

# INDIA

## A Record and Review of Indian Affairs

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### Indiana.

THERE has come to be among our A Discredited Jingoos at home a stock mode of Policy. treating outbreaks of hostilities beyond the North-West frontier of India. While the fighting lasts they say: "this is no time for discussions about policy." When the fighting is over they say: "it is now too late to talk of going back." And so the game has gone on merrily—the indigent taxpayers of India paying the piper while Whitehall and Simla call the tune. The present war, however, partly no doubt because of its unusual magnitude, partly we may hope because of a certain awakening of public opinion, has seen—on paper, at any rate—the defeat of the policy of reticence and rush. During the past few weeks, side by side with the humiliating telegrams from the parts beyond the Indus, readers of newspapers have found caustic, trenchant, and persistent condemnation of the source and cause of all the trouble—namely, the self-defeating "forward" policy. Some attempt is made in the present issue of INDIA to indicate the volume and the weight of this mass of valuable criticism. Experts like Sir Auckland Colvin, Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Adye, Sir James Lyall, Colonel Hanna and Major Raverty have led the way in signed contributions to the *Saturday Review* and the *Times*, while the newspaper press—especially the *Daily News*, the *Daily Chronicle*, the

*Manchester Guardian*, the *Bradford Observer* and the *Star*—have pressed home day after day the real meaning of the war and the utter collapse of the "forward" school. On the other hand, one looks in vain in any quarter for anything even distantly resembling a plausible defence of the policy of Lord George Hamilton and his friends. The *Times*, when it is not discreetly silent, contradicts itself on successive days. The *Standard*, with a fine air of contempt, abandons discussions of the past as "vain" and entreats the friends of the "forward" policy to contrive some not wholly humiliating compromise for the future.

So far, so good. But a victory on paper is one thing. The actual reversal of a policy is another thing.

Mr. John Morley said somewhere last autumn that throughout the Session the Opposition had been in a majority in everything except numbers. If Lord George Hamilton has not a coherent argument on his side, he has "the largest," and in some respects the most docile, "majority of modern times" at his back. Under ordinary circumstances, when Parliament meets, the wisacres of the Unionist Party will not ask for reasons, and the Government will be content with votes. It behoves the critics of the useless, costly, and perilous "forward" policy, therefore, to see to it that the circumstances are not ordinary—in other words, that the almost universal opinion of intelligent citizens throughout the country



may have made itself heard and felt. Already the question has been asked in more than one quarter—where are the Liberal leaders? Here, surely, is a matter which deserves their strongest sympathies and their best energies. Jingo writers, having nothing better to say, will say of course—indeed, they are saying now—that Liberals seek to make party capital out of the matter. Cant of that transparent kind deceives nobody. In the Chitral business the policy of Lord Rosebery's Cabinet, which was also the policy of Lord Elgin's proclamation, was hastily and flippantly reversed by Lord George Hamilton and his colleagues. Here, then, is a plain issue even for the mere partisan. But what is really wanted is that the Liberal leaders should rise to the height of a great opportunity and, ranging themselves with the unanimous opinion of educated India, and the almost unanimous opinion of Anglo-Indian "experts," strike a blow at that militarism rampant which, more than any other single cause, is responsible for the present disorders and discontents in British India.

Impatience among Liberals. SIGNS are not wanting to show the impatience of the Liberal rank and file at the apathy of their leaders in view of the present position of affairs in India. Some of the newspapers of September 7 printed a letter in which "a member of the Liberal party," writing to Mr. Samuel Smith, M.P., said:—

"The question of the moment is, will not you and your friends call up those (front bench) spirits from the vasty deep of their present dumb inaction? If they will come when you have called, then another effort may be made to save the commonwealth instead of leaving it to the mercy of the now confused and discredited Jingoos of the India Office and Simla."

Similarly, on September 14, in a leading article headed "Where are the Liberal leaders?" the *Star* wrote:—

"What are the Liberal leaders thinking about? Here, if anywhere, is a matter which deserves their best efforts and which, rightly placed at this time before the country, would, we are very sure, not only check the policy of grab beyond the Indus but also serve to exhibit, and therefore to discredit, the fatuous Jingoism of our present Government all round. Now, if ever, is the time for the Liberal leaders to turn the 'forward' policy inside out and upside down, to trace its history and origin, to describe its purpose, and to display its terrible consequences—especially its consequences to the Indian taxpayers. Men like Colonel Hanna (in his three admirable volumes), Sir Auckland Colvin, Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Adye, and Sir James Lyall, have done the work, and done it brilliantly—on paper. But while they are writing the India Office is acting, and unless public opinion in this country makes itself heard and felt, promptly and on a considerable scale, heaven knows what monstrous policy we may be committed to by the Government of India and the Government of Lord Salisbury."

The same wish was expressed with force and

moderation in an admirable letter by Mr. John Addison, printed in the *Speaker* of September 11. "There is some talk," Mr. Addison wrote, "about calling Parliament together in the autumn for the purpose of taking steps to afford India financial aid, but we may take it for certain that this will not be done if the Government can at all avoid it. But whether Parliament is summoned for an autumn session or not, the country will look for some guidance from the Liberal leaders in reference to the very grave state of affairs which has arisen in India."

"It being obvious (Mr. Addison continued) that we have come to a point in the history of our connection with India which demands some searching enquiry into our methods and rule, Liberals have a right to expect that their leaders will show themselves alive to the importance of the question, and do what in them lies to give the country a lead upon it. . . . Our position in India can only be justified by our rule improving the moral and material condition of the people. If, as some say, it is issuing in the progressive impoverishment of the people, then our rule stands condemned. I express no opinion of my own. All I say is that the time is obviously critical, and that statesmen of light and leading who may be called upon to administer our Indian Empire should be prepared to make an avowal of a clear and a decided policy, and to advocate such a thorough and searching enquiry into the principles and methods of Indian administration as would resolve doubts on such points as those above hinted at, and lead to such reforms—especially economic reforms—as might be found necessary."

We await the response of those "statesmen of light and leading."

It is evident, as Reuter said the other day, that the Indian Government is confronted by a grave crisis "involving heavy expenditure and probably considerable loss of life." But who is to meet this expenditure? As Sir Auckland Colvin asked in a recent article in the *Saturday Review*:—

"Is it the Indian labourer, or the Indian artisan—is it our Indian fellow-subject only—who is to meet this little account? The long foreseen and foretold military bill has fallen due at last, and has been presented with a vengeance. Somehow or other it must be honoured. Serious as the military task now before the Government of India may be, Lord Elgin and his Council will meet with less difficulty, it may be apprehended, in putting down the tribal risings than in finding the resources necessary to defray their cost, without adding materially to the discontent and irritation already too rife among our own Indian fellow-subjects, and having its roots in fiscal pressure and in the growing popular belief of the increasing poverty of India."

The belief has long been general in India that the Imperial Exchequer ought to bear the expense of military aggression beyond the Indus, and this equitable proposal is now beginning to gain ground in the United Kingdom, as the following extracts from the newspaper press may indicate:—

"These operations have been undertaken in defence of



British interests; for extension of British rule; to enlarge the Empire. Yet the over-taxed peasantry of India will have to pay the bill; and if educated natives grumble, they are 'seditious.' Were Parliament's oversight more close, were it compulsory that such military expenditure should come under Parliamentary review, there would be less filibustering on the frontier, and not quite so much provocation of 'sedition.'"—*South Wales Daily News* (September 6).

"The whole system of our administration in India, unique and admirable as it is from many points of view, is being very severely tried by the recent succession of plague, famine, sedition, and insurrection; and if to these is to be added a further drain on the impoverished Indian Exchequer in the form of fitting out a big expedition to bring the Amir to his senses, it will be seen that the burdens on our great Eastern dependency is likely to necessitate our drawing upon Imperial resources for the defence and maintenance of the flower of our Empire. Thus the British taxpayer will learn that the Empire about which he has heard so much this year is not altogether inexpensive to maintain. Dominion and greatness are costly luxuries."—*Newcastle Weekly Chronicle* (August 28).

"There is reason to hope and believe that the Government of India is now awakened to the necessity of really subduing once for all these border tribes. No considerations of expenditure should deter it. If India cannot bear the cost, Britain can."—*Scotsman* (September 2).

We quoted last month Mr. Romesh Chunder Dutt's proposal for a proportionate Imperial contribution to Indian military expenditure, and, unless Lord Welby's Commission ignores the weight of the evidence given before it, it will make a recommendation in that sense. Meantime, it is interesting to note the opinion expressed by Mr. J. M. Maclean, M.P., in an interview reported in the *Western Mail* of August 25:—

"I believe British rule has conferred immense benefits upon India, but, on the other hand, I have seen with grave anxiety the growing tendency there has been of late years to spend Indian money unprofitably and at a distance from the country where it is raised. The territory in which our troops are now operating does not form properly a part of India at all. It is quite outside India. The whole of the revenue, on the other hand, of the Indian Government is raised from the industrious population labouring in the plains of India itself. The peasant of Bengal, or Bombay, or Madras pays for all these frontier expeditions out of his hard-earned and miserable pittance. It is literally true that at the present moment out of fifty millions of net revenue half comes to England to pay the home charges, while, probably, another third is spent on the Army, which is mainly employed in guarding the frontier. Very little of the Indian revenue is spent, in fact, in India at all."

Mr. Maclean added:—

"Of course, there is always the alternative that the Imperial Government will pay for those frontier wars itself, but I have seen no indications that Sir Michael Hicks-Beach is likely to take that responsibility upon himself."

Perhaps not; but Sir Michael Hicks-Beach may have to give way before the necessities of the case.

It is interesting and instructive to note a certain confusion of tongues among the apologists of the policy which the Government of India, acting under in-

structions from Lord George Hamilton, adopted in 1895 in regard to Chitral. Mr. Walter Long, who is President of the Board of Agriculture, and a member of the present Cabinet, said on September 8 last at a Primrose League meeting at Christchurch:—

"We had trouble on the north-western frontier of India, which caused many people anxiety and alarm from fear of a catastrophe. He would not be so rash as to prophesy what might be the result of the difficulties which had arisen there, but we had two securities against any very dangerous development of recent unfortunate episodes. One was that the Government of India was well prepared for any emergency which might arise—well prepared by its own foresight and knowledge of what was possible and probable—and further because we had on the frontier a large and sufficient force, ready at a suitable time and opportunity to teach those rebel tribes who were now endeavouring to repudiate the authority and sovereignty of Great Britain that they were in the wrong, and must bear the punishment."

Lord Elgin's proclamation, which our readers now probably know by heart, promised two years ago that the relief force should be immediately withdrawn from Chitral, and that there should be no permanent occupation of territory or interference with the independence of the tribesmen on the route. Yet these tribesmen, according to a member of Lord Salisbury's Cabinet, are now rebelling against "the authority and sovereignty of Great Britain." Mr. Long has apparently forgotten Lord G. Hamilton's indignant speech of February 17, 1896, in which, replying to Sir W. Wedderburn's allegation that the proclamation had been violated, he said:—

"The proposer of the amendment had accused the Government deliberately of a breach of faith. . . . It was a pure concoction from beginning to end. There was not a word of truth in it. It was not based on one iota of fact. He thought that hon. gentlemen opposite ought to reflect that the Viceroy of India, a high-minded gentleman, was a member of their own party."

Perhaps that rebuke will make Mr. Long feel penitent. But then, again, perhaps it will not. For Mr. Long may observe that in the same speech Lord G. Hamilton said that the Government had occupied Chitral, and made an excellent road from Peshawar to Chitral through the territory of the tribesmen. Indeed, Mr. Long may remark that Lord G. Hamilton in his recent speech on the Indian Budget (August 5) said that we had "extended our sphere of influence over these territories." Does that interfere, or does it not, with the independence of the tribes? Still, Mr. Long's penitence may be encouraged when he finds that on September 2 Sir Mortimer Durand said:—

"One cannot too clearly understand that the frontier tribes who are giving all this trouble are not in British territory, and have not captured any British fort whatever. They occupy a belt of mountain territory lying between India and Afghanistan, and have been for generations independent."

Similarly, Mr. Long may notice that "N" (which sometimes stand for Nathaniel) said in the volu-



minous letter to which the *Times* accorded nearly three columns of large type on September 9:—

"I see it frequently stated that Chitral has been annexed. . . . The State is no more annexed than is Muscat or Zanzibar. The only difference between the present and the former systems is that the British connexion with the country . . . is now permanent instead of fluctuating."

And yet, and yet, the diligent seeker after truth will not even now have found it, pure and undefiled. For in the Queen's Speech delivered to Parliament on February 11, 1896, occurred these words:—

"On the North-West frontier of my Indian Empire the measures taken last year to secure an effective control over Chitral have been successful."

On the whole, we fancy that Mr. Long may be disposed to stick to his guns and to say that the *Manchester Guardian* was quite accurate when it wrote:—

"The truth is that Lord George Hamilton tried to disguise, and Mr. Long has blurted out, the way in which the Jingo party in the Ministry regarded the affair of the proclamation. They held that 'reasons of State' excused the breaking of a British promise, and so they broke it, and now they feel that the time has come when they can safely own that they broke it. Mr. Long in a single sentence admits all that Lord George Hamilton made a long speech to conceal."

The tribesmen themselves, we may add, have shown by their conduct that they are not prepared either to split hairs about the differences between "retention," "occupation" and "annexation," or to accept without a struggle "independence" tempered by fortified posts, a military road, a British "sphere of influence," "permanent connexion" and "effective control." That is because the unfortunate tribesmen have not been brought up in the bracing atmosphere of political departments and military diplomacy.

MR. S. H. SWINNY writes:—Almost alone among English statesmen of the eighteenth century Burke is still quoted as an authority on public affairs. The splendour of his style may account for something of this, as may also the deep philosophic insight and the wide views that were even a hindrance to him in the narrow party conflicts of his own time. But this would not be enough to explain his unique position. The truth is that he has been accepted as the prophet of all that distrust of democracy which has grown up since the failure of the French Revolution cheated the hopes of the Western world. All who cling to the old ways, who doubt the possibilities of violent regeneration, and who shrink from the sacrifices that such a regeneration must entail, find in Burke, with his love of the old, the habitual, and the familiar, and his hatred of present suffering inflicted in the name of general theories and problematic advantages, just that support which their cause lacks, just those broad views necessary to save

it from the taint of narrowness and self-interest. In spite of all that the friends of the Revolution have said, in spite of the efforts to divide his life into two distinct periods of light and darkness, there have been few more consistent careers than his. From the beginning he distrusted the critical spirit that would have everything by reason and nothing by tradition. In his early life he defended the Constitution against the new methods of the king and his friends. In his later life he defended it against the new principles of the French Revolution. But whether he was fighting against the theory of a Patriot King, or the theory of the Rights of Man, he always took up his ground on tradition and precedent, custom and common-sense. And if he was thus blind to the courage, devotion, and high hopes inspired by the Revolution, if he failed to sympathise with these fierce efforts to begin a new reign of justice on earth, is it surprising that he felt nothing but horror for those whose violence had no excuse but the lust for territory, and who destroyed the venerable civilisations of the East to gratify the trader and the buccaneer? Thus there is one point where the modern admirers of his anti-revolutionary polemic part company with Burke; he was no lover of the Empire. He feared for England the over-confidence bred of power, and he foresaw the hatred to which that power would give rise. Above all he had no belief in the forcible introduction of European thought and institutions to undermine those older civilisations that still directed the lives of millions. Nor was this distrust of Empire and imperial ways the idle fancy of callow youth or disappointed age. At his first entry into Parliament he protested against the taxation of the American colonies; in his prime he supported the peace by which those colonies were lost to England for ever; he spent years in the prosecution of Warren Hastings; and finally, in the last scene, amid his embittered attacks on the French Revolution, he recurs to the same theme. This is how he speaks in his "Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with respect to France," written when he was the idol of the Tories:

"I must fairly say I dread our *own* power, and our *own* ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. . . . Can we say that even at this very hour we are not invidiously aggrandised? We are already in possession of almost all the commerce of the world. Our Empire in India is an awful thing. If we should come to be in a condition not only to have all this ascendancy in commerce, but to be absolutely able, without the least control, to hold the commerce of all other nations totally dependent upon our good pleasure, we may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard-of power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin."

"Our Empire in India is an awful thing." Is it



less awful to-day, when a steady drain of millions has been substituted for the occasional pillage of an unscrupulous official, when the manufactures of the country have been ruined, when the people are poorer in peace than they were formerly in war, and when the stirring of Western ideas of liberty mocks the sufferings of the slaves of our Imperial rule? But now there is no Burke to give voice in England to the miseries of India.

Wanted: THE *Times* of September 23 printed the Simultaneous list of the successful candidates in the Examinations. recent examination for appointments in the Civil Service of India as follows:—

Name.	Total Marks.	Name.	Total Marks.
William Arthur Robinson...	3,495	Pestonjee Sorabjee Patuck	2,141
Douglas Dewar .....	3,237	James Alexander Bathurst	2,105
James Wallace Peck .....	3,163	Edmund Vivian Gabriel ...	2,096
Alexander Fiddian .....	3,025	Frank Brodie Sherring .....	2,093
Robert Lindsay Ross .....	2,995	Joseph Vas .....	2,082
Charles Cunningham Watson	2,662	Arthur William Watson .....	2,073
Maurice Lyndham Waller .....	2,765	Richard Clifford Tute .....	2,051
Henry Alford Anthony Cruso	2,719	Edward John Colston .....	2,044
Frederick Buisson Evans .....	2,654	Arthur Harold Wolter Ben-	
Joseph Beardsell Crosland...	2,602	tinck .....	1,995
Eustace Alexander Acworth		Charles Leslie Alexander .....	1,988
Joseph .....	2,537	George Douglas French .....	1,935
David Fhearme .....	2,522	Frank Bradley Birt .....	1,972
John William Stewart Ander-		Lawrence Morley Stubbs .....	1,968
son .....	2,518	Oswald Farquhar Lumsden	1,964
George Herbert Stoker .....	2,517	Hubert Calvert .....	1,963
Lewis Sidney Steward		Richard Arthur Jenkins .....	1,962
O'Malley .....	2,461	Edwin George Lister Laird-	
Charles John Trench Bedford		MacGregor .....	1,953
Grylls .....	2,388	Michael Keane .....	1,952
Alexander Macgregor .....	2,385	Horatio Norman Bolton .....	1,951
Roderick Geikie .....	2,367	Albert Penderick Charles .....	1,939
Charles Alexander Innes .....	2,365	Charles Frederick Payne .....	1,932
Alan Daniel Brown .....	2,345	Arthur William Botham .....	1,931
Stewart Edmund Peare .....	2,335	Juanendra Nath Roy .....	1,911
Philip Longueville Barker .....	2,320	George John Monahan .....	1,886
Frederick John Richards .....	2,309	Frederick Walter Kennaway	1,881
Arthur Mellor .....	2,302	Leonard Birley .....	1,854
Henry Lewis Stevenson .....	2,261	Crews Armand Hamilton	
Alexander Phillips Muddi-		Townsend .....	1,851
man .....	2,226	Henry Aupère Leggett .....	1,847
Wilfrid Owen Alcock .....	2,216	Edward Hugh Rhodes .....	1,846
Harold Edward Lawrence .....	2,204	Leonard William Reynolds	1,839
William Gaskell .....	2,200	Arthur William Dentith .....	1,832
Hugh Rosser Bardswell .....	2,195	Harold Frederick Ellwood	
Basil Theodore Gibson .....	2,168	Bell .....	1,829
Leslie Maurice Crump .....	2,162	Harold Anselm Bellamy	
Charles Frederick Usborne	2,145	Vernon .....	1,826

It would seem that of the 66 successful candidates only 2 are Indians! The fact illustrates the success, such as it is, of the opposition to simultaneous examinations, which the House of Commons has approved but which the Government of India steadily declines to adopt. In theory, Indians are equally eligible with Englishmen for posts in the Indian Civil Service. In fact, all but a very few Indians are barred by the refusal of the authorities to hold the examination in India as well as in London. It goes without saying that none but rich Indians can send their sons to England on the mere chance that they may be successful in the preliminary examination, and it is precisely for this reason that the present iniquitous system is upheld. How ill English performance in this matter squares with English promises, every candid observer sees at a glance; and how disadvantageous the present system is to the public service may be gathered from the heavy falling-off in marks towards the end of the

above list. Nobody supposes that simultaneous examinations would not show a higher average of intellectual attainment among successful candidates.

THE annual summary of the administration of the State of Gondal for Progress in Gondal.

1896-97 is a very satisfactory and encouraging record of steady and useful progress. There is a healthy absence of high colour in its complexion, and the tone is serious and justifiably hopeful. There is acknowledged room for improvement in the general condition of the population, for the cultivators, the bulk of the people, are stated to be only in "fair" circumstances, while the tradesmen's position is described as "moderate." The State was happily unvisited by the famine, or by the plague, the authorities having taken prompt measures against the invasion of both calamities. The indirect effects of the famine, however, made themselves felt, all the more by reason of the harvests having fallen somewhat below the average. The abnormal rise in grain prices, though lining the pockets of some traders, pinched the poorer classes dependent on wages or limited earnings. The State, however, came forward with timely assistance. It remitted duty on juvari and bajri (staple food) imported from outside Kathiawar; it opened relief works on a liberal regulation scale; and it paid a grain compensation allowance to all State-servants under a certain salary. His Highness at the same time contributed a good sum to the Bombay Relief Fund in recognition of the interdependence of the whole Presidency. Here and there we are told that the figures for last year were incorrectly given. We regard it as a sign of honesty and common sense when such blunders are officially admitted.

