

INDIA

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Indiana.

EVERY mail that comes from India brings news of the painful impression which has been created there by the arrest and deportation of the Natu brothers under the Bombay Regulation of 1827. Instead of dying out, that impression is clearly deepening. Nor could it well be otherwise. When the arrests took place every thoughtful observer supposed that a responsible Government like the Government of Bombay—acting, it is to be presumed, in consultation with the Government of India—must have had in its possession cogent evidence to justify its action. It is now nearly four months since the arrests were made, and as yet the Government has made no sign with regard to the trial of its suspects. One cannot believe that the Government of Bombay intends to keep the Natu brothers in durance vile for an indefinite time, and it seems to us that the authorities would be acting in a manner highly prejudicial to the good government of India if they did not without delay take the public into their confidence with regard to the case they have against the Natus—in other words, if they did not speedily bring them before a court of law and formulate their charges against them. Apathetic as the general public at home habitually are with regard to Indian matters, even they were startled when the news of the arrests was telegraphed to this

country. Some even of the public organs that habitually support the Government of the day spoke out in no uncertain terms as to the duty of the Government to justify what must be confessed to have been a very high-handed proceeding, taken under cover of an almost obsolete enactment. The general belief in India, however extravagant it may appear here, is that the Natu brothers were arrested and deported from Poona in order that they might not be able to produce publicly information as to the actual working of the measures adopted to stamp out the plague. Nothing but the clearest proof could make us accept that explanation. But this much is certain, the more delay there is on the part of the Government to bring the prisoners to trial, the more widespread the belief will become. We have endeavoured to arrive at the facts to the best of our power, and all that we have discovered in connexion with the matter is the correspondence between one of the Natu brothers and the authorities which we print on another page, and to which we desire to draw the earnest attention of our readers. Whether the statements made by Mr. Natu in his letters are true or not—and we have seen nothing to justify us in believing that they are not true—they certainly seem to show that, so far from hampering or in way obstructing the Plague Committee in their necessarily unpleasant duty, he did all he could to help them. Nor can one help feeling that if his suggestions had been acted upon, and his advice followed, much of the excitement which was created at Poona

in connexion with the plague administration would not have arisen at all. To judge from the letters it is almost impossible to believe that the writer could have had any idea of sedition in his mind. The letters tell a melancholy tale, and we will leave our readers to judge for themselves whether they furnish any evidence necessitating the imprisonment of the writer. A very heavy responsibility rests on Lord Sandhurst's Government in this matter, and the sooner that responsibility is discharged, and the action of Government made clear to the eye of the public, the better it will be for all concerned.

IF the remarkable "confession," reported by Reuter on October 4, regarding the murder of Lieutenant Ayerst and Mr. Rand should prove to be true, one thing is quite obvious. It disposes once for all of the hasty theory that the crimes were the work of an organised and widespread conspiracy. But the story, as it stands, may well excite a little scepticism. The prisoner, a Brahmin and an advocate, by name Damodar Chapekar Deccani, is said to have confessed both to the Poona murders—in which he had the aid of an undiscovered accomplice—and to the tarring of the Queen's statue at Bombay. He is said to have started two years ago a school of arms at Poona, under the cloak of a club reading-room, and to have applied without success to the military authorities at Simla to be enlisted as a soldier. The refusal is reported to have "instilled in Damodar a feeling of hatred towards Europeans and the Government," and we are asked to believe that he seized the opportunity offered by the excitement at Poona of taking an odd revenge. The passage from Reuter's telegram is worth noting because it admits the existence of public excitement at Poona:

"On subsequently returning to Bombay he (that is, Damodar) failed in an examination for which he had entered, and went back to Poona, where the plague operations had begun. In the height of the excitement which prevailed there owing to the alleged harshness of the measures adopted, it is asserted that several persons heard him remark: 'So many people are dying of the plague; is there none prepared to die putting a period to the author of all this tyranny?' This is regarded by the police as having been a direct incitement to kill Mr. Rand, an idea which seems to have taken possession of Damodar and another man."

The whole story, even if it did not come from India, is, it seems to us, of a kind to put cautious readers on their guard. Coming from India, where a bogus confession appears to be a common makeweight in prosecutions, it will not be regarded as important until it is proved to be true. The well-known Balladun case threw a good deal of light upon police methods of obtaining confessions, and the Howrah case, where a man "confessed" to having murdered his daughter who turned up alive and well

in time to interrupt his trial, was not less illuminating. A prisoner in India often "confesses" under police persuasion and withdraws the "confession" before the Sessions Judge. Nor can a "confession" made merely to the police be used against a prisoner on his trial. In order to be used, it must be made before a magistrate and certified by him to be voluntarily made. Even "confessions" so certified have, we believe, in numerous cases been held to be worthless by Sessions Judges and High Court Judges. It remains to be seen whether this Poona "confession" will hold water. The fact that we have heard nothing of it since October 5 seems ominous.

MR. SURENDRA NATH BANERJEE did good service in putting in the Bengal Police Offences in Calcutta. Legislative Council the two questions

which we print on another page with reference to the conduct of certain police officers in Calcutta. In the first case, no doubt, there is ground for some uncertainty as to what really took place. The Commissioner of Police denied that Inspector Marklew had assaulted Mr. Mookerjee. But it is not denied that Mr. Mookerjee was needlessly and vexatiously arrested, and dragged to the police-station without being informed of the charge against him. It is not difficult to imagine the outcry that would be raised in London if such outrageous treatment were meted out to an University official here. But in India, it seems, the authorities are well content to express a mild doubt as to whether the action of the police-inspector was "throughout judicious," and to take no further steps. In the second case, another officer of the Calcutta police force—one Lyons—is admitted to have been fined by the Joint-Magistrate of Alipur for a "perfectly unjustifiable" assault upon a person in custody. Yet the Lieutenant-Governor "sees no necessity for any interference on the part of the Government." What is hardly less disgraceful than this comity towards Lyons, who did the act of a cowardly blackguard, and thereby proved himself utterly unfit for his responsible office, is the series of delays, arising largely from the indefensible combination of judicial and executive duties in one and the same officer, which for five months prevented the prosecutor from obtaining redress. The terrorism which the Marklews and the Lyonses of the Indian Police Service are able to exercise can hardly be imagined by Englishmen at home. Yet it is, we fear, ruffians of this type who to a large section of the Indian people are by far the most palpable embodiment of British rule. That is one reason among many why the action of the Government of Bengal in deliberately associating themselves with such offences, by declining to expel either offender from the office he had disgraced, is in our judgement

simply astounding. We commend the matter to the notice of the English press.

WE remarked last month upon the line which the *Standard*—the official organ of the party now in office at home—had adopted with reference to the “forward” policy. Since our last issue went to press the indications of policy contained in the editorial columns of that journal have become both more frequent and more positive. For example, on September 29, commenting on Mr. John Morley’s speech at Arbroath, the *Standard* said that “like a good many critics of the ‘forward’ policy,” he was “arguing from insufficient knowledge.”

“He ignores (the writer continued) the obvious reasons which compelled the British Government to take measures for gradually establishing an effective occupation of the mountain belt that girds India from the Himalayas to the sea. It has been impossible to carry out these measures all at once; the work must be done by degrees, and, here and there our dispositions have been incomplete and more or less of a temporary nature. This is the real explanation of the occasional misadventures which have attended the operation. It was not the ‘forward’ policy which impelled the Swatis to attack our forts on the Malakand, the Mohmands to raid Shabkadar, the Afridis to burn the Khyber posts, and the Orakzais to swarm round the forts on the Samana range; but the difficulty of carrying out that policy to its legitimate conclusion.”

On the following day (September 30) the *Standard* added:—

“There is now an admirable opportunity for establishing an efficient control over the whole extent of country within the British sphere of influence. It may have been a wise policy in the past to leave the border tribes, as much as possible, severely alone; and to adhere to a system of subsidies alternating with punitive raids or blockades. The gradual but sure advance of another European Power in Asia has made it imperative to adopt a stronger and more adventurous line of action. Statesmen of all Parties have agreed that India must be secured from external dangers; and this security can only be attained by the effective occupation of the Military frontier which would have to be defended. It may be that if the tribesmen had rested quiet, the present incomplete and provisional arrangement would have held good for some time to come. Perhaps, it is just as well that its deficiencies should have been unmasked when it is not too late to repair them. It will cost money, no doubt, which India can ill afford; but a far larger expense might be forced on the country were the opportunity neglected.”

Again, on October 5, discussing Mr. John Morley’s reference to Lord Lawrence, the *Standard* said:—“When Lord Lawrence spoke of our finding the strongest security against a Russian advance in our ‘previous abstinence from entanglements’ on the frontier, he talked excellent practical common-sense, based on the facts of a time when Russia was thousands of miles away, and when Asiatic railways and telegraphs were still in their infancy. To quote the bare words of Lord Lawrence without reference

to their context, or the circumstances that called them forth, is what in a meaner politician might be called lack of candour, if it did not proceed from sheer ignorance.” On October 14 the *Standard* published another long leading article in the same vein, urging that the controversy as to “the respective merits of forward and backward policies” was “out of date,” that “a backward policy is an impossibility, since the Indian Government cannot retire to the Indus,” and that “the recent troubles have arisen not as a consequence of adopting a forward policy, but because the Indian authorities, except at one or two points, worked on the old system.” We have dealt with the policy for the future which this sort of writing suggests, but it is well that the opponents of never-ending aggression should have before them in a compact form the pleas and pretexts of their opponents.

Our Ally—
Nature.

THE Russians are said to be making some stir in the Pamirs again, no doubt for the special benefit of English Russophobes. Reports are sent to Europe intimating industrious progress in making roads over inaccessible ridges of the mountains, and on October 8 the *Times*, ever willing to oblige, printed this “interesting story” from its correspondent at Vienna:—

“An interesting story reached me a few days ago from a friend abroad in a position to be well informed. He assured me that Prince Lobanof had left certain papers in which he defined his views touching Russia’s mission in the world. Among other things, the Prince pointed to England and Germany as the two Powers from which Russia had most to fear. He believed that in four years, when the Russian railway system in Asia would be completed, there should be no delay in striking a decisive blow at India. If this course of action should be attended with success, Prince Lobanof considered that the bonds uniting the British colonies with the mother country would be materially loosened and that the decline of the British Empire would follow.”

Yes it is an “interesting story.” At the same time, however, the first Russian base—if indeed it is good enough for even a temporary base—lies away back at Faizabad, some 400 miles off; and a long way behind that advanced post there is very significant trouble. The garrison of Merv—or rather the remnants of it—have had to be withdrawn to Krasnovodsk, owing to the prevalence of malarial fever. This breaks the most direct, and only conceivable, line of communication. Not only so, but the malarial epidemic has pursued the Russians into the Caucasus; and “in some places”, says Reuter, “the average number of daily cases admitted into hospital exceeds 400.” When the Russians start out on the “invasion of India,” they will (among other unconsidered trifles) have to arrange for the suspension of malaria along a couple of thousand miles of route.

THE troubles beyond the North-West Frontier have illustrated strongly the difficulties of the position of the Amír of Afghanistan. The Amír is our ally by solemn treaties; yet many English newspapers, including some that really ought to know better, have at once taken up the assumption that the Amír was, if not actively participating in the rising, at any rate supporting it indirectly and secretly. This is scarcely the way to confirm the Amír's fidelity to his engagements, or to strengthen his confidence in the English people and Government. Happily, however, the Amír has more sense than his English vituperators. It is worth while now to recall two or three of the points. At an early period of the outbreak, some two or three hundred camels of the Tochi punitive expedition were raided. The Amír at once directed the Governor of Khost to punish any Afghans who might be found engaging in any such hostile enterprise. Again, when the Shabkadr Fort was attacked, it was reported that the aggressors consisted mainly of Afghans, whereupon the Indian Government made a friendly communication to the Amír, requesting him to prevent such occurrences. It is not easy to see how the Amír could hold his hand upon tribesmen down in that region, considering how nominal his influence there has always been at the best. Yet, before the Indian Government's communication reached Cabul, he had done what he could by despatching orders to restrain all Afghans from taking part in the frontier disturbances. Further, the Amír's withdrawal of certain commercial (and no doubt informally political) agents from Calcutta, Simla, Bombay, and Karachi, was interpreted in English papers in practically the same sense as the recall of Afghan ambassadors regularly accredited to foreign courts. Then he was hand in glove with the Hadda Mullah; he provided the insurgents with rifles of the newest pattern; he intrigued with the Sultan through Sheikh Seyd Yahia, his emissary; and so forth. Yet—and this is the astounding and crushing fact—the Government of India has not so much as hinted at the complicity of the Amír in any one of these points.

Ignorant
Charges.

THE openest distrust, though not the most reckless malevolence, was exhibited unfortunately by the *Times*.

Several persons, presumably in a position to understand the attitude of the Amír, came forward with explanations and declarations in his defence. The *Times*, however, knew better. "They savour," it wrote on August 18, "a little too much of zeal not according to knowledge, and those who put them forward are either very ignorant of the subject on which they pretend to enlighten us, or very confident

in the credulity of the British public." The *Times*, indeed, is well qualified to speak of the credulity of the British public, and to gauge the advantages of an assumption of omniscience. But this time it was totally wrong. Of course, it drove home its ignorance with an access of forcible, and partly self-contradictory, assertion. Admitting readily "that the Amír is too intelligent and prudent a statesman to wish a rupture with the British Government," it yet proceeded to end off the sentence with the obviously contradictory and unproved assertion that "the fact that he has long systematically intrigued with the tribes on our frontier cannot be denied by any one at all intimately acquainted with the history of frontier politics during the last fifteen years." We do deny it, point-blank; and we ask for proof. If the *Times* knows so much better than anyone else, why foist on the credulity of the British public such an ugly assertion without a single syllable of evidence? Where is the official record? And why has the Indian Government taken no steps to bring him to book? Such assertions wear the look of mere bravado. In the same article the *Times* proceeded to say: "Of his [*i.e.*, the Amír's] complicity in the present disturbances there seems no reasonable doubt." Now, why? There is one reason stated. "The Hadda Mullah, who has been preaching a Jihad . . . has long been a *persona gratissima* in Kabul, where his personal relations with the Amír have been for some time an open secret." Dr. Leitner, who has had personal experience of those regions and peoples, has shown as clearly as possible that a Jihad has not been preached, and that the Hadda Mullah has been quite as troublesome to the Amír as to the Indian Government. The Amír, too, in his reply to the communication of the Indian Government, pointed out the same fact—that the Hadda Mullah had in former years incited risings against the Amír in his own country. The "friendly" communication of the Indian Government did not agree with the proud stomach of the *Times*. "Abdurrahman," said our contemporary, "is not a personage on whom soft words make much impression, and it would be well if he understood clearly that there are limits to our patience." He does, we venture to say, understand so much quite clearly. He understands also the limits of some of our journalists' knowledge and sense of justice. The Indian Government cannot proceed to rate the Amír without at least a plausible excuse in the facts within its knowledge. The hot-headed journalist is free from such awkward trammels. As Dr. Leitner says, "any story will do against an Afghan or Pathan tribe"—or an Amír either. Let us not forget that among the apostles of the "forward" school there are very many who would gladly provoke another Afghan war.

The Amír's
Justification.

THE alleged intrigues of the Amír at Constantinople, and the influence in India of English opposition to Turkey, are now all but universally discounted as factors in the troubles. If the echoes of the Turkish slaughters of Armenians and Greeks, in the face of the Christian Powers, have had any effect on the Punjab frontier tribes, Dr. Leitner holds it to have been "of the very weakest description."

"The relations of the Sultan with the Amír, if any exist," he says, "I take to be purely formal, and such as befit the *de facto* Khalifa of all Sunnis, and a ruler of that denomination who teaches Islam and has added to its domain."

In the same article, in the current number of the *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, Dr. Leitner has disposed absolutely of the nonsense that has been talked about a Jihad, as well as of the sinister statements and inferences in connexion with the Amír's pamphlet; and he illustrates amusingly the stupid blunders and groundless suspicions that arise in English minds from ignorance of, or inadequate attention to, the native language or polity. The charge against the Amír of supplying guns and rifles of new design to the insurgents is a similar outcome of ignorance and thoughtlessness. Everybody who knows anything about the facts is aware how careful the Amír is about the disposal of rifles of recent type. Besides, it is equally, if not better, known how diligent the frontier tribesmen are in thieving rifles. If the rifles are not stacked and guarded during the night, our soldiers tie them firmly to their persons during sleep; and even then the rifles are stolen. They make first-rate merchandise, bringing several hundred per cent. on their cost down country. But journalists ignorant of the facts at once rush to a charge against the Amír. Finally, the Amír turned back the Afridi deputations at Jelalabad, and posted up his reply to them publicly in Kabul. In that reply he ridicules the notion of a Jihad, and affirms his rigid maintenance of the British alliance:—

"I will never without cause or occasion, swerve from an agreement, because the English, up to the present, have in no way departed from the line of the boundary laid down on the map, which they have agreed upon with me. Then why should I do so? To do so will be far from justice. . . . What you have done with your own hands you must carry on your own necks."

But, it will be said, this is the attitudinizing of a "savage," when he sees he has no chance; the Amír is making a virtue of necessity. With such as take this view, there is no room for argument. The solid fact is that the Government of India have not a word to say against the Amír. The Amír, therefore, it seems to us, comes out of the affair with flying colours. He has stood firmly to his agreements during the eighteen years of his reign, and that ought to entitle him to the respect and confidence

of Englishmen, in spite of malevolent insinuations and ignorant charges in quarters where grave responsibility ought to be permanently felt and steadily respected.

The Indian
Mints.

As if there were not enough trouble on hand already, the Indian Government has been worried by the Home Government with the question of reopening the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver. We offered a decided opposition to the policy of closing the mints as an artificial interference with the free action of currency operations. We are equally decided against any interference now with the system at work, especially under the existing difficulties of the Calcutta treasury, and in view of the disastrous results of a chopping and changing policy. In a case of this sort nothing will satisfy men but an actual experience, and now that we have settled down to such experience we had better work it out on a fair and full trial, and at last have done with it. Why should there be a disturbance of the currency now? The motive for action appears to have come from the United States, whose treasury vaults have for years been bursting with useless silver, and who naturally are anxious to raise its value in relation to gold. France plays up to the United States with an official lack of insight which would be ludicrous if it were not painful to witness. The allied forces of bimetallism have hitherto completely failed to drag England into the welter. But from time to time the attempt is renewed persistently. Mr. A. J. Balfour unhappily has given himself over to the academic doctrinaires, probably in the main under the influence of his brother-in-law, Professor Sidgwick. In any case, it is a deplorable weakness that the English Government should ever coquette or hold parley at all with foreign schemes for the open debasement of the currency of the nation. And it is next thing to a high crime and misdemeanour even to affect to make India a pawn in the preposterous game. That such action should be regarded as possible indicates an alarming ignorance of the condition of India, or a no less alarming adventurousness of political manœuvre.

The Real
Question.

Of course, the Indian Government has put down its foot on the proposal, and after an unnecessarily prolonged period of suspense we learn (from Washington!) that common sense is to prevail. Perhaps the backing of the Bank of England may have turned the balance in favour of India. For, though the Governor of the Bank weakly consented to hold one-fifth of its reserve in silver (under the antiquated powers of an old Act), yet he hedged his consent with conditions

which practically saved the situation. The reopening of the Indian mints at the present time would have caused grave embarrassment. The Chairman of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China expressed the position the other day in very fair terms :—

"Debtors," he said, "would be heavily handicapped, local mills and other industries would be exposed to a serious fall in the value of their stocks, raw material, and manufactured goods, holders of imports would find the prices of their commodities greatly shrunken, and, more than all, the native cultivators would have to face much lower silver values for those products which were exported to gold standard countries."

