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*MYTHOLOGY AND RELIGION.**

A STUDY of works on comparative religion can hardly fail to convey the impression that the science which deals with this subject is yet in its infancy, and that with regard to many of its most interesting and important problems even the ablest investigators are still only feeling their way towards a solution. The extreme complexity of the subject makes it very difficult to avoid incomplete and inadequate explanations, based on partial views of facts. Mr. Herbert Spencer's attempt to account for the origin of religion by the ghost theory, and Professor Max Müller's attribution of all the strange freaks and fancies of mythology to purely philological causes, are sufficiently glaring examples of hypotheses which can only be supported by neglecting the greater portion of the matter to be dealt with and restricting the attention to a certain set of carefully selected facts.

Mr. Andrew Lang has done yeoman's service to the science of religion by bringing a very vigorous commonsense to bear upon the various theories which have been brought forward to explain the origin and development of religious ideas and practices. In his investigations, Mr. Lang employs the anthropological method, "the study of the evolution of ideas from the savage to the barbarous, and thence to the civilized in the province of myth, ritual, and religion," seeking to find an explanation of some of the more puzzling features of the higher religions in the ideas and

* *Myth, Ritual, and Religion.* By Andrew Lang. 2 vols. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899.

fancies of savage races, just as a comparative anatomist seeks, and finds, a reason for the existence of certain atrophied and useless organs of the human body by tracing these back to some of the lower forms of animal life. He distinguishes and very rightly, between mythology and religion, and not the least valuable part of his work is that which shows how, side by side with the most absurd and immoral stories of the gods, one finds even in the lowest races germs of genuine religious feeling reaching out towards some being who is regarded as at once all powerful and all good. Most anthropologists have failed to recognise the distinction between myth and religion, and, while striving to trace the development of the higher religious ideas from the low and degrading conceptions of savage mythology, have overlooked the higher elements in savage life and thought. This oversight is to a certain extent excusable, for, while the lower elements embodied in ritual and myth obtrude themselves upon the attention, the higher and more spiritual elements, from their lack of outward expression, are apt to escape the notice of even the most careful investigator. It was only, for example, after long years of residence among the Zulus that observers arrived at any real knowledge of their religious ideas and practices. Their reticence had led some by no means incompetent judges to the conclusion that they were entirely destitute of religion. The feelings of reserve which make civilized people hesitate to speak freely of those things which they esteem most sacred act most powerfully in the minds of ignorant and superstitious savages. An Australian observer, in describing his endeavours to extract information from some "blackfellows," says: "They required such secrecy on my part, and seemed so afraid of being heard even in the most secret places, that, in one or two cases, I have seen them almost tremble in speaking."

It is, as Mr. Lang very clearly shows, failure to discover the higher elements in the lower forms of religion that has enabled the supporters of the animistic theory to bring forward so many arguments in support of their views. A careful examination of the results of the most recent and most accurate investigations conclusively proves that, so far from belief in higher powers being evolved from ideas of ghosts and spirits, this belief is to be found among savages who have probably not yet formed the idea of spirit, and who certainly do not think of worshipping the ghosts of their ancestors. It is difficult, it may be impossible, to account for the origin of these early religious conceptions, but it cannot be denied

that amongst the very lowest and most degraded races, such as Australians, Andamanese, and Bushmen, there are to be found ideas, however vague they may be, of a Supreme Being who is interested in and concerned with the actions and lives of men. Side by side with these purer and more rational conceptions are to be found a mass of wild mythological tales, many of them so gross and debasing that it is hard to believe they could have originated with a people possessing even the very faintest ideas of a moral order and a moral governor. This is no isolated phenomenon, but one that is to be found amongst people in every stage of civilization. So far as mythology is concerned there is nothing to choose between the stories of the Greek and Indian classics and those current among the degraded tribes of Africa or Australia. Almost every incident, however immoral, almost every idea however irrational, which is to be found among low savage races, has its exact counterpart in the literature or folklore of the more civilized peoples. The mythical and the religious moods are, as Mr. Lang says, "present, and in conflict, through the whole religious history of the human race. They stand as near each other, and as far apart, as Love and Lust." They are in ceaseless conflict, and, so far as a study of comparative religion leads us, we are obliged to come to the conclusion that it is almost always the higher which gives place to or is degraded by the lower. This is only what might be expected, for in no region of human thought is it more sadly true than in the religious, that the imagination is tainted by, and the inclinations tend towards, that which is evil. In moments of genuine religious feeling it is probable that the worshipper loses sight for the time of all unworthy associations connected with the deity whom he reveres, and regards him as the one all-powerful, all-holy power in the Universe. While, however, this is so, mythological notions exercise so powerful and baneful an influence upon the human mind that in many cases all higher and purer conceptions of the Divine are lost beneath the mass of irrational and, in many cases, immoral notions, associated with a complex polytheistic system. As civilization advances it becomes more and more difficult for men to retain in their minds ideas which are grossly and palpably inconsistent. The more ignorant and thoughtless consequently in most cases become the slaves of degrading superstition, while the more thoughtful and more pious, troubled by grave questionings and painful misgivings, strive to, "whitewash the gods of the popular religion," either by direct

denial of the stories narrated of them, or by furnishing explanations which make these stories comparatively harmless and innocent.

All such attempts at explanation are futile. The absurd and immoral elements in the mythologies of civilized peoples are in reality survivals of savage ideas which, at first existing in the lower strata of human thought, became gradually more and more prominent, as the higher and vaguer notions of the religious consciousness melted away. The famous philological theory which supposes myths to have been originally rational statements of physical truth which had lost their significance through people forgetting the meanings of the words in which they were expressed, "reverses the known conditions of the working of the human mind among early peoples." There is "a stage of human society and of the human intellect in which facts that appear to us to be monstrous and irrational—facts corresponding to the wilder incidents of myth—are accepted as ordinary occurrences of every day life." At this stage everything is regarded as personal. Stones, plants, animals, sun, moon, and stars, all are akin to and connected with man. There is no sense of proportion; everything is unknown and mysterious; even the meanest object may be possessed of strange incalculable powers capable of producing the most stupendous phenomena in Nature. We cannot understand a condition of mind which made it possible for men who had attained to even the vaguest possible belief in a Moral Governor to associate with him, or with beings suffered to usurp his place, a multitude of contemptible stories, containing ideas inconsistent with even the most primitive ethical conceptions. It was inevitable, however, that men, looking at things from the savage standpoint, should, when attempting to arrive at some definite ideas of the Divine Being, be led by their crude science and lax morality into gross and grievous error. "What we regard as irrational seems only part of the accepted and natural order of things to contemporary savages, and in the past seemed equally rational and natural to savages concerning whom we have historical information." It need not therefore surprise us that savages, when they began to define their religious instincts and give them formal and explicit expression, should bring the Divine down to their own intellectual level, and believe that the gods might take the form of animals or even the animals, that they might have amours with human beings and beget human or semi-human offspring, that they might torture and slay their foes or be tortured and slain by them. The persistence of these ideas long

after civilization has advanced beyond the stage at which they seem rational or even conceivable is, there can be little reason to doubt, the explanation of the vagaries and absurdities of the mythologies of civilized or semi-civilized peoples. •

The wonderful similarity, in many cases amounting to absolute identity, of the myths of people, between whom it is impossible to trace any historical connection, presents one of the most difficult problems of anthropology. The fact that men are so constituted as to think and feel alike accounts for the general lines of mythological development, while the obvious connection between many myths and the physical phenomena with which they are related explains to a very considerable extent the similarity in details. When both these factors are taken into account, there still, however, remains a large residuum which seems entirely inexplicable unless we adopt the theory of a general diffusion of ideas and tales from some common centre. Mr. Lang discusses this question in connection with the epic tales and märchen which are even more difficult of explanation than the nature myths, and comes to the conclusion that each story must "have been invented once for all in one centre, but at a period so incalculably remote that it has filtered, in the exchanges and contacts of prehistoric life, all over the world, even to or from the Western Pacific and the lovely Oceanic Islands." The attempt to discover the original home of the various myths and tales, and trace their gradual diffusion from shore to shore and people to people, is one of the most interesting branches of anthropological inquiry. Though not in itself a part of the science of religion, properly so-called, it is so closely connected with it that any results we may arrive at are sure to help us towards an explanation of at least some of the problems of comparative religion.

W. HOWARD CAMPBELL.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.*

PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER'S work on the Six Systems of Indian Philosophy is a remarkable proof of the increasing interest in things Indian which the learned Professor has himself done so much to

* *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy.* By the Right Hon. F. Max Müller, London, New York, and Bombay : Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899.

create. Not that the modern interest in Indian philosophy is altogether new. The works of Colebrooke and Muir and Ballantyne, of Gough and Cowell and a host of other workers, have all tended to familiarise the philosophers of the West with the speculations of their predecessors in the East. Others before Professor Max Müller have attempted to penetrate the labyrinth of the Six Darsanas. But their writings have appealed rather to the specialist than to the general student of thought. Gough's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, for instance, is a most able study of "the remote sources of Indian philosophy," as Professor Max Müller calls them, but it is not a work that can be described as attempting a popular exposition of the interesting subjects of which it treats. The purpose of Professor Max Müller in compiling this new work has been to set forth in popular language what he has noted as of value in the Six Systems, which are, as he judiciously observes, "important not only in the eyes of Sanskrit scholars by profession, but of all who wish to become acquainted with all the solutions which the most highly gifted races of mankind have proposed for the eternal riddles of the world." And he tells us that he wished not so much to restate the mere tenets of each system "as to give a more comprehensive account of the philosophical activity of the Indian nation from the earliest times, and to show how intimately not only their religion, but their philosophy also, was connected with the national character of the inhabitants of India." Hence his new work is one that appeals to all readers who are interested in the history of human thought.

Professor Max Müller is eminently fitted to perform the arduous task that he has here set before himself. Though a man of seventy-six years, whose whole life has been spent in the pursuits most likely to develop the pedant, his style is as lucid in discussing the details of the Sāmkhya philosophy as in writing his reminiscences of interesting people whom he has met; and there is no clearer introduction to the study of Indian thought in the English language than *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*. The plan of the book is such as to enable the reader to see at once the main lines of philosophic thought in India. An introductory chapter of great interest describes the conditions under which philosophy grew up in India, the intellectual life, and the 'mnemonic literature' of the early ages. The second chapter deals with the growth of religious ideas, the tendency toward monotheism and monism discernible in the Vedas, and the beginnings of philosophy. It must, however, always

be remembered that, in India, philosophy and religion have never been separated, a foundation fact in the study of Indian thought which is prominent in the third chapter. For those who are already familiar with the Six Systems the chief interest of this section of the book lies in the pages that deal with the little known and less understood teaching of Brihaspati. In Sanskrit philosophy the teaching of Brihaspati is anathema, and the materialism which is its characteristic principle is constantly confuted by the six orthodox systems. It is strange to meet such a system—if it was a system—in the sacred atmosphere of Hindu speculation, and the reader will wish that Professor Max Müller had been able to throw more light on this ancient heresy. Another section, of more positive value in the treatment of the different orthodox schools, is that in which the common philosophical ideas which underlie all Six Systems are discussed. These are the axioms of philosophic thought in India, and reveal the kinship of the Six Darsanas. Professor Max Müller names six of them, and as they are essential prolegomena he discusses them at some length. It is here that the student of modern Hinduism will pause with interest to inquire if the ancient Sanskrit thinkers accepted the same premisses as their more modern advocates; and he will find that twenty-five centuries ago the same fundamental ideas were current as are current to-day. The constant round of birth and rebirth, the immortality of the soul, the misery of finite existence, the permanent results of the deeds done in the body, the infallibility of the Veda, and the existence of the three Gunas, are the data from which all true Sanskrit philosophy begins, and they underlie all modern Hindu thought. There may be differences in the definition of the soul or the three Gunas in the different schools of thought, but—and Professor Max Müller brings this out clearly—the six ideas referred to were part of the “common fund of philosophical thought which, like language, belonged to no one in particular, but was like the air breathed by every living and thinking man.” Nowhere is this more obvious than in the Tamil poem *Saiva Siddhānta* to which Professor Max Müller himself seems to refer, when he speaks (Pref. xx.) of a South Indian philosophical literature “which, though it may show clear traces of Sanskrit influence, contains also original indigenous elements of great beauty.”