THE land of Gondal is nearly all under cultivation, and the culturable waste, not very extensive, will soon be re-

claimed if the advance of the past year be maintained. It is reported that the Vighoti, or cash assessment, introduced three years back in place of the Bhagvatai system, continues to work satisfactorily. The rayat is said to be quite satisfied with it, being able to transfer his occupancy right at pleasure, and to pocket the whole value of his improvements. Still, there must be a certain number of grasping men about, and a certain number of improvident rayats. There is good reason, therefore, to watch over the operation of the system. If we understand the table aright, it appears that there has been an increase of transfers of land by sale and mortgage to Khedus both absolutely and relatively to the transfers to non-Khedus. This fact, unless we misunderstand the statement, emphasises the necessity for vigilance to prevent the setting in of a disastrous



current of land ownership. The revenue keeps distinctly on the right side, and the settlement of villages is slowly advancing. More wells have been dug, with great advantage, wells being the only mode of irrigation. The sugar-cane cultivation is steadily and largely decreasing before the superior profitableness of cotton, which is the staple produce of the State, and is growing rapidly. Two ginning factories were added last year to the three already in operation, and a sixth is under consideration; and a full-press has been set up at Dhoraji by an enterprising Parsi of Bombay. State encouragement has also been given to the erection of a spinning and weaving mill at Gondal. There seems to be active movement in other manufactures, too, care being taken to foster local aptitudes and endeavours.

Public Works and Justice. THERE is active progress upon a fresh scheme for bringing into Gondal town an ample supply of good drinking water, in supplement, if not supersession, of the existing supply, which is wholly derived from wells and from the river. This enterprise is calculated to run to three lakhs of rupees. It will prove a great boon to the townspeople, especially in the dry weather. The Grasia College building is practically ready for occupation. It is to be run on Western models, and His Highness has appointed to the principalship Mr. S. A. Moor, a distinguished graduate of Cambridge, with special qualifications in science subjects. It is worth noting that the building was wholly designed by, and constructed under the supervision of, the State engineer, Mr. Balabhai Gulabchand. The careful utilisation of local ability is much to be commended. Another wise project is the steady encouragement given to tree-planting, Babul trees being now frequent in the neighbourhood of almost all the villages, as well as in the waste land. These trees are coming more into demand for fuel for the factories. The record of the administration of justice is very satisfactory in all its branches. The health department is also very efficiently managed, as might be expected from the medical training of His Highness the Thakore. Ample evidence of the progress of education is furnished by the fact that the school houses in the principal towns are full and pressing for enlargement. The Thakore may be cordially congratulated on the admirable example he affords to other Native States, and on the credit he does to his country in the eyes of English observers.

Indians in South Africa. THERE has recently been issued to Parliament a paper entitled "Proceedings of a Conference between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premiers of the Self-governing Colonies at the Colonial Office,

London, June and July, 1897." It consists chiefly of an able speech on questions of Colonial policy by Mr. Chamberlain, in the course of which he deals in a liberal and statesmanlike manner with the vexed question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain's remarks are worth quoting at some length, not only because they express with real eloquence the proper Imperial attitude in this matter, but also because they afford clear evidence of the Colonial Secretary's sympathy with this particular Indian grievance. In the first place, speaking of the Alien Immigration Bills, Mr. Chamberlain says with simple directness:—

"I have seen these Bills . . . but there is no one of them, except perhaps the Bill which comes to us from Natal, to which we can look with satisfaction."

Again, after pointing out that communities had a certain right to protect themselves against alien immigration which would "seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labour population," Mr. Chamberlain reminded his hearers of the traditions of the Empire, which professes to make no distinction in favour of, or against, race or colour, adding these notable words:—

"The United Kingdom owns as its brightest and greatest dependency that enormous Empire of India, with 300,000,000 of subjects, who are loyal to the Crown as you are yourselves, and among them are hundreds and thousands of men who are every whit as civilised as we are ourselves, who are, if that is anything, better born in the sense that they have older traditions and older families, who are men of wealth, men of cultivation, men of distinguished valour, men who have brought whole armies and placed them at the service of the Queen, and have in times of great difficulty and trouble, such for instance as on the occasion of the Indian Mutiny, saved the Empire by their loyalty. I say, you who have seen all this, cannot be willing to put upon those men a slight which I think is absolutely unnecessary for your purpose, and which would be calculated to provoke ill-feeling, discontent, irritation and would be most unpalatable to the feelings not only of Her Majesty the Queen, but of all her people."

Finally, Mr. Chamberlain indicated clearly the only legitimate grounds upon which a State may object to alien immigration.

"What I venture to think you have to deal with is the character of the immigration. It is not because a man is of a different colour from ourselves that he is necessarily an undesirable immigrant, but it is because he is dirty, or he is immoral, or he is a pauper, or he has some other objection which can be defined in an Act of Parliament, and by which the exclusion can be managed with regard to all those whom you really desire to exclude."

These are wise words. You must not generalise against a race, or a colour, or a creed. Each individual immigrant must be judged on his merits. We trust that the Colonial Premiers concerned will ponder well these passages from Mr. Chamberlain's speech and that the Colonial Parliaments will recast their Bills in a form which self-respecting British communities may not be secretly ashamed to pass into law.



## THE "FROWARD" FOLLY.

I.—BY PROFESSOR A. F. MURISON, LL.D.

Not on "manifest destiny," but on the Tory party, rests the grave responsibility for the frontier policy that is steadily driving us onward to meet Russia in Central Asia. The Indian Secretary who inaugurated the new departure was Lord Salisbury, but probably he was little more than a pliant agent in the stronger hands of Lord Beaconsfield, who professed to have been "influenced" by "information" from Lord Napier of Magdala. In spite of the steadfast resistance offered by the Government of India over a period of two years, the baneful change was definitively effected with the appointment of Lord Lytton to the viceroyalty. The history of Lord Lytton's government is burnt into living memory by the pitiful treatment of Amir Shere Ali and the miseries and consequences of the second Afghan war. True, the Liberals made strong attempts to overcome the mistakes of their predecessors, and, in Lord Ripon's time especially, we drew back at most points. The root blunder, however, was that we did not boldly and definitively re-confine ourselves to the natural and impregnable line of the Indus Valley. No doubt, it needed an exceptionally powerful statesman to rase the fortifications of Quetta, but, if the right thing is to be done at all, it must be done thoroughly. It stands to the credit of the Liberals that they ordered withdrawal from Chitral and from the whole line of communication through the Swat valley. It seems beyond doubt that the reversal of that order by the present Government is the immediate and sufficient cause for the existing turmoil beyond the frontier. The Tories are responsible for the unfortunate projection of India into the arena of party conflict; and the Liberals will bear no less heavy a responsibility unless they now take up the challenge with all their strength. There is no other question of anything like equal magnitude and urgency before our statesmen to-day.

In these columns I have already been permitted to draw attention to the material difference between the conditions of India to-day and the conditions recognised by Sir Henry Rawlinson in 1874-75 as the favourable basis for his approval, in a very qualified form, of the projects of General Jacob. That difference might well give pause to the promoters and abettors of this "Froward" policy. If that consideration were not sufficient, a comparison of the results during the past twenty years with the experience of the period preceding might well be supposed to be calculated to induce at least hesitation. From the circumstances of the case, it is not to be expected that such a borderland could be kept quiet without occasional brushes with ignorant, headstrong, and venturesome tribesmen, and even without occasional expeditions to mete out specific punishment. But this is a very different matter from a course of perennial warfare that has been calculated by Colonel Hanna—and the calculation is probably as nearly accurate as it can be made on the insufficient accounts available—to have cost India more than 700,000,000 rupees, before the

commencement of the present extensive and expensive operations, the end of which is not yet in sight, or even within probable forecast. The further question remains, Where are we going? At what point do we propose to stop? The answer does not seem to be very difficult, but it would be interesting to know whether the responsible authorities have definitively formulated it in their minds.

The answer is necessarily determined by the operative cause of the frontier advance. That cause is, beyond all question, the activity of Russian conquest in Central Asia. But for this, we should, in all probability, even in spite of the severe strain of military ambitions in the Indian army, still have remained content to protect the Indus frontier in the old way with a handful of Frontier Militia and with conciliatory but firm dealings with the tribesmen. Lord Salisbury, in his despatch of January 22, 1875, initiating the disastrous change of policy, started from the position that "though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in those regions (the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan), the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution." If any proof were needful to show that Lord Salisbury had Russia in his mind—what other bugbear, indeed, could he possibly have had in his mind?—such proof is ready to hand. Lord Salisbury wrote explicitly to Lord Northbrook on November 19, 1875, that "the question has been clothed with an importance it never possessed before by the recent advances of Russia." On January 28, 1876, the Indian Government replied that "at present we are in possession of no information which leads us to look upon Russian interference in Afghanistan as a probable or near contingency, or to anticipate that the Russian Government will deviate from the policy of non-extension so recently declared." The warning of the Indian Government, however, that the projected action would be "a most impolitic and dangerous movement" was destined to be ignored; on the very day it was penned, Lord Salisbury had drawn up instructions to Lord Lytton containing this clause:—

"7. The maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and friendly Power has at all times been the object of British policy. The attainment of this object is now to be considered with due reference to the situation created by the recent and rapid advance of the Russian arms in Central Asia towards the northern frontier of British India. Her Majesty's Government cannot view with complete indifference the probable influence of that situation upon the uncertain character of an Oriental chief whose ill-defined dominions are thus brought within a steadily narrowing circle, between the conflicting pressures of two great military Empires, one of which expostulates and remains passive, while the other apologises and continues to move forward."

Later declarations of Lord Beaconsfield in the same sense, and in the most explicit terms, can readily be quoted. Thus, on December 10, 1878, on Lord Cranbrook's motion for the consent of Parliament to the application of the Indian revenues to the payment of the expedition against the Amir, he said, "things would have gone on, I daresay, as they had gone on for twenty-eight years, had it not been for the sudden appearance of Russia in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan." It seems im-



possible, then, that anything can be plainer than that the enemy is Russia.

Where are we going, then? The answer is that we are going to meet Russia. We have stretched our hand over Beluchistan, and we dominate the frontier on that side by the enormous post at Quetta. We have roped in the country up to Tal-Chotiali, which has its advocates as a place of arms even superior to Quetta, and as a point whence it is much easier to march an army upon Kandahar, and a place therefore demanding a railway (estimated in 1891-92 at nearly Rs. 50,000,000) from the plains. We retain hold of Chitral and the Swat road, with the ridiculous object of preventing the approach or interference of Russia from that side; while, by the way, we have thrown Kafiristan on our flank into the hands of the Amír, without right or title on our part or on his. We have also taken into our "sphere of influence" almost the whole of the rest of the frontier tribes, and this sphere of influence is in rapid process of conversion into actual sovereignty. How those seventy or eighty thousand square miles of mountains, and those 200,000 "fanatical" mountaineers, are to be held and managed is a future day-and-night-mare for Sir James Westland. Anyhow, we thus get into full touch with Afghanistan. And what does that mean? It means that it will be impossible for us, do as we may, to keep the frontier without constant offence to the Amír. Of course, we shall be able to take our own way with the Amír, and to punish him if he is so ill-advised as to question the justice of our dealings with him in the settlement of frontier quarrels. But it is certain that every step we take towards his country will arouse his deeper and deeper suspicion of our purposes, and it will be something of the nature of a miracle if he be not at last driven—driven by our demented selves—to look to Russia for a last possibility of preservation. The outcome seems inevitably to be the smashing of the earthen pipkin between the two iron pots, and the division of the Amír's kingdom between England and Russia. Then England and Russia will glare at each other across the Oxus river; and the two countries will be at the mercy of the stupidest or most ambitious officer on this out-of-the-way frontier, and every lying report will turn the minds of both on war. So much for a "scientific" frontier!

Is there any man so sanguine as to suppose that England and Russia will co-operate amicably in the civilisation of Central Asia? Will political rivalry and national antipathies drift harmlessly down the Oxus? The key to this problem is found in the yet deeper reasons for the Russian advance. The unconcealed object of Russian weltering in Central Asia is neither civilisation nor aggression on the Indian Empire, but the maintenance of an effective engine for the counteraction of England in the diplomatic controversies of the Eastern Question in Europe. Lord Beaconsfield, on his side, openly recognised this fact in the speech of December 10, 1878, already referred to.

"What I want to impress on your lordships," he said, "is, that you should not misapprehend the issue on which you have to decide. It is a very grave one. It is not a question of the Khyber Pass merely, and of some small cantonments at

Dakka or at Jellalabad. *It is a question which concerns the character and the influence of England in Europe.*"

The point of view has not shifted since then. The march of events has only tended to render the diplomatic ruse increasingly dangerous to peace. Are we to fight Russia, then, on the banks of the Oxus? That is the plain question that lies before us, and it is useless to mince words over it. Yes or No? Lord Beaconsfield, there is very good reason to believe, did intend to do so in 1878. Does Lord Salisbury remain still of the same opinion? What does Sir James Westland think of the project? And has the English public considered the possibility at all?

Meantime, what do our authorities picture to themselves as the state of things down in India beyond the Indus? The rectification and the maintenance of the frontier will have to be paid for out of the Indian treasury, for any contribution that England may make for the look of the thing—and by reason of the European origin of the expenditure—need hardly be considered. How is this achievement to be accomplished? We know how the treasury has been harassed for years past; we know something of the effects of the famine and the plague; and we know that taxation is admitted even in official quarters to have reached its practical limits, and, in the opinion of dispassionate observers, to have exceeded them. I have already pointed out how the difficulties of the treasury have affected adversely the commerce and the internal development of the country, and touched more or less directly or indirectly the whole population. And while these difficulties have been working out their socially pernicious effects to the verge of political danger, they are to be traced mainly, if not wholly, to the adventurous policy of the Government. Putting the case in another point of view, if it were not for the expenditure necessarily involved in maintaining the "Froward" policy, the financial stringency would no longer be felt. If, then, the finances are dangerously strained now, what is it to be supposed will be their condition when English and Russian officers are eyeing each other across the Oxus? If the finances now prevent the Government from providing an adequate and prompt supply of transport and a safe minimum of regimental officers, what is to be done when we have on our hands the administration of the frontier hills, with a force adequate to cope with Russia quartered on the Oxus, scores of leagues—hundreds of miles—away from our base? Assume the most favourable conditions, and then answer what is to be done? But, on the other hand, assume unfavourable conditions of an easily possible character. Are we quite sure that the pressure of frontier adventure will be lightly borne by the submissive population of India? We have had dire experience of a military mutiny. There is a very different thing that we have not yet experienced, and that is an insurrection of the people. To ignore such a contingency may be patriotic, but, whatever the authorities may think, it is the ostrich-like proceeding of hiding one's head in the sand. The frontier policy is charged with the fate of the Indian Empire.

There is but one means of reducing Russia to



powerlessness, and that is the spectacle of a prosperous, contented, loyal, and therefore unassailable India. The first step towards the attainment of this end must be the pacification of the border and the withdrawal of our forces to the last man within the Indus frontier, resting on Jacobabad and Multan, Peshawar and Rawal Pindi. Then would commence a vast conservation of the finances and an unknown expansion of internal prosperity and contentment. Our power to maintain a "strong, friendly and independent" Afghanistan would be indefinitely increased by the fresh access of strength. There need not be the slightest tremor of discomfort, let Russia do her worst in Central Asia. If the watchmen at the military passes are not alive to their duty, if the desert furnishes footing to any enemy that is negligently allowed to issue on the plain, if further negligence permits such enemy to cross the Indus—then it will be time for us to pack up and come home. But no enemy—Russian or other—can possibly pass the threefold barrier of mountain, desert, and river—or indeed the first—without an English conspiracy of criminal negligence or folly that is beyond rational conception.

## II.—BY PROFESSOR E. S. BEESLY.<sup>1</sup>

We have had numerous little wars in these regions, but hitherto they have come one at a time. The tribes have been as much at feud with one another as with us. Now for the first time a common fear for their independence seems to have impelled them to something like combined action. We were assured at first that the sudden attack on Colonel Meiklejohn at Malakand had nothing to do with the sudden attack on Mr. Gee at Dotoi; and the Indian Government could hardly believe the announcement that the Afridis of the Khyber had summoned us to retire from the valley of the Swat. To account for such unprecedented concert it was imagined that the Amir in the background must be pulling many strings, or even that the connecting link was to be looked for at Constantinople. "We ought to have been more civil to the Sultan," cries the *Times*. "We ought to have bombarded him," retorts the *Spectator*. Any hypothesis is more acceptable than the simple one that our adoption of the "forward" policy all along the frontier has aroused resistance all along the frontier. . . .

To the adoption of this fatal policy several motives have contributed. Soldiers are always eager for opportunities of distinguishing themselves. Sir Lepel Griffin says that if these little wars did not arise naturally we should have to manufacture them in order to keep our army in training. The *Spectator* holds that "an active administrator would not be worth much if his fingers did not itch to be putting an end to the anarchy over the border." No doubt all these motives count for something. But they have existed ever since the Peshawar district became a part of British India, that is to say from 1848; yet the able administrators of an older school knew how to bridle these restless ambitions. How is it

that the advocates of the "forward" policy have been gradually getting the upper hand during the last twenty years?

The explanation is to be looked for in England rather than in India. Anglo-Indian administrators if left to themselves would have continued to keep the soldiers in check. In 1874 the Government of the Empire fell into the hands of Disraeli. During the six years of his reign he devoted himself to stimulating the worst instincts of Englishmen and turning them from ideas of peaceful progress to those of conquest and empire. Certainly he was not alone in this work of corruption. But no single individual had so large a part in it. In 1876 he prevailed upon a reluctant Parliament to give the Queen the foolish title of "Empress of India" and sent out Lord Lytton as Viceroy with instructions to force a quarrel on Afghanistan. The two years' war with that country is now universally acknowledged to have been a disastrous blunder. For some time the "forward" policy was discredited and succeeding Viceroys have laboured, though not very successfully, to convince the Amir that we have abandoned all designs against his independence. But with this exception the bad traditions of Disraeli are again in the ascendant. The interests of India, which lie entirely in peace and economy, are ruthlessly sacrificed to an insane preparation for a duel with Russia. The military party have it all their own way. All along the frontier there are constant encroachments, not indeed on the actual territory of the Amir but on the independent mountain tribes whom he regards as a barrier between his dominions and ours. No information as to his feelings is needed. They can be of only one sort. It is not at all likely that he incited the tribes to this outbreak; but he *must* wish them success. If this heavily subsidised ally chose to co-operate with us the tribal outbreak would collapse at once. But we do not claim his assistance because he would certainly not give it. We are obliged to be content with his ostensible neutrality. . . .

We need not doubt that the insurgent tribes will be defeated and punished—more or less. Waziris and Orakzais, Afridis and Mohmands will be slaughtered by thousands, dying like brave men in defence of their glens and mountains. Their villages will be burnt and their women and children will perish by starvation. Whether their subjugation will be so complete as to enable the partisans of the "forward" policy to carry out their project of a permanent British occupation of the territory is far from being so certain; not because the Viceroy has just assured the Amir that it shall not be done—for our retention of the road to Chitral has recently shown what a Viceroy's pledges are worth—but because it would mean, if Colonel Hanna is to be believed, "the location of at least 40,000 troops in those miserable and unhealthy regions, every man of that number costing India three times what she has to pay for him within her true limits."

Here lies the insanity of the proceeding. All this risk of military disaster is being run to gain what at the best will be a ruinous loss. When Lord G. Hamilton made his financial statement on August 5 he announced that he would have to borrow

<sup>1</sup>By the courtesy of Professor Beesly we are enabled to print these passages from his article in the October issue of the *Positivist Review*.—ED. "INDIA."



£8,000,000. How much more does he want by this time? The *Spectator* says that "the risk of bankruptcy is as remote as that of a Russian attack." If the writer sincerely believes that, it must be because he counts on the British tax-payer to make good the Indian deficit. It is very likely that some such proposal will be made by the Government before we are many months older.

We are told that when the "forward" policy is held to be necessary by the responsible authorities in India it does not become ignorant persons in England to criticise it. I reply that the "forward" policy was born and bred in England and exported to India. But for the insane jingoism rife among ignorant persons in England the partisans of the "forward" policy in India would have continued to be over-ruled as they were when Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook were Viceroys. India is now governed from London. Indian officials who dissent from the views now in favour find they do not get on. The frank expression of opinion from subordinates, to superiors, which used to be encouraged and was such a valuable tradition of the Indian Civil Service, no longer prevails. The way to promotion lies in professing agreement with the dominant policy, or at all events in holding your tongue. Of a piece with this is the unwise determination to silence the native press, almost the only means our officials have of observing the tone of native opinion and feeling. This is a system of government which in the long run has never proved successful anywhere. Least of all is it adapted to a country where the rulers are aliens and there is an entire absence of confidence and sympathy between their narrow circle and the vast populations they administer.

Nowadays it is only from *retired* Anglo-Indians that we can expect to hear a freely expressed judgement. Those who have still much to hope and much to fear from the Government of the day only open their mouths to support the Government of the day. And that Government is no longer to be found at Calcutta, but at Whitehall. The Viceroy has become the mere mouthpiece of an English Ministry placed in office by the readers of English newspapers. Let no Englishman, therefore, who hates militarism shrink from expressing his opinion on Indian questions because he has not an Indian experience. For he will be resisting opinion no better informed, at any rate, than his own, and biassed by a sentiment which at the present day is retrogressive and anti-social. . . .

### III.—By J. DACOSTA.

An article in the *Times* of September 6 under the heading "Indian Affairs" professes to explain the actual situation prevailing beyond the North-West frontier of India. The writer, dividing the disturbed tribal territories into four sections, admits that three of them had been brought within the sphere of our "forward policy," but contends that the fourth section, inhabited by the Orakzais, the Afridis and the Mohmands, had been more or less excluded from it. The difference here referred to amounts merely to the fact that, whereas British forces were employed in attempts to subjugate the other tribes,

subsidies and diplomacy were chiefly used for obtaining the submission of the three tribes above-named. But both methods involved for the tribes concerned the loss of their ancient and fanatically cherished independence, a circumstance which explains their equally persistent resistance which frustrated our designs.