No doubt, part of such distress would be attributable to the closing of the mints. But that is no reason why a sudden change, at a most inopportune time, should plunge the country into a deeper abyss of pecuniary difficulty and disorganisation. With the decline of the opium revenue there is nothing now between India and bankruptcy except the fact that she is still able to borrow money from England. The situation is anything but creditable to us. The fundamental reason is that like other distressed silver countries she has been spending beyond her means. The true recuperative plan, therefore, is simply to spend within her means. Her burdens must be lightened. The process may be slow, but the real difficulty in the case of India is to get so much as a beginning. One is sick and tired of having to emphasise the pressing necessity of a great reduction of military expenditure. Yet we are in the thick of military operations that will swallow up many years' careful savings, and we are on the brink of a fateful choice of future policy on and beyond the North-West Frontier. If the hardly credible rumours of the proposed increase of the Indian Army by one-third—or by any other fraction—prove true, we are probably doomed to see yet larger burdens fixed on the neck of India. If this should actually be the result, we had better come home. For the Indian Empire, in that case, is doomed irrevocably.

The Indian
Army.

A CORRESPONDENT writes :—"Some good or evil genius has been seeking to grasp the thunders of the sky whilst Lord Salisbury has been sleeping and Lord George Hamilton has been discovering the difference between a promise to retire from Chitral and a military road. He has produced a great quaking, and probably good will be the result. It is represented that the Indian Government, with a bold but undisclosed frontier policy in its mind, has notified to Lord George Hamilton and the War Office that India must have her army increased one third, or say, in plain figures, by 73,000 men. Without this increase the tribesmen may come down to Peshawar,

there may be friendly Mussulman risings, and our hearts may some day be in our mouths. Hence the India Council and the War Office are deliberating, using very strong language, and wondering what is to be done. At its worst, the quake given to England by this thunder-stealer means 24,000 British and 49,000 Indian troops, in addition to the 74,000 and 145,000 already in existence. No wonder most of the papers treat the idea as a bit of madness of the autumnal, political-capital-manufacturing order, but it emanated from a source whence the Government look for support. It came from Birmingham, and Birmingham always goes in for big military things, cordite or Chamberlainite, but usually presented under the idea of Imperialism or Nationalism. An increase of one-third in the expenditure on effective services in India would mean five millions. Birmingham cares little how the money is to be found. What it wants is to have a share in the orders given out under it. This levity where India is concerned is characteristic. The gossips increase an army by 73,000 men and add £5,000,000 to the expenditure of India and think nothing of it. Possibly the genius who stole the thunder was a good genius after all, and he wanted to let the world know with what wisdom India is governed. The military party is dominant just now, and it is talking in camp and grove at Simla no less than at Peshawar of a mighty increase in the Indian army. 'Just for once, I will let the British people see what are the ideas and tactics of Indian rulers, under Hamiltonian direction and inspiration,' the good genius may have said, in which case he was good to India and bad to the blunderers. An increase of 73,000 men and five millions of money in yearly outlay! Here is thunder indeed, of the Hamiltonian kind, to play about the British taxpayers' ears and bewilder the minds of the British electors, and stir military providers and purveyors into a most exciting competition. Of course, it is too much to expect us to believe that this thunder is real. We know that it cannot be so. Let Lord George Hamilton make any such proposition in the House of Commons and he will be taken for a madman forthwith, who has been driven out of his mind by the magnitude of his own ideas, and who fancies he knows India and understands England. It must surely be against him that the good or evil genius has been sending his thunderbolts through the air. Never has he made our hair stand on end with such tragic and tremendously far-reaching ideas. Forty-nine thousand more native troops—where are they to be found, unless he invites the Mohmands, Swatis, Afridis, and Orakzais to come over, don the military uniform, and take arms against their own women and children? As for the 24,000 British troops, they

could not be found, unless the engineers' strike is a Government device for sweeping the unemployed into the hands of the recruiting sergeant. Probably some increase of the Indian army really *is* intended; a modest half-dozen battalions or batteries, or something of the kind, just to garrison a few places along the main frontier valleys. Anything further than that is surely a joke; a Hamiltonian scheme for letting the sceptics know how easily he could govern an empire, annex a mountain region, or conquer a continent, if you would only give him the men and the millions. We cannot seriously believe that any British or Indian Government is going to increase the Indian army by one-third, and add five millions of tens of rupees to the burdens that already sufficiently oppress the people. It would be simple madness to do anything of the kind: we wish to remain sane."

The Work of the British Committee. PREFERRING to combat only the enemy, we have hitherto observed the rule of ignoring reproaches against the British Committee which from time to time, without a shadow of foundation, find their way into some of the Indian newspapers. But when the editor of a journal so influential and, as a rule, well-informed as the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* gives currency—evidently in good faith—to statements which are probably none the less damaging because they happen to be the merest fictions, it seems fitting that the facts should be stated. In the weekly issue of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* dated September 19 last, an editorial note, dealing with the work of the British Committee, suggests that it neglects its obvious duty in two important particulars, namely, (i) in not distributing to the British press Indian intelligence which might serve as an antidote to the ordinary prejudiced versions of fact and opinion; and (ii) in making "no serious attempt" in the direction of securing the co-operation of prominent Liberal newspapers. To these two rebukes we may add a third, which is equally groundless, namely, (iii) that nothing is done by the British Committee to organise in the United Kingdom meetings on Indian subjects. Let us take these three allegations *seriatim*. As to (i) hardly a week passes without the distribution among British newspapers of some document received by the British Committee from India. Also—though the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* will apparently regard this as a thing of no value—advance proofs of the most important matter which is about to appear in the forthcoming number of INDIA are regularly circulated in this way. We may mention also that no pains are spared in supplying prompt and full information in reply to the large and increasing number of queries regarding Indian affairs which reach the Committee from all quarters.

And if the current proposal that a press message should be sent weekly from India to the British Committee be carried into effect, we have little doubt that the Committee will be happy to make all possible use of such intelligence. As to (ii), nothing could be further from the truth than to say that no serious attempt has been made to secure the co-operation of prominent Liberal newspapers. Not only has this been attempted, but it has been done, and, by a pleasant coincidence, especially in the case of the three influential journals specified by the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*. As to (iii) the British Committee has done all that its resources permitted, and is at present making arrangements to do more than has hitherto been possible, in the matter of organising meetings in the constituencies. Apart from the meetings which were addressed by the gentlemen who came over from India last spring to give evidence before the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure, a good deal was done in the autumn and winter of 1896-97 partly by individual members of the Committee, partly through the friendly co-operation of the Eighty Club, and partly with the very active assistance of the National Reform Union. Mr. A. G. Symonds, the secretary of the last-named association, which has a large staff of able lecturers, and a large number of branch associations throughout the country, had kindly supplied the British Committee with the names of some of his best lecturers, to whom all available information was and is regularly sent by the British Committee, and who speak and lecture on the lines of Congress policy. To give one or two examples of the work done in this way, we may mention that one of the lecturers of the National Reform Union last season delivered Congress lectures on India at Salford, Gainsborough, Lowton, Denton, and Stacksteads. Another advocated the Congress policy at no fewer than forty meetings, at one of which a collection was taken on behalf of the sufferers from famine in India. This work, and work of the same kind, will, we are happy to say, be carried on upon a larger scale during the present political season. Arrangements are now being completed—of which particulars will be given in our next issue—for a considerable series of meetings, especially in the North of England. The editor of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, having these facts before him, will we are sure hasten to remove the mistaken impression which he has been instrumental in spreading. There are, we may remind him, two ways of working. One is to blow the big trumpet, and beat the big drum. The other is to plod on steadily, earnestly, and without ostentation. The British Committee has not chosen the former way, and is in consequence liable to a certain kind of misrepresentation. But it is discharging to the best

of its power a difficult and thankless task which is rendered none the lighter if there is misinterpretation in quarters where support and sympathy might rather be expected.

PLAYING RUSSIA'S GAME: THE FOLLY OF IT.

By SIR W. WEDDERBURN, BART., M.P.

At the opening of Parliament early last year, it devolved upon me, on behalf of the Indian Parliamentary Committee, to divide the House of Commons on the Chitral question, by an amendment on the Address; and I desire now to draw attention to Lord George Hamilton's statements on that occasion, in order to show how completely, within a few months, all his allegations and forecasts have been falsified by subsequent events; and how fatally he and his friends have been playing Russia's game both on the frontier and in the interior of India. Also I wish to ask whether, before it is too late, the British people will not open their eyes to the facts, and cease to follow these blind guides who have upset the best traditions of our Indian administration, and are rapidly bringing our great national inheritance to ruin?

The grounds upon which I moved a censure upon the Government were—1st, That by refusing to withdraw after the Chitral Expedition we had broken the pledges made to the border tribes in the Viceroy's Proclamation; 2nd, That the retention of Chitral, with its 180 miles of communications beyond our frontier, was a grave political danger; and 3rd, That the cost of these external aggressions would be ruinous to the Indian people. With regard to the first point Lord George replied that "the Indian Government from first to last had adhered to every letter of that Proclamation." But strange to say, almost in the same breath, he admitted that the Proclamation was specially issued to the inhabitants of Swát; so that the Swátis were among those to whom the assurance was solemnly given that if they would let us pass through their mountains to the relief of Chitral *we would not occupy any of their territory, or interfere with the independence of the tribes.* When therefore we fortified and permanently occupied Malakand, in the heart of the Swát territory, the act was one in flagrant defiance of both the letter and the spirit of our national promise; and we may recognise a Nemesis in the fact that in the present disastrous outbreak the first blood has been shed in an attack upon this particular fortification. In such matters an appeal to moral duty may to some politicians appear foolishness, but all will admit that confidence in our national good faith is the sheet-anchor of our power in India. Those therefore who have struck this deadly blow at our reputation for honesty have, apart from all moral considerations, committed an unpardonable offence against the safety of the Empire. 2nd, as regards political considerations, I pointed out the folly of piercing a military road through the natural ramparts by which our North-West frontier is protected, and killing the brave defenders by whom these

ramparts are manned, thus paving the way for a Russian invasion; I warned Lord George Hamilton that, in seeking to occupy these wild territories, the first steps were the easiest and the cheapest—afterwards followed the dangers, the difficulties, and the heavy expenditure; and I reminded him that Lord Roberts himself had estimated the fighting population of these mountain regions at a quarter of a million of men, mostly well-armed, brave, and with an unconquerable love of independence. What did the noble lord say, in answer to this, as to possible dangers arising from our encroachments on the independence of the tribes? He showed himself absolutely and hopelessly blind to coming events, assuring a complacent House that "the most sanguine anticipations that anyone could have indulged in had been more than realised. (Hear, hear.) So far from their occupation being regarded in a hostile spirit by the people of the country, on the contrary they welcomed the English occupation, because it had inaugurated a period of security which they had not known before. (Hear, hear.)" Was there ever such a fool's paradise? He even became jocular on the subject, explaining that the only difficulty arose from the tribes jostling each other in their eager competition to be incorporated in British territory. In conclusion he expressed his belief that "there had been no forward movement in recent years made by any Government which had been more beneficial to all concerned, and which would tend to put an end to these periodical disturbances and outbreaks of fanaticism and terrorism which had characterised that portion of (*sic*) her Majesty's dominions." As many of us knew then, and as everyone knows now, this whole Arcadian picture was a dream and a delusion. In a few short months the whole frontier was in a blaze. But what shall we say of the men whose long-drawn schemes have landed us in these disasters? What shall we say of their foresight, their knowledge of men, the accuracy of their local information? Is no one to be made responsible for all the lives that are now being sacrificed, and the vast sums that are being spent? And this brings us to the 3rd point, the ruinous cost to India, both in blood and treasure, before these warlike tribes can be coerced and bribed into accepting our presence in their country. I anticipated that the noble lord would tell the House that, according to official estimates, the cost would not be great, so I pointed out that, as a matter of experience, such official assurances were invariably falsified; as in the Abyssinian campaign, which was estimated at 3 millions, but which cost 10 millions; and the last Afghan War, which was estimated at 1½ millions, and cost 21 millions. Undeterred by such experiences the confident declaration of Ministers was that the occupation of those 180 miles of wilderness, with Chitral at the further end, would not add a rupee to Indian military expenditure. The exact sum originally budgeted for an account of the Chitral expedition was Rx. 220,000; and in answer to my challenge Lord George failed to specify any approximate amount, but stated generally that "he thought the expenditure would be less than was anticipated." He denied that Indian finance was in a critical

condition, and foretold that, notwithstanding the Chitral business, income and expenditure would be equalised. We know what these prophecies have come to. Two millions did not pay the bill for the Chitral affair; and now, having sown the storm, we are reaping the whirlwind. We have already on the frontier 60,000 men, with transport and commissariat at famine prices; and no human being can foretell how many more millions, wrung from the hard hands of peasants, will be spent before this wretched business is settled.

Now I am no Russophobe; but if danger from this quarter does exist, then I say that those who commit follies like these are preparing India to drop, like a ripe plum into Russia's open mouth. Our true safety is to be found in the wise and humane policy of Lord Lawrence, the "Saviour of India"; masterly inactivity beyond the frontier, statesmanlike care for the welfare of the people within our own borders; a policy resting on the sure basis of a contented people, friendly neighbours, and a full treasury. The Marquis of Ripon, who followed in the steps of Lord Lawrence, further developed the same policy of wise economy and confidence in the people, so that when his term of office was over, some twelve years ago, he left behind him peaceful frontiers, financial equilibrium, with reduced taxation, and a population throughout India not only contented, but filled with gratitude and affection, and enthusiastic for British rule. This I saw with my own eyes. Since then Lord Lawrence's policy, both external and internal, has been reversed; and in a few short years this happy state of things has been upset and destroyed. For the genial kindness of Lord Ripon's time has been substituted a new policy, hatched in secrecy and nourished upon violence; a policy of aggression abroad, and of distrust and repression at home. The fruits of this policy are very manifest: beyond our frontier all is now waste and bloodshed; within our borders misery and unrest.

I will not now further discuss the external or frontier policy of the Chauvinist clique which rules at Simla, and has for its spokesmen Lord George Hamilton in the House of Commons, and Lord Roberts in the House of Lords. Doubtless their defence will be that they have failed only because they have not gone far enough. For they are political Sangrados, whose only prescription is bleeding and hot water; if the patient does not improve, then more bleeding and more hot water. But we may await their newest frontier proposals with some equanimity, for even the man in the street is beginning to see that their whole scheme has broken down, and that their fussy activities, directed against Russia, are only promoting Russian interests. Of course the frontier tribesmen, however brave, cannot resist the armaments of the British Empire. The present rising will therefore be suppressed. But fortunately under section 55 of the Government of India Act of 1858, the consent of both Houses of Parliament must be obtained to the bill of costs, so we may hope that some light will soon be thrown upon the rights and wrongs of the case. Also, after the views expressed in the Suakin debates, we may safely assume that the national

conscience will not consent to the whole burden of this Imperial Kriegspiel with Russia being thrown upon the famine-stricken Indian rayat. A large share of the expenses must be borne by the Imperial Treasury; so her Majesty's Ministers may expect a rigorous inquisition into the facts when they place before Parliament an account of their stewardship in those dark and discreditable transactions.

There exists therefore some hope that a stop may be put to the mischievous frontier intrigues and aggressions of the Simla clique, and that a return may be ordered to the sane and successful policy of Lords Lawrence and Ripon. It is more difficult to bring public opinion to bear upon the equally unwise, and still more dangerous, methods of the same clique in matters of internal administration. The delusions of Lord George Hamilton respecting the condition and needs of the rayat and respecting the aspirations of the educated classes, are as absolute as, a few months ago, were his delusions regarding the political sentiments of the frontier tribesmen. But as he persistently refuses all enquiry, there are no means of bringing the facts to light. According to him the rayat is a fat and prosperous person, very lightly taxed, and pleasantly conscious of "the infinite blessings of British rule;" whereas Indian public opinion knows that the rayat is in a chronic state of semi-starvation, "ruined, despairing, embittered," hopelessly in debt to the money-lender, crushed by burdens too heavy for him to bear, ready to perish at the first touch of scarcity and disease. Upon the top of these miseries have come famine, plague, and earthquake; so that the minds of the people are distracted, and they are almost driven to despair; and I ask, is this a time for harshness and rigour? Would not commonsense, if not humanity, suggest an attitude of sympathy and forbearance on the part of those in authority? But such is the infatuation of our present rulers that instead of seeking to calm and soothe this suffering people, they can think of no better remedies than punitive police, attacks upon the freedom of the press, political prosecutions, and *lettres de cachet*. I say that all this is simply playing into the hands of our enemies. In Russian schemes for the invasion of India it has always been recognised that much cannot be effected unless disaffection exists among the people of India themselves. The chance of success depends upon the possibility of popular risings against the British Government in the interior of India, behind the "thin red line" which will face the invaders along the frontier. Our un-friends in Russia and elsewhere must therefore sincerely rejoice when they observe that, instead of allaying unrest and stimulating affection to our rule, we are actively engaged in alienating the most important classes upon whom the safety of our Empire depends.

Our Indian officials undoubtedly mean well. Why then do they behave with this fatal perversity? What is the origin of their extraordinary delusions as regards the plainest facts? The reason is simply this, that they are out of touch with the people. It is the vice and misfortune of despotic rule, whether in India, Russia, or elsewhere, that it cannot tolerate independence: "It is the curse of kings to be attended by slaves that take their humours for a

warrant"; and so it comes that Indian officials usually get their facts and guidance from the time-servers and sycophants who naturally gather about them, attracted to the seat of power. Official information is thus tainted at its source; and a Secretary of State for India has but rarely an opportunity of learning the truth. Occasionally no doubt a man of exceptional independence tries to hear both sides and to judge for himself. And I remember when in 1885 three independent Indian delegates came to England to set forth the case for India, Lord Randolph Churchill sent for them to the India Office, and gave them a most attentive and courteous hearing. Unfortunately Lord G. Hamilton resents similar attempts to enlighten him. But he should remember that it is a thankless and even dangerous task to tell disagreeable truths to those in authority, and this duty is not usually undertaken by those seeking personal advantage. Our Indian autocrat might take a lesson from another Oriental potentate, not an estimable character, but who in this respect showed himself wiser in his generation. When Ahab, an early light of the "forward" school, contemplated an aggression upon his neighbours the Syrians, he was not content to accept the assurances, however emphatic, of his official advisers, but was at great pains to hunt up Micaiah, the son of Imlah, and extract the truth from him. He hated him, "for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but evil," but all the same he adjured him in the most solemn terms to tell him nothing but that which was true. In this way, with difficulty, he at last got at the truth. Now no such difficulties stand in the way of the modern ruler of India. The educated classes are willing and anxious to act as interpreters between him and the masses of the people. They have no desire for Russian rule, and if he will accept their services in the frank and loyal spirit in which they are offered, the first step will have been taken to bring the rulers into touch with the ruled. During the last twelve years independent public opinion has organised itself thoroughly, and in the programme of the Indian National Congress will be found a body of moderate and practical measures of reform which would go far to regain the affections of the Indian people.

The more we differentiate our rule from Russian rule, the stronger will be our position in India; and those reactionists among us who are attempting to exchange British methods of progress and trust in the people, for Russian methods of distrust and repression, are the people who are playing Russia's game in more senses than one.

We take the following from "Notes on Books" in the *Coming Day* for October (edited by the Rev. John Page Hopps):—"Report of the Eleventh Indian National Congress," held at Poona, December, 1895. London: Office of INDIA, Palace Chambers, Westminster. A volume of the highest possible importance. The unrest in India is widespread and grave in the extreme, and it is useless to ignore it, or only to fight it. The Poona Congress went fully into every subject of national importance, and this report is a verbatim presentation of its resolution and speeches, all of which were of a very high order. The officials who affect to despise or ignore the Congress and its demands are very badly serving their country.

"IF THIS BE TRUE, WHAT DOES IT MEAN?"

By W. C. BONNERJEE.

When about thirteen years ago the Marquis of Ripon was retiring from India, after resigning the Viceroyalty of that Empire, a series of demonstrations were held all over the country to do honour to him. People of all classes, including Poona Brahmins, and Brahmins in other parts of the country, took part in these demonstrations, and they were so spontaneous, so enthusiastic, and withal were so loyal to the Government that they drew from (as was believed at the time) the pen of an experienced and sagacious member of the Indian Civil Service, then holding high office in the Executive Council of the Government of India, and afterwards rising to still higher eminence in the administration of the country, a very remarkable article under the above heading in the columns of the *Pioneer* newspaper. After taking pains to ascertain if the feelings expressed by the people at these demonstrations were genuine or not, and satisfying himself that they were so, the writer in effect concluded that the people of India were loyal to the core to the British Government, and that they had no interest apart from it, and sincerely desired its permanence. No publicist of the day raised any dissentient voice with regard to this conclusion, and thoughtful men of both parties in England accepted the conclusion as being perfectly correct, and until the other day, when after the lamentable murders of Lieutenant Ayerst and Mr. Rand the Government of Lord Sandhurst in Bombay commenced the press prosecutions for sedition of which we have heard so much, nobody ever suggested that the people of India were otherwise than perfectly loyal.

