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LECTURE CL.

PÆAN.

(The National War Front Supplement).

THE National War Front has done a year's work and many who have studied its effects regret that it did not come into being 3 or 5 or 15 years ago. They wonder why the sharp goad of its propoganda was not unsheathed long ago, and why the virtue in its creed was allowed to moulder in obscurity until the hounds of war were unleashed upon us. The same observers commonly add a rider. The National War Front they say, should now be more than a transient war organization. Instead of bending all its energy to girding the country for the filthy business of war, why should it not become the spear-head of its reconstruction after the war? Why should it not turn its now undoubted power to unifying and strengthening India, as she looks anxiously into a strange but mighty future? We echo, why not?

THE circumstances surrounding the birth of the National War Front may be recapitulated. Everything looked black. Mere survival was in doubt. Sparks of hope and volumes of prayer notwithstanding, no rational mind could hold a clear vision of Victory. For two and half years (except in Russia) a precarious defensive roll had been the lot of the Allies. The ears of India were filled with noise of the over-running of Europe, and her eyes beheld the tentacles of the Japanese octopus crawling through her eastern gates. Within the land, a powerful caucas, preferring political ascendancy to patriotism, huckstered their way to violent revolution, while the mass of simple, unread, peace-loving people grew more puzzled, more fearful and more hungry.

THE founders of the Front then said: "If the men of India are men and not morons, this shall not be. We must attack the tapeworm of apathy and ignorance, and the were-wolf of defeatist rumour. To the students we will recall the glories of the Mauryan and the Moghul, of Ujjain and Vijianagar. We will ask the builder and the craftsmen if the beauties of Bhuvaneshwar or Ajanta, of Mohanjadaro or Halebid are to crumble under the guns of the invader. To adventurous youths we will recall the triumphs of Chand Bibi, Sivaji, and Clive. To the pious we will ask whether the Gods are deathless or not, and whether there are no Rakshasas left for the Lord Rama to destroy. To the aesthete

we shall say: We summon the minstrels and the bards, the poets and the playwrights, to resurrect the arts of Kalidasa and Thulasidas and Abdul Fazal, and from the materialist we will enquire what right has any other than an Indian to the wheat-prairies of the Punjab, the coal-fields of Jharia, the oil-wells of Attock or the rice-fields of the Cauvery?"

THIS the National War Front set out to do, and in its first year achieved enough to establish itself for a generation or more. There have been failures and shortcomings; there is a mass of human material even now unstirred and unharnessed; there are a hundred untried directions for forethought and enterprise; but morale in this country and this Presidency has been mightily strengthened and the National War Front has obtained a hold on the imagination of the Madrassi which withstands the sneers of doubters, the captiousness of critics and the attacks of enemies.

THE principal themes of the National War Front have naturally changed with the changing fortunes of the war. Last year and early this year people had to be told that "This is India's War," that "The Power of the Axis Must be Broken," that "India's Honour Must be Maintained," that "We must Suppress Rumours For They Destroy Strength." As prospects for Victory for the Allies grow brighter and brighter the undertone of the slogans changes. "Victory Lies Ahead But We Must Work For It," "This is India's Industrial Opportunity," and "Through Victory to Freedom" are the clarion calls to-day. The switch over is significant.

A new confidence suffuses the national effort. Our feet are on the path to Victory, and only jealousy, suspicion and the obscuration of our objective can cause our feet to slip from it. At a time when the outlook was black, and when fear and mistrust and treachery were rampant, the ideals of the National War Front were embodied in a noble Pledge, not a word of which need be repudiated by any honest man of whatever political complexion. But some day soon when that "Sure and certain hope of Victory" materializes, a mind of equal genius must contrive for us a new Pledge, limning the prospect of the National War Front as it gazes over the last grim barriers of War into the brave new world.

WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

5-6-43 to 11-6-43.

Russia.—Nothing is known as yet as to when the Russian Campaign will begin, or which side will strike first. A few days ago it was prophesied that MOSCOW would be the scene of a renewed German offensive; now the Donetz and the Kuban are mentioned. Meanwhile fierce air-battles are raging, and local engagements are reported on the KALININ, OREL, LISICHANSK and KUBAN fronts.

Attu Island has been occupied by the Americans. The Japanese forces of occupation have been wiped out.

China.—The Chinese have retaken YUYANGKUAN described as the gateway to CHUNGKING, and after a 5 days fight near SHIHPAI, have expelled the enemy from CHANGYANG, CHIHKANG, ITU, TANGYANG and KUNGAN. The Japanese drive on CHUNGKING has failed.

ALLIED AIR RAIDS.

31-5-43. (Monday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

Day:—(2 Axis planes shot down; 1 Allied plane missing).

The air-field at CAEN.

The docks at CHERBOURG (France).

Targets at FLUSHING and ZEEBRUGGE (Belgium).

Air combats over NIEUPOORT.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The air-field, administrative buildings and marshalling yards at FOGGIA (Italy).

Docks, power station and barracks in SARDINIA. PANTELLARIA.

Axis shipping in the AEGEAN SEA.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN front.

FAR EAST.

KISKA (Aleutians).

The air-field at RANGAAR (Kai Islands).

FINSCHHAFEN (N. Guinea).

The waterfront, town area and air-field at LAE (N. Guinea).

Enemy railway installations at MANDALAY (Burma).

Air-fields at MANYWA, and TUMBONGHKA (Burma).

A road bridge near KAMAING (Burma).

A military dump at SHINGBAN (Burma).

Suspension bridge at SHWELI (Burma).

1-6-43 (Tuesday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—

5 Small supply ships off the coast of HOLLAND.

Railway targets in Northern FRANCE.

Air combats over N. FRANCE (5 enemy planes shot down).

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Supply vessels, railway and dock installations in SARDINIA.

Seaplane base at STAGNANE Island.

PANTELLARIA.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

The railway junction of SMOLENSK.

The railway stations at KARACHEV and KRASNIBOR (all in German occupied Russia).

FAR EAST.

Jap base at LAE (N. Guinea).

FINSCHAFFEN (N. Guinea).

KISKA (Aleutians).

The main Jap base of ICHANG (China).

The railroad installations at MANDALAY (Burma).

2-6-43 (Wednesday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—(5 Allied planes missing).

Railway targets and armed trawlers in occupied territories.

EVENING:—

Air combats over the BAY of BISCAY (5 Axis planes shot down).

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Targets on the Island of SAN ANTIOCO (near Sardinia).

PANTELLARIA.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircrafts all along the RUSSIAN front.

Railway junctions of KIEV and ROSLAVI (3 Soviet aircraft destroyed).

FAR EAST.

KISKA (Aleutians).

Jap aerodromes in WEWAK area (N. Guinea).

BULLDOG area (N. Guinea).

The air-field at CAPE GLOUCESTER.

HOLLANDI (Dutch N. Guinea).

Shipping off LANTEM (Timor).

Jap positions in the TUNGTING Lake and YANGTSE areas (China).

ICHANG (China).

Warehouses in the SALWEEN area (Burma).

Enemy radio installations on Diamond Island (S.W. of Rangoon).

3-6-43. (Thursday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

*NIGHT:—

Laying mines in enemy coastal waters.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

PANTELLARIA.

Air-fields in SARDINIA.

RUSSIA

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

Railway junction at OREL (German occupied Russia).

FAR EAST.