The present situation might perhaps more accurately be described as a war waged by us for the subjugation of the Afghan tribes in pursuance of the "forward policy" of 1876, aiming at the conquest of Afghanistan and the subjection of its ruler to the control of the British Government. Referring to the subsequent period, the writer in the *Times* observes that in Lord Lytton's time the forward policy aimed at our holding Kandahar, Kuram and Jellalabad; but that in 1880-81—that is, when the war entered upon for the execution of that policy had come to a disastrous termination—we withdrew from these positions and fell back upon Jacobabad as our frontier post, thus retiring within the boundaries of our own territories. In 1885, however, the British Cabinet, availing itself of the scare caused by the Penjdeh affair, revived the "forward policy" and employed a series of expeditions in fresh attempts to subjugate the border-tribes of Afghanistan, and to open out roads leading to the heart of that kingdom. And these are still the objects pursued in the present war—a war essentially aggressive on our part, nowise connected with the defence of our frontier and entirely opposed to Lord Roberts's opinion expressed under official responsibility when he was in a position to entertain a correct judgement on the point. He said in his despatch of May, 1880:—

"We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be flattering to our *amour propre*; but I feel that I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests, if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."

Should the present war enable us to achieve the long attempted subjugation of the border-tribes and to advance our frontier into Afghanistan, the reader should remember that in the opinion of our highest military authorities, India would then lose the impregnable frontier she possessed before the inauguration of the "forward policy," and be subjected at the same time to crushing financial burdens in order to defray the cost of holding the difficult and barren tracts which would be brought within her external frontier.

The issue of the war is still involved in doubt. But recent telegrams show that its cost in treasure and bloodshed is certain to be very great and that the hostile feelings of our tribal neighbours will be much intensified by the strife.

Englishmen should also bear in mind that the revenues of India are being illegally applied to defray military operations carried on beyond her external frontier, and that the war which is being waged has not been justified to the representatives of the nation, whose legitimate control over it was neutralised because the necessary supplies were obtained without the sanction or consent of Parliament.



## THE WAR BEYOND THE NORTH- WEST FRONTIER.

FRUITS OF THE "FROWARD" POLICY.

DESIGNS MATURING FOR THE FUTURE.

A BILL FOR THE BRITISH EXCHEQUER.

WHERE ARE THE LIBERAL LEADERS?

EXPERTS HOSTILE TO AGGRESSION.

THE specially retained advocates of the "Froward" policy have been very circumspect in dealing with that "kittle cattle" the British public. None know better than they that the continuous flare of "fanaticism"—that is, despairing patriotism—which began in Waziristan two years since, again in June of this year, presently followed by attacks in force on the Malakand and Chakdara fortified posts, and succeeded by the sealing up of the Khyber and even threats on Peshawar, signified the utter breakdown of their own aggressive operations, more especially since the Kabul transaction of 1893. Therefore the inner circle of experts lay low whilst indiscreet outsiders, such as Lord Roberts and Sir Robert Low, were giving their case away with soldierly frankness. As rising and revolt ran along the whole line even down to the Beluchis, this striking object-lesson was confirmed and punctuated by those of the old-fashioned, stand-fast order whose sage counsel and earnest remonstrances are in part recorded in the following columns. The next stage was when the conflicts of our skilled troops with the half-armed but recklessly brave tribesmen brought out in the telegrams stories of those heroic deeds of endurance and gallantry which are always shown by British and British-led troops, and thrust aside from the public mind the essential questions as to how this fearful struggle had arisen and who had been responsible for its causes and origin. Then the inner circle began to see a fresh chance to hide and confuse these questions. Apart from a few shame-faced assertions deftly inserted in leading articles, the first of the special emissaries, with the modest signature of "N" was given a couple of large type columns in the *Times* wherein to suggest that "the entire question of our frontier administration may come under revision;" and he urged that the public should not "sink dismayed from the inevitable obligations of Empire." This was followed in the *Standard* by specially subtle but more ominous indications of the secret counsels of the India Office. Then we had a bluff combatant in the *Pall Mall Gazette* trying to make believe that this rising throughout eastern Afghanistan is merely a recrudescence of former "frontier" raids and forays, but also disclosing the great scheme now maturing, described in his specious phrase, "the construction of [fortified] roads [to] introduce the first seeds of "civilisation among the mountains." Now to summarise the present position of these "forward" experts and "civilisers" with other people's money: their phrase, quoted above, "our frontier adminis-

"tration," is a gross and impudent sophism, with intent to deceive. The schemes now in hand have nothing to do with the "frontier" of British India. The designs now obviously being concocted in secret conclave will be found, when the confiding public shall get ready to bear the full disclosure, to include a gigantic project of absolute and permanent subjugation of tens of thousands of square miles of barren mountain regions far away from the borders of India, the cost of which in millions on millions no statistician can compute, with a perpetuation that no politician can limit of confusion and misery within our Indian Empire, and burdens incalculable on its helpless peoples. But, as these burdens can no longer be borne, the British Treasury and the British taxpayer will have to share them to the tune of several millions annually. Thus, at last, the only Indian "catastrophe" that our public men can really understand is already imminent. So, again, and at the eleventh hour, the question is asked, Where are our independent and masterful statesmen? If they do not wake up this very month, they will be too LATE—a legend which has aforetime sounded the knell of empires.

### OPINIONS OF EXPERTS.

GENERAL SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

(*Saturday Review*, September 18.)

The "forward policy" has not been long in coming to judgement. To-day's telegram (September 15) informs the public that 59,000 men, with 90 guns, including Maxims are now engaged in the defence of the frontier. Already the blood of thousands of our self-made enemies stains their mountains beyond our territory, and yet the tribesmen must still shed their blood, and their widows and orphans cry aloud to heaven before British prestige can be satisfied. And what has brought about all this strife and carnage, and the depletion of a well-nigh exhausted treasury? Has it for object the subjugation of the tribesmen who have been free from generation to generation, and who—as freemen—rendered untold service to the English cause in 1857? Or is it towards the realisation of the "scientific frontier" of Disraeli? Or has it for aim the long-cherished object of the most forward of the forward party towards the establishing of British garrisons in Cabul, Ghuznee, Candahar, and Herat?

If 59,000 men and 90 guns are needed to coerce the ill-armed, unorganised tribesmen, it only requires a simple calculation to show the call that will have to be made upon the resources of India before the scientific frontier is nominally established, and the Amir of Cabul driven bag and baggage out of Afghanistan. This is no idle hypothesis, for travellers returning from India are full of the preparations already made at Quetta and Peshawar for eventualities that may any day arise in Afghanistan, or upon the death of Abdur Rahman. Such preparations are better known to the Amir and his subjects than to our own people, and is it possible that such a state of affairs can tend to allay distrust or foster friendship? It is the unceasing encroachments along the whole border and the restless activity of military preparations that has given force to the exhortations of the "mad Mullahs" and made the tribesmen rise in arms.

It is time that the nation took the matter in hand, or it may be dragged by the Government, whether it wishes it or not, into future interminable frontier difficulties. Party tactics must be set aside, the whole root of the



matter must be exposed to everybody's view, and every party in the country must unite to fix upon a frontier and a policy that shall be beyond the power of any Government of the day to set aside, save with the sanction of the constituencies. At present the country is embarked in frontier wars by the Government of India or by the Secretary of State for India at pleasure, be the consequences what they may. One ray of light, and one only, is to be discovered in the darkness that now hangs over the north-west frontier, and that is the hope that passing events will cause our rulers and the nation to realise to the full the folly of being led, under any pretext or by the spell of any popular name, into permanently occupying any posts beyond the confines that Nature has fixed upon as the natural boundary of India.

SIR AUCKLAND COLVIN, K.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., C.I.E.

(Interview, September 8.)

After the disturbances have been put down the question of the merits of the frontier policy adopted in recent years will presumably be thoroughly overhauled and examined. That policy practically aimed at establishing British influence, and, if necessary to that end, planting at given points British military posts in various territories beyond our frontier. Its weak point has always seemed to me to be—apart from all questions of right or justification—that in order to be effective it requires a much larger military force than we have at our disposal in India, or than the Indian revenues could pay for, should the army be raised to the figure necessary to provide the further troops required. Any extension of that policy—such as taking up points in the Afridi country, for instance, or undertaking to subjugate and to keep in subjection all or any of the tribes now ranged against us—would prove so costly as practically, in my judgement, to make it quite impossible. Our frontier policy, when it comes to be discussed and examined in all its ultimate possibilities and developments, will have to be re-examined, not only from the point of view of military requirements, but equally from financial and political standpoints. It will have to be asked not only how far it is necessary or possible to establish military dominion in the tribal country, but whether funds are forthcoming to meet the cost, and what will be likely to be the view taken in India of so large a permanent alienation of Indian revenue for requirements in territories far beyond its own borders. . . . Roughly speaking, until 1885 and until the Penjdeh affair, the military authorities of India were looked upon as responsible for the security of India against internal danger only, and the Government of India as a whole were able to judge pretty effectually of any measure that might be proposed to that end, and were able, so to speak, to box their compass. Since 1885, however, the military authorities have occupied themselves mainly with plans and projects for the security of India against attack from Central Asia. This has given them far greater weight in the Council of India. It has enabled them to speak with the greater importance due to their efforts being directed against a more formidable foe, and against what is represented by them, on I know not what authority, as imminent and impending danger. The military authorities in India have, therefore, affirmed, and do affirm from time to time, that this or that position or that range of mountains, or such and such strategic lines, or valleys, or what not, are essential for the defence of the country against a European invader. They are not likely to under-estimate their requirements, and the responsibility lies primarily with them, the Government of India being dragged, as it has seemed to me, almost helplessly at their tail across several mountainous areas and remote valleys, which during the past ten years have been scenes

of constant and successive conflicts. Almost every consideration for the good government of India has been made to yield to the alleged requirements of defence against external attack, and out of these has come about in course of time our present conflict with the tribes whom it is apparently deemed indispensable to overawe in order that they should not assist an invading force if left alone and at liberty. By-and-bye, when the authorities in India have grown more accustomed to the situation created by the presence of Russia in Central Asia, it is to be hoped that some sort of more stable equilibrium may be again established between the several interests pressing on their consideration from various and conflicting quarters.

COLONEL H. B. HANNA.

(Interview, September 19.)

Asked as to the connexion between the occupation of Chitral by the Anglo-Indian forces and the cause of the present rising, Colonel Hanna said: It is the real cause or rather a part of the true cause. That must be sought in the whole frontier policy of the Indian Government since the beginning of the Afghan war. Before that event our relations with the tribes were fairly good, and yearly growing better. Since that event they have been bad, and yearly growing worse; and what is of great importance, where formerly we had to do with one tribe, now we are in contact with a dozen. Without adequate cause, secretly and insidiously, the political and military officers on the frontier have been pushing on from point to point, constructing roads and erecting and garrisoning forts. Quetta was the centre from which this forward movement first began, and it was hidden from the knowledge of the general public by the misleading device of bestowing upon the region thus subject to military occupation—a region entirely inhabited by Pathans—the name of British Baluchistan. If you look at the map you will see how our posts lie scattered all over the Kakar hills and Zhob Valley. But the spread of British authority which could conveniently be reached from Quetta soon failed to satisfy the ambition of the Indian authorities, local and central, and Sir Mortimer Durand was sent to Cabul to obtain the Amir's consent to our bringing all the tribes lying between his dominions and India under British influence. The proposal, though backed up by the offer of a handsome addition to his subsidy, was most reluctantly agreed to by Abdur Rahman, who saw in the confiscation of the independence of his neighbours, the destruction of his own best safeguard against the ulterior projects of the forward school, whose designs upon his kingdom are well known to him. He yielded, however, in the end, and a fresh extension of the forward policy was immediately entered upon. Waziristan, where the present disturbances had their origin, was the first territory to be meddled with. Then followed the occupation of Chitral, carefully brought to pass by political action certain to bring English lives into danger, and so to provide the Indian Government with an excuse for sending up troops to that distant valley. A good many tribes have been directly affected along these two lines of advance, and indirectly many more who saw in our treatment of their neighbours a prophecy of our future dealings with themselves. The fact that we broke our word to the Swatis has had the bad effect of shaking the confidence of the Afridis and others in our good faith, but the occupation of Chitral, and the establishment of posts in tribal territory, would have been sure to provoke revolt even if no promise of withdrawal had been given. The grievances of the tribes are great and well founded. Let me add that in my opinion the only way to remove them and restore peace on the frontier is to withdraw from their territories and to restore their independence.



SIR JAMES B. LYALL, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

(Times, September 1.)

The fire was lit by the forward policy in regard to these independent Afghan tribes which was revived in 1887 by the Government of India. I say revived because it was one part of Lord Lytton's general forward policy, which, with some other parts thereof, was laid aside on the lamented death of Cavagnari and the consequent renewal of the Afghan war.

The high promoters of this policy believed that by generous allowances to chiefs and head men, and timely support of their authority by the slight and very occasional use or show of armed force, it would be easy to get into friendly relations with the tribes, and to secure their services and effective control of their country. They very imperfectly apprehended the peculiar temper of these particular tribes, the warmth of their love of their hereditary independence, and the keenness of their dislike to becoming the subjects of a non-Mussulman Power. It is only necessary to read again the letters from General Sir Neville Chamberlain and Sir Charles Brownlow, which you published in April, 1895, (in connexion with the opening of the road through Swat and Bajaur), to see how clearly officers of their great knowledge of these Afghan tribes foresaw what is now happening.

I quite agree that this is no time for volunteering advice to the Government of India, but it seems to me important that the idea should not become ingrained into the public mind that these outbreaks are simply due to anti-English feeling in connexion with events in Turkey, or to mere religious fanaticism. At the present day the preaching of mullahs would not move these people to any general action unless there was a deep personal feeling other than religious to work upon.

As to their supposed love of fighting they now well know our power, and do not rise against us with a light heart.

### SOME OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

#### I.—INDIAN OPINION.

##### WHY NOT RETRACE OUR STEPS?

We have a splendid frontier defended by nature. Fortified as it has been in some places it is well-nigh impregnable. Beyond this natural frontier of India are wild tribes which have led an independent life from times immemorial and which resent every attempt on the part of foreigners to civilise them. Beyond these frontier tribes there is the Amír who has a strong and liberty-loving nation at his back—a nation which from the bottom of its heart detests both the Russians and the English and will indeed detest any other nation which it thinks attempts to destroy its independence. A policy of sublime indifference towards these people will inspire greater confidence as to the real attitude of the English in their minds than all attempts to subsidise them with money, arms and ammunition. . . . We should however, go a little further and ask whether it will not be considered most desirable to retrace our steps, leave the frontier tribes to their mutual feuds, and fortifying our natural frontier, remain impregnable to all foes alike European or Asiatic. This policy will bring another good result in its train—it will give more time to the Indian Government to devote itself to its internal work of improving the moral and material condition of the people. Such a result will be welcomed by all classes of Indians alike.—*Indu-Prakash* (August 23).

##### A SIGNAL COLLAPSE.

There has been a still more deplorable break-down in connection with the foreign policy upon which the Government has so long plumed itself. This policy has been carefully elaborated by a succession of distinguished statesmen. It has involved the expenditure of vast sums of money, and what is more, it has led to the indefinite postponement of all domestic improvements bearing upon the happiness and prosperity of the people. The people have protested against this policy times without number, but they have protested in vain. It

was confidently stated by Lord Lansdowne, one of the high priests of the new departure, that it would put an end to all frontier troubles and to the recurrence of those frontier expeditions which constitute such a heavy drain upon the Indian Exchequer. Events have completely falsified these confident predictions. . . . All these dreams must now be dissipated by the stern logic of facts. The frontier policy has signally collapsed in a manner beyond the speculations of those who had anticipated failure. It must now be recast. The wisdom of Lord Lawrence's Government was never more strikingly illustrated. Will the Government have the courage and the statesmanship to go back? We will wait and see.—*The Benga'ee* (August 21).

#### A CERTAIN FAMILY LIKENESS.

To us it has always been a matter of the utmost scepticism whether implicit credence should be placed in official statements, whether in State despatches or Blue-books, purporting to give the cause or causes which lead to these little wars. Curiously enough, there is always to be observed a certain family likeness about the official narrative, whether the expedition has reference to Chitral or Malakand Pass, Gilgit or Hunza, Waziristan or Black Mountains. There is the same stock story of some wild or murderous chief or sub-chief or a "Mad Mullah" or equally fanatical leader killing a poor British officer—waylaid while in search of science—or molesting a survey party—both harmless occupations, behind which no ulterior or sinister intentions could possibly be concealed. The remarkable circumstance is that these wild tribes or their leaders, puissant or spiritual, should alone be the provoking party while the British officers or their detachments or *protégés* should always be the injured innocents. If all the stories were collected of the real causes, of course from the Indian Government's point of view, of the various expeditions that have gone forth from Peshawar since the day of the Penjdeh scare it would always be found that the offending parties were the hill-tribes!—*The Champion* (August 22).

#### THE GOVERNMENT AND THE AMÍR.

The ability of the Government to dictate to the Amír by force what he may not be persuaded to do by friendly counsel may be unquestionable, but another Afghan war at this time will be a different thing from that of 1878. Unaided by the Government of India the Afghan army would have remained to-day where it was twenty years ago. But British Indian statesmanship has poured wealth into the Afghan treasury and arms into the Afghan armoury. The Amír is wealthier, has a better organised and better equipped army than any previous ruler of Afghanistan, and is as capable as he is resourceful. His factory is incessantly engaged in manufacturing superior firearms and cannon of heavy and light calibre. For all this he is indebted mainly to the generosity of the Government of India. He is astute and shrewd enough to avoid any open act of unfriendliness towards the Government, and it would be the height of folly to imperil the present relations with him without very sufficient and very distinct proof of hostility on his part.—*Lahore Tribune* (August 21).

#### A STANDING MENACE TO FINANCIAL PROSPERITY.

It is curious to note that almost every year some such expedition is undertaken; so much so that it has become a standing menace to the financial prosperity of the Indian Government. The Chitral war has cost the taxpayer an integral portion of what would have gone to him in some desirable shape, and now the Malakand expedition closely following it will induce the Government to strain their resources to a large extent. From what we read of the state of affairs across the frontier, we are enabled to infer that the Malakand expedition will turn out to be a most gigantic affair, and will entail serious loss of public money.—*Madras Standard* (August 7).

#### TAXATION AND STARVATION.

When the annexation of Chitral was resolved upon by the Simla military clique, a strong and well-informed body of public opinion condemned the annexation and pointed out the serious risk that the Government was undertaking. But the selfish clique at Simla misled the Government in India as well as in England by holding out assurances of friendship from the tribes and of an easy and cheap occupation of the tracts beyond our frontier. But within two years a rude shock has been given to our original confidence and the tribes, throwing



off their mask, have suddenly risen against the British occupants, thus verifying the prediction that knowing men made two years ago. Government is, no doubt, equal to any emergency; its resources are abundant and its forethought is admirable. It is collecting on the frontier an enormous army, and if not only Afghanistan, but if Russia also were to back Afghanistan and present hostilities to us, we are prepared to give an excellent account of ourselves. But while the war will bring honour and distinction to the army and fresh reputation to our statesmen, what will it bring to the wretched taxpayer? It will bring him fresh burden of taxation and starvation.—*The Hindu* (August 20).

## II.—ANGLO-INDIAN OPINION.

### HEAVY ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE.

We are not now engaged in any great war such as engrossed attention when the last Famine was drawing to a close. But two expeditions are at this moment beyond the Indian frontier. The largest of these, the force sent to suppress the rising in the Swat Valley, will entail a heavy outlay that will not end with the campaign itself. One of the principal arguments advanced in favour of the retention of Chitral was that the annual outlay upon keeping a garrison there and maintaining the communications would not be large. It was urged that a small force would be sufficient (in addition to bribes, or "payments" as they are called) to keep the tribes in order, and that the road to Chitral had been practically made by the expedition. But the attacks on Malakand and Chakdara have shown the incorrectness of the first contention, and already a large increase in the permanent garrisons is contemplated. The second contention has also been disposed of by Lord George Hamilton's announcement that "the road to Chitral is to be opened," which will, it seems, in some unexplained way "improve the material condition of the tribesmen." All this means heavy permanent addition to the cost of the long lines of communication across the frontier, which, as recent events have shown, render us so liable to attack and to consequent military expeditions.—*Bombay Gazette* (August 13).

### AMONG THE PROPHETS.

That the frontier will require careful watching for some time there is no doubt; but it may be surmised that no general and simultaneous rising will take place. Such a thing has never been known before, the usual procedure being for small sections to rise successively when more than one tribe is turbulent, as illustrated by the recent events in the Swat Valley and in the Mohmand country. Concerning the Mohmands there need not be much apprehension. They are not a courageous lot, as they have been proved before, and they are intensely mercenary, not caring to risk much. You have only to put a rupee in your eye and you may look at any Mohmand, man or woman, says a frontier proverb. The greatest danger lies in the possible spread of disaffection to their Southern neighbours, the Afridis, a contingency that our Lahore correspondent refers to to-day. The Afridi is a different kind of Pathan altogether—the most lawless and savage, and at the same time the bravest and most treacherous—a typical frontier Highlander. If he "rises" there will be plenty of work for our troops within the next four weeks. But the contingency is a remote one, we are inclined to believe. The Afridis have been in closer relations with us than any other of the frontier tribes, and their Malik has long ago learned to prefer peace and payments to war and want.—*Madras Mail* (August 14).