In this view it becomes necessary to enquire whether it is the fact or not that the articles in the *Kesari*, which formed the subject of the recent State trial against its editor and proprietor, Mr. Tilak, are seditious at all, or seditious within the meaning of Section 124 A of the Indian Penal Code. The enquiry may be said to be useless, seeing that the judge and the majority of the jury before whom the trial was held, have come to the conclusion that the articles were an attempt "to excite feelings of disaffection to the British Government." With all respect to those who are likely to take this view, I think the enquiry is not useless because the verdict of the jury being only that of a majority (6 to 3) cannot carry that weight with the public which it would have carried if it had been the unanimous verdict of all nine. It is well known that the majority of the jury who convicted Mr. Tilak were Europeans, who presumably have not the same grasp over the Marathi language, in which the articles were written, as the three dissentient jurymen, who were natives of the country, and who, presumably, would have a better understanding of the incriminated articles. It must not be understood that I seek in any way to minimise the effect of the verdict. The judge agreed with it, and it stands as the deliberate opinion of seven impartial Europeans that Mr. Tilak

was guilty "of attempting to excite feelings of disaffection to the British Government." All I say is, and I say it with all respect, that the verdict is one with which I cannot agree.

It seems to me that there is no escape from the position that, for a subject to attempt to excite feelings of disaffection towards the Government to which he owes allegiance, he must be disaffected himself. Nobody in his senses, if he were well affected towards a Government, if he entertained feelings of affection for it, or even if he were passively obedient to it, would, for the mere wantonness of the thing, attempt to excite feelings of disaffection towards it in others. If I am right in this, the question arises whether Mr. Tilak himself entertained feelings of disaffection to the British Government. To my mind it is inconceivable that he could have done so. He has known no government of the country except the British Government. Along with all other British Indian subjects he has received vast benefits from the British Government. As Mr. Justice Strachey says in passing sentence on him, and as is well known, he is "a man of intelligence, a man of remarkable ability and energy and who" not "might under the circumstances have been," but, with all deference to Mr. Justice Strachey, was, in fact, "a useful force in the State."

Mr. Tilak knows, as all his compatriots who have thought over the subject do, that the only possible government for India is the British Government, that if the British Government ceased to rule the country it would relapse into anarchy, and that all the best aspirations of the country would be smothered. For years he has taken a prominent part in constitutional movements for the redress of the grievances of the people, and unless he has completely changed it is impossible to suppose that he would turn back on his former conduct, be himself disaffected, and endeavour to sow seeds of disaffection in others towards the Government at a time when the Government was engaged in doing its best to combat the two dread visitations of famine and the plague. This point of view was evidently absent from the mind of the judge, for he not only lays no stress on it in his charge but does not even allude to it.

Looked at from the point of view of the personal position of Mr. Tilak, the incriminated articles do not appear to me to express anything like what Mr. Justice Strachey told the jury would be within the explanation to Section 124 A of the Indian Penal Code. He says "a man may express the strongest condemnation of such measures"—he had previously referred to the Income Tax Act, the Epidemic Diseases Act, military expeditions, suppression of plague or famine, and the administration of justice—"and he may do so severely and even unreasonably, perversely and unfairly. So long as he confines himself to that he will be protected by the explanation." As far as I can judge, the articles in question do not come near this at all. Mr. Justice Strachey continues,

"but if he goes beyond that, and whether in the course of comments upon measures or not holds up the Government itself to the hatred or contempt of his readers, as, for instance, by attributing to it every sort of evil and misfortune suffered

by the people, or dwelling adversely on its foreign origin and character or imputing to it base motives or accusing it of hostility or indifference to the welfare of the people, then he is guilty under the section and the explanation will not save him."

There is a subtlety, I had almost said metaphysical fineness, in this exposition of the law which it is not easy to grasp. One may, says the judge, express the strongest condemnation of the measures of Government, but may not hold up the Government itself to the hatred or contempt of his readers. What is meant by "the Government itself?" Who are to be taken as being included in it? Do the words only mean the Governor and his Executive Council, or do they mean all persons entrusted with legislative, executive and judicial functions? If the words "the Government itself" are to be taken as meaning all these persons, then according to Mr. Justice Strachey, ridiculing a policeman on his beat and so holding him up to the contempt of the bystanders would apparently be contemned. I hardly think the judge intended to go so far as this.

Strongest condemnation of measures proceeding from human beings acting singly or conjointly with others necessarily implies condemnation of the persons passing them. The measures must be bad indeed to merit strong condemnation; and what does this condemnation mean except that the authors of the measures are either perverse, wrong-headed, or incompetent? And when persons are held up before the public as being perverse, wrong-headed, or incompetent, what are the feelings that would be excited in the public mind with regard to them? Would it be feelings of admiration and love, or of hatred and contempt? In such serious matters as sedition or seditious libel, the only safe standpoint, as it seems to me, is to see as far as possible what the motive of the writer was in writing the articles.

What was Mr. Tilak's motive in publishing the articles which have been held to bring him within the meaning of section 124 A? Did he intend that they should excite feelings of disaffection towards the Government, or did he intend to bring to the notice of the Government what was being said by the people of Poona with regard to their uneasiness? He was the editor of a vernacular journal, and as such had a twofold duty to perform—first, to bring to the notice of the rulers the voice of the people; secondly, to explain to the people the measures of the rulers. If the people reasonably or unreasonably say what is not creditable to the Government I hold it to be the duty of an editor to bring this state of things to the notice of the Government by giving it publicity in the columns of his newspaper, and the articles in the *Kesari* did but give voice to what the people at Poona were saying amongst themselves with reference to their grievances.

One of the instances which Mr. Justice Strachey gives as to how "the Government itself" might be held up to the "hatred or contempt" of the people is very unfortunate in the circumstances of India. He says that the Government might be held up to the contempt of the people,

"by attributing to it every sort of evil and misfortune suffered by the people."

He evidently has not read much of the ancient

literature of the land of which he is now one of the judges. If he had done so, he would have known that it has been ingrained in the minds of the Hindu people (at any rate from before the time when Yudisthira, of *Mahabharata* fame, was king) that no evil or misfortune befalls the country except owing to the sinfulness or shortcomings of the rulers. The belief in question, as a moment's reflection would show, does not proceed from any "feelings of disaffection" to the Government but from an exaggerated notion of the purity and wisdom of the rulers.

I cannot help feeling that the Press prosecutions in the Bombay Presidency have been a mistake from beginning to end. The assumption that people are likely to be imbued with feelings of disaffection to the Government by articles in the newspaper press is an unfortunate one. If, after so many years of British rule, articles in the newspaper press are able to make the generality of the people disaffected towards the Government, then indeed that Government cannot be said, as it is said on all hands, to have been a successful one. There is no doubt that the murders of Lieutenant Ayerst and Mr. Rand created a panic in Government circles in Bombay. The panic deepened when, with large rewards and promises of pardon to accomplices, no information as to the perpetrators was obtained. It was unthinkingly concluded that there was an organised conspiracy which brought about the murders. This belief helped to intensify the panic, and to save themselves from the charge of inactivity the Government have laid a heavy hand upon the unfortunate editors of the vernacular journals of Poona.

RAILWAY POLICY IN INDIA.

By G. SUBRAMANIA IYER.

On no question raised by the Indian witnesses in their evidence before the Indian Expenditure Commission was there greater difficulty in bringing home to the members of the Commission the Indian point of view than on the question of the extension of railways in India. To the majority of the Commission—that is, to the whole Commission except the three members that represent India—the present policy of pushing forward railway construction with enormous borrowed funds appears to be an unmixed blessing. They seem to think that nothing but good can result from the breathless activity shown by the Government of India in widening the network of railways, by which it is hoped that the people will be completely protected against future famines, and that incalculable material and moral benefits will accrue in proportion to the length of railways. But the Indian witnesses contended that the benefits of railways were a great deal exaggerated, and the peculiar economic conditions of India rendered a less rapid progress the wiser policy. In the present article I shall try to prove that Lord Welby and his official colleagues on the Commission are wrong, and the Indian witnesses are right. If India were a self-governing country without the serious evil of foreign domination, not only in

the public service, but in the management of railways and every other large enterprise, perhaps Lord Welby's contention would be sound. His lordship repeatedly pointed out in the cross-examination of the witnesses that most countries in the world engaged in a vigorous prosecution of railway construction borrowed the required capital from England, and that this fact was not looked upon as a source of economic evil. True, Australia, China, Japan, and other countries obtain their capital for this purpose from foreign markets and they pay large amounts of interest to their foreign creditors. It cannot be denied that this foreign payment is an evil in these countries as well as in India; at all events they would avoid it, if they could. But these countries enjoying the blessings of self-government and not being liable to foreign drain by other channels, the evil is almost imperceptible. But what is the case in regard to India? India has her wealth drained into foreign countries to the extent of 30 millions sterling every year, and her people are exceedingly poor with a heavy and oppressive burden of taxation to bear; and this great fact distinguishes India from all other countries in the world, and introduces in the consideration of her political and economic questions a point of view which does not arise in self-governing countries like Australia and China. Amidst this enormous drain which, as Lord Salisbury observed, is bleeding India to exhaustion, the payment of nearly three millions every year as interest on her railway expenditure is not a small matter. It would be different if India had no drain of her money in other ways, and if she had only to pay the interest on foreign capital raised for this purpose. And then there is another difference between India and other countries in this respect. In Australia, for instance, to which Lord Welby frequently referred, the railways are not administered by a large number of foreigners in receipt of handsome salaries. In India, on the other hand, nearly two thousand six hundred Europeans employed in the management of railways already constructed are at present in receipt of salaries aggregating every year to the large amount of nearly eight hundred thousand pounds. These eight hundred thousand pounds include only the salaries of Europeans holding higher appointments. There are in almost every railway a host of young men employed to do ministerial work. It should be remembered that every European employed in this manner not only takes away the bread from the mouth of an Indian who would otherwise take his place, but also takes away the opportunity of a training in public administrative work which the Indians would otherwise have. Thus, in addition to the enormous foreign drain of India's wealth as the result of her foreign domination, the army of Europeans employed in the administration of the railways, and the loss of opportunities for administrative training that I have referred to, constitute the radical difference between India and other countries in respect of the construction of railways, and this difference it was extremely difficult to make the Commissioners comprehend. The Commissioners probably think that with all these evils which must be admitted, there are advantages which more than

compensate for them and which justify the policy of extending this means of communication as rapidly as possible. But we endeavoured to point out that these compensating advantages are exaggerated and in many respects imaginary.

Lord Welby laid stress on the fact that the railways would be of invaluable service in times of famine by bringing into the affected areas food stuff not merely from the unaffected areas of India itself, but from all parts of the world. At first sight there appears to be a good deal of truth in this. But, as a fact, have the 20,000 miles of railway that now traverse the country prevented a famine? Since the last great famine more than 10,000 miles have been constructed, and who would deny that the present famine has proved disastrous to the people?

I do not for a moment deny that railways have been highly useful in transporting food from one part of the country to another, and thereby have made food to some extent available in the afflicted areas. But railways do not transport food for nothing. The process of transportation costs money, and at the place where grain is brought for consumption, it can be sold only at prices higher than those of normal years. The theory that grains can be imported into India from foreign countries and that in times of scarcity India would indent on other parts of the world, has not been found to hold good in the present famine. The much talked of relief from America and Russia has not come, for the very obvious and sufficient reason that private enterprise cannot undertake the transportation without profit, and it would not pay to bring wheat all the way down from America or Russia to India. The fact is, the Indian famine is as much of money as of grain; perhaps it is becoming more and more the former than the latter. The Indian people are becoming more and more impoverished, and even when the grain is available, there must be money to buy it with, which money is not forthcoming. It appears to me therefore that the theory that railways are the panacea of all the economic evils of India is a fallacy.

It is urged by the exponents of official opinion that railways tend to raise the prices of agricultural produce and thereby benefit the cultivators. I doubt whether the so-called rise in the prices is the result of an increase in the prosperity of the people. The official figures representing the rise in prices are misleading, because they include prices in years of drought and abnormal seasons and in places where large numbers of people more or less temporarily congregate on account of large public works executed by Government. If allowance were made for these as well as for the prices in large cities where they must be higher than elsewhere, I am not sure that in the villages any considerable rise in the prices of grain can be proved. Still, granting that there has been a genuine rise in the prices, let us consider whether it is of any real good to the cultivator. So far as his payment to the Government goes, he would be no doubt a gainer. For while the assessment is unchanged for a period of years, he could pay it, if the prices had risen, by disposing of a smaller quantity of his produce. But even here, there is a

lurking fallacy. The arrangements for the payment of the demand by Government are such that the rayat is forced to dispose of his produce at a time of the year when the produce sells cheapest. The time for the payment is fixed about the harvest time to enable the rayat to satisfy the demand easily. But this very fact brings an enormous quantity of the produce to the market in a forced manner, and the excessive and unnatural glut in the market tends to the lowering of prices. The middleman takes advantage of the rayat's difficulty, and buys up the available grain and stores it in order that he may sell it when the prices are most dear. In many instances, the rayat sells off most of the grain he has, and having consumed in a few months what little remained, he buys his food when it is dear. Apart from this payment of the Government demand, the rise in prices does not at all help the rayats. The majority of the landholders paying tax to Government in all parts of the country, except where the system of permanent settlement prevails, are exceedingly poor, holding a property of five acres or so. In the Presidency of Madras two-thirds of these hold such petty properties that they pay no more than ten rupees a year to the Government, an amount which, according to the theory of the settlement, represents one-half of the landholders' net produce. In other words, two-thirds of the landholders of Southern India derive from their land an income of no more than ten rupees after paying the Government's demand. Surely, such poor people cannot benefit much from increased prices. What is left after the payment of the Government's demand is mostly taken by the rayat's creditors, so that his actual food, as well as other articles of consumption, such as the condiments, fuel, clothes, etc., he has to buy in the market. Thus, it will be seen, the rayat is not a gainer from the so-called increase in prices; on the other hand the real gainer is the middleman.

There is also another point of view from which the extension of railways is not an unmixed blessing in India. Railways necessarily tend to upset the old indigenous industrial system. India is not a new country where the people are a newly settled community with a civilization yet to grow, with no ancient industries and arts to boast of. Here again the Commission betrayed their inability to realize the peculiar conditions of India and could not understand that institutions and improvements which are an unmixed blessing in countries where they have spontaneously grown up in the gradual evolution from a previous state of things, or in countries where society is a *tabula rasa*, as it were, on which any superstructure can be raised without any destructive effect, may not be the same in a country like India where a social system has grown up during ages when railways as well as most appliances of the modern civilisation of the West were unknown. As a fact, wherever the railway penetrates in India, it carries destruction into the indigenous industries which have given the means of sustenance to the people and to which they have become accustomed during centuries. In no instance has this destructive effect of railways been proved to produce more lamentable results than in the weaving industry of India. This

industry is as old as Indian civilisation itself and the genius of the Hindus in displaying the highest excellence in its products has been admired by every foreign observer. "India," says Sir George Birdwood, "was probably the first of all countries that perfected weaving." In times gone by, India not only clothed all her people with her own cotton, but the European, including the small British, demand for cotton goods before the seventeenth century was met by importations from India itself. A very large proportion of the population have always lived upon the weaving trade. But this weaving trade has well-nigh become extinct. As Sir William Hunter says, "the tide of circumstances has compelled the Indian weaver to exchange his loom for the plough," thus adding largely to the heavy pressure of the population on land. Mr. J. S. Cotton says, "Lancashire has attained its pre-eminence by annihilating the indigenous industry—first by prohibitive duties and then by the competition of machinery." The extreme poverty of this large class of people is proved by the fact, so well known to famine administrators in India, that among the people that first feel the pressure of famine are the weavers, for whom special arrangements have always to be made in order that they may not become hopelessly scattered, and that, if perchance they survive the famine, they may remain in their places and continue to carry on their hereditary trade. What applies to the weaving industry applies to all indigenous industries. In fact every machine-made article imported from Europe and carried into the Indian village with the help of railways drives a nail in the coffin of a native industry, and in this manner the railways have to answer for a good deal of the poverty which makes the lot of the Indian poor so miserable. It may be said that the evil is inevitable and India is only going through the same experience that other countries went through in the period of transition when machinery replaced manual labour. This is true no doubt. But there is no particular reason why this inevitable evil should be aggravated and the work of the people's destruction made quicker and more complete by taxing the people themselves. Cannot the destructive process be made slower and more gradual so that the people may be given time to recover themselves? It is a great mistake that the Commission made in assuming that the Indian witnesses urged the complete stopping of all further construction. They never did any such thing. They recognise the material and moral good that railways do and the fact of their being indispensable in the carrying on of Government in modern days. They only pleaded for a more moderate progress which will not cause such large amounts to be borrowed in foreign markets from year to year.

The question of railway extension in India raises the other important question—where the required money should be borrowed, in London or at home. I have already referred to one weighty consideration in favour of the latter course. There are other reasons to which it is necessary to refer here. The result of borrowing in London has not been at all encouraging during the last quarter of a century.

Though the rates of interest have been reduced, still the rupee has so fallen in value that the saving from reduced rates of interest has been more than counterbalanced by the increase in the cost of exchange. The amount of interest on the sterling loans has grown during the last eighteen years from $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions to nearly $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions. Last year the Government resolved to borrow nearly 30 crores of rupees more for the construction of railways. Of these 30 crores about ten are to be borrowed in India, the rest being raised in London; and this will add another half-million sterling to the amount of interest. When the 20 crores are raised in London, the total amount of sterling loan will be 125 millions, roughly speaking. If the Government of India were to make up its mind to repay this whole loan, it would have to find nearly $17\frac{1}{2}$ rupees for every pound sterling, that is to say, nearly 2,200 crores of rupees! But this impossible task the Government has no intention of trying. No provision is made in the Indian Budget for a sinking fund every year for the repayment of the foreign loan. So that the four millions paid as interest will be a perpetual yearly charge on the revenues of India. Nobody can maintain that such an unceasing drain is desirable. On the other hand, if all further growth of this charge can be stopped and all loans were raised in India, limiting the annual amount to what the Indian money market can safely supply, not only will the increasing drain be arrested, but the Indian capitalists will be benefited in proportion. The Government has estimated that about 5 crores of rupees can be annually borrowed in India; and to be on the safe side, and in order that the capital available for local industry and trade may not be encroached upon, we may put this figure at 3 crores. If to this amount a crore from the current revenues of the Government were added, it would give 4 crores every year for the extension of railway communication; and with this amount, whatever may be the consequence, the Government should rest content. During recent years Indian borrowing at home has been beneficial. The price of Rupee Paper has been steadily rising, and Government has been able to borrow at lower and lower rates. The 4 per cent. Rupee Paper was converted first into $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cents. and subsequently to 3 per cents. Even if the Government has to pay a higher rate of interest in the Indian market than in the London market, it would be, for reasons already stated and for those which I shall briefly refer to below, more advantageous, on the whole, to borrow in the home market. Strangely, our financial authorities lose sight of the fact that the fall in the gold value of silver is exaggerated by the Secretary of State's offering for sale every year an increasing number of Bills in London. But the question should not be looked at from the point of view of Government's finance; it should be considered in respect of the results on the people of India. If the loans were raised in India instead of in London, the interest would be paid to people resident in India. Supposing ten crores of rupees were borrowed in India at 3 per cent., the interest paid to those that lent the money would be 30 lakhs a year, and along with all the benefits to the trade and industry and the

education of the people which would result from the railways built with the money thus borrowed, the 30 lakhs would remain in the country and fructify in the pockets of the people. Such a policy, steadily pursued by the Government, would be a great inducement to habits of economy and prudent investment among the people. If the 10 crores were not lent to Government, that money, or most of it, would have been spent in the households, in the making of ornaments, in marriage and other ceremonies, or in other more or less unproductive ways. But lent to the Government, it would yield an income of 30 lakhs a year, which would probably be spent in new productive investments.

