a connection with the Universal Soul. This, therefore, is again a unique gift of the Vedic literature to mankind.

Through every stratum of this literature, through all the forms and phases of its development rings a sweet tune which entering through the ear touches the human heart and sets up vibrations that accord with the music of that ideal world in which individual pleasures and pains meet into the pleasures and pains of all sentient beings.

He becomes steady-minded and dispassionate; the shackles of worldly life can no longer bind him to gross materialism This ideal of the serene life, selfless and joyful, is set forth in the most moving accents in the *Gīta*—the Song of Songs, which is the quintessence of the teachings of the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* and though in language a little removed is in spirit the very heart and core of Vedic culture.

The *Bhagvadgitā* thus defines the wise man, the sage

दुःखेष्वनुद्विग्नमनाः सुखेषु विगतस्पृहः ।
वीतरागभयक्रोधः स्थितधीःमुनिरुच्यते ।

"He, who is not upset by sorrows and who does not hanker after happiness, who is free from attachment, fear and anger and has a steady mind, is called a Muni."

Such men may not be regarded as useful or necessary by a world that lusts for riches and pleasure and power; but the ancient wisdom of India, first of all revealed this great truth that the existence of such persons in the security for the good of the humanity, turns this world, which is full of miseries for the time into the kingdom of heaven.

Let me in conclusion say a word about the *Varṇāśrama-dharma* already referred to. Whether this socio-religious order can be acceptable to all the peoples of the world need not be discussed here. This is not the occasion to consider whether the form of this institution, which is so characteristic of Indian culture, as prevalent in India through the ages, is the real and original form. We must not forget that the picture of the *Varṇāśrama-dharma* as given in the Vedic literature, deserves close study. Every responsible leader feels and admits the necessity of uniting countless persons of naturally divergent natures into groups or societies for general improvement and advancement and for peace on earth and good-will among men.

The difficulty lies in formulating the principles on which the social structure should be so based as to make it useful and beneficient. The ideal society is one in which there is a proper balance between the whole and the individual, in which nobody feels himself neglected or oppressed by others, in which the individual is allowed the liberty of action up to a limit beyond which it may interfere with the interests or welfare of others or of the whole; in which the individual maintains happy, peaceful and cordial relations with others and there is no clash between the individual and the community.

There is no satisfactory solution of this problem in the Social or political literature of the world except in the Vedic Sanskrit literature in which the institution of the *Varṇāśrama dharma* approached the ideal. This institution which bases the sub-divisions of a social group of constituent nature and action a elaborated in the *Bhagavadgītā*, can be adopted by all peoples of the world.

ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियविशां शूद्राणां च परन्तप ।
कर्माणि प्रविभक्तानि स्वभावप्रभवैर्गुणैः ॥

शमोदमस्तपःशौचं क्षान्तिरार्जवमेव च ।
ज्ञानं विज्ञानमास्तिक्यं ब्राह्मं कर्मस्वभावजम् ।
शौर्यं तेजो धृतिर्दाक्ष्यं युद्धेचाप्यपलायनम् ।
दानमीश्वरभावश्च क्षात्रंकर्मस्वभावजम् ।
कृषिगोरक्ष्यवाणिज्यं वैश्यकर्मस्वभावजम् ।
परिचर्यात्मकं कर्म शूद्रस्यापिस्वभावजम् ।
स्वेस्वे कर्मण्यभिरतः संसिद्धिं लभते नरः ।
स्वकर्मनिरतःसिद्धिं यथा विन्दति तच्छृणु ।
यतःप्रवृत्तिर्भूतानां येनसर्वमिदंततम् ।
स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः ॥

"The duties of Brahmans, Kṣhattriyas, Vaiśyas and Sūdras are divided, O Parantapa, according to the guṇas bred in their respective natures.

Control of the mind and senses, practice of austerities, purity, patience, rectitude, knowledge, spiritual perception and belief in God are the qualities of a Brahman, born of his nature.

Bravery, energy, fierceness, skill, not turning back in battle, giving of alms and lordliness, are the qualities of Kṣhattriya born of his nature.

Agriculture, cattle-breeding and trade are the natureborn duties of a Vaiśya, while menial service is the nature born duty of a Sūdra.

"Man devoted to his proper duty attains perfection. Listen how he attains perfection by devotion to his own duties.

By worshipping Him from Whom all beings have emanated and by Whom all this is pervaded, with devotion to one's duty, man attains perfection."

If the human society is based on this model, conflicts originating in unbridled desire, uncontrolled passions of hate and envy and a gnawing sense of unequality may be removed from the face of the earth. The gospel of Varṇāśramadhnrma has been given to the world in the Vedic Literature.

Without proper and equitable distribution of wealth, human society cannot be placed on a firm basis of abiding peace. The world-wide disturbance of peace at the present moment is due to unequal distribution of wealth.

The sages on whose inspired souls the Vedas flashed, once gave the solutiou of this great social question. It worked for ages to the ends of peace and harmony, love and well-being. We have at present before our eyes new experiments of social adjustment Before we throw in our lot with the innovators, let us make sure that we do not discord in a hurry what for untold ages has yielded benificient results.

On us, who are assembled to view and unfold the precious heritage of India coming from the Vedic times rests a two-fold responsibility. It is not merely to discuss and disseminate the manifold glories of our rich past but also to remember that theories and doctrines turn into husks and empty shells and dead wood, to lifeless dogmas and unmeaning survivals of the past, when they cease to animate society and inspire individuals. It is our duty no doubt to unearth the treasures of thought, but no less to see that the great ideals that are embalmed in our ancient literature fail not of imitation and assimilation, do not cease to work on the surging life around.

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THE TENTH ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE
TIRUPATI

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

ARCHÆOLOGICAL SECTION

DR. R. C. MAJUMDAR, M.A., Ph.D.,
Vice-Chancellor, Dacca University.

Fellow Delegates,

I must first of all thank the authorities of the Conference for the great honour they have done me by electing me as the President of this Section. But while appreciating this high distinction conferred upon me I am not unaware of the heavy responsibilities attaching to the position, and I wish the choice would have fallen on a worthier person, and one directly connected with the archæological work in India.

Before proceeding further, I consider it to be my melancholy duty to refer to the great loss that Indian Archæology has suffered by the death of Pandit Dayaram Sahni and the tragic murder of Mr. Nanigopal Majumdar. Both of them were widely known for their profound scholarship and the eminent services they rendered to Indian Archæology. On behalf of you all I pay a tribute of respect to the illustrious dead and pray to God that their souls may rest in peace.

It is unnecessary for me either to stress the great importance of Archæology or to impress upon the attention of the delegates assembled here the leading role it plays in the study of Indian History. As workers in the same field you all know that the study of the history of ancient India is almost entirely based on archæology. Ancient literature has no doubt a great value from the cultural point of view, but for our knowledge of political history, development of art and the evolution of social,

religious and economic conditions associated with definite periods of time, we are solely indebted to Archæology. Indeed it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that ancient Indian history so far known to us consists mostly of an orderly presentation of archæological data rather than a narration of events with sufficient details to explain the causes and consequences of broad movements by a critical study of the various forces and factors underlying them such as is properly implied in the term history. It is the archæological discoveries of the last hundred years that have rendered possible the reconstruction of ancient Indian history such as it is to-day, and its progress in the future depends almost entirely upon further archæological explorations and discoveries.

Such explorations and discoveries, apart from the chance finds of coins and inscriptions by private individuals, are directly dependent on the activities of the Archæological departments of the Government of India and the Indian States. Students of Indian history and all those who are interested in its further progress must therefore feel naturally concerned about the efficient and successful working of these departments.

No apology is therefore needed if I take this opportunity of making a brief review of the work of the Archæological Department of the Government of India. Apart from general considerations mentioned above, there are two special reasons which impel me to do this. In the first place, the axe of retrenchment dealt such a heavy blow upon the Department in 1931 that most of its useful activities have been seriously crippled ever since. Secondly the internal management of the Department during the last two decades has not been such as to inspire public confidence in its efficient working. The gravity of the situation disturbed even the equanimity of the Government of India, and they took recourse to what they have now come to regard as almost a universal remedy for all the evils of India, *viz.* the importation of a foreign expert for advice and guidance.

The name of Sir Leonard Woolley was thus added to a long list of foreign experts who have recently visited India, made a rapid tour all over the country and left valuable advice in the shape of handy reports. As Sir Leonard's report is likely to form the basis for the future reorganization of the Archæological Department, it is high time that Indian scholars should unequivocally state their own views not only on the various suggestions made by him, but also on the general working of the Archæological Department. It is all the more necessary because Sir Leonard did not evidently think it worth his while to make himself acquainted with the views of men, outside the Archæological Department, whose scholarship, experience and judgment entitled them to be consulted before a foreign scholar, eminent in his own line of study, but without any known credentials for any deep knowledge of Indian archæology or scholarship in Indian antiquities, should have formulated far-reaching proposals about the future planning of Indian archæological work. Presumably the Government of India also share the same views in this respect, for this valuable report has not yet been widely circulated and no steps have been taken, to my knowledge, for eliciting opinion of Indian scholars. But whatever may be the attitude of Sir Leonard Woolley or the Government of India, we cannot afford to treat this report with indifference and must give expression to our views, at least on the salient features of the scheme adumbrated in it. But in order to present it in its true perspective it is necessary to begin with a general review of the archæological work in British India.

Fortunately or unfortunately this all-important work has been almost a monopoly of a Government Department. From one point of view this has been a great advantage, for without the energy, resources and initative of the Government, and a unified direction and policy inherent in Government control, the archæological explorations in India would not have made the remarkable progress which we all witness to-day. The Department can justly be proud of its notable pioneer, Sir

Alexander Cunnigham, and a noble band of workers, both Europeans and Indians, who worthily carried on the work initiated by him. India must ever remain grateful to them and to Lord Curzon who reorganized the Department and placed it on a stable and secure basis.

Unfortunately this Government Department suffered from the defects and shortcomings which seem to be almost inherent in all bureaucratic systems of administration. Chief among these are want of elasticity, a lack of adaptability and a rigid adherence to a general system of official routine permanently fixed without reference to the peculiar needs and requirements of any particular department. At a time when the study of ancient Indian history was yet in its infancy in India and few outside the official circles took interest in it, it was only natural that the Archæological Department should rely mainly on its own officials for carrying on their work in all its aspects. But the bureaucratic Department seemed to be oblivious of or impervious to the great changes that were taking place in India in this respect. The introduction of the study of Indian antiquities in Universities and the growing popularity of the subject, produced a gradually increasing number of able and competent scholars. But far from pooling the resources which were thus easily available and without making the slightest effort to profit by their knowledge and experience and enlist their support and co-operation in any way, the Department carried on its monopoly business from 1920 to 1940 in exactly the same way as it had been carrying on its work since the very beginning. The evils of this bureaucratic tenacity would have been much less if the Department were really manned by able and efficient scholars as before. Unfortunately here the rigid official system came into full play and thanks to the rules of promotion according to official seniority or exigency of departmental needs important positions in the Department were not unoften filled by men whose claims were based solely on long service in the Department (in any capacity) rather than on scholarship or

knowledge of Archæology. As I am anxious to avoid personalities, I would not pursue this topic to its logical end but would ask everybody to compare the names of stalwarts like Marshall, Vogel, D. R. Bhandarkar, Dayaram Sahni, R. D. Banerji, Sten Konow, Venkayya and Krishna Sastri among others, who filled responsible positions in the Archæological Department in the early part of this century, with those who followed them. Scholarship and technical knowledge were discounted not merely in the filling up of responsible posts, but also in regard to selection of field workers. Things came indeed to such a pass that even important excavation work had to be entrusted to most incompetent persons who had no background of scholarship or any technical experience. One can form an idea of the disastrous result of this mistaken policy, pursued over a long period, from the following lurid picture given by Sir Leonard:

"I have visited sites in which digging was in progress under the direction in one case of an Excavation Assistant, in another of a Draftsman, in another of a Museum Custodian and in a fourth of a working foreman who in the absence of all members of the establishment had no one to supervise him at all. One of these men had been specially instructed to carry out a piece of research requiring the greatest care and judgement; he had not got even the tools which were indispensable to work of the sort, most of the evidence was destroyed in the course of the digging, and what survived the workmen's pickaxe he could not understand. Another of them who was working with laudable care and considerable skill was misinterpreting nearly all that he found in a way which would have been seriously misleading to scholars; the third, who also worked carefully, did not even attempt to interpret things and had no scientific results to show. It would be manifestly unfair to criticize these men for not doing well something which they should never have been asked to do; but that they should have been thought fit to do the work is a grave symptom of the low standard and inexperience of the

Department. But where excavations have been conducted by the regular officers of the Department the effects of inexperience are not less marked. I do not propose to multiply illustrations *ad nauseam*, but I can say that on almost every site which I visited there was evidence of the work having been done in an amateur fashion by men anxious indeed to do well but not sufficiently trained and experienced to know what good work is."

Things were not better in other spheres and the Department had to seek outside help even for carrying its normal routine work. Before the second decade of this century was over an eminent English scholar had to edit the *Epigraphia Indica*, and in 1935 a Hungarian gentleman was appointed officer on special duty to edit a consolidated report of the Annual Reports of Archaeological Survey which were in arrears by four years i.e. from the year 1930–31 to 1933–4. The publication of the *Epigraphia Indica* was also heavily in arrears. This is all the more surprising as the normal work of the Department was reduced to a minimum during this period owing to the policy of retrenchment pursued by the Government of India.

It is difficult for an outsider like me to find out all the causes that might adequately account for this sad spectacle and I do not therefore attach the blame to any person or persons. Nor can I say if the reason is to be found in the system followed over a long period for which the person later in power cannot be held primarily responsible. In any case there is no gainsaying the fact that the Department suffered in efficiency not only from the policy of retrenchment but also from the grave defects in the internal administration.

It is, however, gratifying to find that the Department is slowly reverting to its better traditions in respect of recruitments for responsible posts, and several junior appointments made in recent years raise the hope that the Department will ere long recover some of its old efficiency. A more liberal policy

is also being followed for utilizing the services of scholars outside the Department. If these policies are steadily pursued it would not be long before their effect could be seen in the increased usefulness of the Department.

The report of Sir Leonard Woolley at this critical juncture must be regarded as of unusual interest and his recommendations must be very carefully scrutinized before they are given effect to. Some of the principles laid down by him, though not altogether novel, may be readily accepted. It would, for example, be generally agreed that there should be a systematic planning of archaeological activities with reference to the gaps or deficiencies in our knowledge, and a special attempt should be made to explore those sites which are likely to yield data for the reconstruction of the history between 2500 B.C., and 250 B.C. But one may not so readily agree to Sir Leonard's suggestion about the selection of sites, at least before it is carefully considered by persons who can claim greater knowledge of Indian history and richer and longer experience of Indian conditions about excavation than Sir Leonard Woolley.

Sir Leonard's emphasis on the study of Stone age and the co-operation between the Archæological Department and the Museums and Universities, most of his suggestions about local Museums and his proposed change in the budgetary arrangement would unreservedly commend themselves to everybody, and we hope full effects should be given to them without any delay.

But while we whole-heartedly appreciate all these suggestions we may not see eye to eye with him in respect of several others which are calculated to affect profoundly the character of the Archæological Department.

It is difficult to endorse fully either Sir Leonard's sweeping condemnation of the Departmental staff in respect of museum work, excavation and conservation, or his suggested remedy for the same. We have noted above how a number of responsible posts came to be filled by persons who had neither

the knowledge nor the training requisite for them and we unreservedly condemn the system of official procedure which renders possible such a state of things. But one can hardly accept the statement that the Department is altogether lacking in men trained for the work which they have to do. If this criticism were well founded it would furnish the most unanswerable objection to his suggested remedy, namely, the appointment of a European advisor for five years in order to train the staff. For, is it not a fact that the Department was under an eminent European archaeologist in the person of Sir John Marshall for nearly four times the period suggested by Sir Leonard, and did not the Government import other expert European advisors like Mackay ? If the net results of their training have been such as to evoke and justify the criticism of Sir Leonard noted above, what guarantee is there that better results would follow another experiment on the same line ?

The belief is generally wide-spread that Indian officers, if they are rightly selected, and given reasonable opportunities, can prove very efficient, but neither of these two conditions are guaranteed under the present official system or procedure. Indians do not possess much faith in the system of European advisors, and examples of several big institutions like the Institute of Science, Bangalore, have rudely shattered the implicit belief in the willingness or capacity of the European advisors to train up their successors. Besides, if an European expert recently imported as a special officer in the Department, be a foretaste of what is likely to happen in future, we should do without it. We should rather suggest that highly qualified young Indians should rather be recruited as officers in the Archæological Department and facilities should be provided, not only for their special training in suitable centres at the early part of their career, but for periodical visits to these centres throughout their term of office. Besides, promotion to responsible posts should depend upon proved ability and scholarship and not mere seniority of service. If these two things can be ensured by a suitable change in the administra-

tive policy and system we may legitimately expect a steady growth in the efficiency of the Archaeological Department.

Sir Leonard's other suggestions about the recruitment of staff particularly those based on specialization within the Department according to the nature of work, also do not carry immediate conviction While there are undoubted advantages, the inherent defects in the scheme also cannot be overlooked. It is difficult to conceive of a responsible Superintendent in the Archæological Department, who should either be a good excavator but quite ignorant of epigraphy, or a good epigraphist without any knowledge of scientific excavation. But these proposals should be subjected to minute examination before any final judgment can be pronounced. The same remark applies to many other suggestions made by Sir Leonard, not the least important of which is the proposal to render greater inducement to the foreign exploration expeditions to India.

The question naturally arises who would be most competent to examine these proposals in detail. This brings into prominence one of the most vital defects in the general system of bureaucratic administration. As the matter stands the ultimate decision on Sir Leonard's report is to be taken by an official probably belonging to the great service which has come to be regarded not only as all-powerful but also as omniscient. He may consult the views of the Departmental Head who nearly stands in the position of the accused so far at least as the major part of this report is concerned. There is no channel through which responsible non-official views may be formed and considered by the Government before they take the momentous decisions which would affect the destiny of the Archæological Department and therefore also of the study of Indian history for many years to come.

Such a state of things calls for immediate remedy, and the one suggestion that occurs to me is the permanent appointment of a Central Advisory Board for Archæology. It is not a

little strange that there are similar Boards for Education and Agriculture which are not subjects of administration by the Central Government and for which they are not primarily responsible. Yet for such a technical subject like Archæology, which is directly administered by the Government of India, no necessity has ever been felt for an advisory body of this type. There is now no paucity of Indian scholars who would gladly serve on the Board and whose scholarship and experience would be of immense value in properly guiding the departmental work on broad issues and helping the Government to formulate right policy in respect of the Department. I would therefore, strongly urge upon the Government to take advantage of Sir Leonard Woolley's report for instituting a Central Advisory Board of Archæology, and ask this body to examine the various suggestions of Sir Leonard Woolley. It would be extremely unwise to launch new schemes of a far-reaching character solely on the advice of one person, however, eminent he may be, and the association of outside experts with the archæological work would be beneficial from many points of view.

Brother-delegates, I hope you would pardon me for dwelling almost exclusively on a single topic and I can only hope that the Archæological Department would not take amiss the observations I have made. My excuse lies in the very great importance which I attach to the work of the Department in furthering Indological studies. I may also assure the authorities that my remarks were prompted, neither by any personal likes or dislikes, nor by the vain spirit of criticism for its own sake. Nothing but a genuine and ardent desire for reform and improvement of the Department has urged me to discuss the defects and shortcomings which have considerably reduced its utility and given a semblance of justice to the unmerited condemnations by a foreign expert.

I should not like to detain you long. But before I conclude I would stress the great importance of training young

Indian scholars for the archæological work in general and excavation in particular. The discoveries at Harappa, Mohenjo-Daro and other sites in the neighbourhood have also brought into prominence the necessity of training of a new kind for which there is not much scope in India. Unfortunately the Government, while always eager to import foreign experts, have not hitherto paid sufficient attention to a regular system of training though it can be provided without much difficulty or expense by the Government with the co-operation of the Universities and the foreign exploration societies. If India has not to remain in perpetual tutelage to foreign experts, adequate arrangements must be made for giving proper training to suitable Indian Graduates, so that all responsible works in the various branches of the Indian Archæology might be entrusted to them. Unless this end is steadily kept in view the problems of Indian archæological researches will never be solved. Repeated representations have been made to the Government of India for providing facilities to graduates of Indian Universities for training in archæological work. But these have not borne much fruit. The defects pointed out in Woolley's report are largely due to the indifference on the part of Government to train future recruits to the Department. To ensure that right types of persons are attracted for training it is necessary as noted above to alter the rules of appointment to higher posts in the Archæological Department. As in the case of appointments to Professorships in Universities and many Government colleges, the higher and more responsible posts in the Departments may be filled by direct recruitment on the basis of proved ability and merit rather than promotion on time-scale.

Archæological work is now being carried on in various parts of India and in order to properly co-ordinate and successfully carry out the activities it is essential to have a Central Advisory Board of experts and a band of scholars with the best training for the archæological work. This is the steel frame on which all other suggestions for reform must be

superimposed. Without it all schemes of reform must ultimately prove to be of little worth.

In spite of all the handicaps under which the archæological work has to be carried on in this country, the results are sufficiently encouraging. The important finds from old sites and the discoveries of coins and inscriptions by individual efforts are enriching our knowledge. It is a gratifying sign of the times that non-official institutions and at least one University, *viz.* that of Calcutta—are making earnest efforts to explore, collect and preserve the antiquities. We may legitimately hope that as years pass by, more and more reliable data would be available for the study of Indian history, and it will be possible to construct a complete skeleton of Indian history from at least 3000 B.C. That would be a fitting end and the crowning achievement of the triumphant career of Indian archæology.

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THE TENTH ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE TIRUPATI

Presidential Address

Anthropology Section

Dr. M. H. Krishna, M.A., D.Litt. (Lond.),
Mysore.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am grateful to the authorities of the All-India Oriental Conference for the honour they have done me in electing me to the Presidentship of the Anthropology section of this Conference. Though I have followed with keen interest recent researches in these subjects and have been lecturing on various aspects of Anthropology at the Mysore University, my original study has been mostly confined to things of the past, to History, Archæology and Pre-history.

Anthropology, Sociology and Ethnology

Perhaps the title of this section is itself a matter for reconsideration because I find that in the past it has been called Anthropology and included Ethnology, Mythology, Folklore, Sociology, etc. The term Ethnology refers to the study of contemporary human groups in respect of their physical, cultural and social characteristics. It makes use of the facts collected by the ethnographer in his monographs, makes a comparative and critical study of them and attempts to draw scientific inferences. Ordinarily it does not go farther back than the immediate past. But occasionally attempts have been made as in the presidential address of this section at its last session to give historical explanations for present day

facts. Thus Ethnology is sometimes developed to include the facts of racial, social and cultural history There has been a distinct tendency in recent years to expand Ethnology into the more comprehensive and more methodical science of Anthropology and I strongly plead that the section do return to its old title of "Anthropology."

We are aware that, in recent years, another great subject Sociology has been developing and forging ahead basing itself upon a study of society—past and present, primitive and civilized. It has been gradually drawing into itself the social aspects of Ethnology and social Anthropology. Since these subjects are closely connected with each other, it is sometimes very difficult to mark out their boundaries and differentiate them.

If Ethnology studies human groups, social Anthropology, primitive society and Sociology—contemporary society, it is a particularly difficult operation to differentiate them from each other in India, for here not only has the primitive past left its distincive impress upon the civilized present, but also primitive society and civilized society live in contemporaniety and are linked together by a number of intermediate stages. Whether Indian society is primitive or civilized, it has inherited so many of the ancient traits and has to such a large extent grown out of the past that its student in India has got to be a Sociologist, a social Anthropologist, an ethnologist and a social historian. At this stage of social studies in India and in view of the limited scope of the other sections of the Conference, the scope of this section would, I believe, be best expressed by the title "Anthropology and Sociology." This would include the study of Ethnography, Ethnology, physical, social and cultural Anthropology relating both to the past and the present and the scientific study of the Indian social structure and its problems. The scope would be quite wide enough and would not duplicate that of the other sections of the Conference.

Problems of Physical Anthropology

With such a wide scope for the subjects of this section, one would feel tempted to enter into a discussion of the numerous problems that yet remain unsolved in the Anthropology of India, physical, cultural and social. But since the time at my disposal is limited, I shall confine myself to the discussion of only some of the problems of physical Anthropology.

Risley and his Critics

The study of racial questions and the reconstruction of racial history is one of the most interesting branches of our subject. Though earlier writers had published short notes, it was Sir Herbert Risley who made his pioneer studies nearly forty years ago and gave a start to physical Anthropology in India by publishing his book *The People of India*. The seven fold classification of our countrymen was almost classical until recent years. But subsequently investigation has demolished many of Risley's conclusions. Ramaprasad Chanda and Dr. Ghurye disclosed that the Mangolo-Dravidians and the Indo-Scythians were only the Indian cousins of the broad-headed Alpine Caucasians. Rivers, Thurston and Seligman discovered that the jungle tribes of India were descended really from various different races. Elliot Smith and Richards argued that the Tamils were close cousins of the Caucasian Mediteranians. Brown and others established the existence of a Negrito branch in the Andamans. Hutton and others pointed to the existence of Melanesian blood among stray primitive peoples strewn about in Assam, Central Provinces and in Malabar. The study and discussion of the Mohenjo-Daro skeletons by Keith and Guha and the restudy of the North Indian peoples by Eicksted and Guha has pointed to the existence of a distinct North-Indian branch of the brown Caucasian race. These and other researches though started by Risley's theories have turned the latter inside out and given new classifications.

EICKSTEDT

Of the recent writers on the subject, Eickstedt and Guha have done very valuable work and deserve the fullest consideration. Eickstedt's conclusions have been published in numerous articles in English and German and in the volumes on the Castes and Tribes of Mysore and of Travancore. After a detailed all-Indian study he has described the races of India and suggested a new set of names for them. His classification may thus be summarized:

I. Negrid:
   1. Negrito—Andamanese.
   2. Melanesian—Some Assam and Behar tribes.

II. Weddid (Ancient Indians):
   1. Gondid—Tallish and slender—Central Indian type.
   2. Molid—(*a*) Many South Indian hill tribes.
      (*b*) Veddas of Ceylon.

III. Mongolid:
   Several groups including Central Indian Paleo-Mongolic type.

IV. Europid:
   A. Melanid group—Black brown—curly hair, steep forehead, triangular low ridged nose, medium height, a dark branch of the white race.
      (*a*) Southern Melanids — represented by the lower Tamil castes.
      (*b*) Kolid—Central India.
   B. Indid Group:
      (*a*) Indid race—consisting of the main body of the people of India: slim, graceful body, thin bones, Medium height, long head, long face, brown skin, black wavy hair, protruding, narrow forehead, triangular nose, weak chin.

(b) North Indid—Tall body, coarse features, black hair and eyes, light brown colour.

C. Brachid :

(a) West Brachid–Bombay

(b) East Brachid–Bengal

(c) Tall Brachids–

(d) Orientalids–recent immigrants from Western Asia.

GUHA

Eicksted's valuable studies of the somatic features of the Indian people were followed by the detailed investigations of Dr. B. S. Guha who may now be said to occupy the position of the latest comprehensive writer on the subject. His facts were published with detailed anthropometrical calculations in the *Census of India*, Ethnology volume in 1935, while his conclusions were more popularly presented in his article in *The Field Sciences of India*. His racial analysis may be summarized thus :

A. Negroid :

(1) Negrito–Short stature, round head, woolly pepercorned hair, dark brown skin, prognathic.

These people live in the Andamans.

(2) The Melanesians– A medium statured, frisly haired, dark-brown micaticephalic race is found thinly sprinkled about among the jungle folk of Malabar, Bihar and Assam.

B. Proto–astroloid :

(3) Among the Veddas of Ceylon and some small aboriginal groups of southern and central India a smallish, dark skinned, prognathic, wavy haired people are found who may be called proto-astroloid. Baron Eickstedt distinguishes two groups among them namely the Weddid and the Gondid.

C. Mongoloid :

(4) Tibetan type inhabiting the hilly parts of Kashmir adjoining Tibet.

(5) The long headed Mongolian on the eastern borders of Assam.

(6) Round headed Mongolian on the southern borders of Assam.

D. Indo–European (?) :

The above named six types do not belong to the so-called Indo-European race. Six Indo-European types are distinguised, three of which are also minor in importance namely numbers 7, 8 and 9. 10, 11 and 12 are very important.

(7) *Chalcolithic*—A powerfully built, large brained race with prominent eye brows projecting back of the head, robust body, light complexion and coarse general features found sprinkled in the Punjab-both five thousand years ago and now.

(8) *Protonordic*—The group nearest to the Nordic race in India. Large brained, medium long headed, grey or blue-grey eyes, chestnut or red hair, rosy white complexion, high pitched nose, well built long face and a powerful lower jaw. This type is now found among the Red-Kaffirs and other hill people of east-Afganistan, microscopic mixed up traces of it in the Konkan coast and elsewhere.

(9) *Oriental*—With fair skin, black eyes and hair and nose markedly long and acquiline. A minor type found among the Pathans, some Punjabis and some sub-Himalayan regions.

(10) *The basic Indian type*—medium stature, a long high cranium, a narrow vertical fore-head, weak eye-brow ridges, pointed weak chin, moderately prominent nose, with spread-out nostrils, full lips, largish mouth, bright black eyes, slightly

wavy hair, moderately present on the face and body and varying shades of brown skin from a rich to a dark tawny brown. This type forms the largest part of the South-Indian population and a considerable part of the North-Indian population. This is the basic type of India. Guha does not recognize a distinctly Tamil type, the Melanid of Eickstedt.

(11) *The north-west Indian called by Guha the Indus type and by Eickstedt the north-Indid type.* This has a delicately made medium sized body with sharp, well cut, refined features, fine narrow high pitched nose, low long head, a well arched forehead and a brown skin with smooth wavy hair. It is closely akin to the Meditaranean race of Europe. It forms a very large proportion of the population of north-west India and of some upper classes in the other parts of India. Guha thinks that the taller and coarser elements in the north-western population are minor and are due to later immigrations.

(12) *The Broadheaded type called Alpo-Dynaric by Guha.* It has a rather round, broad face, a long prominent nose, sometimes arched, a flattened vertical occiput, a broad high head with a some-what receding forehead, shortish or medium stature, round horizontal dark eyes, profuse straight hair on the face and body, pale olive, light brown or tawny brown skin. The Branches of this race spread over the west of India, the Canarese country and Bengal.

I have stated this analysis at length though partly in my own words since it is likely to be the foundation on which work of the next generation will be based. It deserves the closest scrutiny and examination. It serves as a basis for future investigation.

Terminology

Some amount of confusion is no doubt caused by the fact that each investigator has coined his own nomenclature and used it. Risley's names are popular, but they have to be given up since they connote linguistic and cultural groups and cannot be purely somatic terms. Guha's terms are somewhat more correct and more explanatory. But some of them lack uniformity and scientific form. It is time that the scientific bodies do come to an understanding about the terms to be used. I suggest below a modified scheme based on the suggestions of Eickstedt and Guha.

As for real differences among modern writers, they appear to agree about most of the main divisions though there might bo differences about some details.

New Facts

Among the facts that stand out and appear to be likely to become unshakeable three may be specially mentioned :

First—that nearly all the known branches of races of the world have their representatives in India though sometimes in very small numbers.

Secondly—The north-European or Nordic race, which Risley thought occupied the Punjab, Kashmir and Rajputana is represented in India by a small sprinkling of tribes in the North-west hills ; and the main body of the people of North-west India are as distinct from the Nordics as the South Indians are.

Thirdly—that the bulk of the population of India is made up of three allied branches of the Caucasian race each distinguishable from the other, each largely occupying distinctive tracts though mixed up considerably in the course of history. Their common characteristics are medium hight, slightly wavy black hair, black bright eyes, brown skin, well developed nose, rather light weight, graceful body.

As a basis of our future studies both in Somatology and Pre-history, we are now in a position to co-ordinate the work done till now and understand racial classification in India thus :

I. Old Indo-Europic Race—This consists of the great bulk of the people of India. Its branches have been settled in India from pre-historic times. Three branches are distinguishable :

(1) *Indic*—Eickstedt's Indid, Guha's Basic Dolicocephalic and Risley's Dravidian. It is the largest single sub-race in India. It is a distinct branch of the so called Caucasian race inhabiting large parts of North India and South India. Eickstedt's Melanid type of the Tamil lower castes appears to have arisen owing to an ancient admixture with the Malic hill type.

(2) *North-India*—Eickstedt's North-Indid, Guha's Indus, Risley's Indo-Aryan. It is a fairer branch of the brown race with more refined features than No. 1 and slightly taller. It is found in North-west India, but is spread over the rest of India, particularly in the higher castes.

(3) *Brachic*—Eickstedt's Brachid, Guha's Alpo-Dinaric and Risley's Indo-Scythian and Mongolo-Dravidian. These are round-headed brown people occupying Western India and Eastern India.

II. New Indo-Europic—Small groups coming in more recent times.

(4) *Indo-Nordics*—long headed and fair haired.

(5) *Orientalic*—Round headed, long nosed, black haired.

III. Proto-Astralic-very small numbers.

(6) *Gondic*—Central India.

(7) *Malic*—of the South Indian hills.

(8) *Veddic*—of Ceylon.

IV. Negric-very small proportion.

(9) *Negrito*—Andamans, etc.

(10) Melanesian—Assam, Nagas, etc.

V. Mongolian-small numbers mostly on the borders

(11) *Palco-mongolic*—in the Central Indian tribes.

(12) *Tibetan Type.*

(13) *Assamic Type.*

(14) *Burmic Type.*

(15) *Oceanic Type.*

Aryan Problem

The racial history of India has to be built up on the basis of this classification. But numerous questions have to be answered before that can be done. If the old Indus people are the forefathers of the modern North-Indic people, what about the Aryans? The Aryan invasion of India requires re-study. We are now forced to accept one of three conclusions:

The Aryans who invaded India after 2000 B. C. were somatically exactly similar to the bulk of the population which existed in the Punjab before that date and at the time of the Indus Civilization the difference between the Aryan and the non-Aryan being purely in some aspects of culture. Both belonged to the same race and religion. The words "*anāsāḥ*" nose-less and "*kṛṣṇaḥ*" -black- do not apply to the great majority of the people whom the early Vedic Aryans fought and conquered though the word "Siśnadevāḥ" phallaus-worshippers may apply.

The Aryan invasion took place before the Indus Civilization took place in which case the early Vedic period would have to be posted to a date C. 3500 B. C. This would upset our present notions of the relations between the Vedic and the Indus Civilizations.

The Aryans who imposed their dominion over the brown race people were small in numbers and became indistinguish-

ably absorbed in the North-Indian population though some aspects of their culture like language and religion became so widely absorbed by the conquered population that they have endured to the present day.

Perhaps the first of these three conclusions is the least objectionable.

Dravidian Problem

Another problem of race is about the Dravidians. The discovery we have now made is that the Basic Indian or Indic which forms the largest part and the basis of all Indian population is a distinct branch of the brown section of the "Caucasian" race to which the North-Indic branch also belongs. The South Indians are not the people whom the Aryans conquered. But it is the North Indian one. The Tamils or so-called the Dravidians were not conquered by the Aryans. The Dravidians belong to a Europid or Caucasian sub-race clearly distinguished from the Astraloid and Negroid races. Their geographical position suggests that they have been in India from earlier than the rise of he Chalcolithic culture of the North-west to which Marshall has assigned the date the 5th millenium B.C. So their immigration to India took place C. 4500 B.C or earlier. If there was an invasion on a large scale it was by the North Indian race people somewhere about 5000 B.C. with a copper age culture.

Problem of the Broad-heads

The coming of the brachic or broad-headed people is a problem unexplained in history. Their occupation of the middle belt suggests that they came before the North Indian or South Indian folk and after the Indic. It has of course been presumed that they entered from the west possibly through Baluchistan and Gujerat.

Other Problems

Before these Indo-Europic races came to India the peninsula was inhabited by the proto-Australic branches of whom appear to have migrated from India to Ceylon.

To this dim past may be ascribed the coming of the Negritos and perhaps of the Menlanesian folk who must have lived in the caves and jungles of India along with the proto-Australoids for tens of thousands of years before Europids or Caucasians of the Basic Indian type entered the country.

The existence of fair-skinned persons of broad-headed castes among the Tamils, of long-headed families among the Bengalis and the Mahrattas, of the Chalcolithic type among the Punjabis and of similar admixtures in all parts of India goes to show that racial migrations of a minor character have been continuously taking place in the historical period from one part of India to another and from outside into India.