Jap bases in TIMOR, Dutch N. Guinea and N. BRITAIN.

KISKA (Aleutians).

Warehouses and railway yards on the CANTON-HANKOW Railway (China).

Pailoki air-field near YOGHOW (China).

ICHANG (China).

Warehouse at AKYAB (Burma).

Supply sampans in the MAUNGDAW-BUTHIDAUNG area (Burma).

Military objectives at KALEMYO (Burma).

4-6-43 (Friday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY and NIGHT:—

No information available.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The air-field at GROTTALGLIE (Italy).

PANTELLARIA.

CATANZARO (Italy).

The air-fields at SYRACUSE and MILO (Sicily).

Machine gun positions on FAVIGNANA Island (near Sicily).

RUSSIA (German occupied).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

The Ry. junction at BRYANSK.

The railway station at KARACHEV.

FAR EAST.

Air-fields, ammunition dumps and grounded aircraft at WEWAK, BUT, DAGUA and BORAM.

Oil installations at CHAUK (Burma).

A factory at MYAUNGN (Burma).

BUTHIDAUNG area (Burma).

Supply dumps at TANGYANG (China).

ITALY (China).

5-6-43 (Saturday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY and NIGHT:—

No information available.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The Italian Naval Base of SPEZAI (Workshops and other ships hit).

Workshops and the air-field at MONSERRATO (Sardinia).

Air combats over PANTELLARIA (4 Axis planes destroyed).
The harbour at of PORTO RAMANO (Sardinia).
The landing ground at LAPOPERRO (Sardinia).
Enemy shipping in the AEGEAN Sea and off the west coast of GREECE.

RUSSIA.

(For the week 29—5—43 to 6—6—43 Russians lost 212 planes; Axis lost 752 planes).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

DOBO (Aru Islands).
Air-fields at LAHA (Amboina Island) and LANGGOER.

Jap installations at KHALI (Burin).
A destroyer in the BOUGAINVILLE area.
KISKA (Aleutians).
ALON (Burma).
Jap targets at CHAUK and MANDALAY (Burma).
Buildings at PAUKKAN and at WETLET (Burma).
Barracks at MONYWA.
Jap remnants at OTU (China).
ICHANG (China).

6—6—43 (Sunday).

EUROPE (German occupied)

DAY:—

Minesweepers in the STRAITS of DOVER (2 minesweepers set on fire).

Railway targets in Northern FRANCE, ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Railroad yards at MESSINA (Sicily); **The harbour area at REGGIO DI CALABRIA; SANGIOVANNI; PANTELLARIA** (2 axis planes destroyed).

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

The railway centre of UNECHA (German-occupied Russia).

FAR EAST.

Air-fields at KOEPANG and PENFOCI (Dutch Timor) (3 Jap planes destroyed).

Jap positions at CHOISEUL Island;
Jap installations at MUNDA (N. Georgia); **KISKA** (Aleutians); **Objectives at KALEMYO** (Burma).
The air-field near YOCHOW (China);
A railway bridge at PUCHI (China);
Shasi air-field near ICHANG (China);
Trucks at TANGYANG (China).

ENEMY AIR RAIDS.

1—6—43 (Tuesday).

BRITAIN.

A town on the south-east coast of ENGLAND (5 Axis planes shot down).

Another town on the south coast of ENGLAND.

RUSSIA.

Russian airfields behind the forward lines.

2—6—43 (Wednesday).

BRITAIN.

Places on the East ANGLIAN coast (1 axis plane destroyed).

RUSSIA.

KURSK (162 axis planes shot down).

3—6—43 (Thursday).

BRITAIN.

No information available.

MEDITERRANEAN.

MALTA (only alerts).

RUSSIA.

KUBAN area (8 enemy planes shot down).

4—6—43 (Friday).

BRITAIN.

A place on the south-east coast of ENGLAND.

MEDITERRANEAN.

MALTA (1 Axis plane destroyed).

RUSSIA.

Russian air-fields and supply centres behind the forward lines.

5—6—43 (Saturday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity anywhere in BRITAIN.

RUSSIA.

Air combats over the KUBAN peninsula.

6—6—43 (Sunday).

BRITAIN.

A town on the south-east coast of ENGLAND (1 axis plane shot down).

RUSSIA.

KUBAN area.

FAR EAST.

Wau air-field (1 Jap plane shot down);
Towns near CHUNGKING (China).

7—6—43 (Monday).

BRITAIN.

No information available.

RUSSIA.

GORKI.

FAR EAST.

LIANGSHAN (N. E. of Chungking).

SIDE LIGHTS.

THE TUNISIAN VICTORY. Its Significance.

As the days pass, the importance of the great victory won in North AFRICA, becomes more and more apparent. As Gen. Eisenhower and Field Marshal Smuts have together pointed out in a recent B. B. C. talk ("All-Africa Calling Europe", May 29) the result is not only the 'jolting' of the enemy morale but the whole battle technique has changed. The initiative has not only been wrested from the enemy, but the Allies can now exploit the element of surprise. It is not only that the British and American armies have gained in technique and professional ability, but it is now possible for them to concentrate and command overwhelming resources upon the European theatre of war.

Other great results have followed. One of them, either accidentally or by design, is the transfer to Allied service, of the French Fleet at ALEXANDRIA, consisting of 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, 3 destroyers and 1 submarine.

Secondly, the situation in TANGIER has altered. Time, there was, when, with Rommel on one side, and the Spanish forces at TANGIER on the other side, the Allied forces at ALGIERS feared a treacherous attack from TANGIER in the rear. But the present Allied possession of TUNISIA has forced Gen. Franco to revise his attitude.

Thirdly, French unity talks have reached a definitely satisfactory stage. Gen. de Gaulle has met Gen. Giraud at ALGIERS and a committee of National Liberation, with both of them as Presidents, has been set up, invested with sovereign powers. It will continue the common fight till the laws of the French Republic are restored, and FRANCE has regained her traditional place in the comity of nations.

Italy. Fear of invasion has gripped ITALY. Her Newspapers betray panic. Landings are expected anywhere and everywhere. There is little confidence in the defences. The massing of an invasion fleet of 146 merchant ships at GIBRALTAR is rumoured. As a German Commentator has observed, ITALY's position is difficult. Her empire is lost and an enemy, 'numerically and materially stronger' stands ready to land. Once PANTELLARIA is occupied and the shield that SICILY forms is pierced, ITALY will collapse helpless and fall to the invader. Frantically Mussolini has changed his cabinet ministers and army chiefs. To quote his own words he is now fighting, not for the Axis, but for ITALY.

But ITALY will not be the only point of invasion. As Mr. Morby Richards writing in the *Daily Express* has pointed out, if the island screen of PANTELLARIA, SICILY and SARDINIA falls, the Allies can pick the best of three invasion lines against EUROPE. It will be either (1) the occupation of the whole of ITALY or (2) the invasion of southern FRANCE by way of SARDINIA and SICILY or (3) the invasion of YUGOSLAVIA across the boot of ITALY, with a possible attack on GREECE through CRETE.

Thus, in the words of Sir Stafford Cripps the stage is set for the next Act in this great drama of victory. We wait with expectancy to see the curtain rise. The enemy has been put on the defensive, points for attack have been gained, and the initiative has been seized, so that the enemy does not know where the next blow will fall.