### A GIGANTIC BLUNDER.

Our officially inspired contemporary, the *Pioneer*, whose grateful task it is to shield administrative blunders of whatever description, hints vaguely at mysterious causes that have yet to be traced in India and Afghanistan; but it is easy to explain the occurrence without going beyond the facts that lie upon the surface. . . . The stationing of small isolated British outposts in inaccessible hills, in the midst of brave and fanatical tribesmen who have never in their previous history submitted to civilised rule, is quite sufficient to account for periodical disturbances; and, so long as the causes that give rise to them are present, short of the impossible operation of disarming the whole frontier, the recurrence of such attempts as those of Maizor and the Malakand is inevitable. The barren hills of Waziristan and Swat will never be able to pay anything appreciable towards the cost of holding them. Data

Khel and Chitral are both far beyond the natural frontier of India, and a gigantic blunder, to call it by no worse name, was undoubtedly made in including them within the sphere for which the Government of India holds itself responsible. It would be difficult to exaggerate the folly of the whole policy which entails the maintenance of these dangerous outposts, far removed from our effective base of operations.—*The Statesman* (August 18).

### INDEFINITE EXPENDITURE.

It is quite evident that the Government has been so hard hit that it cannot estimate, or shrinks from contemplating, the approximate extent of its losses through famine and plague, joined to the damage done by the earthquake and the indefinite expenditure to which it has been committed by its frontier policy. To that policy Lord George Hamilton has again expressed his determination to adhere, although his statement on Thursday night lacked the confident ring of the declaration he made immediately after taking up office. He now merely "hopes" the Government of India will overcome the predatory habits of the frontier tribesmen by "improving their material condition." If the Government of India shares the hope of the Secretary of State, it is more than we do. If the Government proposes to devote itself to "improving the material condition" of the inhabitants of Swat, while the Mad Mullah is left to improve them from a moral and religious point of view, the complications likely to arise in future will throw any of our past experiences into the shade.—*The Englishman* (August 11).

### A RADICAL WAR-CRY!

The fighting in the Malakand was three weeks ago eagerly seized by some of the Radical papers as the text for much unreal preaching upon the wickedness and impolicy of maintaining and securing communications with our political frontier. This looked at the time very much like an attempt to find a substitute for "Home Rule all Round" as a rallying cry for an inert and divided party. . . . Even for Radicals in search of a war-cry something better than the argument that anxiety has been awakened amongst the "other tribes" by this peaceful regimen ought to be provided. It would require more ingenuity than can be found in all Fleet Street to show how the anxiety of the Afridis in and around the Khyber and of the Orakzais on the Samana Range could be excited by keeping open a line of communication which at its nearest point was some days' march from their country. Geography and chronology are alike discouraging to this preposterous theory. It is scarcely good enough even for the not particularly worthy purpose for which it has been devised.—*Times of India* (August 27.)

## III.—BRITISH OPINION.

### ABSOLUTELY IMMORAL CONQUEST.

The whole question of Indian frontier policy is only too simple. Before they knew what was being done, the people of this country were drawn into the beginnings of conquest beyond the Indus. The peoples there had not injured us. We did not on this occasion pretend that we wanted to make Christians of them. They were so poor that there was no hope of their ever buying much cotton. We attacked them simply because certain soldiers said that if we did not attack them Russia would. For the last ten years these attacks have been constantly growing more frequent. The fact that they are attacks is sometimes disguised by elaborate preliminaries which give to the blow when it comes the air of a reprisal. We first send agents to make and unmake chieftains in remote mountain valleys inhabited by Pathan caterans, and in good time our agents are duly set upon, besieged in mud forts, and rescued with a proper flourish of British heroism. The whole performance is cut and dried, and the end of it is never in doubt. We suppose it must be that a punitive expedition against Naboth serves to quiet some consciences that might stick at stealing the vineyard without more ado. For the forward extremists make no secret of their wish that the whole of the Pathan tribes between India, Afghanistan, and Russia should be conquered. It is the most glaring instance of conquest absolutely immoral that can be conceived. In order to relieve ourselves, or certain nervous officials, of fantastic fears of Russian invasion, we deliberately commit over and over again the crime of forcing weak and ill-armed little com-



munities into wars in which, whatever trivial momentary successes they may gain, they have to stand up sooner or later to be killed by thousands, like the Swatis, by our machine guns. What is needed is that people here should rid their minds of the cant which assumes that there is one code of conduct for individuals and another for nations. We have for years been committing beyond the North-West frontier acts strictly corresponding in their moral quality to private acts of robbery with violence. It is no doubt comfortable for slight-minded persons to have this ugly fact disguised by talk about our Imperial mission, but if the Empire is to remain anything better than a greedily and viciously conducted speculation Englishmen must retain enough simplicity and directness of character to lead them straight to the point in such discussions as this, where a simple issue of right or wrong presents itself for determination.—*Manchester Guardian* (September 14).

#### "THE DANGER OF MILITARY COUNSELS."

The civilian governors of the Punjab, who have control of the relations with the frontier tribes, have opposed the policy again and again, but as they have no seat upon the Council they have been unable to make their influence felt. Lord Roberts is primarily to blame, and he forced his views on the Government of India in opposition to the views of men whose knowledge and experience of the frontier tribes are far greater than his. By the occupation of Chitral the military party no doubt hoped to make it impossible to draw back. It lies so far away that if we are to retain it we shall be forced to occupy all the intervening country and bring its inhabitants "within the pale of civilisation." No wonder the tribes have begun to fear for their independence and have been moved to a general resistance to our encroachments. The danger of military counsels in questions of State policy has seldom been more signally illustrated.—*Saturday Review* (September 11).

#### A "BAD IMITATION OF MACHIAVELIANISM."

Even Lord George Hamilton admitted two years ago that the expense of occupying the Chitral Valley was a great objection. He remarked in a lucid interval that "no external policy, however bold, and no frontier performances, however heroic, can compensate for the permanent annual deficiency in the Indian exchequer." He made another admission, and a still more significant one. He said that he had not much belief in the strategic value of Chitral, and that the reasons for retaining it were moral rather than military. It appears, then, that there was no military necessity for departing from Lord Elgin's Proclamation, but that the Ministers of the Crown were morally obliged to break their word. We see now what they have gained by their bad imitation of Machiavellianism. If they could have foreseen in 1895 the events of 1897 not even Lord George Hamilton would have consented to the annexation of Chitral. But they ought to have foreseen them. They should have listened to Sir Neville Chamberlain. They should have listened to Sir James Lyall. They should have paid some attention to the views of their predecessors. They should have counted the cost and considered the future. They would not do any of these things, and unfortunately it is not they who bear the punishment of their obstinacy.—*Daily News* (September 2).

#### WANTED: SEARCHING ENQUIRY.

The first consideration, of course, is to assert the supremacy of our arms; but when that is done there must be a searching enquiry into the whole of our frontier policy. Lord Beaconsfield assured us twenty years ago that he had secured for us "a scientific" instead of a "haphazard frontier," and that our position was "invulnerable" against any and every foe. But now the complaint, even of advocates of the forward school, is that our frontier is so little "scientific," and so entirely "haphazard," that they are unable to trace it on the map. The policy which has been in vogue for some years, and for which Lord Roberts is largely responsible, is to dot military outposts among the tribes beyond our frontier, but within "our sphere of influence"—a vague phrase which has no meaning at all for those tribes, and to which they have never been parties. It simply means that we have agreed with the Amir that he shall regard a certain belt of mountainous territory as outside the sphere of his influence and interference—a concession which we reciprocated by giving him a free hand in Kafiristan—a liberty which he appears to have been utilising by forcing the population to adopt Muhammadanism.—*The Observer* (September 19).

#### MERELY PLAYING RUSSIA'S GAME.

Whatever route they took, a Russian army of such a size as could seriously threaten India, would be starving every day of its march, since all Russia does not contain the number of baggage animals which would be required to carry food for it along any one of these long and barren routes. Why, then, it may be asked, is Russia making preparations which seem to menace India? If we make such counter-preparations, it is worth Russia's while. We do not suppose Russia loves us. She may not be unwilling to see us following a will of the wisp into the glaciers of the Hindu Kush. A forward policy which irritates British India and alienates Pathans and Afghans may not be disagreeable to her. She may conceivably think it worth while to take a few cheap and easy steps of a rather ostentatious kind in order to confirm British Indian policy in a twist so little conducive to British interest. We do not say so positively, for there is no evidence to prove it, but it is perfectly credible that in all their "precautions against Russian aggression" the "forward" party may be merely playing Russia's game.—*Manchester Guardian* (September 3).

#### LORD GEORGE'S SUBLIME SIMPLICITY.

We have a Secretary of State for India who takes counsel, like Rehoboam, of the young men. Lord George Hamilton believes that India should be governed, as he believes that the British Empire has been maintained, on the principles of the Primrose League. He laughed at the idea that there would be any discontent with British rule in Chitral or the Swat Valley. That, he said, was only the misguided imagination of ignorant Radicals. As a matter of fact, we should be received with open arms, and the only complaint would come from tribes who were not so fortunate as to be annexed. There is something almost sublime in the simplicity of Lord George. But this altitude of mind, which may be wholly admirable in the Grand Master of a Habitation, is rather dangerous in the Secretary of State for India. Phaethon might have passed for a good jog-trot driver if he had kept outside the chariot of the Sun.—*The Speaker* (August 21).

#### WHERE THE DANGER LIES.

The "forward" policy has had its trial over a fairly extended period; it has failed conspicuously in matters which were the especial pride and boast of its advocates; and it has failed exactly on the lines on which its critics prophesied from the first that it was bound to fail. If we are to derive any profit from these experiences there must be no question of leaving those who have been convicted of disastrous want of foresight to attempt to retrieve the situation by plunging more desperately when so much has already been lost; and unless those who hold Sir Auckland Colvin's opinions are equally frank and insistent in the expression of them while there is yet time there is no small risk that the terms of ultimate settlement will open the way to graver mischiefs than any we have yet encountered. The danger lies in the commitment of the settlement of the whole business—involving, as it does, questions of the utmost political and financial moment—to the charge of the Indian military authorities, who, as Sir Auckland Colvin points out, have exercised a predominant influence in the Viceroy's Council since 1885.—*Warrford Observer* (September 9).

#### "WE MUST HARK BACK."

The official apologists of the policy which is immediately responsible for our present humiliation—to say nothing of the appalling waste of India's taxes—beyond the North-West frontier, are beginning to pluck up a little defiant courage. Utterly worsted in the discussion about the "forward" policy, they now describe that discussion as "vain," and bid us look to the future, regarding the "forward" policy as the unassailable basis of settlement. A more audacious begging of the question it would be difficult to conceive. What matters is not continuity of policy, but doing the right thing. But if the "forward" policy is to come by its due, all who distrust militarism, and all who have a care for the future of British rule in India, will have to bestir themselves. The *Standard*, which is supposed to know something of the mind of the Cabinet, says to-day:—"The real question to be faced has reference, not to the history of the various compromises which have come into force in the past, but to the imperative necessity of organising some system of control which shall ensure the maintenance of peace in a borderland irrevocably included within the British sphere of influence." The accent



here is on the word "irrevocably." The errors of the past are not irrevocable. The borderland which has been so ill included must be abandoned. No other policy can be satisfactory. We must hark back to the same principles of Lord Lawrence which are stoutly upheld to-day by men like Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Auckland Colvin, Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir James Lyall, Colonel Hanna, and, indeed, every expert save Lord Roberts, who can be contradicted out of his own mouth.—*The Star* (September 22).

#### "A HORRID NUISANCE."

It is all a horrid nuisance, no doubt. Every incident of the kind is an interruption to real work, just as a European war is an interruption to progress. The Indian Government needs every moment of time and every rupee of revenue that it can use, for its daily work of administration, for physical improvements which have hardly begun—just listen to the accounts of men who have seen the Plague in Bombay—and for that solidification of the Empire on bases other than cantonments which has not begun at all. Not one Indian fighting race has joined us yet, nor is there one which can be relied on to perish before the Empress's throne is overturned. There is an infinity of work to do, and whenever there is a campaign it all stops, if only for reasons of expenditure and all eyes, Indian eyes as well as English eyes, turn towards the scene of action.—*The Spectator* (August 21).

The military influence has been predominant in India, and at the India Office in England the opinions and advice of the wisest councillors have been contemptuously disregarded. "What can you expect," asks one of our correspondents, "when the opinion of every one of experience is set aside in favour of that of a self-sufficient and ignorant prig like Mr. George Curzon?" Our true policy towards the frontier tribes should be one of conciliation and friendliness. To annex their territory and to make military roads is to weaken, not strengthen, the frontier.—*Saturday Review* (August 21).

Instead of adhering to the terms of the Queen's proclamation, the very first act of the present Government was to intimate that Chitral would be permanently occupied. With what face can we charge the tribesmen with treachery when our own position there is the result of a breach of faith? With what honesty can we pledge British honour when the Queen's word is violated in this fashion? Yet, singularly enough, the whole justification of the "forward policy," as expounded by Lord Roberts, is the cultivation of cordial relations with the frontier tribes.—*Eastern Morning News* (August 23).

We are afraid there is a good deal of truth, after all, in General Chamberlain's contention in the *Saturday Review* that outposts have been pushed forward in the border country with too free a hand, and permanent garrisons established on lands belonging to the tribesmen where we cannot readily reach or reinforce them in emergency.—*Birmingham Daily Post* (August 31).

It is satisfactory that none of the Anglo-Indians who have yet expressed their views on the subject consider the situation a very serious one, or doubt the power of the Indian Government to deal thoroughly and effectively with the menaces of hostile tribesmen. When these are settled with some modification of frontier policy may be necessary. Whatever new arrangements are made, clear and definite terms, which the tribes cannot mistake, will need to be laid down. It would be well to put an end once for all, by effective measures, to the frequent need of punitive expeditions, which are no less disastrous to the finances and to the material and social status of India than they are irritating and discouraging to the people of this country.—*Sunday Times* (September 5).

The curse of this forward policy is that by it we get no "forwarder." Protectionists, in the vain pursuit of their phantom, are always asking for just one more turn of the screw, which alone is wanted for the complete success of their policy. Just another 20 per cent., *ad valorem*, and the country will be prosperous. In the same way, these military men always find there is just another river or mountain chain necessary to make the frontier perfectly secure. Lord Roberts now declares that the frontier will not be secure until it is joined to Cabul and Candahar by a line of railway! How much longer is this tomfoolery to be dignified with the name of statesmanship?—"A. H." in the *Leeds Mercury* (August 28).

The "forward policy" has come to grief, and now all the talk is about sending an overwhelming force to break the power of the Afridis. Of course, we shall defeat them in the end, but we shall have made implacable enemies where we might have kept useful friends.—*North British Daily Mail* (August 30).

When Lord Salisbury and his colleagues reversed the decision of their predecessors, Lord Rosebery warned them solemnly of the inevitable consequences of the policy they elected to adopt, and predicted grave troubles on the frontier as a result of their breach of faith with the tribesmen. Mr. Akers-Douglas's desire for information regarding "the causes that have led to the present troubles" comes, therefore, rather late in the day. We are now seeing the effects of a cause for which he must be held partly responsible.—*Leeds Mercury* (August 31).

In view of the facts it may well be doubted whether this forward movement, which has increased the burthens on the unfortunate Indian people by thirty-five per cent. in a dozen years, has not really weakened the defensive power of the British in India against a northern attack instead of strengthening it.—*Freeman's Journal* (August 28).

If our Government is alive to its duty, as soon as it has punished the malcontents outside the proper limits of British India, it will leave those malcontents to their own devices, and will concentrate its energies in making British India itself the prosperous and profitable possession that under firm and just rule it cannot fail to be.—*The Referee* (August 29).

Each successive telegram of bloodshed and expenditure provokes an ever-increasing irritation when we remember that all this ghastly and costly business was due to the headstrong blunder of Lord George Hamilton and Lord Roberts, who, in defiance of all that was best in Anglo-Indian opinion, persisted in abandoning the old frontier and establishing the outposts of British authority far beyond the line where it could be effectively and economically defended. The duty of withdrawal within our own frontier, after the relief of Chitral, was almost the only important question upon which the late Liberal Cabinet was absolutely unanimous. But in face of every protest, Lord George Hamilton and Lord Roberts persisted in drawing this advance line across the hills, thereby threatening the independence of the most fanatical independent tribes of Highland men to be found outside Montenegro. The Indian telegrams of last month have indeed supplied ample vindication of the sound statesmanship of the Liberal Administration on this question.—*Review of Reviews* (September).

The wild and independent mountain tribes of the frontier might have been made our permanent friends, and their territory would have constituted an invaluable buffer against invasion. We are now converting them all into everlasting foes. This policy necessitates the locking up of regular troops in worthless districts, who in war-time will be needed elsewhere, while it establishes permanent bitterness amongst the hill tribes.—*Christian Commonwealth* (September 2).

These frontiers have cost us millions of money to conquer, they are not necessary for the defence of India, and they are inhabited by uncivilised tribes who would oppose any Power intent on effecting their subjugation. We went into their country to build forts, hold passes, command roads, and to be better able to resist a Russian advance on India. At least, that was the plausible argument that was considered good enough for civilians. Looking back at the policy, it does not seem very successful. It seems just now to be as calamitous as it can be.—*Leicester Daily Post* (August 20).

One point will certainly be raised in Parliament, and should be discussed, namely, whether it is wise to occupy distant posts like Chitral at so great a distance from the frontier line. If India is to be one day attacked from the north, would not one of our chief defences be found in the rugged independence of the warlike tribes through which our assailant would have to pass before he could strike the first blow?—*East Anglian Daily Times* (August 23).

We wish all our readers could read the September issue of *India*, which contains a large amount of information with respect to the nature and results of the "forward policy" in India, which has once more involved us in much unnecessary bloodshed and peril.—*Methodist Times* (September 9).



## NOTICES.

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## INDIA.

LONDON, OCTOBER, 1897.

## BACKWARDS OR FORWARDS?

THE *Calcutta Englishman*, the organ of the Indian Civil Service, wrote in the middle of August last that the frontier policy had so far answered excellently as a stimulant for minds jaded with the monotonous round of Simla festivities. The *Englishman* sympathised with "this craving after warlike excitement." But it could not put the question of cost altogether aside. "Nor," it added, "is this the most serious question. It is of even greater importance that we should know when and how all this is to end." That is the question which is being steadily forced to the front at home also, in spite of the manifest and easily understood reluctance of the champions of a discredited policy to come to close quarters with experts like Sir Neville Chamberlain and Sir Auckland Colvin. Argument has never been the strong point of the "forward" school. They are content to act while others write, and to commit the Government of India to a ruinous policy of immoral and perilous aggression while the public at home is asleep. If anybody has assumed that the present war beyond the Indian frontier must turn the "forward" school from the error of their ways, the assumption is egregiously mistaken. Nothing save precise orders from home can terminate the "forward" policy, and, in spite of the terrible object-lesson of the past few months, those orders will

not be given unless public opinion at home makes itself irresistibly heard. If the *Times* and the *Standard*, and the anonymous correspondents whom they delight to honour, may be taken to represent the views of the India Office and of the military clique that predominates in the Government of India, nothing is more certain than that the close of the present operations will be made the starting-point, not for a return to the sane policy of Lawrence and the wisest of his successors, but for a development of the "forward" policy on an unprecedented scale of ambition. That is the real danger which it behoves every Englishman who has not lost his head to do his best to avert. The apologists of the "forward" school contradict themselves and each other frequently, vigorously, and with complacency. Their predictions have been falsified with ludicrous completeness, and with every circumstance of humiliation. But nothing daunts them. In one point at least they argue and persist—namely, in declaring that whatever else may have set the parts beyond the North-West frontier ablaze, the "forward" policy at any rate has contributed nothing to the conflagration. The fault lies with the Sultan; or with Mr. Gladstone for denouncing the Sultan; or with Lord Salisbury for not overthrowing the Sultan; or with the Amír of Afghanistan; or with the bellicose instincts of the tribesmen; or with excessive education in India; or with the vernacular press; or with the famine and the plague;—the fault lies with these influences, or with any combination or permutation of them according to the taste of the individual writer, but it emphatically does not lie with the "forward" policy and its friends. In short, as the *Saturday Review* says, if we are to believe these wiseacres there is only one cause which has not influenced the tribes, and that is the recent forcible occupation of points within their territory by British troops.

That is obviously not an attitude of repentance. The *Times*, with an air of conclusiveness, says that some of the critics of the "forward" policy are mere Radicals. The *Standard* goes further and supplies Lord George Hamilton with a line of excuse for the past and of policy for the future. On September 16 the *Standard*, which is sometimes the spokesman of a Conservative Government, wrote:—

"The task of enforcing our authority over the border has only just begun. The real origin of recent troubles must be sought in the incompleteness with which even the foundations of firmer rule have been established. They are due, not to the inherent defects of the 'forward' policy but to the impossibility of finishing in a few years a task which it will take a generation and more to accomplish. . . . A more permanent system, and one more in consonance with the principles of the 'forward' policy, has yet to be adopted; and its application, if only financial considerations permit, will in all probability be the most notable outcome of the present uprising."