THE POLICE AND THE GOVERNMENT.

"NO NECESSITY FOR ANY INTERFERENCE."

At the meeting of the Bengal Legislative Council on August 28 last the Hon. Surendra Nath Banerjee asked two important questions regarding the conduct of certain police officers in Calcutta.

The first question was: "I have the honour to call the attention of the Government to the statement noted in the margin, taken from a recent issue of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, which purports to describe a case of gross and unprovoked assault committed by Mr. Marklew, Inspector of the Sukea Street thana, upon Babu Girish Chunder Mukherjee, M.A., Head Assistant in the office of the Registrar of the Calcutta University.

"Is it the case, as alleged, that the Inspector assaulted Babu Girish Chunder Mukherjee, cutting his under lip, and gave orders to drag him to the thana, and that, although the Inspector was asked several times by the complainant what offence he had committed, the Inspector declined to give any answer? If so, will the Government be pleased to state what notice has been taken by the superior authorities of the conduct of the Inspector in the matter? Does the Government consider the Inspector a fit and proper person to remain in responsible charge of a station?"

The "statement noted in the margin" was as follows:

A police *zulum* of an unprecedented character was perpetrated at Machua Bazar Street this morning. At about 9.30 o'clock, when Babu Girish Chunder Mukherjee, M.A., Head Assistant to the Registrar of the Calcutta University, was about to leave for his office, he was arrested by a *posse* of constables, headed by Inspector Marklew, of Sukea Street thana, assaulted on the public road, and walked off to the thana. The head and front of Girish Babu's offence was that he had asked two police constables, who were beating a supposed thief and abusing him in the filthiest language on a piece of his land close to that part of his house especially intended for the ladies. Girish Babu objected to the violent language used by the constables within the hearing of the ladies, and told them to leave the place. One of the constables went and informed the Inspector of the local thana, and he immediately, with about a dozen constables and head-constables, came to Girish Babu's house, arrested him, and assaulted and took him to the thana in the manner I have mentioned above. He was charged with obstructing police officers in the discharge of their duties. He was afterwards released on bail.

AT THE POLICE COURT.

Later on the same day, Mr. Manuel, with several junior pleaders, appeared before Mr. Bonnaud, Officiating Northern

Division Presidency Magistrate, and applied on behalf of Babu Girish Chunder Mukherjee for a summons against Inspector Marklew of the Sukea Street thana and two of his subordinate police officers, for having trespassed into his client's house in Machua Bazar Street, and for having abused and assaulted him, dragged him along the streets to the local thana, although at the time no charge was made against him, and although the complainant's brother, Babu Gopal Chunder Mukherjee, Deputy Collector of Calcutta, desired to know what offence (if any) his brother had committed. It appears that early on Saturday a broken box, which was connected with a charge of theft, was found on an open piece of ground adjoining the complainant's house, and that some Indian police officers had taken two men to that piece of ground and were unmercifully beating them, on which the complainant, from an upper window, remonstrated with them. Thereupon, the complainant was called downstairs. On his coming downstairs, the subordinate officers at once laid their hands on him, and was dragging him to the thana, when Inspector Marklew came up with a *posse* of policemen, abused the complainant, and hit him a blow in the mouth, cutting his under-lip, and gave orders to drag him to the thana, and, although the Inspector was asked several times by the complainant and his brother and several other respectable neighbours, to state what offence he had committed, the Inspector declined to give any reason. As far as the complainant was aware, he was arrested without any justification whatever. In the scuffle he was so flurried that he dropped his spectacles, so that when a document was handed to him and he signed it, he did not know a word of its contents. After recording some evidence his worship granted summonses against Inspector Marklew and his subordinates.

The Hon. Mr. Bolton gave the following answer to the first question:—

"The Lieutenant-Governor's attention was attracted by the case mentioned by the hon. member, and an enquiry has been made. The Commissioner of Police reports that the Inspector did not assault Babu Girish Chandra Mukherji. It appears that two thieves were taken by some police officers to an open plot of land adjoining that person's house and belonging to him, for the purpose of pointing out stolen property hidden there. Babu Girish Chandra Mukherji objected to the noise which was made, and told the police to leave, pushing or assaulting one of them. He was thereupon arrested by another officer for assault on the police, but broke away. Information was conveyed to Inspector Marklew, who came and re-arrested the Babu at his door, after enquiring whether it was he who had assaulted the police officer and receiving the answer that he had committed no assault, but had got away from the custody of the police. The Inspector did not exceed his powers under the law, but the Lieutenant-Governor is not satisfied that his action was throughout judicious. He is an officer of fourteen years' service, who is reported by the Commissioner of Police to bear an excellent character and to be quite fit for the charge of a station. The case instituted by the police, as well as the complaint filed against them by Babu Girish Chandra Mukherji has been amicably settled."

Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjee's second question was: "I beg to ask if the attention of the Government had been called to the allegations set forth in the margin, and which are quoted from one of the newspapers.

"(a) Is it the case that Mr. Lyons, Inspector of the Ekbalpur thana, was fined five rupees by Mr. Wheeler, Joint Magistrate of Alipore, for committing an assault upon one, Jack Blackford, while he was in police custody, causing him to bleed, for no other offence than that he had complained to the Inspector of violent treatment at the hands of the constables in whose custody he was?"

"(b) Is it the case that the Deputy Magistrate before whom Blackford complained called for a report from his immediate superior officer, Mr. Forsyth, the superintendent, and that upon such report, and after such enquiry as the Deputy Magistrate made, he declined to issue process?"

"(c) Is it the case that the District Judge before whom an appeal was made against the orders of the Deputy Magistrate characterised the assault committed upon Blackford as 'perfectly unjustifiable,' and directed process to issue against the police inspector, and the case having been made over by the Judge to a Magistrate other than the Deputy Magistrate who had heard the complaint, viz., Mr. Wheeler, the Joint Magistrate of Alipore, the said Joint Magistrate fined the Inspector five rupees, notwithstanding the evidence of Mr. Forsyth, the Superintendent, to the contrary?"

"(d) Will the Government be pleased to state what notice has been taken of the conduct of the Inspector who was convicted by a Judicial Court of assault committed upon a person in his custody?"

The "allegations set forth in the margin" were these:

Another officer of the same (Calcutta Police) force, Mr. Lyons, has, we observe, been fined by Mr. Wheeler, Joint-Magistrate of Alipore, for assaulting a young Eurasian while in police custody. This case has a history of its own well worth reproduction. One night in March last, Mr. Lyons, then in charge of the Ekbalpur thana, received information that some people were having a row in a house close by, occupied by an East Indian family, and he at once started with a couple of dozen constables, as if he was going to put down a riot. Arrived at the house, he found that those whom he wanted had gone away, and an inoffensive young man, Jack Blackford, was the sole occupant of the premises. Against him there was no information before him, and it was abundantly clear that he was not one of the party which was indulging in liquor, and yet Lyons had him arrested, and to cap all, struck him with his fist, causing him to bleed, simply because he had the impudence to complain of the ill-treatment he had received from the constables in whose custody he was. The arrest and the assault, according to the Sessions Judge, before whom the matter went on revision "were perfectly unjustifiable"; but how did the Magistrate dispose of Blackford's complaint when he went to Court? Maulvi Abdul Kader, who first took judicial cognisance of the matter, declined to issue a process upon the European Inspector, but wanted a police report first. In vain did Blackford protest against Superintendent Forsyth—the *alter ego* of the Inspector—having anything to do with his complaint; but the Magistrate, whose sole aim was to stand well with the police and be a *persona grata* with the Commissioner of Police, was inexorable. Mr. Forsyth's report, as was anticipated, was adverse to the complainant, and then the Magistrate held an elaborate enquiry, during which Mr. Forsyth represented the accused with the result that the complaint was dismissed under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Lyons was deemed too big a swell to be summoned as an accused and placed on the dock. Discomfited before the Magistrate, poor Blackford had to approach the Sessions Judge, who, fortunately for him, at once saw the injustice of the Magistrate's order, and directed process to issue against the Inspector. The Judge would not trust the Maulvi with the re-trial of the case, and it was, therefore, made over to Mr. Wheeler, who found, in spite of Mr. Forsyth's evidence to the contrary, that Blackford's version of the assault was substantially correct. For full five months this man had to run from Court to Court to seek that justice, which came tardily in the end.

The Hon. Mr. Bolton gave the following answer to the second question:—

"The Lieutenant-Governor has perused papers relating to the case referred to. It is true that the inspector was fined by the Joint-Magistrate, as stated, that the Deputy-Magistrate had previously refused to issue process against him, and that the Judge ordered the hearing of the complaint, believing from the evidence before him that an assault had been committed by the Inspector. On full consideration of the circumstances of the case, the Lieutenant-Governor sees no necessity for any interference on the part of the Government."

OUR WEEKLY ISSUE, 1898.

The first number of the weekly INDIA will be issued on Friday, January 7, 1898.

It is proposed in the first instance to publish each week a paper of 16 large foolscap pages.

That is to say, subscribers will receive in the course of the year more than twice the number of pages which they now receive.

It is not, however, proposed to increase the Indian subscription, which will remain at 6 RUPEES per annum, prepaid, including postage.

The subscription in the United Kingdom will be 9 SHILLINGS per annum, prepaid, including postage.

As regards the contents of the journal, it is proposed to continue in somewhat abbreviated form the Notes on Indian Affairs which have hitherto appeared under the heading "Indiana."

In addition to unsigned editorial articles on current Indian topics, it is proposed to print from time to time Signed Articles by acknowledged experts.

A full report of Parliamentary proceedings relating to India will continue to be printed, and it is hoped that questions put and answers given on THURSDAY AFTERNOON may be fully reported in the issue of the following day.

In addition to news, articles and notes relating specially to Indian topics, it is proposed, in accordance with the suggestion of many readers, to publish regularly a careful CHRONICLE of the most important events at home and abroad.

It is also proposed to publish weekly during the Session a PARLIAMENTARY SKETCH from a Special Correspondent in the Gallery.

Efforts will be made to give prompt and exact information regarding the arrival and departure of Indians, and such other PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE as is likely to be of interest to Indian readers.

Special attention will be given to articles upon Indian affairs which appear in British NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, and REVIEWS.

The Indian and Anglo-Indian journals which come to hand by the mail on Monday or Tuesday will at once be searched, and matters of interest contained in them, or in the letters of INDIA'S own correspondents, will be dealt with in the issue of the following Friday.

Prompt reviews of books and of official publications relating to India will be published, and every effort will be made to deal promptly with official and other publications forwarded from India.

The work of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress will be regularly chronicled, and reports will be given, so far as space permits, of meetings at which Indian topics are discussed.

In these and in other ways INDIA, possessing the advantages of more frequent publication, will endeavour to discharge faithfully its twofold function, (i) as a medium of communication between the United Kingdom and India, and (ii) as a source of information for English readers in Indian affairs.

The Editor will be glad at all times to receive and consider suggestions.

NOTICES.

TO CONTRIBUTORS.

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INDIA.

LONDON, NOVEMBER, 1897.

THE SILENCE OF SIR H. FOWLER.

"I believe there is nothing on which Liberals ought to set their hearts more firmly than resistance—strong resistance—to what is called the 'forward' policy in India."—*Mr. John Morley* at Forfar, October 4.

"I trust that at any rate these troubles will have one good result—that they may lead to the reconsideration, and that at no distant time, of the lines upon which our Indian frontier policy has for the past twenty years been carried on."—*Mr. Asquith* at Ladybank, September 30.

WE asked last month, Where are the Liberal leaders? Mr. John Morley and Mr. Asquith leave no doubt as to the answer. They are, and plainly intend to remain, well to the fore in the work of overthrowing the mad policy of which the present war beyond the Indian frontier is but the latest, and not the worst, result. While Sir George White, in the exhilarating atmosphere of the United Service Club at Simla, has been talking transparent cant about "England's great and beautiful civilising 'mission in the East'—the mission, that is, of educating mid-Asia partly by means of broken pledges, and partly by means of machine-guns—and Lord Napier of Magdala, in the friendly columns of the *Times*, has been advocating further advance as a preventive of fever among our troops, Mr. Morley and Mr. Asquith have told the truth in words understood of the people, and formulated the policy of the Liberal party in terms which cannot be misin-

terpreted and will not be forgotten. Their speeches, which are recorded in another part of our present issue, are admirable. But they are not better than the correspondence between Lord Northbrook, Mr. Morley, and Lord George Hamilton, which—for the present at any rate—leaves the Secretary of State for India to meditate upon "decidedly one of the 'most foolish Parliamentary smiles to be found in 'all 'Hansard'.'"

It is not only Mr. Morley and Mr. Asquith who have said what they ought to have said. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Acland, Mr. Herbert Gladstone, Mr. George Russell, Mr. Schwann, Mr. Philip Stanhope, Mr. Herbert Paul, and many other prominent Liberals have during the past month turned the "forward" policy inside out and upside down. Mr. Paul, for example, said at Manchester on October 22—and his words were applauded—that if this policy were persisted in India must become bankrupt, and the English taxpayer would have to come to her relief. So, too, it is this subject which is the chief bone of contention in the bye-election in the Middleton division, where the cotton duties have brought home to men's business and bosoms the question of Indian military expenditure. All this is very much to the good. But where, in this chorus of voices, is Sir Henry Fowler? If Parliament were sitting, there would be no difficulty as to the answer. We should know that he was conversing with Lord George Hamilton behind the Speaker's chair. It is little short of a scandal that Sir H. Fowler as ex-Secretary for India has not yet come forward in the present discussion to denounce the reversal of the policy of the late Liberal Cabinet.

Sir H. Fowler's silence is, we fear, characteristic. Let us not forget that he has done his best on more than one occasion to prevent effective discussion upon the general question in the House of Commons, and that his evasive answers in March, April and May, 1895, gave rise to much misgiving among independent Liberals. As we wrote in INDIA for November of that year:—

Candour compels us to add that, although Lord Rosebery's Government came to the right decision in the end, they took an unconscionably long time to make up their minds. They discouraged and evaded the attempts of the Indian Parliamentary Committee to obtain information in the House of Commons, and by their failure to make that information public, they paved the way for an easy reversal of their decision at the hands of their successors.

It is well to remind ourselves of these points because they make clear the impossibility of Sir Henry Fowler's returning to the India Office in any future Liberal Government. As for the righteous indignation which is now being lavished upon Mr. Morley and Mr. Asquith for what the *Times* is pleased to call their "attack upon Lord Elgin," let us remember that the *Times* and some of its colleagues in the Tory press never proposed to observe the Chitral proclamation at all. The proclamation was published in the *Times* of March 20, 1895. In a leading article on March 26 the *Times* said: "We want a road, neither more nor less. . . . We may expect with some confidence that a valuable and indispensable right of way will be permanently assured." That puts the *Times* out of court.

"PLAUDITE!"

THE Mansion House Famine Relief Fund, in strange contrast with its reluctant opening, was formally closed with a cheerful alacrity at a meeting in the Mansion House on October 7 last. There was present on the platform the customary galaxy of official personages and civic dignitaries, and there was in evidence the usual incorrigible optimism of our Indian administrators. The speeches were laden with the usual compliments of officials by officials. Nor was self-praise lacking in this truly civic banquet of laudation and congratulation. To change the metaphor, the play was over and before the well-graced actors retired from the stage they bade the audience, "Plaudite." In the Lord Mayor's glad recital of the fact that the fund had broken all previous records, one seemed to detect the gratified introspection of London's Chief Magistrate. I am a great Lord Mayor, he seemed to say. See how I have managed this fund. My energy is unsurpassable. I have deserved well of India and of my country. And Lord George Hamilton in feeble tone took up the strain. The Government of India, he said in effect, has carried through this vast enterprise with rare skill and devotion. I myself form no small part of the Government of India. My cool restraining judgment, my critical assay of all the conditions, my sober estimate of the needs of India, were invaluable at the start. The decent hesitation which I decreed added incalculable lustre to the fund when I finally gave permission for it to go forward. And now see how careful I am of the pecuniary interests of persons charitably disposed. It is true that the famine is not over yet: but still with economy we may pull through. Not one day longer than I can help it shall the fund remain open. Let it then be closed, but let us first thank each other for the conspicuous parts we have played in the matter and for the success which has crowned our efforts. Thus the Secretary of State mingled his official treble with the deep, full-bodied bass of the prosperous civic magnate. An exhilarating performance, to be sure! Yet whatever may have been the tone of these two protagonists, the Mansion House Fund has not been altogether unworthy. The total sum raised by the parent fund was £549,300. There are still a few hundreds to come in, so that it is not unreasonable to assume that the final total will reach £550,000. The cost of administering the fund in London was £6,768 or 1½ per cent. But of this nearly £6,000 were spent in advertisements—so necessary in all such appeals—and as the contributions from the proprietors of newspapers practically returned this amount in donations, it is not unfair to say that out of every pound subscribed by the public no less than 19s. 11½d. was sent to India. That is satisfactory and matter for moderate and reasonable gratification. In addition to the Mansion House Fund proper Lancashire and other parts of the Empire contributed directly to the Central Relief Committee at Calcutta—the contribution of Lancashire alone, whose generosity on such occasions is proverbial, amounting to £158,000. The grand total, therefore,

received in Calcutta amounted to Rs1,65,00,000 or roughly over £1,000,000. This also is satisfactory and one need not follow Lord George Hamilton into his rather puerile calculations that 35 lakhs more were contributed in kind. There was at the meeting a sort of rivalry between the Secretary of State and the Lord Mayor as to who could make the fund the bigger. The Lord Mayor said a million in all, but Lord George Hamilton, capping the total with the somewhat hypothetical 35 lakhs, put in a claim for two crores or nearly £1,500,000. It does not make pleasant reading, this rather vulgar contest in big talk about the fund. For all practical purposes one may take it that a million was subscribed in one way or another—a sum which, if one considers all the circumstances, is matter for quiet approval, but certainly not for bombast.

Another point in the Secretary of State's deliverance does not surprise us in the least. It will be remembered that when the whole London press—especially the *Daily Chronicle*—was criticising with severity the delay in opening the fund, the officials at the India Office were bidding the people be calm, and denouncing the wild exaggerations of ignorant busybodies. The famine "threatened" to be extensive, they admitted. But it might not come, after all. Besides, in any case, it would not be "intense." It was a gross abuse of the power of the press to allege that we were face to face with the greatest famine of the century. Let all men trust the officials; they had their hands on the threatened visitation, they knew their work, and would ask for charitable aid in good time. To-day what do we hear? The famine has been "the most serious of which the century has record." We quote from the *Times* report of Lord George Hamilton's speech. Officials, it would seem, tend to be all alike. While it suited the theories of the India Office the famine was a "scarcity." Now, when it suits its views to recognise the opposite, the famine is the greatest famine of the century. At the first, any amount of belittling, of minimising to cover official unpreparedness, to comply with official red tape, and to conform to official notions of deliberate procedure. When all is over, magnification to the utmost, not without glorification of Government for "the manner in which the famine has been combated in India." It is to be presumed that, when the time comes, this ampler estimate will serve to belittle and minimise by comparison the next great famine upon its approach—and so on, in a never-ending vicious circle of official evasion and wordy opportunism. "My estimate [of the number of persons needing relief] was considerably exceeded," says Lord George Hamilton, with something like a simper. Of course it was. Most of us perceived at the time that Lord George Hamilton's estimate was nothing more than a statement based on the official conception of what ought to be the course pursued, rather than upon the real and full facts of the situation. In the middle of June there were no fewer than 4½ millions on relief—at the time, that is, when the officials were talking of "privation," "starvation" being too rude and rough a word for official lips to utter. Even to-day, when the fund is closed amid salvos of mutual applause, there are something like a

million and a-half unfortunates reduced to the necessity of working on relief works. But there is something more serious than that. It is admitted by the Secretary of State that in the Central Provinces a state of acute famine will continue until "well on into the ensuing calendar year," which is a long way of saying that there will be another six months of famine in the Central Provinces. And yet the Secretary of State thinks "we may congratulate ourselves on the manner in which the famine has been combated in India." Our readers will doubtless be reminded of the passages from the Anglo-Indian press which we quoted in our last issue. Even the *Times of India* regretted that the Secretary of State was in "such good humour" in his Budget speech. The writer added that there was "no danger lest a too optimistic construction should be placed in India upon the Secretary of State's account of the situation."