The change from the offensive to the defensive attitude is nowhere better seen than in the hesitant stand of the Germans on the Russian front. Here, in spite of an early spring, the Germans have not started an offensive yet. Dr. Goebbels states, 'It would be too much to expect from me that I should say even one word about the immediate intentions of the German High Command in the East. Our command will not be provoked to break its persistent silence'. Silence betokens fear—fear of an eventual Italian collapse, fear of the R. A. F. whose attacks are increasing in violence every day, fear that the U-boat piracy is not going as well as GERMANY would like, fear of the decreasing stocks of oil, and last, but not least, the need to maintain defensive forces along the entire European Coast line. So GERMANY thinks that it is the better part of valour to be on the defensive, and it is not improbable that the Germans may continue to maintain a general defensive-offensive in RUSSIA all through the coming months. Says the German military spokesman General Dittmar, 'Those who must attack are our opponents, not ourselves. The question of who is able to attack is less important at present than the question of who is forced to attack. After the painful experience of TUNISIA our enemy must not come nearer.'

RUSSIA.

Stalin's gesture to the Allied world showing that he does not intend to interfere with the internal economic and political structure of other countries, which is the meaning of his promise to dissolve the Comintern is, as we pointed out last week, a great statesmanlike move. It has not only knocked the bottom out of enemy propaganda but has knit the Allies more closely. It also takes Stalin himself and RUSSIA a stage further. In his November 7th speech Stalin looked forward to Victory in War only, but his latest letter on the subject of the abolition of the Comintern shows that his vision now extends further to the winning of the peace as well, for which Russian co-operation with other Allied states is essential. If the Anglo-Russian Treaty has laid the foundations of post-war economy, Stalin's disbandment of the Comintern lays the foundations of political amity in a post-war world.

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THE U-BOAT.

In recent weeks and months the U-boat attacks have definitely declined; more Allied ships have crossed the Atlantic, and more U-boats have been killed, than for the corresponding months of last year. To this several causes have contributed—increase in the number and effectiveness of convoy escorts, and of air patrols and air escorts. The mid-Atlantic gap where air cover had hitherto been absent no longer exists—the result is that a shipping pool is being slowly built up for a great overseas offensive. A succession of such successes in the Battle of the Atlantic, by saving shipping, will add tremendously to the striking power of the Allies when the time for invasion comes.

Mr. Churchill has returned to LONDON. He flew from the U. S. to GIBRALTAR and thence to ALGIERS, where he met Generals Eisenhower, Giraud and de Gaulle. Here Mr. Eden joined him. He visited the Tunisian battle-area and addressed 3,000 soldiers in the ruins of the ancient amphitheatre at CARTHAGE, congratulating them on the glorious Victory they had won and the large number of prisoners they had taken.

THE FALL OF ATTU has evidently increased the Japanese fears. Speaking on June 2 Gen. Tojo observed, 'the situation is too serious to be described by words. There is not one single Japanese to-day who would not be prepared to forfeit his life spontaneously for Victory and the greatness of the country in the spirit of the 2,000 Japanese killed on ATTU Island.'

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ARAKAN.

'The breaking of the Monsoon' says the *Times*, 'has brought down a curtain of rain and mist on the Indo-Burmese front. In the south, the Arakan campaign has reached its expected but disappointing close. We retired toward the starting point. The Japanese are again in occupation of BUTHIDAUNG and MAUNGDAW. All that can be said of the six months' obstinate fighting is that our offensive, although unsuccessful, may well have prevented the Japanese from raiding CHITTAGONG and the Province of BENGAL. Our battle casualties are not excessive considering the numbers engaged and the bitterness of fighting. Malarial fever however, has probably taken a heavier toll from both the armies than machine-gun and mortar. Its extreme prevalence in the ARAKAN during the rains seems to rule out the employment of more than the minimum troops in operation by either side for several months to come.'

TUNISIA : HITLER'S GAMBLE

By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS BROWNRIGG

The first lesson I learn from Tunisia is the indivisibility of war. This victory will not only have psychological repercussions all over the world, but what is perhaps more important, it will have a quick practical effect many miles from the north coast of Africa.

The Mediterranean now is open to our fleets and convoys. The Far East is brought some 5,000 miles nearer to our home ports; and a very large proportion of the Royal Naval escort craft immediately becomes available to swell the protection given to our Atlantic convoys. Thus in one fell swoop, the Atlantic U-boats have their task made far more difficult and the Japanese see their enemy's lines of communication with Europe shortened by 5,000 miles.

A VICIOUS INCLINATION

The effect closer to the scene of victory, of course, is more immediate. For the second time, Hitler has gambled and lost. But we must remember that gambling is a vicious inclination and not a mere slip into a momentary temptation. Stalingrad has proved to have been no isolated mistake from which a lesson could be learnt; it has shown a tendency to take risks unwarranted by circumstances. And I detect the continuance of this tendency at the present moment in the Kuban.

We can take great comfort that we have forced the enemy into a large and sudden surrender, and one for which there is little explanation unless it be that the German Generals, after Rommel had left, realized the folly of their High Command, and knew that there was no purpose in continuing to fight for a régime which had so grossly let them down.

RETENTION OF A BRIDGEHEAD

I am not going to speculate on where the Allied blows will first fall in Europe, but instead I want to turn for a moment to another place which bears close resemblance to Tunis and Bizerta—the Kuban.

Here we see the Germans struggling to maintain another bridgehead, and the Russians endeavouring to reduce it. I have sometimes seen the retention of such bridgeheads likened to the occupation by Wellington of the lines of Torres Vedras. But the analogy is false, because Wellington had one ingredient in his strategy that the Germans have lacked in theirs. Wellington was fighting for a nation which had assured him the command of the sea at his back. Germany has never provided this advantage to her armies fighting on foreign beaches and foreshores.

Modern war has also introduced the air arm which now assists surface ships to maintain command of sea routes; and Germany has now lost command in this element. Thus we see that her armies overseas (and the Kuban is strictly speaking overseas for the Germans) have no security of regular supplies, and have little chance of escape by the way they came, should things go ill with them. The Kuban is, therefore, much more of a gamble than Torres Vedras.

PATTERN FOR GERMAN DEFEATS.

London commentators observed that the dramatic capture of Tunis and Bizerta indicates the pattern for German defeats of the future. Forty-eight hours before, the Germans were standing on a line which had considerable natural strength. Behind them was a powerful fortress.

We had been attacking steadily for some weeks, and our progress had been slow though steady. Yet our pressure had been so inexorable on land, and the battle of attrition for the enemy's supplies so severe, that taken together they had deprived him of essential stores, equipment and ammunition, and robbed him of his capacity for resistance and shattered his morale.

After a facade of stubborn resistance and savage counter-attack, the Germans must be crumbling for days. A single powerful tank thrust at Massicault was enough to break them. Their resistance disintegrated with terrifying suddenness and completeness. Not even the powerful fortress of Bizerta could be defended. These casemates and redoubts were formidable as ever; it was the enemy who was too weak to hold them.

HARD BUT BRITTLE

It is believed in London that this pattern of defeat will be repeated again and again as the war goes on. Hard resistance will be followed by collapse, without any intermediate period of slow, discernible deterioration.

No one can tell when the Germans will collapse, all one knows is that they are certain to do so, but only after the toughest fighting.

Much earlier in the war, astute observer, expressed the opinion that the German resistance tended to be hard—but brittle. The collapse of Tunisia vindicates this opinion.