Problems of Origins

Yet another problem for which a solution has to be sought in India is the origin of the Man and particularly of the Indian racial types of Sivalik. It has been held by some authorities that the prehistoric extinct races whose remains are found on the Sivalik hills particularly Sivapithacut bear many traces closely resembling man. Sir Arthur Keith's theory that some of the fundamental racial characteristics of the human races were developed even as early as the ape stage and have been inherited from distinctive races of apes, tempts us to institute a comparative study between the Sivapithacus and the Indo-astraloid and the South Indian races, in order to find out if either of these two has its origin and development in or around India. Further the tradition of the existence of monkey races in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and of pigmy races in Megasthenes and Indian popular tradition lead us to seek for the remains of extinct sub-human and pigmy races in India. Pre-historic Archaeology has to develop a great deal more before we can find out the truth about these problems. But it is well worth our while to start the investigations.

Fundamentals of Physical Anthropology

Science progresses with doubt and curiosity. There would perhaps be people who have doubts about some of the

methods of Physical Anthropology and expect the scientist to subject some of the fundamentals of his science to re-examination. India has been called an "Ethnological Museum" and here scope is offered for a re-study of the basic principles of racial classification. I suggest two of the many points which may thus be tested: First, the question of the shape of the cranium, particularly the cephalic Index. The caste system with the rather strict enforcement of endogamy promises that castes which have migrated from one part of India to another retain their original racial traits. Is this borne out by a study of the emigrant and immigrant castes? Very often as in the case of the Kayasthas of Bengal and those of the Punjab of the Sarasvats of West India, of the Kanarese and the Mahratta families naturalized in the Tamil land and of the Tamil and North-Indian families settled down in western India and Bengal, the head form is more like those of the surrounding population than like that of the caste in its original home. Here is something which appears to support the conclusions of Dr. Boas when he said that there was a distinct American somatic type towards which European immigrants gradually changed. Here is a case for re-study. Either the endogamic nature of caste will have to be shaken or it will have to be conceded that the head form does change under the influence of environment.

Environment and Food

It will of course be conceded without serious opposition that somatic features do change according to food and environment. But the question is what is the time taken for the change? While Sir Arthur Keith points to certain features which have endured from the early pleistocene times, e.g. Negroid features in the African apes and African man from the days of the Australopithecus and the Rhodesian man. Dr. Boas mentions changes which take place in a few generations. Food experts account for the large size of the Punjabi and the small bones of the rice eating Bengali and Madrasi. Perhaps some features take a long time and some a shorter

time to change. Which are these and how long do they take to change? Thickness of the lips, width of the nostrils and skin colour, weight and stature are explained away by many writers as changeable in comparatively short periods of time. The general question needing verification is what is the period of time that food and climate take to change the several somatic features. Particularly in India do long heads change into round and round heads into long? If so, what is the length of time taken for the change? Assuming that the large bulk of our population belonging to the Brown Race have been living in their own parts for over several thousand years and some of them perhaps for ten or twelve thousand years, how far could the slight somatic differences observable in them be attributed to evolution from a common early Brown race type. Further, the influence of the internal secretion glands on somatic features may also be a matter for study by specialists.

Further Investigation Needed

I have stated above a few of the problems that suggest themselves to me which appeal to me as worthy of investigation. Of course there is much work to be done in making more detailed studies of the ethnic groups of India taking larger numbers of subjects and carrying on studies from district to district. What has been done till now is the study of comparatively small number of subjects in each area. Detailed study of the kind I suggest would.....a large network of scientists organized and controlled by a central directing Board. If Dr. Guha had not been given the opportunity in connection with the last Census many interesting discoveries would not have been made. I think the coming Census is a golden opportunity for starting such an investigation which would of course take many years to complete. Once it is started, the universities and scientific bodies will take active interest in the solution of these and other problems in the racial history of India.

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THE TENTH ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE TIRUPATI

PRESIDENTAL ADDRESS

HISTORY SECTION

C. S. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A.,
Annamalainagar.

I am very grateful to the Committee of the All India Oriental Conference for honouring me with the Presidentship of the History Section at this, the Tenth Session of the Conference; and I am very grateful for this honour as one done to an humble worker in the field of historical studies, and also as marking a growing recognition on the part of scholars, of the value of pure historical work, as differentiated from archæological and other kindred branches of learning. The constitution, in the division of the branches of the Conference, of a separate section for History, distinct altogether from Geography and Archæology, is a feature which should hearten those devotees of pure historical studies who make use of the fruits of the efforts of the labourers in these other fields. In the Baroda Session of the Conference, History was linked on to Archæology. In the next gathering at Mysore, it came to develop an individuality of its own; and it has been since confirmed in its separate and individual status. This is not, however, to mean that historical studies should ignore or make insufficient use of the material that may be gathered by labourers in the allied fields of Archæology, Anthropology, Chronology and Geography.

One of my predecessors in this office has drawn attention to the fact that History has had to work under hard conditions and with tough and intractable material which has neither the

living interest inherent in current events nor the idealism which is the essence of reforms planned for the future, and that it must perforce allow the records of the past, in whatever manner these may be available, to serve as the bases of its construction in the strictest and most realistic sense. The term *Itihāsa* has been interpreted by the learned Mahāmahopādhyāya Rai Bāhadur Gauri Sankar Ojha as being indentical in its scope and meaning with all that happened in the past, though it has been generally understood to bear a special reference to political events. The student of history has therefore got the right and the duty to delve into and, in a varying degree, to make use of the material culled from literature of all variety and from every kind of evidence that can throw any light upon political events; and for this purpose, these other branches of study become ancillary to it.

Archæological and other material, as understood in the broadest sense of the term, can at best furnish what may be called the dry bones of History, or to use the words of a veteran Historian, only "such a sequence of occurrence and priority and posteriority in point of time and the general condition of the civilization of people whose handiwork is subjected to examination." But for anything like a full appreciation of historical evolution and cultural development, we require very much more than the mere assembling of these materials in a proper sequential and correct skeletal formation. Even literary matter which has been exploited for historical purposes to a far greater measure than the material gathered from other fields, has got to be used with considerable caution and care. The use of literature as a source for the construction of History is liable to some dangers which should be carefully guarded against. Literature is held to belong to a region of conscious effort; and full allowance must be given, in the interpretation of its substance, for individual vagaries and personal equations of all kinds.

The difficulties of the true process of History have been attempted to be set forth by a long succession of great masters

of the art. All of them are, however, agreed upon one point, namely, that any formal enunciation of general principles of interpretation constitutes a far more difficult task with regard to the more prominent sources of evidential value for History. Neither Archæology nor Literature, nor the conclusions arising from a study of language and linguistic development can be allowed any undue force; nor can anyone of these factors be taken as the sole deciding test in any given situation, even in the absence of the existence of other categories of evidence. The exploitation of historical sources should always be conducted "with a careful apparatus of criticism applied with judgment." The building up of history depends, therefore, upon the proper evalution of the various sources that may bear upon a particular question or aspect of history; and how difficult would be the correct interpretation and what possible sources of corruption may enter into it, would be clear from what has been stated before. Even so, it need not be regarded as impossible of achievement—it cannot, in any case, be to perfection—but to such a degree of completeness as is humanly attainable in a field of work like this." (*Proceedings of the Fifth Oriental Conference*, Lahore, 1938, Vol. I., p. 313).

II

This naturally leads on to an examination of History as being the result of a process of knowledge which can be included in the category of an art or a science. There is a large amount of disagreement expressed even at the present day on the view whether History is or may become a science. The learned Bishop Stubbs has elaborately discussed the question and arrived at the following conclusion: "Whether we look at the dignity of the subject-matter or at the nature of the mental exercise which it requires or at the inexhaustible field over which the pursuit ranges, History, the knowledge of the adventures, the development, the changeful career, the varied growths, the ambitions, aspirations, and if you like, the approximating destinies of mankind, claims a place second to none in the rôle of sciences." The strict collation and examination of facts

and the drawing of ordered conclusions from them should, according to late Prof. J. B. Bury, make us always remember that "although History may supply the material for literary art or philosophical speculation, she is herself simply a science, no less and no more." But, on the other side, we have, among many thinkers, W. S. Jevons who has declared that a science of History in the truest sense of the term is an absurd notion, because the smallest causes might produce unexpected results and because in such instances the real application of the scientific method is out of the question. Concurring with him, Henry Sidgwick would not accord any support to the claim of History to be a science as "it is specially and largely concerned with presenting particular events in chronological order."

One feature that may be remarked about the work of historians, particularly those engaged in the several fields of historical research in our country is that very often assertion evokes rejoinder and each writer becomes particularly sensitive to the lapses or omissions of his immediate predecessors and even occasionally works himself up into a white heat of indignation there at. This feature has particularly thrust itself upon the notice of the student of the growth of Indian historical material and research. The wise Bacon had long ago shown the way to one type of historians when he said that the past should be investigated by students with an absolute blank in their minds as to what they might wish to know or what they might expect to find. This method which in effect will only mean the mere cataloguing of facts, can be natually criticized as constituting not a scientific, nor even a reasoning process but a mere building up of the sequence of different happenings, a dry and in many respects, meaningless and unfruitful, collection of annalistic data unmarked by the "apprehension of phenomenal difference as the basis of pre-requisite of thought." Lord Acton gives his idea on this subject, in the following words in his *Lectures on the Study of History*: "In the Renaissance the art of exposing false-

hood dawned upon keen Italian minds and it was then that History as we understand it, began to be understood and the illustrious dynasties of scholars rose, to whom we still look both for method and material. Mediæval chroniclers of literary merit like Mathew Paris, Joinville and Froissart whose testimony to the events of their own time was fairly trustworthy, did not satisfy the essential condition of true historical study." One may well ask one's self: When did this ideal come to be realized in the evolution of historical work? Gooch says that for liberty of thought and expression, for clear and ordered insight into the different ages and for the judicial temper on which the historical science, if it exists, should depend, we have got to come down to the 19th century, when alone there emerged a historical method with high ideals of objectivity and truthfulness. Thus one can support the dictum that "History and its interpretation and method are made to re-live with every awakening of the critical spirit. And these discoveries of true historical beginnings have been made by scholars who identify history with critical inquiry. On the other hand, those who identify it primarily with composition press the beginning over further, not only to epic poems and ballads, but to the simplest recital of some unwonted occurrence or adventure." (Teggart, *Prolegomena to History*, 1913, p. 173).

The student of Indian History has naturally to inquire into the question whether the statements which should form the staple of his treatment should be always subjected to such severe criticism of this kind noted above and whether such intensive investigation of origins and deduction of conclusions should always serve as a necessary factor of the work, of histriography. Very often, particularly when working on fields in which the available material is either scanty or not capable of being tested by the application of other evidence, he finds himself reduced to a position in which he cannot make use of any critical apparatus at all. The illustrious German historian of the last century, Leopold Von Ranke,

cautiously avoided any probing of the fundamental problem of the historical scholar's task and wrote his works as narratives upon what seemed to him to be the best elements sifted from the testimony available. The derivative question, coming immediately after the acceptance of this idea, is whether the historian should lay any stress upon the literary form to be adopted for the expression of his work and whether the literary form that may be adopted by him should give expression to any pronounced individual characteristics that would naturally assert themselves as the projection of any peculiarities of his particular personality and the temper of his work. Statements as to past events are in reality re-statements made after the examination of the evidence accumulated till then by the writer or scholar concerned; and in most cases the re-statement "is a selection dominated by ideas current now, from the restricted contents of the original statements." Shall we not add that the process of re-statement which should be naturally proceeded by a process of selection or elimination of unnecessary or irrelevant or unreliable data is one involving a subjective presentation? and this subjective and largely personal element has also natually coloured the growth of historiography among the generations of Indian historians particularly those working on the more recent centuries. On the other side, it may be maintained that their main task should be to avoid any subjective interpretation to the farthest limit possible. Thus it may be argued that the historian who endeavours to probe into the past would naturally project himself into a presentation marked by psychological features which necessarily accompany his endeavour to make the actions of his heroes and the picturing of processes of the period of his work intelligible to his contemporaries and readers; and so he makes the past vary with the present and so constructs history to be a record of events that actually happened only to some extent, and to be a presentation of inferences of his own suited to the age and temper of the reader, to the remaining extent. Do not our historians in

their presentation of the character and achievement of an Aśoka, a Samudragupta, a Pulikesi or a Rājarāja, though they have to be restrained and canalized in defined directions by their knowledge of ideas and institutions known to be dominant in those respective ages, still work out for themselves some definite notions and bases concerning the characters of the heroes and the movements of the periods of study they are engaged in? Pictures of the past occasionally get to be refined by the charm of guessing ancient motives from the records of ancient deeds; but more largely they come out distorted from true perspective by the projection, unconciously it may be, of later and contemporary ideas. The historian of ancient times has indeed a cardinal duty to project himself into the past; but in doing so, he generally runs the risk of subordinating facts that might have had a fundamentally different spiritual and contemporary ideology. This applies, in a particular measure, to the description of ancient epochs, the genius and perspective of which the historian has set himself to investigate. He has to judge the springs of action in individual actors, to measure the calibre of their moral and intellectual powers and to pronounce a verdict of praise or blame or any intermediate opinion on the motives which have determined their manifestation.

III

It is said that the vision of Roman History as the true expression of Roman character came to Livy in natural course and that a momentary and incidental inspiration gave to Gibbon that most interesting and fruitful day of inspiration in his literary life when he first thought of writing of the *Decline and Fall of the Eternal City*. Only the tallest of our historians, for instance, a Kalhaṇa or an Elphinstone, gets such a chance or guidance. One other feature should be characteristic of our historians, particularly of those who narrate the events of the distant past. Mommsen has said that history should be neither written nor made without love or hate. It is this intensity of personal feeling which

should be inseparable from patriotism and politics that have given history its specific quality of intellectual and emotional excellence on the one hand and at the same time has served as the greatest obstacle to the development of the true histriographic art. The golden mean between these two extremes here presented as antithetic to each other, is very difficult to find; but it is more or less close approximation to this ideal mean that should be the aim of everyone of our historical writers, particularly those engaged in presenting pictures of formative periods and constructive heroes. It is bound to prove most difficult to portray historical personalities and their impelling forces in all the complete and full accuracy of their lives and ideals without getting into one or another of these dangers. Such has been the experience of the historians of our national heroes like Akbar and Shivaji and of movements like the Maratha national growth. In the guise of dealing with the spirit of the times some writers have been unconsciously led to reproduce their own mental texture and environment into their conclusions about the past. Thus it is dangerous to talk of the verdict of History in such cases, because such judgment varies from generation to generation and from country to country. In the words of Prof. G. M. Trevelyan, "action and reaction is as much the method of historical as of political progress." Historical conclusions accepted through a length of time have tended to stereotype popular and later judgments (e.g., Macaulay's classic essay on Warren Hastings and the synchronism of Sandrocottus and Seleucus) and any attempt to go against these well-established assumptions has the disadvantage and risks of being condemned either as revolutionary and not sufficiently orthodox or as being not based on accepted data. Thus new conclusions put forward in contravention of the old, though they are very often based on inadequate study or upon data which may not be convincing enough, are easily rejected on grounds that, when examined internally and *per se*, do not present any great reliability. On the other hand, there is the danger of some

faddists who have become indissolubly wedded to their pet theories and interpretations hastening to condemn the historical conclusions against which they go, as being against information and methods marked by "refreshing reason and convincing argument so called." Thus attempts have been made from time to time to shake and move out of their rooted foundations, accepted synchronisms and schemes of chronology for periods and dynasties and epochs, particularly of the millennium down to the Gupta era. Such attempts have naturally been made from time to time; and in the burdensome task of the proper evaluation of these attempts, the right-minded critic should wield his powerful *daṇḍadhara* in such a truly conscientious and efficient manner as should encourage the growth of accurate historical perspective and scholarship and that should at the same time not damp healthy attempts at re-interpretation and re-valuation.

Some of the above mentioned dangers are incipient in those aspects of Indian historical studies that are associated with questions of race and culture mixtures and that imply a scrutiny of the bearings and reactions of castes and groups, of the institutions of militarism and pacifism and of kindred questions of social evolution and repercussions. They also appear again and again, in the treatment of the growth and fortunes of particular movements like primitive Buddhism whose cult suffered modification in every different milieu through which it passed. Questions of the relative superiority and value of cultures like those of Sumer, Egypt and the Indus Valley and of the resultant fruits of the impacts of ethnic groups and types associated with these great breeding grounds of primitive civilization have got to be treated in a particularly careful manner. The social order of the Hindu village community which has proved to be so vital, has been held to bear in its formative stages a religious or sacerdotal imprint which has made it essentially immobile and to have contributed to petrify the castes on a permanent and herditary basis. The examination of these features and of the changes in the social

order that have ensued is also a very important field of work for the historian and may be said to constitute a valuable and instructive supplementary region of activity for him.

IV

I may be permitted to digress here on one important side-track, as to what the historian should do positively on his own part in the interpretation of such vital forces. His duty, according to one school, is to follow closely the movements of races and of peoples, to vitalize old materials and to interpret them in the light of the present needs and ideals and to recreate, and ever renew, the memory of the past. Lord Morley has said of the Teutonic historians of the 19th century that "in Germany at least, it was the dynasty of historians and not the abstract men who supplied the final clenchers for public opinion and national resolution." (*Notes on Politics and History*, p. 183). If History should aim at providing a body of ideas which would serve to unify the attitude of the individuals of a nation towards their common country, it should, according to this view, first create a common pride in past events. The great Baron Stein thus wrote in 1829 of the discovery of this potent principle: "In the year 1818 I gave an impulse to this undertaking, because I thought it for the honour of the nation to collect and set out properly the monuments of its history, because I considered History an efficacious means of exciting patriotism and sustaining it against the influence of self-interest." (J. R. Seeley, *Life and Times of Stein*, p. 499). On the reverse side of this shield is the natural desire of even the patriotically-inclined historian to be fair and impartial in his interpretative work and tell the exact truth without being impulsed by any sort of pre-possessions. Thus the illustrious Count Palacky who was animated by an equally great national patriotism as Stein was, prefaced his *History of Bohemia* written in 1836, more than a century ago with these words:

"That I write from the standpoint of a Bohemian is a fact for which I could only be blamed, if it rendered me unjust

either to the Bohemians or to their opponents. I hope, however, that my sincere craving for truth, my respect for all laws, divine and human, my zeal for order and legality, my sympathy with the weal and woe of all mankind, will preserve me from the sin of partiality."

The art of historiography may be held to stand in a very delicate and complex relation to the principles of nationality and patriotism; and it may well be maintained on the one side that the historian is "memory's mouth-piece for his countrymen; and history is the inspiration of the patriot." But, likewise, on the other side of the shield, it may be put forward that history should bear a definite relation to the highest aspirations of the human spirit and should steadfastly aim at presenting a wide philosophic vision comprehending clearly an ultimate synthesis of forces far wider than those of one's own country or time.

Modern European nationalities have been moulded to a large extent by the efforts of historians who have taken Herodotus as their exemplar in this respect. This view holds that through the recounting and representation of the exploits of earlier generations by historians, the descendants of a people acquire a feeling of pride which can be made use of as a most important factor in the achievement of success in the struggles of the nation for its free and individualist manifestation. The danger lies in this fact that it is but a short distance from this attitude for the historian to go, before he could become grievously and fatally coloured by political partnership and by passions of ideology. Should ideology operate and if so, in what measure, in the mental field of the historian is a question that should seriously though perhaps unconsciously, be always agitating the mind of every sober-minded student. The good historian has a duty to strive to arrive at the true meaning and explanation of the underlying principles or ideas of the period with which he is concerned. In this connection one can recall to his mind D. G. Ritchie's dictum that the Philosophy of History is an attempt "to reap the

plan of providence to unravel the plot of the great drama that is played throughout the centuries ; " Bishop Stubbs has likewise stressed the great value that should always be attached to the drawing of a moral by the teacher and student of History and concluded that the marrow of civilized History is ethical and not metaphysical and the deep underlying cause of action as manifested in the march of the Historical Muse through time passes through the maze of the shades of right and wrong. On the other side, there are men who would hold that the main line of research should be to free History from all partiality of ideas and to make it entirely self-reliant and dependent only on its own material for its conclusions. Lord Acton has taught us that though it may appear that the historian might have no interest beyond his narrative, still he should never debase the moral currency or lower the standard of rectitude ; and he has cautioned the historian " to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which History has the power to inflict on wrong. Lord Haldane has expressed himself in confirmation of this view thus :—" The Historian will fail hopelessly if he seeks to be a mere recorder. For the truth about the whole the expression of which is what matters, was not realized in its completeness until time and the working of the spirit of the period had enabled the process developed in a succession of particular events to be completed .....His business is to select in the light of a larger conception of the truth. He must look at his period as a whole and in the completeness of its development. And this is a task rather of the spirit than of the letter." (Viscount Haldane, *The Meaning of Truth in History*, London, 1914, pp. 28–29).

V

The foregoing antitheses of views and ideas have begun to have their own repercussions in India, where the problems to be unravelled by the historian have been complicated by biases arising from conflicting religions, race contacts and conflicts and also imperialistic conceit. To give but one example of this type of insidiously working forces, it may be

pointed out that several Indian writers, particularly those of the period of British rule, have expressed themselves with a mentality marked by a disproportionately stressed admiration for English political and administrative ideals, while on the other side, the European historian of the same epoch is in the danger of falling into a tilted national or racial bias that must necessarily harm the cause of balanced conclusions. This danger of impaired judgment and of a deficiency of true, balanced, vision operated even in the minds of the Hindu historians of the age of Muslim domination as well as in those of their Muslim counterparts themselves. It is these that have rendered many otherwise able pieces of work sink in the scale of final values and become bad patches in the developing web of the historical scholarship of our country.

Let us go further into the question of the partiality, either racial or cultural, which has coloured the work of historians. In his introductory remarks to the *Cambridge Modern History*, Bishop Creighton wrote that "the point of view and the nature of the conclusion at which the historian should arrive are important and they would determine the whole nature of the treatment; or else he warns us that the whole work sinks to the level of a mass of details uninformed by any luminous idea, and the writer who strives to avoid any tendency becomes dull and the cult of impartiality paralyzes the judgment." He is supported in this view by another eminent historian, W. Cunningham, who remarks that "the claim to impartiality on the part of the historian seems to me to be unmeaning; and in so far as it has a meaning, is likely to be a mere affectation." Likewise, Professor G. M. Trevelyan has opined that "History must be thought about from some standpoint, and the cant of pure impartiality in History is only equalled by the cant of pure historical facts having value except as food for thought and speculation." The *partial* historian has been charged with taking sides and with allowing himself to be influenced by personal and patriotic considerations and with being a mouth-piece for his country-

men. A demand was made for *impartiality* by the classic historian, Polybius, who wrote at a distance of more than 2,000 years from us. He says as follows in speaking of Philinus and Fabius:—"Judging from their lives and principles, I do not suppose, that these writers have intentionally stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were characterized by wisdom, honour and courage, those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now, in other relations of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country; he ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and their likings. But directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to forget all considerations of that kind." This double current of the partial and the so-called impartial interpretation have been ever flowing in the stream of history. It may be likened to the mingled, yet separately seen currents of the Jumna and the Ganges flowing side by side from holy Prayāga for some distance. It has sometimes stained and sometimes cleared the waters of the stream and its effect in the sum total is hard to find out.

Perhaps this impartiality is more easily attained by men writing of the histories of foreign countries and of distant periods of time far removed from their own days. How far the historian will succeed in keeping himself entirely aloof from his times and in creating the distance necessary for the strict working out of his pure art by the interposition of a right and true judgment depends upon the capacity, the moral fibre and the standards that he aims at and endeavours to keep in view. This distancing, both mental and moral, which is so neeessary between the historian and the subject of his work, may and should be done with the conscious skill of the artist; but it is, in actual practice more often the effect of the operation of the distance of time that intervenes and the gulf of physical sepa-

ration in area and life. Cannot one justifiably ask that this distance of attitude rising from a rigid impartiality of mind and judgment should be kept up on a most rigorous scale and should never be allowed to be warped by considerations of pride and the natural desire for claiming a great credit for the past that should be reflected on us? How often have pictures of the past with preconceived ideas serving as their bases, been given expression to by writers, largely Indian, but nevertheless comprehending foreigners also, when they have proceeded to describe the genesis of Dravidian and Aryan civilizations, the effect of the Aryan invasion on the inhabitants of South India and the consequent inter-twinings of cults and beliefs, the bearings of the impact of one civilization on another and even of the less uncertain, but more elusive, interaction of the forces of the north upon the south and *vice versa*? These dangers, among others, have got to be guarded against by those scholars and interpreters of the vast expansion of Indian culture into the central, western and south-eastern regions of Asia, our knowledge of which has been expanding by leaps and bounds in the last two decades. The culture-contacts of India with the outside world seem to be fields which are particularly susceptible to the manifestation of the symptoms of such an outlook and presentation; and in this connection one may with advantage remember the warning given by Dr. Finot, the distinguished Director of the Indo-French School of Oriental Research at Nanoi that "it is impossible to trace clearly the evolution of Indian civilization in Indo-China in all its definite stages without great precaution being taken and to show how the ideas and social institutions of India came to be transformed at the touch of foreign races of quite a different turn of mind." Studies of a historical, or even of a quasi-historical character in this field are to be pursued both from an external and an internal point of view and particularly the latter view-point should be kept up on the almost axiomatic assumption that a faithful presentation of the growth of Indian culture abroad should be free from the

natural partiality and twist that may be developed by the historian and the student looking at new facts from their own accustomed points of view. Sir Denison Ross has given a subdued sort of expression that is however perfect in form, to this lurking danger. He writes: "The detachment that is really called for in an effort at the understanding of an extraneous culture is not perhaps always possible in the fullest measure. Nobody, therefore, need be held to blame; but it is none the less necessary to remove the defect and perfect the knowledge that we possess of ancient Indian culture in its evolution down to modern times. That such defects are possible with a large amount of sympathy for the subject of study, is in evidence in the latest publication bearing on the subject by three continental scholars in the work *Ancient India and Indian Civilization*, published by Messrs Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co., London, 1934)."

VI

The principle of continuity on which some historians lay so much stress becomes very important in the bridging over of the breaks and lacunae that often occur in the early history of different regions and dynasties of our land and that may be regarded as marking the margin between the historical and pre-historic times and peoples in India. Primitive cultures and pre-historic epochs have been roughly defined to be the times in which man was dominated mechanically by his physical environment; while the historical period has been held to begin from that point in which social life had already become the result of the inter-relation of human wills. Can we, in this sense, maintain that the periods named Paleolithic and Neolithic were quasi-historic? Shall we be justified in comprehending the times in which the Indus Valley culture is deemed to have flourished as having been part of the pre-historic epoch? We can include them with some measure of appropriateness under the category of evolution during historic times, because the growing volume of our archæological discoveries and the ever-developing interpretations of

finds and the comparative study of primitive institutions that has become possible, thereby, can support us in holding that documents either written or as good as written, exist abundantly in the archæological relics, pot-sherds, stone implements and such modern survivals of them as have been interpreted and give facilities for the study, comparative as well as evolutionary, of ancient customs and institutions.

If thus the field of history has been projected into these far-off days which were till recently called primitive or prehistorical, rendered largely possible by the endeavours of scholars who have followed the method of comparative studies (of whom the pioneers might have said to have been Sir Henry Maine, Sir John Lubbock and Sir Edward Tylor) and who securely laid the foundations of the comparative study of man and Anthropology, we have, in the present century explorers of eminence ranging from Marshall and Aurel Stein to Quaritch-Wales and R. D. Banerjee who have discovered vast vistas of periods and regions which may well be regarded either as projections of the present into the past or *vice versa*. Thus the idea of continuity of history which was stressed so much by Freeman has been brought back to us, "after so long a circuit to the view of Diodorus and the Stoics that all men living or who once lived, belong to the common human family though divided from one another by time and space." And, as a result, History to-day includes "not alone every manifestation of political activity among men but the entire range of human experience." Thus the true interpreter of history should have not merely a nation-wide, but also a continental background; for example that of British History should comprehend much of European and that of Indian History should include in its wider scope much the largest portion of Eurasiatic History; and the historian should try to extend his understanding from the conventional and narrow national and even subnational background and project it into the truly international one.

The so-called movements of peoples and cultures going on from the dawn of history may be said to have made a rough

marking line for themselves occurring about 500 B.C., which date, according to a recent interpretative historian, O.E. Burton (see his *A Study on Creative History* —The interaction of Eastern and Western Peoples to 500 B. C. 1932), saw the emergence about the time of full-fledged religious creeds like the Prophetic School in Israel, or Mazdaism in Persia, of Brahmanism and subsequently Buddhism in India and of Confucianism in China. These major philosophies and creeds formed the starting point of subsequent important currents of interaction that have formulated ideas which have exercised a definite influence on men and affairs in subsequent ages. Burton thus concludes, stressing on the uniting value of History and its great service as a guide to our present conduct and as a help to the solution of our problem in these words: "For Asia, with all the various tribes of Barbarians that inhabit it, is regarded by the Persians as their own, but Europe and the Greek race they look on as distinct and separate. (*Herodotus, Book I*, c. 4). Human history, from about 1000 B. C. centres upon the problems arising from economic impact and in the dangers and difficulties inseparable from the ebb and flow of vast populations. There is a living historical process connecting 'Croesus, son of Alyattes.....lord of all the nations to the west of the river Halys.....the first of the Barbarians who had dealings with the Greeks.....' (*Herodotus, Book I*, c. 6) and such modern movements as Swaraj, Christian Missions to the East, the operation of Western capital in China and Hindu labour in Fiji. If we can grasp the ascending sweep of this great process of wheeling and circling upward from the dawn of History to our own time, we shall have a fuller knowledge of the immense problems men of our age are heir to, gain some ground perhaps for optimism and some guidance for our activity."

VIII

Political and social systems, though they might vary in outward forms, have been essentially unified in spirit and essence, in their evolution through the ages, being marked by

the imposition of the authority of the strong and the rich, justified either by physical strength or by religious ideas or by some other concrete philosophy of life. In India we have had a continuous evolution of society in which the original currents of organized social activity have not disappeared into the dry and barren wastes of lifeless sand, but have contrived in their several stresses to join the wide river of human life which today flows on towards the great ocean of progress. The tendencies and influences which have gone to make of India an integral part of the warp and woof of international history have never died out and are now beginning to assert themselves with full force, bringing to the nation's mind pictures of its former achievements, through the delineations of historians and archæologists. Our knowledge of Indian History has been very extensively expanded by Epigraphy and allied studies. The various currents in the progress of historical studies have been flowing on in ever-widening and deepening channels ; and they have mingled with ethnological and anthropological studies and have also been greatly influenced by geological and other scientific advances as well.

Hindu culture which deserves, from its essentially comprehensive and absorbing character as revealed by the process of History, to occupy such a large space in the chess-board of human evolution, has demonstrated, in its growth through the ages, a vitality for progress and a capacity for absorption as well as adaptation of foreign elements into its fold and has spread over a vast area of Asia, in fact all Asia, excepting only the Islamic countries of the West and Siberia. In one region, i.e., in the Further India and Indonesia, the absorption of Indian culture by their peoples stopped so soon as their contact with India in an active sense ceased : but its continuing part is seen even now after the passing of several centuries of Islamism, in the fact that the cultural back-ground of many parts of Indonesia has remained essentially Hindu. If Hindu culture has thus demonstrated its vitality in foreign lands, it should be easy to perceive how much more its inherent forces

of strength should have operated in India itself and how much more important its influence has been on the peoples and cultures that have become comprehended in the course of the ages into the web of Indian life. In the interaction between the essentially Hindu elements and the essentially foreign ones in the evolution of Indian culture may be seen those features that have been at once the glory and the bane of our land. One line of research and presentation that may be suggested to scholars is the inquiry into the widening stream of Hindu life flowing on towards the ocean of the interaction of the peoples. Again we may say that in the field of Indian historical investigation the question of race mixture has been operating as a most complex and perplexing feature, the resultant pictures being roughtly marked by a descending scale of evaluation of colour and mixture until we come to the Veddas who have been voted as one of the lowest races on earth. But in the intensely debated and still contentious question of the division of the peoples into race groups and their cultures into Dravidian, Aryan, Scythian etc., we do not definitely know yet, nor have we been in any way able to arrive at, any certain conclusion as to where the distinctions of the one type, ethnic or cultural or otherwise, should properly begin and where the corresponding features of the others should be regarded as ending. More likely to be profitable than this search after the mirage of race origins and culture contacts, Aryan and Dravidian, is the quest of data concerning the development of social institutions like the village community, tillage, irrigation and social economy. We are probably on safe ground in assuming that in India the work of regular tillage, though it has been often interrupted to some extent by successive invasions, has contrived not only to maintain its intensive hold upon the people, but developed in some remarkable directions throughout the ages. The series of external invasions and internal irruptions, so far from their having broken down either the complexities of caste or the involutions of land tenure and village rights, have, on the other hand, added to the complica-

tions of the situation, and the divisions of caste have consequently tended to dip, clash, combine and interpenetrate into one another and not to be superimposed, one upon another, like the skins of an onion.

Again, a much needed corrective to the view that has been confidentially put forward as to the continuing vitality of the sea-faring capacity of the Indian peoples on a considerable scale, may proceed from an impartial examination as to the causes that have enabled the Phoenicians and the Arabs on the one hand and the Malays on the other getting hold of a disproportionately large share of Indian commerce, while the Hindus have gradually lost control of the bulk of their transmarine trade, though the difficulties of their shore-line and coastal approach have not been as great to overcome as that of the Arabs who, under equally unfavourable conditions, have taken more readily to the ocean. Can we say, therefore, that India has been the land of rigidity and turgidity in all respects of social activity? Can we further maintain the thesis that the internal attractiveness of the land has been sufficient in itself to withhold the Hindus from developing as navigators? In this sense, the main problems confronting the task of interpretation of the evolution of Indian culture through the ages has been summed up very succinctly by Andrew Reich Cowan in these following words: "For ages race must have warred with race and system with system within the pear-shaped continent itself, malignity everlastingly marring the march of sympathy, which yet made headway not only against predatoriness within, but also the still greater rapacity from without. The progress was probably largely in terms of those peaceful emulations that constantly operate in society in the midst of open breaches of the peace. The stratification that ensued in Indian society was not in the least peculiar to the peninsula, even if the caste system was more complicated and rigid than almost anywhere else, sacerdotalism asserting itself almost to the dwarfing of the secular in almost every relation of life.

That that was not due to the subtropical character of the climate with its fierce vegetational power is evident by the fact that among a "Turanian" race on the other side of the Himalayas, in bare, windy and barren Tibet, sacerdotalism had almost equal power if a less monstrous mythology. In India, however, progress cannot always have been banned, and we shall see Buddhism coming in as one of the great challenges in the history of humanity. But it will also be found that nothing availed to supplant the allied despotism of priest and king, or lever the people out of the superstitions of which, indeed, the common people are the greatest conservators." (*A Guide to World History*, 1923, pp. 82–83).

IX

Coming down to the history of Islam in India, any one who has bestowed some serious thought on the matter will naturally find pressing on his attention a number of questions clamouring for solution of at least an attempt at interpretation. The military and political achievements of the Muhammadan conquerors and rulers, the genius of Muslim writers, artists and builders, these and other related topics have been largely dwelt upon; but the problem that would still wait for a definite interpretation is how far Islam has really entered into the web of Indian life in some of its remote phases and whether historians have done much really to illustrate the Muslim peoples themselves in their religious and social lives and in their evolution fully through the ages, apart from their conquests and politics and superficial contacts. We can easily refute the charges generally made that all our indigenous historians have not lived into the life of the common people and have not given pen pictures of their everyday activities and difficulties or of the changing features of society. To take but two shining examples:—Kalhaṇa's famous *Rājatarangiṇī* is something far more than a record of Kings' doings and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru describing the scope of this work, in his foreword to R. S. Pandit's *Rājatarangiṇi*, the Saga of the kings of Kashmir, 1925, page 12, points out how the historian has

revealed the old order changing in Kashmir and the economic structure collapsed, shaking up the old Indo-Āryan polity and rendering it an easy prey to internal commotion and foreign conquest. He thus estimates the worth of the work in revealing this interesting phase. " It is a rich store house of information, political, social, and to some extent, economic. We see the panoply of the middle age, the feudal knights in glittering armour, quixotic chivalry and disgusting cruelty, loyalty unto death, and senseless treachery ; you read of royal amours and intrigues and of fighting and militant and adulterous queens. Women seem to play quite an important part, not only behind the scenes but in the councils and the field as leaders and soldiers. Sometimes we get intimate glimpses of human relations and human feelings, of love and hatred, of faith and passion. We read of Suyya's great engineering feats and irrigation works ; of Lalitaditya's distant wars of conquest in far countries ; of Meghavahana's curious attempt to spread non-violence also by conquest ; of the building of temples and monasteries and their destruction by unbelievers and iconoclasts who confiscated the temple treasures. And then there were famines and floods and great fires which decimated the population and reduced the survivors to misery."