The remaining chapters of the volume are devoted to a detailed consideration of each of the Six Systems that comprise the whole of Sanskrit philosophy as it has come down to us, the six roads that

all lead to the highest bliss, that salvation which, though expressed variously, is always the liberation of the personal self from the round of birth and rebirth. The monistic Vedânta claims that true salvation is in a knowledge of Brahman that is tantamount to identity with that Impersonal Existence, the only truly existent being. The dualism of the Sâmkhya admits the true existence of the individual personality that knows (*purusha*) and the eternal something possessed of qualities that is known (*prakriti*), and "therefore recognises the true means of destroying all bondage and regaining perfect freedom of the spirit in our distinguishing between spirit and matter, between subject and object, between Purusha and Prakriti." (p. 486.) These are the two most important and most diverse of the Six Systems. The Yoga lays emphasis on spiritual exercises and "devotion to a spirit supreme among all the other spirits" as means to freedom, which freedom it defines much as the Sâmkhya does. The Pûrva-Mimâmsa of Jaimini "lays its chief stress on works (*karman*) and their right performance, and holds that salvation may be obtained through the performance of such works, if only they are performed without any desire of rewards." Lastly, the Nyâya and the Vaiseshika systems lay emphasis on correct knowledge. "These two philosophies," says Professor Max Müller, "agreeing as they do among themselves, seem to me to differ very characteristically from all the others in so far as they admit of nothing invisible or transcendent (*aryakta*), whether corresponding to Brahman or Prakriti. They are satisfied with teaching that the soul is different from the body, and they think that, if this belief in the body as our own is once surrendered, our sufferings, which always reach us through the body, will cease by themselves." (p. 487.)

From this it will be seen how it is that the philosophy of India is so intensely religious. The ancient Indian thinkers were not possessed of any love of research or inspired by any love of knowledge merely for its own sake. Their intensely minute inquiries into the processes of thought and their devotion to knowledge were the results of their belief in the evil of human existence and their fixed conviction that escape must be possible to him who should learn the right way. In India philosophy has never been the pure love of knowledge: it has always been the quest for salvation. It is because of this that the study of Indian philosophy is so essential to any right comprehension of Hindu life. In India philosophy has sought not only to give answers to the questions put

by the intellect, but even more fully to show how the human, finite life may be transmuted into divine and perfect existence. However much we may feel that their statement of the problem and the solutions that they offer are incomplete, the fact that the authors of the Six Systems kept this very practical object before them cannot fail to make their speculations of vast importance to any one who wishes to understand India. They contain the gospel of individualism, it is true. There is no thought for the welfare of the masses, no attempt to inculcate any doctrine of moral obligation for others, no message of hope for the sad and weary toiler whose apprehension of the misery of life is not intellectual but none the less very real. They have been evolved by sages for disciples who have put the responsibilities of social life out of their sight, or have deliberately refused them and sought in isolation and mental concentration for a state untrammelled by earthly conditions and undisturbed by any activity. It may not be possible to overlook these defects, but the defects must not blind us to the fact that in the Six Darsanas we have the most careful answers that the ablest intellects of India have given to the profoundest questions that humanity can ever ask, answers that are accepted by the more thoughtful in India, even to-day, as sufficient and worthy, though the recent writings of those of the apostles of the Vedānta best acquainted with Western thought show that they, at any rate, are awake to the need of an ethic that shall bridge over or excuse the aloofness of the philosopher from "this people that knoweth not the law."

That Professor Max Müller is aware of these defects he again and again makes clear, with a frankness which is so genial that his criticism cannot be resented. Indeed one who knows India at first hand cannot help feeling that a man of Professor Max Müller's penetration would have been a severer judge had he known more of the moral apathy that is the inevitable consequence of any system of thinking that belittles or neglects the sentiment of solidarity, and teaches that in the highest spiritual experiences the individual must make his own welfare his sole concern, regardless of all the claims of domestic and social life. In one other respect, too, a personal knowledge of Indian life would have corrected the perspective of the Professor's picture of Indian thinking. Though such ideas as transmigration and the authority of the Vedas are among the elements that make up the intellectual air breathed by the Indian thinker and the common villager alike, the philosophers

form an infinitesimal minority, and their systems, even the Vedânta, are, as systems, the property of the few, and have no influence on the many. The Epics and the Purânas are well known, but the elaborate ratiocinations of the philosophers bulk so largely in the eyes of European scholars because Sanskrit literature was largely the work of the very thinkers who elaborated them. Sanskrit literature is vast, so vast that it has taken several decades for its limitations to be known. But the long lines of this ancient palace of learning are now discernible, and its dimensions have been ascertained. Mighty as it was, it was the work of comparatively few men: few, that is, in relation to the multitudes who have peopled India with their myriads for long centuries. Here and there, in forests and hermitages, in palaces and at shrines, a venerated teacher has taught and a few eager disciples have learned his hoary lore. But the masses knew not the Darsanas. Peace and war, harvest and famine, home, wife and child, the worship of the village gods, the ritual of the Shâstras, filled up their lives; and they left the Six Systems to those who had devoted themselves to these things. A clearer apprehension of this would have saved Professor Max Müller from endorsing the dictum—"India has always been a nation of philosophers."

But after all this is no fatal mistake, and the consummate scholarship, perspicuous expositions, happy illustrations, and painstaking ability of *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* make it a most valuable and most instructive contribution to the study of Indian thought.

A. C. CLAYTON.

HINDU HEROINES : SAKUNTALA.

Wouldst thou the young year's Blossoms, and the fruits of its decline,
And all by which the soul is charmed, enraptured, feasted, fed,
Wouldst thou the earth and heaven itself in one sole name combine?
I name thee, O Sakuntala! and all at once is said.

THE drama of *Sakuntala*, which inspired such a critic as Goethe to write such words as the above, is the most important work of the greatest Indian dramatist, the illustrious Kalidasa. Kalidasa is represented by some authorities as having lived in the time of a celebrated king of the name of Vikramaditya, whose reign at

Ujjayani, the renowned ancient capital of the present State of Malwa, is the starting-point of the era called *Samvat*, commencing about 57 B.C. There are many reasons, however, for not assigning this date to him, one of them being that the degraded form in which Prakrit appears in his works brings him down to a period some centuries after Christ. Professor Eggeling has fixed the date of Kalidasa about 550 A.D., but Professor Monier Williams was of opinion that he lived more probably about the commencement of the third century A.D.; and this theory is the more probable of the two. He probably lived at Ujjayani, and hence his supposed connection with the great Vikramaditya, who reigned there.

The writings of Kalidasa are universally admired; and "the richness and fertility of his poetical genius, the exuberance of his imagination, the warmth and play of his fancy, his profound knowledge of the human heart, his delicate appreciation of its most refined and tender emotions, his familiarity with the workings and counter-workings of its conflicting feelings"—all these more than entitle him to be called the 'Shakespeare of India'. Besides *Sakuntala* he wrote other works, among which are two dramas, *Vikramurvasi* and *Malavikagnimitra*—fine plays, but both falling short of the perfection of *Sakuntala*. The play of *Sakuntala* must have been very popular when it was first presented, and even now it is greatly admired. The majority of English readers make acquaintance with the drama through the medium of translations, but for a true appreciation of its intrinsic worth *Sakuntala* must be studied in the original Sanskrit.

There is an interesting and rather romantic story told of how *Sakuntala* was first discovered to the European world. Sir William Jones, the first European who admitted for certain that the languages of Greece and Rome had the same origin as the languages of India, relates how when employed in his gigantic work, the Digest of Hindu Laws and the translation of the Institutions of Manu, he suddenly remembered a passage in a collection of Catholic missionaries' letters, which made mention of "many books, called *Natac*, which as the Brahmans assert, contain a large portion of ancient history without any mixture of fable." He was very anxious to learn what these books were; but for some time he could not get any information about them, except that they consisted of conversations in prose and verse, held before ancient Rajahs in public assemblies, on an infinite variety of subjects, and in various dialects of India. At last, however, he met with an intelli-

gent Brahman, who told him that they were compositions of the same sort as the English plays represented at Calcutta. He was informed that the most esteemed of these compositions was *The Ring of Sakuntala*; and then he relates how, after first translating it into Latin, he turned it word for word into English and finally prepared a freer translation of the celebrated Indian drama. But, as Sir Monier Williams points out, the pandits unfortunately omitted to inform Sir William Jones that owing to the great number of manuscripts of this play that were in existence, a confusion had arisen between the manuscripts in Devanagari and those in Bengali. The Devanagari MSS., which are chiefly found in the Upper Provinces of India, are thought by most scholars to be the older and the purer, and moreover they have been faithfully copied; while the Bengali MSS., which are also defended by many scholars, have been altered and modified a good deal. Sir William Jones made use of the Bengali manuscripts. Dr. Boehtlingk was the first who edited the Devanagari version, and after him in 1853 came Sir Monier Williams. The play has been translated into nearly all the European languages.

The discovery of *Sakuntala* opened to the amazed scholars of Europe the hitherto unsuspected world of Indian literature. Till then India had been valued chiefly for its wealth; but now came the discovery that the Hindus possessed a fine literature of their own, older than European literature including even the classical, a literature as varied and finished as any in the West, "glittering with all the finish and brilliancy of their country's own rainbow-hued, thousand-faceted gems." The Hindu dramas were found also to have close resemblances to the English dramas, not only in the general manner of treatment of subject and plot, not only in the character development, but also in details of form. Sir William Jones speaks thus of Sanskrit dramas: "They are all in verse, where the dialogue is elevated; and in prose, where it is familiar: the men of rank and learning are represented speaking pure Sanskrit, and the women Prakrit, which is little more than the language of the Brahmans melted down by a delicate articulation to the softness of Italian; while the low persons of the drama speak the vulgar dialects of the several provinces, which they are supposed to inhabit." Such a description might well be made to apply, even word for word, to the English drama. There was great astonishment also at the plot of *Sakuntala*, which was seen to resemble one of the most familiar stories of European folklore. Such resemblances, how-

ever, only served to bring into clearer light a fact that had been discovered by the labours of scholars—the close relationship of Sanskrit with the languages of Europe, and even the affinity of the divinities of the Hindu religion with the gods and goddesses of the classical world.

Sakuntala is one of the noblest types of female character that our ancient Indian literature presents. In the delineation of women, the Hindu poet, as has been often remarked, throws aside all exaggerated colouring and draws from nature; and many are the lifelike pictures of heroines we meet with,—noble women engaging our interest far more than the women of European classics. Sakuntala, as we shall see presently, is a perfect pattern of conjugal fidelity, of the ‘*Pativrata*’, of whom we find such glowing descriptions in Indian poetry. It is from such portraits that we gather many interesting hints as to the social position occupied by Hindu women in ancient times, so infinitely above what they hold now. Though the ancient lawgiver, Manu, speaks of women as having no will of their own, yet the evidence we have shows that women in India were subjected to much less social restraint in former days than they are at present. They were on a footing of perfect equality with the men, and they responded nobly to their greater advantages. The pictures of domestic happiness which we find in Indian poetry, especially in the epics, are very beautiful indeed. We find women devoted to their husbands, yet possessing great independence of character and exhibiting a capacity fit for the discharge of the most important social duties; love and harmony are the prevailing elements of home life. What a terrible falling off from this high standard is presented by the condition of women at the present time; and yet so long as we have the ancient examples of noble Hindu womanhood before us, so long there is no cause for despair. The Indian woman will one day be given back her ancient liberty, will be restored to man as the help most meet for him, as his best companion, realizing the fine description of a wife given in the *Mahabharata* :

“ A wife is half the man, his truest friend—
 A loving wife is a perpetual spring
 Of virtue, pleasure, wealth; a faithful wife
 Is his best aid in seeking heavenly bliss;
 A sweetly-speaking wife is a companion
 In solitude; a father in advice;
 A mother in all seasons of distress;
 A rest in passing through life’s wilderness.”

To come now to a consideration of the drama itself, the first mention that we have of Sakuntala is that she is the gentle protectress of wild animals, especially of the fleet and graceful antelopes, which the king is forbidden to kill. Here we have the same idea expressed as in the stories of old English folklore, of the all-conquering power of beauty and purity, by which even wild animals are subdued. As Spenser says in the *Faery Queene*:

"O how can beautilie maister the most strong,
And simple truth subdue avenging wrong!"

It is indeed fitting that Sakuntala, who afterwards appears to us such a model of patience and gentle forgiveness, should first be presented as preventing, though indirectly, the slaughter of an innocent animal. Then how dramatically are we introduced to the actual presence of the heroine. First, there is the description of the sacred and peaceful hermitage—fit habitation for the gentle maid,—where every object that meets the eye bears the sign of being associated with holy rites and ceremonies,—the grains of hallowed wild-rice scattered on the ground, the crushed fruit of the sacred Ingudi-tree, the lines of consecrated bark floating on the gently undulating waters of the holy pool, the bundles of sacrificial grass, the smoke rising from oblations of clarified butter, through which the glowing leaves of sacred trees are dimly seen, with the parrots and young fawns grazing on the lawn that from long association with holy men are not scared away by the sound of the human voice or the approach of a human being. No wonder Sakuntala loved the peaceful spot as she did! King Dushiyanta, the hero, who is first introduced to us as engaged in the manly sport of hunting, has great reverence for holiness, so much so that at the request of the hermits he gives up the sport in which he has been so hotly engaged. He alights at the entrance to the sacred grove, and immediately after feels a sudden throbbing in his right arm, a sign which was supposed to foretell union with a beautiful woman. While trying to imagine what such an omen might mean in such a place, he hears the voices of women calling to each other. Unobserved, he looks at them, and he finds that the voices belong to young girls, who are watering the garden plants. Among them he sees Sakuntala herself, engaged in the same work. Here we get a glimpse of the simplicity of ancient Hindu life. Even the highest-born women did not think it beneath their dignity to occupy themselves with domestic affairs; and we are reminded of Toru Dutt's beautiful description of Savitri's home-life:

“ Though in a lowly home she dwelt,
 Her conduct as a wife was such
 As to illumine all the place ;
 With simplicity and grace
 She discharged each household duty kind.
 Strong in all manual work,—and strong
 To comfort, cherish, help, and pray,
 The hours past peacefully along,
 And, rippling bright, day followed day.”