Lord George Hamilton tells us something about the cost of the famine to the Government of India. Doubtless his estimate is conceived upon the same liberal scale as that upon which he constructed his fanciful total of the Relief Fund. The Government of India will have a big deficit on the next Budget, and it is much better to attribute financial misfortune—now that exchange is so perverse as to be continually better than the estimate—to famine, which the Government of India can call the act of God, than to frontier wars, which are too obviously the act of the Government. With this caution, we reproduce Lord G. Hamilton's estimate:—

	Rx.
To Direct Relief	6,000,000
„ Remissions of taxation	6,000,000
„ Advances to cultivators	2,000,000
TOTAL	Rx. 14,000,000

The only other point to notice in regard to this estimate is the claim that the Government have "remitted" six crores of money due from the taxpayers. One would like to have the details. Was it all cash remitted? And has it been "remitted" or only "suspended"? But this is, at best, only an estimate of cost in money. What has been the cost in human lives? Upon this point—incomparably the most important point in the whole matter—Lord George Hamilton is decorously silent. He refrains from words even of good omen. There has been heavy mortality in some districts—but then there are always outbreaks of disease in the train of every famine. True. But the name of the chief disease is Death by Starvation. What is the number of deaths by starvation that represents the true cost of the present famine? That and that alone is the test of how the famine "has been combated in India"—that and that alone is the true criterion of success. We have contended all along that it was the duty of the authorities to keep the British public and the public in India informed of the course of the famine by the periodic publication of clear and intelligible bills of mortality. How have they performed this obvious duty? Perfunctorily and unintelligently. People have died by hundreds

of thousands—but not of "starvation." Epidemics, fevers, "privation,"—that blessed word—have been the causes of death in official returns. Now that the famine is to be officially treated as a thing of the past, we renew our demand for light on this point. We desire to be informed by means of precise comparative tables, and through the medium of the best statistical information at the disposal of the Government of India, what has been the excess mortality reasonably attributable to the famine, or—if the phrase be preferred—to the inadequacy of efforts to cope with the "scarcity" which has prevailed. When one knows this, and knows that the mortality has not been very great, then and not till then one will know also whether it is suitable to congratulate the Government on "the manner in which the famine has been combated in India."

THE ENGLISH PROSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.¹

To pass judgement on the prose of the nineteenth century whilst it still has an appreciable, if rapidly disappearing, portion of its life's course to run, may seem to savour of indecent haste. Let the Diamond Jubilee, which has turned all our thoughts to retrospect, serve for one excuse; the completion of Mr. Craik's useful selections of English Prose may serve for another. Living writers are excluded from Mr. Craik's plan; yet since Walter Pater and R. L. Stevenson have passed, all too soon, to the majority, there can be no doubt that, with one great but solitary exception, he has had at his disposal all the prose of the first quality that the century has produced. The one exception is, of course, the prose of Mr. Ruskin; and since "Praeterita" was broken off unfinished some years ago, Mr. Ruskin has written nothing. We live in a curious literary interregnum, both in prose and poetry:

The epoch ends, the world is still,
The age has talk'd and work'd its fill,
The famous orators have shone,
The famous poets sung and gone.

If any great and arresting voice should claim a hearing in the next year or two, it will belong not to the nineteenth century but to the twentieth, just as the famous volume of "Lyrical Ballads," published in 1798, belonged not to the last century but to this. Already we seem to hear the new age, in its favourite newspapers, "carolling and shouting, over "tombs, amid graves."

Sculptors like Phidias,
Raphaels in shoals,
Poets like Shakespeare—
Beautiful souls!

But those who feel the spell of the past are tempted to be a little slow in responding to these clamorous appeals for admiration. They do not like to break the charm of the twilight hour; their eyes are fixed on "the one or two immortal lights" that—

Rise slowly up into the sky
To shine there everlastingly,
Like stars over the bounding hill.

¹ "English Prose Selections." Edited by Henry Craik. Vol. 5, Nineteenth Century. (London: Macmillan.)

Mr. Craik's bulky fifth volume is not confined to "the one or two immortal lights;" it contains specimens of the work of no fewer than forty-six prose writers. Nor is there any need to carp at the inclusion of so large a number. They cannot all be immortal; but perhaps there is no one here who does not deserve to be held in remembrance for some time to come. Of course, every such collection must have its surprise, and Mr. Craik's surprise—he bears himself the full responsibility, for he is the writer of the critical appreciation, and the tone of it is curiously defiant—is Lord Beaconsfield. Few would cavil at Lord Beaconsfield's inclusion; but fewer still would be prepared to accord him the space allotted by Mr. Craik. Nor does the appeal twice made to Mr. Froude's authority strengthen the editor's case. Mr. Froude, despite his own great literary gifts, was never remarkable for critical judgement; his own style had weaknesses akin to the more glaring vices of Lord Beaconsfield's; and he was notoriously biassed by political partisanship. The first sentence of one of the examples of Disraeli's writing here printed runs as follows: "It is proverbial to what drowning men will cling." After which, anyone with an ear sensitive to the requirements of English prose is tempted to turn the page, and thereby to draw down upon himself the scathing strictures of Mr. Craik. Of course, it is unfair to judge by a first sentence, even by the first sentence of a specimen presumably chosen for excellence of style; yet it would scarcely be unreasonable to say that no man who wrote such a first sentence as this could take high rank as a writer of English prose. For though "matter" should count for more than "manner" in our estimation of literature, both are indispensable: it is only when the "matter" takes on a certain "manner" that it becomes literature at all, and the "manner" of the sentence quoted above must be described as execrable. On the whole, however, Mr. Craik has performed his task with conspicuous ability. The introductions are the really valuable part of the book. It is neither profitable nor pleasurable, as a rule, to read prose writers in selections whose average length is a couple of pages, the novelists especially suffering from this mode of representation. But the critical estimates by the editor himself, by Mr. George Saintsbury, Mr. W. P. Ker, and others, are most acceptable contributions towards the literary history of the century. More than that, they are contributions, in the critical aphorisms that lie scattered up and down them, to that sound body of literary criticism that has still to be formed. Thoroughly deserving of study, for instance, is the editor's dictum that "false ornament" "is, on the whole, a better and more healthy sign than no ornament at all; a prose style which moves too timidly, and fears all that is gorgeous lest it become tawdry, and all that is strenuous lest it become exaggerated, soon becomes afraid of its own shadow, and ceases to move at all" (p. 7); or Mr. Saintsbury's, that the sentiment of enthusiasm, "though at a first perusal it may be a fallible and even a rather suspicious guide, is the surest test of literary excellence when it renews itself at each fresh reading after or through a long course of years" (p. 379); or Mr. Ker's observation that

"Macaulay's weak places are those in which his memory fails to make up for the want of a philosophy" (p. 416); or Mr. Raleigh's criticism of the limitations of Charlotte Brontë, that "there is too much that does not interest her, and that she does not understand, in the world at large, to allow of her dealing happily with the supernumeraries" (p. 627).

The great characteristic of the prose of the century as defined by the editor in his general introduction, is not *development* but *variety*. The talk we sometimes hear about "raising English to a new power" comes chiefly from those who know nothing of the history of English prose. To read the prose of Milton and Dryden, or of the Elizabethans, is to learn a lesson in humility. A man who has their great sentences ringing in his ears will not lightly boast himself better than his fathers. But the wonderful and manifold advance of knowledge has made new demands upon speech; and speech has not been slow to respond to those demands. "It has bent itself to the needs of a restless age, and has acquired elasticity thereby."

A careful survey of the best writing of the century will probably impress upon the student these two principles, at first sight, but only at first sight, opposed to each other. First, that a good style is not attained without much labour. Secondly, that a cardinal requisite of a good style is absolute sincerity. We have all heard how R. L. Stevenson "played the sedulous ape" to each of the great masters in turn, and of the "travail and agony," and "toil as at a deep petroleum well when the oil refuses to flow," of Pater's method of composition. But such labour is no new thing. Carlyle, with all his contempt for the mere art of words, toiled incessantly; Macaulay, though his marvellous memory supplied him with inexhaustible material, worked at the writing of his history with the most unrelenting conscientiousness. We are not accustomed to think of Thackeray as industrious; but if he was not, he must be the only great writer of the century whose words have arranged themselves on paper in the fit and natural order, without any effort on his part. For it is not an easy, but a very difficult thing, to write naturally—as most men know who have tried. We try to set down our thoughts, and lo! instead of a pleasant cadence, disagreeable assonances, harsh combinations of jarring consonants. Yet the literary successes and failures of the century alike convey the lesson that sincerity is the first thing. The writers who will live are those who have had something to say, and been tremendously in earnest about saying it. De Quincey, for instance, who cared far more about manner than about matter, and who achieved high distinction by his experiments in "impassioned prose," is by this time unmistakably falling into the second rank: the matter is hardly weighty enough to carry the manner to the proud immortality that used to be predicted for him. With Carlyle, with Macaulay, with Ruskin, each in his own way, the toil was not to achieve a style, to find some superlatively fine manner of saying things, but to find adequate expression for the thought that was in him. Mere imitation of style is apt to lead only to gruesome parody; as was shown the other

day by the popular novelist who wrote a preface, or, as he preferred to call it, a "foreword" to some early essays of Carlyle, and described his hero as "him of the burning stomach and the honest, forth-looking, irascible eyes." How could he write such fustian, one wonders, without hearing the indignant voice of Carlyle thundering its remonstrance from the pages of *Past and Present*, and bidding him "cease to be a hollow sounding-shell of hearsays, egoisms, purblind dilettantisms, and become, were it on the infinitely small scale, a faithful discerning soul." This is the counsel that all the great writers would give us, if we could ask their guidance.

"DISGRACE AND DISASTER."

Sir Lepel Griffin, who will not be suspected of bias in favour of the National Congress or of Radicalism, has raised his voice in the October number of the *Nineteenth Century* in strong condemnation of the "Froward" policy. According to Sir Lepel, this policy has utterly broken down; it "has culminated in both disgrace and disaster." The censure is thoroughly well deserved, and the weight of it is all the greater as coming from such a quarter. Apologists of the Government policy have attempted to minimise the loss of the border posts, such as Ali Masjid and Lundi Kotal. They have told the British public that, after all, these were "not British forts, but Afridi wayside halting-places, held by the Afridis themselves, with regard to which the British Government was precluded from any responsibility." Sir Lepel has no difficulty or hesitation in sweeping away such plausible and disingenuous cobwebs, and he goes to the point of substance at once.

"The Khyber, from end to end," he points out, "whatever agreements may say, was in charge of British officers, its police paid from the Peshawar treasury, and was virtually British territory, and to have allowed its posts to be captured and burned shows that the responsible authorities were unprepared and badly informed. *No such disgrace has before befallen us in the whole history of the frontier.*"

Sir Lepel hits the nail on the head and drives it home. The disgrace is patent, and with it is involved disaster. But the main element of disaster really lies on the financial side of the business.

"The radical evil is that, the Commander-in-Chief having behind him the Treasury of the Government of India, military expeditions are conducted on the most extravagant scale, every regiment in the regular army is eager to join in the rush for distinction and service, and an army is collected, as now, of 60,000 men, sufficient to repel the attack of a European Power. Either the Government are aware that their irritating measures of interference have excited a general and concerted rising of all the frontier tribes, or the present preparations are out of all reasonable proportion to the difficulty. But when the Commander-in-Chief, who knows as little of the frontier tribes as the Viceroy, demands an army, the Government at Calcutta, having no local knowledge behind them which is not eager to spend money rather than save it, is powerless to make a stand for economy."

There is another cause of the immense cost of recent expeditions, and that is "the vicious system of scattering military posts over independent territory far from support, like those in Chitral, Kuram, and Samana."

"In time of peace these posts are useless for all purposes of

civilisation; they waste valuable troops required elsewhere, and are a cause of chronic irritation and discontent. In time of war they require an army to relieve them."

So, what with military ambitions and political folly, the money goes disastrously. And on this point, Sir Lepel Griffin confirms in the strongest manner the broad principles of administration that some of us have been steadily inculcating for years. Thus:

"To lighten taxation, to develop the industrial resources of the country, to render the people prosperous and content, to relieve them from dread and danger of famine, to feed and clothe them better, to give them cheap and speedy justice—these are the aims which an enlightened Administration must endeavour to attain. No spirited frontier policy which is pursued by the sacrifice of these beneficent objects can be called successful, and the Government and the English people will have to decide which of the two they will choose. They certainly cannot have both."

A very Daniel come to judgement! The disastrous character of the "Froward" Policy can hardly be stated more strongly than in Sir Lepel's unqualified assertion that "unless it be speedily reversed it will lead India to bankruptcy."

With regard to the cause of the outbreak Sir Lepel is in no doubt whatever. It is not incitement from Constantinople. Condemnation of the Sultan by English speakers and writers "has undoubtedly excited great and legitimate disgust and irritation among Indian Muhammadans who regard him with respect as the ruler of Turkey and the chief representative of Islam." But—

"But beyond our border, among the independent tribes, I do not believe that the influences from Constantinople, which to some extent affect Indian Muhammadans, have any practical force. I have never seen any evidence of this on the frontier; and the late Akhund of Swat . . . had twenty times more influence with the tribes than any Sultan at Constantinople."

Sir Lepel agrees exactly on this point with Dr. Leitner. He also comes to the same conclusion with regard to the Amir. "There is every presumption in favour of the Amir's good faith, and no public evidence against him."

"My own belief is that, in the splendid isolation in which it seems to delight English statesmen to reside, His Highness the Amir of Kabul is about the most trustworthy ally that we possess in Europe or Asia."

What, then, is the matter? This:

"While those who are responsible for the policy in question are endeavouring in every way to shift the blame from their own shoulders to those of the Sultan or the Amir, it seems unreasonable and unnecessary to seek for obscure and recondite causes for the hostility of the tribes when there is an amply sufficient reason in their belief that the forward policy of the Government endangers, or is directed against, their immemorial independence."

Again, Sir Lepel is in thorough accord with our own view. Now, as to the future? Well, what ought *not* to be done is tolerably patent; although, probably enough, it will be tried.

"Suppose, for example, that the advisers of the Viceroy, who persuaded him to sanction the military road to Chitral, should insist as a condition of Afridi submission on their disarmament, or on the future maintenance of a similar road through the Afridi country to their summer headquarters in Tirah. Judging by past experience and present suggestion, it is probable enough that such proposals may be pressed upon the Viceroy, yet all experts in frontier administration will agree that no more foolish measures could be adopted, or more fatal to the chance of future tranquillity."

Even the *Spectator*, we regret to observe, calmly contemplates, not merely roads, but even the establishment and maintenance of a post or posts in the Afridi country. When the decision comes to be taken, we trust that the officers of the Indian army from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, will be treated as Sir Lepel prescribes: "their opinion should neither be asked nor taken." No doubt, we shall be officially told that the tribesmen are all dying for love of us, and will never be happy till they get us to make a road or a fort in their territory; and we shall have the charge of a breach of faith bandied about once more. With all respect to Lord Northbrook, we cannot but think he is grasping the husk and missing the kernel, in his criticism of Mr. Morley and Mr. Asquith. We agree unreservedly with Sir Lepel Griffin:

"If a military road, supported by military posts, and held by tribal levies paid from the British treasury, is made and maintained in independent territory, that will be considered by the tribes to be occupation, whatever any apologist may say, and it is difficult to assert that they are wrong."

Looking at the positive side of the question, Sir Lepel Griffin only indicates his view, reserving full exposition for another occasion. He thinks "it is impossible to restore the past system, giving back the Frontier Force to the local Government, and allowing it the effective control of all trans-border affairs." He, therefore, falls back upon Lord Lytton's premature proposal, to place the frontier districts under a Chief Commissioner. No doubt the growing complexity of the work of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is a strong argument; yet, on the other hand, there seems danger in having a special Commissioner in charge of the frontier. Such an officer would be tempted to make himself work. True, Sir Lepel firmly bargains that this official shall be a civilian, and on no account, as Lord Lytton proposed, a military man.

"What is needed is a strong civil administrator whose professional instinct would be in favour of peace and not of war, and who would be content to follow the firm and friendly policy towards the tribes which was pursued with success by Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab: Lord Lawrence, Sir Robert Montgomery, Sir Donald McLeod, Sir Henry Durand, Sir Henry Davies, and Sir Robert Egerton. He would be the full receptacle of local knowledge, on which the Viceroy and the Foreign Office could safely draw, instead of, as at present, remaining the unconscious instruments of a military clique which is most unwisely endeavouring to deal with the country beyond our border as Russia dealt with Circassia. For in the armed independence of the frontier tribes is one of the surest defences of India."

Anyhow, we shall look with interest for the full exposition of these ideas; and, meantime, we record our satisfaction with the main lines of the present powerful and most opportune article.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the reappointment to the Council of India, for a further period of five years, of Sir James Braithwaite Peile, K.C.S.I., whose present tenure of the office expires on November 12, 1897.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the reappointment to the Council of India, for a further period of five years, of Sir Alfred Comyns Lyall, G.C.I.E., K.C.B., whose present tenure of the office expires on January 17, 1898.

THINGS OF INDIA: SEEN—AND NOT SEEN.

THE Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure has, in course of its protracted sittings, touched several other points of the Indian problem besides dealing with that large subject, one which any man, who cares to try, can understand. Amongst certain obscure points and side issues that have cropped up in course of the evidence or conversations between the Commissioners and their examinees is that large and difficult one as to the total annual income of India as a whole, and its relation to the poverty or prosperity of its population—more especially the four-fifths thereof under direct British administration. This subject appears to have been dealt with chiefly by one of the Commissioners, Sir James B. Peile, who, at various stages, undertook the duty of closely cross-examining the Indian witnesses thereon. One typical instance of this sort occurred in the examination of Prof. G. K. Gokhale, last April. That Commissioner, who is a prominent member of the India Council and a retired Bombay Civilian of much experience, was the chief speaker in the course of this crucial passage. After giving his own concise summary of the increased production and rise in prices of agricultural products during the modern period, more especially as following on railway extension, he sought to bring the question to practical test by citing the large importations of the precious metals by India during the last two or three decades. He took as one substantial fact to go upon, a table by the Bank of Bengal (why not from the India Office's own statistics?) showing that on the thirty-three years ending with March, 1892, India had received and retained 356½ millions of bullion (rather less than one-third of which was gold), being equal to 10½ millions annual average.¹ Thereupon Sir James put, as if admitting of but one answer, the question: "Are not these facts that I have mentioned signs of decreasing rather than of increasing poverty?" and the noble Chairman further emphasised this by his interrogative remark: "The fact of these large amounts pouring into India shows that India as a whole was not decreasing in wealth?"

Now these passages are an apt statement of "what is seen" in this matter. They fairly represent the popular and superficial view of this special factor in India's commercial finance. To the evident surprise of these weighty men, the Indian witness replied, "I do not think so." On being pressed, he pointed out the considerations that lie immediately under the surface of these apparently large imports of treasure, remarking first, they were not "very large sums when you remember what a large country India is." Here let us take this simple arithmetical test, which the Indian witness had not opportunity to apply at the time. Taking the whole population at 300 millions (287 in 1891), that enormous aggregate only gives a fraction over five annas (5·76), say *ninepence* per annum per head. Surely there is in this statistic no striking display of "prosperity" or "wealth," even of the metallic sort. Granted: this is "seen," and it is real; but this true figure leaves an impression very different from the bald statement of the huge aggregate total. And this average is only on the surface. So let us follow the Indian witness as he brought out other considerations "not seen" at once, even by the two Commissioners. In citing Professor Gokhale's explanations regarding the Chairman's "large amounts pouring into India", it will be sufficient to summarise them thus:—This as a question of poverty and prosperity relates only to British India, so we have to ascertain what proportion

¹ It must be remembered that these thirty-three years included several years following the Mutiny, when the Home drafts being nearly suspended, treasure flowed in—mainly proceeds of looms—also the years of dear cottons, when the imports of treasure were enormous and abnormal.

of these large amounts of treasure are absorbed by the Native States—then, as the question relates to the economic condition of the populations under, and as affected by British administration, we require to trace what are the classes into whose hands flow the chief portion of these “large amounts”; it is not only possible, but almost obvious, that while a small percentage of the population, say from five to ten per cent., get very much more than the small share *per capita*, the annual share of these precious metals distributed amongst eighty per cent. of the population—cultivators, artisans and labourers—would have to be reckoned in annas, not rupees; not in silver, but in copper. (That is so, as shown above.)