CAN JAPAN SAVE THE GERMANS?

by

LIBERATOR

The Axis Ace has not turned up. Last summer both Rommel and the Japanese were preparing to play their Middle Eastern trumps. The Japanese were to come up through the Indian Ocean; Rommel was to cross the Suez Canal; and von Kleist was racing to keep up the Caucasus end of this great converging strategy.

The Axis meeting did not take place. Japan's sun failed to rise over the Indian Ocean; Rommel's star did not shine along that last sixty miles to his Alexandrian goal, and the now dead von Kleist's Caucasian force is retreating in a desperate effort to save itself. This Allied achievement brought about on three vital battle-fields, divided from each other by over 3,000 miles in two of the three cases, is greater than is sometimes appreciated.

GREATEST OPPORTUNITY.

The firmness of the Indian Army under Wavell, the offensive hitting power of the Eighth Army under the Alexander-Montgomery combination, and above all the unbending defence of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, have collaborated to transform the sombre scene of four months ago into one which presents the Allies with the greatest opportunity yet for combined and synchronised action.

We may hail this new situation with just pride—so long as we do not forget to appreciate also its essential realities. For what has happened is that grim stubbornness and far-seeing determination of the Russians was added to our own planned determination to build up the striking power of the Eighth Army at all cost, and that during this crucial period the Japanese remained strikingly inactive. The present opportune

situation has arisen therefore to a large extent not from any central design but from a fortunate outcome of loose collaboration. Moscow planned its counter-offensive; London was responsible for the Egyptian campaign; and Washington was mainly responsible for the directing lines of the North-West African invasion. In the Indian Ocean however, it was Japan's own choosing that decided her prolonged inactivity.

Nevertheless, from this variety of planning and distinctive development springs the present opportunity of the Allied Nations. In place of the threatened merger of Japanese and German troops in the Middle East, the possibility of joint fronts between the Allies and the Soviet Union becomes *the great opportunity*. The natural meeting place for such a strategic union would be on the flanks of Hitler's European fortress: in Scandinavia and the Balkans.

In many ways the enemy is perhaps to-day more conscious of this latent possibility than are the Allies. And therefore is it strange that German attention is being focussed on Japan, the one important Axis partner who still enjoys comparative freedom of action? It must now be the one overriding axiom of German strategy that *the more the United Nations concentrate their effort on the approaches to Hitler's fortress of Europe, the greater must be the part played by Japan in diverting and dispersing Allied efforts*.

On our side, therefore, full understanding of the rôle Japan intends to play within the Axis concert becomes essential to the exploitation of our present favourable situation.

It is sometimes suggested that the Japanese do not care overmuch about the fate of their partners in Europe. That is a false conclusion drawn from correct premises. Japan's policy will be not to do anything which might go against her own interests. She will therefore not embark on any venture merely to satisfy the demands of her allies. But, on the other hand, Japanese interests dictate very definitely that the two naval Powers and the one land Power which can challenge her hegemony in Asia shall not be triumphant in Europe. To that extent therefore she is vitally interested in a German victory, and will go to great lengths to prevent a German defeat at the hands of the United Nations. In doing this, however, Japanese policy pursues at the same time its own ends, with the same deliberateness which characterised her opening moves of the war against Britain and America.

THE PATTERN IN OUTLINE.

The pattern of this policy is now becoming recognisable, and repays following in outline.

The first striking fact of this last phase of Japanese policy is that it is now based on Japanese rule over an Asiatic population of about 400 million people; three times the population of the Soviet Union. Yet with this vast reservoir of man-power—even allowing for its limitations—at its disposal, Japanese policy has not increased the army in any appreciable form. The strength remains as it was at Pearl Harbour: 100 Divisions, about two million men. And of these 100 Divisions only a fraction has been employed in warfare since last April. In fact, there have been numerous reports of parts of the army being engaged on industrial, agricultural, and road-building jobs in Japanese-occupied countries. Everything points to the single fact that the Japanese have been utilising the pause in the fighting to mobilise the greatest possible amount of industrial strength.

It cannot, of course, be compared with the industrial efforts of the United States or this country. But it would be folly to try and do so. So far, the Japanese have shown one common trait in their strategy and their tactics: they have learnt from the West, but they have not simply copied the West. They have in fact shown extraordinary adaptability to the needs of fighting in the Pacific, its islands and along its shores. Add to this trait the recovery of a great amount of vital raw materials, of which the Axis countries—and Japan in particular—had gone short, and the ruthless temperament of the Japanese at war. The result must produce an impressive effort to build the economic base for the type of war Japan will have to face in the days to come.

HITLER'S URGENT NEED.

In the Solomons, and in New Guinea, Japan is fighting a grim defensive war. It is evident that she is not seeking a show-down yet, but that she is prepared for considerable sacrifices in order to maintain the protective girdle of islands behind which toil and prepare the 400 million Asiatics under her rule. But this can only be a temporary phase while she exploits and consolidates her gains. Japan cannot feel secure behind her islands once the hope of Germany's break-through to the Middle East has faded. She cannot feel safe so long as Australia and India serve the Allies as bases for reconquest.

For the next six months it will be the main Axis object to prevent the United Nations from concentrating shipping which will enable the building up of a great Allied striking force for the assault on Europe. Hitler's urgent need is to create a second front against our shipping while the U-boats are most damaging in their onslaughts. His one great hope is Japan. It is evident that the Allies have given priority—rightly—to the European theatre of war. Such forces as are in the Pacific are maintained on the basis of strict economy of force. Only a major Japanese attack either on India or Australia could lead to an alteration in the present distribution of Allied shipping and armed forces.

Germany must tide over the next critical eight months. She needs time. Her hopes are staked on Japan. She alone can delay the great concentrated effort of the United Nations on the offensive. Zhukov, Montgomery, Alexander, Cunningham, Wavell and Eisenhower are concentrating Allied strength. But just at this moment when everything points to Europe let us watch the connection between Tripoli and Trincomalee. Germany is looking to Japan for help. We can refuse the Germans this comfort by refusing them the time which they need now so much.

SEVEN SEAS STRUGGLE.

A YEAR AGO.

1 Air and surface patrols over the Western Atlantic were not completely organized and U-boats took heavy toll of Allied shipping in the Caribbean Sea and off the U. S. east coast.

NOW.

With the speed-up of Allied ship and plane production, convoys are assured of escort in considerable strength both in the air and on the surface. The increased range of aircraft has made air cover possible throughout the voyage across the North Atlantic.

A YEAR AGO

In the first four months of 1942 Berlin Radio claimed the sinking of 352 Allied ships (2,217,300 gross tons).

American shipyards in the same period built 106 new ships (887,390 gross tons). Even with the output of the United Kingdom and Canadian yards, sinkings (though fewer than the Germans claimed) exceeded replacements.

Apart from convoys for Malta, Allied merchant shipping was excluded from the Mediterranean the short route to Russia, the Middle East and the Far East.

In June 1942 Japanese forces seized Attu and Kiska, in the Aleutian Islands.

In April 1942 a powerful Japanese naval squadron appeared in the Bay of Bengal and carried out air bombardment of Ceylon, Coconada, and Vizagapatam. In May a similar force was engaged in the Coral Sea, off N.W. Australia. In June the Japanese sent an armada against Midway Island, in the Central Pacific.