Such a tender occupation well becomes the beautiful maiden, who is described herself as “ soft as the fresh-blown Mallica,” a kind of double jasmine, which for its beautiful white flowers and delicious perfume is greatly admired by Indians. The plants and flowers seem to thrive with special vigour under her care, and, we may, appropriating the words of Shelley, say :

“ I doubt not the flowers of that garden sweet
 Rejoiced in the sound of her gentle feet,
 I doubt not they felt the spirit that came
 From her glowing fingers through all their frame.”

As Sakuntala herself says, she feels the affection of a sister for these young plants, and the description of the sweet lady in *The Sensitive Plant* might well be applied to her :

“ She sprinkled bright water from the stream
 On those that were faint with the sunny beam ;
 And out of the cups of the heavy flowers
 She emptied the rain of the thunder-showers.
 She lifted their heads with her tender hands,
 And sustained them with rods and osier bands ;
 If the flowers had been her own infants, she
 Could never have nursed them more tenderly.”

The artless conversation of the young maidens pleases the king, but what charms him most is the lovely figure of Sakuntala herself, whose beauty he sees with surprise in such a retired place. But, as he says, “ the lotus, though intertwined with the *Saivala* (moss) is charming ; the speck, though dark, heightens the beauty of the moon ; this graceful one, even with her bark-dress is lovely ; for what is not an embellishment of sweet forms ?” He feels his heart go out towards the maiden with such love that he has a doubt whether she could be really the daughter of a hermit, for, if she were a pure Brahman woman, both on the father’s and on the mother’s side, she would be ineligible as the wife of a Kshatriya. Meanwhile Sakuntala has been flitting, from plant to plant, from

the *Amra*, which with its gently-moving leaves seems inclined to whisper some secret to her, who is "as graceful as the blooming creeper, which twines round it," to the fresh *Mallica*, which she has named 'The Delight of the Grove', and the graceful *Madhavi* creeper, which out of season is covered with gay blossoms, thus foretelling a happy future for the maiden under whose care it has thriven so marvellously. The young girls, with their fresh spirits and the superstitious fancies peculiar to Hindu women, observe all sorts of good omens from the flowers, and predict that Sakuntala will soon have an excellent husband. Half-pleased and half-displeased, Sakuntala tries to parry their jests when suddenly a bee comes buzzing round. She tries to free herself from the importunate insect, and in so doing still more excites the admiration of the already captivated Dushiyanta, who sees the utter absence of affectation in her, so different in this respect from the court beauties to whom he has been accustomed. The girls playfully suggest to her that only King Dushiyanta can save her from the bee, as he is the sole defender of the consecrated groves. This gives an excellent opportunity to the king to discover himself; but, with a fear hitherto unknown, he is unwilling to appear in his true character. He therefore appears as a simple stranger, as a student of the Veda, come to "behold the sanctuary of virtue." The other two girls talk freely to him, and here we may notice the fearless freedom allowed to Hindu women even in conversation with men, as also the exceeding hospitality shown to strangers, even now so characteristic of Hindu manners. But Sakuntala feels a sudden bashfulness. It is her duty to pay the proper respect to the stranger in the absence of her foster-father; but she is unwilling to move. The fact is that, like her royal lover with herself, she has fallen in love with him at first sight. As she herself says, "she feels an emotion scarce consistent with a grove devoted to piety."

" Her heart-rose opened had at last—
Opened no flower can ever shut. "

As Toru Dutt has put it,

" Love at first sight, as poets sing,
Is then no fiction ? "
. " Heaven above
Is witness, that the heart its king
Finds often like a lightning flash ;
We play,—we jest,—we have no care,—
When hark a step,—there comes no crash,—
But life, or silent slow despair."

Sakuntala pretends not to understand the jesting remarks of her attendants, who at once, with the proneness to match-making characteristic of Hindu women, find in the stranger, with "the union of delicacy with robustness in his form, and of sweetness with dignity in his discourse," a fit mate for their gentle mistress. Meanwhile, Dushiyanta has been enquiring about the parentage of Sakuntala, and finds that she is not in reality the daughter of the hermit Canna, but of Causica, a sage and monarch of the great family of Casa. Her mother is a nymph of heaven, the divine Menaca; and this, as the love-stricken Dushiyanta says, explains the secret of her transcendent beauty, which could not be the portion of mortal beings. He now feels all his doubts removed as to the advisability of his union with the beautiful maiden, and his heart bounds with joy when he hears that it is not the intention of her foster-father to keep her unmarried, as he had feared it would be. Sakuntala has been modestly sitting apart all the while; there is a strange flutter in her heart; and in her tremulous excitement she acts with pretty inconsistency. When her attendants tell her to do honour to her guest, she pretends to be angry and threatens to leave them; but, when she is given permission to retire, she declares her intention to stay behind. She exhibits the eccentricities which are supposed to be the attendants of love, and we are reminded of Rosalind's behaviour after her first meeting with Orlando in *As You Like It*. "Shall we go, coz?" says Rosalind. "Ay," says Celia, "Fare you well, fair gentleman." But Rosalind hangs back.

"He calls us back: my pride fell with my fortunes;
I'll ask him what he would. Did you call, sir?"

Then when Celia mockingly accosts her with, "Will you go, coz?", "Have with you," Rosalind rejoins, quite understanding her cousin's jest; but still slow to leave, hoping and longing for some words from Orlando addressed to herself. So Sakuntala acts. Dushiyanta feels that her behaviour is favourable to him; but at this moment a disturbance occurs outside, which cuts short the interview. The girls leave him, but not before they have found out his real rank and apologized prettily for not paying him the proper honours. Sakuntala lingers to the last, trying to catch her lover's attention and unwilling to leave him, and with her departure the first Act ends.

In the next Act we are informed that Dushiyanta is so much in

love with Sakuntala, that he has decided not to return to his kingdom for the present. He stays in the forest on the plea of hunting, in order to be near his love. He has such tenderness for her that he is unwilling to hunt the beautiful deer who are her companions. Madhavya, his buffoon, generally a very important character in Hindu dramas, tries to jest him out of his purpose of marrying Sakuntala, by comparing her with the court beauties ; but it is just this difference from them that seems to have attracted the king towards the rustic maiden. His heart is too deeply fixed on her to be turned from his purpose. " When I meditate on the power of Brahma," he says, " and on her lineaments, the creation of so transcendent a jewel outshines, in my apprehension, all his other works : she was formed and moulded in the eternal mind, which had raised with its utmost exertion the ideas of perfect shapes, and thence made an assemblage of all abstract beauties. She is a fresh leaf, which no hand has torn from its stalk ; a pure diamond, which no polisher has handled ; or rather, the celestial fruit of collected virtues, to the perfection of which nothing can be added." He asks Madhavya's advice as to how he is to gain his object ; and the latter advises him to use his privileges as a king ; but Dushiyanta, who is represented as the perfection of kingly virtues, and is moreover simple-minded, religiously inclined, and generous, declines to do so. Meanwhile he has been called upon to defend the hermits from the ravages of evil demons ; but before he departs on this errand there comes a message from his mother requiring his presence at the court. He hesitates what to do, and at last sends Madhavya to personate him at the palace, while he himself decides to remain behind.

In the third Act Sakuntala is introduced to us as brought through love-sickness into the languid condition of lovers described to us in legendary tales. Her two friends are trying to comfort her ; and, persuaded by them, she at last divulges the cause of her indisposition. It is the prince Dushiyanta, she modestly declares, who is the cause of " my present languor." At this moment, Dushiyanta is concealed near, secretly listening to their conversation ; and the discovery that Sakuntala loves him as he loves her fills him with the greatest ecstasy. Meanwhile, the two handmaids of Sakuntala are consulting how they are to find a cure for her, that is, how they are to inform the prince of her love for him. They decide to write a love-letter and concealing it in a flower give it to the king, and they ask Sakuntala to think of a verse or two, which they could enclose

in the letter, and which "would be consistent with the character of a lovely girl born in an exalted family." Sakuntala is afraid she may be rejected, but decides to take the step and fixes upon the following couplet: "Thy heart I know not, but day and night, O cruel one, Love vehemently inflames my heart, whose desires are centred in thee." No sooner has Sakuntala finished quoting her couplet than Dushiyanta, unable longer to contain himself, advances into view with another couplet: "Thee, O slender-limbed one, Love inflames; but me he actually consumes incessantly; for the Day does not so cause the lotus to fade as it does the moon." The unhesitating promptitude with which Dushiyanta, whenever he can, conceals himself and listens to the conversation of the girls, seems somewhat questionable behaviour; but we must remember that such action is required by the needs of the drama; and even Shakespeare himself does not hesitate to make his heroes in *Much Ado About Nothing* listen secretly to the conversation of the heroines, and that, too, on such a delicate matter as love.

Now there is certainty on both sides, and at the request of one of the girls, moreover, Dushiyanta gives them the assurance that Sakuntala is his only love. The two handmaids contrive to leave the lovers alone, and we have the description of a pretty love-scene. The coy maiden is at last persuaded to yield herself to her fond lover. Sakuntala, in the simplicity of her nature, doubts herself. We see no vanity in her, though she is told on all hands that she is beautiful. She is even afraid of being rejected. She cannot be coquettish, but betrays her love after a few vain attempts to hide it. The way in which she pretends to reject her lover, all the while trying to test his sincerity, and at last, unable to bear his grief, reveals the true state of her heart, reminds us again of Rosalind in *As You Like It*.

In the fourth Act we are told that the two have been married according to the *Gandharva* ceremony, and that the prince has gone back to the palace, leaving the disconsolate Sakuntala behind. So far all has been happy, but now comes in the misfortune, of which we had already a premonition when we were told at the very beginning that Canna had gone to Somatirtha (a place of pilgrimage in Western India) to avert some calamity which threatened his beloved foster-daughter. In Canna's absence, Sakuntala was to be the hostess; but after her marriage her mind is so absorbed in thoughts of her husband that she forgets to dispense the rites of sacred hospitality to a sage, Durvasas, who is represented as the

most hot-tempered of the Hindu Munis. The sage, enraged at her neglect, lays a curse on her: "Woe! thou that art disrespectful to a guest! That man, of whom thou art thinking to the exclusion of every other object from thy mind, so that thou perceivest not me, rich in penance, to have approached, shall not recall thee to his memory, even being reminded; as a drunken man forgets conversation past." The two handmaids are alarmed and strive to appease his anger, and in the end persuade him to relent a little. The curse would be removed and Dushiyanta would remember his wife when he saw the ring, "the jewel-of-recognition" which he had given her at parting. They decide not to tell of the curse, however, to their gentle mistress, who is already almost beside herself with love. Meanwhile Canna has returned to the hermitage, and we are told that, while the girls are afraid to tell him of what has happened during his absence, he has learnt of it from a divine source, and is more pleased than sorry at the intelligence; and on the observation of a very favourable omen in that day's sacrifices he has decided to send her to her husband at the palace. Now comes the affecting farewell of Sakuntala to her old home, her old friends, and her old pets, one of the sweetest portions of the whole play. We see of what an affectionate disposition she is. How her heart must have been wrung at leaving her beloved companions, and especially her old foster-father, who has been so good to her. Her grief at parting from the trees of the hallowed grove, of which she has taken such care, her last request to be informed of the welfare of her pet antelope, the affecting incident of the little fawn clinging to her skirts, the ingenious device of the poet in depicting the whole forest as grieving over her departure—the antelopes ceasing to browse, the very plants losing their strength and beauty, the birds not answering to the loving calls of their companions—all this makes the scene beautiful and pathetic beyond words. Sakuntala pays her respects to the gods, and even the wood-nymphs show themselves happy at her happiness. They make her a gift of splendid clothes, and from this we may see how simple and devoid of luxury her life had hitherto been. She has had no grand clothes, she has been wearing a rough bark dress all these days, and yet we have never heard a word of complaint from her. On the contrary it is on account of this that her character has developed with such sweetness and purity; and perhaps this is the reason why she is not at once transplanted to the gay and corrupt life of the court, but is taken away to heaven, where she is safe from all temptations, till

her purity and innocence are strengthened. Sakuntala on her part, after the retired life she had been leading, feels afraid at the idea of going out into the world without the support of her father; but Canna consoles her with the thought that, as the body must necessarily be separated from the soul, so must we be loosened from the weaker bonds of extrinsic relations. He gives her wise advice as how to conduct herself. "When thou art settled in the mansion of thy husband," he says, "show due reverence to him, and to those whom he reveres. Should he displease thee, let not thy resentment lead thee to disobedience. In thy conduct to thy domestics be rigidly just and impartial. By such behaviour, young women become respectable; but perverse wives are the bane of a family." Then, at last, Sakuntala leaves the hermitage which has been such a happy home to her, and thus closes the first period of her life.