This brief analysis, as indicated by the Indian witness, of Sir James Peile's imposing pile of 356 millions imports of precious metals during thirty-three years opens up a wide field of “what is not seen” by the superficial observer or wholesale statistician, and which this Royal Commission seem to have very imperfectly surveyed.

II.

Now there is, lying nearer the surface, another view of this important passage in the Commission's proceedings which is not brought out as it stands. Mainly for brevity's sake, this may be treated interrogatorily. Will not persons unacquainted with the subject who may con that passage be led to suppose that the aggregate import of bullion was a balance that India received over and above its exports? Sir James Peile would, of course, know so well that this is not so that he might not think it needful to be explicit; but it would really seem from that remark of Lord Welby's, quoted above, as to a “great quantity of precious metals coming into the country and not going out” that the noble chairman, skilled financier though he be, was, for the moment at least, under the ineradicable British propensity of misapprehension regarding the chief dominant factor in India's commercial and industrial finance. What otherwise could his lordship mean—when the Indian witness “could not quite see” that the precious metals forming part of India's inadequate imports is equivalent to “wealth”—by the somewhat impatient remark: “Perhaps you hesitate to accept proofs of prosperity”? To this the witness answered: “I am quite open to correction; but I do not see clearly that the mere fact of importing gold and silver can mean [taken by itself] that the country is increasing in prosperity; that is a fallacy of the mercantile system long regarded as exploded.” No one is better able than Lord Welby to appreciate the force of that remark. And the witness had already discounted Sir James Peile's prosperity argument founded on the import of bullion, by such obvious considerations as “those precious metals do not come in for nothing—a large part of the produce of the country goes out” in exchange for them; and “our exports are greater than our imports owing to the Home Charges” [payments for which there is no annual return]. “The fact that such large quantities of precious metals come into the country shows that the imports in other shapes are fewer than they would otherwise be.” The italics are mine; and, as Lord Welby will perceive, these imports that do not come in pertain to “what is not seen” in the argument; and the more so, as the witness at once neatly turned his lordship's fallacious analogy as between his own bank pass-book and the whole mercantile transactions of India by the remark, “it all depends on what the total amount (on both sides) comes to.” This leads me to suggest the question, has Lord Welby asked Sir James Peile to show him the total trade returns of India for those thirty-three years from which Sir James only gave the one incidental item? When that reference is duly made even that skilled financier may be astonished in realising that during that period India's export values exceeded her imports, treasure included, by many tens of millions. But, as the Commissioners have

before them Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji's full tables exhibiting the figures of the constant unbalanced excess of India's exports over her imports, they can have no excuse, nor is it to be expected that they will ignore that large factor as an index of India's adverse condition in her monetary, commercial, and industrial position amongst the civilised nations of the world.

III.

There is another and somewhat more difficult branch of “what is seen, and what is not seen” in connexion with this subject of India's monetary and commercial condition under the present political and administrative circumstances that can only be briefly touched upon here. This vital portion of the Indian question may be put thus:—As trade is free, the producer gets the market price; how then is he affected by the drain of produce in shape of exports for which there is no trade or special return (services, pensions, etc.) or only non-productive return¹ (as public debt, the bulk of it incurred in old wars)?

This was put by Sir J. B. Peile to Professor Gokhale in the usual conversational form as “what is seen,” thus: “The produce that is sold, that passes out as surplus produce and is sold—it is quite a *voluntary matter to sell*—you must suppose that it would be (is) sold at a profit?” Then the proposition was stated more precisely by the same Commissioner when pressing Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji as to what difference there is between the receipts of the producer in Native States and of the producer of similar exports in British territory. Sir James Peile asked, and it was admitted that for the same ten sovereigns' worth of cotton each of the two gets the same amount: that is “what is seen.” Now let me give so much of Mr. Dadabhai's answer as goes towards explaining “what is not seen” in this transaction, thus:—“The British Indian subject sends his ten sovereigns' worth of produce: that produce is here intercepted by the India Office in sending him a bill . . . out there (in India) to be paid *not* from the price that is got here from that produce, but from the *revenues* of India that are drawn upon to meet the bill which is presented there.” Then in response to the query: “Does that in any way affect the profit of the native producer and exporter in India?” the Indian witness said “its effect is this, that as much is intercepted here (in England) by the India Office in sending its bills off that price of the produce, does not itself return to India, but in its place that price (value) of the produce is paid out of British (Indian) revenue, which in the case of the Native States is quite different, he gets back actually the return.” As to this latter remark we shall find there is an important qualification applying to all exports from India when we consider the question of price, that is profit. And this brings us to the bed rock of the subject in respect of which, “what is not seen” is the dominant all-pervading factor.

IV.

Now, let Lord Welby and his colleagues turn to J. S. Mill's chapter xxi, “Distribution of the Precious Metals,” and the concluding paragraph thereof, in which he describes the cause and effect of “International Payments not originating in Commerce.” That remarkable passage cannot well be set out here; but to such instructed minds it should suffice if they would apply, to much that has been stated above, these two or three sentences:

“A country which makes regular [non-commercial] payments to foreign countries, besides losing what it pays, loses something more by the less advantageous terms on which it is

¹ Ordnance and other military uses, also all railway material are included in imports, *pro tanto* reducing the figures of excess exports.

forced to exchange its productions for foreign commodities. . . this lowers prices [and profits] in the remitting country and raises them in the receiving country. . . . The tribute or remittance will be virtually paid in goods. . . . The paying country [India] will give a higher price for all that it buys from the receiving country [or elsewhere] while the latter [England] besides receiving the tribute, obtains the exportable produce of the tributary country at lower prices."

Now this is precisely the case between India and the United Kingdom, as our italics and interpolated words serve to make it plain even to the wayfaring man. One more remark: In the course of Professor Gokhale's examination, Sir William Wedderburn interposed the explanatory query: "Is it not the case that the rayat is so much in the hands of the money lender, that is to say, the trader, that he has to give him his produce at the price the trader chooses to give him for it?" Just so; this is "what is seen" over the larger part of India; "what is not seen" in this matter are the present inexorable tributary conditions set out with such marvellous synthetic skill in J. S. Mill's short paragraph. The same case is stated in more popular form in course of Walter Bagehot's essays on "The Silver Question" written nearly twenty years ago.

AN EXAMINER IN POLITICAL ECONOMY.

MR. NATU'S LETTERS.

We print below the correspondence that passed between one of the brothers Natu, of Poona, and the Collector of Poona some time previously to the deportation of the former:—

From MR. BALWANT RAMACHANDRA NATU, Sirdar and Municipal Commissioner, City of Poona.

To the DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, POONA.

SIR,—His Excellency Lord Sandhurst came here twice from Bombay to advise all the citizens of Poona to co-operate with Government in carrying out all the preventive measures which Government would take to stamp out the plague in the City of Poona. We accordingly, considering it our duty to offer all possible help to the Plague Committee, did for some days the work of inspection along with the soldiers on duty, in spite of the humiliation we were subjected to. We did it with an intention of assisting as much as possible the Government officers and the citizens of Poona. Our work has been, and is, useful to the general public, but as the Plague Committee thinks otherwise, I am constrained to bring to your notice the following state of things:

1. We first informed Mr. Rand, the President of the Plague Committee, that public notices should be posted a day previous in the wards in which the inspection would take place, specifying the time of the inspection. We added that this step would enable the people to remain present in their shops and houses at the time of inspection, and in reply we were informed that the inhabitants of the quarters would be enabled to remove the plague patients of the locality to some other parts of the town in case a previous public intimation were given according to our suggestion. We urged the fact that anyone who was thus desirous of deceiving authorities by secreting the plague patients would be enabled to do so, in spite of the absence of a previous intimation, as soon as the inspecting party would visit those quarters. Even taking it for granted that an individual acted in this way, it would be much better for the safety of the citizens' property if a public notice were given. For it will obviate the necessity of breaking locks in owners' absence. A plague patient removed from one place to another could be detected next time, and the evil is not so great as the loss of property caused by breaking the locks of the shops and leaving them open after inspection. But no attention was paid to our suggestions.

2. The inspection being conducted in the morning time, it is inconvenient to people whose shops are generally locked up in the morning time. Again, many people have left the town through fear of the plague and have left behind their houses and shops locked up for safety. The locks were broken and

an entrance was forced not only at these places, but also at the offices of the suburban municipality, the collection office of the city municipality, and the Government registration office. These events are openly taking place, and the house to house inspection seems to have become a season of profitable trade to the lock manufacturers of the place.

3. If inspection be conducted as specified above, by breaking open the locks, the responsibility of protecting the property lies on Government. No effort seems, however, to have been made in that direction. On the first day of inspection, March 13, the soldiers broke into the houses and went away without leaving anybody to protect the property therein. On the very same day I wrote to Mr. Rand stating whatever omissions I found in the work of the inspection party which I accompanied in the Shukrawar Peth; but I have as yet received no reply either verbal or written. Hundreds of instances can be adduced of an inspection party breaking into the houses and going away without caring to leave them guarded. We asked the inspecting soldiers to make some provision for the protection of houses, but our requests were not attended to. We wrote to the authorities, i.e., the Plague Committee, to issue orders, but they too have made no arrangements.

4. There are many houses in Poona with two or more doors of entrance. The houses can still be recognised as one, as they have the same municipal number. Yet it is often found that if an inspection party enters such a house for inspection by one door, another party breaks forcibly into it by a door on some other side without heeding our remonstrances to the contrary. There are many such cases, but I would give two as typical: (1) The house of Rao Bahadur Narayan Bhai Dandiker in Shukrawar; and (2) The house of Babu Sahib Karwe in Sheinwar Peth.

5. We informed the Plague Committee of the unnecessary breaking open of the boxes. Before starting for the inspection work on the next day, the officers gave orders to the soldiers for not breaking open small boxes, and yet they have broken the boxes, some of which are extremely small, and have broken the wooden cover over iron safes in some other places.

6. This and the other manner of breaking the doors open is stated here on the information supplied by Rao Bahadur Narayan Bhai Dandiker, late Director of Public Instruction in the Hyderabad Assigned Districts. A lady residing near the Tambat's reservoir in the Kasabu Peth, was struck on the hips by a soldier. I took with me the two gentlemen who personally witnessed it and reported the case to Colonel Phillips. I do not know what steps have been taken in the matter the complainants thus bring to the notice of the plague authorities. The soldiers do not reveal the name of the offender, and identification is not possible for want of numbers.

7. A certain person named Eknath, simpi (tailor), is a tenant of the house of Seiohar Vithal Natu in the Sheinwar Peth. He died of plague on March 7. On the next day the Municipal Committee disinfected the house and burnt his bedding and clothing. The remaining things were locked in the house by the members of his family and they left for another place. Some sixteen or seventeen days after, on March 24, one soldier and three sappers broke open the locks of the house, the clerk of the above-mentioned Natu tried to prevent them, when he was pushed aside, and both the locks of the simpi and Natu were broken, and the furniture in the house, including the sewing machine, the doors of the shop, the clothes of the customers, and all other furniture, except an earthen doll, was burnt, in spite of the protests of the house owner. It was worth some hundred to a hundred and twenty-five rupees. I went there about 9 a.m., while the burning was in full progress and advised the soldiers to desist; but was not heeded. And, asking for their names, they refused to give them. I asked for the name of the officer of the party, but there was no reply. Myself and Rao Sahib Bhalchandra Triambak Bapat then went to Mr. Rand to request him to accompany us to the spot and to see everything personally. He did not see us as he was busy for a long time. We prepared a written note and took it to Mr. Rand. He heard us and told us that it was not proper on our part to obstruct them instead of offering our help. We informed him that the soldiers of the inspecting party were always refractory and refused to give their names, and set at naught the orders of the higher authorities. The work was carried on in a way directly contrary to the spirit of the official orders, and it was strange that our conduct in reporting these

transactions was held to be obstructive. We reported the same in writing, but do not know what came out of it. The smouldering fire of the burnt articles lasted till the next day. Iron furniture like the sewing machine could not be burnt completely, but was rendered useless. I have personally showed all this to Colonel Phillips on the spot.

8. At the same time, I brought to the notice of Colonel Phillips the hardships to which certain inhabitants in the "Paga" of Rao Bahadur Khandero Viswanath Raste of the Mehun-puree were being put to owing to the segregation operation. A barber in one of the rooms in the chail fell ill. For this reason the inmates of some thirty-four or thirty-five rooms of this chail were taken to the segregation camp, and the rooms locked. The horses, cows, sheep, and other animals of the inmates, were left unprotected. There was nobody left to protect the property of so many families. In this plight the inmates were taken away without any covering to protect the body, or any other furniture for their use. They were placed under a military escort, and taken to the sowar's gate. A day or two previous I had made enquiries about the way in which the segregation was to be carried on, and was told by the members of the Plague Committee that they would not segregate the inmates of all big houses for a plague case in a room, but only the inmates of the room actually infected, and, at best, the adjoining rooms on either side. I informed Colonel Phillips that the segregation operations were being carried on in a spirit directly opposed to the assurances we had received, but was told, in reply, that the procedure adopted was through the direction of the medical authorities. I would request you to personally see the place, in order to have an idea of the way in which the people have suffered through the segregation operations; or read the last issue of the *Sudharak*, of which I beg herewith to send a copy for your perusal. I would beg to draw your attention to the statements contained in that paper, which, in the words of the journal, rather understated the case than otherwise. Moreover, the apprehensions of the people that the segregation camp was not a safe place have been realised by the fact that plague cases have occurred even in the camp.

9. On March 25 a Muhammadan gentleman accompanied an inspection party, which I accompanied. He must have most probably come as a volunteer. He entered house No. 135 in the Shukrawar Peth, and arrested a Ramadassi beggar named Shanker, who lived in the house, on the pretence of examining him. He made a show of examining him, and told something to a soldier near. The said soldier and another, whom I at that time thought to be a soldier, pronounced it to be a doubtful case, and forcibly thrust the Ramadassi in a commissariat cart accompanying the party. He told the soldier to send the man either to Dr. Jones or Dr. Beveridge, as this was a doubtful case, and to send the man to the general plague hospital in case either of those medical gentlemen pronounced it to be a real plague case. I also told them that, under the existing regulations, they could not forcibly remove the man until he was regularly certified to be a plague patient. I was, however, not listened to, and Shanker was taken to the Sangama Hospital. I thought Shanker was not ill, and, therefore, asked the soldier to give me his name. He hesitated to give it for a long time, and, after some twenty or thirty minutes, he wrote down his name as—, on a piece of paper, and handed over the paper to me. At the very moment Colonel Phillips came there, and rebuked me for obstructing the work of the inspection party. I told him everything that had happened, and then he found out that I was not obstructing. I accompanied Colonel Phillips to Shaniwar Peth to point to him the burning of the simpi's furniture, as stated in ss. 7 and 8. Shanker's house was disinfected after he had been sent to the hospital, and his wife was taken to the segregation camp. After a while, Shanker was released from the hospital as not being affected by plague. He returned home to find it disinfected, his furniture destroyed, and his poor wife forcibly removed to the segregation camp. The house was disinfected, and all this trouble given to a man who was immediately proved to be not affected. This will prove how much misery was inflicted on him. His poor wife is, even till now, detained in the segregation camp. I do not know how to characterise this conduct.

10. I would also state here the treatment received by volunteers. On one day some of us were called to Budhavar and some to Bhamburda. Budhavar and Shanawar Peths are

quite close one to another, and as my house is in Shanawar, I thought my presence quite necessary there in case the search party went from Budhavar to Shanawar Peth. I went to Budhavar Peth and informed Mr. Rand, who was present there, that I could not go to Bhamburda if the Shanawar Peth where I resided was to be searched. He refused any information on the point. I was, therefore, compelled to express my inability to go to Bhamburda. You will, I daresay, hold me justified in so acting, but Mr. Rand thought otherwise. Last Saturday I was called to the Ganesh Peth Bridge. On reaching the place, Mr. Rand told me to accompany the party that was going to the Daru Wallah Bridge circle. I pointed out that as the Daru Wallah Bridge block was mostly inhabited by Muhammadans who keep their females in Gosha, it was advisable to entrust work to any of the Muhammadan volunteers who were present on the spot. He did not like the suggestion and told me that it was highly improper on my part to offer objections to every work that I was being entrusted with, and that my presence being no longer useful was dispensed with. I was, therefore, compelled to return. One can easily see how inconsistent is the treatment received by volunteers at the hands of the Plague Committee and the request made by His Excellency the Governor to the subordinate officer to the gentry of the city to volunteer their services. This and similar other acts of ill-treatment have diminished the number of volunteers. The soldiers pay no heed to their suggestions at the inspection time, and complaints made to the superior authorities are disposed of in the manner above specified. You will thus find that nothing but direct insult was the reward for the volunteer's services in Poona. In Bombay, the respectable gentry go to the places where they possess influence, and perform their duties with due respect to the customs, religion, and prejudices of the general populace, and specially the seclusion of the Maratha and Muhammadan females. His Excellency the Governor assured us that the same method would be brought into operation in this city; but as the real state is contrary to his intentions in all respects as above specified. I do not know what to say about it.

11. On March 20, a soldier pushed and insulted My. Nana Sahib Deo, a resident of Kanade's Wada in Kasaba Peth. As he has already reported to His Excellency the Governor, the same incident, in a letter of the same date, I do not wish to further allude to it here.

12. As District Magistrate you have got every authority to enquire into all grievances, and all this information, supplemented and supported by direct instances, has been sent to you with a hope that the difficulties and hardships which the by general public has been labouring under, would be removed means of the same. This will also acquaint you with the cause of the absence of many volunteers from the searching parties. Residence in Poona has become unsafe, and it is still more so to prefer complaints against any member or members of the Plague Committee, to whose safe keeping have been confided by Government the lives and property of the inhabitants of Poona. It is my prime duty, however, to inform you of the difficulties experienced by me in working as a volunteer. It is also highly necessary for you and the Government, in case you become acquainted only with one side of the case from the Plague Committee, to be informed of the other side of the same. As it is necessary to give you all this information, I am taking the step of sending this note to you. The present operations are, moreover, carried out in direct contravention of the firm determination of the British Government to allow no interference with the time-honoured customs, religion, or the female seclusion and other principles of Indian social polity. The result is a great amount of unrest among the general populace. It is my duty to acquaint you with the same, and beg you to be kind enough to inform me of the decision which you would arrive at in this matter. All the above-mentioned grievances are well-known, and have occurred in my presence, and I have informed you of those only which I have personally seen. Many more complaints have come to my notice. Though they might be true, I have not personally seen them, and do not, therefore, consider it proper to acquaint you with the same.

I beg to remain,

(Sd.) BALWANT RAMACHANDRA NATU.

Poona, March 30, 1897.

To the PRESIDENT, Poona Municipality.

With compliments. I beg to solicit your kindness to send

this note to the District Magistrate of Poona, after kindly perusing the same.

(Sd.) BALWANT RAMACHANDRA NATU.

Dated, March 30, 1897.

No. 4744 of 1897.

Poona District Magistrate's Office,
Junar 10, April 11, 1897.

Vernacular Yadi from Sirdar and Municipal Commissioner, B. R. NATU, dated, March 30, 1897.

Subject.—“Anti-Plague Measures in Poona City.”

Reply of the DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF POONA.

It is quite right that those who see the actual working of the anti-plague measures should make reasonable suggestions for their improvement.

2. With regard to the suggestions now made, it is impossible to give previous notice of when each day's inspection is to take place, or that places found closed should not be opened for inspection. All persons know that the inspection is in progress, and it behoves each man to take adequate care of his own property.

3. It is, of course, useless to break open small boxes to search for plague cases, and the native gentlemen and others who accompany the search parties no doubt prevent such unnecessary proceedings, as also all improper treatment of persons found in the house, whether male or female.

