



PUDUKKOTTAI STATE NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU

BULLETIN]

MAY 29, 1943

[No. 148

LECTURE CXLVIII.

MR. CHURCHILL'S REVIEW OF THE WAR.

Address delivered to the Joint Session of the U. S. Congress, at Washington, on May 19, 1943.

The United States, Britain and their Allies have toiled and suffered and dared against a great and mighty enemy and have operated in the closest contact in many parts of the world, on land, sea, and in the air. The last time I addressed the U. S. legislature, was at a moment when the U. S. was aflame with wrath at the treachery of Japan.

In the days between May 1940 and Dec. 1942, we in Great Britain were waging a lonely struggle. But our experience and yours led us to the conviction that a closer association of our two peoples was essential for the future of the world and its peace. Despite the heavy misfortunes that we met in the Pacific theatre and elsewhere, we had confidence in the ultimate outcome of our efforts. In Malaya, and especially at Singapore ourselves suffered the largest military disaster in British history.

All this has to be retrieved, and all this and much else has to be repaid.

Here let me say, let no one suggest that we, British, have not at least as much interest in the relentless waging of the war against Japan as the U. S. We will be in the war side by side with you, in accordance with the best strategic deployment of our combined forces, while there is strength in our bodies.

A definite part in this war against Japan must, of course, be played by the large Armies and the Air and Naval forces now marshalled by Great Britain on the E. frontiers of India. In this quarter lies one of the means of bringing aid to hard-pressed and long-tormented China.

HELP TO CHINA.

Immediate and effective help to China is one of the most urgent and important aims of our common task. Field Marshal Wavell and the other Commanders-in-Chief in India have come here, and they did not travel many thousands of miles merely to visit Washington. They like ourselves, and all concerned in the task are met together to thrash out, in a friendly heart-to-heart discussion, all the points that arise.

You may be sure that if all that was necessary was that an order be given to the great Army standing in India to march towards the Rising Sun and open the Burma Road that order would be given. The matter is, however, somewhat more complicated, for there are mountains and jungles in N. E. India.

AIR WAR AMONGST GERMANY. PROMISE OF INTENSIFIED BOMBING

From the British Isles are conducted terrible air offensives against Germany, and in this we are powerfully aided by the U. S. In this war numbers count more and more both in the day and the night attacks. In aerial war, by which Germany and Japan imagined they could strike decisive and final blows on terrorised nations, big and small, and beat them into submission, the United Nations have already proved superior and shown the weakness of the Axis. The more continuous and severe the air fighting becomes, the better for us. For we can replace our casualties and machines far more rapidly than the enemy, and our progress in this sphere is safe and sure. But the potential development of great masses of ground personnel on which the efficiency of the aerial forces depends, however earnestly pressed forward, is bound to take time.

Regarding the question whether the use of air power by itself, could bring about the collapse of Germany or Italy. We are all agreed, that the damage done by aerial attacks to the enemy's war potential is enormous. The condition to which the great centres of German war industry, and particularly the Ruhr, are being reduced, is one of unparalleled devastation. You would have just read of the destruction of two great dams in Germany which feed canals and provide power to the enemy's ammunition works. It is also our settled policy to make it impossible for Germany to carry on her war industry on any large or concentrated scale, either in Germany, Italy, or in the occupied countries. Wherever these centres exist or are developed, they will be destroyed, and the ammunition will be dispersed.

ADVICE TO GERMANS

These raids will increase in intensity—and they are increasing in intensity—until the people of Germany and Italy abandon the monstrous tyranny which they have incubated and reared in their midst.

Meanwhile, the Allied air offensive is forcing Germany to withdraw a very large proportion of its air power from the fighting fronts to provide protection against air attacks. Hundreds of fighter aircraft, thousands of A-A. guns, and many hundreds of thousands of men, together with the output of vast war factories, are already being assigned to this defensive function.

This air war is a major factor in the process of victory. It is, however, agreed that we should, at the earliest possible moment, similarly bring our joint air power to play against the military targets in the homelands of Japan.

The cold-blooded execution of U. S. airmen by the Japs is an act of barbarism which provides good proof of the way in which they regard this possibility.

It is the duty of those who are charged with the prosecution of the war to overcome, at the earliest possible moment military, geographical, and political difficulties, and bring the necessary destructive forces into action over the munition centres of Japan; for they must surely be destroyed before peace comes to the world.

TRANSPORT OF ALLIED TROOPS. A GLOBAL STRATEGY

The prime problem before the United Nations, is not so much the creation of armies of men or aircraft, as the obligation to get these forces, in the teeth of enemy opposition and U-boat resistance, across the narrow seas and great oceans, and on land through mountains and jungles to the various parts of the globe.

All our war plans must, therefore, be inspired, and even dominated, by the supreme object of coming to grips with the enemy at the earliest possible moment, and engaging the enemy wherever it is profitable and, no doubt, wherever it is possible to do so.

The employment of our vast forces, the selection of the points at which to strike with the greatest advantage to those forces, and the emphasis and priority to be assigned to the various theatres—that is the task requiring the constant supervision and adjustment of our combined Staffs and all the heads of the Governments.

This complicated process calls for the utmost goodwill and readiness to think of the common cause. The war scene is constantly changing for the better.

I regarded it as my important duty to come here with the full authority of H. M.'s Govt. and with the highest officers, in order that the combined Staffs might work in the closest contact with the President.

We hope that at no distant date we may be able to achieve a meeting with Marshal Stalin and, if possible, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. But how, when, and where, is not a matter on which I am able to shed any clear light at the present time. Even if I were, I certainly would not.

Meanwhile, we will do our best to keep the closest association between the authorities of the countries who are engaged in the active direction of the war. It will be my special endeavour to promote and maintain intimacy and contact between all parts of the British Commonwealth and the leaders of the United Nations.

WAR AGAINST THE U-BOATS. SHIPPING POSITION MORE ENCOURAGING.

While the U. S. take a greater interest in the Pacific theatre, we take the main burden on the Atlantic. It is only natural. We have sustained, since the alliance began, more than double the losses in merchant shipping tonnage that have fallen upon the U. S.

On the other hand, the prodigious output of shipping from the U. S. Naval yards has in the last 6 months overtaken, and now far surpasses, the losses of both the Allies. There is reason to count upon a ceaseless and progressive expansion of Allied shipping available for the prosecution of the war.

Our killings of the U-boats have as your Navy Secretary will readily confirm, greatly increased in the last 3 months, and particularly the last 3 weeks have yielded record results in this connexion.

This of course, is due, to some extent, to the larger numbers of U-boats operating, but it is also due to the marked improvement in the severity and power of our measures against them, and the new devices continually employed.

While I repeat that the U-boat danger is still great, I have good, sober confidence that it will not only be met and contained, but will be overcome.

The increase of shipping tonnage over sinkings, for the movement of battle-supplies has provided that margin which is the main measure of the joint war-effort.

THE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN WRESTED FROM THE ENEMY.

One morning, during my visit to Washington in June 1942, the President handed to me a slip containing news of the Tobruk disaster, and the surrender of 25,000 men there. It was a grievous blow. But I was comforted by the knowledge that the one thought of Americans at that time was how to help to retrieve the situation.

The President immediately withdrew General Sherman tanks from U. S. units in training and sent them to N. Africa, and when the first ship-load of 150 was lost by U-boat action, he immediately sent others to replace them. These Sherman tanks played a very important part in the battle of El Alamein. The recent successes in N. Africa were most encouraging examples of what could be achieved by Britons and Americans working together.

If we can keep it up, there is hardly anything we could not do in the field of war, or in tackling the problems of peace.

The Allies have recovered the initiative, and retained it, and have rallied to their side French forces under the gallant leadership of Gen. Giraud. They have secured bases of vast strategic importance, and violent attacks will be delivered on the whole of Italy with results which no one could measure, and which must be beneficial to the common enterprise. Incessant attacks have been made on enemy shipping in the Mediterranean, which have proved to be of great importance to the Middle East and the Far East. They have struck the enemy severe blows which have equalled Stalingrad, and which took off a little of the burden of our heroic and heavily-engaged Russian Ally.

All this has been achieved notwithstanding Corporal Hitler's cheap sneer that Parliamentary democracies are incapable of waging effective war. Corporal Hitler's military intuition, the same Master Hand that condemned Marshal Paulus at Stalingrad, has also condemned a fine army in Tunisia.

THE AXIS LOSSES.

Here the Allies have destroyed or captured considerably more than a quarter of a million of the enemy's troops, together with vast masses of material. The injury that has been inflicted on the enemy, physically and psychologically, the training of troops in the hard school of war, and the welding together of the Anglo-U. S. Staff machines, are advantages which far exceed anything which has been lost by the delay in achieving their objectives. The African war is over; Mussolini's Empire is no more. The Emperor of Abyssinia once again sits on his throne. From Dakar to Alexandria, from Casablanca to Cairo, from Madagascar to Morocco, the whole territory is under British, U. S. or French control. The whole continent has been cleansed of Fascist and Nazi tyranny. The African excursions of the Dictators have cost them 627,000 soldiers, 2,400,000 gross tons of shipping, nearly 8,000 aircraft destroyed—all these figures excluding large numbers of ships and aircraft damaged or sunk. There have also been losses to the enemy of 6,200 guns, 2,550 tanks and 70,000 trucks.

The N. African campaign, and particularly the Tunisian climax, is a fine example of the co-operation of three different countries, and the combination, under one Supreme Commander, of the Sea, Land and Air Forces of those countries. The British and U. S. Staff work is a marvel of efficient organisation, which has enabled the 2nd U. S. Corps, and the British Army, to be moved 300 miles from the S. sector to the N. coast, beating all opposition in their advance towards Bizerta.

No more capable officer could have been chosen than Gen. Eisenhower for keeping such a large and heterogeneous force together, and creating the conditions of harmony and amity which were the indispensable elements of victory.

HITLER AND RUSSIA.

Heavier work lies ahead, not only in Europe but in the Pacific and the Indian spheres. The President and the combined Staffs and myself have gathered here in order that this work may be, so far as it lies in our power, well conceived and pressed forward without losing a day.