As a second revealing illustration we have the illustrious Abul Fazl ; and we have got in his *Ain-i-Akbari*, not only a descriptive account of the regulations of the judicial and executive departments of Akbar's empire, but details of the survey of the land, the tribal divisions, the social conditions and literary activity of the people, especially of the Hindus, in philosophy and law and also chapters on the foreign invaders of India and distinguished travellers. Blochmann's estimate of the value of the *Ain* will give us a true idea as to what a full-told history, at the hands of a great polyhistor ought to be in scope. Apart from the trustworthiness, the love of truth and the marvellous powers of expression that marked the great author, we see in his books " the governed classes brought to the foreground ; men live and

move before us, and the great questions of the time, axioms then believed in and principles then followed, phantoms then chased after, ideas then prevailing, and successes then obtained, are placed before our eyes in truthful and therefore vivid colours." And also "his (Abul Fazl's) wishes for the stability of the throne and the welfare of the people, his principles of toleration, his noble sentiments on the rights of man, the total absence of personal grievances and of expressions of ill-will towards encompassing enemies, shew that the expanse of his large heart stretched to the clear offing of sterling wisdom." Some of these features may well be copied by the present day historians whose aim is to make their work perfect and all-sided.

X

It is well for the student of History to become early acquainted with the elements of historical methodology and to be trained in classifying facts into different groups. He should at the same time develop his powers of reasoning and of applying criticism to facts. Methodology comprises four sequential parts, heuristics, criticism, synthesis, and exposition. Of these heuristics is the searching of documents or sources in the most comprehensive sense and covers a very large field of activity, individual parts of which would form distinct directions of work. Criticism would necessarily involve the examination and discussion of the sources so found and well divides itself into internal and external examination. Much has been written about the art of historical criticism which should be followed by the objective aim of constructing the planned historical narrative based on the real sequence of historical happenings. The task of the historian is therefore one which requires a versatile mind, a critical capacity and a special training. Pointed attention was drawn to them and to their essential importance by the great Sir R.G. Bhandarkar, who laid stress in a lecture of his delivered in 1910, on the accumulation of material not only for political history but also for the history of thought and of religious and social institutions

and held that in the use of historical material, a great deal of keen critical power should be evinced and exercised particularly with respect to the sources utilized. The task of historical construction is certainly a most noble one; and students of Indian History who feel the urge to engage in that task either by the advantage of natural instinct or as a result of well-considered choice, will easily find in the varied aspects of the culture of the past ages of our land and peoples "a vast field of ideal human study, appealing to the best gifts of heart and mind."

22—3—40.

THE TENTH ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE TIRUPATI

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

TELUGU SECTION

K. RAMAKRISHNIAH, M.A.,
Madras.

Gentlemen,

It is a matter for congratulation for all Āndhras that at this the Tenth Session of the All-India Oriental Conference, now held under the gracious and providential care of Lord Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara, the organizers of this Conference were kind enough to recognize the propriety of giving a separate section for the Telugu language. This may be in view of the fact that this holy land of Tirupathi forms an important part of the country of the Āndhras, just like Telingana—the land of the Telugus, which forms an important part of the territory of His Exalted Highness the Nizam, under whose patronage this Conference was to have been held last year under ordinary circumstances.

I say it is a matter for congratulation, because, I think, it is the first time that Telugu won recognition as an independent unit and as a result got separate recognition at the All-India Oriental Conference. For, I know, that at the third Session of the Conference held at Madras, though on request permission had been granted to present papers in Telugu, there was no opportunity to read them, as the deliberations of the section were not held in that language. On behalf of the Āndhras, I thank the organizers for having made Telugu a separate section. But I cannot help giving expression to my feeling that the choice should have fallen upon a more competent person than the one present, to preside over it and guide

its deliberations. I thank the organizers for the great honour they have done me.

The Presidential Addresses to the various sections of this Conference are expected to deal with the progress made in that particular branch of study, during the interval since the Conference met last, and to present any problems connected with the progress of such studies. But since this happens to be the first address to a Telugu section, I think it may be proper to trace the beginnings and the progress of literary and linguistic studies in Telugu.

Gentlemen, we are now privileged to meet at this holy land of seven hills, which, from time immemorial, formed the southern boundary of the Telugu country. It has been referred to as Veṅgaḍam, the land of high peaks, cool groves, and wild elephants by the Tamil poets of the Śaṅgam period and they warned their heroes not to cross in search of wealth or stay beyond the hills in the land of Vaḍugu—the Telugu country—as they called it, since the wealth acquired there would not give more happiness than the company of the lady-love at home. That Veṅgaḍam formed the northern limit of the Tamil country almost from the beginning of the Christian era is attested by a reference of Parambaranar in his prefatory verse to the *Tolkāppiyam*,[1] the first grammatical work in Tamil, generally assigned to the early centuries of the pre-Christian era. Lord Veṅkaṭeśvara, the presiding deity of this holy land of Veṅgaḍam, who, in his message to Kṛṣṇa-deva Rāya of Vijayanagar, identified himself with the Āndhra Viṣṇu or Āndhra Vallabha of Śrīkākulam on the banks of the Kṛiṣṇa, is the family god of all Āndhras. He seems to have

1. Vaḍa Veṅgaḍam, tenkumariyayidaiththa mil kūrunallulahattu etc.
2. "ఎంకితమోయన నీకల
వేంకటపతి యిట్టమైన వేల్పగుటఁ దదీ
యాంకితము నేయు మెుక్కొ-క
సంకేతము గాకతఁడ రస న్నెఁగానే" (ఆము—16)

attracted the gathering of Orientalists here to his holy seat of Tirupati, on this border land, from Telingana, the interior of the Telugu country, just perhaps to remind us forcibly the close and ultimate relationship of the language of his people and country with the Drāviḍa language spoken in the south and west of this region. The same Āndhra Vallabha who is no other than Lord Veṅkaṭeśvara, called himself also Telugu Vallabha and identified Āndhra with Telugu country and declared Telugu as the best of all the vernaculars in the country.[1]

This very name of our country as Telingana and the language spoken there as Telugu reminds us of the fact that we are the first Telugus speaking the language of this country and then Āndhras. We need not now draw any distinction between Telugu and Āndhra, since they became identical long long ago—just like the supreme deities presiding over our destinies; but, I should only like to draw your attention to it now, in connection with the tracing of the history and development of our language and literature. Does not the question naturally arise, how is it that we have got two names—Telugu and Āndhra—though fortunately, the distinction has been so much obliterated as not to lend to any complications in these days? Let us first trace the word *Āndhra* which seems to be older than the word *Telugu* if we rely upon the epigraphical information available to us.

The word 'Āndhra' as referring to people, is, we know, as old as the time of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, where these people are mentioned along with Puṇḍras, Pulindas, Śabaras, etc., as outcastes occupying the southern borders of the Vindhyas, treated as such perhaps for their having adopted

1. తెలుఁగదేల యన్న దేశంబు తెలుఁగేను
   దెలుఁగు వల్ల భుండఁ దెలుఁగొకండ
   ఎల్లనృపులు గొలువ నెఱుఁగవే బాసాడి
   దేశభాషలందుఁ దెలుఁగు లెస్స! ఆము. 15

non-Āryan customs after getting mixed up with those people. Next we hear of them in the edicts of Aśoka, where they are mentioned along with Pinthinikas and Pulindas as "Āndhra-pulindeṣu" as a powerful nation occupying the country beyond his empire but fully honouring the rules of conduct published through his edicts. Later, Magasthenese, the Greek ambassador, refers to their kingdom as the only powerful one, after that of Magadha, beyond the Ganges. Then we know of the Āndhra dynasty of Emperors with whom are identified the Śātavāhanās and Śātakarṇis, ruling from Magadha about the beginning of the Christian era, a vast empire, with Pratistāna in the west and Dhānykaṭaka in the East as two principal seats of their Viceroyalty. It is about the Āndhras of this period we have substantial evidence from Prākṛtic inscriptions and Buddhistic monuments found at Amarāvati, Jaggayyapeta, and other places, situated on the banks of the river Krishna in the east, and in the caves at Nasik in the west. Though Godavari was considered as the southern Ganges, perhaps in later times after the revival of the Vedic religion in this country, the river Krishna seems to have played a glorious part in the Buddhistic period, its banks having been centres not only of Āndhra rule, but also of Āndhra art and culture developed through the religion of the Buddha. The Āndhra tribe, referred to in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, as living in the Vindhya region, seems to have slowly migrated downwards and settled in the plateau of the Deccan watered by the rivers Godavari and Krishna and having got mixed up with the original inhabitants of the soil, wrested power from the hands of the Nāgās or Dravidians, who were holding sway over the land locally, and established a kingdom with Śrīkākula on the River Krishna as its capital. It was perhaps when this was washed away by the current of the river that the capital was shifted to a safer place on the bank at Dhānyakaṭaka which played a great part in the Āndhra history of those days. Tradition attributes the establishment of this kingdom to one Āndhra Viṣṇu or Āndhra Deva, the son of Sucandra. He is later

identified with God Viṣṇu, who is said to have migrated to that place from his original seat at Ahicchatrapura in the north at the request of the river Krishna and in fulfilment of the desire of Brahma who was performing penance on the banks of the river in the impenetrable forest of Daṇḍaka. Later, an Āndhra king Sumati by name, inspired by love for his country came to Śrīkākula and being ushered in the presence of the God by the sages living there, identified Him as the lord of his family, the very Āndhranātha, and bowed down to him calling himself "Āndhranāyakadāsa." Thenceforward, the Viṣṇu of that place came to be known as "Āndhranātha" or "Āndhravallabha."[2] This tradition as preserved in the Sthalapurāṇa of Śrīkākula is mentioned by a later poet, Kodaṇḍaramakavi in his Prabandha called '*Vallabhābhyudaya*,' otherwise known as the "*Śrīkākula Māhātmya*;" now being published under the Telugu Series of the University of Madras.

We meet with a reference to the worship of the stone images of ancestors in the *Pratimānāṭaka* of Bhāsa about the beginning of the Christian era. Even among the early Āndhras a practice seems to have been prevalent of preserving the memory of their illustrious kings, by raising stone figures for them. This is evidenced by the figures in stone of Śīmuka-Śātavāhana and others of his family, found in a cave at Nānāghāt. Under these figures we find the names Rāya Śīmuka Śātavāhana, Devīnāyanikayarannocha Śirīṣatanikavo, Kumarobhaya, etc., etc. Thus it is not at all improbable that a similar stone figure was raised at Śrīkākula in memory of Āndhra Viṣṇu, the son of Sucandra, the founder of the Āndhra kingdom on the banks of the river Krishna. A later king, Sumati by name, seems to have identified the stone figure with the first king of his family and having deified him as God Viṣṇu, built a big temple and founded a city at the place in his honour. From that time onwards this God has been worshipped by various rulers of the country even down to the days of Kṛṣṇadeva Rāya of the Vijayanagara Empire.

It is on account of the glorious history of that imperial dynasty of Āndhras of those days that the country watered by the rivers Godavari and Krishna, the people therein, as well as the language spoken by them happened to acquire the name Āndhra, throwing into oblivion for many centuries to come, the original name of the country as well as of the language spoken in that land. All the inscriptions of the kings of the Āndhra dynasty discovered at the various Buddhist settlements in the valley of the river Krishna, as well as those found at Nasik in the west, are found to be in the Prākṛt language, and not one in what we call Āndhra or the Telugu language as we know it. Even some of the later rulers of this country like Ikṣvākus followed them in using Prākṛt while still later kings adopted Sanskrit but not Telugu.

Nor have we any direct evidence to show that the language used in this country by the imperial families themselves at home is different from the language used in the inscriptions. We have only to conjecture the state of things regarding the language of the people of the country and the home language of its rulers in those days, from a few outside references and from traces left in Sanskrit and other inscriptions of a later period.

No doubt the few references we have to the language of this country, as Āndhra, do not seem to lead us to the conclusion that this language is either identical with the language of the Inscriptions of the Āndhra kings, or a development from it. One of the earliest references is that of Bharata, who in his *Natya Śaśtra*, seems to make a distinction between this language and the Prākṛts while prescribing the use of these languages to the various characters in a drama.

'Na barbara Kirātāndhara Drāvidāyāsu Jātiṣu |
Nātyaprayōge kartavyam kāvyam bhāṣā samāśrayam' ||

Then while dealing with the usage of Prākṛts in the dramas.

'Jatiṣvetāsu sarvāsu śuddhāsu dvijōttamāh |
Śaurasenīm samāśritya bhāṣa kāryatu nāṭake ||
Athavā chandatah kāryā dēśa bhāṣā prayoktṛbhih' ||

Even 'Drāviḍi' which was considered as a different language from Āndhra even at that time was not considered by him to be a Prākṛt.

'Gavāsvājāvikoṣtradi ghoṣasthāna nivāsinām |
Ābhiroktih sābari vā Drāviḍi Draviḍadiṣu' ||

Even Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the 7th Century A.D. did not consider Drāviḍa as a form of Prākṛt, but calls it a 'Mleccha bhāṣā', and Āndhra was in his view a different language from Drāviḍa. While trying to condemn the practice prevelant in those days among Sanskrit scholars, of providing Sanskrit derivations for Mleccha words, he illustrates it by mentioning a few words from the Drāviḍa language, like 'chor', pāmpu, vayiru, ataru, etc.

The word '*Cōr*' he says, is identified by them with word '*Cōra*' of Sanskrit and derived in the same manner. The word pāmpu is derived in the same manner as '*pāpa*', as '*Pāmpu*' snake is really a sinful creature. The Dravidian word '*Vayiru*' belly, is identified with the word 'vaira' and is said to be an 'enemy'. 'Athar' a way is derived from the root '*Tr*' *taraṇe* and explained as 'one that cannot be crossed'.

Let me quote the passage from *Tantravārtika.*

"తద్యథా ద్రావిడాదిభాషాయామేవ తావత్ వ్యంజనాన్తభాషపదేషు స్వరాన్తవిభక్తిప్రత్యయాదికల్పనాభిః స్వభాషానురూపానర్థాన్ ప్రతిపాద్యమానాదృశ్యంతే. తద్యథా ఓదనంచోరిత్యుక్తే చోరపదవాచ్యం కల్పయంతి. పన్థానమతరిత్యుక్తే అతర ఇతి కల్పయిత్వాహుః. సత్యం దుస్తరత్వాద్ధతరపీవ పన్థా ఇతి. తథా పాపశబ్దం పకారాన్తం సర్పవచనం అకారాన్తం కల్పయిత్వా సత్యం పాప పీవాసావితి వదంతి.....తద్యథా ద్రావిడాదిభాషాయామిదృశీ స్వచ్ఛన్దకల్పనా తదా పారసీకబర్బర యవన శాకాదిభాషాసు కిం వికల్ప్య కిం ప్రతిప్రత్యన్తన్త ఇతి నవిద్మః"

తస్మాత్ మ్లేచ్ఛప్రసిద్ధం యత్పదమార్యై ర్వికల్ప్యతే
న కశ్చిత్తత్ర విశ్వాసో యుక్తః పదపదార్థయోః
నిరుక్తవ్యాక్రియాద్వారా యస్యర్థః పరిగమ్యతే
పికనేమాది శబ్దానాం సపేవార్థో భవిష్యతి.

—(తంత్రవార్తికం 3)

On another occasion he refers to the language of the Āndhra deśa where he draws attention to the usage of the word Rāja in the Āndhra language, in the sense of a person belonging to the Kṣatriya caste, besides that of the ruler of a country in general. Hieun Tsang also makes a passing reference to the language of this part of the country by saying that it differed from that of the north, i.e., perhaps from Prākṛt. From the evidence of the inscriptions of the Colas and the Cālukyas which by that time began to appear in the Telugu language we arrive at the same conclusion. But it is not perhaps until the time of Rājarājanarendra, that we meet with a direct reference to the language of this country as Telugu, as identified with Āndhra. For we know that that illustrious king asked Nannya to write the *Bhārata* in Telugu:

" జననుత కృష్ణదై్వపా
యనసుని పృథుభాషితమహాభారత బ
ద్ధనిరూపితార్థమేర్పడఁ
దెనుఁగున రచియింపుమధిక ధీయుక్తిమెయిన్. " (భార. ఆది.)

and accordingly Nannaya began to write it in Telugu.

" నన్నయభట్టు దెనుంగునన్ మహా
భారతసంహితారచనబంధురుఁ డయ్యె జగద్ధితంబునన్. "

Thus we have to understand that the language of the rulers of the Āndhra Dynasty as found in their inscriptions cannot be identified with the Telugu language of the Telugu country. The Āndhra rulers might have spoken Telugu in their homes and used Prākṛt for inscriptions, because it served as common language throughout their empire, and happened to be the language of the predominant religion in the country. Unless we presume that their home language in the country between the rivers Godavari and Krishna was different from the language of their inscriptions, it is quite impossible to think that the language of the Telugu inscriptions of the later Āndhras from the seventh century A. D. onwards is a development of the language of the imperial dynasty of Āndhras. Any-

how, it is clear that during the period of the early Āndhras Prākṛt language was more powerful than the other languages in India.

For over six centuries, i.e., from the second century B.C. to the fourth century A.D., Prākṛt language and Buddhist religion held sway in North India as well as Deccan, and after the revival of Brahminism, Sanskrit began to hold its sway with redoubled vigour. Dr. Bhandarkar has remarked about Sanskrit in those days thus : " Because most of the inscriptions during this period happen to be in Prākṛt, and no trace of building or sculpture devoted to the use of Brahminic religion has been left, we cannot conclude that Sanskrit language or Brahminic religion did not exist during this period. Of course Brahminism existed and it was probably during this period, being developed into the form it assumed in later times."[1] I should like to point out here that this last remark of Dr. Bhandarkar, exactly applies to our Telugu language also during that period. Even though there was no reference to the Telugu language or country, Telugu language did exist in that country, during this period when Prākṛt or Sanskrit held its sway, and during that period it was gradually developing into the form it assumed in later times.

Thus, unlike the Dravidian languages of the South, it was being moulded into a form which gave it more of an Āryan colour than of a non-Āryan one. It is this super-imposition of the Prākṛt language of Āndhras which gave an altogether new garb to the Telugu language, and the reverence with which the Sanskrit language came to be held subsequently by later scholars and grammarians made some of them consider not only Telugu but almost all languages of India as derivatives of Sanskrit or forms of Prākṛt. There seems to be a strong prejudice among Sanskritists even in those days against the independent development of the vernaculars like Telugu ; and it is the strong patronage offered by the Cālukya kings like

1. R. G. Bhandarkar, *A Peep Into the Early History of India*

Rājarājanarendra that made it possible to Nannaya Bhaṭṭa to produce the first and most memorable work in the Telugu language. As Nannicodadeva has said in his *Kumārasambhava*, it was when Sanskrit was holding its supreme sway in the country, that Cālukyas adopted them in their inscriptions in place of Prākṛt, encouraged poetical compositions in them and thus re-established the position of Telugu in the Āndhra country. Thus we see how its position has been endangered first by the Prākṛt language, and then by Sanskrit and Sanskrit scholars who had no sympathy for the vernaculars. This condition seems to have prevailed even after Nannaya and Tikkaṇa have given a firm stand and dignified position to the Telugu language. Otherwise, there could have been no reason for Vinnakoṭa Peddanna to bewail the condition of things about the Telugu language in his time like this:

"విలసద్భావ రసాఢ్యలంకృతులచే విప్పారి గీర్వాణ భా
షల కబ్బంబుల కెన్నమంచితనముల్ సంధిల్లు నాచందమై
వలియుం బ్రాసయు నంతకగ్గలముులై వర్తిల్లుసత్కావ్యమున్
దెలుఁగన్చున్ జెవిబెట్టలేమి యుడుపన్ దేగల్గునే మందిలన్."

In spite of all the embellishments borrowed from Sanskrit, Telugu after all is a vernacular and requires no study or grammatical analysis, thus the Sanskritists seem to have argued in his day. So he had to take shelter under the "Prākṛtic" nature of Telugu whatever it may mean, to meet their argument, and declare himself to have been following the footsteps of Prākṛt grammarians like Trivikrama, Hemacandra in writing a grammar for this vernacular language—Telugu.

"తెలుఁగు దేశభాష తెలియుఁబొమ్మనఁబోక
తెలియపలయు మించు తేటపడఁగఁ
దొడవుగాకపసిఁడిఁ దొడిగినయొప్పునే
కనకమింటనెంత కలిగెనేని."

" విశ్రుతులు హేమచంద్ర త్రివిక్రమాదు
లూనరఁజూపిరి ప్రాకృతంబునకుఁ ద్రోవ
నాంధ్రభాషయుఁ బ్రాకృతాహ్వయముగాన
వలయుఁ దల్లక్షణంబులు పరుసఁదెలియ. "

(కావ్యాలంకారచూడామణి 9వ ఉల్లా)

Thus we see for writing a grammar for the language he had to make so many apologies, and Peddanna seems to have invoked the aid of the Prākṛtic nature of the language, just as an argument to satisfy the prejudice of the Sanskritists. But other Telugu grammarians began to formulate the theory of the regular " prākṛti vikṛti bhāva " not only of Sanskrit and Telugu but also of Prākṛt and Telugu, of course not knowing or caring for the implications of derivative or cognate relationship. We know they made an attempt to derive certain Telugu words from Sanskrit or Prākṛt, but they did not at all touch the grammar, the very core of any language.

Some later scholars and Prākṛt grammarians included another South Indian language also—the " Drāviḍa "—among the Prākṛts. It was Mārkaṇḍeya and Lakṣmīdhara, both of the seventeenth century A.D. that included Drāviḍa and Pāṇḍya respectively among the countries where the Pisāca languages were spoken. Mārkaṇḍeya makes further distinction between Kāncideśiya, Pāṇḍya and Drāviḍa and we do not know what he meant by making such a distinction in the seventeenth century when the Tamil language was spoken throughout that area. He does not seem to distinguish them even as provincial dialects of the Tamil language. Rāmatarka Vāgīsa mentions ' Drāviḍa under the class of Vibhāṣas or minor Prākṛts along with Sakari, Sabari, Abhirika, and Utkali, which though characterized by rusticity (apabhramśata) are yet not to be ranked in the class of apabramśas, if they are employed in the dramas.

" शकार कोद्र द्रविडादिवाचोऽपभ्रंशा वाच्यद्यपि संश्रयंति ।
स्यान्नाटकादौ यदि संप्रयोगे नैतास्वपभ्रंश इयात्तदोषः॥

If they are used in any of the dramas it seems they will lose their apabhramaśatva. But who knows they were ever used in any of the Sanskrit dramas. He does not say anything about it.

Moreover, we must note here that none of the early Prākṛt grammarians like Hemacandra, Vālmīki, Trivikrama, ever referred to "Drāviḍa" or any of these South Indian languages as Prākṛts and even their knowledge about the Pisāci seems to be very meagre. Thus we may conclude that none of those later Prākṛt grammarians who included "Drāviḍī" or any other South Indian language among the Prākṛts or Pisāci languages had any definite ideas about them, nor do they seem to realize fully the implications of trying to establish the cognate relationship of the languages of the South with Sanskrit and Prākṛts. Yet it is surprising that following the opinions which some of these Prākṛt grammarians have expressed, some modern scholars like R. Swaminatha Ayyar and Dr. C. Narayana Rao should have come forward to establish the prākṛtic nature of the South Indian languages, denying at one stroke the independent origin of any of these languages, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Malayalam, etc. and of the existence of the people speaking them in this area before the Āryans came and settled in this country.

I do not propose now to go into the various arguments brought forward or the details presented, to show that the South Indian languages and particularly Telugu are nothing but later disintegrated forms of Prākṛts, or to trace the various forms of these languages to Prākṛtic or Āryan source. I shall only touch one or two important positions taken up by them in order to establish the theory of the Āryan origin of the South Indian languages.

The absence of inscriptional or literary evidence of any of these South Indian languages before the seventh or eighth centuries of the Christian era, is urged as a powerful argument against their existence before that time. We have seen how the

Āryan Āndhras by their glorious career in the middle country have succeeded in imposing their Prākṛt language and Buddhistic religion upon the people of the middle India, and contributed to the dislocation of the Dravidian languages spoken in that country and turned the tide of their growth. From the various references in the Buddhistic literature, and in the Buddhistic Art preserved in the various monuments at Amarāvati, Jaggayyapeta and other places in the valley of the river Krishna, we can infer that Nāga tribes were living in the Telugu country centuries before the Christian era. They seem to have offered welcome to the Buddhist pilgrims who got stranded at the mouths of the Krishna on their way to Ceylon. As kings and queens of the Nāga race were also represented in the monumental figures, we understand that they belong to the ruling race of the country before the Āndhras came there. But we have no traces left to know the nature of the language used by them before the advent of the Āndhras. But at least as regards the name of the country, I think we have clear evidence in the reference made by Ptolemy the Greek writer of about the second century A.D. to the *Triglipton or Trilingon*, that this country retained its name and known at the time by its original name Telinga or Telingana, even after the Āndhras settled in that country and developed an Empire. This shows that it took some time before the country came to be called Āndhra after the name of the imperial dynasty that ruled over it. Thus we have some consolation that we have here at least a reference to the original name of our country Telingana—Telugu—as old as the time of Ptolemy though we are not sure whether Telinga has been sanskritized into *Trilinga* or the former only a *tadbhāva* form of the latter. It is not improbable that the old name of the country should have reached Ptolemy through the medium of Sanskrit.

Though it is true that inscriptions in Telugu language before the seventh century A.D. have not so far been discovered a study of the personal titles and names of villages occurring in the Prākṛt or Sanskrit inscriptions of that period in the

light of the history and development of other South Indian languages like Tamil and Kanarese, and in the light of the inscriptions available in those languages, will certainly give a clear and decisive answer to all those Sanskritists who doubt the very existence of these languages before the period of the available inscriptions. The Tirunātharkunṛu inscription in Tamil, perhaps the oldest in that language, seems to take us to two or three centuries earlier as it is believed to have belonged to the fourth century A.D. and recently a Tamil inscription of Aśoka's time also seems to have been discovered. In the former Vatteḻuttu inscription we meet with what are called the two peculiar Dravidian letters, namely "ḻ" and the vallinam 'ṟ' or the Sakatarepha in the words *Aimbatteḻana Channannoṟṟa.* These letters occur not only in some village names in the Sanskrit inscriptions of the Telugu country in the earlier period, but also in later inscriptions in Telugu and in hundreds of words and roots that are found common to all these languages. The old Dravidian "ḻ" changed later in Telugu into 'ḍa' in a good number of words (cf. 'Aimbatteḻu' of the above inscription becoming 'ebadi eḍu, in Telugu) while the vallinam 'ṟ' remained almost the same. In the Ongodu grant of the Pallava King Sivaskandavarman II of about 430 A.D. we have the vallinum 'ṟ' appearing in Karmaṟaṣṭṟē narachēḍu gramo dakshiṇatah, Penukapaṟṟu grama Uttaratah, etc. Here even in the word 'rāṣtra' vallinum 'ṟ' is used. In the Gorantla plates of Attivarman of about the middle of the fourth century A.D. mention is made of a village 'Tāṉḻikoṉḻa' on the southern bank of the river Krishnabēṇṇa. The peculiar Dravidian letter 'ḻ' which occurs in later Telugu inscriptions perhaps appears for the first time here in the name of a Telugu village which is identified with Tāḍikoṇḍa of Gudivada Taluq in the Krishna District. It was read as 'Tanthikontha' by Dr. Fleet (Indian Antiquary Vol. IX, p. 102). In the Bucchireddipalam plates of Simhavarman II we have a grant of 'viḻuvattigrama' which is identified with Viḍuvaluru of the Kovvur Taluk, Nellore District—by Mr.

Somasekhara Sarma (*Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1940.) As for the ఌ here he has expressed a doubt but as the letter in these plates exactly resembles that in ఏఌ, in the Tirunātharkunṛu inscription in Tamil we may take it that this letter being a peculiar one happened to be a common inheritence and was in use in Telugu country even from earlier times. In the Timmapuram plates and Chipurupalli plates of Viṣṇuvardhana I or Viṣamasiddhi we have 'ḷ' used in "Paḷakiviṣaya."

In Talamanci plates of Vikramāditya I we have ఌ used in the same manner.

को ఌ- चुको (न् ఌ) ग्रामस्योत्तर पार्श्वे एळसत्तिर्नाम ग्रामः

In the Cikkulla plates of Vikramendravarman of Viṣṇukuṇḍin dynasty we have ఌ in 'ఌందు భూరివాహకాత్...రేగోన్లమ్ నామ్రగామంద త్తం.'

Thus in many other later inscriptions in Telugu very many words with ఌ and ఽ appear as in Yuddhamalla's Bezwada inscription as చోఌ, ఌన్ని, అటిపుఌ etc.

In the Pedavegi grant of Hastivarman of the Sālankāyana dynasty mention is made of 'pralura grama' and as its boundaries 'Cenceṛuvu,' 'Kamburanceṛuvu' etc. In the last two words we meet with the sakatarepha or the vallinum 'r' which is peculiar to the Dravidian languages. 'Ceruvu' is a Telugu word corresponding to its Kanarese from 'keṛe' meaning a tank, which also contains the sakatarepa, thus indicating the cognate relationship of these languages.

Thus even in inscriptions written in Sanskrit, we find that the peculiar Dravidian letters are introduced, when the names of the Telugu villages containing these letters are mentioned. This is itself enough evidence for the existence of indigenous languages besides Prākṛts and Sanskrit in that country, and a comparison of the words containing these letters also help us

in tracing the history of our language into a period far beyond the age of inscriptions.

In some of the prākṛtic inscriptions of the Ikṣvāku line of kings discovered at Nagārjunakoṇḍa, traces of indigenous languages may also be detected in the use of the words like 'Mahātalavara.' This word Mahātalavara occurs as a title of nobility applied to some members of the royal family along with other titles as Mahāsenapati and Mahādaṇḍanāyaka. Later it occurs again in the Koṇḍamudi plates of Jayavarman of the Brihatpalāyana dynasty and its Dravidian origin is suggested by Dr. Sten Konow. The term 'talavara' is explained in a commentary on *Kalpasūtra* by Vinayavijaya thus —"Tushṭa bhūpala pradatta paṭṭa bandha vibhūṣita rājastānīyāh" (Cf. *Kalpasutra, Ed.*, Jacobi) and some scholars like Vogel saw a connection of this word with the 'Talayāri' of the Tamil language, meaning a village watchman. The Telugu word 'talāri' used in the same sense may be considered as a form derived from it, and if these are connected with the form of the inscriptions, they offer an example for deterioration in meaning. But 'talavara' can more easily be connected with the Tamil 'talaivar' meaning 'leader,' head, president, etc. (from talai=head; var=avar—an honorific or plural suffix) of which 'talavara' may be considered as a peculiarly Telugu form of that day, since the word 'talai' of Tamil becomes 'tala' in Telugu, and the whole word is changed into *ajanta* according to the usual practice in Telugu. Hence we may say that the Dravidian word preserved in this form is more a Telugu word than even a Tamil one. But a Sanskritist may easily connect it with some Sanskrit or Prākṛt word like *sthala* and say that the plural or honorific suffix *var* (cf. Tam. *avar*. Tel. *vāru*) has developed in the same manner as those of the Āryan vernaculars like Bengali—'amhara,' 'tera,' or 'Ihvar'; 'Hor,' of the Dardic group of languages. (cf. *History of Telugu Language*, Vol. II). Because the Bengali plural 'ra' is traced by Dr. Sunitikumara Chatterji to the genitive plural in ra—as amhara, tunhara, it is said the

Dravidian *avar* also must have been developed in the same manner. At this rate it may perhaps be even connected with English verb *are*. Because some Sanskritists persume the non-existence of any language here before the coming in of the Āryans, they are sometimes obliged to trace an older form in a language to a later form in a later language and thus put the cart before the horse.

What I wish to impress upon you here is that it is this advent and the domination of the semi-Āryan tribe of Āndhras in the middle country which made Prākṛt the language of the state and of their inscriptions during the early centuries of the Christian era that was responsible for crushing the Dravidian languages of the country or turning the tide of their growth into an altogether different direction. We cannot, therefore, expect to have inscriptions or literature in the language of the country, as an evidence of their existence, as it was not patronized either by the kings or the people of that day.

But in the country further south, which was not affected by any political or linguistic domination, Dravidian language and literature continued to develop under the patronage of the kings of the soil.

Even there we find the literature and language of the period affected by the religious thought of the Buddhists and Jains who went and settled there in smaller numbers, for the purpose of religious propaganda. The Tamil language seems to have been analyzed even as early as the beginning of the Christian era, and though one may not believe the fabulous stories regarding the literary activities of the Tamil Sangams, from the nature of the linguistic forms and literary traditions embodied in the Tamil grammar by Tolkappiyanar, from the type of language and the form of poetry of what is called the Sangam literature, which looks very much older when compared with that of Prabandhas and still later religious

poetry of Ālvārs and Nāyanars of the sixth and seventh centuries, A.D., we may safely presume that we have at least in one Dravidian language literary evidence to show that the language was in a developed state of existence many centuries before the era of Christ. It looks ridiculous enough to think of deriving the Tamil language of *Puranānuru* and other poems of the old Sangam literature and also the old Halagannada language from the later Prākṛts or the modern Āryan vernaculars of Northern India and much more so if their very existence as independent languages before the sixth or seventh century A.D. is denied, in order to make way for the theory of their Āryan origin or to explain away the non-Āryan or the Dravidian characteristics found in the later vernaculars of the North.

Of the earlier scholars of Dravidian Philology it is Dr. Pope that held strong opinion regarding the close affinity of the Dravidian languages with Sanskrit. Dr. Caldwell and others, while admitting some points of similarity between the Dravidian and Indo-European, assigned Dravidian idioms to the Scythian group, after close investigation into the grammatical features of these languages. As the Scythian theory seems to have been exploded, later scholars like Dr. Sten Konow considered the Dravidian languages of South India as an independent group by themselves. But very recently, serious attempts have been made by R. Swaminatha Ayyar and Dr. C. Narayana Rao to revive the theory of Dr. Pope and by way of substantiating, the former tried to derive the pronominal and verbal forms from Sanskrit, while the later considering Telugu and its sister languages of the Dravidian group as disintegrated forms of Prākṛts attempted to trace their history to the Prākṛt through the Āryan vernaculars of the North. We know Sanskrit is a very copious language and the grammarians have furnished it with a comprehensive Dhātupāṭha, and we have already seen how, with great ingenuity, derivations from Sanskrit were offered for foreign words borrowed by the language, even in the days of

Kumārila. Those who look into the *Lingābhaṭṭīya*, will see how the words *pika* and *kāka* are both derived from the root *kai, gai*—Śabde (apihitam Kāyatīti pikah)—by applying suitable Sanskrit terminations, though the Sanskrit grammarians of the early period have according to Kumārila's own testimony recognized the words *pika, nema, tamarasa* etc., as foreign. The word *pika* is clearly known to be a borrowing from Latin *pikes* like Dīnāra from Greek *Danarios*. And it is against this kind of offering derivations to foreign words that Kumārila entered a strong protest in his day. "Verbal resemblance is" says Mr. Beames in his *Comparative Grammar* "unless supported by other arguments the most unsafe of all grounds on which to base and induction to Philology. Too many writers, in other respect meritorious, seem to proceed on Fuellen's Process. There is a river in Macedon and there is also moreover a river in Monmouth, and there is Salmon in both." A certain Tamil word contains a P, so does a certain Sanskrit word, and *ergo*, the latter is derived from the former. We may even say *ergo*—the former is derived from the latter. We have already seen how the plural suffix *ar* or *var* which is at least as old as the time of the Tamil grammarian Tolkāppiyar, is derived from later Bengali genitive forms *amara, era, tora* used in the nominative. Similarly another plural termination *kal* which according to the earliest Dravidian grammar is said to have been used only after neuter nouns, but later came to be used after other nouns also, appears in Telugu as *kalu, kulu, la, lu,* (as in Mrakulu, samvatsarambul, alu (alamanda) and this is traced to plural forms in Sanskrit or Prākṛt with a Ka-pratyaya in Svārtha to which the word *loka* is said to have been suffixed. Thus the word *mrākulu* may be said to have developed in some such manner as this—*mrānu, mrānu eva-mrānu-lokaka + mrānuka-loka-mrānukal, Mrānukalu-mrānukulu.* The Tamil *marangal,* maragal, also in the same manner. But one difficulty here is, that the words *loka* and *sab* (from sarva), *gana* etc., came into use in Bengali and other

modern Āryan vernaculars only in the New Indo-Āryan period, say from about the tenth century A.D. while we have the form in *gal* occuring in the early Sangam literature in Tamil, and noted as a sign of plurality appended mostly to amahat or case-less nouns, in the grammar of Tolkāppiyar who belonged to the beginning of the Christian era. A good number of noun forms that do not end in *ka* in Tamil even from a remote time as *eli, kili ī, maram, piṇam, ānai, nari, muri,* etc., appear in Telugu as forms ending in *ka, ga, ku,* or *gu,* as *eluka, chiluka, īga, mrāku, pīnuga, ēnuga, nakka, mukka* and they have to be considered as back forms from the plurals in *gal* when *lu* alone of *galu* came to be taken as the sign of plurality in Telugu. But to explain them as being due to a *Svārthe-ka-pratyaya* of Sanskrit, is not only far-fetched, but does not at all fit in with the nature of the forms in Tamil or Kanarese. Moreover the word *loka* as a sign of plurality was not in use in the Prākṛtic or the middle Indo-Āryan period when the old case signs of Sanskrit were still preserved, but came into use only in the later vernacular stage, and it is really surprising to note that it should have been considered as giving rise to forms in *gal* current in literature of the pre-Christian era. No further comment is necessary.