NOW

Despite the much advertised "Doenit" offensive, and the considerable increase in the number of U-boats at sea, the Berlin radio claims for the first four months, of 1943 total only 383 ships (2,448,600 gross tons).

American shipyards alone have replaced, not only all the ships lost in the first four months of 1943, but also those falsely claimed sunk by Berlin, with an output of 539 new ships (3,800,720 gross tons).

The United Nations Merchant Fleet is now at least THREE MILLION GROSS TONS bigger than it was nine months ago. Admiral King and Colonel Knox hope the U-boat will have been mastered by autumn 1943.

The Allied armies having cleared the last vestige of Axis might from Africa, Allied shipping can now travel throughout the length of the Mediterranean with air cover all the way.

In May 1943 American forces landed on Attu. In recent months Kiska has suffered an aerial bombardment which is beginning to measure up to Malta's ordeal.

In February 1943 the Japanese were obliged to evacuate the key air-base island of Guadalcanar, in the Solomons.

The loss of six aircraft-carriers has curbed the over-ambitious Japanese Admirals.

Since two were sunk in the Solomons six months ago, nothing has been seen or heard of Japan's capital ships.

Shortage of merchant shipping (222 vessels have been sunk, probably sunk or damaged by U. S. submarines alone) has called a halt to Japanese overseas expeditions.

GROWING CRESCENDO OF AIR BOMBARDMENT**A YEAR AGO**

Raids on Lubeck, Rostock and Cologne so annoyed the Nazis that Goering launched a series of "reprisals" against the Cathedral cities of England.

NOW

R. A. F. raids on Germany are so heavy that "reprisals" have no value, even as propaganda.

A YEAR AGO

On Lubeck (March 28, 1942) the R. A. F. dropped 340 tons of bombs at the rate of two tons a minute.

The heaviest bomb dropped on targets in Germany weighed 4,000 lbs.

R. A. F. minelaying operations were on a comparatively small scale.

No U. S. aircraft were operating from bases in Britain.

During 1941 America had built planes at an average rate of 1,500 a month.

By structural weight, aircraft production in America during 1941 totalled 87,000,000 lbs.

Joachim von Ribbentrop declared on September 27, 1942: "The time will come when we will deal finally with this aircraft carrier in front of Europe—BRITAIN".

Raids on Italy were spasmodic, and during the home-based offensive which coincided with the first five weeks of Montgomery's advance from El Alamein, the R. A. F. dropped bombs on Northern Italy at the rate of 300 tons a week.

NOW

On April 26, 1943, the R. A. F. dropped 1,360 tons of bombs on Duisburg at the rate of 30 tons a minute.

The heaviest bomb dropped on targets in Germany weighs 8,000 lbs.

On the two succeeding nights of April 27 and 28, 1943, the R. A. F. laid more mines in enemy waters than would normally have been laid in a whole month.

U. S. aircraft have been operating from Britain since July 1942. They have bombed Germany heavily by day—a new experience for the Nazis.

The average for 1942 was 4,000 a month. In March 1943 U. S. factories turned out 6,200 planes.

By structural weight, aircraft production in America during 1942 totalled 291,000,000 lbs. The estimated output for 1943 is 911,000,000 lbs. and for 1944 it is 1,417,000,000 lbs. The output of heavy bombers from Britain's factories is $2\frac{1}{2}$ times what it was a year ago.

By liquidating the Axis forces in North Africa the Allies have acquired a second "aircraft carrier" in front of Europe—TUNISIA. And there is no sign of the Nazis "dealing finally" with either.

On May 9, 1943, four hundred Allied bombers based on North Africa dropped 450 tons in a single raid on the Sicilian port of Palermo. "That happy, abject, subject province of Germany which used to be called Italy will have its fair share too." That was Churchill's promise on July 14, 1941. Italy is beginning to get her "fair share" now.

COUNT CIANO.

A smooth, smug face, with not a wrinkle, not a line in it. Rich black hair above a forehead never marked by the pains of thought or care, a big sensuous mouth, naive brown eyes, and spread over it all the constant, confident, complacent smile of a spoilt child. A male beauty of the kind which is so cheap and frequent in the south. He might be a tenor in vogue, a middle-weight boxer, or just a young man about town. But he is

the newly-appointed Italian Ambassador to the Vatican, formerly for six fateful years Italy's Foreign Minister, a European figure, and unbelievable, a protagonist in the great world-tragedy through which we have been living.

Count Galeazzo Ciano's career has been as smooth and unbroken as his face. Son of a man who had made fame, a fortune and a title in the last war, he found every door open to him from the start. His father had, moreover, been one of the earliest sponsors of Mussolini's Blackshirt movement, and young Ciano had a grand time as a schoolboy playing, with full paternal backing, at the revolutionary. It brought him neither wounds nor dangers, but it gave him a share in the myth of Fascism's years of struggle.

When this hopeful young man embarked upon a diplomatic career, quick advancement was easy to predict. What could not be predicted was that already as an attaché he would bring off the big coup. Actually, he did. Back from his first post at Buenos Aires and attached, for the first time, to the Italian embassy at the Holy See, he married Edda Mussolini. The alliance was valuable to both parties. To the Mussolinis it gave a foothold in aristocratic society; to the Cianos—whose social rank was of recent date—a foothold in political power. Young Ciano, still under thirty, was now clearly earmarked for high office. After a short spell as Consul-General in Shanghai, he became head of his father-in-law's public-relations office, which was soon elevated to a fully fledged ministry: the Ministry of Popular Culture. Then came the Abyssinian war, and for the first time Ciano caught the attention of the world.

He went out as leader of a bomber-squadron, high-soundingly named "La Disperata." He bombed defenceless Abyssinian village crowds, and he made himself the bard of his own exploits: "A beautiful experience," he wrote. "The movements of the crowds which dissolved at the approach of our birds reminded me of the unfolding of a flower."

This utterance has been much quoted and pondered on. Like almost nothing else, it epitomises the type of which Ciano is the perfect example: that Nazi and Fascist jeunesse dorée which, while the world burned, had a thoroughly good time—enterprising young upstarts, almost disarming in their native callousness and vanity, buying a cheap sensation of artistic refinement out of the sufferings of others.

Feeling on top of the world, one of the "victors over fifty nations," Ciano came back from Abyssinia—and was at once appointed Foreign Minister of the King of Italy and Emperor of Abyssinia. He was thirty-three.

From now on for six years he was a figure in the great game of world-politics. His first mission was to Berlin to negotiate the foundation of the Axis. Since then few European capitals have not seen him. He was generally considered—most of all by himself—as the Crown-prince of the Mussolini dynasty and the second man of Fascist Italy. At the same time, he did not succeed in developing what might be called a political personality.

What personal traits he developed during these years were not connected with his office. He became notorious for his pleasure-seeking and greed. His innumerable amorous affairs were the most common gossip of Rome. He did nothing to hide them; he displayed them with the same naive, self-satisfied vanity with which he had boasted of his Abyssinian exploits.

At the same time, he showed the fervour of a hero from a Balzac novel in pursuing his own enrichment. Using the information to which his office gave him access, he

gambled most successfully on the Stock Exchange. He acquired large estates in Tuscany, corporations, private railway companies. Rich from birth, he was well on the way to becoming the richest man in Italy.