Not one moment must we forget that the main brunt of the battle on land is still borne by the Russian Army which is holding, at present, 190 German divisions and 28 satellite divisions on its Fronts. A further trial of strength between the German and Russian Armies is intended. Russia has already inflicted injuries on the German military organisation which will, I believe, prove fatal.

There is little doubt that Hitler is making the supreme gambler's throw in another attempt to destroy the armed forces of the mighty nation which he has already twice assaulted in vain. He will not succeed.

But we must do whatever lies in our power which is profitable and practicable to take more of the weight off Russia in 1943. How and when cannot be foreseen, still less foretold.

RUIN SPREADS OVER EUROPE. NEED FOR EARLY ALLIED OFFENSIVE.

It is necessary to take the most early steps, so that the favourable position which has already been reached both against Japan and against Hitler and Mussolini is not let slip by.

It is our wish to stop the ruin which is spreading rapidly to so many lands, and to this end we must contribute in a larger measure in sacrifice and suffering.

We cannot tolerate for a moment the slightest abatement of our war effort. The enemy is still powerful and hard to get at; he still possesses enormous armies, vast resources, and invaluable and strategic territories.

One false step, one wrong direction of the strategic effort, or any lassitude among the Allies, may leave the common enemy with the power to confront the Allies with new devilish threats. We have surmounted many serious dangers, but there are still dangers ahead—not the least of which is an undue prolongation of the war.

No one can tell what new complications and perils may arise. Dragging on the war at an enormous expense till the Democracies are tired of war—that is the main hope of

Germany and Japan just now. We must destroy this hope, as we have destroyed so many others, and to that purpose we must beware of every topic, however attractive, and every tendency and every suggestion, however natural, which turns our minds from the supreme objective of a complete victory of the United Nations, by singleness of purpose, steadfastness of conduct, tenacity and endurance such as we have so far displayed.

By these, and only by these, can we discharge our duties to the future of the world and the destiny of Man.

WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

22—5—43 to 28—5—43.

Germany.—A new kind of blow was delivered on GERMANY on May 17 when the Bomber Command attacked and breached the Mohne, the Sorpe and the Eder dams, which together control two-thirds of the water-storage of the RUHR. The operation, which was one of extreme difficulty, was carried out by picked crews under Wing-Commander Gibson. The Eder dam—400 metres long and 41 metres high, with a reservoir 25 kilometres long by 2 kilometres—the largest in EUROPE, controls the waters of the Weser and the Fulda and operates several power-stations. The Mohne dam, not so large, is the biggest source of water-supply for industrial and domestic purposes in the RUHR. The floods caused by the breaches have flooded the country around for miles. 54 towns are reported to be under water and 50,000 families have become homeless. Power stations and factories have been destroyed. The inundation has seriously affected German war production.

Italy.—Smashing raids on the Italian bases are being carried out, of which the reader will find an account in the next section. Among the targets of the week may be mentioned LIDO DI ROMA, ALGHERO, PANTELLARIA and SICILY.

Added to this, the British Navy is destroying enemy shipping in the Mediterranean

The Allies have occupied LA GAULLEITA—an important island off the north coast of TUNISIA.

Russia.—The fight for NOVOROSSISK continues. Local fighting in the TULA, KALUGA, IZYUM, KALININ, SYEVSK, VOLKOV, ROSTOV and LISICHANSK, is reported.

Pacific.—The chief event is the steady American advance in ATTU Island. The high grounds near Holtz Bay were occupied on May 17; SARANA PASS was taken on May 19; ATTU village was destroyed and the Japanese forces were split on May 21. According to news dated May 23 U. S. troops have launched a new triple drive on E. ATTU Island against the remnants of the enemy still holding out near CHICAGOF harbour and Lake Nicholas.

Ground fighting has flared up again in the MUBO area in NEW GUINEA. Clashes have occurred near CISSEMBOM, S. W. of SALAMAUA.

The Japanese made 2 attempts in the week to raid Exmouth Gulf, near ONSLOW, in W. AUSTRALIA. 10 bombs (one, in the first raid and 9 in the second raid) were dropped, and all fell harmlessly into the sea.

Reports are to hand of a dastardly attack on the Australian Hospital ship *Centaur*, off BRISBANE, by a Japanese submarine. The ship was torpedoed and sunk, though it bore the mark of the Red Cross and was brilliantly lit. Out of 332 passengers 268 were lost and 64 saved.

China.—Sanguinary fighting is reported west of the Tungting Lake (N. HUNAN), and in SZECHWAN, CHITUHO. A Japanese army of 60,000 is driving from ICHANG along the Yangtse.

Burma.—The successful completion of a daring, 3 months campaign by a mixed force of British, Burmese, Gurkha and Indian troops, in the heart of BURMA is reported. Marching through the jungles of ASSAM it crossed the Chindwin on Feb. 16, depending on wireless for communication and on plane and parachute for food and other supplies. Breaking into columns, they penetrated 200 miles inside BURMA, making forced marches through jungle and mountain. In March, they put the MANDALAY—KYITKINA railway out of action, cutting it in 75 places. Some columns also operated east of the Irrawaddy. Having completed its appointed mission, the force has returned in spite of the enemy's attempt to trap and overwhelm it. One of the results of the campaign has been to compel the enemy to call off his offensive against the Kachin Levies, north of MYITKYINA.

Patrol activity continues on the Arakan Front. The air-raids of the week are recorded in the next section, including the enemy's puerile attacks on COX BAZAAR and the CHITTAGONG air-field.

ALLIED AIR RAIDS.

15—5—43 (Saturday).

EUROPE (German-occupied).

NIGHT:—

Trains, barges, motor lorries and airfields
in FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND
and GERMANY (2 Axis planes and 1 Allied
plane destroyed).

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The railway station and barracks at TRAPANI
(Sicily).

Shipping around GREECE.

RUSSIA.

(For the week 8—5—43 to 15—5—43 Russians
lost 104 planes; Axis lost 370 planes).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the
Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

Air-fields at BUNA and FINSCHHAFEN
(N. Guinea).

The Yunakanan air-field at RABAU (N. Britain).

The air-field at GASMATA and CAPE
GLOUCESTER (both in N. Britain).

Air combats over LANGGOER (3 enemy planes
shot down).

Railhead of the Burma road at LASHIO (Burma).

Railway installations at SEDAW, ALON
and NAMKAN (all in Burma).

TAVOY (Burma).

16—5—43 (Sunday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—

Enemy air-fields at CAEN and MORLAX (France).

Railway yards at EU.

Enemy vessel off the French coast (1 Allied
plane missing and 2 Axis planes destroyed).

NIGHT:—

Targets at the RUHR, RHINELAND
and at BERLIN.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The sea plane base at LIDO, DI ROMA (Italy).

Shipping off SICILY.

RUSSIA

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the
Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

Enemy shipping in the BUIM area (Solomons).

The air-field at GASMATA (N. Britain).

ATTU Island.

KISKA (Aleutians).

Railroad installations at SHWEDO,
MOKSOGYON, ZIGON (Burma).

Warehouses at WETLET and MAGYZAUK
(Burma).

Jap H. Q. at MYITKYINA (Burma).

Villages on the AKYAB Island (Burma).

KALEYMYO (Burma).

Jetty at MAUNGDAW (Burma).

17—5—43. (Monday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—

MOHNE and ELDER dams and SORPE
reservoirs in the RUHR (Germany).

NIGHT:—

Enemy convoy off DUTCH coast.

Road and rail communications and enemy air
bases in Northern FRANCE and BELGIUM;

Laying mines in enemy coastal waters.

Targets in south GERMANY (3 allied planes
missing).

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The port and air field at ALGHERO (Sardinia).
Landing crafts with troops at AUGUSTA (Sicily).
Power stations at PORTO EMPEDOCLE (Sicily).

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

Jap installations at REKATA BAY.

WAKE Island.

Jap forces on ATTU Island.

The air field at KAVIENG (New Ireland).

Jap radio installations near AKYAB (Burma).

GUDABYIN (Burma).

Transport on the MAYU river.

The air field at KANGAUNG, YENANGVANG and

RATHEDAUNG (Burma).

Objectives at TAUNGUP (Burma).

18—5—43 (Tuesday).

EUROPE (Germany occupied).

DAY:—

The air fields at ABBEVILLE and POIX (both in France.)

NIGHT:—

Laying mines in enemy coastal waters.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

6 merchantmen in PANTELLARIA harbour.

TRAPANI (Sicily).

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian front.

FAR EAST.

Air combats over KAVIENG (New Ireland).

The air fields at RABAU, GASMATA and CAPE GLOUCESTER (all in New Britain).

Air fields at LAE (N. Guinea).

The water front at FINSCHAFEN (New Guinea).

LORENGAU (Admiralty Islands).

ARAWA (New Britain).

Warehouses near AKYAB town (Burma).

Water transport on the MAYU river (Burma).

Motor vehicles in the BUTHIDAUNG area (Burma).

Objectives at TOUNGOO (Burma).

Jap installations at MINBU (Burma).

Railway yards at PROME (Burma).

EUROPE (German occupied).

19—5—43 (Wednesday).

DAY:—

The German Naval base at KIEL.

Diversionary sweeps over the Northern FRANCE.

NIGHT:—

BERLIN (Germany).

Enemy air fields and railway lines in FRANCE and BELGIUM.

Barges in the GHENT area and on the LYS river (France.)

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The Milo air-field in SICILY.

Four air-fields in Sardinia (18 enemy planes destroyed).

Communications in Sardinia.

The docks at PANTELLARIA.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

Enemy troops in ATTU Island.

The air-field at RABAU (N. Britain).

Enemy objectives at KYAUKTLAW and GANGAW (Burma).

Jap water transport in the coastal area of Burma, from AKYAB to RAMREE Island.

TAUNGUP (Burma).

LANYWA workshops near CHAUK (Burma).

Enemy installations at MAGWE (Burma)

and THAYETMYE and PYAYE (Burma).

PADAUKKAN oil fields south of MAGWE.

EUROPE (German occupied).

20—5—43. (Thursday).

DAY:—

Air duel over the BAY of BISCAY (1 enemy plane destroyed).