Even the case-terminations are traced to Sanskrit sources. The Tamil nominative *an* to the Sanskrit instrumental *na* as in *Rāmeṇa, dhanena; dative ku* to Sanskrit *kṛte* etc.

Prof. Sten Konow saw some Dravidian influence in forms like *kṛtavān* as compared to Tamil *Seydavan; Kartāsmi, Cēsinavāḍanu,* but these were traced to the Avestic forms. The Tamil pronominal form in *an* is traced to Vedic *Bharan;* and Telugu *Vāḍu, Vānḍu,* to Pali *Bharanto;* Kanarese *avam* to Ardhamagdhi *bharam.* For every kind of change in the Dravidian form we are shown a corresponding form in some Āryan language or other. Just like *vāndu* is

traced to *bharanto* the verbal forms *randu* (you come) ; *Vinudu* (you hear) are traced to *āgachchantu, śrinvantu.* The feminine termination *al* is also from the same *ant* in *Bharant* since in Telugu it sometimes changes into *ndr* as in *Kōḍalu – kōḍaṇḍru.*

The first and second personal pronominal forms, *yān, nān, ēn, yām, ēm, nīn, nēm,* etc., are derived from Sanskrit *asmat and yuṣmat.* The method of deriving terminations of one language which still keeps to its agglutinative nature from the fossilized forms in another language which seems to have reached its inflexional stage long ago, does not anyhow appeal to our reason.

Another peculiar method is adopted by these Sanskritists who deny the very existence of Dravidian languages as an independent group. Whenever a peculiarity in Dravidian languages not traceable to modern Āryan languages is found, they try to trace it directly to Sanskrit as in the case of the vallinum 'ṟ' or the Śakaṭarepha and the peculiar Dravidian sound ḷ ; and for anything that cannot be traced to Sanskrit or Prākṛts, parallels are shown in the later Āryan vernaculars. The Śakaṭarepha not found in later Āryan vernaculars but is found in Telugu words like *kaṟṟi piṟṟa* etc., is traced direct to Sanskrit words *Kṛṣṇa, Pṛṣṭha,* etc., but here the parallels in other Dravidian languages, the development and the history of these words therein is not taken into consideration at all. As for the sound 'ḷ' though it is as ancient as the time of Tolkāppiyar in Tamil, since it occurs in the names of some modern vernaculars as Oḷiya, Marwaḷi, &c., it is taken as on Āryan sound. Again as for the relation in Dravidian languages between the substantive and its attribute, which is quite unlike that in Sanskrit, which requires the agreement between the two as regards the gender, number and case, the parallels from the later North Indian vernaculars are cited. When a peculiarity not traceable to Sanskrit or even Prākṛt is found in the modern Āryan languages and when that is inherent to all the languages of the Dravidian group, it is but reasonable

to attribute it to the influence of the latter upon the former than otherwise.

Just like the terminations, most of the Telugu roots and verbal forms are also traced to Sanskrit roots and forms, depending more on the superficial resemblance in sound than upon the history and development of those forms in other Dravidian languages. Thus the services of the root 'kṛ' are requisitioned to explain the particles 'ku', 'gu', etc. found at the end of most of the Telugu roots as *dūku = dhunu + kṛ*, *ekku* = to rise up = *ēdh + Kri*, *braduku*, *vṛddh + kṛ = amiṣ + kṛ = mringu*; *diggu*, *di + kṛ = regu ric + kṛ =* (eru), *paḷṭu*, *vartita dhṇḍu* with *kṛ* gave rise to *dunnu* = to plough; *akṣn* to *kanu*, *pakva* to *vandu* = to cook etc. *Tucch + kṛ = longu*, because Hindi has got luccha.

The roots ending in *cu* etc., are all derived from *iṣya* the future particle suffixed to the Sanskrit root—*tōcu* from udayiṣya *chigirucu* from *Sikhariṣya*, *aḍakincu* from *adhariṣya*, *gelucn* from *jita + iṣyv cīlucu* from *chinna + iṣya*, etc. Similarly *tattu* from *tāḍita*.

Even *taddhita* forms were made use of to derive certain roots. Tel. *chimmu* to scatter, is derived from *Syandanam*, *Teliyu* = to know is derived from *dhavala + iṣya* and so on and so forth.

I do not propose to discuss these derivations here, but only wish to indicate another line—perhaps what I think a more proper line—of investigation into the early history of the Telugu language. Unless we compare the forms in other Dravidian languages also, we cannot arrive at the truth regarding the nature and form of these roots in Telugu and until we arrive at a root material common to all the Dravidian languages, and frame regular laws of Phonetic change, no purpose is served by trying to trace those found in Telugu or any other single language to Sanskrit or Prākṛt. Moreover 'roots are prohibited from being used

independently in the Sanskrit language unless they are converted into padas by suffixing *pratyayas* according to the dictum *apadam naprayunjīta* and we cannot understand how *kṛ* by itself could come at the end of other roots and give rise to those ending in *gu* in any of these languages. I cannot help drawing your particular attention to one fact that most of the forms ending in *ku, gu,* etc., considered by grammarians as roots in the Telugu and also in Kannada language appear without these particles in the Tamil language and sometimes also in Kannada. This clearly shows that these forms ending in *ku, gu,* etc., which according to Dr. Caldwell are mere formative additions, cannot claim to be roots at all. Another point is that while Telugu grammarians consider the forms ending in *ku, gu,* etc., as roots the Tamil grammarian Tolkāppiyar considers *ku, ḍu, tu, ru,* in the singular and *kum, ḍum, tum, rum,* in the plural as verbal suffixes which convert the root into a finite verb. The Kannada grammarians make mention of *kum, gum,* as two affiixes of the third person which convert the root into a verbal form. These forms can be used for all tenses, even also in the past without any distinction of gender, number, etc. Here I think we discover a reminiscence of the old condition of things prevailing in this group of languages in the early stages of their development, when the form in *kum* as in *Velugum, pōgum,* etc. the *taddharmādhaka* as it is called used, in all tenses without any distinction. Other forms distinguishing time, gender and number, seem to have been developed from the old form in *Gu,* when this *gu* which is a remnant of the auxiliary root *agu* came to be considered either as a formative suffix, as in Tamil, or as a part of the root itself, as in Telugu. While *ku* was retained only in the forms of the present in Tamil, to which *iru* and *en* were added to make the first personal singular form therein, the *ku* ending form was taken as the root itself in Telugu, to which *cu, unna, nu,* were added to make the present form, and *itu* and *ni* were added to create a past form from it. cf.

Tamil; *Seygu + irēn = Seygiren. Sey + du + en = Seyden*; Telugu: *Velugu + cu + unnānu = Velugucunnānu. Velugu + iti + ni = Veligitini.* These signs of tense have to be traced to independent words in the language and not to any terminations in Sanskrit.

The preconceived theory of the Āryan origin of these forms makes the Sanskritist overlook the fact that unlike the Āryan languages, the Dravidian still preserve clear traces of agglutination, and that is why we are still able to trace these cut up parts to some independent word or words which were merely glued on to the original root one after the other. As Tamil *Sey+(a) gu+iru+en = Seygiren*; Tam: *Sey+(i) du+ēn = Sey (i) dēn*; Telugu: *Cēyu + itu + ēn = Cesu + (i) ti+ni = Cesitini.* etc. etc. It may also be shown that most of the other forms of the verb are formed in the same manner by the help of other auxiliary roots as-causal *Cēyu + incu = Ceyincu.* Infinitive—*cey + an = Cēyan* (cf. Tamil: *Seyya*). Passive—*ceyan + paḍu = ceyabadu* (cf. Tamil: *Seyyappaḍu*) etc.

Similarly all declensional endings which are traced to Sanskrit terminations, may be easily shown to be remnants of independent words in the Dravidian languages, since these seem to be just passing into inflexional stage, unlike those of the Āryan which have already reached a petrified stage of inflexion. But I do not propose to trouble you with all that now.

I ventured to take so much of your time, for which I crave your indulgence and deal with this topic at such length, because this is an important question connected with the origin and development of our own language. Dr. C. Narayana Rao's work describing the *History of the Telugu Language* in two big volumes, published by the Āndhra University, is one of the most important works connected with the Dravidian linguistics published in recent years, and it must be said that it is a result of very patient study and hard work on the part of the author. He has collected very valuable material for the history of the

Telugu language and with the help of this, he endeavoured to substantiate the theory of the Āryan origin of the Dravidian group of languages. Hence it is not only the Telugu people that should be interested in it, but it should draw the attention of all those who are interested in the study of Dravidian linguistics. But I wish to point out to all interested that this question cannot be solved by this kind of approach alone. To trace the history of the Telugu language beyond the limits of the available literary material in that language, a close comparision with other South Indian languages more closely allied to it, than with those of the North is necessary, and every attempt has to be made to explain the forms from the material available in these languages themselves, before we think of tracing them to outside sources. The laws of Dravidian phonetics have to be discovered and established before any attempt is made towards any kind of linguistic affiliation. The grammatical forms and structure of the various Dravidian languages have to be studied in detail. A closer study of, and comparison with Tamil language and grammar in which we find some of the earliest recorded traditions of Dravidian language and thought, is absolutely necessary, particularly because this is comparatively less influenced by the Āryan language than other languages of the group. It is perhaps true that Dr. Caldwell gave more importance to Tamil in comparing the forms in Dravidian languages, as, perhaps he was better acquainted with it, but we cannot say it is quite undue, as it preserves the oldest records in the whole group of the languages; only we have to urge that equal or due importance should be given to other languages also. But it is really surprising to find some modern scholars of America and Europe perhaps carried away by swing to the other side, advancing views altogether minimising the importance of Tamil in a study of Dravidian linguistics. It is Mr. E. Tuttle of America who seems to have said : "If we want to understand the history of the language of the South, we should begin from the Northern side." This view has been endorsed by Prof. Jules

Bloch in this manner: "The Dravidian language which has almost always been chosen for comparison, is Tamil, which, in fact, is best known of all the dialects for various reasons. Even if we admit that from the Vedic up to the present time Tamil has changed very little, there still remains the fact that the domain of this Dravidian dialect is the furthermost off from the region of Vedic civilization. On this principle alone, it should have been the last one to be taken into consideration for the sake of comparative study. Here he quotes the above opinion of the American scholar Mr. Tuttle, and proceeds—

"In fact, our knowledge of the Dravidian languages of the North is very imperfect, and certainly has been very recently acquired so much so that, when it is possible, to recognize the interchange of vocabulary between Dravidian and Indo-Āryan, it is very difficult to determine which is the lender and which is the borrower, though it is absolutely necessary to know the common form of the Dravidian (in a general way). We know of it very little and we search for it less." In fact Tamil represents very badly the common Dravidian language." Prof. Jules Bloch at least admits that our knowledge of the Dravidian languages of the North is very imperfect and very recent and recognizes the absolute necessity of search for the common Dravidian form. Though the present day Tamil and the Tamil country is far away from the Vedic civilization, we have to admit its Dravidian counterpart of the Vedic age must have had its abode very near the Vedic land to have exerted its influence on the lower strata of the Āryan society to such an extent as to develop non-Āryan tendencies in their language which ultimately led to the development of Prākṛts and later Āryan vernaculars of the North. No-body can say that Tamil represents that old Dravidian common form. It has to be got at by a thorough comparison of all the forms available in all the languages of the group including those of the North. The only claim to be recognized for Tamil is that it can show us a much older recorded tradition, indicating a particular stage in the development of the Dravidian tongue,

than what we find in other languages of the group especially those of the North about which our knowledge is very meagre and recent. It may be noted here that the Northern Dravidian languages must have undergone a considerable change during their long life and they must also have been considerably influenced by the Āryan languages surrounding them. The residue of the Dravidian element therein must be very small indeed, though of sufficient importance to any study of the Dravidian linguistics. This brings to our mind more prominently the absolute necessity for a collection of Dravidian cognates and root material before we will be able to determine the nature and development of the vocabulary or forms of the Dravidian languages.

Dr. Caldwell has led the way for the study of the Dravidian linguistics, nearly a century ago, and we owe him a deep debt of gratitude, but it has to be followed up by further investigations and closer comparison of forms in various languages of the group with a view to understand the common line of development of these languages. Grierson's *Linguistic Survey* of individual languages and their dialects has been very useful, and increased interest is being shown in this subject by various scholars. In our own country, the name of late K.V. Lakshmana Rao must be remembered in connection with the work on Dravidian linguistics and Rao Saheb Gidugu Ramamurty Pantulu Garu endeavoured to follow in the wake of Dr. Caldwell, but it is very unfortunate that the former should have been cut off, before his schemes have been fulfilled, and that the laborious work of our Rao Saheb now—alas, late Rao Saheb—has not taken any proper or tangible shape for one reason or other. Nobody in this country can help feeling that the recent demise of Rao Saheb Ramamurty Pantulu has created a very great void in the field of linguistic studies in the Āndhra deśa. His untiring energy and his singleness of purpose in search after truth and his dogged enthusiasm in the cause taken up by him, especially in the matter of linguistic

development and reform, has been a source of great inspiration for all those who came into contact with him. He is the pioneer of modern linguistic studies in our own country, and it is the misfortune of the Āndhras that they have not been able to derive the full benefits of his profound scholarship.

The Nighaṇṭu work started under the loving patronage and unbounded munificence of that great patron of letters, the Maharaja of Pithapuram, and the able guidance of Mr. J. Ramayya Pantulu, should have removed the great want of an etymological dictionary for Telugu. Cognate forms from other Dravidian languages are no doubt given here and there, like the *Tamil Lexicon* published by the University of Madras; but more attention seems to have been paid to the Sanskritic than to the Dravidian point of view. We hope to have the complete work before us ere long to satisfy the needs of the Telugu literary public.

Thus the origin and early history of our language has yet to be traced and worked from the Dravidian point of view, especially in view of the fact, that the recent approach to the subject made from the Prākṛtic and Āryan point of view, by Dr. C. Narayana Rao, seems to land us in an imaginary sphere where the very existence of the Telugu as well as of other Dravidian languages of the South before the rise of the Āryan Prākṛts is completely denied. But as a matter of fact Telugu was in existence even during the Buddhist period. We have seen how traces of it appear here and there in the Sanskrit and Prākṛt inscriptions in the form of titles, place names, boundaries of villages etc. But from about the seventh century A.D. we see it in its earlier form in the inscriptions of the Cola and Cālukya kings who came to the rescue of the vernacular languages of the country. We hear that more inscriptions in Telugu of the early period are being discovered; thanks to the endeavours of the archæological departments in British India, and Native States, which we hope would push further the boundaries of our knowledge of the Telugu language into the

early centuries of the Christian era. Even the recent enterprise of private institutions like Lakṣmaṇarāya Pariśodhaka Maṇḍalī of Telingana, of the Āndhra Historical Research Society and the Āndhra Sāhitya Parisad of the Circars, of the Tirupati Devasthanam Committee of Vengaḍam, and the *Bhārati* of Madras, have laid the Āndhras under a deep debt of gratitude by the publication of the various inscriptions collected by them.

Though the language of the earlier inscriptions seems to betray the peculiar characteristics which indicate the Dravidian origin of our language, that of the later ones written in verse already exhibits such a high flown style, with Sanskrit elements, as would lead the way for the stately march of Nannaya's style of Āndhra Bhārata. But none of them seem to give us any inkling into the nature of the early warblings on the indigenous bards of Telingana. Just as the beginnings of the Telugu language were lost shrouded by the thick mist of the Āryan language, the beginnings of the indigenous Telugu literature were also lost buried deep under the debris of the Sanskrit influence.

Hence it is that our Nannyabhaṭṭa of the eleventh century A.D. has to be considered as our first poet and a translation of his *Vyāsabhārata* as our first work in the literature. After the revival of Brahminism, the rulers of some dynasties in the Deccan like the Cālukyas began to encourage and patronize the Deśi poetry in the indigenous language of the country—the Sanskrit scholars naturally gained favour with them and dedicated works to them or composed the texts of their inscriptions. The form the theme and the style evolved by these scholars of Sanskrit and adopted in their writings in various languages of the country specially Kannada and Telugu gained favour with the upper classes of Society and seems to have driven into complete oblivion all the popular literature of ballads, songs, etc., that must have previously prevailed in the country in the old language of the soil. We have so very few and stray references to such kinds of compositions that we are now

almost inclined to doubt their very existence. The Cattāṇe and Bedende types of composition in old Halagannada referred to by Nṛpatunga in his *Kavirājamārga*, seems to have been forgotten even in his day. Similarly there are many types of old composition referred to by Palkuriki Sômanātha and Nannicodadeva in their works as different kinds of *gītas, ānandagītas, sankaragītas, gaudugītas*, etc., many kinds of *padas*, as *vennela padas, gobbipadas*, etc., and many kinds of *ragadas, udāharaṇas, gadyas*, etc., and most of these have gone out of use as the poets of the royal courts who were mostly scholars in Sanskrit would not adopt these types in their preference for Sanskrit models. The adoption of the Sanskrit *vṛtta* and *campu* form has become the order of the day just like the translation of the purāṇic literature and the extensive use of the *tatsama* form of language came to be considered as the only things befitting the high class literature in Telugu. Naturally the folk songs and other types of composition mentioned above mostly current in the lower strata of society and perhaps written in the spoken language of the masses, were not considered dignified enough to be recognized as part of literature. Though a little later, the poets of the Śaiva school tried to revive the old types of composition and the *Jānu Tenuga* of the country, in order to facilitate their work of religious appeal and propaganda among the masses, they would not cross the bounds of tradition already laid by previous writers in matters of language and style, though they did not hesitate to deviate from it in a number of ways. It was Palkuriki Sômanātha that stood for the revival of these popular types of literature and he not only gave us information regarding the currency of these popular types of poetry in Telugu in his day, but also gave us a few examples of some of these types of composition in his *Dvipadas, Ragadas, Gadyas*, and *Śatakas*. Few other poets in Telugu have given us as many types of popular poetry of their day as Sômānatha. Though the *Dvipada*, and *Śataka* have found favour with a good number of latter poets also in the Telugu land no

echo of *Jānu Tenuga* in the country was ever heard after Sômana and Nannicodadeva. There came in later a movement for the introduction of *Acchatenugu* in the field of Telugu poetry perhaps by way of a reaction against the preponderance of Sanskrit element in the language in the form of long compounds, but it has unfortunately taken a ridiculous turn, in as much as it has tended towards the creation of an artificial language which was neither as dignified and graceful as the old, nor as homely and intelligible as the current language of the day. We thus see how Śaivism and Śaiva poets especially Sômanātha were responsible for preserving the tradition regarding the popular types of ancient Telugu literature. Though it has not been actually handed down to us, the old tradition seems to have been continued in the various kinds of folk songs current in the lower strata of society even to the present day and it is one of the important duties of the present generation to take early steps to preserve even now these old types of composition before they are completely swept away from the land and forgotten by the incursions of modern tastes, and influence of foreign civilization. This undercurrent of mass literature though clothed in a language not so elegant as that of the higher classes of society and as such tabooed by them as *grāmya*, carried with it various branches of varied interest like the heroic tale, the purāṇic story, the social, religious and philosophic theme, most of these in the form of *Dvipada*. We have the indigenous drama in the form of *Yakṣagāna* or *Vīdhi Nāṭaka* and also in the form of shadow play, and various kinds of songs in a variety of metre in the form of *padas*, and we have also prose compositions in the form of *gadya*. We cannot to-day afford to neglect such a variety of literature simply because it happened to be composed in the language of the masses. Even from the linguistic point of view it will be very useful as indicating the lines of growth or corruption in the language, and as a help to understand the provincialisms in the various parts of the country. The vocabulary of our language has to be enriched and our dictionaries

enlarged by gathering together the provincialisms of the country. Dr. Woolner speaking of Sir George Grierson's *Peasant life of Behar* remarked, at the third session of this Conference thus: "It reminds us how much material there is in the mouths of the peasants, that is not recorded in dictionaries of the literary language. It should be the function of the Universities to train such local enquiries."

Now coming to the high class literature in Telugu, we cannot trace it to earlier popular literature of the country, since it had its beginnings in the translations of Sanskrit works. But it seems to have shared some traditions in common with the literatures of the neighbouring languages like Kannada, particularly in the adoption of the translation method, of the purāṇic theme, campu form, Sanskrit *Vṛttas*, introduction of long Sanskrit compounds, *tatsama* language, and *Akkara* metre etc. The method adopted in both these languages is more of an adoptation than of a direct translation and the purāṇic theme of the early days in Kannada had a Jaina colouring and borrowed much from Jaina literature, unlike that in Telugu which is purely Brahminic. The campu form is older in Kannada than in Telugu and does not seem to be a common borrowing from Sanskrit as it can be traced even to the Tamil Literature of the early centuries of the Christian era.[1] The introduction of Sanskrit metres also seems to have started earlier in Kannada than in Telugu though each language has adopted them according to its own genius and inherited traditions. The fact that the few verses that are found in the inscriptions of the pre-Nannya period so far discovered were written only in the indigenous metres and not in the metres adopted from the Sanskrit literature, clearly indicates that these Sanskrit metres were not very much in vogue in the Telugu country before the time of Nannaya. It

1. The *Campu* form of composition in the south seems to be as old as Tolkāppiyar who refers to it as *tonmai dane urai odu punaruda palamai meṟṟy*. This is called *tonmai* or Campu where prose is mixed with poetry in narrating an old tale.

is perhaps Nannaya himself or poets of his age that made a harmonious blend of all the various elements, indigenous and Sanskrit, available in their time. They not only gave a local colouring to the *vṛttas* borrowed from Sanskrit by introducing into them the indigenous elements of *yati* and *prāsa*, but along with them they continued the use of metres of native origin like *sīsa*, *gīta*, *akkara*, etc. When we find that some of the Telugu metres like *sīsa*, *dvipada*, etc., are developments from the old *ahavalpa* metre in Tamil, and there is a correspondence between the Telugu *yati* and the *monai* of Tamil, between the *prāsa* of Kanarese, and Telugu, and that Akkara forms a common feature of Telugu and Kanarese, we are forced to believe in the independent existence of these languages, some common features of which persisted to appear in the individual languages in spite of the overpowering influence of Sanskrit and its literary models.

This blending of linguistic and literary traditions of old with those of Sanskrit which has been going on perhaps since the revival of Sanskrit and Brahmanism in the country at last culminated in the production of Āndhra *Bhārata* the first and most memorable work in Telugu by Nannaya under the direction of the king Rāja Rājanarendra of the Cālukya dynasty. Tikkana followed in the wake and being a man of more resourcefulness and national predilictions managed to impart a new colouring to the old purāṇic theme by giving Āndhra touches and by adopting more of a *Deśi* style than that of *marga*; and as if to pave the way for the evolution of the independent *Prabhandha* in Telugu Literature called his work a *Prabandaha Maṇḍali* while dedicating it to Harihara-nātha. Out of this purāṇic theme was gradually evolved the Telugu *Prabhandha* the greatest achievement of the Āndhra poetic genius. Nannicoda, Nacana Sômanatha, and Śrī-nātha, and other later poets have all contributed their share towards the evolution of the Telugu *Prabhandha*, which appeared in its full glory and perfect form in the age of Kṛṣṇadevarāya of the Vijayanagara empire. In the age of this

Emperor, we see again something of the glory of the days of the Imperial Āndhras. Here we find Telugu language attaining its high and honoured position, not only by being used by the Emperor-poet himself as the language of his memorable work *Āmuktamālyadā*, but also by being declared by his Lord Āndhra Vallabha, as the best of all the vernacular languages of the country. Telugu Literature which has been developing under the patronage of Cālukya, Kakātiya and Reddi dynasties of kings, has not only reached its high water mark in this memorable age of Kṛṣṇadevarāya, but even began to inundate the Tamil country of the South, as far down as Tanjore and Madura, where later on it had fostered the growth of some new branches of literature under the loving care of the Nāik rulers of the day. The process of evolution of Telugu *Prabandha* need not detain us here, but I should like to take this opportunity of impressing upon you here the importance of the application of the evolutionary process in all our studies either literary or linguistic. This method of study which is otherwise known as the historical and comparative method enables us to understand the inner meaning of the various currents in the literary and linguistic life of a nation. By this we can understand and explain not only the characteristic features of poets of different ages and their works, but also see in the proper perspective, how the whole language or literature is a true reflection of the life of that nation. The old time-honoured method of studying a work for its own sake, applying the grammatical or rhetorical principles, and investigating into *guṇa*, *doṣa*, *alamkāra*, *rasa*, etc., of the works is good enough in its own way, but there is no doubt that a critical and intelligent study of a work in relation to the life and times of the poet and to its position in the whole range of that literature, will lead us to a better appreciation and understanding of its beauty and its merit, as well as the genius of its author. It is very unfortunate that literary criticism is generally attended with cavilling and rancour in our country, instead of being a liberal large-hearted appreci-

tion of the beauties of the art of poetry. The critic must have an appreciative and sympathetic heart, the *sahṛdayatva* as our Ālamkarikas put it, and must be able to understand without prejudice to the other man's point of view. Let me quote from a great author a few relevant sentences about the present state of criticism in our country :—

" Too much of what is called criticism ignores examination and is no more than an effort to agree or disagree upon, to accept or reject, what is said or done by other people. We rush to take sides. Such criticism is perverse and hides truth. The reason why we understand one another so imperfectly is that we attack or accept what is said or done as we are impelled by our prejudices. We consider everything subjectively, in its relation to ourselves. We do not take the trouble to perceive what the other person means. If we listen carefully to the words he uses, it is merely to fasten upon their ambiguities and look for blemishes. What the man had in his mind we do not try to discover, what the intention of the artist was, we do not bother to understand. We must get behind the words and actions to seek out what the other man really means."

Perhaps those who are trained in old methods of criticism cannot appreciate this new historical method which is being introduced as a result of the western influence and English education. Mr. K. Veeresalingam Pantulu to whom Āndhras are deeply indebted in more ways than one, has already laid the foundations for the history of Telugu Literature in his *Lives of the Telugu Poets.* Dr. C. R. Reddi has led the way by his *Kavitvattattvavicāram* for this new kind of literary appreciation in Telugu and a few others followed him. Mr. Vanguri Subba Rao has adopted this method to some extent in his history of Telugu Literature and Mr. Tekumalla Achyuta Rao in his *Telugu Literature of the Vijayanagaram Empire.* A comprehensive history of Telugu Literature indicating the gradual evolution and historical development of the various forms of literary creation in the land as reflecting the

various phases in the national life of the Telugu people, has yet to come into existence. It is gratifying to learn that the Āndhra University which is devoted to the cause of the advancement of higher studies in Telugu, has just addressed itself to the task of encouraging the production of such a history of its literature by its recent announcement of a handsome prize for such a work on competitive basis. We hope we will have a comprehensive history of Telugu literature ere long. Besides a history of our literature, authoritative editions of some of the most important works like the *Bhārata* with a complete collection of the necessary readings from all the available manuscripts which are likely to perish owing to the flimsy nature of their materials, is absolutely necessary both from the literary as well as from the linguistic point of view. It is also the duty of all Āndhras to bring to a successful conclusion the stupendous work of the Telugu Encyclopædia started by Mr. K. V. Lakshmana Rao, the pioneer of many such movements in the Telugu country, and carried to its third volume by that liberal patron of letters Desodharaka Nageswara Rao Pantulu of happy memory. The Telugu literature has further to be enriched by the importation into it of various kinds of modern knowledge whose bounds are rapidly increasing day by day, and as it is said

Samaṣṭih Sarva śāstrāṇām Sāhityam iti kathyate

and Āndhra *Sāhitya* cannot be said to be complete unless all kinds of scientific knowledge is brought into its fold. The *Āndhra Vijñāna Grandha Maṇdali* started by Mr. K. V. Lashmana Rao quarter of a century ago worked for some time, but seems to have become defunct now. Fortunately the Madras University has come forward to encourage the production of works dealing with modern scientific subjects in South Indian languages by instituting prizes of their own and by managing an endowment in the name of Rāja Ramarayaningar for the encouragement of scientific works in Telugu. The scheme is good so far as it goes but it does not seem to have attracted sufficient attention of scholars

in science. Besides this, translation of standard works on science may also be undertaken as has been done by the Osmania University, and it may prove useful in hastening the achievement of the object in view. The Āndhra University also seems to have addressed itself to such a task by publishing a work in Telugu on *Vijñānam*, as this is the most necessary preliminary work that may be done, before a University can think of introducing the vernacular as a medium of instruction. I think we need not still quarrel over the standard of the language that can be used in such prose works. We know that such a great scholar as G. Ramamurty Pantulu has already sacrificed his life in the cause of language reform. Telugu prose style has still to be developed and it must answer the various needs of the Telugu publics. The old order changeth in every sphere naturally yielding place to the new; and so far as the language used is intelligible, maintains the standard of elegancy, while keeping with the dignity of the subject in hand, I think we need not quarrel over the minor points of grammatical usage. When the theme is great, the treatment is dignified, and the style elegant, the sentiment pure and overwhelming, it is absurd to quarrel over a *Katvardhaka ikara sandhi* or a *repha sakatarepha sankara* which has forced itself into it here or there. Let our new poets of the Romantic School and prose writers of this new age produce works of that standard, and all the minor objections of the old fashioned grammarians will vanish away into time.

Gentlemen, we are now at the ṭhreshold of a new era of literary activity in Telugu. The old classical models of purāṇic translation, *prabhandha* or *dvyarthi kavya* are no longer finding favour with the new bards of the Telugu country. The modern tendency seems to be in favour of a subjective theme, Khaṇḍa Kāvya, revival of old indigenous metres, social novel, short story, and one act play-*ekaṅka nāṭaka*, the patriotic song-*Rāṣtragāna*. Let us not blame the new generation that nothing yet outstanding, nothing grand, nothing that can stand for

ever—in our estimation—has yet been produced. Let us not be hasty in our opinions or condemnations. We are yet in a stage of transition. The world ideas themselves are in a state of great flux. Yet we must admit there is a great awakening in our country. Āndhras are always forward to enter into or take up any new movement. They must develop tenacity of purpose and spirit of endurance to see it through. The days of translations or mere imitations seem to have gone and we see signs of the dawn of a new era of original production as a result of the synthesis of the western culture newly imbibed and old inherited culture of the East. Let us patiently wait and see. Meanwhile we have got much to do by consolidating the history of the Āndhras and of their Art and culture. A comprehensive history of their language, literature and prosody in their bearings on other South Indian languages and literature; a study of the various provincial dialects in its bearing on the development of the language; an etymological dictionary for the language; an encyclopaedia for which a beginning has already been made; a collection and study of the manuscripts and inscriptional material available in the country and the publication of the authoritative editions of important Telugu works published or unpublished; an importation of modern scientific knowledge into the language, the conservation of the various kinds of indigenous literature and Art—these are some of the problems that may invite the immediate attention of all Āndhras.

May all Āndhras and Institutions rise equal to the occasion and May their Family Deity, Lord Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara, shower choicest blessings on them and infuse into them sufficient energy and enthusiasm to work for the advancement of their mother tongue and mother country and the Āndhra Rāṣtra.

PART II

A NEW APPROACH TO THE DATE OF BHAṬṬOJI DĪKṢITA

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According to Dr. Saletore[1] Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita is to be assigned to "*the last quarter of the Sixteenth and the first quarter of the Seventeenth Century*" i.e. between A.D. 1575 and 1625. According to Rao Bahadur Bambardekar[2] Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita was born about A.D. 1570 and died about A.D. 1635.

1. Vide *Karnatak Historical Review* (January-July 1937).—"No evidence is forth-coming to suggest that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita was a Senvi Brahmin. As regards the age in which he lived we learn from the opening verses of *Tattva—Kaustubha* that he wrote it at the order of Keladi Veṅkaṭendra *(Keladi—Veṅkaṭendrasya nirdeśāt Viduṣām mude)*. (Read Hultzsch, *Report on Sanskrit Mss. of South India*, II. Intro. Pp. xii, 122, Madras, 1895-1896). The ruler Veṅkaṭendra mentioned here is to be identified with king Veṅkaṭapa Nāyak I, who ruled from A.D. 1582 till A.D. 1629 (Rice. *Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions*, p. 157). King Veṅkaṭapa Nāyak was noted for the patronage he gave to learned men (Read *Keladi Basavarāja, Śivatattva-ratnākara*, Kallola VI, Taranga XIII, Ed. by B. Ramarao and Sundara Sastri, Mangalore 1927, cf. S. K. Aiyangar, *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, p. 345). He himself seems to have composed a commentary in Sanskrit on the *Siva Gītā of Padmapurāṇa (Trivn. Cata. of Mss* in the Govt. Ori Mss. Library, Madras, p. 2623). We have, therefore, to assign Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, who calls himself the son of Śrīmad-vidvan-mukuṭa-māṇikya Lakṣmīdhara Bhaṭṭa in the *Tattva-Kaustubha* to the last quarter of the Sixteenth and the first quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D."

2. *Vide* p. 349 of *Bhaṭṭoji-dīkṣita*, 1939 (Bombay). On p. 341 the author makes the following remarks about the chronology of Śeṣakṛṣṇa, Appaya Dīkṣita, Bhaṭṭoji and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāya.—

"There are no satisfactory means of determining definitely the chronology of Seṣakṛṣṇa, Appaya, Bhaṭṭoji and Jagannātha. The descendants of Appaya state that he lived from A.D. *1554 to 1626* (72 years) while other writers state that he flourished between A.D. *1520 and 1593*. Śeṣakṛṣṇa lived before A.D. 1600 while Jagannātha is supposed to have lived before A.D. 1660. The period of Jagannātha's literary activity is given as A.D. *1630—1660*.

(continued on next page)

I propose now to point out some facts regarding Bhaṭṭoji's date, which have not been recorded either by Dr. Saletore or Rao Bahadur Bambardekar but which go to support the probable chronology for Bhaṭṭoji given by them.

It appears that an author of some Vedānta works called *Nṛsiṁhāśrama*[1] was the guru of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and that one of this guru's works was commented upon by Bhaṭṭoji. According to Rao Bahadur Bambardekar[2] the name of this commentary is तत्वविवेकविवरण while according to Aufrecht

There is a Ms of Jagannātha's *Citramīmāṁsākhaṇḍana* dated A D. 1652—1653, from which it appears that the present belief of Jagannātha's direct opposition to Appaya is baseless Bhaṭṭoji is said to have lived from A D. 1576 to A D 1634 or 1640 or 1650. If we base our arguments regarding the rivalry between Bhaṭṭoji and Appaya on the several dates given above we are inclined to think that some of the present beliefs regarding the relations of these two writers are positively baseless as they give rise to anachronisms. Hence we must rely on documentary evidence only in our investigation of this problem"

1. *Vide* p. 353 of Bambardekar's *Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita*. On p. 305 some information about Nṛsiṁhāśrama is recorded —नृसिंहाश्रम was the guru of Bhaṭṭoji. Bhaṭṭoji composed a commentary called विवरण on the work तत्वविवेक of नृसिंहाश्रम. This very नृसिंहाश्रम was the guru of Raṅgoji bhaṭṭa, the younger brother of Bhaṭṭoji. Raṅgoji in his work, अद्वैतचिंतामणि refers to नृसिंहाश्रम as guru ("तदुक्तं श्री नृसिंहाश्रमगुरुचरणैः")

Aufrecht (*CC* I., 305) makes the following entry about नृसिंहाश्रम and his works in his Catalogue —

"नृसिंहाश्रम pupil of गीर्वाणेन्द्रसरस्वती and जगन्नाथाश्रम guru of नारायणाश्रमः—(1) अद्वैतदीपिका (2) अद्वैतपञ्चरत्न (Oppert, 5878); (3) अद्वैतबोधदीपिका (Oppert, 4808), (4) अद्वैतरत्नकोश (5) अद्वैतवाद (K 114); (6) तत्वबोधिनी संक्षेपशारीरकटीका (7) तत्त्वविवेक Completed at पुरुषोत्तमपुर in 1547 (8) पञ्चपादिकाविवरण प्रकाशिका, (9) भेदधिक्कार (10) वाचारम्भण (Hall p. 137), (11) वेदान्तविवेक B 4.96. See above तत्वविवेक"

2. Aufrecht (CC. I, 220) records the following Mss of this commentary :—"तत्वविवेकदीपन-व्याख्या or तत्वविवेकटीकाविवरण or वाक्यमाला by Bhaṭṭoji. Hall, p 156, K. 120"

Hall, (p 156) records a Ms. of तत्वविवेकदीपन which is a commentary on the तत्वविवेक of नृसिंहाश्रम by an unnamed disciple.