And now? He has fallen from eminence, but he has fallen on his feet. As Ambassador to the Holy See, he occupies probably the only place in Rome out of reach of the Gestapo. He may still be of some service to his father-in-law at this listening post. As to the future, he scarcely views it with undue alarm. His fortune is well scattered. Some of his assets have recently been frozen in Brazil, but enough should remain in Argentina and Switzerland to assure him a comfortable exile, from which to look back on a perfectly enjoyable time.

HOW JAPAN WAGES WAR. TOUGH FIGHTERS AND THEIR TACTICS.

by

Hanson W. Baldwin —From the Times Feb. 24, 1943.

In less than four months of war the Japanese conquered an empire. They swam, waded, walked, bicycled, and flew more than 400 miles down the Malayan Peninsula in 69 days. The golden Indies, richest archipelago in the world, was theirs in three months. The *Prince of Wales*, *Repulse* and *Hermes*—battleship, battle cruiser, and aircraft-carrier—were sunk by Japanese planes in the first month's action, achievements unparalleled by the Germans in more than two years of war. In Burma they drove toward the storied city of Mandalay at an average rate of better than five miles a day; and, as Lieutenant-General Joseph W. Stilwell, the American Commander, put it, "we took a hell of a beating."

None of these things was expected; all of them were as surprising as the German panzer charge across Europe. The best military and political minds of the United Nations were fooled by the Japanese enemy, and their victories were a harsh awakening.

The Japanese are not merely psychologically tough—tough in the primitive way of feudalistic and semi-barbarous peoples—but tough physically. With a few balls of *nigurimeshi* (rice rolled up into balls, "sometimes with a salted plum in the centre") a Japanese soldier can be self-sufficient for about six days. He has no field kitchen and no hot food—sugar is a luxury. He can live off the country; he needs no canteens or recreation or athletic facilities; he slakes his thirst at any pool or stream by using a water filter he carries with him. He is in many ways animalistic man, but his primitive instincts, which serve him well in war, are carefully directed by the cunning brains of his leaders.

A BRITISH HANDICAP.

The Japanese Army is not a mechanized army. "Shank's mare", bicycles, horses, ships, sampans are important means of transportation; motor transport is used, and, so are railroads when there are any, but the Japanese do not depend upon them. General Alexander, who commanded the British forces in Burma, attributed the British defeat there in part to dependence upon motor transportation in a country ill adapted for it.

The Japanese [he said] had ideal light equipment carried on pack ponies and coolies, and soldiers specially trained for jungle fighting. To be dependent on motor transport, and therefore on roads, was far too serious a disadvantage for the British to overcome.

There is probably no nation in the world that has had so much practice, or is so skilled, in the operation of making a landing under fire as Japan. Once ashore in the hot lands fringing the South-Western Pacific, the Jap is really in his element. For his performance shows he has no peer in jungle warfare. Some of our Panama-trained troops, the Philippine Scouts and the Thirty-first Infantry, which fought on Bataan, were probably as well trained and as fully acclimatized and accustomed to jungle fighting as the average Japanese unit, but as an army the Japanese have mastered this form of fighting as no other army has.

Like the Germans, from whom their concepts of the art of war are derived, the Japanese are nurtured on offensive tactics, and prefer to attack enemy flanks and envelop them if possible. With this goes a perpetual process of infiltration through the front. Taken together, these two processes invariably result in building up a force behind the enemy front line, thus threatening his conventional supply lines. This is what happened time and time again in Malaya; the British made the mistake of trying to fight an Occidental war in the Orient.

BARRAGE AT SINGAPORE.

The infiltration process, conducted by thousands of individuals—many of them in the costume of the invaded country—aided by Fifth Columnists and malcontents (another leaf from the German book) is often sufficient to force an enemy withdrawal. When it is not, the Japanese attack from both flanks and from the front, and are aided by the groups that have seeped through into the enemy rear. Field artillery may aid the assault; it was a material factor in the storming of Singapore Island, when the Japanese laid down what was probably the heaviest barrage ever fired in the Orient. The object is still the same—to close with the enemy.

To meet such tactics the recipe is simple. We must be better than the enemy at their own game. What is wanted is a reversion to the ways of the American woodsmen; we need to study the Indian wars again. But that is not enough. The Jap is at his best at amphibious war and in the "green hell" of the jungle (and that is what the war in the Pacific is), but he is tough wherever he is met. He has weaknesses. His platoon, his division, has far less fire-power than our own, and the Japanese Army is but little mechanized; there is not a single organized tank division (though there are tank regiments). On open terrain, where the internal combustion engine that has revolutionized war can exploit its tactical possibilities to the full, the Japanese would probably be at a disadvantage with Western armies. And when we start out-guessing them, and giving them some more surprises like the raid on Tokyo, the nature of their temperament may induce excitement and faulty judgment.

PADDED UNIFORMS.

But we cannot count upon it. The Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria, with its padded uniforms, has long been acclimatized to the Russian cold and used to operations on relatively open terrain, and Japan has trained ski troops and mountain troops. At Chankufeng Hill, one of the 3,000 engagements or skirmishes that have been fought in the "unknown war" along the Russo-Japanese frontier, the Japanese lost

heavily in men and equipment to the Russian soldiers, but showed their typical pertinacity and determination. And we must not forget Port Arthur. They took Port Arthur with blood; time and again the attacking ranks of the little yellow men were obliterated, but others came on. The enemy took shocking punishment at Midway, but their defeat did not change their ambitions; they landed in the Aleutians and are there to stay. And they will stay—until we kill them.

It is high time we discarded that old shibboleth that the Japanese will fold up when the Germans lose. They will not. They have already conquered an empire; they are eyeing new worlds; if allowed to go too far Japan can win the war for Germany. Even when Germany is defeated it will take a long time to smack the Oriental enemy out of his stolen holdings.

THE MASSACRE OF THE JEWS.

by

Sir William Beveridge.

In February of last year Hitler announced that "the Jews will be exterminated." Only within the past few months has it come to be generally realised outside Germany that this was no mere figure of speech, that wholesale destruction of human beings for no reason other than that they were of Jewish race had long been proceeding in some of the lands under Hitler's rule, and that in the latter part of last year the process of extermination was being organised with German thoroughness.

The House of Commons, receiving on December 17 from the Foreign Secretary both the first full and responsible statement of the facts and the declaration of protest on behalf of the United Nations, stood in silence to signalise in a way seldom, if ever, precedented, their recognition of horrors hitherto beyond belief. Mr. Eden's announcement, in declaring the condemnation by the United Nations of the bestial policy which they placed on record, proclaimed also our determination to bring retribution upon all those responsible for these crimes, and to press on with the necessary practical measures to this end.

Promise of retribution was necessary and inevitable. But retribution must wait on victory, and the threat of retribution will not of itself save any lives or any pain in Germany, or in lands now under German rule. No one can be content, no one is content, with threatening retribution. Since the facts were formally acknowledged, since they must have been known to those in authority before then, the question has become daily more insistent in the minds of all feeling men in Britain and elsewhere—what can be done to save from death and torture as many as possible of those condemned to it by the Nazi mania.

THE OPEN DOOR.

This, of course, includes persecuted people of all kinds, whatever their race. The Jews are receiving special cruelties, but do not ask for special treatment. The political martyr has as much claim on our merciful protection as the racial one.