NIGHT:—

The railway yards at TERGNIER.

Laying mines in enemy waters.

Railways and transport targets in FRANCE and North-west GERMANY.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

A convoy between PANTELLARIA and MARETTIMO.

A train near CATANZARO (Italy).

A motor vessel and an E-boat off SICILY.

Air-fields at VILLA CIDRO and DECIMOMANNU (Sardinia).

Railway ferry termini at MESSINA.

REGGIO DI CALABRIA.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian front.

FAR EAST.

Jap bases on New Guinea and New

BRITAIN especially GASMATA and SALAMAUA.

Jap troops at ATTU.

KISKA (Aleutians).

Enemy objectives at LEPTAN, KYWEGU and the route from ARAKAN to TAUNGUP (Burma).

Warehouses at AKYAB.

Jap water transport along the coast of Burma.

Warehouses at MONYWA and MYINGYAN (Burma).

Cement plant at THAYETMYE (Burma).

A Jap workshop at YENANG (Burma).

PROME (Burma).

A mill at ALLAMYO (Burma).

21—5—43 (Friday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

NIGHT:—

Railway targets at ORLEANS (France).

BERLIN (Germany).

An enemy convoy off the FRENCH coast.

DAY:—

Submarine yards at WILHELMSHAVEN and EMDEN.

Patrolling over the DUTCH coast.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

Enemy air-fields in SICILY and SARDINIA.

Harbour installations and gun positions

at PANTELLARIA.

Wireless station and camp at MELILLI (Sicily).

A factory at POZALLO (Sicily).

MESSINA (Sicily).

Targets in South ITALY.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

Jap installations at KAHILI and BALLALE; ATTU village.

KISKA (Aleutians).

Jap bases in New GUINEA and New BRITAIN.

Railway stations at INDAW (Burma).

AKYAB Island.

The marshalling yards at MANDALAY (Burma).

Workshops at CHAUK (Burma).

22-5-43 (Saturday).
EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—

7 trains in FRANCE.
Laying mines in enemy waters.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.
BORIZZO, air-field and other air-fields in SICILY.
Shipping in the AEGEAN SEA.

RUSSIA.

For the week 15-5-43 to 22-5-43 Russians
lost 61 planes and the Axis lost 313 planes.
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the
Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

Enemy ships over the Gulf of MARTABAN.
Railway installations at KANBALU (Burma).
Jap installations at PROME, RANGOON
and TAUNGUP.

Jap bases in New Guinea and New BRITAIN.
Jap troops and positions on the ATTU Island.

23-5-43 (Sunday).
EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—

* Axis transport in the occupied COUNTRIES.
3 railway tankers and marshalling yards
in Northern FRANCE.
Coke ovens at ZEEBRUGGE (Belgium).

ENEMY AIR RAIDS.

16-5-43 (Sunday).
BRITAIN.
LONDON area (only 3 alerts).

RUSSIA.
Air combats over the KUBAN.

FAR EAST.
WAU area (Many Jap planes damaged).
PORT MORESBY (New Guinea) (2 Jap planes
shot down).

17-5-43 (Monday).
BRITAIN.
Places in South and East ENGLAND, ESSEX and
the Greater LONDON area.

RUSSIA.
Russian air fields behind the Russian lines.

FAR EAST.
Air combats north of MAUNGDAW.

18-5-43 (Tuesday).
BRITAIN.
LONDON area (a few civilians killed).

MEDITERRANEAN.
Outskirts of MALTA.

RUSSIA.
LISICHANSK area.
U. S. Positions in GUADALCANAR and RUSSEL
Islands.

19-5-43 (Wednesday).
BRITAIN.
LONDON area.
Places in South east ENGLAND and ESSEX
(only slight damage caused).

MEDITERRANEAN.
Air duel over the SICILIAN channel (1 Jap
plane shot down.)

FAR EAST.
The allied base at WAU (New Guinea) (Many
Jap planes damaged).

NIGHT:—

Industrial town of DORTMUND (Germany).
E-boat off the Isle of WIGHT.

ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN.

The docks and air-fields at PANTELLARIA.
CARI FORTE harbour and air field in Sardinia.
Enemy shipping in the AEGEAN SEA
and off GREECE.

Warships south-east of CATANIA.
The air-field at LAMPEDUSA.
A train near CATANZARO (Italy).

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the
Russian Front.

FAR EAST.

Jap air-fields at GASMATA and RABAUL
(N. Britain).

KAVIENG (New Ireland).
Railway objectives at YE U (Burma).
AKYAB Island (Burma).

24-5-43 (Monday).
EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—

A convoy off the DUTCH coast.

20-5-43 (Thursday).
BRITAIN.

LONDON area (only an alert).

RUSSIA.
Russian communications behind the Russian lines
FAR EAST.
GUADALCANAR (Solomons).
A town on the S. E. coast.

21-5-43 (Friday).
BRITAIN.

LONDON area (only an alert) (1 Axis plane shot
down).

RUSSIA.
LISICHANSK area.

FAR EAST.
Air combats over COX'S BAZAAR (India) (4 Jap
planes damaged.)

22-5-43 (Saturday).
BRITAIN.

No information available.
RUSSIA.
Russian air fields behind the Front lines.

FAR EAST.
Air combats over the CHITTAGONG area, (India).
(9 Jap planes shot down and 6 damaged).

23-5-43 (Sunday).
BRITAIN.

A town on the South east coast of ENGLAND.
2 places on the South coast of ENGLAND
(3 enemy planes shot down).

FAR EAST.
Air combats over ATTU Island.

24-5-43 (Monday).
BRITAIN.

Towns on the North east coast of ENGLAND.
RUSSIA.

Air combats over the KERCH STRAITS.
FAR EAST.

No information available.

SIDE LIGHTS.

Mr. CHURCHILL'S WASHINGTON ADDRESS.

On May 19 Mr. Churchill delivered his second address to the U.S. Congress. His first address was at a time when

Japanese treachery drove American isolationism to take part in a World War. Then Mr. Churchill's speech was to prepare the Nations for united action. The second speech was a fitting sequel to the first. The mighty invasion which his genius had planned had borne fruit in a resounding victory. It was only natural that he should tell the tale of the triumph and call the Nations to a fresh effort, as only he could do it, with all the force and grandeur of superb oratory. No wonder that Mr. Churchill, now the centre of a world's admiration, should receive a tremendous ovation, as he did, when he addressed his American audience—Tears stood in his eyes, we are told, 'at the ovation which greeted him from isolationist and interventionist' members. 'He shoved his thick, horn-rimmed glasses', says an eyewitness, 'over his nose, blinked and balanced himself like an old sailor. Then he left himself go in eloquence, blunt and effective, as an old Knob Kerrie, with growling and galling scorn for his enemies and in passages of noble purple for his friends. Between the bursts of applause, in which supreme court justices and diplomats joined as lustily as the doormen, the galleries wondered whether ever before such a moving and eloquent speech had been made on the floor of the Senate. Actually it was not the speech so much as the personality that put it over'.

One great point which Mr. Churchill made in his great speech was to expose the fallacy that BRITAIN was not interested in the fight against JAPAN, and that after defeating Hitler in EUROPE she would leave AMERICA in the lurch, and that AMERICA must fight JAPAN alone. While he still held to the thesis that while the defeat of GERMANY in EUROPE would lead to the collapse of JAPAN in ASIA, a Japanese defeat in ASIA would not bring about the downfall of GERMANY in EUROPE, he also drove the point home that even more than AMERICA BRITAIN was interested in a Japanese defeat. It was only a case of priorities. If AMERICA had lost the PHILIPPINES, BRITAIN had lost both BURMA and MALAYA—and SINGAPORE. Set against the distant chances of a Japanese attack on AMERICA, was the more immediate danger of an invasion of INDIA and AUSTRALIA. For this reason, BRITAIN had massed great forces on the N. E. Frontier of INDIA, and Field Marshal Wavell had come all the way to WASHINGTON to confer.

THE TIME FACTOR.

One other point in this historic speech deserves mention.

Mr. Churchill made the significant observation that Time had now changed in value for the Allies. In the early, unprepared stages of the war, time was required to build up the Allied strength, and a defensive, delaying tactic was necessary. Now that the Allies were strong and the enemy had grown weak and a strategic position had been gained in N. AFRICA delay would be dangerous. The blows must now fall quickly: the iron must be struck while it is hot; the enemy must be overpowered, while he was exhausted. To delay now would help the enemy to recuperate, to recover.

It was to gain time that Hitler—though he knew too well that he had lost his African battle even at EL ALAMEIN, still continued the hopeless fight as far as CAPE BON-

A MYSTERY.

It is possible to argue the point and to ask, 'why, then, in the final stages, the fortifications of BIZERTA were evacuated in favour of an undefended place like CAPE BON, undefended by the *Luftwaffe* and unassisted by the Italian fleet.

HITLER'S MASTERHAND.

This, we confess, is one of the mysteries of the N. African campaign—which time alone will solve. Perhaps it was a touch of Hitler's 'masterhand'—the result of a change of mind, brought on by despair and vacillation—a sudden collapse of morale—the knowledge that an axis Dunkirk was impossible with the Royal Navy near by.

THE DOUBLE PURPOSE.

The African Campaign had a double purpose—a political one to humour ITALY, by fighting her African battle in order to keep a lingering hold on the vanishing Italian Empire; and a military necessity, to hold on and gain time. But in the final stages both evacuation and resistance becoming hopeless, there was nothing to do but surrender.

Thus, Hitler, did not delay longer, because he could not, not because he would not. He did not change his strategy; but circumstances overpowered him. He would have held on longer, if he could.

FESTUNG EUROPA.

But let it also be admitted that, in the six months of the campaigning in AFRICA, though at great sacrifice Hitler has had a spell of time in which to strengthen his European defences. But the claim to have built up an impregnable fortress—a Festung Europa—is mere bunkum. As Major George Fielding, the American Military Commentator has pointed out, in the April 5th issue of the *New York Herald Tribune*, 'a nation which builds a wall upon its frontier to defend it from enemies is already beaten. By that very act it proclaims its decadence or weakness. It puts its faith in stones and mortar rather than in the stout hearts and strong arms of its fighting men. It does so either because its men are no longer willing to march beneath its battle-standards, or because it no longer possesses enough men to form adequate armies. In either case the building of walls is the inevitable herald of disaster.'