The same journal added on September 22:—

"It must be clearly recognised that the objects to be attained include something more than the blowing up of towers, the dispersal of hostile gatherings, the destruction of villages, and other measures calculated to make the tribesmen who attacked our outposts and raided over our border perceive the impropriety of their conduct. Wider and more permanent results must be aimed at. . . . The real question to be faced has reference, not to the history of the various compromises which have come into force in the past, but to the imperative necessity of organising some system of control which



*shall ensure the maintenance of peace in a borderland irrevocably included within the British sphere of influence."*

Similarly one finds the *Morning Post* and the *Scotsman* arguing that the "forward" policy has hitherto been "starved for the sake of economy," and that "we limit expenditure to the lowest possible amount," and try to show that the cost of the operations is "but a trifle, and is never likely to be serious." Perversity and blindness of this kind may be amazing, but it is what the opponents of the "forward" policy have to face. The "trifles" and the "economies" which are so contemptuously regarded, and which, if the Jingoos have their way, will now be abandoned, have cost the indigent taxpayers of India an ascertainable sum of something more than seven hundred millions of rupees. What is to be the cost of the more ambitious policy to which we are now vaguely invited? What is the precise nature of the policy proposed? And who is to pay the bill? Our Jingoos do not attempt to answer these questions. One looks in vain for any argued defence of the "forward" policy. What one finds is merely reckless prediction, a reckless lust of aggression, a reckless and unceasing demand that the Government of India should go on and on, nobody knows where, and squander millions upon millions, nobody knows how many, to be provided or extorted nobody knows whence. The folly and the wickedness of the thing are unspeakable. Clearly its advocates rely merely upon public indifference, and the misleading catchwords "scientific" frontier and "forward" policy.

When the apologists of the "forward" policy have deviated into argument, they have produced results the reverse of encouraging. The writer of "Indian Affairs," for example, said in the *Times* of September 6, that "there should be no disguising of the truth that the tribal risings amount to an attack on our present system of frontier policy." But he straightway proceeded to argue in effect that the risings were not serious where the "forward" policy had been, and were serious where it had not been, applied. The value of the apology may be estimated by a single test. It was necessary to the argument to assume that the Orakzais were "more or less excluded from" the sphere of the "forward" policy—the Orakzais of whom Mr. Thorburn in his "Asiatic Neighbours" wrote that by the application of the forward policy to their territory, "a perpetual grievance is created which will embitter the Orakzais against us for all time." Hardly less unfortunate was the mysterious and dogmatic "N" who, in a long letter in the *Times* of September 9, threw over the writer of "Indian Affairs" and other inventors of special pleadings in order to announce that to those who, like himself, knew India, the risings beyond the border were nothing surprising. By way of shielding the "forward" policy from the attacks of ignorant and illogical Radicals "N" asked: "Why should the Afridis now rebel because for two years there has been applied to the people of Swat, Dir, and Chitral precisely the same system of tribal levies, military road, and Indian subsidies which they have themselves acquiesced in for 16 years?" Half-a-column later he forgot this plea, and asked anew:—"Why should the

"Afridis have risen at all when the forward policy has admittedly never been applied to them?" In other words, ignorant and illogical Radicals are assured (1) that 16 years' personal experience has made the Afridis love the "forward" policy, and (2) that they have never had experience of it. This is the sort of sapience the "forward" policy vouchsafes to her children. And it is, of course, a mere detail that "N" and the *Times*, in arguing that these troubles beyond the border are things to be expected, throw over Lord George Hamilton and his confident prediction that the occupation of Chitral would put an end to outbreaks of fanaticism and terrorism. That prediction has gone the way of Mr. G. N. Curzon's no less emphatic declaration that, thanks to the wise arrangements between the Government of India and the Khyber levies, "in case of the outbreak of war we might rely with certainty upon our subsidised allies to co-operate with us either for the purpose of guarding our own advance or of resisting the descent of a hostile force." Never were prophets more ludicrously disappointed than the soothsayers of the "forward" school. Yet on the strength of their failures—the millions they have squandered, the wars they have provoked, the lives they have sacrificed, and the discontent they have spread in India itself—they now have the superlative effrontery to invite the public at home to entrust them with still larger sums for still more ambitious designs of the same type. Indeed, so utterly do they despise their audiences that Lord Wolseley permits himself to say: "We fight [with the Afridis] in the interests of peace because we love peace." It is for the public at home to say whether ambitious soldiers in India shall go forward to inevitable war with Afghanistan at the expense of the British Exchequer—India having now sunk to a point of penury at which exploitation ceases to be possible—or, humbled by the appalling results of an immoral, useless, and actively perilous policy, shall go back to the sane statesmanship of Lawrence, and, ceasing to play Russia's game, shall ensure safety by "holding our ground and doing our duty."

## THE NIGHTMARE OF RUSSIAN INVASION.

THE fear of a Russian invasion of India by the North-West frontier has drawn the British Government into a course of action that illustrates painfully the sagacious Swedish Chancellor's remark: "Behold, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed." The disturbing action of Russia in Central Asia is well understood to be promoted by way of leverage against Great Britain in the questions of Eastern Europe. No doubt there are some fanatics in Russia who press for active operations directly against our tenure of India, but it is substantially certain that no such ideas find countenance with the influential authorities. And for a very good reason: they recognise that the undertaking is hopelessly beyond their power. Skobelev, in the days of his inexperience of Central Asia, talked exuberantly about organising "masses of Asiatic cavalry, and hurling them into India under the banner of blood



"and pillage, as a vanguard as it were, thus reviving "the times of Tamerlane." This was all very fine and large—on paper. But before you make your omelette, you have to get your eggs. The "masses "of Asiatic cavalry" have to be reduced from the sphere of imagination into the actualities of war; and when Skobelev came to business he found that, though he stamped the sand hard, the men and horses did not spring up. "Three very modest "squadrons of irregulars, aggregating 310 rank "and file," we are told, "is all the Turkoman "cavalry that Russia possesses." Yet this ignorant bombast of Skobelev's served to stir a wave of excitement in minds that should have known better. In 1882, after sufficient experience of Central Asia, Skobelev did not hesitate to recall his earlier utterance, and to declare that he did not understand what our military men meant by talking of a Russian invasion of India. "I should not like to be the "commander of such an expedition," he said. And if Skobelev adopted that attitude, what egregious presumption of folly may not be attributed to any other Russian general who may venture to address himself to the task? Grodekoff, who enjoyed the illuminating experience of collecting supplies for the Akhal Tekke campaign, was no less emphatic than his chief. He asserted frankly that it would be impossible for Russia to march a competent army into India. To his mind, also, a Russian invasion of India is an impossibility. If it be argued that these officers were merely trying to throw us off the scent, then the question must be considered in view of the definite facts that were, or might have been, present to their minds. Such facts are open to the study of anyone that cares to look at them; and they are of such a character that there is no room for expert military opinion to overbear the judgement of the plain citizen. As a matter of fact, however, the vast weight of military expert opinion coincides with the lay opinion, and Lord Roberts is the sole authority of distinction who gives his name—and that by an afterthought—to the support of the "Froward" policy.

In the first place, consider the nature of the ground. It is not a smiling English or Indian plain that a Russian army would have to cross. It is a howling wilderness of sand and rocks, shut in at last by an impassable range of mountains, succeeded first by an impassable desert, and next by an impassable river. Colonel Hanna has set forth all this in absolutely convincing array. The Russian base must be Tiflis, some 2,000 miles distant from the Indus! But even the Caucasus is poorly furnished with resources as compared with India, and the base would have to be fed mainly from more distant parts of the empire. From Tiflis to Baku, on the western coast of the Caspian, is 341 miles, over a railway badly built for the heavy traffic to be presumed, all but totally unfurnished with the minimum of necessary transport, and liable to have its bridges swept away by floods, as in the winter before last. Baku stands in a desert, and the slight rainfall has to be supplemented by cargoes of drinking-water from the Volga. The Caspian takes 24 to 30 hours to cross, to say nothing of the difficulties of disembarkation on a shallow, shelving shore; and time is

of the essence of the problem. On the eastern side of the Caspian any considerable army would die of thirst, and this demands the establishment of condensing machinery on a very large scale. Put your army on the Transcaspian railway at Usan Ada or Krasnovodsk, and you will soon find that this line is badly constructed and badly worked. The route to Samarcand is the route that "offered the greatest "promise of subsistence by the way." Yet the view on the first 144 miles—and the view probably for the most part takes in all the cultivated or cultivable space—"chills the traveller with its lifeless monotony." The next stretch of 240 miles runs through sand, broken only by the slight oases of Kizil Avat, Akhal Tepe and Atak, which have enough to do to supply the simple wants of the local populations. Another hundred miles of desert take us to Merv. Assuming that a dash is made straight upon Herat, or that the desert and the Oxus are braved in a descent upon Balkh, the invader is at once involved with the Afghans. Let him even hold Herat—that ridiculously belauded "mass, of "mud hovels;" it could only be regarded as a temporary refuge; it cannot possibly serve as a point of concentration, and starvation would at once compel resumption of the march. Now the passes of the frontier have to be negotiated. Taking the whole range of some 700 miles from Chitral westwards, there may be several hundreds of passes, but the military passes are practically three—the Khyber, the Kuram, and the Bolan. These alone need serious consideration, in spite of all the nonsense that has been talked about the Boroghil and Chitral. And, given the meanest modicum of English sense and energy, can it be imagined for a moment that any army—Russian or other—is capable of forcing its way through in face of English guns and English steel? The thing is ridiculous. Yet, supposing it did, how is it to cross the desert? And how could it, by any practicable device, bridge the Indus in the teeth of an enemy that had not absolutely gone to sleep? The supposition is nothing short of idiotic.

But where is this Russian army to come from? "To invade India," said Skobelev, "we should need "150,000 troops—60,000 to enter India with, and "90,000 to guard the communications." Grodekoff's estimate was double—300,000 men; and if Skobelev imagined he could enter India with 60,000 men in face of the British defence, he was certainly in a most sanguine mood. But the Caucasus army is estimated only at 200,000, with 388 guns. "70,000 "of the troops belong to the Regular Army, 50,000 "to the Reserve, 30,000 are Georgian and Imeritian "Irregulars, and 50,000 Cossacks drawn from settlements north of the Caucasus." The Regulars are absorbed in garrisoning Transcaspia, and in holding the fortified towns on the Turkish and Persian frontiers. The Reservists are little better than militia, and the rest are known to be in a poor state of efficiency. Russia could not bear the strain of providing anything like the necessary force, to say nothing of supplying the frightful waste continuously accruing. How the force, if provided, could be forwarded over the wretched single line of railway, is a problem that the Russian War Department may



be wished all joy of. They will remember their experience at Tchikishliar in the expedition against the Turkomans of Dengeel Tepe; and we, on our side, can guess the results from the recent congestion on the North-Western Railway. And where is the transport to come from? For the subjugation of Akhal, the Russians, with only 5,000 troops, required 20,000 camels, which all died. And as Skobelev put it, "if 5,000 men need 20,000 camels, what would 150,000 need, and where could we get the transport?" We hear complaints of the difficulty of our own transport in the Bajaur territory, but a few miles from our base. We found almost the whole of our transport broken to pieces in the comparatively small expeditions of 1889-95. Such experiences may well enable us to look upon Russian aggression with quiet unconcern. Besides, as Colonel Hanna points out, the elements of time and of wear and tear are of the most fundamental importance. Suppose the railway break down, not with congestion, but by obliteration of a stretch of it through sand or snow storm, or an irruption of floods. Suppose a flank attack from the side of Persia, or raids at some point or at fifty points by Turkoman tribesmen. Consider where the enormous mass of men and animals is to get water on the march. These are but the merest surface considerations. Yet what conclusion can they possibly point but the utter and hopeless inability of Russia to hurt us in India, if we will only keep quiet within our pre-Lytton frontier? We have said nothing of British preparations for the reception of the Russian visitors. It may, indeed, be questioned whether any special preparations would be necessary. The larger probability is that the Russian army would be reduced to the merest absurd handful before it reached the passes of the frontier, if indeed it were not overwhelmed in the sands of Central Asia, or cut to pieces by the Turkomans and the Afghans. It is sufficiently pitiful, therefore, that India should be put to such vast trouble and expenditure for defence against such a nightmare of military faddists.

#### GOVERNMENT BY PANIC.

THE sentence of eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment passed upon Mr. Tilak at Bombay on September 14 for seditious incitement in his journal, the *Kesari* (that is, "the lion"), and, still more, Mr. Justice Strachey's amazing interpretation of the law, have, as will be seen from the newspaper extracts printed on another page, provoked much hostile criticism in the United Kingdom. The remarks of the *Standard* are specially noteworthy. The *Standard* is commonly regarded as the official organ of the Tory party in London. Moreover, the writer of the article, despite his adverse criticisms, took some pains to argue himself into the belief that justice had been done. Reluctant condemnation from such a quarter carries a weight which is not easily exaggerated. The *Times*, observing justly that in the absence of a full report, "any detailed comment upon the course of the proceedings would be premature and unwarranted," hastened to add that the verdict was

sensible and the sentence neither harsh nor vindictive. That is the sort of apology which refutes itself. Observers who are not dominated by partisanship may well await the full report before they pass judgement upon the case as a whole. But there are obviously some features of it which call for immediate notice. Chief among these is Mr. Strachey's summing-up. Section 124 A of the Indian Penal Code, under which Mr. Tilak was brought to trial, is directed against attempts "to excite feelings of disaffection to the Government." The term "feelings of disaffection" being dangerously vague, an "explanation" was added which laid down that "such a disapprobation of the measures of the Government as is compatible with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government is not disaffection." The chief duty, therefore, which devolves upon an Anglo-Indian judge in a prosecution under this section is to explain clearly and fairly to the jury the difference between disaffection and legitimate disapprobation. That is precisely what Mr. Strachey, unless he has been very stupidly reported, failed to do. On the contrary, as most of his critics at home have remarked, he left no choice to the jury, but reduced the "explanation" to a dead letter.

"Disaffection, (he said), meant hostility or ill-will of any sort towards the Government, feelings of ill-will—great or small, intense or mild; and any attempt to excite such feelings brought the offender within the section. It was not action but feeling that was the test. . . . Comments upon a measure of the Government, if they excited hatred, must also come within the meaning of the section . . . disaffection meant want of affection. . . . Disapprobation unless kept within certain bounds became disaffection . . . and the measures of the Government must be taken to mean everything they did or omitted to do."

After such a summing-up as this—a mere travesty of justice—the jury had to choose between dissenting from the judge's law and finding the accused guilty. The effect of Mr. Strachey's indiscretion is therefore to take away from the sentence upon Mr. Tilak any moral value which it might otherwise have had. Sir James Stephen, who was responsible for Section 124A of the Penal Code, explained its meaning in these simple words: "You may say 'what you like about any Government measure, you may publish or speak what you please, so long as you say or write what is consistent with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government.'" Under that interpretation of the law, helpful criticism of Government measures was possible. Under Mr. Strachey's interpretation, it becomes impossible. No journalist may write anything calculated to excite even the smallest and mildest feelings of ill-will towards the Government. He may not say, for example, that the new Cantonments legislation, which has very properly excited a storm of indignation in India, is unworthy of a civilised Government. The journalist must be affectionate towards the Government, or he is seditious.

A Reuter's telegram of September 24 stated that Mr. Tilak's application for an appeal to the Privy Council had been heard before a full court and rejected. If such an application was really made, it is not easy to understand its purpose. It is not for



the High Court of Bombay to determine whether in such a case application may be made to the Privy Council. If a point of law had been reserved by the Judge, or if the Advocate-General had given his *fiat* for a re-hearing, the matter would no doubt have been determined by the High Court. But, as we understand the procedure, an application to the Privy Council is independent of the High Court and may yet be made in Mr. Tilak's case. If such an application should be made, the Privy Council would probably hear it, and, although it might not grant the appeal, it might according to precedent take some other important step provided that it were satisfied that something less than justice had been done. It has been generally assumed at home that Mr. Tilak's jury necessarily consisted of equal numbers of Indians and Englishmen. That is a mistake. The composition of the jury, whatever it may have been, and one will not know that until one sees the names, was controlled by the accident of a sort of ballot. It is to be remarked that Mr. Justice Strachey sentenced Mr. Tilak to rigorous imprisonment. The sentence is, of course, within the law. But the law also permits simple imprisonment, which is plainly not severe enough for Mr. Strachey's taste. The severity of rigorous imprisonment for eighteen months—a far harder thing than the hard labour of English prisons—is in the case of a man of Mr. Tilak's temperament and physique merely inconceivable. His prison, no doubt, will be the hospital. But the nature of the sentence, like the tone of the summing-up, indicates the judge's frame of mind. The most charitable supposition is that he acted, not vindictively, but as a victim of the really humiliating panic which seems to have taken possession, if not of Anglo-Indian society, at least of the Anglo-Indian press. A more suitable case for the equitable intervention of the Privy Council it would not be easy to find. The real question is, whether Mr. Tilak's conduct was or was not consistent with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government. Extracts from the incriminated articles—and it seems fair to assume that the worst passages were extracted—have been printed in the English press. Will any candid reader deny that they were compatible with a law-abiding disposition? For our part, we find it impossible to conceive that an Indian in the position of Mr. Tilak should be capable of thinking that the overthrow of British rule in India would benefit either his fellow-countrymen or himself. Yet that is the thought which Mr. Strachey's verdict and sentence ascribe to him. To incite to sedition is to incite to the subversion of the established government. What possible object could a man like Mr. Tilak hope to compass by such means? Political speakers and writers in England may advocate Indian Home Rule as a goal for British statesmanship to aim at. But we have never yet met with an Indian who believed either that Indians could wholly govern India or that any other foreign rule would be more acceptable to them than British rule. Educated Indians—the Indians of the National Congress—accept the permanence of British rule in India as the starting-point of their hopes for the future, and they seek to make that permanence

secure by removing from British rule the elements of weakness—arising chiefly from imperfect knowledge and its offspring, imperfect sympathy—which undoubtedly impair its hold upon the affections of the people. The anarchists of the Anglo-Indian press stigmatise this attitude as sedition, thereby committing the crime which they condemn. Men like Mr. Tilak, we are convinced, know that the interests of their country are bound up with the permanence of British rule. They know, also, that to a government situated as the Government of India is the friendly advice and warning of journals which are closely in touch with the mass of the people are, or ought to be, highly useful. Can anybody point to anything in the *Kesari* that is inconsistent with this temper?

The truth is, no doubt, that the prosecution of Mr. Tilak, and the many other prosecutions for sedition which have lately occurred in India, would not have occurred at all if the foul crimes of June 22 had not been committed. The attitude of mind induced in Anglo-Indians of the less judicial type by the assassination of Mr. Rand and Lieutenant Ayerst makes it easy to leap to conclusions, and to read a sinister meaning into innocent words and deeds. But it is an attitude of mind against which civilised rulers should be on their guard, and especially rulers exercising authority on Indian soil in the midst of a vast population which they do not, and to some extent we fear will not, understand. Acts like the deportation of the brothers Natu, and the sentences of transportation for life and for seven years upon the editor and the publisher of the *Mahrani*, not only stink in the nostrils of Englishmen at home. They also do infinitely more harm than good in India, because, quite apart from the injustice done to individuals, they point to government controlled not by reason, but by panic. The deportation of the brothers Natu, for which, under the Regulation of 1827, it appears that the Governor of Bombay is personally responsible, has struck terror into thousands of innocent men in India. So grave a step, one naturally supposes, must have been taken upon some sort of definite information. But if the information appeared to be substantial, why were not the suspects brought to trial? Medieval methods of the kind adopted are baffling and disconcerting to those who would gladly see the Government of India establishing itself more and more firmly upon the sure ground of popular confidence and affection. Within what time, one would like to know, are the brothers Natu to be brought to trial? Or is no trial contemplated? Meantime, is it the case that while the Regulation provides for the attachment of "estates and lands" only—in other words, of immoveable property—the moveable property of the Natus, including jewels to the value of many lakhs, has been attached as well? Has the Government of Bombay, chafing at the excessive scrupulousness of its legalised though essentially despotic powers, overstepped their limits? As for the Satara sentences, it would be difficult to express one's sense of their iniquity in adequate terms. Even the India Office appears to have gone out of its way to apologise for them, and to explain, through the convenient medium of Reuter, that they are subject to



revision by the High Court. Professor Murray, of Glasgow, probably expressed the general feeling when he said: "No mention is made of incitements to murder or to political violence; and unless some offence at least as grave as these be hidden in the background, it will be difficult for the ordinary Englishman to acquit his Indian officials of acting in a spirit of revenge or panic." The assassinations at Poona, and a hasty theory regarding them, are at the bottom of the whole series of humiliating blunders. The authorities in India leapt to the conclusion that the crimes were the result of a widespread conspiracy. Yet the offer of a reward of enormous amount in the eyes of the average Indian, together with the promise of a free pardon to any person cognisant, though not actually guilty, of the murders, has so far produced no charge, not even a false one. That does not wear the look of conspiracy. On the other hand, it is becoming more and more clear that the plague administration at Poona, with which the assassinations have been (perhaps too hastily) associated, gave great offence to an excited and almost despairing population. One sees it stated that Sir William Wedderburn, in the House of Commons, "put on a white sheet and apologised for having supported the memorials." Sir William Wedderburn did nothing of the kind. He expressed his regret for having indirectly aided in giving currency to a particular charge which was not substantiated. That particular charge, which was based upon private correspondence, had absolutely no connexion with the Poona Memorial of May 10, which the Government of Bombay so disastrously neglected. Sir W. Wedderburn neither supported this memorial nor apologised for it. He asked Lord George Hamilton whether he had seen it, and by his timely intervention at a season of uncommon difficulty in the House of Commons prevented the press-gagging Act which was threatened by the Secretary of State and eagerly demanded by the yelling Tory pack below the gangway. The Poona Memorial, which has never needed apology, is now receiving support from unexpected quarters. Dr. Barry, who was appointed by the Collector of Poona to examine the sanitary condition of the city, and whose report encouraged the *Times* to print an unusually mischievous and unfair article on "Brahmin Self-Government," has made an important statement. He was the special medical officer at Poona while the plague was rife, and he says that as he was frequently engaged at the plague hospital the European soldiers placed at his disposal for plague duty "were left to themselves all over the city without an officer to keep them in hand." This statement reminds one of the similar statement in the *Times of India* of June 18, that the soldiers "worked in all sorts of out-of-the-way places, far from the cognizance of their officers." Dr. Barry adds that he had no complaint of misbehaviour, but, of course, he was not the officer to whom such complaints would naturally be addressed. They were made to the Plague Committee and afterwards to the Government of Bombay. The authorities in India will not make good their slackness in dealing with those complaints by harsh treatment of native

editors and other suspects. Press prosecutions are, at the best, merely symptomatic treatment. At the worst they mean government by panic, which can lead only to disaster.