The answer to that question is not simple or very cheerful. Each of the nations that has joined in the declaration of protest at German action can, and should, revise its existing regulations for entry of refugees, so as to ensure that these cannot throw back into German hands any Jew who is able to make his escape. Knowledge that the door to

safety, if it could be reached, would be found open and not barred from the other side, would no doubt encourage efforts to escape, and thus increase the number of escapes. But, however much increased by this hope, the number that can make their way without special aid to any of the countries at war with Germany is trifling. The announcement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies of hastened admission to Palestine affects, in the first instance, refugees not from Germany itself but from Bulgaria.

The doors of escape for nearly all refugees lead first to some neutral country like Spain or Switzerland. To keep those doors open as wide as possible, more positive action is required of the United Nations than a revision of their own regulations. Immediate help may be needed in feeding and transport. More important than that is a binding declaration of future policy. The thing most urgently needed to save the lives of Jews to-day is an announcement on behalf of the United Nations that they accept, as part of their joint responsibility after victory, the making of a permanent and adequate settlement of the future of Jewry in Europe and the world.

HELP FOR THE HELPERS.

The making of such a declaration would be just. In one sense the whole war is a war about the Jewish problem. Hitler describes the war as started by Jewry to overcome the Aryan peoples. Hitler's treatment of this particular people is only the extreme case of that disregard of all human rights outside Germany which makes the Nazi creed. To destroy that creed, to re-establish the right of all human beings of all races to live unmolested while they live peaceably, is the object for which the United Nations fight. To win the war, and leave the problem of Jewry unsettled for the future, would be to fail in one of the objects of victory.

Threats of retribution on Germany can have little effect. The saving of lives now threatened depends upon influencing other minds than those of the Nazi leaders. First, there are Jews in peril, not only in lands directly controlled by the Nazis, but in satellite countries like Hungary and Rumania or Vichy France. To all these countries the threat of retribution, if they follow the German example, should be extended. Second, the only people who can give first aid to any numbers of Jews now in Germany are the neutral countries—Spain and Switzerland—to whose borders Jews in small numbers are escaping, to which, if the suggestion considered below for direct approach to the German rulers proved feasible, much larger numbers might come. But these countries cannot be expected to shoulder the whole burden of humanity. They need, first, help in feeding those who may escape; second, a firm undertaking on behalf of the United Nations that the help they give is first aid only, that the United Nations will find a permanent home elsewhere for these temporary sojourners.

CHALLENGE TO HITLER.

When all this has been done, those who have any chance of escape while Germany pursues a policy of extermination are but a tiny fraction of all those now under threat of destruction. With a view to saving lives, not by the hundred, but by the hundred thousand, the suggestion has been made that the United Nations through the Protecting Powers should ask Germany, in place of exterminating the Jews, to set them free to leave Germany and lands under German control. This request might be refused. In that case, it is argued, no harm has been done, and, at least, every effort will have been made; the conscience of those who make the request will be clear, and the record of Germany will

be blacker still. The request might receive a favourable reply; Hitler might think he saw an advantage in throwing a large mass of people upon the resources of the Allies to use their food and transport; in place of sending the inhabitants of the ghettos to slaughter-houses in Poland and Germany, he might send them in train-loads to the borders of neutral countries and leave them there to the responsibility of the United Nations; he might use the Jews in this stage of the war as his armies used the civilian refugees of invaded countries to impede their opponents, as a weapon to stave off defeat.

Is that a reason for not making the request? That is a question which can be answered, with a full sense of responsibility, only by those who are in a position to survey the whole field of war, and all its problems of feeding, transport and supply. Only by making such a request can the United Nations hope to save any large numbers of those otherwise doomed.

Whatever the numbers that can be saved from German fury, whether trifling, as now, or swollen by more vigorous efforts to escape, or made a flood because Hitler's desire to embarrass his enemy outruns his hate of Jews, first-aid to the threatened men, women and children, depends mainly on neutral countries. But the power and the readiness of neutrals to give that aid depends on the United Nations, for they will control the world after the war, they alone can give a guarantee that first-aid need only be temporary, that for all those rescued to-day a permanent home will be found elsewhere.

FINDING A HOME.

Where can this home be? What should be the ultimate settlement of the problem of Jewry? The problem itself is not a great one. Outside the boundaries of Russia there are not likely to be after the war more than three or four million Jews. It may be assumed that with Hitlerism exorcised finally from Europe most of these could be left or resettled as citizens of the countries to which hitherto they have belonged. But if for their future happiness and the peace of the world it appeared better that most Jews should be gathered together into one community, the finding of space for a community of this size, whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa, could not be regarded as one of the major problems of the peace. There are many other and more difficult problems.

But none of these things can be done by one only of the United Nations. The refugee problem is a test both of the humanity of all the United Nations and of their capacity as a Grand Alliance to make up their minds upon the problems for whose solution the Alliance exists, and in hopes of whose solution it fights.

SIAM'S SOUR FACES.

(Far East News Letter).

Broadcasts from Bangkok to the Siamese people studiously avoid all reference to relations with Japan and continue to harp on the theme that culture will make Siam a Great Power. It is obvious that the long-suffering public are fed up with the constant stream of advice to dress better and to wear modern trousers, hats and skirts, when clothing is almost unobtainable even by the few who can afford to pay for it; to put

a smile on their "sour faces" when they are at work or are serving customers; and to abandon faith-healing, when they are unable to buy medicines. In the cultural talk on May 10th the speaker admitted that there was much grumbling about the sartorial injunctions of the Premier as President of the Institute of National Culture, that a book could be filled with the Premier's instructions, and that many people did not want to follow the Government's advice. But, said the speaker, "our Leader has led the country rightly not only in small but also in big matters, and there is no doubt his leadership will make the nation a Great Power."

Thereafter, however, the interminable cultural talks took a different line. On May 11th the speaker breathed fire and thunder upon unnamed enemies. Both men and women loved their nation, said the speaker, and would "destroy entirely anyone who is an enemy of the nation." "The Thais are Buddhists and love truth and straightforwardness. Should anyone try to steal our Emerald Buddha or our holy relics, we will not rest until we have been avenged.....The Thais will carry on till good conditions return."

Next day another talk was broadcast in which the speaker insisted that the Siamese had always been strong and brave fighters. He mentioned several Kings who had been national heroes, and said that the Defence Ministry was arranging a Remembrance Day for King Phra Naresuan, "who was a great fighter for the freedom of Siam, just as our Ministry of Defence is now." Can it be that these warnings, like the defensive cultural talks, were directed against the proprietors of Greater East Asia, who have now "acquired" the Angkor Wat relics?

THE MAN WHO FIGHTS IN THE RED ARMY, OUTLOOK OF THE MODERN RUSSIAN SOLDIER.

(London Times.)

The fighting men of Britain and America would not feel strangers beside the Red Army man. Differences of temperament, of course, there are, and many would perhaps find it strange that members of non-Russian nationalities—Mongols, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kazakhs—fought with equal rank and prestige beside Russians and Ukrainians. Over one-third of those awarded decorations during the war were non-Russians.

HOME AND FAMILY.

In company they would find the Russian soldier quieter, more reserved, more formal in his attitude towards his fellows than they are used to; and in intimacy more impulsive, articulate, and emotional. In moments, of grief, anger and triumph he is more exalted, but in the humdrum everyday experiences of life perhaps a little more patient. He smiles less, rarely laughs, but sighs more; cynicism is far from his nature, and his favourite songs like the popular "Dug-out" and "Let's have a smoke", are wistful and tender, his thirst for education is unquenched by his experiences, and many go into battle with text-books in their pockets; his taste is extraordinarily high.