(continued on next page)

its name is तत्वविवेकदीपन-व्याख्या or तत्त्वविवेकटीका-विवरण. The colophon of a MS. of तत्वविवेकदीपन dated A.D. 1618 states that this work was composed by नृसिंहाश्रम (folio 147-MS No. 566 of 1886-92) while Hall states that तत्वविवेकदीपन[1] is a commentary on the तत्वविवेक of नृसिंहाश्रम by an unnamed disciple. In the list of Bhaṭṭoji's works recorded by Bambardekar (p. 354) we find the entry "तत्वविवेकदीपनव्याख्या." If we are to believe in the testimony of the colophon of *A.D. 1618* which clearly states that the work was composed[2] by नृसिंहाश्रम, the work तत्वविवेकदीपन is a work of नृसिंहाश्रम himself and that Bhaṭṭoji wrote a commentary on this work of his guru. It is however, stated by Dr. Das Gupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy*[3] that *N* (= नृसिंहाश्रम) was "a teacher of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita" and that Bhaṭṭoji wrote the "वेदान्ततत्वदीपन–व्याख्या which is a commentary on commentary तत्वविवेकदीपन of नारायणाश्रम (a pupil of नृसिंहाश्रम) on the latter's work, वेदान्ततत्त्वविवेक." Whether the तत्त्वविवेकदीपन is the work of नृसिंहाश्रम or of his pupil नारायणाश्रम, its MS of A.D. 1618 should naturally have a special value for us in considering the chronology of

Some dates of Mss. recorded by Hall may be noted here :—

A.D. 1615—Ms. of तत्वविवेक of नृसिंहाश्रम dated *Saṁvat 1671*. (Hall p 155).

A.D 1676—Date of a Ms. of Bhaṭṭoji's आशौचनिर्णय (Hall, p. 156) dated *Saṁvat 1733*

A.D. 1735—Date of a Ms. of Bhaṭṭoji's तिथिनिर्णय (Hall p. 156).

A.D. 1618—B. O. R. Institute Ms. *No. 566 of 1886-92* of तत्वविवेकदीपन was copied in *Saṁvat 1674*.

It ends :— "इति श्रीमद्वेदांतसिद्धांतसाराभिज्ञश्रीमन्नृसिंहाश्रममुनिप्रणीते तत्वविवेकदीपने द्वितीयः परिछेदः ॥ वेदाश्वरसभूमगण्ये हायने विक्रमार्कतः । शुचिकृष्णद्वितीयायां वासरे गुरुसंज्ञिते । पूर्णानंदाश्रमेणैतल्लिखितं स्वेष्टसिद्धये etc.

1. Aufrecht makes the following entry about तत्वविवेकदीपन (*CC*, I, 220)— "तत्वविवेकदीपन by a pupil of नृसिंहाश्रम (नारायणाश्रम?). W p 182., Hall, p. 156 K. 118 Ben 83. Radh. 5 NP. III, 122 Oppert II, 9394."

2. Ms. of तत्वविवेकदीपन No. 566 of 1886-92—*Folio 98* "इति श्रीवेदांतसिद्धांतसाराभिज्ञश्रीमन्नृसिंहाश्रममुनिप्रणीते तत्वविवेकदीपने प्रथमपरिछेदः" A similar colophon for *2nd Pariccheda* occurs on folio 147.

3. Vol. II (1932), p. 54.

नृसिंहाश्रम and his pupils (1) नारायणाश्रम and (2) भट्टोजिदीक्षित, who were evidently contemporaries of each other and junior contemporaries of their common *guru* नृसिंहाश्रम who composed his तत्वविवेक in A.D. 1547[1] as stated by Aufrecht. The chronological relation of these two pupils with their guru may be represented as follows :—

नृसिंहाश्रम living in A.D. 1547
⋮
(MS. of his तत्वविवेक dated A.D. 1615)
⋮

pupil.....pupil

(1) भट्टोजि

(2) नारायणाश्रम
[MS. of his टीका on his guru's तत्वविवेक is dated *A.D. 1618.*][2]

If नृसिंहाश्रम was living in A.D. 1547 as proved by the date of composition of his तत्वविवेक we are unable to accept the date A.D. 1500 for नृसिंहाश्रम given by Dr. Das Gupta,[3] and the period of *N's* literary activity must be assigned to the middle of the 16th

1. The B. O. R. Institute Ms of तत्वविवेक (No. 278 of 1895-98) contains the chronogram of the date of composition viz. Saṁvat 1604 .—

" अद्रे वेदवियद्रसेन्दुगणिते पौषासिते श्रीदिने
रक्षो नामनि पूरुषोत्तमपुरे ग्रंथे मुदाचीकरत् " ॥

2. नारायणश्रम's commentary on नृसिंहाश्रम's भेदधिक्कार is represented by a dated Ms. (No. 123 of A 1883-84) in the Govt. Mss Library). It was copied in Saṁvat 1710 (=*A D. 1654*) at Benares

3 *History of Ind Philosophy* Vol. II (1932), p 216—" *Nṛsiṁhāśrama Muni* (A D 1500) was a pupil of Gīrvāṇendra Sarasvatī and Jagannāthāśrama and teacher of Nārāyaṇāśrama, who wrote a commentary on his *Bhedadhikkāra* He wrote many works etc."

If a work like *Tattvaviveka* is composed by its author in A.D. 1547 we may at the best suppose that he was born about A D 1500 but his literary activity must be presumed to lie a few years either way from A.D. 1547 i.e. say between A D 1530 and 1560 or so

The date " A.D 1500 " for Nṛsiṁhāśrama has also been given by Pt. Siddheswar Shastri Chitrav in his *Madhyayugīna Caritrakośa* p 501 (1937).

century say between A. D. 1530 and 1560 and consequently the literary activity of his pupils Bhaṭṭōji (= *B* and) Nārāyaṇāśrama (=*NA*) must lie in the last quarter of the 16th Century i.e. between A.D. 1575 and 1600. This inference harmonizes with the date A.D. 1618 in which year a MS. of *N's* pupil's work came to be written as we have seen above. It is also possible to suppose that this pupil was living when the Ms. was copied in A. D. 1618, though his guru नृसिंहाश्रम may not have lived upto A.D. 1618.

There are dated Mss.[1] of Bhattoji's works in some of the Mss. Libraries in India and outside. They are dated A.D. *1664*, *1676*, *1677*, *1735*, *1754* etc. These dates would enable us to state that Bhaṭṭoji flourished before A. D. 1650. This limit does not, however, help us very much in the matter of Bhaṭṭoji's chronology. Hara Prasad Shastri, however, gives us a surer criterion to fix the age of Bhaṭṭoji to whom and to

1. *Vide Indic Mss. in American Libraries* by Dr. H. Poleman (American Ori. Society) 1939. Dr. Poleman records the following dated Mss. of Bhaṭṭoji's works :—

Page 152—A.D. 1664—आशौचप्रकरण (Saṁvat 1720) (Ms. No. 3029)

A.D. 1677—आशौचनिर्णय (Saṁvat 1733) (Ms. No. 3026). cf. *A.D. 1676*—date of Hall's MS. of this work.

Page 155—A.D. 1754—तिथिनिर्णय (Saṁvat 1810) (Ms. No. 3102) (cf. *A.D 1735* date of Hall's Ms. of this work).

In a work called **अद्वैतसुधा** (Ms. No. 143 of 1902-1907) composed by **लक्ष्मणपंडित** in Saṁvat 1719 (—*A D. 1663*) we find a reference to **शब्दकौस्तुभ** (of Bhaṭṭoji) :—*folio 61*—" इति सूत्रे च शब्दकौस्तुभे च." Bhaṭṭoji wrote **शब्दकौस्तुभ** a voluminous commentary on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

The Bodleian Library contains a Ms. of Bhaṭṭoji's **विस्थलीसेतु** dated Saṁvat 1732 (=*A.D. 1676*)—Vide p. 286 (Ms. No. 1514) of *Catalogue* Vol. II (Winternitz and Keith) Oxford, 1905.

The following dated Mss. of the *Prauḍhamanoramā* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita at the B.O.R. Institute are important for Bhāttoji's chronology —

No. 657 of 1883-84-Saṁvat 1713—*A.D. 1657*

No. 331 of 1895-1902—Saṁvat 1708—*A.D. 1652.*

A Ms. of *Siddhāntakaumudī* (No. 36 of 1907-15) is dated Saṁvat 1727—*A.D. 1671.*

whose son, Vatsa-Rāja salutes in his work called the *Vārāṇasīdarpaṇaprakāśikā*[1] composed in Saṁvat 1698 (=A.D. 1642). A still better criterion for fixing the limit for Bhaṭṭoji's date is furnished by the date of composition of a work called शब्दशोभा by नीलकंठ शुक्ल, a pupil of भट्टोजि ("भट्टोजिदीक्षितछात्रः")[2] This

1. *Vide.*, p. 175 of *Descriptive Catalogue of Kāvya Mss.* (Vol. VII) Calcutta (A.S.B) 1934.—वाराणसीदर्पणप्रकाशिका—The author and the commentator of this work are one and the same person **वत्सराज.**

"The text is not yet found. It was composed in *Saṁvat 1698* (संवत् षोडशाष्टनवतितमे वर्षे) as appears from the commentary on the last verse. Herein lies the importance of the Ms under notice as affording a surer criterion to fix the age of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita to whom and to whose son the author salutes at the beginning as his *gurus*."

Dr Belvalkar *(Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 48) states that **सत्वराज** a disciple of **वीरेश्वर** (=भानुजी) son of **भट्टोजि दीक्षित** wrote in 1641 A.D. I believe that this **सत्वराज** is the same as **वत्सराज** the author of the **वाराणसी**-दर्पणप्रकाशिका-

2 Ms. of शब्दशोभा (No. 183 of A 1882-83) ends as follows :—

"शुक्लजनार्दनपुत्रो वल्लाचार्यस्य दौहित्रः ।
अभ्यस्तशब्दशास्त्रो भट्टोजिदीक्षितछात्रः ॥ १ ॥
महसि प्राप्तनिजजन्मा कविनीतशर्मा निर्मितमेनम् ।
विनिर्ममे शैवः ॥ २ ॥
यद्यपि खल बह लोची नदषाक्लेशस्तदप्येषः ।
तुष्यतु तदेव तेजो विलसति यस्य प्रसादोयम् ॥ ३ ॥
त्रिनवषडेकमब्दैतिक्रांते विक्रमादित्यात् ।
शिवरात्रौ शिवपदयोर्निजकृतिराधायि नीलकंठेन ॥ इति श्री नीलकंठकविकल्पिता शब्दशोभा समाप्तिमगमत् ॥ श्रीः ॥ संवत् १७३६ वर्षे भाद्रपदवदि ७ इन्दुवारे लिखितं कृष्णदासेन । गुर्जर गोडवाली etc"

This Ms was copied in Saṁvat 1730=A.D. 1680. The verses recorded above which contain the parentage of the author and the chronogram (त्रि-नव-षड-एक = Saṁvat 1693) are not found in two other Mss. of शब्दशोभा in Govt Mss Library at the B. O. R. Institute viz :—*No. 494 of 1884-87* and *No. 84 of 1866-68.*

date is Samvat 1693 or *A.D. 1637* and hence 5 years earlier than Vatsarāja's work of A.D. 1642.[1]

We are now in a position to fix two sure limits to Bhaṭṭōji's date viz. A.D. 1547[2] when his guru नृसिंहाश्रम composed his तत्वविवेक at पुरुषोत्तमपुर and A. D. 1637, when his pupil (छात्र) composed his work शब्दशोभा. Bhaṭṭoji must stand chronologically midway between his guru and his pupil as shown below :—

नृसिंहाश्रम (wrote तत्वविवेक in *A.D. 1547*—Ms. dated 1615 and another work in 1558 A.D.)	pupil ——> भट्टोजि	pupil——>नीलकंठ शुक्ल wrote शब्दशोभा in *A.D. 1637* —Ms. dated A. D. 1680)

Now the exact period of Bhaṭṭoji's life can be determined only if we can determine the exact periods of the lives of नृसिंहाश्रम and नीलकंठशुक्ल. I shall now tabulate some of the present views regarding Bhaṭṭoji's date :—(See next page.)

1. Aufrecht (*CC. I*, 395) states that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita "is quoted by नीलकंठ in the आचारमयूख." According to Prof. P. V. Kane नीलकंठ's literary career falls between A.D. *1610 and 1645 (His of Dharma*. I, 440). If the exact date of आचारमयूख is determined it will give us a more exact limit to Bhaṭṭoji's date than what is furnished by the period A.D. 1610-1645 to which the आचारमयूख evidently belongs.

2. Prof. B. N. Krishnamurthi Sarma states that Nṛsiṁhāśrama "wrote one of his works in *1547* and another in *1558* " (Vide p 666 of *NIA*—Jan. 1940) This statement is against the date *A.D. 1500* for Nṛsiṁhāśrama given by Dr. Das Gupta and supports my view about Bhaṭṭoji's date recorded in this paper.

1. Dr. Saletore's view	A.D. 1575-1625	This view depends on the identification of Keladi Veṅkaṭendra with Veṅkaṭapa Nāyak I (A.D. 1582-1629) — *Karnatak His. Review 1937*
2. Rao Bahadur Bambardekar's view	A.D. 1570-1635	*Vide* page 349 of "Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita" (1939)
3. Prof. P. V. Kane's view	i. A.D. 1575-1650	P. 716 of *History of Dharmaśāstra* Vol. I
	ii. A.D. 1560-1620	P. 517 do
	iii. First half of the seventeenth century	P. 454 do
4. Dr. S.K. Belvalkar's view	About A.D. 1630	*Vide* pp. 46-7 of *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar* (1915)
5. Prof. S. P. Chaturvedi's view	C. 1600 A.D.	P. 742 of *Mysore Oriental Conference Proceedings* 1935
6. Dr. A. B. Keith's view	Seventeenth century	P. 430 (fn. 4) of *History of Sanskrit Literature* (1928)
7. Dr. M. Winternitz's view	About A.D. 1625	*History of Indian Literature* (*German*) Vol. III, p. 394.

The above table shows the unstable state of Bhaṭṭoji's chronology. We have, however, indicated in this paper two sure dates on the strength of which the period of Bhaṭṭoji's life can be determined. As Bhaṭṭoji's pupil Nilakaṇṭha Śukla[1] wrote a work in A.D. 1637 after having studied Grammar under Bhaṭṭoji (अभ्यस्तशब्दशास्त्रः भट्टोजिदीक्षितछात्रः) we may allow a

1 On p. 454 of P. V. Kane's *History of Dharmaśāstra* I, (1930) we read "Nīlakaṇṭha Śukla wrote a work in Saṁvat 1663." Here "1663" is a misprint for "1693"

Vide, *Cata. of Vyākaraṇa Mss.* (A. S. B., Calcutta, 1931) Vol. VI, Preface, p. CV ff —

March 1514—Birth of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, whose son Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa was the guru of भट्टोजि.

(continued on next page)

period of about **20** years between this pupil and Bhaṭṭoji. On the other hand if we allow a period of 20 years between Bhaṭṭoji and his guru Nṛsiṁhāśrama who wrote a work in A.D. **1547** the period of Bhaṭṭoji's life would be "*A.D. 1557 to A,D. 1627*" i.e. a period of 70 years. This period arrived at on the strength of the dates of Bhaṭṭoji's guru and pupil gives independent corroboration to the following views of scholars regarding Bhaṭṭoji's age :—

(1) P. V. Kane—"A.D. 1560—1620"—60 years.

(2) B. A. Saletore—"A.D. 1575—1625"—50 years.

(3) W. A. Bambardekar—"A.D. 1570—1635"—65 years.

I agree with Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's view regarding Bhattoji's date[1] in so far as he states that "Bhaṭṭoji lived after the third quarter of the 16th Century" but it is difficult to agree with him when he states that "Bhaṭṭoji's literary activity must have begun at the earliest about the year **1631** A.D. *i.e. he might safely be understood to have flourished about the middle of the Seventeenth Century.*" If this conclusion is

A D 1586—Death of Rājā Vīra-vala. शेषकृष्ण the guru of भट्टोजि wrote his प्रक्रियाप्रकाश at the request of this Rājā for the education of his son कल्याण *(Prakriyāprakāśa* v. 35). Perhaps कल्याण and भट्टोजि read together.

About A.D. 1580— भट्टोजि finished his education

A D. 1636—Composition of शब्दशोभा *(Leipzig Cata* 760) by नीलकंठ a direct disciple of भट्टोजि. M M Haraprasad states that the date "A.D. 1630" given by Dr. Belvalkar for Bhaṭṭoji is wrong

1. R. G Bhandarkar · *Report* (1883-84), Bombay, 1887, p. 51—Bhandarkar states that in the तिथिनिर्णय Bhaṭṭoji mentions several authors and works —

अनन्तभट्ट, अपरार्क, कालादर्श, ज्योतिर्निबंध, त्रिस्थलीसेतु, नारायण, नारायणवृत्ति on आश्वलायन, निर्णयदीपिका, निर्णयामृत, पृथ्वीचंद्रोदय, प्रतापमार्तंड, प्रयोगपारिजात, भार्गवार्चनचन्द्रिका, मदनपारिजात, माधव, रामार्चनचन्द्रिका, विश्वरूपनिबन्ध, सर्वज्ञ-नारायण, स्मृतिचन्द्रिका, स्मृतिदर्पण, स्मृतिरत्नावलि, स्मृतिसंग्रह, स्मृत्यर्थसार, हरदत्त, हेमाद्रि.

त्रिस्थलीसेतु is a work of नारायणभट्ट. The dates of this author given by Prof. Kane are *"about A. D. 1550-1560."* (*Vide.*, p. 556 of *His. of Dharma. I*).

accepted it is difficult to reconcile it with the facts recorded in this paper and in particular with the fact that Bhaṭṭoji's guru *Nṛsiṁhāśrama* composed one of his works in A.D. 1547. To make Bhaṭṭoji of A.D. 1650 a contemporary of his senior of A.D. 1547 would be allowing to him a span of life exceeding even the normal span of "three score years and ten."

We have taken *A.D. 1637* (=*Saṁvat 1693*) as the later terminus for Bhaṭṭoji's date but I think, we can push back this limit to *A.D. 1633* (=*Saṁvat 1689*) which is the date of a Ms.[1] of Bhaṭṭoji's शब्दकौस्तुभ recorded by MM. Haraprasad Sastri. If this date is genuine we have before us the earliest dated Ms.[2] of Bhaṭṭoji's *Śabdakaustubha* and consequently we can adjust Bhaṭṭoji's period of life and literary activity between or about two sure chronological outposts *viz. A.D. 1547 and A.D. 1633—a period of 86 years.*

As a result of the data recorded in the present paper we get the following series :—

नृसिंहाश्रम ——— >	pupil भट्टोजि ——— >	pupil नीलकंठ
A.D. 1547-1558	(Ms. of his शब्दकौस्तुभ is dated *A.D. 1633*).	*A.D. 1637*

I shall close this paper by recording below the chronological data about Bhaṭṭoji referred to in the foregoing paragraphs :—

A.D.

1500— Date of Bhaṭṭoji's guru Nṛsiṁhāśrama according to Dr. Das Gupta.

1. *Cata. of Grammar Mss* (A S B Calcutta, 1931) p 11 "4224 A—The same (=शब्दकौस्तुभ by भट्टोजिदीक्षित) country made paper, 9 x 4 inches Folia 44—lines 13 on a page ; character, Nāgara.

"*Date Saṁvat 1689*. Appearance old" The Ms contains the 3rd *adhyāya* upto the end of the 3rd āhnika of the 2nd pāda"

2. We have already referred to other dated Mss. of Bhaṭṭoji 's works bearing the dates *A.D. 1652, 1657, 1664, 1671, 1676, 1677* etc.

A.D.

1547—Nṛsiṁhāśrama wrote *Tattvaviveka* at Puruṣottamapura and another work in A.D. 1558.

1615—Date of a Ms. of *Tattvaviveka* referred to by Hall.

1618—B. O. R. Institute Ms. of *Tattvavivekadīpana* by Nārāyaṇāśrama, pupil of Nṛsiṁhāśrama.

1633—Date of a Ms. of Bhaṭṭoji's *Śabdakaustubha* (R. A. S. Bengal.)

1637—Bhaṭṭoji's pupil Nīlakaṇṭha writes *Śabdaśobhā*.

1642—Reference to Bhaṭṭoji by Vatsarāja.

1652—Date of Ms. of *Prauḍhamanoramā* of Bhaṭṭoji (at the B. O. R. Institute).

1657— Do.

1663—Bhaṭṭoji's *Śabdakaustubha* mentioned by Lakṣmaṇa paṇḍita in his *Advaitasudhā*.

1664—Ms. of Bhaṭṭoji's *Āśaucaprakaraṇa* (in America).

1571—Ms. (B. O. R. I.) of Bhaṭṭoji's *Siddhāntakaumudī*.

1676—Ms. of Bhaṭṭoji's *Āśaucanirṇaya* referred to by Hall.

1677—Ms. of *Āśaucanirṇaya* (in America).

FOUNDATION AND SKETCH PLAN FOR A NEW TREATISE ON INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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It is Otto Schraeder, I believe, who points out, while reviewing a recent Indian publication on philosophy, how surprising it is that the country which gave birth to great Darśanacāryas and Vedāntic system-builders, as well as to profound metaphysicians, subtle logicians, strikingly original aesthetic thinkers and political theorists should have suddenly run dry at the very source of its intellectual springs. This phenomenon, let us admit, is not peculiar to our country or age. European thought too has had its periods of depression as well as its exalted peak periods. After Aristotle came the gloom of the middle ages, and even within the range of the history of modern philosophy we find intellectually infertile periods alternating with great constructive ages. But, in our country, an unduly and intolerably long interval has elapsed since the days when the Bhāṣyakārās flourished. And we seem to have lulled ourselves into the belief that no more constructive work will ever, hereafter, be done in our country.

The passive attitude that I speak of has been revealed significantly by an incident, which is rather insignificant in itself. The Ramakrishna Mission have brought out a new edition of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.* A recent reviewer of this excellent edition of ancient philosophic work says, that the Svāmi who was responsible for editing, translating and commenting on it, has drawn freely upon his knowledge of western philosophy in expounding the philosophic doctrines. There does not appear to be any definitely condemnatory note

in the reviewer's criticism, but there is just a touch of surprise. Even the most enlightened student of Indian philosophy seems to take it for granted that the last word in philosophic wisdom has been said and that the task hereafter of scholars is to expound the old without any idea of generating new thoughts transcending the old. This is an altogether wrong attitude, and it is responsible for the death of Indian philosophy.

Are we to be content with mere expositions and re-expositions of the old systems ? Should we not agitate our minds and whip ourselves up into a state of profound dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs ? Would not learned bodies and conferences of scholars express their discontent with the prevailing state of affairs in Indian philosophy ? For, in this field, discontent is bound to lead to very fruitful and encouraging results.

When we contemplate the magnificent philosophic edifices erected by our forbears we are rightly and justifiably filled with national pride, but when we look round us and find no structure that can stand comparison with the ancient monuments we are filled with despair. This despair, instead of inducing passive resignation, should be made to infuse new hope in us. How are we to set about the task of preparing the path for the birth of a new system or systems of thought which can take rank with the ancient *darśanas*, for a new *darśana* will come and must come in order to regain for us our lost prestige, and to re-vivify our national intellectual life. We may, in this connection, learn a very useful lesson from the West. The Renaissance was ushered in by the spread, on an extensive scale, of classical learning. The flood gates of Graeco-Roman culture were opened out, and drained the arid lands of central and western Europe. So, the first step that we may take, following the example of our western brethren, is to release the flood-gates of ancient Samskritic learning by translations, on an extensive scale, of the original texts, and commentaries with critical introductions. This work has

been done with commendable thoroughness and skill by reputed scholars at different centres of learning, both oriental and occidental. One may say that the end of this stage is almost in sight, and so we must hasten the rate of our progress and reach the second stage. Once again we may look to the West for inspiration. In the great constructive periods each leader of philosophic thought began, no doubt, with a careful study of the systems of his predecessors. Each philosopher steeped his mind, as it were in the thought of his fore-runners, but very soon he shook his mind free of the oppressive burden of the past, and brought his critical faculties, trained in the then scientific methods, to bear upon philosophic problems. Thus did Aristotle produce his great system, thus did Descartes, Locke and Kant strike out original lines, and bring into existence great constructive schools of metaphysics. The great pioneers of western thought disciplined their minds by classical studies, by assimilating what the ancients had to say, but they also aroused and sharpened their critical faculties by modern mathematical and scientific studies. Had they been ultra-conservative and shut themselves up against influences of Mathematics and science, European thought would have been as barren as Indian thought is to-day.

To bring about a renaissance in Indian philosophy we need, as we have already pointed out, critical editions and new translations of the old texts, comparative studies of Eastern and Western systems, and the discovery of parallel passages and ideas in oriental and occidental works, but more than these, we need a synthesis of the critical, analytical and empirical method of the West with the *apriori*, speculative and deductive method of the East in handling philosophical problems. We must make an attempt at assimilating the new knowledge which contemporary science has placed in our hands. Only so, can we usher in the new era of intellectual renaissance which will witness the birth of a new *darśana*.

We have now marked out three great stages in the onward march of Indian philosophic thought, the first relating to the present as well as to the immediate past, the second to the immediate future, and the third to the not very distant future. The first relates to the work of translating and critically editing classical texts, the second to the task of a bringing out a new treatise which will contain the results of a critical and synthetic evaluation of the achievements of Indian philosophy, and the last to the creation of a *darśana* which will appeal to, and at the same time guide aright, the spirit of the present age. This paper is concerned with the second stage. An attempt will be made here to sketch out a plan for a new treatise on the persistent problems of philosophy, and the solutions to these problems suggested by Indian thought.

Of the philosophical treatises published in the West three distinctive types deserve to be noticed in connection with this paper. The first of these comprises the great original works written by master minds giving a new orientation to philosophy. These works are highly critical, and it goes without saying that they are written from a particular point of view. Descarte's *Meditations*, Kant's *Critique* and Bergson's *Creative Evolution* are examples of this class of writing. Into the second group will go the histories of Philosophy such as those of Erdmann, Windelband and Cushman, and the third class consists of works dealing critically with the problems of philosophy. Watts Cunningham's *Problems of Philosophy*, Robinson's *Introduction to Living Philosophy* and Patrick's *Introduction to Philosophy* are three of the most recent publications belonging to this class. These treatises take up the great and persistent problems of philosophy, and without ignoring altogether the historical aspect, deal with the problems in a refreshingly original, critical and scientific manner. It is this attitude, that, in my opinion, would be the most fruitful one at the present stage of the development of Indian philosophy.

A critical treatise on the persistent problems of Philosophy with an Indian orientation should open with a vigorous defence

of the Hindu attitude towards the problems of life. The first section will contain, naturally, several chapters dealing with the aim of philosophy, its methods and its relationship to the several branches of human knowledge. The section should conclude with a critical classification of the problems of philosophy. Right at the start, and in the opening chapter it should be made out that for us philosophy is life. Philosophy is not merely to be talked about or discussed in classes and debating circles, but to be lived in every day life. It is here that the tenets of the great Upaniṣadic teachers should be introduced. A clear account should be given as to how they insisted on the empirical method, and how they made the pupil learn for himself by practical experience. The great stories should be interpreted aright and their correct interpretation will lead us on to a discussion of the peculiar intuitive method of Indian philosophy. It is not discursive analysis that the ancient guru, who taught and *lived* philosophy, cared for, but direct intuitive comprehension. The pupil spends sometimes several decades, sometimes only a very short time–it all depends on the mental maturity of the *śiṣya*—in the company of his teacher, breathing in the sacred atmosphere of the forest *āśram*, and lo! at the lucky moment almost in a flash the truth dawns on the pupil's mind. The guru has given of his very best to his *śiṣya*!

Since philosophy is life, and religion also is life for the Hindu, the identity between religion, philosophy and life should be brought out clearly at this stage. It is not the mechanical identity enforced by external causes as in Mediæval philosophy in the West but a spontaneous, living and virile identity that we find in Hindu thought.

Though the mystical and intuitive method is the method *par excellence* of Hindu philosophy, yet the other method of discursive analysis was not neglected by them. What I have in mind is not the dialectic skill displayed in hair splitting definitions and distinctions which abound in tiresome commen-

taries, but the critical scientific analysis of concrete experience. The difficulty in our way arises out of the fact that the ancients did not think much of this method, and those who specialized in it would not reveal their results easily to others. Yet the suggestions are there, and our task is to worm out, and develop them in the light of modern knowledge.

Having discussed in detail the two different philosophical attitudes found in ancient Hindu thought, the intuitive and the discursive, we should, for our present purpose, concentrate on scientific analysis. With this end in view, the problems of philosophy should be first divided into two great groups, the factual and the axiological. Matter, space and time, reality and appearance ; mind, self and evolution should be discussed in the first part, while the second should be devoted to the consideration of problems of logical, ethical, aesthetic and religious values. And in dealing with the problem, data should be drawn not only from the usual orthodox sources, but also from ancient Hindu chemistry, medicine, astronomy, and even astrology. Dr. Seal did yeoman service to our philosophy by the publication of his book *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.* The structure of the nucleus of matter and other problems relating to this field should all be discussed from the Hindu point of view, and then the whole position should be evaluated critically from the contemporary scientific point of view. It should be determined whether we have any definite contributions to make towards settling the current dispute over the wave *versus* particle theory of the nucleus of matter. This critical section, which should be the concluding one in every chapter, is the most valuable part of the new treatise. Instead of being purely aprioristic and speculative, it will come down to the concrete empirical level and throw light on the obscure problems over which western thinkers are struggling in vain.

After matter, space and time will be treated in the same manner. Here again, there is a wealth of suggestive material

hidden away in unorthodox sources, and these should be tapped. Finally, in this part the great problem of Reality and appearance will be discussed, from the Western speculative point of view, next from the contemporary scientific point (of Eddington, Schrodinger and Jeans), there from Hindu stand point, and finally a critical synthesis should be attempted of the electronic theory and the Māya doctrine.

The next section dealing with mind will open with a critical examination of the concepts of mechanism and teleology, stressing the importance of the latter in Hindu philosophy, and will then proceed to a discussion of evolution. Special attention should be paid to the concept of evolution. A suggestive book on this subject has been published recently by Dr. Balakrishna. But what I would insist upon is a very careful evaluation of the concept in relation to the doctrine of Māya. It is out of the findings of such a critical estimation that concepts of great value for the exiological part of the treatise will have to be developed.

Mind, soul and self, with their various strata and sub-strata, will then be discussed both psychologically and metaphysically, and the ground will be paved for the final section on values.

The axiological part will open with a discussion of the logical values, for which inexhaustible material is available in our systems. Ethical discussions will embrace questions of evil and freedom, karma and predetermination, transmigration, Māya etc. For æsthetics we have to step once again, out of the orthodox limits, and draw upon *Alamkāra Śāstra* for our material. Similarly the *Arthaśāstra* will have to be pressed into service for the elucidation of problems political and economic.

With the discussion of religious values relating to the problems of immortality, and of God and His existence and character, the book will come to an end. But it is a tremendous task that we have outlined. What is to be aimed at is not a

mere copy of the western books, but something absolutely original setting forth the Hindu point of view suffused in the critical light of western science. The author will have to be intensely critical and scientific in his outlook, yet he has to keep within the bounds of Indian thought. And, for this, the most important demand we shall make, his mind must be highly original and seminal, for the one aim of the book is to pave the way for the birth of the new *darśana.*

I have mentioned only the most outstanding problems of philosophy. Other questions will easily suggest themselves. What is most important is the method of treatment, and the general orientation given to philosophic thought.

It is perhaps a little hazardous to make any suggestion regarding the lines along which the new *darśana* will develop. But if I were writing the critical treatise, whose ground plan has been sketched here, I should write it with very special emphasis on the section dealing with evolution so as to point to the origin and growth of an entirely *new metaphysical theory of creative evolution nurtured on quantum physics. organismic Biology, Hormic Psychology and Creative Æsthetics.*

ŚRĪ VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA ON THE LOKĀYATA DOCTRINE

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INTRODUCTION

Śrī Vēdānta Deśika, the greatest exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Śrī Rāmānuja wrote the *Paramatabhanga* in 1320 A.D. at Tiruvahindrapuram. It is the 31st rahasya among the thirty-two written by him. It is a primer of the several darśanas as well as an introduction to the study of Viśiṣṭādvaita. It is written for the followers of the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita as well as for local consumption and as such is written in a fluent *maṇipravāḷa* (that is a mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil) language. The work displays all the qualities of dialectical skill and encyclopædic learning for which he had earned the unique distinction of being called *Sarvatantra-svatantra* and *Kavitārkika-kesarī*.

The translation of this work was undertaken by me under the guidance of Srī Mahāmahopādhyāya Cetlūr Narasihmācārya Svāmin, the first Professor of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Nyāya in the Institute, but before we could finish this chapter even, he had been called away from his physical labours to the service of the Divine. The chapter on Lokāyatas, now translated for the first time into English, is the sixth in that book. It is proposed to publish in the *Annals* the other chapters also in due course.

This chapter as compared with the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Mādhāvacārya reveals that on general principles there is agreement about the tenets of the system under consideration though in the details in exposition there are slight additions

and subtractions. The difference in the approach to the subject of expounding the systems is, however, very clear. Śrī Vedānta Deśika, before he starts, wears his spectacles, so to speak, of his system, and then, braces himself to the task of expounding the other systems and demolishing them with their own arguments. His view is that self-consistency is not to be found in any system other than his own. The inner defect of each system is what he points out with ruthless logic. It is thus that the *Lokāyata* doctrine happens to be criticized on the basis of its own logical inconsistencies. The chapter itself comprises of two parts, the pūrvapakṣa and the siddhānta of Viśiṣṭādvaita in relation to this *Cārvāka* system. In other words, the chapter, first states the positions of the Cārvākas and then shows the reactions of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin to it. No statement is left without an answer so that all the doubts that might arise in the mind of a cārvākan-minded Viśiṣṭādvaitin might be dispelled. Śrī Vedānta Deśika reveals his acquaintance with the Sūtras of Vātsāyana's *Kāmaśāstra* as well as Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*.

The spirit of the materialist is wide-spread. Man is first and foremost a material being. The Epicurean theory in the west was characterized by a certain amount of scientific unrest and displeasure with dogmatic belief. The materialistic explanations of the origin of the world as exemplified by the hylozoists in Greek Philosophy continued by Epicurus[1] and Lucretius have their parallels in Indian thought. But both of them so far as the scientific pursuit was concerned were scotched by dogmatism and fundamentalism. The truth of the materialist cannot be denied. Reality cannot cease to be perceptual also. Matter has a reality and it is perceptual, and that is why all idealism must explain perception as real or at least phenomenally real (*vyāvahārika*) and not mere illusion or self-projection. Truth must be experienced and the vision of the materialist is that Reality must become a vision, Brahman

1. cf *Science and the Ancient World*, Benjamin Farringdon. George Allen and Unwin, London.

must become something visible. The *divya-darśana*, the seeing of God with purified eyes[1] and hearing with purified ears is the ideal of the scientifically-minded materialist. That along with this high ideal there have occured degradations of this ideal goes without saying. There is a fateful tendency about all good intentions to gather round them a number of parasitic unholy ones.

Lokayata System

(VI Chapter of the Paramata-Bhanga)

Now we shall proceed to state first the Lokāyata system, among the systems unsustainable by logic, which deludes the dull-witted and is opposed to orthodox systems, and then refute it (on its own grounds).

Purvapaksha

1. What they (the Lokāyatas) say is :

Pratyakṣa, perception, is the only authority (for knowledge). It is a fact conceded by all that even in these perceptions, faults in the instruments (karaṇas namely the sense-organs like the eye etc.,) are sometimes referred to the objects themselves.

2. In inference etc., there is a delusion that they are independent means of knowledge, because of their accidental relation. Even if some of these (inferences and scriptural knowledge etc.,) have authority (i.e. truth), (they could be shown to derive that authoritativeness) from perception alone.

3. The *mantras* (magico-mystical chants) used to cure poisons, and other *yantras* (instruments of the same kind as the previous), are facts of perception on a par with the medicines and sun-light and moon-light influences on sun-stones and moon-stones ; the lokāyata doctrine accepts (as we have said) only perception, and only such authority of experiences which are proved by it (i.e. which are not contradicted by facts of perception and are substantiated by it).