The character of Sakuntala resolves itself into the very elements of womanhood. She is beautiful, modest, and tender; and moreover, brought up as she has been in rustic retirement, she is perfectly unsophisticated and delicately refined. Her soft, artless simplicity, her virgin innocence, her bashfulness, which is more an instinct with her than an acquired quality, so spontaneous and unconscious is it,—what an effect they have on the reader. There is something touching in the suddenness with which she falls in love and gives herself up body and heart and soul to her lover. Conscious of her weakness as a woman, she is struck with wonder at her new emotions and almost worships her princely lover for condescending to bestow his affection on her. Her fondness for nature, her pity and tenderness for all suffering and weak things, are prominent characteristics of her disposition. She can be gay, for before she is stricken with love we see how joyously she jests with her attendants. She has no pride in her, as shown by her simple and ascetic life. But what strikes us most is the frankness and openness of her nature. She cannot hide her feelings, though she ingeniously tries to do so; but with her easily impressive heart, she has an immense capacity for affection. The passionate disposition of the daughters of the south is implanted in her; and, once her heart is fixed on her lover, she can do nothing but think of him, and for his sake she can give up all that she has hitherto held most dear. She does not speak much, but from what little she says we are made perfectly acquainted with her character and with what is passing in her mind; and with her silent presence she attracts

our interest and affection more than if she had obtruded herself on our notice with all the aggressiveness of an acknowledged and pampered beauty.

But now to return to the course of events in our heroine's life. Sakuntala is on her way to her husband, and already the curse has begun to work. Dushiyanta has forgotten to send for his bride, as he had promised to do, within three days of his departure, and now, the gentle Sakuntala, whose heart fluttered at the bare possibility hinted at by her friend, Anasuya, of her husband's forgetting her, is exposed to the full force of that terrible curse. She seems, in her loveliness and perfect purity, heaven-born as she is, like a seraph that has wandered out of her native haunts, and is against her nature made to breathe the tainted air of the world. Her helplessness and her innocence fill us with profound pity. Like a helpless bird caught in the fury of a tempest; like the unresisting Ophelia in *Hamlet*, who, through no fault of hers, with no intention on her part, is linked with the most terrible tragedy ever depicted; like the hapless Desdemona, who through her very innocence is done to death by the vilest criminal ever described; like the noble Hermione, who with her mild dignity and saint-like patience endures the insults heaped upon her by her husband; like another heroine of Hindu mythology, the chaste and devoted Sita, who, when in spite of her indomitable courage and constancy she is suspected of a fault which is such an insult to her, is yet so meekly submissive to her husband, so Sakuntala stands before us. Gentle maiden as she is, with what a marvellous strength of character she meets the unexpected blow dealt to her. The whole scene in which she stands unremembered before her husband is admirably managed. As if to guard us against any uncharitable judgment of Dushiyanta, we are told of his extreme goodness and conscientiousness in performing his kingly duties. We feel that it is not he himself who appears before us now; but the inevitable Fates, the stern curse of the enraged Muni, working through him. But, in spite of the curse, he feels the melancholy remembrance of some past joy. "Ah, what makes me so melancholy in hearing a mere song on absence, when I am not in fact separated from any real object of my affection?" he says; and at this very moment, as if to give him every chance of recognition, the messengers of Canna are announced. Sakuntala enters and immediately feels that the Fates are against her. The king gazes at her with the old admiration, but with no remembrance of his old love; and Sakuntala with alarm tries to console herself

with thinking of the past. She is introduced to him as his wife, but he is only perplexed, and she feels with anguish that her fears are coming true. She is not aware of the curse, and thus his conduct is all the more strange to her; for she fears that his affection for her has ceased; and then of what use, she says to herself, is it to refresh his memory? At last she is persuaded to speak herself, and then how gentle her rebuke is! She reminds him of the ring he had given her; but when, offering to produce it as evidence, she looks for it, she finds that it is not on her finger, and now her story seems really false to him. She makes one more effort, and recalls to him a touching incident which had happened in the days of their intimacy; but he only looks at her with scorn. At last, goaded by his false taunts, her long-suppressed anger and bitter grief at what appears to be his perfidy break out in a rush of words which is stopped, however, almost as soon as uttered. The royal blood in her is roused, gentleness gives place to righteous indignation. Spoken of as she is, as "virtue herself in a human form," and, as Gautami says, bred as she has been in a sacred grove, where she has learned no guile, nor heard what iniquity was, such faithlessness is monstrous to her. But unfortunately this burst of anger still more hardens the heart of Dushiyanta; and feeling the full loneliness of her position, Sakuntala bursts into tears. And now comes in the strictness of the Hindu law of marriage, of the husband's absolute dominion over the wife. Her attendants, leaving her with the king, are about to return. Sakuntala asks them not to forsake her; but she is sternly rebuked. "O wife, who seest the faults of thy lord, dost thou desire independence?" At last a compromise is affected; Sakuntala is to stay with Dushiyanta's old priest till her child is born, when if she has a son, "whose hands and feet bear the marks of extensive sovereignty," such as those which it had been prophesied Dushiyanta's heir was to have, she would be recognised as the king's wife. While Dushiyanta stands meditating on her beauty, but with the curse still clouding his memory, Sakuntala, who is now all submission, meekly accompanies the priest. How bitter must have been her grief and her loneliness! "O earth!" she cries, "mild goddess, give me a place within thy bosom!" and an instant answer is accorded to her. "When Sakuntala extended her arms and wept," we are told, "a body of light, in a female shape, descended, and having caught her hastily to her bosom disappeared." Dushiyanta now tries to think no more about the strange event; but still his

mind is very much troubled, and, as he says, he is almost induced to believe the story.

In the next Act the mystery is explained. The ring has been swallowed by a fish, most probably when, as Gautami says in the previous Act, Sakuntala had taken up water to pour on her head in the pool of Sachitirtha. The fish is caught by a fisherman, who finding the ring and trying to sell it is apprehended by the king's officers, as the king's name is engraved on the jewel. As soon as Dushiyanta sees the ring, his memory returns, and he pardons the poor fisherman whom the officers were intending to execute. It is pleasing, in the midst of all the contempt expressed for the labourer as a member of the lower orders, to see this manifestation of justice and generosity to him. From the moment the king sees the ring, we are told that he is agitated as if it recalled to him some one who had once been very dear; and indeed his grief for the loss of Sakuntala and remorse for his pitiless treatment of her are excessive and all-absorbing. But Sakuntala is in heaven now, happy with her mother and her divine friends; and it makes us happy to think that the gentle maiden is safe from the dangers and insults to which she would otherwise have been exposed. Not until the heavenly nymphs are sure that the king really feels her loss will they give her back to him; and so one of them, the nymph Misracesi, comes to earth to find out the real state of affairs; and there she finds that the king in his great grief has given up all the pleasures of life, has even forbidden the important annual festival of spring, and is neglecting the state affairs to which he had been once so devoted. He tries to console himself with a picture of Sakuntala, and at last even the nymph is satisfied and pleased with him as a fit husband for her beloved friend's daughter. She returns to heaven; and on pretence of being called to subdue a race of demons, the king, of whose justice, generosity, and fatherly kindness to his people as well as of his courage and the constancy of his friendship, we are given brief glimpses, is also taken to the heavenly sphere by the charioteer of Indra himself.

And now everything is ready for his reconciliation with Sakuntala. He has been greatly honoured by Indra, even made to sit on half of his throne, and yet such honours have not spoilt him, for he attributes all his success to the help of the gods. He is taken back to earth, and on the way he stops for a while at the hermitage of Marichi, where we are given an interesting picture of rigid asceticism. Dushiyanta again feels his right arm throb—a sure sign of coming

happiness ; and just at this moment he sees a child, who appears so beautiful and so brave beyond his years that he wishes he were his own son. The boy is wrestling with a lion, and at the request of the attendants, Dushiyanta persuades him to release it. He takes the child by the hand, and the servants exclaim at the wonderful resemblance between the two and at the prompt obedience of the hitherto refractory boy to a mere stranger. He is told that the boy is descended from Puru, his own ancestor, and moreover learns that his mother is related to a celestial nymph. He inquires the name of the father, and is told that he deserted his wife. Struck with the resemblance of this description to himself, he is told that the name of one of the child's playthings, an artificial peacock, is Sakuntalavanyam. His doubts now are almost removed ; but there comes one other decisive proof. He picks up, without any danger to himself, the child's armlet, which could not be touched unhurt by any human being but the father or mother of the boy. Thus, with a great joy at his heart, he recognises the beautiful child as his own son. At this moment, Sakuntala, who has heard of the wonder, enters, dressed in mourning apparel. Both are infinitely touched at the emaciated and sorrowful appearance of one another, knowing that it is the result of grief. Dushiyanta implores Sakuntala's forgiveness ; but she thinks that the fault is all on her side. It is touching to see the full and free forgiveness she accords to her husband, without a single reproach for his inconstancy, except a question about how the remembrance of her had been recalled to him. With what pangs and yearnings of the heart must he have heard this sweet reproach, if reproach it can be called. But all is well at last.

It may be thought that the reconciliation is delayed too long, and that Sakuntala is unfeeling in thus secluding herself from her husband, when she knows how his heart is yearning for her. But we must remember that she acts in obedience to the command of the gods, which she would never have dared to disobey. The delay teaches Dushiyanta the full value of his wife, and hereafter we may be sure he will prize her all the more. And the character of Sakuntala herself must have been rendered purer and stronger by her divine surroundings.

“ He, who for Love has undergone
The worst that can befall,
Is happier thousand-fold, than one
Who never loved at all ;

A grace within his soul has reigned
Which nothing else can bring—
Thank God for all that I have gained
By that high suffering!"

.....
"O benefit of ill! now I find true
That better is by evil still made better;
And ruined love, when it is built anew,
Grows fairer than at first, more strong, far greater."

They pay their respects to the gods; and incidentally everything is explained and Sakuntala learns the true cause of the apparent inconsistency of Dushiyanta. The happy pair are blessed with all possible blessings; a prosperous future is predicted for their son; Canna is acquainted with the happy news; and everything is brought to a pleasant conclusion. And we may take leave of our heroine, this lovely compound of goodness, truth, affection, and constancy, assured that she has all happiness before her, and that in the company of her beloved lord she will get all the compensation she can want for the wrongs she has suffered. And, when they have grown old together, we may imagine Dushiyanta giving up his kingdom to his son, and leading with his sweet wife that tranquil and quiet existence so dear to her heart in the loved and consecrated grove of her old father.

"One Hope within two Wills! one Will beneath
Two overshadowing minds! One Life, one Death,
One Heaven, one Hell, one Immortality!"

.....
"When a Soul, by choice and conscience, doth
Throw out her full force on another Soul,
The conscience and the concentration both
Make mere Life, Love. For Life in perfect whole
And aim consummated, is Love in sooth,
As Nature's magnet-head rounds Pole with Pole."

KAMALA SATTIANADHAN.

THE FOUNDATION OF MORALS :—V.*

Now let us look for a little at the aim and scope of the vast political organisation that is slowly perfecting itself around us. The first and foremost aim of government has been to preserve the stability and general equilibrium of society, as this is the first and indispensable condition of sure and steady progress. This it effects by the organs of legislative, judicial, and executive administration. Whatever be the actual order of events in the history of the evolution of government, medical and sanitary administration next deserves the attention of government, as men must be healthy before they can grow wealthy or wise. All these are but preventive measures which serve to protect and preserve life in general. The highest aim of government has always been to advance national life in length, breadth, and height—which is achieved by a well-constituted system of education, special and liberal, whose influence is calculated to affect the masses. It is not quite right, perhaps, to define so sharply the order of appearance or of importance of the several organs of state, and their functions, as they form parts of one system and invariably act and react upon one another. While the physical life of an individual or nation is a condition for the advancement of the intellectual and moral, the latter is no less essential for physical, well-being. Again, the intellectual life of a nation depends on the moral and the moral on the intellectual.

The effective administration of revenue is the sole means whereby such high ends can be achieved for the benefit of a whole body of people by government. The government demands, as it were, trusting to their good sense, a large annual subscription from such people as are landed proprietors or are engaged in lucrative professions, or derive a large income by serving under it, and sometimes raises by force, where or when force is necessary, extra sums on emergencies. I do not doubt that there are rich proprietors whose view of the world does not extend beyond their household, who, insensible to the services rendered to them by government, regard the demand of a definite sum in the shape of taxation as unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The government, then, raises a large public fund, and, by spending it for the well-being of the people, equalises as far as practicable the conditions of men in society. The perfection of government is in the direction of levelling up more and more the

conditions of life of all men. While there are some people who will not identify themselves with the government which works for their good, some servants of government do not identify themselves with the people for whose sake government exists. Until men are moralized to a certain degree, and are made alive to the motives and object of government, and to the duties which they as men owe to their fellow-men, further steps in the levelling process, which is the grand aim of socialists, cannot be taken by government, without endangering the stability of society. Such is the ideal which the government is advancing to realise. Who can doubt that government at some stage of its perfection may take cognizance of vices as it now does of wrongs and crimes, and even force large charities from the rich and make them benevolent? We see, then, that moral evolution, social evolution, and political evolution have one common purpose, and are different but complementary phases of the one grand process of increasing life in its length, breadth, and height.