## THE COST OF THE "FORWARD" FOLLY.

### "THIS SILENT BLEEDING TO DEATH."

"If we enter on a course of successive measures of fresh taxation, Russia, without moving a man or a gun, need only bide her time. If slow and sure is her game, surely and slowly we shall be playing her hand for her."—*Sir Auckland Colvin.*

"The facts which I have brought to your notice may be briefly recapitulated—an eastern country governed in accordance with expensive Western ideas; an immense and poor population; a narrow margin of possible additional revenue; a constant tendency for expenditure to outgrow revenue; a system of government in India favourable to increase of, and unfavourable to reduction of, expenditure; no financial control by intelligent and well-informed public opinion either in India or in England; an insufficient check on expenditure in India; a remote and imperfect control exercised from England; a revenue specially liable to fluctuations year to year, and growing foreign payments."—*Sir David Barbour.*

By the courtesy of Colonel H. B. Hanna (formerly belonging to the Punjab Frontier Force and late commanding at Delhi) we are able to reproduce from his admirable little book, "Backwards or Forwards?" (Westminster: A. Constable and Co.) the accompanying table, containing "the official confession of the cost of the Forward Policy to the people of India, a confession that is very far from telling the whole tale of cruel exactions and dangerous waste which is the true history of that policy."

The table, it is to be noted, does not represent fully even the *direct* cost of the forward policy to India. Deceptive classifications in the official accounts make it impossible to compile a full statement.

Nor does the table throw any light on the *indirect* price which the indigent taxpayers of India have had to pay. As Colonel Hanna says:—"When we consider the enormous amount of labour which, during the last eighteen [now, nineteen] years, has been turned more or less by force into unproductive channels, and the vast number of lives sacrificed whether in the making of military roads and railways or in the transport of stores of all kinds to distant outposts; when we add to this drain upon India's first element of prosperity—her industrial population—the waste of her resources in the shape of beasts of burden—camels, mules, ponies, donkeys, and bullocks—withdrawn for the same purposes from the service of the peasant in districts where not only the actual cultivation of the soil, but often the very possibility of such cultivation depends upon their use, and from the service of the trader in regions where trade has no other means of transit, we stand aghast at this silent bleeding to death of a people whom most Englishmen honestly desire to benefit."



STATEMENT SHOWING APPROXIMATE COST OF THE FORWARD POLICY ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER  
UP TO 1896, INCLUDING THE AFGHAN WAR OF 1878-79-80.

	Rupees.	
I. The Afghan War .. .. .	223,110,000 <sup>1</sup>	Sir Evelyn Baring, Financial Member of the Viceroy's Council.
II. Military Railways on the North-West Frontier since the War ..	163,967,910 <sup>2</sup>	Administrative Reports on Railways in India.
III. Beluchistan Agency since the War. Government Allotment, } Rs. 865,600 per annum for sixteen years .. .. .	13,849,600	{ <i>Moral and Material Progress of India</i> , 1893-94, p. 157.
IV. Special Grants to Beluchistan Agency—		Financial Statements—
Reservoir in Pishin .. .. . Rs. 261,240		1889-90, p. 15, par. 31.
Quetta Water Works .. .. . 499,000	1,134,240	1891-92, ,, 23, ,, 16.
Buildings at Quetta .. .. . 374,000		1892-93, ,, 32, ,, 84.
V. Lease of Quetta District, and subsidy in lieu of right to collect } tolls in the Bolan Pass since 1883 .. .. .	715,000	{ <i>Progress and Condition of India</i> , 1891-92, p. 15.
VI. Preparations for War with Russia in 1885 .. .. .	22,880,710	Official Estimate. Return, dated, India Office, June 8, 1894.
VII. Special Defence Works on Frontier and Rawal Pindi .. ..	30,000,000 <sup>3</sup>	Approximate.
VIII. Military Roads on North-West Frontier; expended principally } on the Dera Ghazi Khan and Pishin road .. .. .	2,000,000 <sup>4</sup>	Financial Statement—1888-89, p. 10.
IX. Afghan Boundary Commissions .. .. .	1,700,000	Financial Statements—
X. Permanent Increase of Indian Army in 1885-86—		1885-86, p. 22, par. 52.
A. 10,753 British Troops .. .. . Rs. 95,809,200		1894-95, ,, 27, ,, 118.
B. 19,220 Native Troops .. .. . 65,924,600	162,286,100	{ Official Estimate. Return, dated, India Office, June 8, 1894.
C. Deferred Pay of above British Troops .. .. . 553,000		
XI. Increase in the Native Pension Establishment, due to the Afghan } War, Waziri and Chitral Campaigns, and other expedi- } tions on North-West Frontier .. .. .	18,591,300	Approximate.
XII. Cost to Government of Imperial Service Troops .. .. .	1,400,000	<i>Progress and Condition of India</i> , 1894-95, p. 169.
XIII. Re-establishment and Maintenance of British Agency at Gilgit—		<i>Blue Book, Chitral</i> , p. 20.
A. For three years, at the rate of Rs. 50,000 } a year .. .. . Rs. 150,000		Financial Statements—
B. For four years, at the rate of Rs. 200,000 } a year .. .. . 800,000		1893-94, p. 7, par. 11.
C. Special Grant .. .. . 90,000	3,005,500	1894-95, ,, 21, ,, 83.
D. „ .. .. . 481,500		1893-94, ,, 7, ,, 11.
E. Transport .. .. . 784,000		1893-94, ,, 13, ,, 24.
F. „ .. .. . 300,000		1894-95, ,, 28, ,, 121.
G. „ .. .. . 400,000		
XIV. Re-occupation of the Kuram Valley in 1892-93, at Rs. 450,000 } per annum, for three years .. .. .	1,350,000	{ Financial Statement—1893-94, p. 7, par. 11.
XV. Grants for so-called Mobilisation—		Financial Statements—
A. 1889 .. .. . Rs. 2,035,000		1889-90, p. 24, par. 57.
B. 1890 .. .. . 600,000	5,385,000 <sup>5</sup>	1890-91, ,, 8, ,, 12.
C. 1891 .. .. . 2,134,000		1892-93, ,, 8, ,, 13.
D. 1892 .. .. . 616,000		1892-93, ,, 32, ,, 84.
XVI. Additional Transport Animals, Re-mounts, and Mules—		Financial Statements—
A. 1891 .. .. . Rs. 1,321,000		1892-93, p. 8, par. 13.
B. 1893 .. .. . 267,000	1,825,000 <sup>6</sup>	1894-95, ,, 6, ,, 9.
C. 1894 .. .. . 237,000		1894-95, ,, 28, ,, 121.
XVII. Rise in price of food, forage, and increase of number of animals } to be fed—		Financial Statements—
A. 1889 .. .. . Rs. 795,000		1889-90, p. 24, par. 57.
B. 1892 .. .. . 1,500,000	3,485,000	1893-94, ,, 7, ,, 11.
C. 1893 .. .. . 700,000		1893-94, ,, 27, ,, 63.
D. 1894 .. .. . 490,000		1894-95, ,, 28, ,, 121.
XVIII. Expeditions on North-West Frontier since 1888-89 .. ..	5,075,680	Official Estimate. Return, dated, India Office, June 8, 1894.
XIX. Minor operations (not scheduled) since 1884-85 .. .. .	3,239,100	Official Estimate.
XX. Waziri Campaign, including cost of Delimitation Commission, } Fortified Post and Tochi Cantonments .. .. .	3,824,000	{ Financial Statements—1895-96, p. 15, par. 50, and p. 56, par. 200.; 1896-97, p. 34, par. 132.
XXI. Chitral Campaign, including occupation of Chitral during past } and present year .. .. .	21,500,000	{ Financial Statement—1896-97, p. 7, par. 11, and footnote.
XXII. Khyber Rifles raised after the War .. .. .	1,398,240	<i>Progress and Condition of India</i> , 1891-92, p. 17.
XXIII. Subsidies—		13 years at 12 lakhs, 3 at 18 lakhs.
A. Amir of Afghanistan since the War .. .. . Rs. 21,000,000		<i>Progress and Condition of India</i> , 1891-92, p. 17.
B. Khyberies „ .. .. . 1,400,640		<i>Chitral Blue Book</i> , pp. 9 and 13.
C. Ruler of Chitral and his brothers .. .. . 60,000	22,857,400	<i>Progress and Condition of India</i> , 1891-92, p. 17.
D. Gomal Chiefs since 1890 .. .. . 296,760		<i>Progress and Condition of India</i> , 1891-92, pp. 16 and 18.
E. Other small Chiefs on North-West Frontier .. .. . 100,000		
Total Rupees .. .. .	714,580,480	

<sup>1</sup> Five millions sterling were contributed by the English Exchequer to the War Expenses.

<sup>2</sup> Provision is made in the Budget Estimate for 1896-97 for a further sum of Rs. 4,954,000 to be expended on these useless railways.

<sup>3</sup> "A large sum has been spent on defences and military establishments at Quetta, including an advanced position covering the place, strategic roads, and defences for various bridges, tunnels, etc., on the Sind-Pishin Railway. . . . An entrenched position has been formed at Rawal Pindi, and a defensive post at Multan."—*Indian Finance Statement for 1896-97*.

<sup>4</sup> This sum only represents a small portion of the money expended on military roads in Beluchistan and other places b yond the Indus, as large sums are annually disbursed by both the military and civil departments in building new roads and maintaining the old ones.

<sup>5</sup> Provision is made in the Budget Estimate for 1896-97, for Rs. 4,949,000, "for preparations for mobilisation of the Field Army."

<sup>6</sup> The maintenance of the Transport Branch of the Commissariat Department cost, in 1893-94, no less than Rs. 3,408,140; yet, in the following year, it broke down when called upon to provide carriage for the Division of 15,000 men mobilised for the relief of Chitral.



## WHEN IS A FRONTIER NOT A FRONTIER?

(FROM AN ANGLO-INDIAN CORRESPONDENT.)

What is a frontier? What do differently coloured areas on a map represent? Any school-boy, it might be taken for granted, could readily reply to these questions. And yet if we look at recently published maps of the North-Western frontier of India we shall find that, as regards at least that part of the globe, a frontier is not a frontier; and, further, we shall see that the familiar "coloured-red" of British India is swept over territory that is not, never has been, and never will be British territory. In Stanford's map, just published, of "The North-Western Frontier of India" the line that marks the border in the region west of Peshawur between British India (coloured red) and Afghanistan (coloured green) intersects the Khyber route leading from that city to Kabul, some three miles to the west of Lundi Kotal. That post, therefore, Ali Musjid and Fort Maude, are thus all on the "coloured-red" area of the map, and consequently appear as within British territory. It is not possible to believe that either in this map or in other maps of the North-Western frontier of India that have been published of late years, and in which the frontier is similarly given between that country and Afghanistan, this could have been done without the knowledge of the India Office and the frontier military "experts." It may be accepted as certain that both have been consulted in the matter, and equally certain is it that this fanciful laying down of the frontier of India has been deliberately authorised. The unreserved acceptance of the views of a military *clique*, whose headquarters have been established for some years past at "silly Simla," has unquestionably landed the Government of India in an almost hopeless entanglement. The North-Western frontier maps of India and a recently published utterance of a distinguished Central Asian traveller on the so-called "forward policy," of which it would appear he is a warm advocate, prove this, to say nothing of the present attitude of the tribes occupying the country all the way along from the Tochi River in the south to the Swat River in the north, who have been stung into the frenzy of a fanatical war with us by our irritating policy, and who are now shedding their blood in the desperate hope of retaining their greatly cherished independence, which we have given them every reason to believe we were bent on destroying.

Those of us who understand the term frontier as meaning the border dividing one country from another country, and who regard the differently coloured areas on a map as showing the extent of territory respectively held by States whose dominions are adjacent to one another, will of course be told that the North-Western frontier of India, as now drawn, is "the scientific frontier" of India. The meaning of this term no man born of woman has either yet ever understood or been able to give of it a reasonable or intelligible explanation. The great belt of country extending from Mastuj and Chitral on the north, to Bunnoo on the south, that is to say, the region bordering the Punjab, the most north-western province of India, and on the far side of which from India "the scientific frontier" is drawn, being of the nature it is, wild and most difficult of access from either side, the term conveys, as a matter of fact, no intelligible meaning at all, and never will do so. It was coined for more than one purpose. One was to throw a halo of profound sagacity on the visionary views of the Simla Vaubans, who eventually convinced themselves that Chitral, if held by India, might be regarded as a bastion flanking the flank attack of the main attack that Russia *might* some day make on India. All this in a country where to keep a mule on his legs for a few weeks in the year requires months and months of careful preparation. Another was

to reassure, in a certain measure, as well as to mystify, John Bull. He could not be looked upon as the one to bear the cost of this policy, puzzling though it was. "The scientific frontier" of India was clearly the concern of the Indian exchequer, and not of the Imperial. As regards this—the cost of the luxury of a scientific frontier of India—the advocates of the forward policy were wise in their generation in giving it the term they did, for as long as things went fairly smooth, the rupees for establishing posts, making roads, and bribing tribal chiefs in the belt, would be shelled out of the Indian treasury without giving rise to any serious clamour out of India.

When is a frontier not a frontier? Given the map of the North-Western frontier of India, find the frontier. This is what Captain Younghusband, the very distinguished Central Asian traveller alluded to above, is reported to have said on the subject. In the course of a recent interview with a representative of Reuter's Agency, Captain Younghusband said: "The forts"—that is to say, the Khyber pass forts, Lundi Kotal, Ali Musjid, etc.—"are not in British territory." The fighting has taken place, he explains, "in the great belt of independent tribes who can turn out some 200,000 fighting men." It is this great tract of wild country, now "coloured red" in the maps, and thus appearing to be British territory, as we have shown, that it has been "the policy of the Government of India for some years past gradually to get within their control." "These hillmen," Captain Younghusband says, "are never very slow to find reason for fighting, and when they see a post in their country held by infidels it is no very difficult task for the Mullahs to incite them to attack it." And yet knowing this full well, as the Government of India must have done, it has authorised during the last few years, in deference to the views of the Simla military clique, the scattering broadcast of small military garrisons over the length and breadth of this great belt. Captain Younghusband considers that the "duty of Empire," though it may take us half-a-century, will drive us, whether it will "be prudent or the reverse, into effecting control over every one of these turbulent tribes on the Indian frontier." In a remarkable letter by Mr. George Curzon, published in the *Times* when the present Government reversed the policy of their predecessors and retained Chitral, that gentleman termed the policy of those who differed from his views, and who were of opinion that establishing scattered posts in the tribal country was wrong in a political as well as a military sense, the "Policy of Drift." In a letter as remarkable—only in another sense, as the writer was intimately acquainted with the borderland and the tribes inhabiting it—also published by the *Times* at the time, Sir Neville Chamberlain replied that the "Policy of Drift" was applicable rather to the views of those advocating wild schemes of indefinitely extending the control of the Government of India over countries outside and far beyond its proper frontier. As to who was right let this recent statement of Captain Younghusband speak. "Whether prudent or the reverse" we must go on even if it takes us fifty years! The views then published by Sir Neville Chamberlain on the question were eminently sound, as everyone who had taken the trouble to form his own opinion on the subject, unbiassed by the shouting of a numerically strong party, must have seen. That he was one who was fully competent to form a sound opinion on the subject was shown in a letter then published by a distinguished officer who had served under him. General Brownlow wrote that those who had served under Sir Neville Chamberlain respected his "political sagacity and experience, no less than they admired him as a hard-fighting soldier."

If anything were wanting to prove how inept has been our trans-frontier policy of late years and how unsound the views of the military clique at Simla as regards the strategical value of distant garrisons and posts in a wild



and as yet unconquered country, it is afforded by Captain Younghusband's ingenuous remark, "the course [that is, in the trans-frontier belt] which the rulers of India have to follow is practically laid down by circumstances, and is beyond their control." History so far has not taught us that either great statesmen or great generals have deliberately put their countries, whose policy they guided and whose armies they commanded, into circumstance beyond their control. Captain Younghusband added that "the eventual outcome of the outbreak will probably be a more lasting but solid settlement of the frontier than has ever yet existed." Nothing is reported as having been said by him as to the cost of this *probable* result of an army of 59,000 men with 90 guns being assembled on and beyond the proper frontier of India to put down the outbreak. Englishmen will soon have to realise that as regards this, successive Governments having authorised the present disastrous policy, the Imperial Treasury will have to bear the cost, as it will be impossible for India to do so with an exchequer on the verge of bankruptcy. Once this were realised, no time would be lost in giving India the definite frontier on the North-West that stood it in good stead during the Indian rebellion of forty years ago. And those who believe that that frontier is the true frontier in that region of our Indian Empire would be spared such statements as the notorious one of Mr. Balfour when the present Government reversed the honest and statesmanlike policy of Lord Rosebery's Government as regards Chitral. In justifying the retention of that mud-fort after our garrison had been relieved, and contrary to her Majesty's proclamation to the tribes, Mr. Balfour said in the House of Commons, when charged with extending by that act the boundaries of the Empire, that we had *not* extended the boundaries of the Empire, inasmuch as the Government of India cannot use the troops of India beyond the boundaries of India without statutory provision. There had been no statutory provision. The Government had used Indian troops within the territory of Chitral. "So it followed," he added, "that Chitral is within and not without the boundaries of the Empire of India."

#### AN OFFICIAL "NON POSSUMUS."

(FROM A CORRESPONDENT.)

The other day the papers and Chambers of Commerce in Britain were roused a little from the dulness of the "gooseberry" season by a Report on the Trade of the British Empire and Foreign Competition. That report is issued as the consequence of the circular sent from the Colonial Office in November, 1895, requesting information from all the Colonies respecting the competition from foreign sources in the Colonies with goods produced by Great Britain and its Colonies. Comparative statistics and specific notes on a schedule of goods in competition, including sixty-eight heads of merchandise, were sought. The fat volume recently issued is the result, and there can be no doubt as to the interest it has awakened, or the importance of the matter in hand. At home parties which are frequently at loggerheads as to commercial policy unite in a cordial appreciation and approval of the step taken by the Colonial Department. In the Colonies the question was very heartily entertained, and from some of the chief of them elaborate replies are furnished, which are the result of much labour and enquiry. Very important documents of an elaborate character have been sent from Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, and Hong Kong, raising questions of pressing importance to all engaged in commerce. From every part of the globe, save one, the response to this effort to stimulate trade must have been gratifying to its promoters. Save one—and that is India!

Of course, the Colonial Office could not officially communicate with India, and so, at the instance of the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce, Lord George Hamilton moved the Indian Government to attend to the documents forwarded. "The Government of India," he said, "will be directed to give your proposal careful and, if possible, favourable consideration." The volume now in question contains at the end a return from India, the perusal of which must have stirred up feelings of a mixed sort in some quarters.

No complaint can be made respecting the statistical matter supplied; it is well got up, and in form excellent. The result, on the basis suggested from the Colonial Office, is that of Indian trade affected, viz., of imports of goods of which more than five per cent. is of foreign importation—in 1884, of the total of £7,395,180, £1,718,810 were foreign imports; in 1889, of £11,367,110, there were £3,141,950; and in 1894, of £11,695,540, there were £4,279,230. In other words, the foreign percentage of the total in 1884 was 24.0; in 1889, 27.6; and in 1894, 36.6; which shows an increase, a cumulating and accelerating increase, of 12½ per cent. during the ten years in question. Other calculations show that the figures for the years chosen are a fair average for the period. Then, with respect to the points suggested for specific discussion, viz., price, quality, and finish, suitability of the goods for the market, packing, and false marking, the notes are much like those from the Colonies in their trend and suggestion. The commerce of India with Britain and her Colonies has been affected by, in addition to reasons topographical and geographical, a greater care on the part of competitors for the quality of goods suiting the means of purchasers, thus affecting price; by the kind of articles imported, which in many cases are non-British products; and by a study of the taste and prejudices of purchasers. All these, it is quite clear, are practical matters which are being taken to heart in England, notwithstanding a kind of negative consolation from the suggestion that the quality of British goods in many cases is too high for the purpose sought. Referring to Germany, Austria, and Belgium, it is remarked of cutlery and hardware (and the same applies to other goods, such as metals) that "the same three countries are thrusting their hardware and cutlery vigorously upon the Indian market. Although the articles are decidedly inferior, they are, being much cheaper than English cutlery and hardware, extensively used by natives." How suggestive that Bass & Co. have seized the idea, and brew a specially light beer for Indian consumption! Not less significant in another direction is the reference to salt, which has now to be brought from Germany since a "syndicate combined to pool the profits of English production and raise the price of salt to a high figure," and here the "the quality is similar to the quality of Cheshire salt." Monopolies may suit individuals—they blister communities. These facts are interesting, and they may be found to be of the deepest import in reference to the productive trade of the Empire. They should probably be scanned with caution, however impressive and suggestive in detail, as each Colony almost is for trade purposes foreign to every other, and there may be a question whether the basis of the enquiry, the Empire against the world, is commercially and economically a valid one. There cannot be a question, however, that it is highly useful to get returns showing the drift of trade, and that occasionally in considerable detail.