This is also the Verdict of history—both ancient and modern. The instances are the Great Wall of CHINA, the Roman Walls, the Maginot Line and the Mareth Line.

The reason is apparent;—

'The wall on the frontier is based on a false military principle. It seeks to be strong everywhere; the wall itself may be assumed to be equally strong at every point. But as a practical matter, it is only as strong as the troops assigned to defend it; which means that it tends to bring about dispositions of troops on a linear system, which can be pierced anywhere by a strong enemy concentration.'

The wall no doubt, fixes the location of the front to be defended but it leaves the enemy outside free to manoeuvre, to choose his own time, place, and method of attack. In these circumstances mobility and strength alone can save a weak point from being pierced.

The building up of a wall is by itself a confession of the inability to fight a battle of manoeuvre. It may bring disappointment at any moment, at any point.

But, till that sad moment may arrive, the existence of a wall may tend to lull the minds of the beleaguered into a sense of false security, and may also lead to a senseless slackening of efforts needed to defend the country. That is how FRANCE fell in 1940.

Thus, Festung Europa, which is now Goebbels' principal propaganda theme, and which he boasts has been erected impregably from the Arctic Sea to the Aegean, will be no stronger than its weakest spot, and no safer than available reinforcements can make it. Nearly four years of war have depleted the German strength. Owing to difficulty of communications the mobility of her available forces has become poor. In 1918, with her strength reduced to the present level, GERMANY could not hold a short line between SWITZERLAND and the sea. Festung Europa is a bogey.

WHEN? WHERE?

Inebriated, no doubt, by the recent African Victories, the question is impatiently asked, where will this fortress be pierced? 'O! Where? When?' 'Where? When?', answers the echo. 'Patience', is our answer. Great decisions, no doubt, must now have been reached at WASHINGTON but that is a secret safely locked up in the bosoms of Churchill and Roosevelt. But though speculation may be idle, one thing is obvious. Steps must be taken to follow up the African Victory by a Mediterranean descent, to remove the remaining obstacles to a free passage through this sea; otherwise the advantages already won will be lost. SICILY, SARDINIA, PANTELLARIA, and S. ITALY must be occupied by a direct assault, while an oblique operation, aided it may be by TURKEY, may also be made to free the E. Mediterranean and land forces in the BALKANS, which will relieve the pressure on the Russian Ally. All this implies another invasion campaign on a larger scale than in AFRICA, a larger armada, and—time for preparation. Meanwhile, Hitler may attempt another gambler's throw in RUSSIA. Time is not only precious now; but the times are also critical. One false step, as Mr. Churchill has warned, would undo the gain of years. But fortitude and perseverance will win. So we repeat, 'patience'.

THE WHIRLIGIG OF TIME.

A strange change has now come about in the attitude of the Allies and the Axis towards the unknown future. 'When', 'Where', are questions, now more eagerly asked by the Axis than by the Allies. The tables have been turned. It is now the turn of the Allies, because they hold the initiative, to play a war of nerves upon the enemy. The question no longer is, 'where will Hitler strike next', but where, with the great armies released from AFRICA, and with other armies forming and formed in the MIDDLE EAST and in other centres and other continents, the Allies will strike next.

THE AERIAL WAR.

Another demoralising factor is the aerial warfare, which now devastates Hitler's EUROPE, and Mussolini's ITALY. It is no longer a raid, or a demonstration, but a major battle, carried on ceaselessly relentlessly, day and night, hour by hour. The word 'raid', says Viscount Trenchard, Marshal of the R. A. F., is incorrect and conveys an entirely inadequate notion.

These bombing assaults, he explains are major operations carried out against formidable defences and are, in importance, comparable with the great battles of the past. These 'battles', observes Mr. Eden, are planned not only around the clock but round the map. Sir A. Sinclair adds that the only way to save GERMANY from slaughter is to raid the Allied way to BERLIN.

Of late, the RUHR industrial area has received the particular attention of the R. A. F. Over 750,000 men here are engaged in defence operations against air attacks; another 750,000 in fire-fighting and half of the fighter-forces of GERMANY in self defence.

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THE BREACHING OF THE DAMS. The breaching of the Mohne, the Sorpe, and the Eder dams on the 17th, is a new kind of aerial blow. The reservoirs supplying water to the RUHR have been breached, Power-plants have been immobilised; 54 towns and villages, submerged; and 50,000 families, rendered homeless. In dismay, Hitler has rushed an entire sapper division of 9,000 men to the inundated area, and in frenzy has vowed vengeance on the Jews, as if they were the agents who secretly revealed the location of the dams. But it was British aerial reconnaissance that reported on the location and the Bomber Command under Wing-Commander Gibson that planned and carried out this new and hazardous enterprise.

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ATTU. The American occupation of ATTU Island is according to official reports 'going satisfactorily' and the Japanese own admission that the Americans in this area are in a numerical superiority is a good augury of further success.

The ALEUTIANS of which ATTU is on, are a chain of 150 islands, stretching over 1,200 miles, across the North Pacific between ALASKA in AMERICA and KAMACHKATKHA in ASIA. This island originally Russian, was sold to the U. S. in 1867.

KISKA, another island of this group was occupied by Japan eleven months ago, on June 13, 1942, and it has become a threat both to AMERICA and RUSSIA, especially after the loss of WAKE and GUAM.

The occupation of ATTU, which is now in progress, will have important repercussions. The island is the most westerly of the group and the nearest to JAPAN. From here super-bombers can visit JAPAN and return. AMACHITKA, another island in the Aleutian chain to the east of KISKA has been already taken; and though KISKA is still in enemy hands it may be by-passed and isolated by the capture of ATTU, which lies further west.

When the possession of the ALEUTIANS is completed, the 'sons of heaven' can be blasted from these northern bases, and supplies in plenty can be taken to PETROPAULOVSK in KAMACHKATKHA for Russian relief.

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DUTCH HARBOUR. the target of recent Japanese attacks, is another ALEUTIAN island, which, for its strategic importance, has been called the 'Singapore of the North Pacific'. Situated 28,500 miles from TOKYO, this ice-free base is a potential threat to the Japanese mainland. It is a strong air and naval base.

THE NEW CHINA ROUTE.

The completion of a new route to CHINA is reported.

KALIMPONG—its starting point lies midway between **BOMBAY** and **CHUNGKING**. The first half of the journey from **BOMBAY** to **KALIMPONG** can be done in 4 days, but the second half of the journey will take 12 weeks. In the first half supplies can be loaded on railways trucks, while in the second half, they have to be carried by mules. Thus, the quantity of materials that can be transported becomes limited; medical supplies will have the preference; but 'every little helps'. It is a great thing that **TIBET**, through which the route lies, has agreed to the passage of the supplies in spite of its traditional pacifism.

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THE EXPEDITION INTO BURMA.

Our commentary of the week would be incomplete without the story of the expedition of a small force, British and Indian, Gurkha and Burman, which stole into the interior of **BURMA** three months ago and has now returned, having successfully completed its mission. The expedition owed its conception to **F. M. Wavell** and its execution to **Brigadier Wingate**. When seeing the men off at **IMPHAL**, **Wavell** showed them a special honour by reversing the usual practice and saluting them first, in recognition of the hazardous enterprise on which they were embarking. Proceeding east, the force crossed the **Chindwin** and cut the **MANDALAY—MYITKYINA** railway in 75 places, marching over 750 miles. Communication was by wireless, and supplies were dropped by air. Parachute-Freighting was the method. Food-parachutes were brought by planes and flung at the 'delivery stations': in urgent cases, the planes themselves descended, and when they returned took back the wounded.

The enterprise has provided a unique experience of land and air co-operation in jungle-fighting. As a result of the effort the Japanese have called off their offensive against the **Kachin Levies**, north of **MYITKYINA**.

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EXIT SIDI MONOEF PASHA.

The deposition of **Sidi Monoef Pasha**, and his removal to **MADAGASCAR** with his family, are not matters for surprise. During the initial stages of the **Tunisian** campaign he was anything but friendly to the Allied cause. Latterly he had become a tool of his German masters. He got what he deserved, much more than **Quislings** deserve.

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WAR MEASURES IN PUDUKKOTTAI.

The **Pudukkottai** Government have prohibited the transport and the sale of cotton yarn without permit. Cotton spinning mills must submit monthly returns. Owners of rice mills must submit fortnightly returns of their stocks of rice and paddy. Milling has been licensed.

Another order prohibits persons engaged in retail sale from using any paper other than old newspaper for wrapping or packing goods, except food-stuffs or of articles, which they have agreed to deliver away from their premises.

THE PILLARS OF SECURITY.

A PEOPLE'S WAR FOR A PEOPLE'S PEACE.

BY SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE.

(*From the Observer*).

One of the discoveries of the year 1942 is the deep and vivid interest of the people of Britain in the kind of Britain which is to emerge when the floods of war subside. This interest in post-war problems implies no slackening of war effort; it has been shown most conspicuously in a year of war effort growing steadily and without weariness to a climax. It implies no unwillingness to make all the sacrifices required for victory. It represents simply a refusal to take victory in war as an end in itself; it must be read as a determination to understand and to approve the ends beyond victory for which sacrifices are being required, and the purposes for which victory will be used.

For the leaders of a nation at war, dealing as they must day by day with the urgent problems of each day, feeling directly the weight of the enemy's resistance and seeking to anticipate his thrusts, it is easy to feel that victory itself may be an end; that when at last they are in a position to impose their wills on the leaders of the foe their task will be done; that the performance of that task should not be complicated by considerations of what may follow its achievement.

VICTORY AND AFTER.