As moralization of individuals is the surest and the best means of advancing the universal life process, the sanctions from society and government, from law and police, must be subordinated to it. But the former being the farthest from the actual and the most difficult to accomplish, we have too often to work from a different side, and to apply force from without to help the realization of the end to which moralization points. Mr. Sundaram Pillai has thus described the relation between law and morals: "Law is the handmaid of morals and not morals of law. As the society improves in its moral status it will be found that law too rises in delicacy, as well as in its demands on the average individual of society. A part of this improvement is no doubt due to law, which drills up as it were, the backward members of the state to the average standard. But while law and government are thus bringing up the rear morals continues to command the van. So the average member continues to rise, drawn as it were by the engine of morals in front and pushed by the engine of law from behind."

Evidences gather from all sides to strengthen and deepen our conviction that the advancement and development of life in all its dimensions is the natural law and divine purpose of the world's progress, with which the laws of all progressive institutions perfectly tally. All the theories advanced in morals, and those relating to society and government, converge to the same central truth. The

only theory, moral or social, that seems to stand out of the comprehensive principle above enunciated is that which looks forward to happiness as the ideal of human progress. But when it is seen that progress on the lines above indicated ever carries in its train a special kind of happiness, the apparently contradictory views will be seen not to conflict.

There are special reasons, however, for regarding the conditions of happiness which constitute life, rather than happiness itself, as the direct end of pursuit. In the first place, the conditions are not only more general and more definite than the consequence, *viz.*, happiness, but themselves define with the greatest possible precision the kind of happiness which would be perfectly consistent with the purest morality. Further, on this view all confusion of the natural motive of pleasure which is individual, with universal happiness, the perfectly disinterested end of morality, is avoided. In the second place, happiness when made the end of morality, would naturally mean the maximum of happiness in equal amount for each and for all, the ideal of the utilitarian, which is open to the objection already urged, *viz.*, that it is a condition of retrogression and dissolution of society, and with it, of all morality and humanity; whereas the happiness that is being advanced with the advancement and development of life, is general happiness, which cannot become universal or equally distributed, as long as even slight inequalities in the conditions of life continue to exist, as they must.

We have thus reached the moral ideal—the supreme ideal of conduct which we were in quest of. Conduct is moral which advances within the limits of possibility imposed by the conditions of society at any time, life in length, breadth, and height, in the individual as well as in the family and the members of society generally. Being is a condition of well-being, as well as of efficient life. Since the development of life, the proper end of morals, is a process in time, continuity or length of life is the prime condition of its fulfilment, and cannot properly be made part of the supreme end. But as this condition can be secured only by the proper regulation of conduct, by doing certain acts and refraining from others, it has also acquired some moral significance. As it is necessarily implied, however, in all successful and efficient activity, the formula of moral conduct may be expressed in terms of life, under the two aspects of breadth and height alone. It may perhaps be well to define here once more the terms employed, breadth and height

of life. By breadth of life is meant the varied and heterogeneous activities which the life of a man in civilized society exhibits, who performs widely different functions in the different capacities of parent, master, neighbour, citizen, etc. By height of life is meant the intellectual and æsthetic culture attained by steady devotion to special kinds of study and work, irrespective of their practical utility estimated by their money value or its equivalent in pleasure.

In view of the above ideal we have to enunciate a practical maxim of conduct. The maxim may be thus expressed: "Live your best life, and help others to live their best." But as life is lived and developed by work, a simple and more practical maxim may be found in terms of work. This may be expressed in the words, "Work and help others to work," implying negatively, "Do not sleep nor hinder others from work," or "Avoid all those conditions which directly or indirectly interfere with your own or others' proper work." This maxim thoroughly agrees with common-sense. No man is held in so much contempt, distrust, and hatred as the man who, unwilling to work, begs from door to door, to support his life. If God Himself will help only those who help themselves, man should not do more. The nature and sphere of his work will have to be defined for every man according to the conditions of the society in which he lives, and according to his tastes, capacities, and powers. Any kind of higher work to be efficient, and to have a market value, presupposes education, general and special. The help which every man who can afford it is expected to give to others, consists in giving a suitable education to those who will surely profit by it, and in finding suitable occupations for those who can and will work, according to their merit. At all times helping the poor in their education has been regarded as the highest form of benevolence. By such means the number of men willing to work will increase, and competition advantageous to life in general, would become keener. In the evolution of life according to this higher law of stress and competition, no life will be lost.

Under the changed social conditions of man, the struggle is no longer of might with might, but of right with right. The right of the individual to live on a certain plane of life should be judged by the manner and quality of his life. But the rights of individuals are not sufficiently vindicated and the competition is not fair as long as under existing conditions the gifts and talents of many are

allowed to rot or run wild, and rare powers, even when exhibited, are not appreciated and valued, owing to accidents of birth, race, or religion. We are often forced to make survival and prosperity the test of fitness, rather than fitness the test of survival and prosperity. To give the laws of evolution full play, and to further progress, nothing seems more reasonable than to make competition fairer and keener by enabling men to appear on the different planes of life according to their intrinsic merits, and to fight with those who are elevated by accidents of birth or fortune. The formula of right conduct as expressed in terms of work is in perfect conformity to the law of stress and competition, the fundamental principle of natural evolution.

We find the moral injunction approximately carried out in the miniature world of the family, and also in small country villages where there is peace, prosperity, and plenty. There men, women, and boys work in perfect harmony, and identity of interests is more or less perfectly established.

Assuming that the formula above set forth works satisfactorily as a practical maxim of moral conduct, we have yet to find a sanction that will induce all reasonable men to act upon it. A man can easily see why he should work for himself and even develop his higher life by such work. The dread of misery and the prospect of happiness to himself or his family, with which he naturally identifies himself, are sufficient motives with him. As almost every man naturally works for his own good, such conduct on the part of the individual is not usually brought within the scope of morality. But why every man should help others also in their work is perhaps not clear. To a natural moralist, of the type of Mr. Spencer, who may rightly be regarded as the child of nature, and with whom obedience to nature's laws is the highest virtue, no reason can be more convincing than that the advancement and development of life in general (social and national) in all its dimensions, is the end of human evolution, which is being realised in the universe according to natural laws, and that the best means whereby man can, and to some extent, does, further such realisation, is by working, and helping others in their work, as best he can. To the theologian we need only say that the goal of evolution is but the divine purpose, revealed in nature's book, and the laws of natural evolution are but divine laws, written on the pages of human history, and that he can obey the divine laws and fulfil the divine purpose, only as he

works himself and helps others to work, according to their capacity and conditions of life. As it is our privilege to compass more or less perfectly the final purpose of human evolution, so it is our duty, as far as it lies in our power, to promote it.

But a shrewd critic would not allow us to halt even here, with this final argument for morality. He would ask whether man is bound to help evolution, and whether the requirement is not altogether meaningless, as evolution, a natural process, will work itself out according to invariable laws. To frame the question as against the theological argument for morality, Is man to help God in fulfilling His purpose? Does it not contradict the fundamental notion of theology, the Omnipotence of God? This objection may be answered by dwelling on the analogy between political government, to the reality and power of which every individual is alive, and the somewhat impalpable and invisible but all-embracing empire of morals. Under political government the individual is punished for the violation of laws promulgated by it for the welfare of society. The fear of punishment, corporal or other, is a sufficient motive for the individual to obey the laws. And yet how many infringe them and are punished? Will it be said that a government is imperfect if it does not wholly prevent men from committing wrongs and crimes? Wrongs and crimes can be prevented in one or other of three ways. First, we may try to paralyse all the principles of human nature, such as courage, anger, revenge, love, honour, shame, and even sympathy. This is impossible, and even if possible, would destroy the very life of humanity. Or secondly, we may seek to control these principles severally within proper limits, in relation to one another, and to higher principles, which enter into the hierarchy, and preserve a proper balance or harmony among them. But this is the function of moral education, which government can aid and indirectly effect through the organ of education, but cannot directly undertake to perform. Or thirdly, we may seek to counterpoise these strong impulses by a somewhat powerful motive, namely punishment. And this is the most rational course adopted by government. When further, the professed object of government is understood to consist in the protection of society, and the advancement of social life, and not of the individuals composing it severally, the frequent violations of its laws by a few individuals and the suffering of a few are no sign of its imperfection. Under the natural empire of morals the law of development and progress operates with much greater certainty. Although the penalty which the individual often pays

for violations of natural laws is often inappreciable, the penalty a whole society is made to pay for the general deviation of its members from such laws is frequently heavy. In the vast ocean of being the individual life is but a bubble. We can have a fair idea of the effect of disobedience of natural laws only on societies, races, or nations. History tells the woeful tale how nations that once led the world have retrograded for lack of centralization of power, which is best effected by moralization. Nations may rise and nations may fall : evolution continues for ever. But how ? The fear of a fall or the hope of rise in the scale of nations of one's own people, or country, cannot prevail upon the average individual to be moral. Fear of consequence is not the only motive which impels man to obey the laws of government or the moral laws of the universe.

Human evolution would be a chimera if man were not naturally a potent factor in such evolution, progress being real, progress being certain. Man naturally helps evolution more than he hinders it. But how ? Consciously or unconsciously ? Feeling, nature's true guide, which according to Mr. Spencer has steered aright the evolution of conduct from the sentient to the conscious stage, was, in the savage, and is still, the main factor in the life of a people, except as it is indirectly controlled by the intellect and will of an enlightened few. Feeling from the first assumes a double phase, egoistic and altruistic. Drummond in his *Ascent of Man*, has successfully proved the existence of altruism as an original principle and traced its evolution from the lowest form of animal life. Mr. Spencer himself admits that, in a sense, altruism is manifested almost coevally with egoism, on the threshold of the evolution of sentience. Two distinct forces, tending in two different directions, are operating throughout nature, of which egoism or self-love, and altruism or love, which appear in human nature, are more evolved forms.

While self-love and love to others in due amount and proportion are necessary conditions of progress, the undue predominance of the former or the undue restriction of the latter hinders it. As the equilibrium of these forces has been disturbed with the appearance of self-consciousness in man, the balance has once more to be restored by a proper philosophy, the outcome of the exercise of reason.

Love is the link that binds the individuals of a society, tribe, or nation together in one brotherhood. As man becomes more and more rational, and realises more and more vividly his position in the universe, and his relation to humanity in general the stream of

love encircling the family finds an outlet through which it pours forth into the broad world, making life richer and happier. The progress of the world may be described as the improving fertilization of the vast valley of human life in the sunshine of consciousness, as the streams of love pouring forth from every heart gather as they descend the valley into a mightier and mightier stream. If pleasure or the principle of self-love, a natural motive to action, is the sanction for personal morality, love, another motive principle of action, may be regarded as the sanction for other-regarding conduct. These are the sanctions from feeling, the most powerful with the masses. These sanctions, though blind in themselves, are rational in a sense, as they fulfil nature's purpose. A higher sanction from feeling would be the desire to do the reasonable as such, which springs up naturally in the minds of those who are capable of rational contemplation.

We can now understand why the stricter morality according to which human life is not more sacred than brute life except for its higher capacities and powers, intellectual, moral, and religious, that have been or can be brought out, has given place to the laxer morality which regards all life, the brute life of a man and the life of a brute indiscriminately, as sacred. All men are not philosophers guided by their highest reason. The vast majority of people are directly under the governance of feeling, so that the aim of the moral education of the masses must be to work up the right feeling in the right direction by a proper and wise control, without restricting it. The butcher who is not in the least moved when he slaughters an animal, might without the least compunction, take away human life in cold blood, if he should find cause for so doing. Whereas a man who could not bear to look at the agonies of lower animals would not suffer a fellow-man to continue in misery, if he could possibly avert it. Love or sympathy must run its full course; to check it at any point is to paralyse it.