1. cf. Jaina conception of Pratyakṣa, and intuition of Bergson.

4. It is only by taking perception as authority of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that Bṛhaspati has stated the following sūtras:

(i) *Atha lokāyatam:* Now then the Lokāyata doctrine.

(ii) *Pṛthvyaptejovāyuriti tattvam:* Earth, Water, Fire, Air are the elements.

(iii) *Tebhyahscaitanyam kiṇvādibhyah madaśaktivāt:* From that (arises) consciousness, like the intoxicating power from the combination of ferments.[1]

This theory He (Bṛhaspati) got published through Cārvāka (the sweet-tongued) and others.

5. Even *Akāśa*, ether, could be accepted as an (original) element. Since with the help of *Pratyakṣa* that is accepted by all schools (of thought) as the means towards realization of ends of desired, after wealth etc., we are enabled to realize such other ends also as those belonging to ethical life, theft and love and other sciences, which are well-established in this world. As such they are not subjects of dispute (being self-evident to all).

Since we cannot accept anything beyond this world on the basis of our perceptive authority, and therefore cannot refute our experiences on the basis of such super-world experiences (or reports which we do not and cannot have), we should live happily here (and now) (without caring for the hereafter and Heavens) even like the cows and other animals which live according to nature (and do not bother about the morrow). The above counsel of the Guru (Deva-Guru Bṛhaspati) is most acceptable, if only all the theorists would lay their hands on their hearts (i.e. consult their real wishes and desires), and

1. cf. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, trans. Cowell, who quotes Colebrooke's quotation of Saṅkara on Lokāyata.

"The faculty of thought results from the modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor, and as betel areca, lime and extract catechu chewed together have an exhilirating property not found in their substances severally."

therefore this able doctrine is the most helpful to all (parama-hitam).

6. It is an illusion to say that[1]

(i) novel-like kāvyas,

(ii) the creation of castes,

(iii) the performance of duties that are said to belong to them which we neither see nor understand,

(iv) the renunciation of present wealth (for the sake of a speculative wealth in the future),

(v) the causing of suffering to the body (through practices of Yoga),

(vi) living by begging,

(vii) shaving off hair completely or wearing of braided hair and other pain-causing duties, are capable of causing (ultimate) happiness. Other systems which subscribe to such (a strange and false) doctrine are unacceptable to the intelligent-minded.

7. Those who are devoid of intelligence and courage (of their convictions)—that being the common nature of life in this world—are being led by deceitful means to follow others. It is for you to act on the basis of the principle "As is the king so shall the people be?" "As all people (dress or) behave, so shall you." (In this consists happiness).

8. It is only if a person considers that there is a soul different from the body, breath, inner digestive fire, sense-organs and other parts of the body and the elements, (and) that he is one who has to take up other bodies (as results of his present and past karma), and understanding rightly, these, is he afraid of going to Naraka and other (dark spheres), there would be any necessity for him to cease to injure others. (If you do not make such a distinction and do not believe in karma and

1. Means of realization contrary to present happiness is not warranted. Imbedded in this view is the causal principle that cause and effect ought to be identical in nature.

rebirth and suffering in Naraka and other places, there is no need to fear to injure others.)

9. To leave the woman (you love and have), to give up pānsupāri and bed-comforts etc., which constitute the actually enjoyable heaven, and to seek instead the unseen Heaven through fasting, saltless diet etc., means unnecessary (unconscionable) suffering. (Obviously the bird in the hand is worth two in the bush ; cf. Vātsāyana *Kāmasūtra* : I. ii. 29 : varamadya kapotaśśvo mayūrāt.)[1]

10. The body is the Self (ātman) is (the conclusion) arrived at through actual perception, through such statements as 'I am stout' 'I am lean.' Those who try to deny this (*Sāmānādhikaraṇya*—identity) would have to deny such perceptual facts as 'fire is hot' etc., (also). When we say 'My Body', it means that my soul is my body in the same sense as the statement 'the body of the stone image' (where the stone and the image are identical materially).[2]

Consciousness is a product of Unconsciousnss : Asatkaryavada

11. If it be asked whether there could ever be consciousness in any unconscious substance? (the Cārvāka replies) that since there are no substances other than earth, water, fire and air, and since it is by their accidental (or chance) conjunction there arises consciousness, as in the cases of :

i. intoxicating power from fermenting liquids,

ii. the arising of poisonous power from the combination of strange substances (severally non-poisonous),

iii. the medicinal results arising from powers,

iv. the red colour that results from the combination of lime and turmeric,

1. *Sarvadarśanasangraha*, Anganālinganādi janyam sukham Puruṣārthaḥ.

2. The *form* of a stone that is the image is in no sense the equivalent of the *matter* namely the stone itself, nor is it equivalent to the self which is within guiding and directing the body ;

v. the appearance of hardness in the snow-ball (which is merely made up of water,[1]

vi. the appearance of hot and sweet tastes and smells and touch (which are not in those things ?)

vii. pictures that cause delight,

viii. the sharp-points in thorns and their curvedness,

Consciousness is due to the immanent power within their natures, *svabhāvaḥ*, from which arise its evolutes *viz.* happiness etc., their increase or decrease relative to the attainment of what is desired such as the destruction of what is hated, and due to action and withdrawal from action.

Consciousness as Quality

12. Those, who do not accept the quality that is called Consciousness, all the same affirm that for the production of it, mere conjunction of several instruments, (*sāmagrī*) within the body operate as auxiliary causes to bring it about, just like the doll that is made to speak and to perform (gestures). This is like the opening and closing of the lotus buds, expiration and inspiration of breath in us or closing and opening of the eye-lids which occur (in autonomous actions).

13. Because we see that a branch of a tree when transplanted grows there, we cannot say that there is another soul[2] there.

14. To those who hold that we get bodies such as are caused by merit and demerit *(pāpa-puṇya)*, (we reply) it is imposible to say what *special causes*, men, animals and trees etc., have had in the past that marks out their differences from one another.[3]

1. This example is peculiar to Śrī Vedānta Deśika, not found in *Sarvadarśanasangraha.*

2. The phenomenon of a branch of a tree (rose for example) which when transplanted develops or sprouts out of its own accord individually shows that the theory of one soul pervading an entire tree or being is wrong. The bifurcation of souls or existences is a common phenomenon in cell-division in biology. The same question about souls will also arise there.

3. When we speak of a cause, we should not speak of an indefinite and unidentifiable or vague one. It must always be a special cause, well-defined, in the presence of which the effect happens and in the absence of which it does not anvaya-vyatireki.

15. Since sorrow is not (seen to be) the result of sin, to those thinkers who say that freedom consists in getting rid of the causes of sorrow, the giving-up of their bodies alone will be freedom.

16. And to those who hold supreme bliss alone to be the mark of freedom (mokṣa), that which is mentioned in the passage beginning with "Thousand....."[1] will be mokṣa.

17. The self which is characterized by cognitive, affective and conative activities, which is (said to be) immortal, need not be accepted by those theories which

i. refute all differences between substance and quality because of the conflicts between sources of right knowledge,

ii. which accept the doctrine of momentary existence of things, because of the destruction of things without any cause,

iii. which deny cause-effect relation, because of the inability to say anything as to the nature of the inner potency *(svabhāva)* in any thing,

iv. which oppose the externality of things known because of the fact of their being known,

v. which hold that because it is impossible to know all, therefore all are absolutely non-existent.[2]

1 "*Sahasra bhaga sandarśanam mōkṣam*" sexual enjoyment with a thousand women alone is Liberty, bliss, is conquest. Vātsāyana I. ii. 45 Indra is cursed to have thousand *bhagas*. *Sarvadarśanasangraha :* Anganālinganādijanyam Sukham eva Puruṣārthaḥ.

2 This clearly shows that Buddhist view of momentariness, the Yogācāra view of solipsism or the Ālaya-vijñāna idealism, are clearly close allies of Cārvaka doctrine The criterion that if some things are wrongly perceived all are wrong is at the bottom of this view. This criterion is at the bottom of the Advaita view of reality itself which is that because there are cases of illusion, all reality is to be stigmatized as illusion. This is the Cārvāka agreement with Advaita The development of this concept of Cārvākas from mere denial of Scriptural authority, from the subservience of reason to authority to the statement of perception as authority, from this to the denial of cause-effect relation because perception is momentary, from this the transition to the idealistic position and illusionism all comprising the several steps of Materialism are clearly stated. cf Article on Cārvākas and Kāpālikas : VI. *Oriental Conference Proceedings 1933.*

18. Therefore they (cārvākas) say that casting aside all fear of right and wrong, one must pass out of existence enjoying all those perceptible enjoyments that come to one unstriven for, and those that are striven for by oneself, like plants and animals.

19. This theory was taught by Prajāpati to Virocana (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII. 8. 4), and he, in turn, taught this to all his kin. So that this is called the *Upaniṣad* of Asuras by the Vedās themslves. Further this is the system of Bṛhaspati who is the paragon of intelligent persons, having connections with the two divisions (devas and asuras), who has been accepted by those accepting the Vedas (as authority).

20. Jābāli also inwardly accepted this Lokāyata system and on one accasion preached it. (*Rāmāyaṇa*).

21. In the *Mahā Bhārata*,[1] whilst describing Kaṇva's *Āśrama*, it has been declared that the Lokāyata doctrine is very acceptable; as compared with other theories that it is superior.

22. Those persons who seek to be friendly only with those who are continuously performing without any conscience (*anutāpa*) actions that will ends opposed to righteousness, also come under the (sway of this) system.

23. Those (laws) which are established by rulers (kings), by custom of the world, are to be worshipped accordingly as Lords. There is no need for any other special dress of *ācāra* (such as exist for monks and other religious sects).

24. Therefore, since this system is in consonance with the authorities and reason also, and since other systems accept

1. cf. *Mahā Bharata*, Sānti parvan (1410 ff.) mentions a Rākṣasa, Cārvāka by name, who in the disguise of a Brahmin Sanyāsin spoke materialist doctrines to Yudhiṣṭhira.

this system, they (Lokāyatas) say that this is a very important doctrine (which ought to be accepted by all sensible people).[1]

SIDDHANTA

We now proceed to refute this System :—

25. It is impossible to accept the (cārvāka) view that perception is the only authority (for right knowledge). We find that we do gain knowledge through inference (*anumāna*) and scripture. Since such knowledge is not characterized by doubt, nor vitiated by any fault, and since their view that there is non-existence of special reasons (section 14) (i. e. their view that because some inferences are wrong all inferences are wrong, and that there is special reason for saying that some are true) involves them in self-contradictions, and as such is self-refuting,[2] like perception, even inference etc., must be granted to be authorities for knowledge. If this be accepted, even *Pratyakṣa* cannot become an authority (that is

1. Lokāyata doctrine is rather fully dealt with in Vātsāyana's *Kāmasūtras*. Śrī Vedānta Deśika seems to have derived the main aspects of the later doctrine of the Cārvākas from it since he quotes it also. (Vātsāyana sūtras I. ii 18-30). *Sarvadarśana samgraha* I, quotes instead of Cāndogya, the *Brhadāranyaka* II iv 12 regarding the destruction of the individual soul. It also shows that Puruṣārtha is Pleasure, sex-enjoyment mainly.

The *Nyāya Sūtras* II. 57 teach that Vedas are self-contradictory and tautologous.

Śrī Vedānta Deśika in so far as he stresses the fourfold characteristics of Lokāyata points out that other systems do owe their inspirations to Cārvākas doctrine.

i. Denial of Veda is common to Buddhism, Sāmkhya and Nyāya (earlier).

ii Pleasure as *Summum Bonum* is exclusively its own; others preach absence of misery as the goal.

iii The denial of a Self is common to Buddhism, and as also to the doctrine of momentariness.

iv. The denial of inference is a consequence of the doctrine of momentariness, and as a consequence also the denial of rebirth

2. In this, the Cārvākas refute themselves for a further reason mentioned in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* tran Cowell p. 3 they accept in the case of pleasure, pleasure which is never divorced from pain. The universal condemnation of anything through inference is wrong.

irrefutable). If it be said that in inference and śāstra, because we perceive some defects, even in the rest, (there ought to be defects) and that therefore the theory of chance alone is true, then, on the same ground this criticism is valid against *Pratyakṣa* too, (since not all perception is free from defect or illusion).

To those who hold that there are no other sources of right knowledge than *Pratyakṣa*, we reply that they themselves infer that ' if they eat, their hunger would vanish ', and then, proceed to take their food etc. Believing in the words of a ' friend ' ; which are not *perceptions* nor inference for themselves,[1] wherefore do they spend their wealth without any hesitation ?

26. Though in the Sciences of Magic, Medicine, Sculpture, Astronomy and Omens which serve practical ends wherein we arrive at no (perceptive) knowledge on the principle of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatireki*), we find that for any skilful person they do grant results. In the same manner, those sciences which deal with the transcendental world, should not be distrusted *(because they are imperceptible)*.

27. We advise those who have such doubts, as according to the maxim " If the other world were existent, to say that it is non-existent is to perish," it is not right to violate scriptural authority (on the mere basis of its imperceptibility).

It is necessary at this point to ponder over the (following) verse.

> " The Scripture is knowable through perception. In it the knowledge of human ends (puruṣārtha) arises. In it there is no cause for any fault. Therefore, dharma, adharma, soul and self, and others mentioned in the scriptures do not get repudiated by Perception, not even in the Cārvāka System.

1. The critism of Vedānta Deśika here is shrewd, as it points out that in action Lokāyatas are disloyal to their own tenets, even as they charge other systems of being disloyal to their inward convictions. (sec. 5,)

Therefore O Ranganātha, just like Perception the knowledge caused by the scriptures is true. Further, by the performance of Yoga, He who has attained very pure knowledge can *see* the truths of the Vedānta verily as direct Perception."

Śrī Rangarājastava, II. 5.

28. To those (materialists) who hold that inference and scripture could be subsumed under perception for the reason that at the time when there are no sense-organs there is no generation of knowledge through remembrance of (once-perceived) perceptions that become their causes, and also because all normal activites of the sensorium, *Manas*, are only instrumental in that direction and, therefore, dependent on the original perception that has come to us traditionally, (we reply) this view is not correct since the truths revealed by these (inference and tradition) authorities, are absolutely necessary even for themselves (in this argument.)[1]

29. We have already stated that in the mantras etc., that get rid of poisons, the method of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatireki*) is inapplicable. Even the ethical doctrine that holds the acquirement of wealth etc., as means (to *mokṣa*) cannot acquiece in the means that are against dharma, in times other than that of danger, (i.e. it might acquiece in times of distress but not at other times). As regards the '*Science of Thieving*' (steya-śāstra), it says "Get money from those who are wicked and bestow it on those who are good. Forcible plunder is not foul in that case." Likewise, as in the example of Śrī Tirumangai Ālvar (Parakāla), it is applicable to Kṣatriyas in the furtherance of righteousness (only).

1. The point is (i) the fact of remembrance or remembering itself might be a fact of experience alone, yet to be able to say that the past is like the present or *vice versa*, is a fact of inference and not one of direct preception. (ii) Tradition or scripture and dependence on it for knowledge reveal that so far from impugning tradition the cārvakas accept it (iii) *Manas* which is imperceptible is the instrument of activities of remembrance and recognitions and of retention.

30. In the *Science of Sex* (Kāma śāstra) which exists for the sake of pleasing one's own wife[1] it is said "Without any violation of dharma. one should seek love in the living beings, O Bharatarṣabha." Since it is helpful in the furtherance of innocent love, since it is prohibited from being used with respect to other women who have not seen at least five[2] men, and since it is intended to protect other women as also one's own women, it is declared that it is not opposed to dharma.

31. That in all those matters which are not opposed to the world, there is no need to enter into controversy, is acceptable to all the schools. (But on the basis of this view), if it be pleaded that it (lokāyata) does not concern itself with things beyond human experience, there can be no contradiction with this school on the basis of such (superhuman experience), then well might the Mādhyamika nihilist who has given up everything, win in the argument.

32. The claim that it is a system whose truths appeal to all is not true, since it is not in consonance with the views of intelligent men (*nipuṇa buddha*). The Cārvāka-theorist himself is afraid as to how to live if the imperceptible (world etc.,) were really existent. Further because the difference between Brahman, Kṣatriya etc. (castes), like the difference between cows and buffalows, cannot be known through perception, it would be wrong not to treat the śāstric injunctions that are in accord with them as authoritative. It cannot be said that there are no well-established differences between the classes which have come down through ages from (almost) beginningless time, without any kind of self-contradiction.

As said in the following passages "In the beginningless samsāra," though in somethings there happen certain destructions, there are certain other things which do not get lost at all from beginningless time (i.e. they are permanent

1 Vātsāyana *Kāma Sūtra*, I. V. 6

2. ibid I V 33. and I. V 6.

" *Dṛshtapañcapuruṣā nagamyā kācid astiti bābhravīyāh.*"

from the beginning), in the samsāra; after the complete annihilation of all, there is the creation established with all the four castes etc., there is no less of varṇa etc. " Whose fault is not in the caste ? By disease who is not being troubled ? by whom is misery not got ? whose happines is eternal ?" For these the meaning is that knowing these, one should remain without criticizing others.

33. A kind of smell changes the colour (or nature) of milk etc. (into other products such as butter, butter-milk. cream). By such signs revealed by perception, just like ghee, Indranila stone etc., class differences, brahminhood etc, caste-concepts (*jāti*) can be perceived. Thus have our ancients declared. (cf. Ālavandār in *Āgamaprāmāṇya*).

" Tamas is śūdra, Rajas is kṣatriya " as mentioned in these (passages), if it be contended that *jāti* (class-concept) is merely the comparative (excess or defect) differentiation (between the three qualities of the body), it must be said that the fact that what is unforgettably and universally accepted as knowledge received from beginningless time, as in the case of the names of week-days and their successive order[1] is sufficient answer. With the exception of man-class (*manuṣya-jāti*), if it be said that with regard to other classes of beings below it, there would be born mixed-classes of beings of the same kind as *anuloma* and *pratiloma* issues, there is nothing repugnant in such reproductions of mixed classes, since, as in the case of individuals belonging to horse-class, donkey-class, bull-class and dog-class by copulation with other classes of being they do bring about mixed-breeds such as mules etc.

34. Though the Vaidic (orthodox) path prescribes many restrictions on conduct, though they are very difficult to follow, since they have been handed down from father to son in

1. This is an entirely original argument adduced to prove the utter untenability of the view that tradition is valueless and fictional. A fiction that has continued despite changes of dates and founding of eras, in so far as week-days are followed all over whereever civilization exists, is a fiction no longer.

unbroken succession (continuity), it cannot be said that they have been created (by the unscrupulous) for the sake of misleading the lives of the ignorant and the dull-witted and for the sake of deceiving the entire world. The kind of life prescribed by tradition (*sampradāya*) owes its origin to beginningless Veda without any break: to say that it makes one like a man who has his left and right hands tied up, is not acceptable. (It is the way to liberation and not bondage that the Veda through self-control governed by knowledge teaches, and not merely that it is a śāstra that owes no allegiance to any human agency whatsoever).

35. Nor is it correct to say that the body is the Self (*ātman*).

> "Since there are parts, the outer organs that know the body as *this* also know the body. The Self that has no parts that is to be known as the *I* is not capable of being known by the sense-organs, since it is self-luminous. The ordinary man seeing the close conjunction between the two (body and self) does not know their distinct nature. Therefore O Ranganātha, the scriptures that deal about the transcendent world teach that which is different from the body."
>
> *Śrī Rangarājastava*, II. 4.

As mentioned in the above verse, since the body is:—

i. composite of limbs, hand and feet etc.
ii. since it is made up of five elements,
iii. it is known as my body different indeed from my self,
iv. and is the object of sense-organs such as eyes etc., and since
v. the (ātman) does not have any sensations when there is no contact with sense-organs, and (as against the nature of the body) the ātman is the knower having (continuous) oneness of form which

enjoys throughout the body happiness (or misery which is incapable of being known by the outward sense-organs whilst capable of being known directly by one who practices *samādhi* (one-pointed concentration) when the sense-organs are withdrawn utterly (from outer objects), when one knows oneself to be different from the body, (the view, that the body is the ātman gets refuted), and

vi. since like the flame (that has been re-lighted after having been extinguished) is recognized as identical with its previous flame, those judgments such as 'fire burns' which are inferences arising from dispensable antecendents could not be said to be similar to perceptions that are antecedent and consequent relationships (between the self and its body), the view that the body is the ātman gets refuted.

36. The example "The body of the stone-image" is inadmissible to prove the view that 'this is my body.' In the judgment 'My Self', the ātman (or self) refers to the nature of oneself (as a thinking being); (therefore) the judgment "my house" cannot stand as an example of any (other) contrary meaning implied in the word 'body' (whose nature is quite different from the nature of the self just as the house is).

37. Those who making no distinction between those (objects) that can be sensed and those that cannot be, affirm the non-existence of such things that cannot sensed, our ancients have criticized thus: (In which case) a cārvāka who leaves his house and goes out should go on weeping, beating his chest overcome with grief (since that which is no longer sensed, namely his house, his wife and family and property become non-existent).[1]

1. The principle of *esse est percipi* is refuted here. The criticism is valid against all perceptual idealism such as has been made classical by Yogācāras, Mādhyamikas and Berkeley. Cārvākas apparently also held the theory of perception which is identified with existence.

38. The doctrine that by the combination of the four elements, like the arising of intoxicating power from the combination of ganja etc., consciousness arises, is refuted by the counter-questions whether this consciousness arises out of each element individually or in their combination.[1] If it be said that (organs or) parts of the body severally are capable of cognizing, then the body would become a city, within which knowledge got by one (sense-organ) cannot be taken up by another (sense-organ), and there would (consequently) be no law of mutual help between the members.[2]

39. Therefore the view held by Vaiśeṣikas and others, namely, that a new thing other than the parts is born, means only that the new thing is but a change of state of a causal material substance, which is accepted by all, and not that it is something unlike anything determined by perception etc., which gets refuted on the strength of the principles of anyathāsiddhi (that is essential antecedent in causation) and by recognition (that what occurs later is born out of the previous, however different its nature might be, as in the case of the change of mud into pot.)

1. *Sarvārthasiddhi holds* .—" This is a dialectic (*vikalpa*,), the answer must fall in one of this category. If it be said that consciousness arises in each element, then we should have innumerable number of consciousnesses or selves within one body, as the body is composed of many parts. (A Leibnizean view results). If on the other hand this consciousness is said to be born through the combination of all these parts or elements, after such a production, if the parts are separated once again, this quality of consciousness should be present in each one of them, e.g. when lime which is white and turmeric which is yellow are mixed, we get a new colour and a new product, in which each portion has the new colour and new nature. Here Sri Deśika speaks about new qualities emerging only in compounds, qualities which make the original substances different in every sense. The question that Deśika asks is,: Is the body a *mixture* or a *compound* ?—an important chemical question.

2. It would seem that Deśika visualized the *gramā* not as an organism but as a congregation of mutually unaffecting members wherein the knowledge of one need not coalesce with that of others. Individual freedom entails individual indifference to the rest of the community.

ASATKARYAVEDA

40. Even to those who accept the whole as produced, there is no reason for qualities not in the parts appearing in the self (the whole or the *avayavin*). Intoxicating power, poisoning power, redness occuring when lime and turmeric are mixed, the hardness in the snow-ball, the peculiar forms and tastes occuring in cooking etc., processes, these examples are testified to by perception.

41. If it be said that the self has a wonderful quality different indeed from (qualities in) each one of the parts, then it must be accepted that it is born out of the existing qualities inherent in the parts that are perceived to be in them (the wholes).

42. If it be said that (consciousness) is only the combination of these parts and that there is no such thing as self, it would mean that there is merely the combination of whiteness and redness of the several parts and not any other peculiar colour (which actually occurs when they are combined). For this reason, it would follow that the body is just the putting together of hands and legs etc., limbs. (which is non-sense).

43. If it be said that (this combination of limbs etc.,) has cognitive faculty, then there would follow the fallacy of dialectical opposition (*vikalpa*) whether the self arises individually in each limb or in their combination? This mode of reasoning has been followed by the sages in the past :—

"The body is distinguished by characteristics of manhood, head and limbs etc."

44. To those who hold that the body is the ātman, and that "There is no other thing seen, nothing remembered when the body is abandoned, the tendencies do go off and nothing lasts after this"—the refutation of Udayana must be referred to.

REFUTATION OF THE VIEW THAT CAUSE-EFFECT IS NOT ACCEPTED BY CARVAKAS

45. If it be said that there is no cause-effect relation at all, then their statement: " from them (elements) (arises) consciousness " cannot be true. The example that the thorn is sharp-pointed or curved would only illustrate that for each object there are peculiar causal conditions, and not that it is an example of non-existence of any cause at all. *There are causes suited to the special nature of the effects.*

INFINITE REGRESS IN CAUSALITY IS NOT CONDEMNATORY OF CAUSALITY AS SUCH

(It should be remembered that it has been maintained by the materialists that it is due to their *svabhāva,* nature, that the thorns are sharp-pointed or curved etc.). For all effects that are existent or non-existent (*bhāvābhāva*), by taking into account only their peculiar nature (*svabhāva*), if we hold that for each thing there must be a real cause, then as in the case of blueness and other qualities also, all should have (individual) causes. If we refer this causality to the nature of a thing (*svabhāva*), then, it should be capable of producing all effects at all times. If, on the other hand, it is due to conditions (such as qualities and situations), then, the question arises as to whether it is the *nature* of the quality (condition) or the quality of that quality (condition) that produces the effects. Thus there would occur in the former case, the fault of too-wide application, and in the latter case, of infinite regress (*anavastha*). The cause-effect relation is thus self-contradictory and non-existent. Reasoning thus, they (Cārvākas) deny the very nature of the cause-effect relation. All such reasoning however, since they themselves lack reasons, become illogical, since

(i) those things that have both beginning and end should be either non-eternal or non-existent when they have no determination or cause for their origin or end :

(ii) if between the individual particulars only there is said to be cause-effect relation, then there will happen the fault of inapplicability of this (relationship) to those other similar particular instances :

(iii) if it be held that there is cause-effect relation regarding *one particular* thing, it would follow that it is according to what we see (perceive). (And therefore in all cases there is seen this cause-effect relation, and it is not *chance* that has demonstrated the particular cause-effect relation. Therefore cause-effect relation is universal).

(iv) If the cause-effect relation be not accepted, (1) there would occur contradictions to their own system which declares 'from them arises consciousness' etc., (2) contradiction to their premises, and (3) to their performing actions (on the basis of such acceptances, however limited, of the cause-effect relation.) And if they seek to refute other systems and establish their own system, their own view on the cause-effect relation as non-existent, stands self-refuted.

46. As seen in the world, having agreed to follow such conduct as is suited for the sake of attaining those that are desirable and avoiding those that are undesirable, for the cārvākas to say that there is no cause-effect relation, means that there will be no place for reasoning (at all.) Between the acceptance of the ingredients (four elements) for the production of consciousness, and the denial that there is any consciousness, there is self-contradiction. If it be contended that whilst the ingredients (*sāmagrī*) which are said to give rise to consciousness remain without any light (prakāśa), how can they produce any consciousness at all, in their product ? (we reply) that as in case of dream and waking consciousness knowledge arises at first without there being any determination of its cause, as can be discovered in our own recollections (*smaraṇa*).

47. The doll's talks, either through the powers of gods, or of asuras or of other souls through the pervasion of and through the will of the Lord who is the being indwelling and

destining all actions whatsoever, are products of (some) consciousness which is their cause, since they are created at all places (and times). Also such examples as closing and opening of the lotus-bud, and expiration and inspiration of breath (are not autonomous machine- processes and as such) are refuted. The growth of the transplanted branch of a tree at any particular place (*kṣetra*) occurs according to the individual karma-deserts of the countless souls (*ksetra-jñaḥ*) who tenant these (trees). That there might be many more trees than other (living beings etc.) might be due to the large amount of sin that individuals have committed (thus making them deserve to be born as plants rather than as men). This fact, however, cannot be a reason for the denial of the soul-body relationship. Thus the individual soul is proved to exist independent of the body, but as enjoying the deserts of its sinfulness and virtue, namely, misery and happiness. Thus the theories that teach that on the destruction of the body (no soul exists), and that the enjoyment of pleasure in the body is freedom, are refuted.

48. If it be said that if we accepted that there are such facts, as vice and virtue, there will be multiplicity of reasons in the instruments (ingredients) that severally are determined (i) for the sake of realizing those which have been desired and (ii) those which have been coming to us through heredity which are the special causes of our pains and pleasures, then we refute this view, since this is according to the views established according to the eternal Veda, in whose creations there are no contradictions which are capable of being mentioned. And there are no other faults.

ADRISHA AS INVISIBLE EFFECTUATION-PROCESS IS ACCEPTABLE

49. If it be said that in case we accept the principle of *adriṣṭa* (invisible potencies) (or rather see the whole problem from that standpoint), when there are *visible* ingredients, there should not be *invisible* effects (to which they give rise), (then

we reply) since such is seen to be the case in the lives of Prahlāda and Hanumān and others belonging to their kind, as also in the case of curses etc., it is acceptable to us also.

Relation between word and meaning is due to reference, or 'intention', akanksha

50. In perception, inference, ordinary information and scriptural knowledge, there happen in some sense the inter-relation between word and meaning. How can there be any linking with meaning for words of the eternally existing Veda, like the words of a man who has dreamt, even though there is no fault at all in the individual? (i. e. without previous experience there can be no relationship between sound and meaning?) Because of the power in the words in their own nature there is a definite relation between the words and the meanings that arise out of them (more or less experienced or got through *samskāra*). By these words definite knowledge is revealed by reference (pointing out to an object *ākaṅkṣā*), connection (*sandhi*) and relevance (*yogyatā*). When this relationship between word and meaning is not accepted, then there will be no production of any knowledge whatsoever, which have these words as causes. And to the knowledge that has thus arisen, since both the faults in the cause, and (later) in the source of knowledge which reveal that, are not existent, there is no objection in accepting their validity as true as in the case of perceptive knowledge.

51. Therefore, those schools which hold that in creation as well as in dissolution, there happen birth and death for the individuals, will be similar to the heterodox systems of Brahma-datta (Bṛhaspati). How can that soul which is said to merge into the Divine during *Praḷaya*, everlasting, exist undestroyed during the daily and occasional creations and dissolutions? Therefore the souls will be eternally established in *Mokṣa* in *Oneness* (identity). But since the scriptural texts which teach difference between souls will contradict the state of mokṣa decribed by this view, since equality in the possession

of attributes and similarity will not accrue, since to the liberated soul free enjoyment etc. activities are attributed, what is meant by everlasting deluge is destruction of *ignorance, karma* etc., and non-return to birth and the complete Brahman-experience (and not as Advaita holds, loss of individual uniquenesses). Therefore the doctrine which upholds that *Mokṣa* means annhilation of self is equivalent to the Cārvāka doctrine.

52. The view, which, on the basis of momentariness of all things, refutes the difference between quality and substance, also seeks to refute the doctrine of qualified eternal ātman. Refutation of this view must be sought in the chapters where we deal with Buddhist doctrines.

53. Therefore, having known the eternal *Self* which is well-known through perception, inference and scripture, one should seek to attain that which will banish sorrow and happiness that belong to the world of the ordinary materialist.

54. Prajāpati and Bṛhaspati, the teacher of the gods, when they taught the identity between the soul and body, it was for the purpose of deluding the Asuras. Jābāli's words which owe their origination to the devotion to Śrī Rāma are answered by Śrī Rāma's own words.

55. In the description of *Āśramas*, to say that the Lokāyatas are the foremost (violators) is to say that the Lokāyata system is fit to be criticized (given up). Therefore it has absolutely no relationship with Veda or Vedic thought (which they glibly quote). That which is fit for those who are like animals deeply tainted by sin, cannot become the means to truth.

56. Like those, who knowing that they would get fruits by being devoted to their worldly-masters (kings etc.), act on such knowledge in the world, it is certainly no fault if one asserts that by devotion to the *All Highest Lord* proved by the

world, scripture, and common experience one could gain fruits. Even to those who are devoted to Perception alone, there is no possibillity of refuting this because the nature of the Veda and the knowledge born out of such knowledge of Veda are also facts of perception. For this (Veda), the faults due to genesis (cause) or illuding knowledge (limiting adjuncts, *upādhi*) are absent, and as such there is no possibility of refuting it.

MOUNT VEṄKAṬA IN TAMIL LITERATURE

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Tanjore.

Mount Veṅkaṭa is to the South, what Mount Kailas is to the North of Hindu India. In the field of religion Viṣṇu as Veṅkaṭeśvara and Śiva as Parameśvara appropriate respectively these hoary hills as their seats of divine grace. Immemorial antiquity, has besides stamped on these, a halo of sanctity to their other traditions, which has come down the ages. Śrī Viṣṇu is spoken of as having his seat on the coils of Adiśeṣa, personified in the ranges of this Tirumalai (Hills) of nearly 100 square miles in extent and shaded under a hood of its seven peaks—the Mount Veṅkaṭācala; as Śiva rests on Mount Kailas of the Himācala. Hindu devotees of all religious persuasions throng to these hills; and, in the south, Śrī Veṅkaṭeśa attracts pilgrims from all the distant corners of India for worship as "Bālāji" and fulfil their vows to Him.

Hindu lore is replete with references to both the hills. Sanskrit and Tamil vie with each other to honour them. Twelve of the Samskrit purāṇas make mention of Veṅkaṭa—and one of them the *Aditya-purāṇa* refers to its presiding deity as Veṅkaṭa Nāyaka--and to exist from the begining of the Kali-yuga. Be that as it may. It was, however, given to Pasindi Veṅkaṭatturaivar to compile *The Veṅkaṭācala Mahātmya* out of the old *Purāṇas* and the mangalāśāsana adulatory verses of the Ālvārs.

Early literary references to Mount Veṅkaṭa in the Tamil classics date from the first century A.C. *Tolkāppiyam* considered anterior to Pānini's grammar defines the boundaries of 'the

good land of the Tamil language as lying between the northern Veṅkaṭa and the southern Kumāri (Cape Comorin).

வடவேங்கடந் தென்குமரி யாயிடைத்
தமிழ் கூறு நல்லுலகம் ''

This finds a corroboration in a verse of Māmūlanar in *Aha-nānūru* collections :

பனி படு சோலை வேங்கடத்தும்பர்
மொழி பெயர் தேஎத்த ராயினும் நல்குவர் *Aham*, 211

It is evident then that these verses fix the northern boundary of the Tamil land, and that farther north of Veṅkaṭa, the country was inhabited by a people speaking a different language other than Tamil. The *Aha-nānūru* collections contribute ten laudatory verses to Mount Veṅkaṭa as " prosperous and festive grace all-abounding."

" விழ வுடை வீழுச்சிர் வேங்கடம் '' *Aham*, 61

and as the hill of long ranges whereon glide heavy clouds laden with rain, and spotted with swelling water-falls of white foam.

" இனமழை தவழும் ஏற்றரு நெடுங்கோட்
டோங்குவெள் ளருவி வேங்கடத் தும்பர் ''— *Aham*, 213

They also speak to these hill regions being ruled by Tamil chiefs ; and, one of these refer to the tribute of white-tusked elephants sent by them to their Pāṇḍya overlord at Korkai.

" வேங்கடம் பயந்த வெண் கோட் டியானை
மறப்போர்ப் பாண்டியர் அறத்திற் காக்கும்
கொற்கையம் பெருந்துறை ''— *Aham*, 27

Their local chief was one புல்லி by name and are referred to in two verses.

" கழல்புனை திருந்தடிக் கள்வர் கோமான்
மழ புலம் வணக்கிய மாவண் புல்லி
விழவுடை வீழுச்சிர் வேங்கடம் ''— *Aham*, 61

" நிரை பல குழீஇய நெடு மொழிப் புல்லி
தேன் றூங் குயர்வரை நன்னாட் டும்பர்
வேங்கடம் "— *Aham*, 393

Mention is also made to another chief Tiraiyan by name of the Toṇḍaiyar clan.

" வென் வெற் றிரையன் வேங்கட நெடுவரை "— *Aham*, 85

" வினைநவில் யானை விறற் போர்த் தொண்டையர்
இனமழை தவழும் ஏற்றரு நெடுங்கோட்
டோங்கு வெள் ளருவி வேங்கடத்தும்பர்— *Aham*, 213

These references speak distinctly to the fact of this Veṅkaṭa hill and country being under the rule of Tamil chiefs in the early centuries of the Christian era and anterior to it. Four other verses of the *Pura-nānūṟu* collections further this fact.