It is possible that the common people of totalitarian countries, drilled from youth to be instruments of a tyrant's dream or a madman's revenge, living in the servitude of war for years before open war begins, may be incurious or fatalistic about their futures. For them victory or mere escape from war may seem an end. The common people of a pacific democracy are in different case. It will not appear to them sufficient reason, either for risking death in youth or for killing others, that they may thereby be in a position to impose their wills upon another people. They will fight to the death—all people will fight—in defence of their invaded homes. They can be roused for a time to anger against inhumanity abroad—as the British have been roused time and again, as the American people were in the first World War. But this anger may not last long enough to accomplish its aim. The sustained free effort required of the democracies to-day, to lead them to die and to kill in every quarter of the globe, until the forces of barbarism in every quarter are overcome, must be directed not by anger or fear or hate, but towards a clearly seen aim beyond the war—to the making of a world in which the common people of all nations and their children after them may live and work in security.

The people of a democracy, no less than those of a totalitarian State, must have leaders. The difference between democracies and totalitarian States lies, not in absence of leaders, but in the power of a democracy to change its leaders without shooting. To have the power of peaceful change of Governments is the essential condition of a democracy. To exercise that power and make changes repeatedly or frivolously brings weakness in peace as in war. But desire for change can be prevented only by mutual understanding

and trust between leaders and people. That is the real meaning of national unity in war.

National unity is not an affair of party bargains or coalitions. It can spring only from mutual understanding between Government and people. A vital factor in that mutual understanding to-day is recognition by those who govern of what has been described above as one of the discoveries of 1942, namely, the determination of the British democracy to look beyond victory to the uses of victory. This recognition in turn will be made easier by realisation of the difference in the personal impact of war upon the common people and on those concerned with the daily tasks of government.

The most general effect of war is to make the common people more important. In war, needs become manifestly greater than the resources of man-power, machines, and materials available for meeting them, so that any waste of resources is a crime. Every able-bodied person in the community becomes an asset; all men can have the happiness of effort and of service; unemployment with its privations and frustrations disappears. All this happens because the urgency of the needs of war is recognised by the leaders as well as by the people, and by general consent the whole power of the State is used to organise resources so as to meet them.

LIMITLESS NEEDS.

Yet the needs of war, though they may be more urgent, are not in fact greater than the needs of peace. The needs of peace are as limitless as those of war. If and when a community reaches the stage when physical want has been abolished; if and when, proceeding beyond that point, it is able to ensure for all, on condition of service, comforts and material luxuries as well as necessities, the limit of needs will not have been reached; new needs will arise and should be fostered by education—desires for leisure, for learning, for travel. But these stages are not in sight.

The condition of all peoples to-day leaves many needs unsatisfied which to those who feel them are as urgent as the needs of war. There is here another difference that requires to be overcome between the governors and the governed. Those in charge of affairs may find it easier to appreciate the urgency of the needs of war than that of the needs of peace, because for themselves the most urgent needs of peace have long been met. They may not always find it so easy from their own experience to realise the compelling necessity, in peace as in war, to organise resources for meeting needs, without waste or idleness. They are often engaged during war in much the same activities as those of peace, as Ministers, in Parliament, in the organisation of parties or trade associations, in the higher administration of public affairs or of business. The coming of war does not mean for them what it does to millions of the common people, a violent change of occupations, with prospect of another violent change to an uncertain future when war ends.

THE MEANS TO SUCCESS.

This feature of war, as a time of violent changes in the direction of human effort and so of human occupations, involves change in the scope and functions of Government. Automatic adjustment of economic activities by the price mechanism is too slow for times of rapid change; adjustment must be made directly by use of the powers of the State:

adjustment will be made more rapidly and more smoothly in proportion as all the necessary measures have been planned beforehand. This is generally recognised of the changes required on passage from peace to war ; it is as true, though not equally recognised, of the changes required in passing back again to peace.

It is axiomatic technically that preparations for war ought to be made before war begins, during peace ; the fact that adequate preparations for war have seldom if ever been made by modern democracies is due to a political obstacle—to their essentially pacific nature. It is as axiomatic technically that for smooth transition from war to peace adequate preparations must also be made in advance, that is to say planning for peace ought to be undertaken in war. Here there is no political obstacle. Planning ahead for peace even during war accords with the sentiment of democracies. It is one of the services desired by them of their leaders.

The more fully this fact is recognised, in principle and in the practice of Government, the greater will be the unity of the nation in war, and the greater by consequence will be its strength for war. Only through complete mutual understanding between leaders and people can come the unswerving support and untiring effort for which the crisis calls. For the leaders of a democracy at war to concern themselves with the purpose of victory as well as with the means to victory is not a diversion of effort from more important to less important tasks. It is a part of their task—the means to success. Victory against an enemy as strong and as well prepared as our present enemy depends on making the war a people's war. One cannot make a people's war except for a people's peace.

ITALY'S PLIGHT.

AN ITALIAN OFFICER CONDEMNS MUSSOLINI.

(From the Times of India, May 15, 1943).

A frank admission of Italy's present plight and a review of the causes which led to it are contained in a document published in "The Examiner" of May 1. This document was written by an Italian officer, Colonel Villa, now in India as a prisoner of war. Below are some extracts.

Colonel Villa begins with a review of the war position at the end of last year, and concludes : "In the military field the end of 1942 shows that Germany and Japan have lost the advantage they owed to surprise and many years of careful preparation. The armament of the belligerent nations is now balanced and is heading in an impressive crescendo in favour of the United Nations."

Italy should never have entered the war, says Col. Villa, least of all on the side of Germany and Japan. "Mussolini has always claimed that Italy needed 50 years of peace and work, and in the rural visits where he is so fond of displaying himself, I don't know how many times he has repeated 'This is the war we want,'—honest work in the fields and offices, not a senseless imperialist war!"

CLAIMS RENOUNCED.

"Not even her territorial claims against France can justify Italy's intervention in the conflict. Why, in January, 1935, on the strictest terms with Laval, Mussolini

definitely renounced all Italian claims not only on Corsica and Nice, but also on Tunisia where all privileges for our flourishing colony would finally have ceased in 1950. Even the troubles and quarrels between the countries, which were reawakened by sanctions, could have been settled peacefully to their mutual satisfaction, once everyone had calmed down. The means of access to the Empire, the passage of the Suez Canal and the use of the port of Jibouti could have been likewise settled peacefully. England made Italy the most concrete and advantageous proposals about it—although at the last minute—to persuade Italy in 1940 to stay neutral.

“Morally the people did not want war, and had shown it by the demonstrations of joy with which they welcomed Mussolini's return from Munich in September, 1938 ‘after saving the peace.’ They confirmed it still later in the anxiety of the early days of September, 1939, when it appeared that Italy had to come in on Germany's side right from the first, and in the general sigh of relief when it was known that there were no pledges or probability of war before 1942 at least. The people gave a third, very obvious, proof by their almost hostile philliness, when, in June, 1940, the first thin columns of conscripts began to appear in the city streets to glorify war, and by the absence of similar manifestations among the real masses.

STABBING FRANCE.

“The worst of all is to have attacked prostrate France and, without any serious motive, Greece. For that was unpardonable. A country can lose a war without losing its dignity and honour. In the thousand years of Italian history there are plenty of invasions, dominations, humiliations and destructions, and she has been bled white in struggles for districts, cities and fortresses. All her path—as with other nations—has not been happy and worthy and glorious. But no other period has ever been so humiliating and immoral.

“The shame of having stabbed a friendly nation of our own blood when others had struck her down and she was on her knees; and then as a nation of forty million to attack Greece with her seven million, and accuse her of treachery when she prepared to defend herself! Even more, to have attempted to attack her with such nonchalance as to expose our troops to contempt and the danger of having to retreat even out of Albania! We sacrificed two armies in Libya and Abyssinia through not knowing how to arm, wield or command them. We not only lost an empire within five years of having conquered it but all that our fathers had won in over half a century. We screamed and yelled to the four winds about our military strength, and then had to put up with aerial and naval attacks, almost without defence, against our people, our cities and our industries. We have brought the name of Italy into contempt throughout the world and made ourselves enemies everywhere. All these disgraces are enough to make any Italian's heart bleed and to make all among us blush who still have a feeling for our national dignity and chivalry.

“All make mistakes, but the heads of England and America openly admit their mistakes and are not frightened of admitting that they will inevitably make more, while the heads of the Axis shelter behind their presumptuous dogma of infallibility.

DILEMMA.

"In his speech on November 29, Mr. Churchill in a few words outlined the terrible dilemma facing Italy. 'The whole of Southern Italy, all her naval bases, all her munition factories and other military objectives wherever they may lie will undergo a prolonged scientific aerial attack. It is up to the forty million Italians to say whether or not they want this to happen to them.'

"But a dilemma supposes the possibility of choice. Italy's only choice is between suffering the destruction of its cities, lives, industries, ports and shipping, and sufferings perhaps just as great in the form of cruel and bloody repression. All that without knowing where it is leading, what her lot would be if she laid down her arms, what her future will be. Let the Allied Nations clearly tell the Italians how things will be, what position they will have, what means and what territory will be at their disposition in the future new world, which all want to be a better one.....

"Let the military and civil heads of the United Nations announce at once—the sooner the better—a programme affecting Italy, which will be neither oppressive nor mean but generous, noble and far-sighted, neither vague nor theoretical but concrete, if possible with all the 'i's dotted and the 't's crossed to eliminate all ambiguity and uncertainty, and it will be acceptable even to the usual doubters and comprehensible even to the humblest.

"Only then will Italy be able to choose and it will not be a decision taken blindly with death in their hearts. Already there are symptoms of ferment and of action—still unco-ordinated and uncertain but with increasing vitality. Movements among the Italians abroad, especially in America, movements among prisoners of war, the Italian Socialist parties' manifestoes, attempts by other elements, and it is said even among senators and military personalities—all these activities must have a secure basis from which to start and be clear in their intentions."

NEED FOR TRUTH.

Explaining why he wrote this document Col. Villa concludes: "It is right that the truth should be openly spoken to the Italians by an Italian, who is proud never to have asked anything of his country except that he has done his duty, both as a citizen and a soldier, if sometimes not too thoroughly, at least without worrying about sacrifice or self-interest. It is right that it should be said openly without sheltering behind anonymity, since everyone should know how to assume his responsibilities as an Italian."

THE JAPANESE POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

(By Peter Hume—from the *Asiatic Review*, January, 1943).