That being so, although the report from India says it is "slightly modified and enlarged" when compared with the instructions given in the Colonial Office circular—a fact not easily perceptible, especially when compared with the other replies—it must be said that the Indian reply leaves much to be desired, especially in tone and



temper. The compiler makes it abundantly clear that he regarded the whole thing as a nuisance. But, sparing our own comment, the better way is to quote the leading paragraph of the report preceding the tables. Referring to the points suggested by the Colonial Office for discussion (given above), Lord George Hamilton is told from Simla that :

"The last of these heads may be dismissed from consideration with the remark that the Indian law relating to merchandise marks, which is in substance the same as the English law, prevents, or should prevent, the substitution of foreign for British goods under the disguise of false marking." That "or should prevent" is for loftiness combined with recklessness hard to beat. But more remains. His lordship the Secretary for India must understand more, as follows :

"As regards the other heads, it will be evident to your lordship that it would not be possible for us to discuss them as proposed without an elaborate preliminary investigation, conducted by the aid of commercial bodies, and with the assistance of importers. We do not gather that such investigation is suggested to us, and therefore we have deemed it unnecessary to undertake an enquiry, which is more properly one for individual traders interested in particular businesses than for the Government. Some of the information required is moreover of such a nature that probably traders would object to communicate it to us."

Now that reply, this lecture, was sent from Simla on May 26, 1896, when the circular from the Colonial Office had been acknowledged by the India Office in December, 1895. So that five months after date the writer opines that an investigation with the aid of commercial bodies and importers cannot, surely, be suggested to him—such a thing was business—not for Government! Now, the volume itself is the best answer to this—official impertinence. Other Governments have responded heartily. We said that the writer, meaning thereby some official at Simla or Calcutta, opines as above; but this precious document, with its truculent hint that details of the course of trade are not the business of Government, is signed by "Elgin, G. S. White, J. Westland, J. Woodburn, M. D. Chalmers, E. H. H. Collen, and A. C. Trevor," which makes it all the more remarkable. Must we, therefore, conclude that consultation with chambers of commerce and with individual importers respecting the drift of trade is quite beneath the notice of the Indian Government? India's ports dealt with a traffic of merchandise only in 1894-5 of Rx. 182,500,000, and shall it be said of this that the rulers are not concerned, after five months' consideration, with investigating in detail the welfare of such a vast commerce! And how shall we regard the Secretary of State for India's attitude in this matter? He represents the paramount power, the Imperial Government, so-called; but has he resented the scolding, the scorn, the sublime disdain, the documentary kicking, here administered to his lordly, or shall we say his very unlordly, meek self? When the Imperial Government directs such an administrative enquiry to be made, will it be permitted the Indian officials to scold the Secretary of State and tell him that he does not know his business?

The present position of Indian finance may, at least, be shrewdly guessed at by aid of two recent statements in the overland papers: (a) the revenue receipts to the end of July, that is, for one-third of the current financial year, "are a crore and a half worse than up to the same date last year"; and (b) "the cash balance in the Treasuries and Presidency banks is *nine* crores against *fifteen* crores on the same date (that is, the end of August) last year." Thus the loss of income and the excess of outgoings present on the face of things a deficit of seven and a-half crores of rupees—Rx. 7,500,000. But this is only on the face of it. The depletion of the cash balance only partially indicates the excess of expenditure.

## THE SENTENCE ON MR. TILAK.

### OPINIONS OF THE BRITISH PRESS.

THE STANDARD (September 15.)

The facts relied upon by the prosecution are, perhaps, of less importance than the Judge's summing up, and his definition of what constitutes sedition. Disaffection, Mr. Justice Strachey said, meant hostility or ill-will of any sort towards the Government. Whoever attempted to excite such feelings was liable to punishment under the Penal Code. "Not action but feeling was the test"; by which is meant, we presume, that there is no need to prove an attempt to incite active disloyalty. To incite, or attempt to incite, disloyal feelings, or "ill-will of any sort" is an offence. "Comments upon a Government measure if they excite hatred of Government," come within the meaning of the Section; and therefore render the commentator liable to the punishment provided. The law being thus interpreted, it is difficult to see how the jury could have come to any other conclusion. Rightly or wrongly, the judge left them no option. At the same time, it must be confessed that if his remarks have been correctly reported, the judge gave a stricter meaning to the words of the Code than will be found in the explanations that have previously been accepted by jurists and by the Law Courts. The late Sir James Stephen who was responsible for this section of the Penal Code, used the following language:—"You may say what you like about any Government measure, you may publish or speak what you please, so long as you say or write what is consistent with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government." Might it not be contended that hatred and detestation of the Government are sometimes compatible, or in practice may be co-existent, with a disposition to obey the commands of a stronger power? We have it on the authority of a late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal that, in the opinion of the ablest lawyers in India, forcible resistance to Government must be distinctly advocated to bring a newspaper within the scope of the law. Unquestionably, Mr. Justice Strachey has given greater elasticity to the wording of the Code.

THE SATURDAY REVIEW. (September 15.)

It is much to be regretted that a test trial for seditious writing, and the authoritative exposition of the present penal law, could not have been held over some question less calculated to stir to their depths the most violent feelings of the native community. It is not less unfortunate that the murder of two of its [*i.e.*, Government's] officers, shortly after the seditious articles appeared, may have seemed to give to the prosecution by the Government on this occasion an air of vindictiveness and retaliation rather than of a calm administrative act. Public sympathy will be with the condemned man. He will be regarded as one who has dared publicly to avow native sentiments, and to assail the administration at a moment when it threatened the inviolability of hearth and home, and as having fallen a victim to his honourable ambition. The severity of the sentence will certainly not lessen the approval and recognition with which Mr. Gangadhar Tilak's appeals have been regarded by those to whom they were addressed. Justice may have been meted out in the High Court of Bombay to the satisfaction of the Government, but in native opinion it is the Government itself which will be condemned. What it has to do now is to put itself right as soon and as best it can with the local community, whose most valued privileges it has been compelled, however unwillingly, to disregard. The authorities at Simla, on the other hand, will scarcely consider the present moment opportune for recommending a more stringent press law, and accentuating native discontent at such an unfortunate crisis, by throwing further difficulties in the way of its free expression.

THE DAILY CHRONICLE. (September 15.)

Had it not been for the murders of Lieutenant Ayerst and Mr. Rand nothing would ever have been heard of the recent "sedition" of the native press. We have no sympathy with incitement to crime masquerading as criticism. But in this particular case the prosecution admitted their inability to connect the murders with the articles. This, after all, is the important point. Did these articles amount to an incitement to murder? The prosecution offered no evidence; and in the absence of evidence there must remain a doubt of the justice



of so severe a sentence on the accused. . . . After all, here is the main point. In all these Indian trials there is no evidence of anything that approaches concerted sedition. Wildness, discontent, mischievous rubbish, there may be in plenty. But we have got on with it, and we shall get on with it again. Prove real sedition—above all, conclusively connect it with crime—and we should all favour sharp, stern punishment. But when it comes to overhauling poems, and constructing elaborate innuendoes from eulogies of picturesque and popular bandits—above all, when the attempt is made to apply to the hysteria of Oriental oratory the standards of a less fervid imagination, one feels that the Government are on a perilous path.

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. (September 15.)

Mr. Tilak has been convicted, and though in his case the monstrous absurdity of a life sentence has been avoided, the punishment inflicted is one that could only be justified by a very serious offence. Whether Mr. Tilak's offence was or was not so serious it is difficult to decide, in view of the incompleteness of the reports at present to hand. The whole matter of the press prosecutions and, we may add, of the general policy of coercion in India has yet to be threshed out. But the Indian Government will make a grave and perhaps an irremediable mistake if it supposes that a few years of "resolute government" are all that is needed in the Empire for which it is responsible. Press prosecutions may suppress those overt expressions of discontent which reach and perhaps offend English ears. They cannot in a country like India touch the really dangerous methods of disseminating discontent or even concerting measures of resistance. The difficulty of our position in India is that we are strangers among the people. That we remain strangers is perhaps our main defect as a governing race. But for this very reason we shall never materially hinder the propagation of seditious ideas by striking at those methods of expression which a few educated Indians have borrowed from ourselves. We may be sure that as long as we give our Indian fellow-subjects just cause for discontent they will not lack opportunity for communicating their resentment to one another. What an editor proclaims upon the housetops thousands will be whispering in the bazaars, and we shall not stop them though we were to send every journalist in India to gaol. And is it not possible to learn something from this seditious press? When we are told that the people are oppressed with taxes, ought we not to begin by acknowledging the simple truth of the statement, and go on to recognise that this is a definite source of discontent to remove which would do something really effectual towards checking the utterance of seditious sentiments, because it would mitigate those sentiments themselves? The truth is that the adoption of the "forward" frontier policy has starved India. We can hardly expect cheerful contentment in a country which we are draining of its resources in order to maintain a policy of most doubtful advantage to ourselves and of no interest at all to the people who have to pay for it.

THE DAILY NEWS. (September 15.)

It seemed at first as if Mr. Tilak was likely to fare as ill; for, according to first reports, he was unable to obtain the services of a really able counsel in Bombay; and Mr. Pugh practices in Calcutta. To us in England it is a matter of course that the worst of criminals should be defended, and not simply defended, but should have their case put before the jury by the ablest counsel they can fee. But in India, very unhappily, there is marked reluctance on the part of counsel to appear against the Government, not merely in a case of sedition, but in any case whatever. It would be a wise course on the part of high Government officials to guide the practice and the feeling steadily into the healthier grooves of a larger freedom and a larger confidence. The case, further, shows that the excited demands for stronger measures of legal suppression of native newspapers were entirely out of place. The arm of the existing law has reached Mr. Tilak in a case of the most subtle nature. How much easier, then, must it be to deal with the more blatant and unconsidered effusions of more excited and less ingenious scribes!

TRUTH. (September 23.)

Our Empire, in fact, hangs upon the religious differences that exist between Hindus and Muhammadans. They do not love us, but they love each other less. Once let patriotism get the better of religious antagonism, and our Empire would be

in serious danger. In the world's history this has more than once occurred. . . . We ought long ago to have endeavoured to gradually teach the natives how to govern themselves. But this we have not been prepared to do, because we know that self-government would mean that India is no longer to be drained of her resources for our benefit. We have so thoroughly adopted the doctrine that the East exists alone for the good of the West, and that Orientals, not being endowed by Providence with the ability to rule themselves, ought to be ruled by Westerners as the Vicegerents of Providence, that we are unable to free ourselves from it. Equality between them and us we do not recognise. They are the subordinate race: we are the ruling race in the scheme of the Universe.

THE STAR. (September 15.)

Mr. Justice Strachey's summing-up in the Tilak case, and his sentence of eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment upon the defendant, may well fill the best friends of British rule in India—among whom we take leave to count ourselves—with consternation and dismay. These of us who habitually read Anglo-Indian newspapers like the *Pioneer*, the *Englishman*, the *Madras Mail*, and the *Times of India* have been driven during the past few weeks to the conclusion that a large section of Anglo-Indian society had temporarily lost its head. But we still expected to find coolness and level-headedness on the bench of the High Court. The expectation, it is plain, was too sanguine. What we find is not coolness and level-headedness, but the unreason of panic. . . . if we had such law as this at home, every Tory Government would be justified in sending every Liberal editor, and every Liberal Government in sending every Tory editor, to gaol. It may be replied that India is not England. No doubt. But the point is that Sir James Stephen's interpretation of his own law might without absurdity have been employed in this country. Mr. Strachey's interpretation would be merely ludicrous. If every journalist is to go to prison who excites small and mild feelings of ill-will against the Government of the day, we had better abolish newspapers without more ado. The sentence upon Mr. Tilak will, we assume, be revised and reduced. But what will be the effect of Mr. Strachey's endeavour to apply Russian or Turkish methods to the Indian Press? If it were taken seriously, it would simply have the effect of driving discontent systematically inwards. That would be a misfortune in any country, but it would be a calamity in India, where by the very nature of the case it is difficult for the Government to be adequately acquainted with the movement of ideas among its millions of subjects.

NEWCASTLE DAILY LEADER. (September 16.)

We cannot congratulate either the Indian or the Imperial Government on the result. The full reports of the trial have not been received, but the telegraphic summaries pretty clearly indicate that the hostile articles were not judged with that impartiality which British justice demands. . . . The weakness of the case against the prisoner was well illustrated in the Judge's summing up. He encouraged the jury to connect the articles and the murders, although the prosecution failed to produce one connecting link, and he gave a definition of disaffection so sweeping that we are safe to say that if Indian law were applied to this country the most respectable newspapers would not be safe one single day from prosecution. Disaffection he defined as hostility or ill-will of any kind towards the Government, and anything which tends to produce this ill-will came within the meaning of the Act and was punishable. It was not necessary to show, he contended, that active resistance was recommended. The use of words calculated to produce hatred was sufficient. How, we should like to ask, would the Conservative newspapers in this country which are applauding the verdict have fared had their vehement denunciations of more than one Liberal Government, with their insinuations of the basest motives, been subject to the test applied to Mr. Tilak's articles? But of course there is one law in India and another in Great Britain. . . . The most dangerous symptom of all is that this campaign against the native newspapers, which have hitherto been regarded as harmless safety valves, is but one phase of a process of reaction which is gradually introducing into India Russian methods of administration. Costly frontier wars are adding daily to the discontent, and the only remedies which the military clique, whose influence at Calcutta and London is daily increasing, can discover are those which the Czars and Russian bureau-



crazy resort to. Let us take care that repression does not generate in India secret societies that may be more troublesome than even those with which Russia is honeycombed.

**SOUTH WALES DAILY NEWS.** (September 16.)

It may be needful to imprison the man who tries to scatter sparks among gunpowder; but the primary fault lies with those who make the gunpowder. War, pestilence, and famine have made India's condition most grievous; and an enormous economic drain, the outcome of a defective system of administration, has for many years steadily tended to impoverish the country. For the war and the economic drain, British Government is responsible. The pestilence is a misfortune. The rigours of famine would have been lessened materially if the insurance fund had not been misappropriated to other purposes by the British rulers. Seeing that these things are so and that every educated man like Mr. Tilak in India knows them to be so, and that Britain has direct responsibility for so much of the evil from which the peninsula suffers, it is worse than folly to rejoice over imprisonment of a patriot and to fail in recognition of the real nature of the evils he has exposed. The financial condition of India is very serious, and the finances are but a reflex of the whole social situation.

### THE VOICE OF THE JINGOES.

• In India, where many races are under our alien power, a newspaper in any but English hands is peculiarly liable to be a pest.—*St. James's Gazette* (September 15).

The purpose of the prosecution will be answered if Indian officials are reminded that it is their business to take note of the intellectual food supplied to the populations under their care.—*Morning Post* (September 15).

Gangadhar Tilak has been awarded his deserts, and not twenty minutes more. The sentence of eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment hits the happy mean very satisfactorily.—*Pall Mall Gazette* (September 15).

Some such summary indication of the strong hand was sorely needed, and the native editorial eyes should be blinking for some time.—*Daily Mail* (September 15).

The trial will doubtless be keenly scrutinised both in India and, when full reports reach us, in this country also, and it is possible that there may be a division of opinion as to Tilak's guilt.—*Sootsman* (September 15).

The Indian Government gets no prestige out of the case whatever way we take it. The spectacle of the British raj appealing to a jury for the punishment of sedition is not impressive. These are essentially things to be dealt with, if dealt with at all, by power and not by pleadings. There is no question of morality or abstract justice in these matters. We must maintain our rule there for supreme political reasons, but we have no divine right to be in India. Our only right to be there is the right of the strongest.—*Newcastle Daily Chronicle* (September 16).

The acquittal of Tilak would have been a very severe blow to the Indian Government, and might have wrought an amount of evil which it would be hard to exaggerate. . . . Mr. Justice Strachey's lucid summing up must have left little doubt in the minds of the jury.—*The Globe* (September 15.)

For what has happened there is little doubt the forward policy of our Government is as much to blame as anything. It may be argued with some show of reason that to have withdrawn from Chitral after going there would have been a mistake, but military opinion at home and in India was entirely opposed to the permanent occupation of that hill district, Lord Roberts being the only eminent authority in its favour, which was only to be expected, as he is the apostle of the forward policy.—*Nottingham Daily Express* (August 21).

We have no doubt that the conclusion of the present hostilities, when it comes, will place the Indian Government in a very difficult dilemma. On the one hand, they will be inclined to get away from and out of the tortuous valleys and ravines as soon as they can. On the other, they will be confronted with the conviction that if they do nothing but retire, another ten years of independence will have restored confidence to the tribes, and have set them clamouring once again for an attack on the Infidels.—*The Economist* (Sept. 4).

## THE DEPORTATION OF THE NATU BROTHERS.

### EPITOME OF INDIAN OPINION.<sup>1</sup>

**THE KAISER-I-HIND** (Anglo-Gujerati Weekly), Bombay August 8.

Whatever may be the grievances of the natives as regards the method of administration, this much is certain, that they have unbounded confidence in the sturdy justice meted out both by criminal as well as civil courts. The most uncompromising critics of the Government give credit to them for their even-handed justice. Such confidence in the nation at large is worth much to the Government. Before the memorable day of the deportation of Natu brothers, the most ignorant Indian going never thought that the Government would ever punish its subject without giving that subject a fair trial before a duly established tribunal of justice. But the deportation of Natu brothers has taken them entirely by surprise. It has shown to them that besides possessing other powers for the suppression of disloyalty and sedition, Government have the extraordinary power of deporting bag and baggage without a trial any person whom it has reason to believe guilty of those offences. The views which a Hindu Barrister expressed to a representative of the *Bombay Gazette* were a mere echo of what people openly say, viz., "when we see people arrested and put in prison without trial, we can only wonder who will be the next."

**THE INDIAN MIRROR** (English Weekly), Calcutta August 3.

That the several arrests in Poona have filled the Indian community with alarm and consternation, goes without saying. Our countrymen have begun to think that, after those arrests, nobody's liberty or possessions are safe. It were extremely difficult, under the existing circumstances, to draw a line between what does and does not constitute sedition. What has particularly alarmed the people is the setting in motion by the Government of India of Regulation III of 1818. The Regulation is one under the provisions of which the Government may imprison and deport any one at its pleasure. That was a Regulation passed at a time when the British Power in India was still in comparative infancy. It might have been necessary, under the condition of things then obtaining. But for the Government to avail itself of its provisions now, is an anachronism. The Regulation has caused the gravest anxiety to the people, and how dangerous its provisions are, is well exemplified on the present occasion. We have no wish to-day to make any particular reference to the arrest of the Honourable Mr. Tilak. That gentleman is to be regularly put on his trial, under a certain section of the Penal Code, and he will have to take the consequences. Besides, his case is *sub judice*. But as to the arrests of the two Natu brothers, that is quite a different matter. It is these arrests that have created a panic among the people, and for very good reasons, for the Natus will undergo no sort of trial, and their fate may be that of anybody else. Under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, any one can be prosecuted for bad livelihood, as, for instance, in the case of Rai Ishri Pershad of Bankipore. But that is a different thing. We and the entire public are ignorant of the charges brought against the Natu brothers. If the only charge against the Natus is that they have been taking a prominent part in public and political movements, then the liberty of no public man in India is safe. It is true that we are living under the protection of the freest country in the world, but of what good is that fact to us, as long as Regulation III of 1818 continues to disfigure the Statute Book? How barbarous and unsuited to the spirit of the times the Regulation is, will be perceived from a perusal of its 2nd section. It is of the very greatest importance that the entire Indian population should combine, and make a powerful representation to the Government of India for the repeal of this barbarous Regulation. If, as is sought to be made out, there is sedition in the very atmosphere, and sedition-mongering prevails all around us, we think that, like the Natus, others may be arrested also, and then, the state of things in India will be probably much worse than that of Ireland. We are conscious of the greatness of

<sup>1</sup> This epitome of Indian Opinion is taken from the *Indian Spectator* of August 29.



the Government of India, we know that it can wield gigantic powers. If, then, it is meant to resort to the Regulation under which the Natus have been arrested more largely, and to send men to jail for participating in political agitation, why, it would be better before the Vernacular Press Act is revived, or the whole purely Indian section of the Press is gagged, that all the newspapers, conducted and issued by our countrymen, should cease to exist, that all our public men should betimes relegate themselves to obscurity or offer themselves for immolation, that the Congress should abolish itself, that the Government should enact laws without reference to any of the public bodies, and arrogate to itself utter absolutism.

THE MADRAS STANDARD (English Daily), Madras, August 2.