4. Generally, there does not appear to be anything in the manner in which operations are being conducted which necessitates the District Magistrate's interference. A very difficult and dangerous duty is, it seems to him, being performed with a most commendable thoroughness, and he is glad that Mr. Natu's yadi, by not pointing out any serious defects, bears testimony to the general excellence of the arrangements.

(Sd.) R. A. LAMB, District Magistrate, Poona.

Received 14/4/97. B. R. NATU.

From Mr. BALWANT RAMACHANDRA NATU, Sardar and Municipal Commissioner, Poona City.

To the COLLECTOR and DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, POONA.

SIR,—I beg, first of all, to thank you for your reply, No. 4,744, dated April 11, 1897, of whatever kind it may be, to my yadi, dated March 13, 1897, and venture to trouble you further with such information as I have subsequently obtained together with what I have to say regarding the twelve points referred to in my last letter, and which have not been all touched in your reply, hoping it may be of some use to lay that information before you.

There are hundreds of persons in Poona who carry on their business from 6 to 11 a.m. in the fruit and the vegetable market and other places, and being single, who go out for business after locking up their houses. If these men do not know when their houses will be inspected they will have to wait idly in their houses for a month or two at the risk of losing the source of their livelihood. You will see how essential it is to notify the time of inspection to these people. These are days of famine, and if such people give up work for months, they stand in danger of being starved. Several merchants have again left Poona on account of plague, entrusting their shops and houses to single guards. If the latter go to the shops the houses are forced open in their absence, while if they guard the houses the locks of the shops are broken. In this way property is not well protected.

You observe that the native gentlemen accompanying the search parties should prevent all improper treatment of persons found in the house; but I beg to observe that the soldiers not only pay no attention to our suggestions, but refuse to give their names or that of the commanding officer, and the case, even though reported to the Plague Committee, goes unattended. I do not know how we are to act under these circumstances, and shall be glad to conform to any directions that you may be pleased to give.

We are not heard if we urge that temples, godhouses, and kitchens should be searched, not by British soldiers, but better classes—native sepoys—in suspicious cases. Nor is our request to remove old and weak people to hospital only after proper medical examination heeded. They are taken to the hospital in haste; and the disinfecting party not only disinfects the house and burns the property, but removes the other inmates of the house to the segregation camp. The man taken on suspicion to the hospital is soon discharged, and finds himself and his house in the state above described. We have informed

the authorities of these complaints, but nothing is being done in the matter.

I have reported to Mr. Rand the conduct of the soldiers in entering the temple of Rameshwar, Gundas Ganpati, and that of the Gujarati Maharaja, but I do not know what steps have been taken in the matter. But, whether because I made the complaint or otherwise, some soldiers came to inspect a private temple belonging to me. On being told that it was a temple, and that if they had any suspicion it should be inspected, not by the soldiers, but by gentlemen accompanying the party, the objection was communicated to Major Maud (?). Thereupon some ten or twelve soldiers and Dr. Kiddie (though it was not necessary to call a doctor) entered the temple, and searched it all. If your Honour still thinks that this is consistent with the expressed wishes of his Excellency, and that there is nothing in the manner in which the plague operations are being conducted to call for your interference, we must regard it as a misfortune, so far as our people and religion are concerned.

Again, on April 13, a searching party inspected the house of Mr. Hasabnis, an inamdar, in the Shanwar Peth. There was an old man in the house, and Mr. Hasabnis attempted to explain that he was weak through age, and not on account of plague. Whereupon Major Maud ordered Mr. Hasabnis to go with him for four hours. I protested against this illegal confinement, to which Major Maud replied that, though Mr. Hasabnis was not a plague patient, he was being carried to gaol for obstructing the work of the search party. Mr. Hasabnis was detained till 11 a.m. in the custody of sowars. I urged that if he obstructed the work of the search party his name and address might be taken down, and he should be prosecuted according to law; but it seems that the commanding officer took the law into his own hands, and punished Mr. Hasabnis by asking him to go with the party for four hours. It is our misfortune if you do not consider this conduct unjust; if otherwise, you will kindly arrange to prevent its recurrence in future.

I hope that, for reasons given above, you will kindly take steps to remove the hardships and sufferings of the Poona people. At any rate, I hope I shall not myself be put to further inconvenience for bringing these complaints to your notice.

I beg, etc.,

(Sd.) BALWANT RAMACHANDRA NATU.

Poona, April 15, 1897.

No. 5314 of 1897.

Poona Collector's Office,
Camp Manchar, April 24, 1897.

Vernacular Yadi from Sirdar and Municipal Commissioner, B. R. NATU, dated, April 15, 1897.

Subject.—“Anti-Plague Measures in Poona City.”

Reply of the COLLECTOR OF POONA.

Most or all of the matters referred to in your yadi have already been brought to the notice of the Plague Committee, Poona, and such action, if any, as appears feasible is taken on all complaints that are made to the Committee.

(Sd.) R. A. LAMB, Collector and District
Magistrate of Poona.

THE LIBERAL LEADERS AND THE “FORWARD” POLICY.

MR. JOHN MORLEY AT ARBROATH.

“IT IS ALL NONSENSE.”

Mr. John Morley, M.P., addressing his constituents at Arbroath, N.B., on September 28, said in the course of his speech:

Well, now I am going to take you to India, where, as you know, there is a conflagration of more or less magnitude upon the North-Western frontier. I am sure you all read what goes on in these military operations. Gentlemen, this is not at all the time for opening up the large and even momentous issues which are involved in our frontier policy. Brave men

and skilful men are now striving, at the peril of their lives, to bring to an end the mischief which unwise men set loose. We watch the efforts of these brave men of ours, and of their native comrades, with interest and with confidence, and we all wish them a rapid success in their unwelcome and, I venture to think, barren task. But while this is not a moment to discuss the policy, it is a moment when untoward events quicken political comprehensions, and quicken national consciences; it is a moment, while we watch this endeavour to cut down the fire, to look at the policy which kindled the flame.

THE RESULT OF THE "FORWARD" POLICY.

I am not going into it at any length, because there is one other subject which will take me all the time that your patience will permit. But I will say this, and this is clear, that this fierce rising of the wild tribes on the North-Western frontier of India is the result of the prevalence for some years past of a forward policy, and especially—and I call your attention to this—of the unfortunate determination of the present Government to follow a policy of activity in extension in the direction of the Valley of Chitral. You will recollect that in the spring of 1895 a military expedition was despatched to rescue certain British officers in danger at Chitral. The rescue was effected with remarkable promptitude and energy, and then the question was left whether we should retain a foothold in Chitral or keep away. That came before the Liberal Cabinet of 1895. The Government of India held the view that we ought to hold on; men, on the other hand, of the highest military authority and experience were averse. They said, "You had much better come away," and so far as we, the Government of 1895, were able to ascertain, the preponderance of expert and valuable military opinion was in favour of our coming away. I won't detain you with talking as to general grounds, financial grounds, and otherwise, which were present before us, but I cannot pass over one of the most important of all the considerations that were present in our minds when we determined on the evacuation of Chitral. When the expedition was setting out for the relief of Dr. Robertson, the Viceroy issued a proclamation—and I would invite your serious attention to this because your judgment on transactions of this kind goes to the roots of national honour and national character. The Viceroy issued a proclamation in which he promised certain tribes that the Government had no intention of permanently occupying any territories through which a certain chief's misconduct might now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes, and that as soon as the particular object with which they entered Chitral territory had been obtained the force would be withdrawn. It was because of that promise of the Viceroy that some of these wild tribesmen allowed the forces of the Indian Government to go through their territory. We held that to take any step which might be construed as meaning a permanent occupation of the Chitral valley, or of the territory of the tribesmen, would be to break faith—and to break faith, mark you, as I have already said, with those who, on the strength of this promise, had not opposed the advance of our relief expedition. Well, we decided in 1895 to direct the evacuation of the Chitral territory. Events have proved that we were terribly right. (Cheers.) On the very day on which my able and eloquent friend, who was then Secretary for India, Sir Henry Fowler, was sitting down to write his despatch conveying this decision, I think that was the very day when an adverse vote in the House of Commons unfortunately slit the thread of our existence. What happened afterwards was that our successors, in the plenitude of their wisdom and their foresight, flung themselves into the arms of the forward party, of the military party, with the lamentable results you see. I do not deny that other causes contributed to this outbreak, but no reasonable man can or does doubt that the nonfulfilment of our promise had a powerful effect in stirring up the frontier tribes against us. There was a regular course only too familiar to us in all these forward operations.

THE "FORWARD" RAKE'S PROGRESS.

These are the five stages of the "forward" Rake's progress. (Laughter.) First, to push on into places where you have no business to be, and where you had promised you would not go—(hear, hear)—second, your intrusion is resented, and in these wilds resentment means resistance; third, you instantly cry out that the people are rebels and their act is rebellion, in spite of your own assurances that you had no intention of setting up a permanent sovereignty over them; fourth, you send forces to stamp out the rebellion; fifth, having spread

bloodshed and confusion and anarchy, you declare with hands uplifted to heaven, that moral reasons force you to stay, for if you were to leave this territory would be left in a condition no civilised power could contemplate with equanimity and composure. These are the five stages of the "forward" Rake's Progress.

THE GOVERNMENT'S WANT OF FORESIGHT.

To show how blind these men are, let me recall what the Secretary of State for India, when declining this action in 1895, said of this operation, after this reversal of our policy: "We have now arrived"—this is two years ago—"at a settlement of our frontier difficulties. We have, I think, by these arrangements, utilised the results of the Chitral expedition, and my one wish now is"—this is the Secretary of State speaking in 1895—"to look to the condition of Indian finance, to associate with the satisfactory settlement of these frontier questions a period of quietude and economy." (Laughter.) That was the degree of foresight of her Majesty's Government. Was there ever so unlucky a prophet? "A satisfactory settlement of these frontier questions." You see how they are settled. "Quietude and economy!" Why, I am told by those who are very competent to judge these proceedings that they will cost five millions sterling if they cost a rupee. "Quietude and economy!" This is all I have to say on this point. There will be much to be said about it before we have done with it. It is obviously bad to turn these tribes into enemies, and to incline them to be the friends of the invader, if ever an invader should be minded to approach India through those high uplands and valleys. It is bad, but what is worst of all is that it means laying upon India, which is a poor country, and which is at this moment in vast areas undergoing all the horrors and distress of famine—it means imposing upon India a burden which India cannot reasonably, perhaps, not possibly, be expected to bear. From my point of view the military side is the least part of this unfortunate proceeding—it is the effect upon Indian finance. Many men of the highest authority will tell you that the finance of India, even, as it is, is a ruinous finance. I won't argue, but I saw a statement the other day that the cost of the "forward" policy in India during the last twenty years has been something like £50,000,000 sterling. And now you will add several millions more. Gentlemen, you really think it is a far cry from Arbroath to Calcutta, but you are responsible; you in Arbroath here, though far from Calcutta and Simla, are responsible. You can protect yourselves; you have your representative in the House of Commons, and can protect yourselves partially through your representative; but the Indian taxpayer is helpless, and I am sure you will agree with me that it is a monstrous thing, upon a point where military experts differ diametrically, to put upon this wretched and famine and plague-stricken country an increased burden, because some military men say that if you take this valley or that valley your frontier will be a little safer. ("Nonsense," and laughter.) I for one agree with my friend here who says it is all nonsense. Is it common sense? If there were to be a Russian or any other invasion of India, is it not far better that Russia should have, or any invader should have, to make her way against hostile tribes through this intractable country and then find itself face to face with a British force that has been marching fully prepared? It does not require a general to see the folly of this policy. (Hear, hear.)

MR. ASQUITH AT LADYBANK.

"ONE GOOD RESULT—RECONSIDERATION."

Mr. H. H. Asquith, M.P., addressing his constituents at Ladybank, N.B., on September 30, said, in the course of his speech:—

I desire in the few moments which I will still encroach upon your attention to-night to confine myself to one topic and one only, and that is the war which is at present being waged upon the frontier of our Indian Empire. Let me say at the outset, whatever may be our opinion as to the origin of this lamentable occurrence and as to the responsibility for its having arisen, we are all of us, I am certain, full of sympathy and admiration for the efforts which are being made by our gallant soldiers, both of the British and of the native forces—(cheers)—who, amid difficulties which rarely present themselves to

modern warfare, are worthily maintaining the best traditions alike of the British and of the Indian army. But what was the cause? How comes it, and that in a year in which, as I stated a short time ago, India is suffering both from famine and plague, at a time, therefore, when it ought to be, and I doubt not is, the object of all who are responsible for her government to husband her resources and to pursue her policy of conciliation and peace—how comes it, I say, that at such a time India has had to summon to her frontier no fewer than 50,000 soldiers, and has engaged in an expedition the ultimate cost of which, according to the best authorities, cannot be measured in less than millions of pounds sterling? Gentlemen, there are many fantastic explanations afloat, particularly among the speakers and writers who support the present Government, of this lamentable state of things. Perhaps the most fantastic of them is that the Afridis and the Mohmands and the other Muhammadan tribes of the frontier have been moved to a demonstration of sympathy with the Sultan of Turkey by the outrageous attacks which have been made upon that virtuous monarch—(laughter)—in the columns of the English press. Unfortunately, we need not go so far afield to find a cause for what is going on in India.

THE RETENTION OF CHITRAL.

In my judgement, at any rate, the vastly preponderating weight both of probability and of evidence shows that, though our frontier policy for years past may have prepared for, and contributed to the rising which we are now witnessing, the provoking and the exciting cause is to be found in the measures which, as I think, were most improvidently and unwisely adopted by the present Government in relation to Chitral. Ladies and gentlemen, let me remind you, in two or three sentences, of the facts. This is a matter, although it is removed from us by many thousands of miles, which vitally affects both our interests and our honour. In the early part of the year 1895, when we were still responsible for the conduct of public affairs, we found ourselves under the necessity of sending an expedition to Chitral, a remote, mountainous spot, far removed from the extreme North-Eastern Frontier of India, in order to rescue a British officer who had been treacherously held captive by the native ruler of that place. When that expedition was despatched the Government of India, which was, of course, immediately although not ultimately, responsible for it, issued a proclamation to the native tribes through whose territory the British force was about to pass. The language of that proclamation, gentlemen, and its meaning have been so much distorted both by speakers and by organs of opinion in the press that I think it right to quote its exact terms to-night. It reads—I am quoting only one, but it is a material passage—"The Government of India," they say, "have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes." It goes on:—"And they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they, on their part, refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops." Ladies and gentlemen, that is written in pretty plain language, and what does it mean? It means, as we understood it at the time and as I understand it now, that the Government of India gave two solemn undertakings. The first was that they would not permanently occupy any territory through which the expedition would now have to pass, or interfere with the independence of the tribes. The second was that they would avoid even any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen on the way unless those acts were provoked by attacks on the part of the tribesmen themselves. We are told now that those assurances—clearly conveyed, as I have shown you, in intelligible language, and universally understood at the time, both by us here in England and by the tribesmen to whom they were addressed, in the sense I have put upon them—were not a promise, but only the expression of our intention. Gentlemen, that is a kind of casuistry which may be in vogue in London and Edinburgh, but it is not very well understood among the wild tribes of the North-Eastern frontier. (Laughter.) We were told, further, in defiance of the plain intimation which I have read out to you to-night, that the first and the totally independent promise to respect the integrity of the territory through which the expedition was to pass was contingent on the tribesmen not attacking the expedition on the way. That condition, as I have shown you, and as the language plainly proves, related not to the first, but to the second, of the two promises given

by the Indian Government. (Cheers.) Well, it was after that proclamation had been issued in these plain, unambiguous terms that the expedition went on its way and, after it accomplished its purpose, that we who were then responsible for the conduct of affairs had on its return to consider what was to be done with Chitral.

"THIS GROSS BREACH OF FAITH."

Gentlemen, we had no doubt whatsoever, although we gave long and patient and careful consideration, extending, if I remember aright, over two or three months, to all the arguments on the one side and on the other—we had no doubt as to what conclusion we should arrive—that we should withdraw not only from Chitral itself, but from the intervening territory to which this proclamation refers. (Cheers.) We thought so for a multitude of reasons, of which I will only give you three in three sentences, because I think they are quite adequate for the purpose. In the first place, we thought we were bound to fulfil what we conceived to be a solemn undertaking of the Indian Government. In the second place, we were advised by officers of the greatest local knowledge and experience that the occupation of Chitral, which meant of necessity the making of a road between Peshawar, the extreme point in India, and Chitral—a distance, I suppose, of 120 or 150 miles—the making of a road, the building of forts upon that road, and the occupation of those forts either by our own soldiers or by subsidized native tribesmen—we were advised that measures of that kind would inevitably arouse in the minds of the tribes of the district suspicions as to our ulterior purposes, and that we should find the keeping of Chitral and of the intervening country a matter which sooner or later would tax the resources of India herself. In the third place, we resolved to go because Chitral, and the way between Chitral, is of no value whatsoever to any human being, and least of all to the British Empire. We had concluded at that time, I am glad to say, an agreement with Russia by means of which the whole of the boundary between the Russian and British spheres of influence throughout Central Asia, from west to east, had been clearly mapped out and laid down. And the sole purpose for which Chitral, or any one of these outlying and inaccessible places, has been occupied and retained, is to counteract some imaginary and contingent enterprise upon the part of Russia for the invasion of our Indian Empire. We thought these reasons adequate. The present Government, however, had not been in office a month before they reversed our decision, before they resolved to retain possession of Chitral, with the necessary consequence of occupying, by means of forts and of garrisons, the intervening space. Can you wonder that when it was gradually brought home to the minds of the tribes concerned that there had been what they considered, and what I certainly for myself consider, this gross breach of faith upon the part of the Indian Government, and that further, as had been predicted to us, and as the event has proved with the most perfect accuracy, they drew from the establishment of these positions the inference that their independence was threatened, and that annexation to India was with them only a question of time? Can you wonder that feelings of resentment and of unsettlement were aroused which, after they had fermented for a time, have at last found their expression in the rising with which you are now confronted?

"A NEW AND ALTERNATIVE POLICY."

That rising has spread from one end of the frontier to another, because the annexation of Chitral was only the extreme application of principles which now, unhappily for 20 years past, have been pursued in relation to our frontier policy in India, which have scattered along the whole of that vast frontier roads, forts, strong places, occupied in some cases by British troops, in other cases by subsidized levies from the local troops which, as the greatest authorities tell us, are of no advantage whatever for the purpose of spreading civilisation, and which, as the present outbreak has shown, the moment war is declared become a source of danger. In my judgement the responsibility for this grave situation and strain, from which undoubtedly India will emerge, but emerge at an enormous and most unnecessary cost both of life and of treasure, ought to be laid at the doors of an ill-considered decision by which, in defiance of the assurance of the Indian Government, and of all considerations of sound and sagacious policy, this annexation of Chitral was maintained and continued. (Cheers.) I trust that, at any rate, these troubles will have one good result—that they may lead to the reconsideration, and that at

no distant time, of the lines upon which our Indian frontier policy has for the past 20 years been carried on, and that it will be possible for the future to arrive at a new and alternative policy which will in no way diminish the security of India, and will free her from the constant liabilities of those harassing expeditions which her resources, which were never rich, and which have recently been the subject of exceptional and trying calamity, cannot meet.

MR. MORLEY AT FORFAR.

BACK TO LORD LAWRENCE.