What is true of Manchuria is true of all the occupied parts of the Far East. The Japanese come to "bring peace to the Far East," to liberate the Asiatic peoples from the white man's yoke. Some people in the victim countries believe these protestations; so once did some people in the West. Many propaganda-fed Japanese believe that that is in fact what they are doing. Around the whole dirty picture there is a misty fog of benevolence, reform and legality. Disillusion comes too late.

That is what is now happening in Malaya. The Japanese descended on a prosperous land with a parrot-ery of slogans which were bound to appeal to the people. "Asia for the Asiatics." Why not indeed? We are not to expect the ordinary Malay, say, to be able to reason out the truth behind this slogan, to realize that the comparatively high standard of living afforded him by British administration was endangered. It was the Japanese who had the idea, the moral token, which people somehow find necessary to strengthen them. We had none; only the negative propaganda of pointing out the material benefits enjoyed by the people of Malaya and of calling the Japanese liars. That is not dynamic. The Japanese slogan is. And though we know the slogan is a lie and a deceit, we should not be too ready to assume that others know that too.

And when the Japanese did come to Malaya, what did they bring? In the first place, judging from the accounts we have got through, they did attempt peaceful measures to harness the country to their war machine. They gave the people of the country the titles of the offices which the British had always held before. It does not matter that they had no intention of giving them the authority of those offices. The title—the apparent access of dignity—is enough in the first instance to make the people feel that here is a benevolent reformer. It is only gradually that people—first the title-holder himself, then very slowly filtering through to his compatriots—realize that all is not as it seems. As a short-term policy it is most effective in a politically uneducated country.

Fortunately though, as far as the United Nations are concerned, there is in Malaya at least one factor to accelerate the failure of that policy. That is the presence of great numbers of Chinese, who, in their knowledge of what has happened in their homeland in the past five years, are not inclined to take the Japanese protestations at their face value. And what is more, they, in so far as they have been in touch with China's struggle, have a dynamic cause of sufficient force to give them a positive background for resistance. Again, judging by reports we have so far had, they have resisted successfully enough to break down this Japanese goodwill policy very quickly. They have been called Communists by Mr. Suzuki, who leads the Japanese civil administration, and some have been shot as Communists in Penang.

This "non-co-operation" by the Chinese has been followed, tragically for the people of the country, but necessarily, by the terror methods with which the aggressor always tries to break, but seldom succeeds in breaking, resistance. And although this resistance is largely in the passive form of non co-operation, I think we may say that by the suffering they have brought upon themselves, these Malayan Chinese, like their kinsfolk in occupied China, are fighting our battle and helping us to beat Japan.

Another thing, of course, which tends, wherever the Japanese go, to break down their policy of peaceful enslavement, is the behaviour of the Japanese Army. There are two aspects of this. One I do not want to talk about much is the incidence of atrocities—such things as have happened in Nanking and Hongkong. We have all heard plenty about those atrocities, and I do not think anybody now discredits the thoroughly authentic accounts that have come from many sources. They are only on the shortest view "policy," and therefore it does not seem within the scope of this talk to dwell on them.

One thing I would say, though, is that they cannot be dismissed as heat-of-battle excesses. You will have read, and I myself have been able to authenticate, all too many cases where there was no battle to provide the remotest excuse. In Kaifeng, for instance, I was told by a Catholic missionary that it was not only the division which captured the town that followed its fighting with excesses. The same story was repeated by every division that went through—to or from the front—and by the second-line garrison troops, who were hardly concerned with battle at all.

The other and more long-term aspect of the army's behaviour is the systematic looting, the corruption, the drug-smuggling activities of the garrisons and the special service officers, who carry on the politico-military administration of the occupied areas. In the recent Chekiang-Kiangsi campaign, for instance, the towns and countryside were ruthlessly stripped by specially detailed squads of everything that could conceivably be of value to Japan, from scrap-iron to bandages from mission hospitals. That was not individual looting; it was undoubtedly part of a definite policy of grab, ordered from on high.

Then there are the carpet-baggers, the army of civilians, *ronin* or ruffians they call them in Japan, who are allowed to follow up the army and to live under their wing in order to steal from occupied territories a living by any means they think fit. All the expenditure they need is bribes to the Japanese special-service section. A lot of statistics have been released about these men.

There are, for instance, now some 100,000 Japanese children in Peking alone, which implies an adult population of 200,000 to 300,000; and in 1940, out of 2,240 Japanese establishments in business in Peking, 500 were brothels. In Taiyuan nearly half of the Japanese shops were such establishments. One can quote innumerable lists of this sort of thing. It is a means by which Japan gets rid of her most undesirable characters, so that they shall prey on the people of the occupied territories rather than on the Japanese themselves. It is also a means by which the Japanese special service officer is able to enrich himself by what are almost directly Chicago gangster methods—*i. e.*, that the *ronin* are permitted to chuck any Chinese out of his business and to refuse to pay rent, provided they keep in with the special service officer concerned, which tends to mean 10 per cent.

That brings me on to the main trade of many of these people, which is, of course opium; or, rather, probably less opium than the stronger drugs, such as heroin, which are more profitable because more concentrated.

There has been a lot talked about the systematic Japanese plan to demoralise the Chinese populace by giving them opium, but I am inclined to think that demoralization is probably only a secondary motive. I think the prime motive behind the undoubtedly extensive drug activities in China is desire for profit. The army and the *ronin* are able to make probably more and quicker profits out of drugs than out of anything else.

Not that they do not manage to get their profit from many other things—by their hold on the local administration, by innumerable small taxes, which go in general to the army authorities in the place concerned, and by all manner of rackets.

Here is a story I got about Peking again. One ingenious Japanese decree orders that all the Chinese shops in the city shall buy their stocks from Japanese merchant houses at Japanese dictated prices. All Chinese enterprises, whatever their size or capital, are forced to pay a business tax of 500 Chinese dollars. The trouble is that there are almost too many examples of anything like this, and, as I have said before, and I would like to emphasize again, it is difficult to sort them down into a coherent policy, as against a large number of rackets carried out by a large number of unscrupulous men.

What lies behind it all, and what is undoubtedly the basis of Tokyo's policy, is the creation in Manchuria, China and now in the South Seas, of so-called development corporations, mostly financed on a rather bogus basis from Tokyo, which does give Japan and Japan's financiers—the Mitsuis and so on—a tight control over the economic resources of the occupied territories. Thus the conqueror can see that these are diverted to the one purpose of furthering Japan's aims, and swelling the pockets of Japan's industrialists, rather than providing any benefit for the people of the countries concerned.

One last thing, and that is about the so-called material benefits—we used to hear a lot about these some time ago—which Japanese administration effected especially in Manchuria. The Japanese, we used to be told, have opened schools, improved the trains, made the trains run on time—like Mussolini in Italy.

I think these benefits need to be looked into a little more closely. The number of schools they have opened, for instance. They have indeed opened many, but what do they teach? All the information I have been able to gather is that they teach the pupils to be good puppets of Japan. Drastic changes are made in textbooks in order to purify the thought of young China. All courses in Chinese national principles are suspended and the Japanese language becomes a required subject.

Special Japanese language schools sprang up like mushrooms, attended by merchants and clerks motivated by commercial reasons.

After last December, all missionary, middle and primary schools in occupied China were seized and put under the puppet régime, which means under the Japanese advisers to that régime. Each school also has its own Japanese adviser. Even Peking's Catholic University was subjected to constant pressure to slip into line with this programme. All students were required to participate in all mass meetings and demonstrations sponsored by the Japanese, celebrating a new attack against their mother country. Japanese paid agents were placed in all schools to act as fifth columnists.

To sum up, I must say again that it is difficult to achieve a coherent idea of what is Japan's policy. You have, in the first place, the announced policy, the grandiose scheme with which many of us on paper would agree. You have, secondly, the policy which one tries to discern through the rackets and army excesses. And that policy is twofold, representing the two dominant interests in Japan. Firstly, it seeks to harness the resources and the man-power of the occupied country to the Fascist war machine which is striving to gain world domination for the power-drunk militarists of the Rising Sun. Secondly, it seeks to ensure that the profits from the exploitation of those resources by forced slave-labour in the victim country go into the pockets of the Imperialist business interests which work hand in hand with, and indeed egg on, the conquest-lusting maniacs of the Japanese armed

forces. What in fact is happening is, I am sure, exactly the same as is happening in Europe, and the political exploitation of the Japanese China campaign especially presents the most extraordinarily close parallel to that of the German campaigns in Russia and Poland. In the same way, Japan's labour policy in China and Manchuria presents great similarities to what is going on now in France.

There is, we must admit, behind it all a basic idea that some readjustment of the world's economic structure is necessary. But both Japan and Germany have decided that they will do the readjusting in their own interests. They both have this *Herrenvolk* idea, and feel, in many cases quite sincerely, that they are entitled to undertake the rehabilitation of their particular area and must lead it, which means that it must work in their exclusive interest. Incidentally, they find out on putting their policies into practice when they get there, that it is for the individual a very profitable game if you can really be rough with the other fellow.

JEEPS: WHAT THEY ARE, AND WHAT THEY DO.

(From the *Automobile Association of Southern India Magazine*, May 1943).

For many months now, Jeeps have been in the news, on many battle fronts, as part of the mechanical equipment of the Allied armies. How was the Jeep designed, and what are its functions? The following notes are taken from a contemporary, and adequately describe this modern addition to warfare. There are some operating in India, and some have been seen on the roads of the south.

STRING OF NAMES.

People who were privileged a year or two ago to inspect a small motor vehicle designed for the U. S. Army were instantly full of praise for it. They were right.

There was a whole string of names for the vehicle. It was called a technical thing like "reconnaissance car," but that didn't mean much to newspapermen who had to fit words into small spaces. Then they tried "quad car," but that was no good either. Somebody had a good bit of success for a while with "blitz buggy," but that wore out its welcome, too. Probably it was some unsung hero in an army camp who saw "G. P." painted on the side, meaning "general purposes," and called it "jeep," but "Jeep" it is.