The political detention of the brothers Natu is of graver import than even the arrest of the honourable Mr. Tilak. The latter has been effected in accordance with the ordinary Criminal Law of the Land. . . . With regard to the brothers Natu, the course adopted by the Bombay authorities is very different; for these two brothers have been placed in political detention under an old Regulation (XXV of 1827) of the East India Company's days, which empowers the Bombay Government to place in detention persons they deem necessary, and against whom there is no intention of taking legal proceedings. . . . That such Regulations exist can scarcely furnish legitimate ground for complaint, for it will be pretty generally conceded that a Government, responsible for the safety of subjects, should be provided with exceptional powers in case of grave emergencies; and when Governments so armed make use of their extraordinary powers, it cannot be said that they have stepped beyond the limits of their prerogatives; but civilised Governments, with well-organised administrations and with the resources of a mighty Empire behind them, are only expected to resort to such measures in case of the gravest necessity. An ordinary first-class Magistrate is provided with very extensive powers, and if he chose to make use of them, he would soon appear in the light of a veritable despot, interfering with the liberty of the subject; but he is not expected to resort to these powers unless it is absolutely necessary; and a magistrate who indiscreetly or recklessly uses his great powers would rapidly find that his position was in danger and that the end of his Magisterial career was at hand. Similarly in the case of a Governor—particularly the Governor of a Presidency which has enjoyed undisturbed peace for well-nigh three-quarters of a century—it is expected that he will refrain from resorting to powers conferred on him by old regulations unless there is imminent danger of the public peace being seriously disturbed. The exact offences of the brothers Natu have, of course, not been specified; but we can scarcely believe that they could have been capable of stirring up a disturbance which would be dangerous to the British Empire. One could understand such energetic measures being taken on the North-West frontier of India or in Upper Burmah, or some similar disturbed tracts; but in the very heart of the Bombay Presidency, one naturally expects that the Government would have no need to travel beyond the Penal Code for the enforcement of peace and order. The region of Poona is surrounded by British territory from which troops could be rapidly concentrated on that city; moreover, in Poona itself there is a large garrison—to say nothing of the extra punitive police force; the people of the Bombay Presidency are not now warlike races; they have adopted peaceful callings, and for several years the Bombay Army has been unable to obtain a sufficient supply of recruits from its Presidency, so much so, that its ranks have had to be filled for the most part by sepoys from other parts of India. In spite of all these circumstances, Lord Sandhurst and his advisers have found it necessary to resort to political detentions in order to maintain public peace. When Governments resort to such measures as political detentions, the impression usually created is that they entertain fears for the safety of their rule or that they are dealing with some newly-conquered or unruly people. . . . The Secretary of State will have to be pressed considerably before he consents to divulge the real reasons which have prompted these measures. If the brothers Natu have been guilty of reprehensible conduct, it would have been infinitely better—from the point of view of the liberty of the subject—had they been charged, if possible, under some section of the Indian Penal Code; but such a course might have been very

inconvenient for the Bombay Government; for there is always the risk of a prosecution failing. Nevertheless, it is not encouraging to see a Government resorting to extraordinary powers conferred by old regulations. There is, however, no ground for any very serious alarm; much uneasiness amounting even to terror is at present felt; but the Poona incidents are, very likely, one of these periodical storms which are apt to burst even on the best regulated States; and probably when the storms blows off and "the clouds roll by," the atmosphere will be all the clearer for the temporary commotion.

THE ADVOCATE (English Bi-Weekly), Lucknow, August 3.

It is useless to comment on this most extraordinary terrorising and un-English procedure unless the facts are brought to light which justified the arrest and deportation of such important and highly respectable persons. The facts, we hope, will soon be forthcoming, if not in India at least in England. This we are, however, bound to say that Lord Elgin and Lord Sandhurst will, in their calmer moments, admit that since the horrors of the Mutiny a greater political blunder was not committed than what was done last week.

THE QUEEN (English Weekly), Calcutta, August 2.

The unearthing of this almost forgotten Act has been most unfortunate. The people are sufficiently excited over what has befallen them. This Act is sure to create a panic. Sedition, if there be any, should no doubt be repressed, but any and every means cannot be resorted to. The measures adopted for the purpose should be in keeping with the prestige of a Christian and civilised Government like the British. The British Government is powerful enough to do anything it pleases with the prostrate population of this country. This very strength of the Government imposes upon it as a paramount duty to exercise its immense power with great moderation. The offenders must be brought to justice but be dealt with leniently. An allowance must be made for the present exciting circumstances. The people have suffered and are still suffering from almost all the ills that the flesh is heir to. Let the Government act like a good physician and not have recourse to unnecessary bleeding. To tide over the present difficulties, great tact and energy are required, but generosity and sympathy with the people are none the less required. A policy of justice and moderation will be the best policy for the Government to adopt under the circumstances.

NATIVE OPINION Anglo-Marathi (Bi-Weekly), Bombay, August 1.

All accounts tell us that the people are panic-stricken, and everyone anxiously looks about as to when his turn may come. . . . Perhaps the Natus know no more about their sins than we do of them, and, therefore, a judicial trial in their case would have been a preferable procedure rather than the one just followed.

MALABAR AND TRAVANCORE SPECTATOR (English Weekly), Calicut, July 31.

The regulation has the sanctity of antiquity; though until now it was believed by laymen to have become obsolete after the enactment of the Indian Penal Code, and had remained a dead letter these last many years; it has now been resuscitated and put into force. . . . When the Bombay Government punished the whole of the people of Poona by inflicting on it a punitive force, there was considerable justification for our adverse criticism of the step, because the Government, while smarting under a sense of sorrow and passion at the atrocious and dastardly murder of two of its servants, might possibly have taken a hasty step. But it had enough of time to cool down, and we must therefore suspend our judgement with regard to the wisdom and justice of the present proceedings until we are placed in possession of all the facts and evidence in the case. For the present we are bound to presume that His Excellency Lord Sandhurst has taken the above steps after deep deliberation and consultation and under proper advice. . . . With regard to putting into operation an old unheard-of regulation in the year of grace, 1897, we must say we felt it as a regular bolt from the blue, and unless cogent reasons can be adduced for requisitioning the provisions of an ancient regulation, we think it would be hopeless to convince the public of its righteousness.



## THE DEBATE ON THE INDIAN BUDGET.

## SOME OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

## I.—BRITISH OPINION.

## NEED FOR IMMEDIATE SAVING.

The debate on the Indian Budget in the House of Commons was as flat as usual if not flatter. Neither plague nor famine, neither murder nor war, can abate the official optimism of Lord George Hamilton. His tribute to Lord Elgin, which Sir Henry Fowler emphatically endorsed, was thoroughly well deserved. But when Lord George Hamilton says that the only objection to the opium trade is its precarious character, and that the Indian army is too small, he cannot expect to be taken seriously. Happily the Indian Government are far less dependent than they were upon the revenue from opium, and the very calamities which have fallen upon India will enforce the need for economy. The five millions which the Government intend to spend on railways in the next three years will, in the long run, be remunerative. But we wish we could see some sign that the India Office was alive to the need for immediate saving. Lord George Hamilton superfluously, and almost fatuously, defended the efforts of the Bombay Government to stamp out the plague. Nobody has suggested that the disease should have been allowed to run its course.—*Daily News*.

## "SIMPLY MADDENING."

If Indian finance is a complex and uninviting subject, we can hardly conceive of anyone better fitted to add to its complexity and diminish such attractiveness as it may possess than Lord George Hamilton. We cannot recall a more depressing and unilluminating speech on any mortal subject made by a responsible Minister of the Crown than that of the Secretary of State for India made last night in the House of Commons. We have no wish to be unjust to Lord George Hamilton; but to see and hear this amiable and mediocre politician talking much but saying nothing, nervously fidgeting with his eyeglasses, and mixing up thousands and millions to a perpetual accompaniment of "tens-of-rupees," was enough to make one despair of one's fellow man. Here was a man obviously struggling—it was painful to watch—with a task beyond his powers; wearily, haltingly, repeating the lesson he had learned from his subordinates; repeating it with many mistakes, without personal knowledge beyond his coaching, and without one original idea in supplement. Yet with this man rested the final word in the many intricate problems connected with our Indian Empire. And the imperishable dullness of it all! The steady drip, drip, drip of those tens-of-rupees that came tripping off the glib but uninformed tongue. It was simply maddening.—*Daily Chronicle*.

## WANTED: A GRANT OF TEN MILLIONS.

The home Government has a duty to India as deep as any of the actual administrators of that dependency owe it. We here draw immense sums from India every year, in the shape of interest on money lent, or dividends on capital contributed, as well as in military charges, home pensions, and administrative outlays of a most expensive and onerous description. All that we have done for India in a time of exceptional distress, is to start charitable relief funds throughout the country, by means of which it is possible that three-quarters of a million sterling may be raised. Whatever the ultimate total of the dole, it must be insignificant by the side of India's necessities, which may be computed at four times the sum set down by Sir James Westland. Now, considering our position, these necessities, and the disorder reigning in the Indian money markets, would it not be a prudent act, let alone a wise and graceful one, to induce Parliament to give a grant of, say, ten millions sterling, to help the Indian people over a time of great misery? The money could be raised by a short loan, repayable by a five years' annuity out of the proceeds of an additional penny on the income-tax. Assuredly, a deed like this would do more to consolidate and strengthen our Empire than the building of a hundred ships of war. It may be said that this would be to compel great numbers of people to contribute to the relief of India who have no share in the wealth its possession has poured in steady stream for so many years into the hands of a favoured few among us. This is not so. We all have a share in this wealth, which spreads its benefits through all ranks of the community, increasing the general well-being.

And this is really the one and only national way in which to meet India's necessities. If necessary, we had much better economise elsewhere and find ten, if need is, twenty millions to help that heavy-laden dependency out of its afflictions, than that it should be overwhelmed thereby; for when distress in India does reach the point where it upsets the unstable equilibrium of her finances, the disaster then to ensue will cause all the failures and "panics" which we have gone through since the close of the Napoleonic wars to sink into insignificance. For good or evil, we have suffered the fate of India to become interwoven with our own as a commercial nation, to an extent that demands the utmost exertion on our part to prevent her distress from culminating in such a disaster as would throw all our own affairs into deadly confusion.—*Investors' Review*.

## AN EXTREMELY DUBIOUS OUTLOOK.

In reviewing the preliminary statement of Sir James Westland, the Finance Minister of India, in March last, we pointed out that the outlook for the current financial year, 1897-8, was extremely dubious, and that we had not done with the famine and the plague and their consequences; and the additional information communicated to Parliament by the Secretary of State for India last night only too abundantly confirms this forecast. The famine, we are now told, has affected a larger area of the dependency and a greater population than any previous visitation of the kind during this century. This is only what close observers of Indian affairs feared, and in view of the fact that at no time during the past ten months does there appear to have been an actual scarcity of food in India, nor a very serious advance of prices, the starvation having been a consequence rather of the extreme inability of the people to buy food than of its scarcity, it is extremely desirable that exact statistics of the actual deaths and of the circumstances under which they occurred should be pressed for. . . . It is coming to be seen that if the forward policy is fully carried out a vastly larger army than India now supports will be needed to turn to account the advantages which its advocates believe that they have discovered in the forward frontier. For our own part, we believe with Lawrence, that the old frontier was not to be improved upon. Be that as it may, the new frontier is like a great house which cannot be used to advantage without a great establishment, and India cannot afford a great increase in her military establishment. The "forward" men reply that her expenditure on the North-West frontier is of the nature of insurance premiums—that she cannot be safe without it. But even threatened people cannot live on arms alone; they must have bread also. If Indian finance and Indian military policy follow persistently the lines on which they are moving now, India will soon be like a man armed with a most expensive sword which he is too starved and weak to lift—and galled at the same time by the reflection that his sword is as clumsy and useless as it is expensive, and that he could have had a really serviceable weapon at a price which would have left him a little money to buy food.—*Manchester Guardian*.

## "SWARMS OF IMPROVIDENT WEAKLINGS."

The silly chatter of a disaffected Babu seems to be the accepted model for a good deal of the speaking that the House of Commons produces when Indian affairs are under discussion. A mere handful of our countrymen, lost in an ocean of men of diverse types, have just played with conspicuous success the part of an earthly Providence under one of the most appalling calamities that can be conceived. Downright famine over a vast area affecting millions upon millions of human beings who, left to themselves, and any set of rulers they have previously known, would have perished without an effort, has been fought and conquered. The Herculean task of bringing food to the swarms of improvident weaklings scattered over a vast extent of territory has been successfully discharged by a little group of British administrators numerically quite insignificant. Another visitation not less terrible, and not less certain to have been met with complete apathy by any previous rulers of India, has been combated with all the resources of European science, in face of the violent prejudices of the sufferers. But the House of Commons sees nothing worthy of notice in either feat, and contentedly listens to a few dreary bores, who merely use the interests of the Indian population as pegs whereon to hang their empty and ungenerous criticism. A group of sedition-mongers in India, who under any rule



hitherto known in that country would have been mercilessly snuffed out, have abused the toleration of the Indian Government by shameless appeals to the prejudices of their countrymen against a policy inspired by pure benevolence. Their inflammatory writings have compelled the Indian Government to take action in the interests of the Indian population itself, and in the House of Commons we find them treated by a certain section as martyrs in the sacred cause of liberty.—*The Times*.

## II.—INDIAN OPINION.

### DECENTRALISATION.

The National Indian Congress is apparently gaining a victory. Its suggestion that there should be a more effective decentralisation of Indian finance has been taken up in the very highest quarter indeed. We should like to know what Sir James Westland will say about it. Lord George Hamilton in the course of his speech contended that it would be most desirable to increase financial decentralisation in India, in regard to which the Government were considering what arrangements could be made. Why should the Secretary of State contend? Who is opposing him? Anyhow, the news that the Government are seriously considering the subject will be extremely welcome in these disagreeable times, and is no doubt due to the strong attitude taken up by the Indian witnesses before the Welby Commission.—*Indu-Prakash* (August 9).

### WANTED: TECHNICAL SCHOOLS.

We are glad to learn that it is the policy of the Government to multiply the industries of the country. This was one of the recommendations of the Famine Commission. But somehow or other it has been completely over-looked. It remains to be seen what action the Government takes in this matter. All civilised Governments regard the maintenance of technical schools as a part of their duty. The Indian Government is apparently insensible to this obligation; and what is more it affords so little encouragement to those who qualify themselves for technical work. What are the prospects that lie before the graduates of our engineering colleges? These prospects are becoming less and less encouraging every day.—*The Bengalee* (August 14).

### SATISFACTION AND SELF-CONGRATULATION.

While capable men not belonging to the official service are beginning to comprehend the real gravity of the financial position of India, responsible officials whose right understanding of the position is a condition precedent of all reform are as firm as ever in their old notions, and continue to speak of Indian finance in terms of extreme satisfaction and self-congratulation. No reverses, no difficulties, and no amount of effective criticism from the outside world open their eyes and make them admit the crisis, and think about measures necessary to establish our finance on a sound basis. During the last fourteen years, there have been more years of deficit than surplus, the total net deficit amounting nearly to three millions. Without any serious war, without famines and without any great natural calamity such as has afflicted the people during the current year, the Government has been obliged to increase the burdens of taxation by nearly eight millions, and has been obliged to raise loans even for purposes of ordinary administration. So that the financial position of the Government of India is actually much weaker than it was at the close of Lord Ripon's viceroyalty nearly fourteen years ago.—*The Hindu* (August 24).

### IN FAVOUR OF DECENTRALISATION.

Lord George Hamilton said a word in favour of financial decentralisation. We are glad to learn that the Government are considering what arrangements could be made to carry it into practice. Here in India all the local governments supported by the people under them have raised the cry. The recent revision of the provincial contracts has rivetted attention on it, and the manner in which the Government of India have put the subordinate governments on short commons has provoked a great deal of adverse criticism which to this day remains unanswered. The Honourable Mr. Surendranath Bannerji, in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure, laid special stress on it and his arguments have been admitted by all to be unanswerable. Sir Alexander

Mackenzie in the Viceroy's Legislative Council and Sir Arthur Havelock in the local legislative Council, entered their most solemn and emphatic protest against the present system, and in India it has produced a strong and imperishable impression.—*Madras Standard* (August 7).

## III.—ANGLO-INDIAN OPINION.

### UNUSUALLY HOSTILE CRITICISM.

Lord George Hamilton's recent Budget speech has excited more hostile criticism in this country than any previous effort of the same kind that we remember. While the Anglo-Indian press are lost in amazement at his estimate of the probable effect on the frontier tribes of the opening of the road to Chitral, or stand aghast at the satisfaction with which he contemplates the steady diminution of the opium revenue, native critics are startled and shocked at the apparent audacity and unfairness of his statement regarding the Poona assassinations and the arrests by which they have been followed. Not only, it is pointed out, has he assumed without proof that the murders were the result of a conspiracy and were committed for political purposes, but he has condemned the men arrested without trial, and seemingly without any evidence beyond such as may be implied in the fact, assuming it to be such, that they are notorious.—*The Statesman* (August 25).

### "PECKSNIFFIAN" AND "VAGUE."

One hardly knows whether to feel aghast or relieved to hear that the cost of the famine and plague is put at eight millions sterling. But inasmuch as we shall not be able to congratulate ourselves that the famine is over in Upper India for another two months, and in Southern India until the winter rains come to avert still worse distress than has as yet been felt, and since the plague unhappily still keeps a firm grip of Bombay and other western towns, it is merely sanguine guess-work to count the cost before the end comes. The same demur may be made to Lord George Hamilton's highly moral, even Pecksniffian, sentiments about the opium revenue, and the predatory habits of the frontier tribesmen, which will be overcome principally by heavy fines and the maintenance of strong and vigilant garrisons, though doubtless their material condition will improve if they keep the peace and let the trade caravans pass unmolested. . . . There is impenetrable vagueness in the declaration that it is the policy of the Government to multiply the industries of the country and wean the people from too great dependence on agriculture. It may be a form of words for the edification of Parliament, or in some way a retort to certain witnesses before the Welby Commission: for our part we wish that for one thing it indicated that the Government meant to press on with every plan for making us independent of the home market in every kind of article of military equipment and material that could possibly be supplied or manufactured in this country.—*The Pioneer* (August 12).

### LORD G. HAMILTON'S OPTIMISM.

Lord George Hamilton's speech was more free from somnolent qualities than such deliverances usually are. One almost wishes, indeed, that he had not been in quite such good humour as he was. The cares of a Budget statement, which as its central fact recorded a drain upon the exchequer of no less than twelve crores through plague and famine alone, should have sat a little heavier upon him than to permit him to speak thankfully of the normal tendency to increase of revenue out of which such an exhausting charge has to be met. . . . Lord George Hamilton takes comfort to himself in recalling that the greatest number of persons on relief works at any one time was 4,200,000—"a very large number, but not very large in proportion to the population of 250,000,000." No good will be done, but very much harm, by putting the case in this way. The suffering and loss attendant upon the famine are much more serious than even these figures indicate. The collateral suffering indicated in the high death-rate in the Central Provinces and in the North-Western Provinces have to be added. When a rich city like Bombay has its death-rate doubled, largely through the immigration of starving wanderers, it is plain that we have to look beyond the returns from relief works for full indications of the misery that famine brings in its train. . . . It would have been well if the Secretary of State had said less about the elasticity of Indian revenues until some estimate had been formed of the permanent loss that the agriculture of India has sustained during these



trying months. . . . . There is no danger lest a too optimistic construction should be placed in India upon the Secretary of State's account of the situation. Every employer of labour who has been paying grain allowances for months past, and will have to continue paying them for some time longer, knows how little reason there is for cheerfulness in the bare fact that, despite the famine, prices in India have been too low to attract more than one or two shipments of grain from abroad. These "too low" prices are over an immense area double the prices of ordinary years. Their continuance means pinching and debilitating poverty to many millions who have not gone upon relief works.—*Times of India* (August 27).

#### THE GLUT OF RAILWAY OPERATIONS.

Government, said Lord George Hamilton on Thursday night, was "determined to adhere to increased outlay in railway construction." We dislike the word "determined." It shows that Government is conscious of the strength of the feeling which has been roused against the glut of railway operations at a time when Sir James Westland confesses to a deficit of eight millions, and is reduced to piously hoping that the loss will not amount to any more. But, as we showed yesterday, weather conditions are still uncertain. Large tracts of country are still in the grip of famine. We shall not know for some months whether next year may not be an exaggerated repetition of this, and yet Government refuses to admit the possibility, although we know that it has already been compelled to cut down its mammoth railway scheme of last year. It will do so again, doubtless, when it finds the reduction to be absolutely necessary, and in the meantime it gains a cheap reputation for firmness and consistency.—*The Englishman* (August 11).

#### PAYMENT IN KIND.

We take the following note from the *Financial News* of September 25:—

"It has been realised by the authorities in Cyprus that the system of payment in kind is not without its advantages. This has been found to be the case in the collection of the cereal tithes, which some time since were payable in cash. It was found, however, that when this tax was collected in currency a large percentage was always in arrear at the close of the financial year, and a certain proportion of it had to be written off as irrecoverable. Now that a return has been made to the ancient methods the Government receives prompt payment of its dues, and the number of bad debts is very small. For example, when the stores closed for deliveries in 1895 less than 0·3 per cent. of the liabilities were unpaid. This change is rather like retrogression than advancement in the system of tax collection, and it indicates that new ways are not always better than old. The taxpayer has always the wherewithal to pay in kind without inconvenience; but when cash was demanded he, like many other persons, lacked the needful."

One is reminded of Sir W. Wedderburn's suggestion (*INDIA*, March, 1897, p. 70) that the Government of India should make an experiment in the direction of reverting to the ancient customary arrangement by which land revenue in India consisted of a share of grain and other agricultural produce.

War is not made for nothing, and either starved India or overtaxed England will have to pay. These are some of the blessings of a Jingo Government—a Ministry of grab-all, which is causing Continental nations seriously to consider whether they will not form an alliance for the extinction of England's power. By great greed of conquest and confiscation the Roman Empire fell. For greed promoted luxury and effeminacy among the classes, and demoralisation and want of public spirit among the masses. It seems to us that we are tending in a similar direction. And our Paganism, too, is no less pronounced than that of ancient Rome, for Mammon is our only god, and his horrid seal is engraven on the brows of our people.—*Reynolds's Newspaper* (August 29).

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The forward movement has been made, with results which will enormously increase the chronic deficits of the Indian exchequer. There lies the real danger of India, for we may be sure that the British taxpayer will refuse to pay for the luxury of wars to secure an ever-receding scientific frontier which threatens to make frontier wars the chronic condition of India. Bankruptcy is a much more serious danger to India than any invasion by a foreign foe.—*The Observer* (Sept. 5)

Evidently a succession of punitive expeditions, though they give employment to the Indian Army and satisfy military ambitions for a space, make no lasting impression on these half-civilised and easily-inflamed tribesmen.—*Dundee Advertiser* (August 21).

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