Now that we have reached the last point of our analysis, we may trace the growth and development of conscience. The duality of human nature to which all the systems directly or indirectly point, as has been shown, is a fundamental fact. As in the case of the appetites and cravings of the body, the two natural principles of self-love and love give rise to satisfaction, when gratified by appropriate modes of action, or to pain when hindered and repressed. Pleasure and pain so resulting form the rudiments of conscience on the side of feeling. The consciousness of the existence of these

two principles and their relative claims in any given case constitute the perceptive side of conscience. The perceptive cannot be sharply separated from the affective side of conscience, as they are organically connected. For while feeling, by awakening consciousness, helps discrimination, the concentration of consciousness implied in discrimination generates a new feeling, or intensifies an existing one. Mr. Lecky, in maintaining that conscience is original, adverts, in his final analysis, to the consciousness of a higher and a lower principle in human nature. The higher is the altruistic principle of sympathy or benevolence. It is the higher, it seems to me, not because it is supernatural, but because it is rarer, being naturally less strong. In the absence of self-consciousness, which enables man to grasp ultimate and general principles and regulate his conduct, it is only in keeping with the end of nature that the first principle of self-preservation, a necessary condition of the preservation of others, should be made naturally stronger than the other, so that the error, if there be any, may be on the right side. The awakening of consciousness in the individual to the existence of the higher principle does not take place until, under more favourable conditions, it demonstrates itself in one's own or another's conduct. When the higher principle is exhibited in the exemplary conduct of others, it does not fail to provoke a hearty and ready response, which, in the light of consciousness, becomes intelligent appreciation. The moral sense may be said to be original in this sense. But the first discrimination of higher and lower is not as clear, and the higher principle of love or benevolence not naturally as emphatic nor as extensive in its operation as might be desired. As man is rational, with his ever-widening experience, knowledge also grows. In the growing light of knowledge morality becomes crystallized into a number of definite virtues and secondary principles of conduct which fall into order, converging towards the two main principles of self-love and love. These principles raised from the experience of the past are conserved in society, which does not die with the occasional falling off of individuals. The child that is born into a civilized and highly moralized society has the benefit of the whole experience of the past, by which the society was built up, and learns as he grows, directly from others, the general rules of right conduct, and the occasions for practising them; so that, when he becomes a man, even if devoid of philosophic reflection, he decides as it were instinctively what is right and proper to do, and what is wrong and improper, under any given

circumstances. Alongside of the growth of intellectual apprehension of the principles of right conduct which constitutes one half of conscience, the disposition to act in conformity to them is also cultivated in the individual under the influence of feelings incident to life in society.

Thus are explained the seeming intuitive perception of right and wrong in all cases by conscience, the natural impulse to do the right and aversion to wrong, and the satisfaction ensuing upon the one, with the pricking of conscience resulting from the other. The singular fact that in men who bear a character the cognitive, the affective, and the conative elements are so well concatenated that they cannot think of the right without the desire to do it, and desiring it, withhold from action, and that they go through the whole round with machine-like regularity, explains how we have come to regard conscience as a distinct faculty.

The appeal to feeling necessary for establishing a regular connection between the perceptive and the active sides of human nature, and for realizing in practice ideas entertained in thought, is made by means of the several sanctions theological, social, and political. Over and above is natural sympathy or feeling of regard for others, which may be developed independently of these by procuring the proper social environment. It is difficult to settle the historical order in which the sanctions came into operation, or to say of the theological, whether in every individual it naturally grew into the moral, or was invented by some sagacious moralist. I think it is extremely probable that the social sanction preceded all other sanctions, and that the theological sanction supplied the explanation, at a time when the rationale of the social sanction was not understood.

The view of conscience as consciousness awakened to the higher principles of human nature accompanied by feeling, which may be described as the tension of consciousness, is best illustrated in the virtue of veracity. Truth is a virtue, the practice of which naturally follows the line of least resistance, though at times some extremely powerful motives make it take the line of most resistance. But such motives, affording temporary resistance, melt away before the concentrated rays of reflection or self-consciousness. It is a fact of every day experience that the man who does not in the least scruple to tell a lie is staggered when put on oath. Nor is this due wholly to the fear of divine vengeance. The administration of the oath in courts of law in any of the recognised modes is simply a

means of heightening self-consciousness in the individual, and through it of arresting the motives which under ordinary circumstances readily prompt him to tell lies. The honest man shrinks as much as the dishonest from taking an oath out of self-respect; for to put him on oath after he has once declared the truth is to question his character.

A system of moral education must recognise, over and above the appeal to the higher nature in man, in all the different modes common sense and experience would dictate, the non-moral sanctions, theological, social, and legal. Since the religious sense can be easily and early worked up in the individual, the moralist should take care to apply the lever of religion in seeking to elevate the infant mind. At a later stage, when the pupil is able to realize his dependence on society, he should appeal to the principle of self-interest, and to the sense of honour and shame awakened by life in society, and thereby bring about conformity in conduct to the moral rules, and in course of time, uniformity of disposition. In certain extreme cases or in cases in which the means above described have not been successfully employed, an appeal to the legal sanction may become necessary. Want of character in an individual is due mainly, if not wholly, to the failure of the teacher (when education is given) to apply these several sanctions with discernment, in view of the cardinal principles of morality. We need not fear that, as the religious or social sense wanes in some individuals in later life, they will sink down from the moral level to which they have been raised, apparently by artificial means. As a man is a bundle of habits, so is his character. When by the various means best adapted to the ends of morality, at the different periods of life, conduct becomes determined and a line of least resistance becomes established, the individual continues necessarily to move along the same line all his life—all the more gladly as he makes out the rational purpose of the world's progress and becomes alive to the higher principle of his nature, namely love. For, as Professor Sidgwick observes, the perception of the reasonable engenders a desire to follow the reasonable as such in conduct; and a desire to do the reasonable as such is the best part of enlightened conscience. Thus do we apply the key of selfishness to wind up the main spring of a moral life, namely love, which when fully wound up works the man on moral lines a whole lifetime. The altruism that springs from love in this manner is not tainted because of the influences brought to bear upon it in rearing it to its full height.

The misery in the world is by some supposed to be due in great part to the rapid increase of the population, and hence the speculations of Malthus. But even if that were the sole cause of misery, the remedies suggested by Malthus are unnatural, unhappy, perverse, and injurious. The writer on the evolution of sex condemns wholesale the Malthusian philosophy and suggests that the most efficacious remedy lies in the moralization of the people, in the practice of prudence, temperance, and benevolence. Nine-tenths of the misery in the world flow from imprudence, and selfishness, or lack of benevolence, and the remaining tenth from special circumstances incident to the lives of individuals, such as infirmity and old age, which disable them from work, and the vicissitudes of life in general, such as famine and pestilence.

The moral ideal is infinitely progressive as life with its untold possibilities admits of infinite expansion. The capabilities and possibilities of life can be defined only with immediate reference to the actual conditions of life at the successive stages of its evolution. However good the present may be, we always look forward to a better, and the belief is induced that there is a best, which ever recedes, as we advance, before our view.

"Man never is, but always to be blest."

S. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI.

LITERARY NOTICES.

In Western India. Recollections of my early Missionary Life. By the Rev. J. Murray Mitchell, M.A., LL.D. Edinburgh : David Douglas, 1899.

DR. MURRAY MITCHELL is a veteran, but not one of those who lag superfluous on the stage. From time to time one hears of his continued activities. And now he has fitly employed his time in gathering together his reminiscences of life in Western India.

It is with a pleasant surprise that we hear a living voice telling us of Bombay and its surroundings as they struck a newcomer in the year 1838. The book is not exactly an autobiography and not exactly a history of Scottish Missions in Western India, but something between the two. From this it happens that some chapters have nothing to do with Western India, but are records of travel to and from the East ;

and also that one has to do some piecing together to get a connected account of the Mission in which the author worked. Here and there are interesting pieces of missionary history,—accounts of the beginnings of work that was already in existence when Dr. Murray Mitchell came to India, or of experiments that had been wisely departed from. He tells, for example, that before he came to India the Scottish Mission, settling in the Kōrkan, had covered their district with eighty schools, containing fully three thousand pupils. But for these only non-Christian teachers were procurable, and with the small number of missionaries on the field no very effective superintendence could be given. The missionaries had soon withdrawn, accordingly, not from education, but from education on these lines.

But, after all, the attraction of such a volume as this lies mainly in the actual recollections of the veteran author—in his pictures of men and things that have passed away. The writer is a man of wide sympathies and varied activities, and his life seems to have touched Indian life and thought at nearly every point. One is glad, however, to see frequent reference to his diary and other written sources of information, for recollection alone is apt to be an unsafe guide.

The young missionary reached India in October, 1838, having travelled by the overland route, and taken twenty-five days from Suez to Bombay, where “the arrival of the monthly steamer from Suez was working a vast revolution.” The importance of the city as the western gate of India was even then clearly recognized, new mercantile houses were springing up, and the population contained that mixture of elements which still characterizes it. The missionary body which Dr. Murray Mitchell joined was small, and fruits of their labours were slow in appearing. Great as has been the advance since those days, the same may still be said of Bombay when compared with many other parts of India. Dr. Murray Mitchell’s review of the reasons for the hardness of the field is interesting. The chief reasons he held to be the wounds inflicted upon Maratha pride and Brahman prosperity by the overthrow of the Maratha power, and the evil effects produced by the forcible Portuguese methods of promulgating Christianity during the era of their power on the Western coast.

In the Scottish Mission Dr. Murray Mitchell found Dr. Wilson, Mr. Nesbit, and Mr. Stevenson, a trio of distinguished names. All of them were Marathi scholars, and Dr. Murray Mitchell proceeded to follow in their footsteps. Mr. Nesbit was not so widely known as his colleague Dr. Wilson; but one gathers from this book the same impression as is given by Mr. Nesbit’s old scholars when they are led to talk of their former teacher,—that he was a man whose influence went very deep. He was above all a teacher, and he so taught as to leave an indelible impression on his pupils.

In Dr. Murray Mitchell's pages we fight over again the battle of the first Parsi converts, and follow the struggle for the establishment of female education. We accompany him and Dr. Wilson in some of those tours in which the fields of future missions were mapped out. And we see what living Hinduism is at Jejuri and Pandharpur.

Not the least interesting chapter in the book is the one on Marathi poetry, containing translations from Tukaram which make us wish that the author had carried his labours further in this direction and by a full selection made the Marathi poet familiar to English readers. We quote one example :—

“ Why hast thou forgotten
Him, the greatly gracious,
Who the world so spacious
Sole sustaineth ?

For the new-born nursling
Who the milk prepareth ?
Mother, child, each shareth
His rich bounty.

In the fierce hot season,
When the leaflet springeth,
Who the moisture bringeth
Which it drinketh ?

Has not the eternal
Given thee still protection ?
Hold in recollection
All his kindness !

World-upholder call Him,
Of all good the giver ;
Think, says Tuka, ever
On Him only.”

Dr. Murray Mitchell indicates that a volume may follow on his later experience in Bengal. Meantime we are thankful to have this book, and can recommend it for its interest and variety both to all who are interested in Christian missions and to those who are attracted by the life and thought of Western India.

Chisel, Pen, and Poignard, or Benvenuto Cellini, his Times and his Contemporaries. London, New York, and Bombay : Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899. Price 5s.

THE author of *The Life of Sir Kinelm Digby* and of *Falklands* has seen in Benvenuto Cellini one of those characters which at once interest many readers and lend themselves to his chatty critical treatment. Abundant material lies to his hand in Cellini's autobiography and in his Treatises.

He has but to select and condense. Except, indeed, where it is necessary to remove the gloss from Cellini's own account of some action which either was too disreputable for even him to acknowledge in its nakedness or did not in its simplicity sufficiently redound to his credit. Cellini's age—the golden Renaissance days of Leo X. and Francis I.—can never lose its attraction to the student of history or art. The combination in Cellini of artistic and literary genius with shameless effrontery and ruffianly scoundrelism will always make his character interesting to the student of human nature. To set forth that personality for the benefit of those who have not the patience to wade through Cellini's own lengthy works is the main object of the writer, though a subsidiary object seems to be to defend or excuse the Papacy and the Roman Church of Cellini's times. Like other books by the same author, this has in its excellent portraits and other illustrations a great enhancement of its intrinsic interest.

Plane Trigonometry for Colleges and Secondary Schools. By D. A. Murray, B.A., Ph.D. New York, London, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899. Price 3s. 6d.

IN reviewing an introductory work on differential equations by the author of this book we remarked that he showed a keen appreciation of the difficulties experienced by beginners, and gave expression to the favourable opinion we had formed of that work. We are glad to be able to speak in the same favourable terms of the book now before us. We have here the same appreciation of difficulties experienced by beginners as in the former work, and the same careful exposition and illustration of the principles of the subject.

Beginning with a chapter on logarithms and computation by means of logarithms, Mr. Murray defines the trigonometrical ratios for angles less than a right angle, and applies them to the solution of triangles. More general definitions of the trigonometrical ratios are given later, and subjects like circular measure, the periodicity of trigonometrical functions, the graphical representation of trigonometrical functions, and the solution of trigonometrical equations are treated of towards the end of the book. Mr. Murray claims that there are several advantages in deferring the general treatment of the subject till the student has become familiar with the trigonometrical functions as ratios defined with reference to angles less than a right angle, and the claim may be admitted. But, as we have said before, our experience has shown that if students are ever to take up the general treatment of the subject, they ought to do so at the very beginning, and that the disadvantages of following the order adopted by Mr. Murray, and indeed by the writers of most of the text-books in use, outweigh the advantages. We do not

think Mr. Murray's book stands condemned, however, because the order of treatment adopted in it is not that which we think best. As Mr. Murray says, teachers who prefer a wider generality of treatment at the outset can take the chapters in a different order from that followed by him. In this connection it may not be out of place to remark that beginners would find the general treatment of the trigonometrical ratios easier than they do if the use of the phrase, "an angle in the first (or any other) quadrant," were given up. A positive angle less than a right angle may be said to be "an angle in the first quadrant"—though it is not necessarily so; but an angle greater than four right angles and less than five cannot be said to be "an angle in the first quadrant," and the same remark holds good of angles whose bounding or terminal lines are in the second, or third, or fourth, quadrants.