Jeeps are the only really new thing a mechanically-minded nation has produced for a mechanical war. Bombers are just bigger and better editions of the things we have seen over our heads for years. Pursuits are snappier, but they are still the same small aeroplanes with guns. Tanks we know about. And so on. We know about automobiles too, but we had got so used to streamlined showcases with sweeping curves of sheet metal for fenders, chrome for trimming, no clearance underneath, low doors, and small windows, that we had forgotten that the framework, not the frills, is what provides the transportation.

DESIGNED TO BE TOUGH.

The Jeep was designed from the ground up to be tough; a quarter-ton truck with drive to all four wheels. It's simple too, without an extra gadget anywhere on it, and maintenance in the field is eased by that fact.

DIFFICULT JOBS.

It took the Jeep to conquer the precipitous heights and dense jungles of a new Indo-China supply route supplanting the Burma road, according to reports from Chungking. It carried four passengers and is believed to be the first motor vehicle to traverse the route. Press correspondents have been using them to get the news and pictures out to the folks at home. They borrow them from the Army.

In Australia, American soldiers had to lay an underground cable at an airfield without interrupting field operations. Normally, it would have taken several days. But the Jeep rolled in—it was hitched to a plough and the ditch was dug at 10 miles an hour. Close behind came another Jeep, towing a spindle of cable, and behind it came a third Jeep towing a roller that covered the cable and levelled the ground. The job was completed within two hours.

In China, the British forces are using them for liaison work behind the lines. With their four-wheel drive, it is reported, the Jeeps can bounce over the roughest rice fields and plunge across irrigation ditches. They are excellent for night patrol work and for towing smashed planes from bomb-pocked airfields.

The last guard at Rangoon was evacuated to Lashio in Jeeps. They rolled along the bumpy roads at 40 to 50 miles per hour, and pulled many a three-ton lorry from the ditches along the highway. One reporter, after watching them perform in China, said they would have been a tremendous asset in the mountains and mud-bogged valleys of Greece and Albania.

Soldiers in training like them because they're small, rugged and fast. They say the Jeep practically swims. It takes a 65-degree hill like a mountain-goat and scoots over mud like a jack-rabbit. It is used to deliver messages and by generals to inspect troops. With a few changes, it makes a first-rate field ambulance that will haul four casualties, and it can work much closer to the front line than regular ambulances because of its very low silhouette. In a battle or manoeuvres the Jeep can be used as a weapon carrier. It will pull a 37-mm. anti-tank gun around without a whimper; has been known to haul 75's.

OTHER POSSIBLE USES.

Engineers at the Willys plant, where thousands of Jeeps are rolling down assembly lines once devoted to passenger automobiles, believe the Jeep's uses are still relatively unexplored. They think it can be converted to do an even greater number of necessary military chores. Here are some of the ideas that have been proposed: a portable power-plant for aircraft searchlights; a smoke screen spreader; a mobile dump truck for filling holes made by enemy bombers on airfield runways; a field radio car; a field telephone exchange; a mobile anti-aircraft unit to protect land convoys and combat parachute troops; a water supply car to service desert outposts; a medical unit for front-line surgery and first-aid; a fuel supply car for tanks; a food supply unit for front-line fighters; a mobile combat unit for protecting bridges and railroad junctions; an auxiliary fire fighting unit; and a mobile air-compressor to pump up deflated tyres.

THE SALVAGE FRONT.

by

Hamish F. Simpson.

(From a Recent Talk broadcast from A. I. R., Madras).

I understand that most of the talks in this series have been devoted to telling listeners what is being done for the war effort and to-night I am not going to enlarge on what is being done. I am in fact going to suggest a few little things which can be done without any trouble to anyone. Simple things which probably have not appeared to be sufficiently important till now. I frankly confess, thinking over what I have done for the war effort, that a great deal more is certainly to be desired and I rather think, that habit is largely the cause of my various neglects.

Let me give you a few examples of what I have not done for the war effort. I am too lazy to sharpen my razor blades knowing that they can last for three more days if I sharpened them. We all know that the price of razor blades has increased tremendously, but still rather than take trouble to sharpen them, I prefer to pay the extra price for a new blade. When I write letters I do not really pause to think that possibly a telephone call could avoid a letter, and thereby help to conserve paper. I do not make use of old envelopes, but throw them in the wastepaper basket. I buy copies of daily newspapers, but I do not preserve them as I ought to, and so many other minor points. But rather than deal at greater lengths on my personal faults let us see what is best to be done about it.

USELESS ODDS AND ENDS.

There have been many appeals in the press, in the radio and in posters in the city for Salvage. And by Salvage, I think, is meant all sorts of odds and ends of things that are no longer useful to us. I am sure you must all remember how when you have to shift from one bungalow to another and have to empty your almirahs, writing desks, chest of drawers, and book cases, you have been almost amazed at the amount of junk which accumulated, and it is this type of junk that the Salvage people are appealing for, and if we only take the time to search through the house, I have no doubt whatever that an enormous quantity could be collected.

I am very keen on playing my gramophone, and there have been few occasions when inadvertently either myself or one of my servants has stepped on a record and broken it, but I never thought to keep the broken parts and send them to the Salvage depôt. But broken gramophone records and old records for which there is no use are very welcome indeed.

What about all the negatives that one collects over a period of years? I am very keen on photography, and I must have hundreds and hundreds of negatives which I probably never used for making prints, and in fact, through carelessness I have lost as many negatives as I now possess. These too are very welcome in a Salvage depôt. When we require new batteries for our torches what happens to the old ones? I think they are easily thrown away, instead of being preserved. Empty match boxes, your old car batteries, if you are fortunate enough to have sufficient petrol still to run a car, empty bottles, silver paper, in fact, practically everything that you find in your house is not by any means valueless but just the contrary. All the junk that you send to the Salvage depôt is turned into some highly useful and who knows, even essential, article for the war. So really the junk in our homes that we can collect is another of the many ways in which we can help to crush our enemies.

HOW WOMEN CAN HELP.

So far, I have dealt with many ways in which men would be able to collect salvage in their homes. Now let us turn to the ladies of the house. I wonder if I dare suggest that I think they can assist in the common cause. I understand, on good authority that the various paraphernalia necessary for permanent waving is not only very difficult to get these days, but is also very useful for war machines. So perhaps one might do without a permanent wave, or have one less frequently than before. There is no one who can doubt the popularity of the various coloured nail varnishes which are largely used to-day by ladies in India. They have in them chemicals which, I feel sure, have other uses, and I do know for certain that the polish remover, though it be sold in attractive bottles at expensive prices is largely acetone, which is very vital to the war effort. Quite a number of ladies are cigarette smokers, and in certain countries cigar smokers, but I am glad to say that I am still perfectly safe in leaving only pipe and tobacco pouch about. Well, the necessity of conserving paper cannot be better emphasised than the present arrangement which makes it necessary for one to produce empty cartoons before further supplies are effected.

I should imagine that the ladies do collect the odds and ends around the house, but I wonder if they take the trouble of sending them to the Salvage depôt. I rather think that a great deal of it finds its way to the store-room especially now that people will be leaving for the hills, and naturally like to give their houses a clean-up before leaving them in the charge of their husbands, or perhaps completely locked up.

CHILDREN'S OLD TOYS.

Now we come to the children. What about the old toys which are broken, especially celluloid toys, or an old perambulator and the various things which had at one time been necessary for the child's happiness, but now are no longer in use, but stored away probably in the storeroom? A large number of babies are fed on tinned preparations, these empty tins are very valuable as salvage. And the school children must have left at home many old exercise books now that the schools are closed, and all sorts of things which are useful as salvage, and it is now an excellent opportunity to collect these things together and send them to the Salvage depôt. And now what can be done in the office. Old typewriter ribbons, which cannot be further used, old files, some of the last year's calendars, unnecessary books, and so many other things which constantly litter up the desk. What about the old electric bulbs which are very welcome to the Salvage depôt.

So far I have tried to give an idea of various articles which are really valueless to us, and yet are so welcome to a Salvage depôt. And now let us think of a few ways other than collecting junk which would go to help in the common cause. There are many ways by which we could minimise the use of certain materials which would come in useful for the war effort. Again here I mention my faults as they have struck me. I am sure we can always remember to switch off the fan when going out of the room to avoid wastage of electricity, and as you all know electricity has to be conserved as much as possible by seeing that no lights and fans are switched on unless absolutely necessary. Perhaps there are still many who enjoy writing on costly paper, because they think it lends certain dignity to the letter, but at the present time any scrap of paper is good enough to send a note. And visiting cards which, in this country, are considered very important in social life need not be lavishly used, and no one would mind if you wished to have the cards returned after they had served their purpose of introduction. For those who are very keen on bridge it is not necessary to open a new pack of cards. It does not really matter if cards do get a little soiled. After all, the ace of spades is still the top card in bridge whether it is new or soiled.

SEND THEM TO SALVAGE DEPÔT.

I have tried to think of a number of various ways to-night as to how salvage can be collected, but I have no doubt that many other ways will strike you, and after all, we in

this part of the world have so much to be thankful for that any way whatever in which we can assist the Allies in winning this war ought to be our first consideration, and the various ways that I have mentioned to-night do not cause anybody any difficulty financially. All we have to do is to collect the articles for which we have no further use and send them to the Salvage depôt, and by doing so now especially in view of the present emergency you are helping the war effort more than you probably realize.

I am sure that I am by no means the only offender in not collecting salvage, but let us to-night make a resolution that at least we shall not hereafter be lazy and careless, which, after all, is the only excuse I can offer for my not collecting things and sending them to the depôt. I feel certain that none of us deliberately neglect our duty in collecting salvage, and the default in this direction is, I am sure, largely due to our not fully realizing how very important these little articles can be. In peace time we never cared or thought of what happened to them and they were probably just thrown out for a bonfire. To-day they help to kindle those fires which will bring the enemy to his doom. Remember every little counts.

WORKING PARTIES.

(From the South Indian Bulletin of the European Assosiation).