In the course of a speech delivered at Forfar on October 4, Mr. John Morley said:—

You may have seen that when I was speaking the other night in another burgh of this group I referred to a state of affairs on the North-Western frontier of India, and I ventured to point out that the doings of the present Government as contrasted with the doings of the late Government in the matter of what is known as Chitral, were certainly, in some part, responsible for the unpleasant conflagration which is now raging on the frontier. Well, I have been taken to book for all this by a newspaper in Scotland, which is always remarkable for the affability with which it conducts political controversy. (Laughter, and hear, hear.) They say—and I think it is worth while for me to nail a bad shilling to the counter when I see it—(a laugh, and hear, hear)—they say—and the subject is one of great importance—they say that, after all, Lord Kimberley, who was the Secretary of State for India in the Government of which I had the honour to be a member, said this—that it was a matter of importance that we should be able to control the external affairs of Chitral. Well, and then they ask, plausibly enough, How can you control the external affairs of Chitral if you have no post of observation there? Well, but then, up to five years ago, there was no Resident in Chitral and Lord Kimberley himself, whom they vouch as overthrowing the position which I ventured to take up at Arbroath—they forget that Lord Kimberley himself said, having alleged that we ought to maintain—that we ought to be able to control the external affairs of Chitral—that Lord Kimberley himself said it was not intended to maintain permanently a Resident Officer in Chitral. Well, I don't know. These are very technical matters, but I hope you follow them. It may be said, "Oh, but since Lord Kimberley said it was not intended to retain a Resident at Chitral, there has been the campaign." Gentlemen, that does not affect the argument at all. If it was not important, as the Secretary of State of our Government said it was not, to maintain permanently a Resident in Chitral before the agreement which was arrived at between Russia and ourselves in respect of the Pamirs, how on earth can it be more important now than it was then to have a Resident there—to retain a post of observation? Gentlemen, since the agreement between ourselves and Russia upon the Pamir frontier has been arrived at, whatever arguments there were before for our retention of an Agent at Chitral, have not been strengthened, but weakened by that very agreement come to between ourselves and Russia.

"ANOTHER BAD SHILLING."

Well, I must detain you for a minute more whilst I nail another bad shilling to the counter which has been attempted to be put into circulation from the same mint. Our very able friend, Sir Henry Fowler, the Secretary of State for India after Lord Kimberley, is also vouched as making it impossible for persons to make good the charge of breach of faith. And what did Sir Henry Fowler say in the House of Commons? He made two speeches in August or September, 1895, and what he said in these two speeches in the same debate came to this, that if the Government made a road through the territory of these tribes otherwise than by peaceable arrangement with the tribes, to whom a certain proclamation was issued, then there would have been a breach of faith with these tribes. Well, is it contended—and this is almost all I have got to say on the matter—is it contended that a peaceable arrangement was made? The rising, which some of you may have read of, in the Swat Valley, was at the beginning—at all events, it happened in the early part of these troubles on the Indian frontier—and was a protest, as Indian experts inform us

against the right of transit claimed by the Indian Government. Well, so much—I am not to detain you more than that—so much for the right of our political opponents to vouch the last Liberal Secretary of State. (Cheers.)

THE POLICY OF LAWRENCE IS THE POLICY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.

But I don't want quite to leave this subject. I must have another sentence on it to say I don't want to leave it because I believe there is nothing on which Liberals ought to set their hearts more firmly than resistance—strong resistance—to what is called the forward policy in India. (Cheers.) This is no new story. Those of you who are old enough to recollect well, as I do, all the talk something like twenty years ago about a scientific frontier, those arguments—the arguments of what were called a scientific frontier then were exactly the arguments which we hear to-day, and on which we shall hear more by-and-by; and the same resistance which was offered to those arguments—the same dispersion of the force of those arguments in 1878-9-80—I believe the same resistance ought to be offered, and will be offered, to any further tamperings with what is called a forward policy. When I am asked, as I am asked by these journals who oppose us in Scotland, why, instead of dwelling so much on the point of breach of faith why we don't declare our policy in broad terms I am quite willing to meet them, and answer them. I am not to expound our policy in any poor terms of mine. I will expound it in the words of one of the most able, experienced and powerful Indian Governors that India has ever had. I will tell you what Lord Lawrence said. I won't give it you in his own words, but mainly in his own words, and this is what it comes to: Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our strongest security would lie in previous abstinences from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost. It would be in full reliance on a compact and disciplined army stationed within our own territories. It would lie—and you will well be able to understand this—in the contentment of the masses of the population of India. (Cheers.) It would lie in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political stability and strength. It would lie in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources. It would lie in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint, which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits of revolt." (Cheers.) When you see it stated in these prints that we have no policy, my answer is, that we fall back upon that policy every step in deserting which has been accomplished by mischievous expenditure, by some political mischiefs, and every step forward from which will involve you in further expenditure, if not in more and deeper mischiefs than those mischiefs of expenditure. (Hear, hear.)

MR. ASQUITH AT KILMARNOCK.

"EXTRAORDINARY RESOURCES OF SOPHISTRY AND CASUISTRY."

In the course of a speech delivered at Kilmarnock, Ayrshire, on October 6, Mr. Asquith said:—

But let us turn for a moment to another part of the globe, in which we ourselves, as Englishmen and Scotsmen, have a still more direct interest and responsibility. I mean our great dependency of India. India has been visited during the present year by calamities which are due to natural and to economic causes, and which, probably, the foresight of no Government, however ably administered, could possibly have anticipated or prevented. But the state of things—happily as we see dangers both from famine and from plague have somewhat abated, if they have not altogether disappeared—the state of things which confront you at the present moment in India is the direct, and, I will venture to say, the necessary, outcome of the reversal by the present Government of the policy of their predecessors.

"IN RESPONSE TO ORDERS FROM HERE."

I am referring, of course, to this vast and extended rising upon the north-western frontier which, at a moment when

India is ill able, from the disasters to which I have already referred, to bear any exceptional strain, is compelling her to assemble a large army, and to incur week after week, and probably month after month, an expenditure which her resources are ill calculated to sustain. I endeavoured a few days ago, when I was addressing my own constituents in Fife, to go into the details of this matter, and to show that this rising has originated from the fact that the Indian Government—I do not make them responsible, because it is the Government here that is responsible—in response to orders from here, determined upon the permanent occupation of Chitral, and, for that purpose, upon the occupation, by means of a road and by means of forts, of the intervening territory occupied by independent tribes. Gentlemen, we had to consider this matter during the last months in which we were in office, and we considered it carefully and long, and we came unanimously to the conclusion—and, for my part, I cannot recall any question of administration or of policy with which I have ever had to deal in which the preponderance of argument seemed to be so strong—irresistible—upon one side as compared with the other. We came to the conclusion that both as a matter of honour in view of the pledges given by the Indian Government and as a matter of policy in view of our relations both to Russia and to India herself, it was imperatively necessary that this occupation should not take place, and that these outlying posts, of no value whatever to India, should be evacuated. (Cheers.) The Indian Government issued a proclamation when the original expedition to Chitral was undertaken, assuring the tribes through whose territory the force was about to pass that their land was in no danger of being permanently occupied by the Indian Government. I am—I was going to say amused, but rather I shall say I am amused to see the extraordinary resources of sophistry and of casuistry which have been brought to bear to explain away that promise and its non-performance. (Hear, hear.) They say it is not occupying the territory of a country if you only run a road through it, and claim a right-of-way and garrison that way by a force every few miles along the road. Well, gentlemen, I suppose we ought to be very precise, in our statesmanship and diplomacy, in the use of language: but I confess, to me, as a plain and humble student of the English language, that that does amount to occupation in every real and effective sense of the term; and I am perfectly certain if I could put myself in the position of one of the head men of these semi-cultured, semi-naked, semi-savage tribes I should certainly assume—I should draw the inference at once, that the promise made not to occupy my country had been flagrantly violated.

“BURDENSOME AND OUTLYING POSTS.”

We are told that the Liberal Government, and Lord Kimberley, one of its ablest members, had said that Chitral was a place where it was necessary that India should have a post of observation. But our critics entirely suppress the date at which that declaration was made. It is true—not that he advocated the annexation of Chitral or of the intervening country, but that he did say in 1893 that it was desirable to maintain a Resident there. But what had happened in the interval? What had happened was a fact that it was very convenient for these gentlemen to ignore—a fact upon which I look back as one of the most fruitful achievements of the Government of Lord Rosebery, of which I was a member. (Cheers.) That fact is this, that, by bringing ourselves alongside, in a candid and cordial spirit, the statesmanship and the diplomacy of Russia, by frankly and freely abandoning the exploded superstition—to quote Lord Salisbury's own words—of an antiquated diplomacy that there was a certain natural antagonism between Russia and Great Britain in Asia, we arranged, by friendly convention, a strict and complete demarcation and arrangement of the boundaries of our spheres of influence in the region of the Pamirs, and consequently the necessity ceased to last for the maintaining of those posts of observation in those outlying districts of the frontier, whatever necessity there might have been in the past. It was in view of the fact of that concluded agreement, which gives either Russia or Britain a right to claim it as a *casus belli* if the frontier is crossed—it was that fact that convinced us that we ought to retire from these burdensome and outlying posts, which impose on the resources of India an excessive and unwarrantable strain. (Cheers.) The present Government had not been in office a month before they reversed this decision, and resolved on the occupation of Chitral and the construction

of these intervening works; and it is the gradual realisation in the native mind, and the consequent unsettlement of their feelings, and a growing apprehension that they would lose their independence, which is the direct and the certain origin of the disturbances which you have at present in India. (Cheers.) Well, that is another case in which I would like to ask those who were deluded by the brilliant promises and hopes of 1895—if I may use a vulgar expression—whether they have got change for their money. (Laughter.)

“A GROSS BREACH OF FAITH.”

LORD NORTHBROOK'S PLEA—

The *Times* of October 14 contained the following letter from Lord Northbrook, under the heading “Lord Elgin and Chitral” :—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE “TIMES.”

Sir,—It is well known that after the relief of Chitral in the spring of 1895 Lord Rosebery's Government decided to withdraw the garrison from that place, and that upon the change of Government in the following June their decision was reversed by the present Administration. I am one of those who think that Lord Rosebery was right, and I am not surprised that his colleagues should attribute the present troubles on the North-Western frontier of India, in whole or in part, to the reversal of their policy. But Mr. John Morley and Mr. Asquith, in their recent speeches at Lady Bank and Arbroath, have gone much further than this. Mr. Asquith has charged the Government of India with “a gross breach of faith,” and Mr. Morley has made the same accusation in milder language.

This accusation is a very grave one. I have therefore taken pains to examine the facts of the case so far as they are known to the public; and I have no hesitation in expressing my conviction that the charge of breach of faith against Lord Elgin is unfounded.

The reason advanced in support of it is that in a proclamation addressed in March, 1895, to the tribes whose territory the expedition for the relief of Chitral was about to traverse, they were assured that “the Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes;” and it is alleged that the arrangements afterwards made for opening out and protecting a road from Chitral to the frontier of British India involve a violation of the assurances given in that proclamation.

These assurances certainly did not preclude the conclusion of friendly arrangements with the tribes through whose territory the road passes for opening out and protecting it. Indeed, Sir Henry Fowler, who was Secretary of State for India in Lord Rosebery's Government, said in the House of Commons in September, 1895: “The Indian Government believe—I do not agree with them—that peaceful arrangements can be made for the construction of this road. If they are made, of course there will be no violation of the terms of the proclamation.”

It remains, then, to be seen whether peaceful arrangements were actually made with the tribes, and whether those arrangements were entered into voluntarily by them. Anyone who will lay out the trifling sum of 3d. upon a paper presented to Parliament in 1896, entitled “Correspondence Relating to the Occupation of Chitral,” may easily satisfy himself upon this subject. In that paper an account of the negotiations with the tribes is given in ample detail. The instructions to the officers charged with the duty leave nothing to be desired in respect to the determination of Lord Elgin scrupulously to adhere to the terms of the proclamation, and also to secure that any arrangement with the tribes should be freely entered into by them and “not forced upon them.”

against their will." Although two of them urgently petitioned to be annexed to British India they were told that "Government in their proclamation informed all tribes that they had no desire to interfere with their independence, and there was no hope of a departure from that policy." The tribes freely undertook to protect the road. The levies intrusted with the duty were not placed under British officers, lest there should be any misconception of the intentions of the Government. An arrangement was entered into whereby the tribes agreed not to levy transit duties on the road in return for certain allowances; and it was at the desire of the tribes themselves, expressed in petitions which will be found in the paper, that a force of Imperial troops was temporarily stationed at the Malakand Pass.

I shall not enter upon the question whether the endeavour to open out this road was wise or not, or what the effect may have been upon other tribes not immediately concerned. I am simply and solely dealing with the accusation of breach of faith made against Lord Elgin, and I trust that in the face of the facts which I have briefly related we shall hear no more of this charge.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

October 12.

NORTHBROOK.

—AND MR. JOHN MORLEY'S REPLY.

The *Times* of October 19 printed this rejoinder from Mr. John Morley:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES."

SIR,—It is satisfactory to find that a person of Lord Northbrook's Indian authority thinks that the decision of the Liberal Cabinet in 1895 to withdraw from Chitral was right, and that the reversal of that policy by their successors in office was wrong. He does not, however, concur with Mr. Asquith and me in counting breach of faith among the elements of the mischief that has followed the reversal of the policy of the late Cabinet; and he denies that there has been any violation of the proclamation, because the arrangements for opening and maintaining the road from Chitral to the frontier of India were made peaceably and voluntarily with the tribes.

Even if it could be more strongly supported by the evidence in the Parliamentary papers than is actually the case, this contention does not meet the point at issue. The breach of faith, as we have argued from the first, took place when the new Government at home, following the advice of the Government of India, announced in July, 1895, that it was about to establish and maintain, if necessary by force, a permanent right of way through the territories of tribes whose independence and integrity we had promised to preserve. The late Cabinet said, among other objections, that this was to break faith, and refused to sanction it, and agreed that the Secretary of State should tell Lord Elgin so, and should inform him of the grounds of our refusal. It is surely idle to talk to-day of our bringing charges and accusations against the Indian Government simply because we uphold the validity of an objection to a certain decision, which objection we took while that decision was still open, and which we consider that events have strengthened and justified.

The head of the late Government told the House of Lords in 1895 (August 15)—I dare say Lord Northbrook was present—the four reasons which induced the Liberal Cabinet, after full consideration of the views of their military advisers, to direct withdrawal—(1) If you construct roads southward of Chitral to lead to it you make pervious what was impervious, and in that way you add, not to the security, but to the insecurity, of our Indian Empire. (2) After the conclusion of the Pamir agreement with Russia the retention of a military post at Chitral might be considered a menace, to be met by Russia by some similar move. (3) "You are breaking faith with the people among whom your campaign has

taken place. Do not believe that these mountain tribes, because they are savage, are unaware of the binding obligation of a declaration so clear, so specific, and so honourable as that contained in the proclamation."

(4) The financial position of India.

What Lord Northbrook says as to the subsequent behaviour of some of the tribes concerned does not in the least affect the force of the third of these propositions. Lord Salisbury's Government, when they adopted the unfortunate decision to reverse the policy founded on these four grounds, never proposed that the construction and maintenance of the road was to be conditional or contingent upon the assent of the tribes. To make and to hold the road, with or without the consent of the tribes, was the essence of their new policy. The tribes, therefore, had to choose between forcible resistance—at that moment a hopeless undertaking—and acquiescence, and for the time they acquiesced. Then, at the first available moment, they showed what acquiescence really amounted to. I find nothing whatever in the Parliamentary paper referred to by Lord Northbrook (C. 8,037, 1896) to shake the opinion expressed by Sir Henry Fowler (September 3, 1895) that peaceful arrangements in any solid sense were not possible. On the contrary, what that paper seems to show is, first, that the Government decided to make the road with the co-operation of the tribes if possible; but, if not, then without it. Secondly, that the peaceful nature of the arrangements was in the highest degree dubious, if, indeed, it was ever dubious at all. I rather think that correspondents of your own have informed us that even while the road seemed to be going forward smoothly, there was always "a large discontented section" of the population looking sullenly on. This is obviously the meaning of the repeated requests of the Khans, when making these agreements, that the Government should help them with troops to keep the road open, "so that they may be protected from disorder created by their neighbours, and by their own factional disputes" (p. 23). Thus certain Khans say that the presence of Government troops is necessary "to give us protection and safety from other tribes, because, owing to our having rendered services to Government since the arrival of troops in our country, there is apprehension of other tribes being displeased with us and of their causing injury to us. We heartily request that Government may not leave our country. By the presence of troops we will get assistance for the protection of the road from Peshawar to Kashkar" (p. 27). There are other cases of the same sort. Is this the kind of thing that we are to understand is meant by making and maintaining a road by peaceful arrangements with the tribes? With all respect to Lord Northbrook, I submit that on each point the Parliamentary Paper makes rather against him than for him.

The construction of the proclamation is only one among other elements in the discussion of the mischievous reversal of policy in 1895, and neither Mr. Asquith nor I have treated it as more. But to leave it out as Lord Northbrook wishes us to do, is to omit what we judged two and a-half years ago, and judge just as strongly now as then, to be one of the material parts of the case.

Yours faithfully,

October 18.

JOHN MORLEY.

LORD G. HAMILTON'S INACCURACY.

Under the odd conundrum "The Road to Chitral: When did it Become a Breach of Faith?" the *Times* of October 21 printed the following letter from Lord George Hamilton:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES."

SIR,—An attempt to justify the charge of bad faith advanced in such unequivocal terms by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Morley against the present Government for assent-

ing to the construction by the Indian Government of a road to Chitral is made in a letter from Mr. Morley to the *Times* of the 19th inst. In that letter he makes two assertions—first, that the late Government objected to this policy because it broke faith with the tribes, and so informed the Government of India; secondly, that the present Government determined to make the road, in the teeth of the proclamation, whether the tribes objected or not.

Both these statements are, as anyone who reads the official correspondence can see for himself, the exact opposite of what did occur. No such communication was made by the late Government to the Viceroy, and the only allusion to the proclamation is one from myself, in which, whilst assenting to certain of the proposals of the Government of India, I added the mandate, "Do nothing to infringe in any way terms of proclamation."

The policy involved in the construction of the road is a subject of legitimate difference of opinion; the question of honour is one of fact.

I remain yours faithfully,
GEORGE HAMILTON.

Wortley Hall, Sheffield.

MR. MORLEY'S REJOINDER.

Mr. John Morley wrote to the *Times* of October 22 the following rejoinder:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES."

SIR,—Lord George Hamilton has not done me the honour to read my letter accurately, or else he would hardly reply so very wide of the mark.

1. He says that I assert that the late Government objected to the new Chitral policy because it broke faith with the tribes, and so informed the Government of India; and he describes this double assertion as "the exact opposite of what did occur." As for the first of these two propositions, it is enough to remind Lord George Hamilton of Lord Rosebery's public statement in the House of Lords (August 15, 1895), in which he expressly mentioned breach of the proclamation as one of our four grounds of objection to the new policy. Is their any doubt or mystery about this? As for the second proposition, it is not in my letter. As I said in the speech at Arbroath which opened this controversy, the despatch embodying the decision of the Cabinet and the grounds for it was not sent, for the very good reason that the Government were, at the very moment, overthrown by an adverse vote in the House of Commons. What I wrote is the full and precise truth. Lord George Hamilton's letter is headed, "The Road to Chitral, when did it become a breach of faith?" My answer is that the late Cabinet decided that the failure to withdraw would be a breach of faith, as soon as ever the question came before them for determination.

2. The Secretary of State challenges my assertion that the present Government determined to make the road with the co-operation of the tribes if possible, but if not, then without it. This also he declares to be the exact opposite of what did occur. Does he really deny that, just as I said, to make and to hold the road, with or without the consent of the tribes, was the essence of their new policy in July, 1895? Does he assert that, when he defended the project of the road in Parliament (September 3, 1895), he intended the making of the road to be contingent on the goodwill of the tribes? When the Government of India told Sir R. Low (August 10, 1895) that a garrison would be retained in Chitral territory, and that it was intended to hold the road from the Swat river to the border of Chitral by means of levies, was that conditional on anybody's assent? The Indian Government directed the General (August 15, 1895) to point out to the tribes that while Government consider that the opening up of the road "is necessary" to secure the prevention of any future aggression on Chitral

territory, "they are willing and anxious to do what is necessary in co-operation with the tribes." Did this mean that if the tribes did not fall in, the project, which was described as a necessity, would be dropped or postponed? If Lord George Hamilton can give no good answer to these questions—and it is notorious that he cannot attempt it—the interpretation placed by my letter upon the Ministerial policy, as shown in papers and speeches, so far from being the exact opposite of the truth, is incontestable. "I could not help smiling," said Lord George (September 3, 1895), "when I heard Sir Henry Fowler denounce the construction of roads." "I believe this road," he went on, "if the negotiations are properly conducted, will place our relations with the tribes on a better footing than before." *O pectora caeca!* Decidedly, I think, one of the most foolish Parliamentary smiles to be found in all "Hansard."

Yours faithfully,

October 21. JOHN MORLEY.

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