" ஒலிவெள் ளருவி வேங்கடநாடன் " *Puram*, 381

" கல்லிழி யருவி வேங்கடங்கிழவோன் " *Puram*, 389

Silappatikāram :—the epic of the anklet—of the second century A.D. refers to this hill as 'Viṣṇu's Hill' நெடியோன் குன்றம். The poet delightfully compares Viṣṇu to a black cloud with lightning and rainbow streaks brightening His wonderful aspect, on the summit of this hill beautified with torrential water-falls on either side and radiant with effulgent rays of the Sun and Moon :—

" வீங்குநீ ரருவி வேங்கட மென்னு
மோங்குயர் மலையத் துச்சி மீமிசை
விரிகதிர் ஞாயிறுந் திங்களும் விளங்கி
யிருமருங் கோங்கிய விடைகிலைத் தானத்து
மின்னுக் கோடி யுடுத்து விளங்குவிற் பூண்டு
நன்னிற மேக நின்றது போலப்
பகையணங் காழியும் பால்வெண் சங்கமுந்
தகைபெறு தாமரைக் கையி னேந்தி
நலங்கிள ரார மார்பிற் பூண்டு
பொலம்பூ வாடையின் பொலுந்து தோன்றிய
செங்க ணெடியோ னின்ற வண்ணமும் "

Silap-Kāḍukaṅkāthai, 41-51

Mount Veṅkaṭa (Tirupati), Śrīraṅgam, and Tirumālkunram (Alagar-koil) are refered to in this classic, and the first claims the author's clear and detailed mention as above referred to.

Though the mention of this hill in this epic is only as a seat of Viṣṇu, evidences are not wanting to show that the hill is of equal importance to the followers of Śiva as a seat of Muruga (Subraḥmaṇya) in an earlier age and times.

Sivajñāna Munivar of the eighteenth century, the author of தொல்காப்பிய விருத்தி strengthens this view when he says

> " தமிழ் நாட்டிற் பிற வெல்லையு முளவாக வேங்கடத்தை
> யெல்லையாகக் கூறினர். அகத்தியனுர்க்குத் தமிழைச்
> செவியறிவுறுத்த செந்தமிழ்ப் பரமாசிரியனுகிய அறுமுகக்
> கடவுள் வரைப்பு என்னும் இயைபு பற்றி என்பது "

Saint Aruṇagiri of an earlier century praises Mount Veṅkaṭa in eleven of his verses and consistently holds Veṅkaṭa as the seat of his deity Subrahmaṇya.

> " வடவேங்கடத்திலுறைபவ
> னுயர் சாரங்க சக்ர கரதலன் மருகோனே"—தி. 175
>
> " வேந்த குமார குக சேந்தம பூரவட
> வேங்கட மாமலையில் உறைவோனே " தி. 659
>
> " சிவகிரியிலும் வடமலையிலு முலவிய வடிவேலா " தி 647
>
> " அயிற்குமர குகை வழிவந்த
> மலைச்சிகர வடமல நின்ற பெருமாளே— திருப்புகழ். 453

The physiographical திணை classification of the Tamil land falls under குறிஞ்சி. Muruga is its presiding native deity. Possibly Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara's personal decorations of the matted *jaṭa* on the head and *nāgābharaṇa* on the shoulders, and the rituals by Bilva and of Śakti worship followed in this temple during the ṣaṣṭi beside others of Śaiva cult; the term 'Balāji' applied to Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara here by his devotees of the Northern India are other points to be considered in this connection. Significant are the out-pourings of Peyālvār and

Nammālvār too who in their *pāśuras* sing of the dual character of Śiva and Viṣṇu, as blended in the Lord of Veṅkaṭa. But this is another aspect of the Mount Veṅkaṭa.

Coming to the age of the Ālvārs, the hill and Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara are sung by ten of the twelve of them. Mathurakavi and Thoṇḍar-aḍi-poḍi are the exceptions. The *முதலாழ்வார்கள்* possibly in point of time : Saints Poigai-alvār, Pūdat-tālvār, and Pey-ālvar, came of the Toṇḍai-nāḍu bordering on the Veṅkaṭa hill and each of them have sung of Veṅkaṭa in 9,8,15 respectively in each of their 100 verses contributed to the *Nālāyira Prabandha* the *liber sacrorum* of the Vaiṣṇavites.

With Poigai-Ālvār Veṅkaṭa is one of the four great shrines, of his especial esteem, the others being Viṇṇagaram, Vehka, and Koval. He sings of Veṅkaṭa as one enlightening the Gods, that Brahmans worship, and its Lord as the Lord of the four Vedās.

Pūdattu-Ālvār in the eulogies considered Veṅkaṭa, the highest object to be desired.

Pey-Ālvār uses the word 'Tirumalai'-sacred hill for Veṅkaṭa for the first time, as he is also the first to give an equal praise to both Śiva and Viṣṇu as the one embodied therein and presiding on this hill as referred to Supra and that the hill is equal in praise if not more sacred than that of Vaikunda and the Parkkadal.

> " தாழ் சடையும் கீள்முடியும் ஒண்மழுவும் சக்கரமும்
> சூழரவும் பொன்ணாணும் தோன்றுமால்—சூழும்
> திரண்டருவி பாயும் திருமலைமே லெந்தைக்கு
> இரண்டுருவு மொன்ரு யிசைந்து " Peyālvār, *Iyarpah*, 63

Tirumaliśai-Ālvār has sung of his favourite Hill in *Tirucanda Viruttam* and *Nānmuhan Tiruvandādi* " Veṅkaṭa is that the Devās worship ; in truth, it is Veṅkaṭa that frees us from all sins and diseases " is the burden of his fervered outpourings.

Tiruppāṇa-Ālvār's contribution is a hymn of 10 stanzas beginning with 'அமலனாதிபிரான்' dividing his devotions with Śriraṅgam.

Tirumaṅgai-Ālvār the largest contributor to the *Nālāyiram* devotes as many as 64 to Veṅkaṭa in his 1361 verses. His hymn

"தாயே தந்தை யென்றும் தாரமே கிளைமக்களென்றும்
நோயே பட்டொழிந்தேன் துன்னைக் காண்பதோ ராசையினால்
வேயேய் பூம்பொழில்சூழ் விரையார் வேங்கடவா!
நாயேன் வந்து அடைந்தேன் நல்கி ஆளென்னைக் கொண்டருளே."

is of high philosophical truth to save the soul from earthly bondage and of succeeding births and re-births.

Kulaśekara's contribution to Veṅkaṭa is 11 out of his 105 verses. His other poem beginning with ஊனேறு "செல்வத்துடர்ப் பிறவி யான் வேண்டேன்" is a soul-stirring appeal to Him, expressing his preference to be born on Veṅkaṭa Hill as a bird, as a beast, a fish or a tree or be a stream, or stone-step, a post or a statue rather than a human being with all earthly riches;

"செடியாய் வல்வினைகள் தீர்க்கும் திருமாலே
நெடியானே! வேங்கடவா! நின்கோயிலின் வாசல்
அடியாரும் வானவரும் அரம்பையரும் கிடந்தியங்கும்
படியாய்க் கிடந்து உன் பவளவாய் காண்பேனே"

Periy-Ālvār has sung of sixteen sacred Vaiṣṇavite shrines inclusive of Veṅkaṭa in his 473 pāśuras.

Āṇḍāl—the reputed saint and daughter of Periyalvar has 16 verses on this sacred Mount. Her poem நாச்சியார் திருமொழி is of a type of 'Megadhūta' (the cloud messenger) addressing the cloud to carry her message of love to the Lord of Veṅkaṭa.

Nammālvār has sung of this sacred hill in as many as 54 verses in the Prabandha. He describes the Lord as the supreme being ஆதிமூர்த்தி and the hill as one that will bestow *Mokṣa* on its devotees. He is also the first to mention of this

Lord of Veṅkaṭa as Śrīnivāsa, and as '*அலர்மேல் மங்கை யுறை மார்பா*' the goddess enshrined at Chiruttāṇūr.

Coming to still later literary mentions, Poet Kambar of the 12th century gives laudatory mentions of Mount Veṅkaṭa and its presiding Lord thus :—

"*வடசொற்குந் தென்சொற்கும் வரம்பா தநான்மறையு மற்றைநூலும்*
இடைசொற்ற பொருட்கெல்லா மெல்லையதாய் நல்லறத்துக் கீறுய்வேறு
புடைசுற்றுந் துணையின்றிப் புகழ்பொதிந்த மெய்யே பொற்பூத்துநின்ற
உடைசுற்றுந் தண்சாரலோங்கிய வேங்கிடத்திற் சென்றுறுதிர் மாதோ."

Rāmāyaṇam-Kiṣkindhā Kāṇḍam-Nadavitta Paḍalam, stanza 26

The reference is to the directions given by Sugrīva to Hanumān to proceed on to different directions in search of Sītā. The natural scenery abounding on the cool Veṅkaṭa, overgrown with forests humming with hiving bees and as forming the boundary between the northern and the southern languages and that which contains the Truth enshrined in the Vedās and all the śāstrās is a scenic representation of all that is blessed.

Poetic compositions by later Vaiṣṇavite authors have been many and special mention has to be made of *திருவேங்கட மாலை* and *திருவேங்கடத் தந்தாதி* also a stanza on Veṅkaṭa in his *நூற் றெட்டுத் திருப்பதியந்தாதி* all of them by Alagiya Manavālar alias Pillaipperumal Iyangar. Mention has to be made also of another later work *திருவேங்கடக் கலம்பகம்* by Andhakak-kavi Veeraraghava Mudaliar.

Mount Veṅkaṭa has thus been from very early times a land mark in the political configuration of the land, and in the field of religion, one of fervent devotion as an abiding place of both Śiva and Viṣṇu.

A STUDY IN THE MYSTIC AND RELIGIOUS TYPES OF PERSONALITY AND YOGA

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Experience, as has been well remarked by Prof. James Ward, is that which has been experiemented upon by an expert. The expert in this case, is the mystic or religious seer, and our deductions must be based on their experiences.

There are two personality-types, the mystical and the religious. Religions are made or rather founded by the one, whereas the struggles for freedom, liberation or liberty are made by the other. Religious consciousness is typically one of surrender to whatever is conceived to be the highest Person, Principle or System. The feeling of dependence is its characteristic feature. The aim of transcendence is there but it is not clamant. Thus whatever be the definition of religion, the fact of dependence on something that is Other and More, the *surplus* of Rabindranath Tagore, greater than the individual cannot be denied. The mystic, on the other hand, is quite a different type of personality. He has none of the air of subservience and surrender. He has the sense to feel that he is at one with the Infinite; not as a creature does he commune with the Infinite but as one who is participating or rather seeking to participate in the richness and splendour of the Infinite. He does not normally lay stress on the unity of all, of himself with All or the whole, but only on the fact of finiteness which he cannot tolerate, much less admit. For him, the law 'as in the macrocosm so it is in the microcosm' must be extended to the fullest limit so as to grant for the individual

an equal participation, power and plenitude of existence with the All. The idealistic tendency is of mysticism, and finally it emerges as the instinctive struggle for *mokṣa*, liberation. The mystic is a pioneer, an *asura* so to speak, who is anxious to break the bonds of existence, for he dimly feels that he shares the fullness in power, light and being with the All.

Psychologists obsessed by the abnormal types of personality or paying attention only to physiological types, underestimate the distinctions that exist between the two types above mentioned, namely, the mystical and the religious. Religious consciousness and mystical experience are however not contraries.

If a modern classification of types is to be attempted in terms of extrovert and introvert, we might say that the mystic type of personality would appear to be the extrovert and the religious as the introvert, since according to Jung (*Psychological Types*), we find that coercive force, struggle for mastery, and individuality pertain to the extrovert, whereas subordination, resignation to fate, surrender to higher powers and quiet patience belong to the introvert. This division as will be seen cuts across that proposed by psychologists who hold mystical personalities to be introverts.

In the study of the lives of the pioneers in spiritual experience, the two types we have mentioned are clearly distinguishable. It is the truth of the religious man to be conforming to that which exists as established custom or usuage or tradition, whereas the truth for the mystic is to be an iconoclast. This distinction in attitudes is fundamental to any understanding of the Philosophy of Religious Consciousness. So fundamental is this distinction that it is strange that there should ever have been confusion. Religious Consciousness is definitely dogmatical (in the Mac Taggartean sense), whereas the mystical is pantheistic, is nebulous, and shows itself as the vital overflow of idealistic tendencies rather than as the intuitive understanding that defies all dogmatism.

Not that this vitalism is all. Far from it. This characteristic it has because it is essentially a struggle against limitation, social, philosophical or religious. The protest is commensurate in strength with the *felt* heaviness of the bonds.

The *via media* between these two tendencies has rarely been found. We find mystics who having revolted strongly against all limitations finally discover their destination to be a nihilistic *nirvāna*, a contentless existence. Buddhistic thought characterized as it is by mysticism having struggled against all dogmatism ended in an experience that might well be called non-existence. *Advaitic* thought is essentially mystical, and its struggles against all forms and names, all definition and determination, has led it to an experience that is the culmination of limitless existence, abstract Freedom-experience.

Religious Experience naturally moves on the wake of previous revelations. It is, we already said, characterized by the feeling of dependence, may be on the past experiences of the race garnered in proverbs and maxims, or on past speculations and affirmations on the nature of the Supreme Being or Reality. Des Cartes in reviving the Ontological Argument of Anselm really showed his inner indebtedness to religious experience. As a matter of fact the rationalist cannot but finally end in religion. The determination by law of thought, regulation of the present by past experience and revelation, is the significant feature of the religious attitude. It is not often that we find psychologists defining religion in this manner. Prof. Mac Taggart in his *Some Dogmas of Religion* affirmed that true religion consists in the acceptance through reason the probable reality of the Deity, a probability that is almost equivalent to an assertion of its reality.

If Bruno revealed his mystical iconoclasm, and Shelley the promethean revolt against all conformity, Leibnitz revealed the strict loyalty to the Deity and Browning the inner synthesis of religion that has devoutness to the Deity who is the inward ruler of all life and being. It is always the mystic who revels

in the destruction of barriers to freedom *qua* barriers. The problem of freedom is not and has not been the chief concern of the religious. Religious Consciousness abides with those who surrender to the Divine Spirit and with those who live in the life of the Divine and struggle to achieve participation and at-oneness with their Lord, whatever be the changes, crises and calamities that might assail them. Not that it does not love freedom and does not plead for extinction of barriers, but the barriers that it seeks to remove are the barriers to knowledge, which thwart mutual love between the Infinite and the finite and promote separation.

Thus there is a clear-cut distinction between the two types, or the two attitudes. The dualism is a serious one. Interpreters of the Upaniṣads have sought to explain the texts according to their mystical or religious predilection and have tried to create a dualism in the texts themselves. This dualism is possible because the two attitudes are real attitudes, and the personality of the Seer determines the attitude that he reveals in his utterances. This is not to state that the *content* of the revelation or utterance is of either partially true or untrue character, but to affirm that the truth gets itself revealed through the individual medium of mystical or religious bias. Vāmadeva reveals himself as a Mystic whereas Vasiṣṭha is truly representative of the Religious Consciousness. However in their revelations, whatever the particular attitude, the *contents* of their experiences are relieved from the insularity of either.

Just as there are no pure types like introvert and extrovert, so also, mystical consciousness is not stable in itself, and religious receptivity manifests itself as a dynamic struggle after liberation from all limitation and separation from the beloved. A careful student of mystical experience will find that mystical consciousness, when strong, proceeds from one destruction to another, by a deliberate and well-aimed exclusion of all that interfere with final free experience, even as Indra proceeded scientifically from one realization to another, from the discovery

of one sheath to another by a process of unveiling of the curtains of ignorance, till finally he was confronted with the realization of his dependence on some Highest Consciousness full with the plenitude of infinite richness and delight, bliss and beauty, in which he must in thraldom live. Such a knowledge is got at slowly and is of the whole and the integral Being, wherein the individual himself shares the life of the whole, and finds this ultimate sense of unity with the All itself to be freedom and perfection, reality and realization. Mystic consciousness may start with a pantheistic sense of Oneness of all life or law, experience or ecstacy, but at its terminus it transcends the impersonal as it is gradually drawn into the bosom of the Super-Personal Being that is not less personal but more personal, fundamentally divorced from the limitations arising out of the inefficient lower nature. Mysticism thus, strange as it may appear, becomes a champion of intellectualism which defeats intellect.

Religious Consciousness proceeding from dependence to dependence on the All, the *sarva*, the *Īsvara*, the Lord, is able to throw away the minor dependences on forms and names and progressively all that are not of the Lord. Growing in this illuminated consciousness, it finally discovers that it has liberated itself from all its bonds without knowing it. What is essential to it is the fundamental effort or thirst to love, the attachment to and dependence on the Highest. And in this exclusive attachment to the Highest that it knows, there is implied the method of liberation from all others, all attachments and seekings other than the Highest. If ever, it struggles to hold on to mere forms and names and clings to them tenaciously, it is because these names and forms are constellated in its consciousness with the Being that it knows and which it cannot conceive apart from them. If, however, it clings to these through indolence of spirit, then what happens is a catastrophe, followed by a terrible dark night of the soul.

Whether it be the mystical or the religious consciousness, eternal vigilance is an absolute condition. That is why the

end of Mysticism is religion, and the result of religion is the realization of the ideal of mysticism. Psychological experts of the Upaniṣads were aware of these transformations in attitudes and the conditions under which such transformations can be brought about. The several *vidyas* taught in them clearly reveal the purposive technique of transference which will lead to the integral realization. Knowledge is the *goal*, since knowledge alone can solve the problem of instincts; the mystical and the religious tendencies are instinctive in their nature which have to be sublimated. Abnormal Nietzsche, the mystic, ended in the lunatic asylum; the religious dogmatists enveloped in their own darkened sanctuaries have brought about the proverbial Dark Age. Synthesis of both these, *samuccaya*, or *samanvaya*, is possible through the substitution of the ends of Knowledge and Vision of the All in the places of greed and selfishness. The multiplex nature of man's personality requires an ordering of his inner and outer being according to the *integral unity* that he seeks blindly and vitally and instinctively.

The inner meaning of the dialectic of forces, mystical and religious, occult and mediumistic, gnostic and practical, have to be understood through the concept of Integral Personality. These instincts proceed from different planes and intersect with one another. We cannot dismiss their existences. What the Vedic seers did, modern psychologists might yet discover. On us, as it did on Jung, the Upaniṣads and Vedic insights produce an amazement at the depth of understanding of the real forces of Personality.

Two Types of Yoga

Consequent on the distinction made between the mystical and the religious 'instincts', we might say there emerge two ways of approach to the realization of the Highest. These might be called *Yoga*. The mystical proceeds on three lines, in none of which there need be any postulation of a Deity. *Karma Yoga* is the line of action, action that makes it neces-

sary for the individual to break through the superstructure so religious dogmatisms and involves the consistant practice of the freedom and responsibility that one inwardly feels to be one's own reality. This *Karma Yoga* is very modern in conception it might be said ; but this kind of *Yoga* it was that was at the bottom of the Cārvākan ideal of existence, free as the air, irresponsible and living one's own desires out. This ideal no doubt was what even Buddhism sought in its affirmation of the inward law as against the outer conformity that Brahminism was said to have imposed. Hence their practices were non-conforming to the ritualistic. Even the protest of Sāṁkhya was against the ritualistic *karma* of the orthodox. In all these, there was acceptance of Action undoubtedly, but it was something quite differnt from what the religious temperament accepted. The activity of the *Karma-Yogin* who happens to be a mystic, moves between the activities of iconoclastic revolutionary fervour and protestant activity.

The *Jñāna-Yoga* of the Mystic again is different from the aim of the religious *Yogin*. The aim is to discover the real which would liberate the individual. The belief in reality is dependent on its capacity to liberate. The practice of Oneness or Nothingness, is consequential on the liberation-motive, and so long as the *yogin* believes intellectually that any otherness is a limitation, there is no alternative for him except the annihilation of all otherness in and through an Oneness that shall be the indescribable womb of all. But the religious *yogin* knows that all determination is negation, and equally that all negation is determination.[1] He does not see the need for any contradiction between things that could co-exist.

Real opposites contradict one another and might annul one another, but that co-existent things should compete and swallow up one another even like some serpents, it is not possi-

1 The Mystic holds the view that all determination is Negation: the Religions person holds, if he ever does hold, that all negation is determination of something higher. Negation reveals only incompleteness of definition.

ble to admit when the terms describe rather than limit. *Jñāna* or knowledge is of the *whole* not of the One. The individual knowing this *whole* or the Unity really understands his place in this whole and therefore does not feel afraid. As the *Iśa-Upaniṣad* says, He who sees everything in Him, for him there is neither fear nor revulsion. The mystic ideal of Immortality lands the Mystic in his intellectual effort in the abstract realm of *ideas* or *essences* or an absolute that can contain nothing without ceasing to be itself.

Even so is the *Bhakti Yoga*. The *Bhakti* of the Mystic is the *devotion* to the *impersonal ideal* of Freedom rather than to any individual whatsoever. The Personal exists, if at all, as a concession to devotional needs, a fiction or even a real being much inferior to our own fullest *ideal*. *Yoga* of Patanjali postulates an Īśvara who is a *beau* ideal, a desirable object (*ālambana*) for meditation, but certainly not the *ideal* of our own existence which is *fullest* plenitude of Knowledge, Bliss and Being. The *dhyāna* is the concentration and loving devotion, even if only of a fictionally posited being, and as such at a later stage what needs to be done is to give up this and transcend the limits of the object. The meaning of the *Bhagavad Gita Carama Śloka* which insists upon the surrender of the Individual to the Lord is said to be merely a tentative position, whereas the most important teaching of the Gīta is said to be the famous sloka,

> "*Matkarmakṛt matparamo madbhaktaḥ saṅgavarjitaḥ*
> *Nirvairaḥ sarvabhūteṣu yahsa māmeti Pāndava.*"

"Whose work is unto me, whose goal I am, my votary, free from attachment, void of enmity to any being–he comes to me. O son of Pāndu" XI. 55.

The mystic view then consistently persists in its realization of the Immortal which it equates with liberty or freedom *Mokṣa*. Our whole question is whether this is a true identification. Religious consciousness might make certain concessions to this view, but in the main it repels the idea of abstract

liberty. It is more realistic and tends to value the true idea of liberty which consists in the realisation of happiness through the aid of the Highest Being of which it is aware.

The foundation of the philosophic aspiration lies in the discovery of the "immortal sense in mortal existence," "in the divination of the Godhead," or in the realization of the Highest of which the individual progressively becomes aware. This process of growing into the consciousness of the All is a slow progress or rapid one according to the intensity of fervour and loyalty, *śraddha*, and this is the *sine qua non* of all praxis, mystical or religious. An unenlightened consciousness without the capacity or willingness to experiment will only lead to disaster and perdition. Gnosis consists in the perception of the All, and in having, so to speak, the religious attitude. Deity must be perceived in all things, to which all things are tending, in whom all have their birth, bliss and being. Without this original fundamental knowledge the mystic effort at freedom, is mere action that is egoistic and selfish, and can only lead to darkest darkness, blindest Ignorance. 'Egoism is the bar.' The individual must forsake the sense of his possession of anything. Renunciation of the sense of possession coupled with the sense of the Allness or Omnipervasiveness of the Lord is absolutely the *Yoga*. Such a fundamental renunciation of individual possession is the preliminary need. This too is the method of the Buddhist and the Nihilistic mystic. The mystic abjures all possession, for it is essential to be free from all bonds, and possession has the incubus of bondage. Freed from this bondage to matter and material possession, the mystic entertains the hope that he would be free utterly, and realize the Pure existence of his own self. However, this renunciation that is of the mystic, is different from the renunciation of the Religious. The attitude is different though the results are identical. *Vairāgya* of the one is poles apart from the *vairāgya* of the other. Consecration to the Divine, because of the realization that nothing is really one's own but belongs to the All, is the essence of the

religious theistic attitude, whereas the attitude of the mystic reveals the obsession of bondage.

It is true that the mystics or the religious persons do not realize the wide gulf that exists between the two attitudes, and facilely and interchangeably speak about bondage and the body. Even when the religious person feels the weight of his body on his soul, it is not because of its own defect as a body but because the body that he has happens to be a result of his own ignorance in previous lives and activities. Not so the mystic view. The mystic will strive to realise the Ultimate in his own privateness, where the privateness somehow will realize the infiniteness of the All.

The mystic pratice of *Rāja Yoga* as we have remarked takes up the occult *siddhis* also into consideration. The *Yama, Niyama, Āsana, Prāṇāyāma, Pratyāhāra, Dhārana, Dhyāna* and *Samādhi,* which are the eight steps of *Yoga* are intended to purify the individual internally and externally and develop self-control and mind-control, till finally the mind is prepared in a such a manner as to be able to experience utter internal absorption—*Nirvikalpaka Samādhi.* This is usually said to lead to *Nirvāṇa* and even the Buddhist *'Manual of the Mystic'* corroborates this procedure.

Religious praxis, on the other hand, devotes all its *Yoga* to the realization of concentration on the *one and sole object* of its efforts, to achieve the unique relation of dependence *apṛthaksiddha sambandha,* consciously and fully. *Īsvarapraṇidhāna* for him has the fullest significance and is all in his *Yoga.* The *Yoga* is left, as it were, into the hands of the Divine, and nothing is left for the individual to do but to wait on the Highest. He depends upon the *love,* the *grace* and the *bounty* of the Divine. The Highest as the Upaniṣad says choses its men ; it is not left for the individual to dictate to the Lord. You cannot take the Heavens by storm ; you must only willingly supplicate to it for your deliverance from your ignorance which creates ruffles in *sraddha,* faith.

SOME TENETS OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS

(From a Tamil Source)

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The Sautrāntikas are generally believed to be a sub-sect of the Sarvāstivādins, one of the eighteen sects of early Buddhism. A detailed account of the school of Sarvāstivādins is found in Vasubandhu's *Kośa* and *Bhāṣya*. A systematic exposition in English of the Sarvāstivāda is presented by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky in his *Conception of Buddhism*. But there appears to be no book available at present specially devoted to a systematic treatment of the Sautrāntika school though many writers[1] of the school are mentioned as having flourished in early days. Nor is it known that a separate sect of Buddhism based on that school ever has existed either in China or Tibet. We *may* yet discover any special treatise on the subject from these two sources, apart from the cross references found in the works of other schools. Some authorities think that Harivarman's *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* which exists only in Chinese, belonged to some branch of Sautrānti-kas.[2] But we cannot take this statement for certain unless we have a complete analysis of the work before us. Vasubandhu is said to be a Sautrāntika at heart though he has composed the *Kośa* on Sarvāstivāda. But no work composed by him on the subject is known to

1. Kumāralābha, Śrīlābha, Mahābhadanta, Vasumitra and others; s. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Nirvāṇa*, p. 25.

2. W. M. McGovern, *Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 193, 206, 212. S. Yamakami Sogen, *System of Buddhist Thought*, p. 174. Some essential parts of doctrine of the Satyasiddhi school are given on pp. 176-185.

us. Some opinions in favour of the sect are found in his *Kośa*. Therefore the only sources available at present are *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, *Sarvadarśanasangraha* and other works which have summed up, in a separate section, some of the main tenets of this school. Prof. Louis de La Valle Poussin has collected in an article on 'Sautrāntikas' in Hastings' *Encyclopædia* some of the main tenets of the school from these Sanskrit sources.[1] But it is very short and misses an important feature of the school, namely the method of classification of phenomena (*dharma*). Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky has also devoted a section to the Sautrāntika conception of Nirvāṇa in his *Nirvāṇa*. So far, nowhere have we found a full account of their tenets.

I have, however, found in a philosophical treatise—known as *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* written by in Tamil Aruṇandi, a Śaiva philosopher probably of the 13th century A.D., a short account of the Sautrāntikas' philosophy with somewhat fuller details. The treatise is divided into two parts, *svapakṣa* and *parapakṣa*. In the first part the author formulates his own tenets of Śaiva philosophy and in the second all other systems of Indian philosophy, such as Lokāyatika, Bauddha, Nirgrantha, Ājīvaka. In dealing with Buddhism he criticizes all its four schools separately. The major portion of the Buddhistic section of the book is devoted to the Sautrāntika school, whereas the three other schools get only a few lines each. It seems, therefore, that in the opinion of the author the Sautrāntika school was more important than any other Buddhist school. This is corroborated by the statement in the commentary that the other schools, Yogācāra, etc., accept all the main principles of the Sautrāntikas, but differ only in respect of some details. We may infer from this that an impression to that effect was entertained by writers of the time and that it might be due to the influence gained by the Sautrāntikas in later tines. Whatever its justification be, there is reason

1. See also his *Buddhism* (1909), pp. 178-185.

to believe that Aruṇandi has, in all probability, accurately recorded, almost all the main tenets of the school. But we cannot assert that he summarized *all* the doctrines of the sect, because no mention is made of the inferrable nature of the objective world, which is a very important tenet of the school.

I propose to present in the following pages the contents of the first part (31 verses) of the chapter on the Sautrāntika philosophy This part is also divided into *svapakṣa* and *parapakṣa*.

(I) Formulation of the Sautrantika thesis

This section commences with an enumeration of five items common to the four schools of Buddhism: (1) They do not accept the validity of the four Vedas and their *anga*. (2) They daily recite instead the rational dharma, scriptures. (3) They practice the five morals.[1] (4) They wear the dress of a hermit. (5) They take refuge under the Bodhi tree respecting it as if it were God. In addition to these five items, the Sautrāntikas deny the validity of *jāti*.[2]

The Buddha, becoming all-knower, keeping away from all bad acts in the world and through his faultless compassion being grieved by the misery of others (*paraduhkhaduhkhin*), composed the ancient and defectless[3] Piṭakas which have been praised by all gods.

1 The commentator Jñānapra Rāśai enumerates five morals thus: *ahimsā, satya, asteya, brahmacarya* and *saṅgraha*. He further points out that the five morals are binding on lay devotees (śāvaka, read in the text *śāvakarkku* for *śāvatarkku*) ten morals on novices (*śāraṇa*) a hundred on monks (*upasampanna*) and 100,000 on śuvavir (meaning of this word is not clear).

2. The term *jāti* is interpreted in the commentary to mean either the caste system or generality, or one of the seven categories of the Naiyāyikas

3. The commentator remarks that the Buddhist Piṭakas are defectless, because they contain (1) Srīlakṣaṇabhāvanā, viz. conception of every-

There are only two *pramāṇas*, viz. *pratyakṣa*[1] and *anumāna*. The momentary[2] knowledge and the knowable are their objects. These objects get divided into four viz. *rūpa*, *arūpa*, *nirvāṇa* and *vyavahāra*. Each one of these four objects is again divided into two and therefore they become eight in in all.

Two kinds of *rūpa*[3] are : *upādānarūpa* and *upādāyarūpa*.

Two kinds of *arūpa* are : *citta* and *karman*.

Two kinds of *nirvāṇa* are : *sopadhiśeṣanir.* and *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*.

Two kinds of *vyavahāra* are : *sad*—and *asad*—*vyavahāra*.

Four *upādānarūpas* are : earth, water, fire and air.

thing as impermanent, *anitya*, unrest, *duḥkha*, and without self, *anātman;* (2) ten highest virtues of charity, morality, patience, doing away with any action, (*niṣkarmam*) wisdom, energy, truthfulness (*satya*), courageousness (*dhṛti*) friendliness (*maitrī*) and *piṭāka* (*upekṣā* ?), and (3) twelve nidānas, *avidyā*, *samskāra*, *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparśa*, *vedanā*, *tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna*, *bhava*, *jāti* and *karmaphala* (*jarāmaraṇa*, etc) The ten highest virtues being divided into three degrees each form thirty items in all. cp. Note. 2 on p 191 below. It is interesting to note that the enumeration of the ten highest virtues with their sub-divisions goes in agreement only with the accounts found in the Pali Literature. According to the Māhayanists the following are the ten virtues : *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣamā*, *vīrya*, *dhyāna*, *prajñā*, *upāya*, *praṇidhāna*, *bala* and *jñāna*.

1. The commentator, Jñānaprakāśa in explaining *pratyakṣa*, quotes Dharmakīrti प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढम्. It is divided into four. इन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षं, मानसप्रत्यक्षं योगप्रत्यक्षं स्वसंवेदनाप्रत्यक्षम् । See, *Nyāyabindu*.

2. There are four kinds of momentariness, remarks the commentary, viz. (1) A thing exists after being decayed—(*keṭṭuvarttittal*) (2) a thing perishes after being decayed, (*keṭṭukṣayittal*), (3) a thing reappears after becoming decayed (*keṭṭuttudittal*) and (4) a thing is decayed and perishes for ever (*keṭṭukkeṭṭcpodal*).

3 Here the commentator gives another classification of *rūpa* It is divided into two, viz. *caitanyarūpa* and *acaitanyarūpa*. The former consists of eighteen items, five sense-organs and their five objects, the two sex organs female and male, one heart (*hṛdaya*), one food stuff (*āhārarūpa*) and four bhūintas , while the latter comprises eight items above described It is not clear here what is meant by the latter category. It seems, however, that the four *upādānarūpas* and four *upādāyarūpas* constitute the eight acaitanyarūpas in so far as they constitute the external life-less objects.

Four *upādāyarūpas* are : hardness, attraction, motion and heat.[1]

Rūpa is what is produced from the combination of the above eight elements.

Citta is that which cognizes a thing cognizable through the sense organs.

Karman is to discriminate what is good and what is bad.

Here the commentator supplies us with some further details in regard to the classification of the elements (*dharma*). It is well known that the Sarvāstivādins classify the dharmas as seventy-five, which may again be put into two main groups, seventy-two *samskṛta*—and three *asamskṛta* dharmas. The seventy-two *samskṛta* elements are divided into five groups of elements, thus : the *rūpa* group has eleven elements, the *vedanā* group one, the *samjñā* group one, the samskāra group fifty-eight and the *vijñāna* group one. The Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, who deny the reality of the *asmskṛta* elements, reduce the *samskṛta* elements to forty-three. They are grouped into five groups as follows : *rūpa* includes eight elements, four *upādānarūpas* and four *upādāya-rūpas*; *vedanā* three, *kuśala*, *akuśala* and *kuśalākuśala ; samjñā* six, five sense organs and one *citta* ; *vijñāna* six, *vijñānas* corresponding to the six above, and *samskāra* twenty, ten good acts and ten bad acts.[2] Thus

1 The commentary reads *vanna*—colour It is certainly a mistake for *veppam*—heat.

2. According to the commentary on verse 30, the ten bad acts are : 1, to tell lie *(poyśollal) ;* 2, to act as a tale-bearer *(koṭśollal) ;* 3, to utter harsh words *(koṭttuccollal) ;* 4, useless talk *(payanil col)*, (these four pertaining to the speech) ; 5, to commit theft *(kaḷavirkkuṭpodal) ;* 6, to do mean acts *(varide tolil ceydal) ;* 7, to commit murder *(kolai ceydal)* (these three pertaining to the body) , 8, to think of murder *(kolai ninaikkai) ;* 9, an attachment for the worldly pleasure *(kāmaṭṭarru) ;* 10, carnal desire *(āśai)* (these three pertaining to the mind) ; And ten good acts · 1 to speak the truth *(mey yurai) ;* 2, to utter good words *(nal vārttai) ;* 3, to talk in a sweet tone *(iniya kural) ;* 4, to talk so as to be useful *(payanṭaḍa śol)* (these four pertaining to the speech) ; 5, to walk right to left around the temple *(palli vaḷam varal) ;* 6, to practise austerity *(tavam purudal) ;* 7, to present gifts

they work out forty-three in all.[1] The Yogācāras have increased to a hundred the number of elements both *samskṛta* and *asamskṛta*. A complete list of these elements is by Vasubandhu in his *Śatadharmavidyāśāstra*[2] which exists in Chinese. And according to the Satyasiddhi school, the number of elements is said to be eighty-four.[3]

Then follows the description of two kinds of Nirvāṇa.

Liberation from defiling elements is obtained when such elements as desire, etc., are completely removed from *santāna*, but final liberation is not obtained and it will be secured only when the bodily activities come to an end. This is *sopadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa (Tamil, kurruvīḍu)*. Liberation from the five aggregates will be realized when they are eternally suppressed, and that is *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa (kandavīḍu)*.

Turning to the two kinds of *vyavahāra*, we find them classified into three each, as under :

(1) Affirmative expression of *sanghāta (Tamil, togai)*.

(2) Negative expression of *sanghāta*.

(3) Affirmative expression of *santāna (Tamil, todarci)*.

(4) Negative expression of *santāna*.

(5) Affirmative expression of *utpannavināśin (Tamil, mikutturai)*.

(6) Negative expression of *utpannavināśin*.[4]

(dānam ceydal) —these three pertaining to the body—8, to be aware of mercy *(aruṇinai)*, 9, to cut at the root the kernal desire *(āśaiyaruttal)*; 10, to have a faith in the austerity *(tavapparru)* (these three pertaining to the mind).