Their feeling for home and family is intense, and the exchange of letters is felt to be vitally important. The young Russian poet Eugene Dolmatovsky told me that on a sector of the Stalingrad front which he visited there was a craze for writing verse extending from the General to the Red Army men. Russian novelists and playwrights can always count on a host of critical letters from the front after their works have been published in the newspapers. The power of the word is strong, and the meetings before battle, at which commanders and their political assistants address the men, have a profound effect.

The growth of patriotism has been striking; to-day patriotic motives are probably more out-spokenly expressed in the songs and literature of the Red Army than anywhere else in the world. Some of the rousing marching songs you hear on the lips of Russian soldiers and sailors have the sturdy quality of "Hearts of Oak" and "John Brown's body." It is significant that of all British poets Rudyard Kipling is the one most read at present in the Red Army.

A LAND TO FIGHT FOR.

There has been no revival of 'flagwagging' patriotism. Rather has it been a discovery of all that is valuable and significant for the present time in Russia's heroic past, and the men who are fighting for the federation of Socialist republics have been made conscious that behind them, as they take their places in the trenches and gun emplacements, lie not only the great factories on the slopes of the Urals and wide cultivated plains in Siberia, Moscow with its still incomplete planning, a host of new cities beside the rivers, and on the forest edge, of buoyant, aspiring, dogged workers and farmers of contemporary Russia, but also the cathedrals and the Kremlin and ancient tulip-domed churches; poets, musicians, and novelists, and those who fought for a land ordered by justice and reason, knowing no slavery—a Russia ever renewing herself by the fruitful talent of her much-enduring people.

It was in the period of retreat that the Red Army man learned to know how dear his land was to him. "It is a fact, Comrade Commissar," says the hero of that remarkable interpretation of the Red Army's mood during the 1941 retreat, Vassili Grossman's "The people immortal"; "It is as if I have become a different person in this war; only now I have seen Russia honestly. You walk along and you become so sorry for every river, every bit of woodland, that your heart aches. Life was not always easy for the people, but then the difficulty was their own and ours. To-day I was walking along a glade and there a tree was rustling and trembling. It suddenly hurt me as if something was tearing at me. Can it really be that this little tree will go to the Germans? I thought."

UNGATHERED HARVEST.

This is no idealization of the Red Army man. It happened that that long desperate withdrawal through the Ukraine and Byelorussia took place during a summer of unwonted beauty and abundance, and as the heavy boots trampled down the ungathered harvest and rain pattered steadily down, as the shells shattered the trunks of the maple trees in the primeval forests, and the Germans rode roughshod through the orchards of black cherry, tearing down the white Ukrainian cottages where flowers ran riot and

sunflowers stared and nodded, the Red Army man learned to feel that this was his Russia and his blood ran cold to think that the intruder could remain here.

The Red Army is a thinking army, in whose minds you find the unquenchable curiosity of Russian people as you find their richness of talent and their great-heartedness. Proud indeed may the Soviet Union be to-day of its sons who fight so nobly, simply, and thoughtfully on the vast battle-fields.

THE GUARD WHO KNEW HINDUSTANI

— but “overheard” only home-truths

When the recently repatriated Indian prisoners of war from Italy were landed at a Turkish port recently, they had some interesting stories to tell about their Italian captors. Here is one of them.

Soon after they had settled down in their Italian prisoners of war camp, one of the Indian soldiers discovered by accident that one of their guards could understand Hindustani. This man was always fixing on the flimsiest pretexts to linger among them in the hope that, not knowing that he knew their language, the men would give away some useful information.

The Indians held a hurried council—and came to some quick decisions. And when next time the spying guard found an opportunity to linger amongst them, this is the sort of ‘secret’ he overheard.

“Of course, I like the Italians, but what a pity they have been so badly let down by their leaders. And now they’ve lost their Empire to us, and Italy to Hitler.”

And next time—“Such nice people the Italians, but why should they have fought against their allies of the last war.”

And the guard’s ears must have burned when he heard this choice bit of ‘information’.

“I wonder when we shall go to Germany?”

“Why should we go to Germany?” “Oh, well, the Germans are taking over everything that Italy has—and they might as well take the prisoners, also.”

It was not many days before the disgusted guard decided that his knowledge of Hindustani was not going to win him a comfortable job in the Italian Intelligence service in this camp at least.

BAGHDAD GIVING YOU NEWS OF HOME!

“This is Baghdad, giving you news of home.”

Wherever Indian troops are gathered in Persia and Iraq this announcement brings a hush, as radio sets are turned on full blast, and thousands of men listen eagerly for news of their families, their villages, and the life they used to know.

From a special studio at the Baghdad Broadcasting station an Indian Army officer conducts a daily programme for Indian soldiers, instituted recently with a talk in Hindustani by the new Commander-in-Chief for Persia and Iraq, Lieut-Gen. Sir Henry Pownall.

SONG-HITS.

Cables from India bring news of the villages, tell the men of the state of the crop and their cattle back home. Interspersing the news is music to suit all Indian tastes, with the latest film song-hits in Tamil, Telegu, Marathi, Bengali or Hindustani.

Sometimes the men themselves are called upon to provide the entertainment. So keen, in fact, are many of them to try their hand before the "mike" that the Radio Officer is kept busy with auditions.

PUDUKKOTTAI STATE NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU.

PROGRAMME.

LECTURE CL (Batch 3).

12- 6-43 Municipal Office ... 6.00 p.m.	16- 6-43 Ramachandrapuram... 7.00 p.m.
13- 6-43 Mullankurichchi ... 7.00 "	" Rayavaram ... 7.30 "
" Kottaikkadu ... 7.30 "	17- 6-43 Kodumbalur. ... 7.00 "
14- 6-43 Annavasal ... 7.00 "	" Viralimalai ... 7.30 "
" Kilakkurichchi ... 7.30 "	18- 6-43 Valaramanikkam. ... 7.00 "
15- 6-43 Malaiyur ... 7.00 "	" Embal ... 7.30 "
" Karambakkudi ... 7.30 "	

LECTURE CLI. (Batch 4)

19- 6-43 Municipal Office ... 6.00 p.m.	23- 6-43 Nartamalai ... 7.00 p.m.
20- 6-43 Nirpalani ... 7.00 "	" Uppiliakkudi ... 7.30 "
" Avoor ... 7.30 "	24- 6-43 Andakkulam ... 7.00 "
21- 6-43 Karaiyur ... 7.00 "	" Killanur ... 7.30 "
" Idaiyattur ... 7.30 "	25- 6-43 Konnaiyur ... 7.00 "
22- 6-43 Vadavalam ... 7.00 "	" Melaveguppatti. ... 7.30 "
" Sammettividuthi ... 7.30 "	

RECRUITING-ADVERTISEMENT-4 p. m.

12- 6-43 Vettamviduthi.	19- 6-43 Ponnamaravathi.
13- 6-43 Tittanviduthi.	20- 6-43 Marudankoneviduthi.
14- 6-43 Viralimalai	21- 6-43 Arimalam.
15- 6-43 Vadakadu.	22- 6-43 Perambur
16- 6-43 Rayavaram.	23- 6-43 Karambakkudi.
17- 6-43 Kulipirai.	24- 6-43 Kilanilai.
18- 6-43 Pudukkottai.	25- 6-43 Pudukkottai.