A New Sequel to Euclid. By W. J. Dilworth, M.A. London, Glasgow, and Dublin: Blackie and Son, Limited.

THIS work is not in any way a rival to Casey's *Sequel to Euclid*. The object of the author in writing it has been to bring together in a complete and compact form those propositions in geometry which are found in appendices in the more recent editions of Euclid. The book is divided into three parts. The first part contains elementary propositions on the subject-matter of the first three books of Euclid, the second contains more difficult propositions on the subject-matter of the first four books of Euclid, and the third contains propositions for the most part on the subject-matter of the sixth book of Euclid. Besides the propositions of which complete proofs are given there are exercises to be worked out by the student. The work may be recommended both to teachers and to students.

Longmans' Colonial Library.

Some Experiences of an Irish R. M. By E. CE. Somerville and Martin Ross.

THESE experiences of a Resident Magistrate (for so R. M. is to be interpreted) are witty and clever, and were well worth reprinting. The authors know how to write amusingly about Irishmen and Irishwomen, and horses. The stories have a kind of consecutiveness, and there is a little love story that appears and re-appears with just sufficient frequency to keep the reader interested. The authors have had, or have invented, some remarkable experiences, and the would-be reader may begin the book with the assurance that there is not a single dull page in it. The illustrations, which are by Mr. Somerville, are a distinct addition.

Sir Patrick : the Puddock. By L. B. Walford.

THIS is a story without much plot, but it is very bright and readable and does not leave a nasty taste in the mouth as so many modern novels do. The hero, Sir Patrick Kinellan, is called the Puddock because he has few personal attractions. He is short, broad, and quick as a frog, but straightforward and gentlemanly. At forty he meets a bright society girl, who, having become tired of the insincerity of the people in whose company she has been living, is attracted by the good, simple, plain-looking man. How it fares with this couple and with sundry other people is set forth in a pleasant and interesting way by Mrs. Walford.

NOTES AND EXTRACTS.

THE speech delivered by Lord Curzon at the recent Convocation of the University of Calcutta may be regarded as a continuation, based on a year's experience of Indian education, of the excellent address which he delivered at the Convocation of 1899. In his first address to the University the Viceroy sought to defend the Indian educational system and the results of its operation from the somewhat unsparing criticism to which they were being subjected, and he indicated that in his opinion the Supreme Government was not exercising as genuine a supervision over education as it ought to exercise. In his recent address he dwelt at considerable length on both these points.

Speaking more particularly to the graduates, Lord Curzon said he wondered whether they had ever paused to ask themselves what was the object of the examinations they had passed and of the teaching that had enabled them to pass them. He hoped they did not look at the matter exclusively from the utilitarian point of view. He admitted that it was quite a legitimate and even an honourable object to acquire knowledge which had a definite market value, and to use it for the purpose of obtaining employment; but he said it would be an insult to knowledge to regard it as a means to an end or employment as the only end to be obtained by it. The ultimate justification of our educational system, Lord Curzon said, was the moulding of the character of students into a higher moral and intellectual type. Those on whom it had this effect would become not only better pleaders, clerks, journalists, or officials, but would become finer specimens of men. They would inspire others by their example and would elevate and purify the tone of the society to which they belonged or the administration of which they formed part.

So far as university education was concerned, said Lord Curzon, this aspect of it was invested in India with an interest greater than in

any other country. In English and other Western universities young men were taught to a large extent in foreign and even in dead languages, and to some extent in subjects which were of value rather as a mental discipline than as a practical accomplishment. But with all the variety and the transience of the subject-matter, the thoughts, the precepts, the ideas, and the framework of the knowledge communicated were not essentially different from those of the modern world. Much the same conceptions of liberty and patriotism were contained in an oration of Demosthenes as in a speech of Burke; the philosophy of history was as profound in the pages of Thucydides as in those of Gibbon; the same problems of mental and moral science were examined by Plato and Aristotle as by Berkeley and Spencer; and the moral forces that governed the world were not less clearly shadowed forth by the Greek tragedians than by Milton and Wordsworth. In India all was different. The subjects of instruction and examination in Indian universities were not merely expressed in a foreign language but they represented foreign ideas and foreign modes of thought. Well might an intelligent observer look to see what would be the issue, and well might he wonder whether the result of the attempt to combine the native and the foreign would be fusion or discord. Above all he would ask what was the effect being produced upon individual character and upon the aggregate of individual characters that that made up the national character of the East, by a curriculum borrowed almost exclusively from the West. When the two intellectual streams met—the positive, the synthetic, and the practical: and the imaginative, the metaphysical, and the analytic—did they run side by side in the same channel, their characters separate and intact, or did they mix their waters in a fresh and homogeneous current, with an identity and a character of its own?

In regard to this question, Lord Curzon said, much might be advanced on both sides. There were those who would urge that the speculative side of the human intellect did not easily assimilate the positive method, and that reflectiveness was incompatible with action. They would argue that a veneer of Western learning and culture on an Oriental substratum furnished a flimsy and unstable fabric; that it was impossible to amalgamate the subtlety and acumen of the East with the more robust and masculine standards of the West; and that the more complete the illusory and ephemeral success of the experiment the more violent would be the recoil and the more disastrous the consequences. Lord Curzon said there was some truth in this, but he maintained that it was far from being the whole truth. Every one, he said, was familiar with the half-denationalised type of humanity who had lost the virtues of his own system while he had only assimilated the vices of another; but this type, even if he existed in large numbers in this country, was not peculiar to this country, and was not the normal and inevitable product

of the amalgamation of East and West. Speaking for himself Lord Curzon said that his feelings were exactly of an opposite character. He was surprised, not at the egregiousness of the failures, but at the quality and number of the successes. He was struck, he said, by the extent to which, within less than fifty years, the science and learning of the Western world had penetrated the Oriental mind, teaching it independence of judgment and liberty of thought, and familiarising it with conceptions of politics and law and society to which it had for centuries been a stranger. During the time that had elapsed since the Education Despatch of 1854 the progress achieved had been not slow but startlingly rapid. It might be said that as yet only the topmost layer of society had been affected, but nothing more could be expected in such a short space of time. This, however, was a very important achievement.

But, said Lord Curzon, whether his views on this matter were right or wrong, the die had been cast and there was to be no going back. And as for himself he preferred to think that the choice which had been made had been justified. The reason for his confidence, he said, did not lie in the intrinsic merits of the education that was being given nor even in the eternal value of its truths. It consisted in the effect which that education was capable of producing and had already produced upon character and morals, and upon the standards of honour, honesty, justice, duty, and upright dealing between man and man. There were faults in the present system, which were manifest to all, and abuses against which those responsible for the working of the system had to be on their guard. Chief among these, Lord Curzon said, was the tendency, inevitable wherever independence of reason was inculcated in a community that had long been a stranger to it, to chafe against the restraints, to question the motives, and to impugn the prestige, of authority. This, he said, was a dangerous tendency, against which Young India needed particularly to be on her guard. For the admission of independence was a very different thing from the denial of authority. The truest independence existed where authority was least assailed, and almost the first symptom of enlightenment was the recognition of discipline. The ignorance of these conditions was a malady with which a society still in a comparatively early stage of intellectual emancipation was apt to be afflicted; but while it might give cause for anxiety, it need not, if carefully prescribed for, excite alarm. Its existence in India ought not to make men close their eyes to the great benefits that were being conferred on the country by higher education.

With a few words on the extension of the range of human knowledge by original study, experiment, and research, and with a reference to the enlightened munificence of Mr. Tata of Bombay and the devotion to science displayed by Dr. Sircar of Calcutta, Lord Curzon proceeded in conclusion to give an outline of what the policy of the Supreme

Government in regard to education as a whole would be. Owing to the multitude of questions with which he had had to deal he said he had not yet been able to carry into full effect the views to which he gave expression in his previous address. He had not, however, allowed the matter to slip from his mind. There were two considerations, he said, by which any sensible man must be affected who attempted to handle the educational problem in India. The first of these was the desirability of ascertaining by consultation with those who had devoted their lives to education and who might fairly be called experts what was the trend of authoritative opinion on the subject. The second was the desirability of surveying the field of education for the purpose of discovering and removing whatever obstacles might stand in the way of the reformer. This matter, Lord Curzon said, had largely occupied his attention during the past year, as various Government Resolutions that had seen the light bore witness. Though he was strongly in favour of higher education he was no friend of those who argued that primary education could be neglected. On the contrary he was one of those who thought that as time passed secondary and higher education should become more and more a field for private effort and should demand less and less of Government intervention and control. Primary education, on the other hand, could never lose its priority of claim upon the interest and support of the State. That Government would but imperfectly discharge its duties, which, while it provided for the relatively intelligent and literate minority, ignored its obligation to the great unlettered mass of the population and left it to lie in contented ignorance. Some of the Local Governments had been neglecting their duty in this matter, as they had also been shrinking from taking their full share of responsibility in matters affecting the practical carrying on of education. From all this, said Lord Curzon, he had come to the conclusion that a closer supervision of education was required and a more effective control. He did not wish it to be supposed, however, that he had any intention of departing from what since 1854 had always been the mainspring of the educational policy of the Government of India, *viz*, the substitution, where possible, of Government aid for Government management, and the encouragement of private initiative and effort. But the grant-in-aid system from the start involved as its corollary a due measure of State inspection and control; and to call upon the State to pay for education out of the public funds but to divest itself of responsibility for their proper allocation to the purposes which the State had in view in giving them, was to ignore the elementary obligations for which the State existed. "My desire, therefore," said Lord Curzon, in conclusion, "is to re-vindicate on behalf of the State and its various Provincial agents that responsibility which there has been a tendency to abdicate, and to show to the world that our educational system in India, liberal and elastic as I

would have it to remain, is yet not free to assume any promiscuous shape that accident or intention may force upon it, but must conform to a scientific and orderly scheme, for which in the last resort the Supreme Government should be held accountable whether it be for praise or for blame."

In his first Convocation address Lord Curzon inspired confidence by saying that though he had been in India long enough to find out that everything pertaining to education was not perfect, he had not been in the country long enough to dogmatise as to how perfection was to be attained. The address which we have just summarised contains much to encourage those who have for long been fighting for due recognition of the principles laid down in the Education Despatch of 1854 and in the Report of the Indian Education Commission. In this Presidency in particular the Viceroy's determination to find out the trend of authoritative opinion on any question by consultation with those who have devoted their lives to education will be hailed with much satisfaction.

THERE is nothing particularly noteworthy in the statistics contained in the Report on Public Instruction in the Madras Presidency for 1898-99. There was a small increase, as compared with the previous year, in the number of educational institutions, and a slightly larger increase in the number of pupils in attendance; but, as has been noticed for some years, there seems to be a distinct tendency for private institutions to advance at the expense of public institutions. It is said that in the year under review advance was retarded by want of funds, the after-effects of famine and scarcity in several districts, and the apprehension of an epidemic of plague. Taking public and private institutions together, it is estimated that the boys in attendance in 1898-99 formed 27.1 per cent. of the male population of school-going age, and that the corresponding percentage in the case of girls was 4.6. There was a substantial advance in the number of Panchama boys and girls under instruction. There was a slight increase in the receipts from school fees, but the average fee per scholar was the same as in 1897-98. It is interesting to note that the average fee per scholar for the last two years was 6 annas less than the average fee for the quinquennium ending with the year 1886-87, and 5 annas less than the average fee for the following quinquennium. It was slightly greater, however, than the average fee for the quinquennium ending with the year 1896-97.

The question of fee income is one to which the Director has been repeatedly asked to give his attention since the abolition of the fee notification in 1892; and Dr. Duncan, who was largely responsible for the abolition of that notification, enters in the present Report into a somewhat detailed discussion of the question. We regret to have to say that the defence of the present system which he has put forward is not only

altogether unconvincing, but that it is wanting in candour and fairness. A single instance will make this clear. Dealing with the levy of fees in aided colleges in the Report for 1897-98, he admitted that by taking students at reduced rates or as full free scholars managers deliberately deprived themselves of the sum of Rs. 26,000, or 20 per cent. of the total actual fee income of aided colleges. He omitted, however, to state that there were some colleges, and among them one which collected nearly 40 per cent. of the fees levied in aided colleges, to which his statement did not apply. In the Report before us the loss of fee income resulting from the admission of students at reduced rates or as full free scholars is said to have amounted to about Rs. 59,000; but, while the fall in the fee income relatively to the variation in the number in attendance is given in the case of a few colleges, it is said to be unnecessary to give particulars for each college, "since for purposes of comparison averages for groups of institutions only are and must be taken into account." In a matter of so great importance we should have thought a full and clear analysis of the figures for the different colleges would have been the first step towards reform. It surely cannot be that the Department has any desire to make well-conducted institutions suffer for the shortcomings of those which are responsible for the present demoralisation in education. And yet it is a fact, we believe, that a college which levies fees at the 'standard rates' may receive a smaller percentage of its total expenditure in grants-in-aid than a college which charges even less than half the 'standard' rates.