At the beginning of the war there was little that any woman in this Presidency could do to help, except sewing and knitting; the working parties and St. John Ambulance classes practically summed up the war effort of the women of Madras. And even those took quite a lot of faith and perseverance in the months of the "phoney war". Much gratitude is due to those who stuck steadily to their knitting and sewing in spite of all the stories that went round about their work being sold in the bazaar, or their knitting all unravelled and sent out again by some mysterious Penelope sitting at Headquarters, and of the discouraging attitude of those who proclaimed that they would not work to make things that only went into a store. How a war was to be carried on without stores was not clear, nor how it was to be arranged that every pair of pyjamas went straight from its maker's hands to the back of a wounded soldier.

But most of the women of Madras stuck steadily to their work in spite of these discouragements, and were triumphantly justified by the results. Their work was shipped overseas to Malaya and to the Middle East; men shivering with cold in Iran and North Africa had cause to bless our knitting parties and the stocks of warm garments which they had built up during the months of discouragement. It is true that, partly owing to the efforts of the storymongers, the stocks have never been large enough to meet the demand, and some units who wanted warm clothes have never got them. For some unknown reason, this fact is used by the purveyors of these tales as an argument against knitting, instead of being, as it is, a proof of the urgent need for everybody this year to do just twice as much knitting as she did last.

Nowadays, the working party is not almost the only war activity for a woman in South India. She may become a W. A. C., she may do canteen or hospitality work for the troops; there is much she may do, and there is a danger that the working party may be regarded as something rather humdrum and out of date. But it is still a vital part of the Madras women's war effort and it must not be disregarded. It is true that the nature of the work has changed somewhat; there are large stocks of the simple things like bandages and dressings laid up ready for the need that must come. What we chiefly need is the experienced worker who can make pyjamas and shirts, of which there are never enough; and the need for Red Cross garments is supplemented by the crying need of the troops for extra clothing, which we supply through the Joint War Charities Canteen Stores Department. Last year the troops here suffered appallingly from prickly

heat, due chiefly to the fact that they had only two shirts and two pairs of shorts each for wear all the 24 hours, and so in the hot weather they were never properly clean, the most potent cause of prickly heat. We help by providing shirts, pants and pyjamas, which, owing to the efforts of the working parties, are sold at an extremely cheap rate, much below market prices. We can never get enough of these to meet the demand; here the garments really do go almost at once from the worker on to a man's back. And those who cannot make garments can still hem handkerchiefs; the demand for these, khaki and white, is quite insatiable, and they cost far more in the bazaar.

The knitters, too, are wanted more than ever. We have a special order just now for quantities of white stump stockings for an All-India limb-fitting centre, and the troops here in South India are all crying out for stockings; but we are supplying these, as far as possible, with cotton yarn stockings, especially those units which do not have to walk much, since we must not let the man overseas go cold next winter. Unfortunately the discouraging stories are still handed about, and only occasionally does a public-spirited person write and ask what the real facts are, in order to counteract them. There is the ancient story, which never dies, that all the woollies go into a vast store. So they do—in the hot weather. Nobody wants them then; but nothing could be more short-sighted than to stop knitting because nobody wants woollies in the hot weather. That is our great chance to build up stocks, so that we may have some chance of having enough next cold weather to meet the demand. The woollies are all kept in India, cry the objectors. Of course they are; General Alexander can hardly want to be bothered with them in Tunis just now, and by next winter the war may be somewhere else; we trust it will be, and surely the most sensible thing to do is to keep all the warm garments here till we see where they are going to be wanted next winter, and then send them straight to that place.

The Penelope myth, too, is not dead; some people picture all the headquarter depôts as places where the district knitting is all pulled to pieces, and this quite unfounded story is still doing a great deal of harm. Like all the most dangerous stories, it rests upon a very small modicum of truth; all depôts do occasionally get garments made by people with more enthusiasm than experience, stockings only wearable by a man in an advanced stage of elephantiasis, pull-overs suitable for a child of six. Wool and shipping space are alike precious, and neither must be wasted by forwarding such things which the recipient can only use to clean his lorry. They must be remade; but no knitter likes reknitting. It is a distasteful task which is never undertaken except when it is absolutely unavoidable; the unholy glee of destruction pictured by some people is the purest fabrication.

The working parties are doing a great job, and the people who try to discourage them should be treated in the same way as all other discouragers of the war effort.

BULLOCK SHOES AND MOTOR CAR TYRES.

Motor car tyres suffer more than ever before from cuts and bursts due to bullock shoes. The amount of cart traffic has increased considerably with the introduction of petrol and tyre rationing, and the natural result is that there are now more "cast" bullock shoes on the roads than there were in the days just before the war. A tyre which is cut by a bullock shoe is generally useless, for it is seldom that it can effectively be repaired, and with such a great shortage of tyres a more intensive drive is necessary to rid the roads of this trouble. Military vehicles suffer as much as private cars, and public conveyances.

The Government have offered to pay an anna for every six whole bullock shoes collected from the roads.

FUSILIER, EXHAUSTED, WALKS OFF INTO JUNGLE. AFRAID MIGHT BURDEN COMRADES.

Growing weaker and weaker through privation, Fusilier Duner, of the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, feared that he was becoming a burden to his companions—a small party of British and Indian soldiers trying to make their way back to our lines through the Jap-infested hilt country on the Mayu Peninsula in Arakan.

When the party—after an epic 10 day trek—was only two days from safety, Duner fell that he could go no further without hampering the others.

But he did not tell them this. When they sought to encourage him, he replied with a smile, "I can take it."

A few minutes later, he slipped quietly away into the jungle. When the absence was prolonged a search was made, but eventually, the party had to go on without this hero, who, without doubt, preferred to face death alone that the rest might have a better chance of living.

The story of this "Capt. Oates of the jungle" was told me by one of the British members of the party the day after they and eleven Indian companions had struggled into a British camp.

WITHOUT FOOD FOR A WEEK.

They had been without food for a week, their limbs were scratched and torn, they were as nearly exhausted as men can be without collapsing, yet the indomitable spirit which had kept them going was as strong as ever.

When Japanese infiltration made it essential for the British and Indian forces east of the Mayu Range to cross the hills and join up with the main body on the western side, the force split up into small groups as the best method of outwitting the enemy.

The little party that included Fusilier Duner set out, eight strong and swelled to 14—of whom all save one reached their goal—though hope for them was growing thin by the time they did so.

TRIBUTE TO MURREE SUBADAR.

By general consent the man to whom they owed most was Subadar Mohammed Yusuf, a hill man from the Murree district who showed a genius for finding the safest and best routes. "Without him I don't believe we'd ever have managed it; he is, indeed, a stout-hearted fellow" said the British leader of the party. It was a tribute that went for all of them.

Rations consisted of two tins of condensed milk, two tins of bully beef, 4-lbs. of broken biscuits and 1-lb. of tea—some of these being picked up in the early part of the journey.

Although the distribution of bully was limited to a mouthful per man, morning and night, food gave out a week before the end. After that they marched 12 hours a day on no more than half a cup of tea, without milk or sugar, before setting out and before halting for the night to get what sleep was possible in spite of hunger, the near presence of Japs and—not least—mosquitoes.

Five times the party emerged from the hills on to the coastal plain only to find Japs in possession. At last, striking the road leading to Maungdaw, they walked up it unopposed until a British voice signalled the end of their ordeal.

YOUNG NAIROBI CLERK READS OF I. A. F. AND WRITES TO BOMBAY TO JOIN.

An 18-years old Indian railway clerk in Nairobi opened a magazine and read there about the stirring deeds of the I. A. F. in the battle of the Burma skies. The article's illustrations, showing young Indians—keen, modern-minded young fellows very much like himself—learning to become pilots and observers and technicians, fascinated him.

India's own Air Force! What an idea! What a future that would be—to grow up with India's own Air Force!

And why not?

There and then, the young railway clerk took up his pen and wrote a letter to the authorities in Bombay.

"I am 18 years of age and a Muslim by birth," he wrote. "I am physically sound and my sight is normal. I am a keen and all-round sportsman. It has always been my ambition to serve in the Air Force."

And now, from the desk of the Technical Recruiting Officer, in Bombay, a letter is on its way out to the young railway clerk in Nairobi. It tells him that his offer to join the I. A. F. is greatly appreciated. It invites him to come to Bombay to join as a technical trainee.

India has need of many young men with the spirit of this young man of Nairobi.

PUDUKKOTTAI STATE NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU. PROGRAMME.

LECTURE CXLVIII (Batch 2).

29- 5-43	Municipal Office	... 6.00 p.m.	2- 6-43	Mirattunilai	... 7.00 p.m.
30- 5-43	Kiranur	... 7.00 "	"	Arimalam	... 7.30 "
"	Nanjur	... 7.30 "	3- 6-43	Pungudi	... 7.00 "
31- 5-43	Puvarasakudi	... 7.00 "	"	Satyamangalam...	... 7.30 "
"	Venkatakulam	... 7.30 "	4- 6-43	Udayalippatti	... 7.00 "
1- 6-43	Perungalur	... 7.00 "	"	Killukottai	... 7.30 "
"	Adanakkottai	... 7.30 "			

LECTURE CXLIX. (Batch 3.)

5- 6-43	Municipal Office	... 6.00 p.m.	9- 6-43	Kodumbalur	... 7.00 p.m.
6- 6-43	Kudumiyamalai	... 7.00 "	"	Viralimalai	... 7.30 "
"	Parambur	... 7.30 "	10- 6-43	Kalamavur	... 7.00 "
7- 6-43	Vengalur	... 7.30 "	"	Nallur	... 7.30 "
"	Konapattu	... 7.30 "	11- 6-43	Panayappatti	... 7.00 "
8- 6-43	Nachchandupatti.	... 7.00 "	"	Rangiyam	... 7.30 "
"	Virachchilai	... 7.30 "			

RECRUITING—ADVERTISEMENT—4 p. m.

29- 5-43	Ponnamaravathi.	5- 6-43	Tirumayyam.
30- 5-43	Embal.	6- 6-43	Virachchilai.
31- 5-43	Konnaiyur.	7- 6-43	Kiranur.
1- 6-43	Ramachandrapuram.	8- 6-43	Kudimiyamalai.
2- 6-43	Kilanilai-Puduppatti.	9- 6-43	Karambakkudi.
3- 6-43	Alangudi.	10- 6-43	Kilanilai.
		11- 6-43	Pudukkottai.