1. In support of this classification, the commentator quotes an ancient Buddhist verse in Tamil It is the *siddhānta* of the scriptures of the Buddhists that the forty-three parts are counted in five *skandhas* which are built up of eight rūpas, three *vedanās*, six jñānas, and their corresponding six samjñās and twenty samskāras (acts—*cseykai*).

2 Nanjio No 1213 This work will be studied in a separate paper.

3 S *Introduction to Mah. Buddhism*, p 141.

4 The *Maṇimekalai*, a Tamil classic, gives six kinds of oral expression *(vyavahāra)*, *unmai*, *inmai*, etc, combined with *togai*, *todarci*, *mikutturai* and *iyaindurai* Of these the last named, *iyaindurai* is not given by the author here. Probably it is to be included in the *togai* division of *vyavāhara*.

(1) The affirmative expression of *sanghāta* is when we speak of a doer as *arūpa*, who is but five aggregates, *rūpa* and others.[1]

(2) The negative expression of it lies in the statement that the five aggregates, *rūpa* are created by somebody.[2]

(3) The affirmative expression of *santāna* consists in saying that causes and effects continue in succession without any relation to all modes of times, past, present and future,[3] (which are themselves unreal).

(4) The negative expression of it is represented by the speech that the same agent *(kartṛ)* exists in all times and continues all along the succession of causes and effects.[3]

(5) The affirmative expression of *utpannavināśin* is formed when one says in conformity with the Buddha's Doctrine that whatever appears to our eyes is liable to destruction.[4]

(6) Negative expressions of it consists in our speech that all things preserved in the world turn into causes, their

A similar classification of the empirical truth *(samvṛtisatya-vyavahāra)* is found in Bhavya's work, *Madhyamakārthasamgraha* (see my paper on it published in the *Journal Oriental of Research*, Madras Vol. V, p. 41 ff) and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, 23 with bhāṣya (see my Sanskrit text p. published in the above journal, Vol. V).

1. The commentator further explains thus · just as the collection of walls, woods and bricks, etc , forms a house and just as a great number of villages is spoken of as a country, so also the five aggregates, matter, etc., are believed to be an ego, ātman ; but its nature is only nominal and not real. *Maṇimekhalai* gives body, water and country, as instances under a simpler type of *togaivalakku-samghāta-vyavahāra.*

2. ibid.

3. ibid., *toḍarcı (santāna) vyavahāra* is when the people talk of *vrīhi, nellu*, perceiving the phenomenon of continuous succession of seed, sprout and stem, etc.

4. Pali : समुदयधम्मं निरोधधम्मम् | Mikutturai—torraanāśam, that which appears is subject to destruction. *Maṇimekhalai* explains: *dharmamikutturai* is an excessive talk particularly of one aspect of a thing, while it has three, appearance, increase and decay. Then it elucidates *iyaindurai* thus : it is an appropriate talk of several letters as a word and of so many days as a month, *tingal*. This is more or less simply a *togaivalakku, samghātam*. This may explain why the type of expression, *iyaindurai* is omitted in the *Sivajñānasidhiyār*.

previous state, as soon as they change their mode of being product.

The oral expression may again be divided into six kinds :

(1) Affirmative expression. (2) Negative expression. (3) Affirmative expression pertaining to the actual happening. (4) Negative expression pertaining to the actual happening. (5) Affirmative expression pertaining to formerly non-existent. (6) Negative expression pertaining to never-existent.

(1) The affirmative expression is to assert what exists ; e.g. the trunk of the elephant.[1]

(2) The negative expression is to deny what does not exist ; e.g., a horn on the head of hare.[2]

(3) The affirmative expression of the actual happening is to say that a knowledge arises in co-ordination with another knowledge.[3]

(4) The negative expression of the actual happening is when we state that a knowledge will not arise after it becomes perished.[4]

(5) The affirmative expression of formerly non-existent is a statement that a knowledge being formerly non-existent comes into existence afterwards.[5]

(6) The negative expression of never-existent is to speak of a string of bow made of hairs in the palm of hand which can never be existent.[6]

All these types of *vyavahāra* and two kinds of *nirvāṇa* find no place amongst the forty-three dharmas above described, and therefore they are not real dharmas but only nominal.

1. *Maṇimekhalai*, has *uṇarvu*, knowledge
2. ibid , the same example.
3. ibid , Ex. the experience felt in co-operation with the mind.
4. ibid., mind came into being and passed away like a lightning
5. ibid., an effect arises without any cause
6. ibid., as there is no horn on the head of a hare, it is not seen.

(II) Formulation of the opponent's thesis

Apart from those fundamental elements, the Sautrāntikas do not accept other categories such as *ākāśa*, *ātman*, *kāla*, *dik* and *kartṛ*, which the Naiyāyikas and others postulate in their own systems. Therefore the Sautrāntikas refute them one by one as follows.

Refutation of the existence of Ether *(ākāśa)*

[There is no element called ether]. For, it cannot become object of action. Nor can it be accepted as a receptecle of all material objects, since its nature is immaterial. The argument that the ether is the primary factor of the sound is not possible on the ground that the sound will not appear unless it comes into contact with the material objects. Nor is it possible to say that it is ether which is present everywhere without exception; because there is no such thing as 'everywhere'.

Refutation of the Soul *(ātman)*

If the soul has knowledge of its nature, why should it resort to the sense-organs, objects and scripture for knowledge? It is not possible to argue that it acquires knowledge, after being associated with the sense-organs, coming into contact with the objects and also in conformity with the scriptures; because it is unable to differentiate in darkness what is green and what is red. Since there is no possibility of acquiring knowledge, the knower, i.e., soul cannot be proved. If you accept the knower—, the soul as other than knowledge and knowable, we shall ask you whether its nature is knowledge or not. In the latter case, it will be an *acetana* like earth. In the former case, it will amount to this that you have named *kali*[1] as a rice-food well cooked together with

1. Read *kaḷi* for *kari* in the text. The commentary explains this point very clearly as follows: to say that *kaḷi* which is a proper name for the cooked rice combined with dall, *sūpa*, is the cooked rice combined with dall, *sūpa* evolves an error of repitition, *punarukti* Similarly *jñāna* being a knowledge, if you say that *jñātṛ*, knower also a knowledge, then *jñātṛ*, knower, need not be considered to be different from *jñāna*, knowledge

sūpa. If the soul is immaterial (*arūpa*) it will not unite with the body which is material (*rūpa*). If it is material, one matter will penetrate into another matter. If it is an atom (*aṇu*), it will run away from the body through its holes. If it is eternal (*nitya*), knowledge will appear eternally and without exception. If you say again that it is the one pervading the whole, it will stand nowhere. If you maintain that it abides wholly in the body of his own accord; it will, then, perish when the body perishes. If you assume that it dwells in a part of the body, then it will not know the other parts of the body.

Refutation of the Time (*kāla*)

If you hold that it is Time, which has the function of giving rise to, sustaining and destroying the objects, it will, then, be hardly different from the said objects. And as soon as things are destroyed, it will also be destroyed. Since the three-fold oral expression (*vyavahāra*) of the time, past, present and future, is due to the three-fold nature of the objects, it is a good example of the well-established negative expression (*asadvyavahāra*).

Refutation of the Quarters (*dik*)

When you stand east of me, you call my place west; and if some other person stands west of me, he will call my place east. Therefore the so-called *dik* is no other than the place in which I stand; and it will indicate neither your west, nor some other person's east. Thus it becomes only an object of the negative expression and never of the affirmative one.

Refutation of the Creator (*kartṛ*)

You hold that there exists one person who created the world. If the world to be created was already existing, it need not be created. If it was not existing, it could not be created. If you say that the world existed in the form of cause but not in the form of effect, and that the form was created, you are forced by

the position that a thing is both existent and non-existent. If you say again that he has manifested it which was existing unmanifested just like an unmanifested pot [which is made manifested by a potter], where did he exist while manifesting it? If you suppose that he did so taking his stand in the world, then the world would have arisen first. Nor is it possible to assume that he is omnipresent, pervading everywhere without exception; because it will be open to an objection that 'everywhere' existed first. And to the argument that he out of mercy created what was non-existent, we may put this question: What kind of mercy has he in creating animals such as the lion, tiger and elephant, etc? If you say that because he is omnipotent, he created all souls in order to multiply their number, you will be a worshipper of a mad man; (for, only a mad man would act without knowing the consequences of his own action). What did he gain by creating souls If you say that the creation is a kind of amusement for him then he turns out to be an ignorant lad. Supposing that he created living beings in compensation for their actions, you have to face the objection that the action becomes beginningless. If that knowledge is maintained to be real, all other knowledge (i.e. of worlds) will also be without beginning.

As regards his body: If he is considered to be embodied in a form, that form ought to have been created first. If you suppose that he takes his form because he desires so, it follows that the worlds also would assume their forms according to their desires. The argument that he gives forms to living beings in conformity with their previous deeds will lead to the conclusion that their forms arise exclusively from their previous deeds. If he is taken to be have no form, he would not be able to rescue living beings from the misery of life [and would be motionless] like the ether. If he is equal to a shadow of the tree, he would not be omnipresent; because a shadow of the tree would give shelter only to those who come near at it. If you suppose that he, though not omnipresent,

is omniscient it follows that he ought to have a form in order to recollect and realize things with all cares. If you do not admit it, there could be no realization for him. The agreement that the scripture from time immemorial proclaim the existence of a creator, will befit only persons like you who admit that the scripture came into existence without an author. The assumption that the existence of a creator is asserted in the scriptures and that the latter proceeded from the former is indeed a matter for wonder.

These are the main arguments of the Sautrāntikas denying reality of the categories, ether, etc.

Now we have the following description of some other ideas which may be regarded as peculiar to them. Immovable things, trees and grass, etc., that grow on earth, have no life and are constituted of the four elements viz. earth, etc. They grow and get destroyed gradually just like the ant-hill, nail, horn, hair etc. They have been in existence as results of actions done by, and for the enjoyment of, all living beings.

It is sinful to kill but it is not sinful to eat what has been killed by others; because flesh is equal to pure earth.[1] The sin incurred in killing living beings belongs only to the killer and none else. In support of this, the following argument has been put forth. Suppose a man establishes a rest-house in the wilderness. Does the merit that has accrued

1. Here some details regarding the meat-eating are given in the commentary Meat is divided into two, *kalyamāmsa* and *akalyamāmsa* *Akalyamāmsa* also may be divided into three, *tiru(tri)koṭi*, *ṣatkoṭi* and *navakoṭi* *Koṭi* means *vṛtti*, function *Tri-koṭimāmsa* is a meat which is obtained by killing by oneself, causing to kill by others or giving consent to killing; *ṣaṭkoṭi*, has in addition to the above three witnessing, hearing, and being unmerciful in killing for one's own sake by others; *navakoṭi* consists, besides the above six, to desire, to taste it, to eat it too much and to praise it too much *Kalyamāmsa*, meat devoid of any of the above nine functions may be eaten. But *akalyamāmsa*, evolving any of the above nine functions should not be eaten. Another commentator reads *karpiya* for *kalya*.

from the establishment go to the establisher or to those who take rest in it ?

In conclusion, we find an explanation of the nature of misery (*duḷkha*), of bondage, of happiness (*sukha*), of final liberation and of the way to that happiness. The misery of bondage lies in the five groups[1] of elements, matter, feeling, idea, acts and consciousness which combine together, continue orderly in succession and form *santāna*. The moment these groups get suppressed completely and for ever, the happiness of the final liberation is realized.

As to the way; persons, seeking liberation must do away with worldly desire and other evils, which destroy everything that is good. They must practise the ten highest virtues[2] of meritorious acts, restrain all the sense-organs, eye, etc. which drive men to the perilous external objects, relinquish all kinds of feeling, joy and misery, etc., and practise the eight modes of good[3] life such as right sight, etc., which are conducive to cultivate the highest knowledge and morality and arrest all kinds of evil and also lead to mental concentration.

Finally, the arguments levelled by Sautrāntikas against such categories as ether, etc. are strongly criticized by Aruṇandi.

1. The reading, *santānattir paḍuvadu* is better than *santānattir keḍuvadu* Here the commentary says that there are four kinds of streams, viz. 1, stream of air, *vāyusantāna*, 2, stream of flame, *dīpasantāna*, 3, stream of fluids, *dhārāsantāna*, 4. stream of ants, *pipīlikāsantāna*.

2. The commentator, Jñānaprakāśa enumerates the ten highest virtues thus: charity, *dāna*, morality, *śīla*, concentration, *samādhi*, to give up actions, *niṣkarmam*, wisdom, *praṇñā*, energy, *vīryam*, truthfulness, *satyam*, courageousness, *dhṛti*, *(tuṇbu)*, friendliness, *maitrī*, and cutting off desire for any thing *(āśayarudi-upekhā)* These ten are divided into three each, according as they are put into connection with life, body and external objects. cf. Childers' *Pali Dictionary*, p 335.

3. There are eight modes of good life: right sight *(narkāṭci)*, right resolve *(nallūrram)*, right speech *(nalvāymai)*, right action *(narceykai)* right livelihood *(nalvālkai)*, right effort, *(nal muyarci)*, right memory *(nar kaḍaippiḍi)* and right concentration *(nallulattor talai paḍu)*. The converse of the above are eight modes of bad life.

గ్రంథ గ్రంథులు

వేటూరి ప్రభాకరశాస్త్రి

మనుచరిత్రము శ్రీకృష్ణదేవరాయలవారి కాలమున వెలసిన యాంధ్రప్రబంధములలోఁ బేరెన్నిక గన్నది. సవ్యాఖ్యానముగా నిప్పు డది చక్కని ముద్రణములలో దొరకుచున్నది. విద్వాంసు లెందఱో దానిపయి విమర్శముల వెలయించియున్నారు. దానిఘనత కవి తారాకా-ణములు. జాగ్రత్తతో నే నీనడుమ నాగ్రంథమును జదువఁగాఁ గొన్ని సందేహాములు, తన్నివారణకై పరిశీలింపఁగాఁ గొన్ని చక్క-నిపాఠములు, అర్థవిశేషములు గోచరించినవి. అందుఁ గొన్నింటి నిందు వెల్లడించు చున్నాఁడను.

చేర్చుక్క-

"చేర్చుక్క-గా నిడ్డ చిన్ని జాబిల్లిచే
సిందూర తిలకంబు సెమ్మగిల్ల."

ఇది ముద్రితపాఠము. ఈపద్యము సరస్వతీమూర్తి వర్ణనాత్మ కము. సరస్వతీదేవి చేర్చుక్క- యనునగగాఁ జంద్రకళ నలంకరించుకొన్న

దన్నయర్థ మీ ముద్రితపాఠమున;—"చేర్చుక్క-గా నుండు చిన్ని జాబిల్లిచే" నని కొన్ని వ్రాతప్రతుల పాఠము. సాజముగానే సరస్వతీ మూర్తి చంద్రకళాలంకృతమస్తక—కావున తలపైనున్న యీచంద్రకళ చేర్చుక్క- యన్న యలంకారపుసొంపును గూర్చుచున్నదన్న యర్థ మీ వ్రాతప్రతిపాఠమున; వ్రాతప్రతిపాఠము సుందరతర మగునేమో!

భరమైతోచు కుటుంబరక్షణ

"భరమై తోచుకుటుంబరక్షణకుఁగాఁ బ్రాలాల్మాలి చింతక్ నిరం
తరతాళీదళసంపుటప్రకరకాంతారంబునం దర్థపుం
దెరువాటుల్ గొని కొట్టి తజ్జ్ఞపరిషద్విజ్ఞాతచౌర్యక్రియా
విరసుండై కొఅతం బడుక్ గుకవి పృథ్వీభృత్సమీపస్థితిక్."

కవీశ్వరులనే యధికముగా సత్కరించుచుండురుగాన శ్రీకృష్ణదేవ రాయలవారియాస్థానిలో కవిత చేతఁగాని కుకవులు కవితాసత్కారముఁ బడయఁగోరి, ప్రాచీనతాళపత్ర పుస్తకగతము లయియున్న గ్రంథము లనో గ్రంథభాగములనో స్వరచితములఁగాఁ బ్రకటించుకొనుచుండుటయుఁ, బెద్దనాదులు వాని గుర్తించి రాయలసన్నిధి నవమానపఱుచుచుండుటయు జరగుచుండెడిది గావలయు. జాలిమాలి పెద్దనామాత్యులవా రటువంటి చేతఁగాని దొంగకవుల నీపద్యమునఁ జెంగనాడినారు.

ఈపద్యమును విని కోపించి కావలయును, పెద్దనగారియు, శ్రీకృష్ణ రాయలవారియు కాలమునసే వర్ణిల్లినవాఁ డొకయసహాయ కవితా శూరుఁడు, కవిరాజు (కవిరాజ పదమిట తత్పురుష కర్మధారయ ముల రెంటను సంగతమే.) పెద్దనామాత్యులవారిని వారిమాటలనే త్రిప్పి కొట్టినాఁడు.

"గీ. అతికుటుంబరక్షణాపేక్షఁ బ్రాల్మాలి
కృతులు మూఢభూమిపతుల కిచ్చి
చచ్చి నిరయమునకుఁ జనుకంటె హరిహరా
ర్పణము చేసి సుగతిఁ బడయరాదె."

పెద్దనగారి 'భర్తమైత్రోచు కుటుంబరక్షణకుఁగాఁ బ్రాల్మాలి' యన్నకూర్పు నీతఁడు "అతికుటుంబరక్షణాపేక్షఁ బ్రాల్మాలి" యని యనుకరించుట, పెద్దనగారు చేసినకుకవినింద ను ర్తించి, వారిత్రోవనే సూటిగా వారికే తగులునట్లు ప్రతినింద చేసినాఁడుసుమా యని విజ్ఞులు వివేకించితెలిసికొనుటకో యన్న ట్లున్నది. కుటుంబరక్షణకై ప్రాల్మాలి తెక్కలికవులు ప్రాచీనగ్రంథార్థముల హరించి రాజులదగ్గఱ వెల్లడించుకోఁ బోయి గొఱతఁబడుదురని పెద్దనగా రనఁగా, నీతఁడు" కుటుంబరక్షణకై ప్రాల్మాలియేసుమండి సత్కవులుగూడఁ గొందఱు మూఢు లయిన (స్వయముఁరచింపను, బండె, అన్యులు రచించిన గ్రంథస్వారస్యము గ్రహింపను నేరని) రాజులకు, స్వరచితకృతులను (కృతికర్తృత్వారూపమునకో కృతిపతిత్వారూపమునకో) అంటఁగట్టి (ఈలోకమున భోగభాగ్యములతో నందలా లంబారీలు నెక్కి యూరేఁగిన నేమి) పరలోకమున బాధలుపడుదురు" అని పెద్దనగారి కెదురుదెబ్బ కొట్టినాఁడు. ఇట్లు నిబ్బరించి చెప్పిన మొనగాఁ డెవ్వఁడనఁగా బైచరాజు వెంకటనాథకవిరాజు. ఈతని కృతి పంచతంత్రము. తెలుఁగున దేశిరచనాచమత్కారముగల గ్రంథ మీతని గ్రంథమును బోలునది వేఱొకటి గానరాదు. "ఈ రాచ కవిత్వబాధపడరాదు పరామరిసింపు దైవమా" యని 'శారదనీరూప' మనఁబడిన గడుసరికవిచేఁగూడఁ బలికించినవాఁడు. ఈతఁడు తనకృతిని, తిక్కన నాచన సోమనలవలె హరిహరార్పణము చేసినాఁడు.

"క. ఏచనవు గలదు హరిహర
సాచివ్యము నొంద నన్యజనులకు మది నా
లోచింపఁ దిక్క-యజ్ఞకు
నాచనసోమునకు నింక నాకుం దక్క-ఁ ?"

ఇతర రాజులతోపాటు కృతికర్తృత్వమును సొమ్మిచ్చి తనపై వేయించుకొన్నవాఁడే యీరాజుగూడ నని లోకు లనఁబోవుదు రన్న భయమునఁ గాఁబోలు—స్పష్టముగా నీతఁడు—

"క. అసహాయ సరసకవితా
రసికుఁడ వేంకటధరావరప్రభుఁడ, గుణ
ప్రసరప్రకాండమదవ
ద్భసలాయిత విద్వ దఖిలబంధుప్రజుఁడఁ."

అని చెప్పికొన్నాఁడు. మఱియు గద్యమున "నిస్సహాయకవితా నిర్మాణభోజభూదార" అని తనకు విశేషణముఁ జేర్చుకొన్నాఁడు. 'నిస్సహాయకవితానిర్మాణచతురుఁ డనాఁటికి భోజదేవుఁడు నీనాఁటికి మరల నేను' అని యీతఁడు గుండెసఱుచికొని చెప్పుకొన్నాఁడన్న మాట.

కొఱుతఁ

పెద్దనగారిపద్యమున 'కొఱతఁబడుఁ' అనుచో కొఱఁతఁ=న్యూనతను అని యొకయర్థము, కొఱుతఁ=కొల్లుట, అని యింకొకయర్థము రావలెను. ఒక యర్థమున నాపదమున ఱ అకారవిశిష్టము, సార్థానుస్వారము; ఇంకొకయర్థమున ఱకారవిశిష్టము, నిరనుస్వారము. ఒక

యర్థమున నాపదమున నరసున్నగలదు; వేఱొకదాన లేదు. 'శ్లేషే సఖండ నిర్బిందోర్వా శ్లేషణం కుత్రచి న్మతమ్' అన్నశాస్త్రము చొప్పునను, 'లడయోరనణయోశ్చైవ.....స్యాదభేదేన కల్పనమ్' అన్న శాస్త్రముచొప్పునను, అరసున్న కలిమిలేములు శ్లేషార్థమునకు బాధకములు గావుగాని, అకారోకారభేదము బాధకమనీ, యిక్కడ శ్లేషార్థము దుస్సాధమనీ పెద్దలందఱుఁ జెప్పుచున్న చొప్పునే నే నెప్పుడో వెల్లడించితిని. గుంటూరివిద్వాంసులొకరు, ఈభేదముకూడ పాటింపరానిదే యని, శ్లేషము చెల్లునని కావ్యాలంకారసూత్రాంధ్రీకరణమునఁ గాఁబోలును వ్రాసిరి. తలఁపు, తలుపు—ఇత్యాదులకు శ్లేషసంగతి చెల్లుననుట గదాయిది! విజ్ఞులు ప్రమాణము.

శ్రీ కృష్ణదేవరాయాగ్రగణ్యుఁడు

"ప్రబల రాజాధిరాజ వీరప్రతాప
రాజపరమేశ బిరుద విభ్రాజమెవ్వఁ
డట్టి శ్రీ కృష్ణదేవరాయాగ్రగణ్యుఁ
డొక్కనాఁడు..."

ఇందు 'శ్రీకృష్ణదేవరాయాగ్రగణ్యుఁ' డనుచోట "కృష్ణరాయ వీరాగ్రగణ్యుఁ" డని పాఠ మున్నది. 'అగ్రగణ్యుఁడు' అన్నపదము సంజ్ఞావాచకముతో సమసింపఁ దగదు. శ్రీకృష్ణరాయ వీరాగ్రగణ్యుఁ డనుపాఠమే సరియయినది.

పాలింపఁగాను

"——భూవిభుని కృష్ణరాయఁ డభ్యుదయ మంది—పెంపు మీఱుంగ ధాత్రిపాలింపు చుండ" నని యచ్చుప్రతులలోనున్నది. ప్రాత

ముద్రణమునందును, వ్రాతప్రతులలోను, "పెంపుమీఱంగ ధాత్రిఁ బాలింపఁగాను" ఉన్నది. ప్రాచీనకవులు కొందఱు 'పాలించుచు' అనియే కాని, 'పాలింపుచు' అని ప్రయోగము చేయరయిరి. పెద్దన యాత్రోవ వాఁడు గావచ్చును.

నవ్వఁజెనకు

"కట్టికి చీకటి తిండి కరములగిలిగింత నెవ్వాఁడు తొగకన్నె నవ్వఁ జేయ" నని ముద్రితపాఠము. "నవ్వఁజెనకు" వ్రాత ప్రతిపాఠము.

శక్రసదృశుఁడు

"వానికిఁ బురూరవుఁడు ప్ర-జ్ఞానిధి యుదయించె సింహసదృశుఁడు" అని ముద్రితపాఠము. "శక్రసదృశుఁడు" వ్రాతప్రతిపాఠము.

వామనస్తుతి

"ప్రత్యూషపవనాంకురములు పై కొనువేళ వామనస్తుతి పరత్వమున లేచి" ఇక్కడ 'వామనమూర్తి స్తోత్రమునందలి యాసక్తిచేత, విష్ణుమూర్తి స్తోత్రపారాయణముతో ననుట' అని వ్యాఖ్య. కాని యిక్కడ వామనస్తుతి యనఁగా 'దధివామనస్తోత్ర' మను సంస్కృత స్తోత్రగ్రంథమగును. శ్రీ కృష్ణదేవరాయలవారు తెల్లవారుజామున నిద్రలేవఁగానే యీ దధివామనస్తోత్రమును పారాయణముచేయుట పరిపాటి. రాయవాచకమునఁ జూచునది. దధివామనుఁడనఁగా 'వెన్నముద్ద బాలగోపాల

కృష్ణమ్మ'—ఆంధ్ర దేశమంతటను సామాన్యముగా స్త్రీ పురుషులు తెల్లవారుజామున నిద్రలేచి భూపాలరాగముతో 'గుమ్మడేడే గోపెదవీ' ఇత్యాదిగా దధివామన (వెన్నముద్ద బాలగోపాలకృష్ణమ్మ) స్తుతినే చేయుచుందురు.

మండలిక తపన

"క. మండలిక తపన శోభిత!
కుండలిపతిశయన కర్ణకుండలిత రసా
ఖండ కవికావ్య! దిగ్వే
దండశ్రుతిదశనకలహా తాడితపటహా!"

'మండలికతపనుఁ డను బిరుదుచే శోభిల్లువాఁడా! కుండలిపతిశయనునికిఁ గర్ణకుండలములుగాఁ జేయఁబడిన—రసాఖండములగు కవికావ్యములు గలవాఁడా!' అని వ్యాఖ్య.

'మండలికతపనశోభిత' అని సమాసమగుచో 'మండలికతపనుఁడు అను బిరుదుచే శోభిల్లువాఁడా' అని యర్థము నీయఁగలశక్తి దానికుండదు. వ్రాఁతప్రతిపాఠమిట్లున్నది: "మండలికతపన! పూజిత కుండలిపతిశయన!" మండలికతపన! (బిరుదాంక సంబోధనము.) ఇఁక పద్య మిం క్రింది తీరు సంబోధనములతో నుండును.

క. మండలికతపన! పూజిత
కుండలిపతిశయన! కర్ణకుండలితరసా
ఖండకవికావ్య! ... ...

రసాఖండములగు కవులకావ్యములను కృష్ణరాయలే కర్ణకుండములుగాఁ జేసికొనుచుండువాఁ డని యర్థమగును.

చతుర్విధ కవితలు

"శతకోపప్రసాదాసాదిత చతుర్విధకవితామతల్లి కాల్లసాని" అని యాశ్వాసాంతగద్యమునఁగలదు. 'చతుర్విధ కవితలనఁగా, బంధము, చిత్రము, గర్భము, ఆశువు' అనివ్యాఖ్య—ఇది సరిగాదు. ఆశు, మధుర, చిత్ర, విస్తర,ములన్నవి చతుర్విధకవితలు. "చతుర్విధకవితామతల్లిక" అన్నసమాసము చింత్యము.

రాచవారు

"వలరాచరాచవాఁ డలికాఱుకనువెచ్చఁ గరఁగిన యలకనికరపుఁ జోటు."—2 ఆశ్వా. 10.

పైపాఠ మచ్చులో నున్నది. 'రాచవాఁడు' అని యేకవచనాంతముగా నాపదమున కెక్కడను ప్రయోగము గానరాదు. 'రాచవారు' అన్నపదము 'దొరవారు' అన్నపదమువంటిది.

ఒకచపలాక్షీ లేఁజిగురుటూయెలఁ గోయలరాచవారి ని
క్కకునెలయింపవచ్చు...

—ఉత్తరహరివంశము

ఏనికమోముతా ల్వెలుక నెక్కినరావుతు రాచవారు,

—భీమఖండము

కనుక నిక్కడఁగూడ 'వలరాచరాచవా రలికాఱుకనువెచ్చ' నసియే యుండవలెను.

అనుకూలగతి

"అనుకూలవతి నాదుమనసులో వర్తించుకులకాంత మది నెంత గుందునొక్కొ." ఇక్కడ 'అనుకూలవతి' యన్నపదము క్లేశపడి సమర్థింప వలసినది—అనుకూలపదమున కానుకూల్య మర్థముచెప్పుకోవలెను. 'అనుకూలగతి' యన్నపాఠము వ్రాతప్రతులలో నున్నది. దీని గ్రహించిన నేయసందర్భము నుండదు.

కుఱుంగలి, ఓసరించక

"గొంటుదనం బెఱుంగక కుఱుంగటనున్న యమ్మహీసుర... గదురు మనంబున నోసరించక చంచలదృగంచలప్రభలు....."

—2 ఆశ్వా. 61 పద్యము.

పయివచనమున అనుప్రాససంగతిని బట్టి 'కుఱుంగట' కంటె 'కుఱుంగట' యుండదగు ననిపించును. శబ్దనిష్పత్తికూడ, కుఱు+కలను, 'కుఱుంగలి' యగుటకే సహిపడును. వ్రాతప్రతులలో 'కుఱుంగట' అన్నరూప మున్నది. మఱియు నీపదము సోమనాథుని యుత్తరహరి వంశమునఁ గూడ 'కుఱుంగలి' యనియను ప్రాససంగతితోనే కలదు. "చక్రంబు మొదలగు కైదువలు మెఱుంగులు గుఱుంగలించిన రవి మండలంబు తెఱంగున."

ఉ. హరి. 4 ఆశ్వా.

ఇట్లు చూడఁగా 'కుఱుంగలి' రూపము సాధు వని యేర్పడినది. 'కుఱుంగలి' రూపపు సాధుత్వము చింత్యమే. మఱియుఁ బయివచనమున 'ఓసరించక' పెద్దన సమ్మతించినది.

(ఇటుపైఁ గొంత భారతిలో 'ఆవీ-యివీ' అన్నపేరఁ బ్రకటిత మయ్యెను. చూ. ప్రమాథి మాఘభారతి.)

ఉపాధ్యాయి

"ఈ పాండిత్యము నీకుఁ దక్క మఱి యెందేఁ గంటిమే" అన్న పద్యములో 'కామశాస్త్రోపాధ్యాయిని' అనఁగా ఉపాధ్యాయినిపత్ని అనికాక, స్వయము వ్యాఖ్యానము చేయనేర్చిన యుపాధ్యాయురా అని యర్థము. నరూథిని యుపనిషన్మంత్రమునకు స్వయము క్రొత్తయర్థము కల్పించినది గదా!

బాహుమూలరుచి

ప్రవరుఁడు రోఁతచెంది 'చెప్పకు మిట్టితుచ్ఛ సుఖముల్ మీసాల పైఁ దేనియల్' అని తెగడఁగా వరూథిని హృదయాబ్జముజల్లన నీవీబంధమూడఁగా కొప్పువీడఁగా రతిసంరంభముమీఱఁగా పైపాటున

ప్రాంచదూర్ధ్వణ బాహుమూలరుచితోఁ బాలిండ్లు పొంగారఁ బై
యంచుల్ వెనువఁగఁ గొఁగిలి చి యధరం బొసింప...

ఈపద్య మిట్లు ముద్రణములం దున్నది. వ్యాఖ్యాతలు 'ప్రాంచ దూర్ధ్వణములయొక్కయు బాహుమూలములయొక్కయుఁ బ్రకాశము తో పాలిండ్లు పొంగారఁగా=ఉబ్బఁగా, పైయంచుల్=చనుమొనలు, మోవఁగ=ఆనునట్లుగా, కొఁగిలించి' అని వ్యాఖ్యవ్రాసిరి. కాని వ్రాత ప్రతులలో 'పాలిండ్లు పొంగారి పైయంచుల్ మోవఁగ' అని పాఠ మున్నది.

ప్రాంచద్బాహుమూలములగు (ప్రాంచద్బాహుపదము, బాహులకుఁ గానితనూత్పలములకుఁగాని విశేషణము) బాహుమూలములకాంతితోఁ, (ఆకాంతి యలముకొనె ననుట) పాలిండ్లు పొంగారి, పైయంచుల్ మోఁవఁగ=దోర్మూలకూలంకషములుకాఁగా, (ప్రతిక్షణవిజృంభణా దుభయ బాహుకూలంకష స్తనత్రుటితకంచుక' మిత్యాది ప్రయోగముల ననుసంధించునది.) అధరం బొసించినది. ఇక్కడ పైయంచుల్=చూచుకములు, అని వ్యాఖ్యానము సుందరముగాదు. రతిసంరంభము మిఱుఁ, పైపాటునఁ జేసిన కొఁగిలింత యట్టిదిగా నుండదు. ఈసందర్భము నింకను దెలిఁగించుట బొగుగాదు. కలాప్రపూర్ణులు శ్రీశేషాద్రిశర్మగా రిక్కడ నిట్లు వ్రాసిరి. "బాహుమూలరుచిత్రోక్=భుజశిఖరములకాంతితోఁ, ... మూలమనఁగా మొదలు-బాహుమూలము లనఁగా భుజశిఖరములు—అను నర్థమేర్పడును. బాహుమూలములందు కేయూరము లనుభూషణములుండును. స్త్రీలకు నుండునాయని ప్రశ్నింతురేమో! స్త్రీపురుష సాధారణములగు భూషణములే యవి యనియేర్పడును. కేయూరచతుష్టయము పరమేశ్వరికి భూషణములుగాఁ జెప్పఁబడినవి. కావున నాఁవేరుగల భూషణములతోఁ గూడినబాహుమూలములకాంతితోఁ బాలిండ్లు పొంగాన అనఁగా నాకేయూరరత్నకాంతులు వక్షోజములపై వ్యాపింపఁగా ననియర్థము సిద్ధమగును.....కంచుకము సడలించినదని యంగీకరించినను రూఢ్యర్థమగు బాహుమూలకాంతి యసంగత మనవలయును. వీనికిఁ బ్రోద్బలముగాఁ బై పద్యమున 'నీవీబంధమూడఁ' అను మొదలగు రతిసంరంభచిహ్నములు చెప్పఁబడినవి. కనుక రూఢ్యర్థ మంగీకరసము గాదని తోఁచెడిని."

విమర్శనిది యేమో నేఁ దెలియఁజాలకున్నాఁడను. సంస్కృతాంధ్రకవులు పలువురు భుజయుగము పయికెత్తినసందర్భములందు స్త్రీ

'బాహుమూలద్యుతుల' హేలము వెట్టిగా వర్ణించిరి. ఆంధ్రమున నిట్టి సందర్భము వర్ణింపనియర్వాచీనకవి యుండఁ డనవచ్చును. వసుధని భుజములెత్తినప్పుడు వర్ణ్యము భుజశిఖరములగునో యింకేమగునో చర్చ యెందుకు? పెద్దనామాత్యుఁడే తెనాలిరామలింగఁ డన్నట్లు లీ 'బాహుమూలరుచి' వర్ణనాభిమానము విడువఁజాలక కాఁబోలు మరల, మరల, నీ తీరుననే పంచమాశ్వాసమున వర్ణించినాఁడు.—

" ... ... ఉత్కంఠాగ్రమై నిక్కి నా -
ధ్వనిహళిత దలఁబొలుపొసె నవలా దోర్మూలకూలంకష
స్తనవిస్ఫూర్తికి సందిదండలధళల్ సాహోనినాదం బిడక.
ముడివడుకంకణప్రభల ముత్తెపుసేసలు దోయిలించి యె
త్తెడుతఱి బాహుమూలకుచదీప్తులపైఁ బతి దృష్టి పర్వినక
బ్రీడమినలజ్జ బాణియుగముక వెన వంచియ మోమిమోఁదికై
పోడవునఁ జల్లె—"

—మనుచరిత్ర, 5 ఆశ్వా.

ఈపంక్తులు వ్రాయుచున్న సమయమున నాచేత రంగనాథ రామాయణమున్నది. ఇట్టివర్ణన మందును నున్నది యిదిగో!

"పొంగారుకుచకుంభములు పదార్వన్నె
బంగారుపొడి రాలు బాహుమూలములు."

పెద్దనామాత్యుఁడు తాను తొలుతఁ జెప్పినపద్యములోని 'ప్రాంచదుష్ణాంశుభూషణము'లను స్పష్టముగాఁ బంచమాశ్వాసపద్యమున 'సందిదండ' లని తెలికఁజెప్పినాఁడు గదా!

(సశేషము)

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