There are some other statements in the discussion of the question of fee income which seem to us to obscure rather than to elucidate the points at issue, and indeed the whole discussion is a piece of special pleading in which the bearing of many important facts which were familiar or ought to have been familiar to the late Director has been obscured or even ignored. In the concluding paragraph of the Report Dr. Duncan says that he always endeavoured to keep a perfectly open mind and to welcome light from whatever quarter it might come; and we are sure that all who went to him in order to express their views on educational questions found him a most sympathetic listener. But on the question of the levy of fees, on which light had been shed abundantly, he either did not choose to walk in the light or he was not free to walk in it.

Whatever may have been the case in this matter we know that the late Director was not always free to choose his policy, and that in some cases the policy which he would have chosen was better than the policy which he was compelled to adopt. We have good reason to believe that he was opposed to the most objectionable of the additions which it was proposed to make to the grant-in-aid code; and our only regret is

that he did not take up a stronger position in regard to them than he seems to have done.

In a paragraph introductory to the present Report Dr. Duncan passes in review some of the more important measures, which have engaged the attention of the Department during his tenure of office as Director or are still under consideration. As might be expected, he has something to say in defence of the Primary and Lower Secondary Examinations. In regard to the tendency of so many pupils to appear at public examinations, he remarks that while it is accompanied with certain evil effects, it is better to endure these evils for a time than by departmental or Government enactment to forbid pupils from appearing. To adopt the latter course, he says, is to deprive the community of the need for forming an intelligent opinion of its own, and to check that growth of self-reliance and self-government which all profess to have so much at heart. These words, in which there seems to be a tinge of bitterness, explain Dr. Duncan's attitude in other questions besides the question of examinations. He did not, it appears to us, realise the true significance of the fact that while many persons can be led into the right path others must be driven into it, and either he did not recognise with sufficient clearness the principle of giving the utmost freedom of action to those who have shown that they can exercise their freedom well, and at the same time bringing pressure to bear on those who refuse to work harmoniously with others in the general interest of education, or he shrank from the responsibility of applying the necessary pressure.

In the Government Order on the Report there is one serious mistake. It is stated that each student in a Government college cost the State Rs. 339, and each student in an aided college Rs. 162. These sums represent the *total cost* of a student in a Government college and the *total cost* of a student in an aided college respectively. In connection with the question of injudicious promotions the Government says the Director "should consider whether it would be well to prescribe a minimum proportion of a class to be sent up for examination." The suggestion seems to us to be altogether impracticable.

AN interesting meeting was held in Calcutta in January last in connection with a conference of the Bishops of the Church of England holding jurisdiction in India and Ceylon. The Metropolitan had arranged that there should be a meeting which Hindus and other non-Christians should be invited to attend, and that certain of the bishops should address the meeting.

In opening the proceedings Bishop Welldon explained the object of the meeting. He and his colleagues, he said, were there as bishops of the Church of Christ. They did not, however, as being bishops, claim any spiritual right over their hearers, they only desired to offer them

their counsel as one man might offer counsel to another. But he wished to begin the meeting with prayer, and he therefore asked the audience to stand while he said the Lord's Prayer—a prayer, he remarked, that belonged to the Christian religion but which expressed the thoughts and aspirations of all religiously-minded men.

The Bishop of Colombo then addressed the meeting. He did so, he said, with considerable deference and with feelings of great and sincere respect for the thoughtful, religious, and ancient people of whom the greater portion of his audience were the representatives. He was aware that in what he would say to them much that appeared certain to him would appear doubtful and uncertain to them, and he would present to them his own views with the greatest deference. The subject on which he wished to speak was the bearing of religious beliefs on a sense of responsibility. Looking, then, at the world as it was, at life as it was, and at what was valuable in man as he was situated, what was it that brought out the good qualities in man? Though action was not the end of religion, it was the outcome of it, and it would be readily admitted that a religion that did not bring out the best qualities in man could have little good in it. In Christianity, said Bishop Coplestone, there was a powerful influence to draw out a sense of duty in men. No religion had a monopoly of the idea of a man doing his duty, but the Christian religion had in it that which stimulated to a high sense of responsibility, for the Christian was taught that he was accountable not only for everything he did or said but for every idle word he spoke. The Christian, further, owed his responsibility to a personal loving Father; and, said Bishop Coplestone, it seemed to him impossible that there should be a high sense of duty where the idea of a personal God did not exist. So also the belief that this life was but one life in a series of lives appeared to him to make the pressing home of a sense of responsibility very difficult.

The Bishop of Lucknow next spoke on the witness of the Christian Church to the permanence of the life of the soul after death, and he was followed by the Bishop of Lahore, who spoke on the lessons to be derived from the resurrection of Christ. The last speaker was the Metropolitan himself.

It was a remarkable fact in the history of Calcutta, Bishop Welldon said, that a non-Christian audience should be willing to listen to Christian addresses from men who if known to them at all were known as bishops of Christ's Church, and still more remarkable that those who spoke in Christ's name should be able to address those who were non-Christians without uttering any word that could cause just pain or offence to any one. A brighter day, he said, was dawning on religion in Calcutta and throughout India. Christians and non-Christians were coming to understand each other better.

In religion, said Bishop Welldon, there were only two courses that were thoroughly cowardly. One was for men to be afraid to hear the arguments of men with whom they did not agree, the other for men to be afraid of following their convictions. As for the first of these, Bishop Welldon said he knew the educated men of Calcutta were ready to listen to such arguments as Christians might advance in their Master's name. And Christians were no less willing to hear non-Christians. They translated the Bible, but they also translated the Sacred Books of India, and sought to learn their contents. They believed that by the free rivalry of religions the truth would be attained; and they believed also that the attainment of the truth would lead first individuals and then bodies of men in India to accept the religion of Jesus Christ. Those only, however, were worthy of receiving God's truth who were willing to hear it and prepared to follow it.

Bishop Welldon asked his audience to bear with him a little while he explained the mission of Christianity to India and what seemed to him to constitute the greatness of the Christian faith. He said it could not be denied by any fair-minded person that if the work of the Christian missionaries during the last hundred years could be blotted out from this land, then India would lose a great treasure which she now possessed in their sanctified labours for such causes as education, charity, and social reform, and in an exalted and sanctified moral sense. India, he said, could not afford to lose the faith of Jesus Christ, and she would be a poorer and less happy land if those who professed the religion of Christ were not in her midst. With these remarks on the debt which India owed to Christianity, Bishop Welldon proceeded to explain the relation of the person of Christ to the Christian faith, and commended the life and teaching of Christ to the consideration of his non-Christian hearers. He asked them in conclusion to follow the star of their consciences, the God-given guide which pointed the way in every heart, the monitor which told every one that, however much men might differ in religious opinions, there were some facts about which they did not differ at all. It was better to be good than to be evil, better to be just than to be unjust, better to be pure than to be impure, better to suffer affliction, if need be, with the children of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season. To every man Bishop Welldon gave the advice to follow the star of his conscience. It might lead him to the Saviour, in whom the hopes of all hearts were fulfilled, and to him, as to the wise man of old, the finding of the Saviour might prove a joy exceeding great.

As in the previous year the presence of Mrs. Besant was the chief attraction at the meetings held towards the end of December last in connection with the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Theosophical Society.

Mrs. Besant chose the theory and significance of the *avatâras* as the subject of her morning lectures, and according to the official report she handled it with "her accustomed fiery eloquence," and held her audience "spell-bound."

The address delivered by the President-Founder at the opening of the Twenty-fourth Annual Convention of the Society contains very little that is noteworthy. Colonel Olcott spoke of the past year as having been a prosperous one, and remarked that disaster had begun to fall upon the party that had seceded in 1895. He had a good deal to say about the Hindu Central College, Benares, and about the educational work carried on by the Society in Ceylon and among the Panchamas of Madras. In regard to the work in Ceylon, however, he had to regret the indifference of some of those who had helped him to start it; and in regard to the work among Panchamas he said that certain difficulties had arisen which at present hindered progress. Many valuable additions were made to the Oriental Department of the Adyar Library during the past year, and the preparation of a Descriptive Catalogue has been begun. Twenty-eight new charters were issued and a French Section was formed. Altogether 570 charters had been issued at the close of 1899.

Colonel Olcott said he was to start soon on his second tour round the world. His intention is to visit the branches of the Society in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, France, and the United States of America. He will return to India in time for the next convention, which is to be held at Benares. The visitation of branches seems to be a very important part of the work of those who are leading in the theosophical movement, for the sectional reports show that the smaller branches are very apt to get into a dormant condition, and America is not the only country in which a tendency to internal dissension seems to have shown itself.

SCIENTIFIC AND LITERARY JOTTINGS.

A VERY grave case of snake-bite which was successfully treated with antivenene serum is described in the *British Medical Journal* by Major S. J. Rennie. The patient was a boy who had been badly bitten by a snake, and was to all intents and purposes dead before being treated. Major Rennie, in his remarks on the case, says that it proves that no matter how acute the symptoms, or how far advanced the effects of the poison, it is never too late to use the antidote. He adds that the case also proves that the antivenene keeps well, as the serum which he used had been in his possession in the plains for nearly four years.

THE problem of the utilisation of domestic refuse seems to have been successfully solved at Shoreditch. The refuse is burned there in specially designed furnaces and generates steam in a number of water-tube boilers. No coal or other fuel is mixed with it, but a forced-air draught is supplied to the fires by electrically-driven fans. The steam generated in the boilers is disposed of mainly by engines attached to electric generators, though a small portion is supplied for clothes-washing purposes to the public baths and wash-houses adjoining the electricity works. Exhaust steam is also supplied to the baths and free library, which are entirely heated in this way.

THE researches of Professor Emil Fischer on uric acid show that it is closely related to theobromine, theophylline, and caffeine, the physiologically active constituents of tea, coffee, and cocoa. Some time ago it was shown by Strecker that xanthine could be methylated and converted into theobromine, and, by a repetition of the same process, to theophylline and caffeine. Professor Fischer has now shown that uric acid can be reduced to xanthine, and consequently to theobromine, &c. This result is not only of great interest to physiologists, but seems likely to be of considerable therapeutic importance, and may even be of commercial value.

THE first few weeks of 1900 with their epidemic of influenza have proved very fatal to English writers and thinkers. It seldom happens, fortunately, that the deaths of three such distinguished men as Dr. Martineau, Mr. Ruskin, and Mr. Blackmore, have to be chronicled practically simultaneously. They were all old men, Dr. Martineau being 94, Mr. Ruskin 80, and Mr. Blackmore 75, and it is specially from the ranks of the aged that influenza carries off its victims.

To Mr. Ruskin we referred last month. Dr. Martineau is known to all students of philosophy as the author of *Types of Ethical Theory*, and he had long occupied a foremost place in the ranks of English religious and philosophical thinkers. Mr. Blackmore is probably best known as the author of *Lorna Doone*, a novel which did for parts of Devonshire what Sir Walter Scott's writings did for the Highlands of Scotland. The continued popularity of *Lorna Doone* is testified to by the fact that a short time ago 150,000 copies of a sixpenny edition of it were rapidly bought up. Mr. Blackmore wrote a good many other novels, some of which were most excellent, but none of them took the popular fancy like *Lorna Doone*, the overshadowing popularity of which is said to have really become a source of annoyance to its author.

Several other less distinguished but well known writers have died during the past few weeks. Among these may be mentioned Canon Dixon, the friend of Burne-Jones and Morris, one of the founders with them of

the *Oxford and Cambridge Magazine*, a poet, and the author of a *History of the Church of England*; Mr. C. P. Mason whose *English Grammar* has long been regarded with reason as one of the best English grammars in existence; and Mr. W. E. Tirebuck, a successful journalist and novelist.

More recently the death has been announced of Sir W. W. Hunter, the well-known author of many works on India and Indian subjects. Sir W. W. Hunter's death appears to have been somewhat sudden, for in a recent number of the *Athenæum* he is mentioned as having presided at a meeting of the Asiatic Society, of which he was Vice-President. Among the many important duties performed by Sir W. W. Hunter when an official in India probably the most important was that of presiding over the meetings of the Education Commission.

THE *Academy* has for the past year or two been in the habit of awarding, at the beginning of each year, a prize to the book which it considers most deserving of being 'crowned' as the book of the previous year. This year it has somewhat extended the scope of its awards to authors and has divided its prize of one hundred and fifty guineas into six portions, which have been allotted to six books "representing various branches of literature, notable for promise, sincerity, and thoroughness in literary art." The books chosen for honour in this way are:—poetry: *The Wind Among the Reeds*, by Mr. W. B. Yeats; fiction: *On Trial*, by 'Zack' (Miss Gwendoline Keats); biography: *Danton: a Study*, by Mr. Hilaire Belloc; history: *England in the Age of Wycliffe*, by Mr. G. M. Trevelyan; translation: Mrs. Garnett's translations of the novels of Turgenev; miscellaneous: *The Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century*, by Mr. H. G. Graham.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

THREE of the articles in the *Contemporary Review* for February are devoted to matters connected with the war in South Africa. Though more recent events seem to put them out of date, yet they deserve consideration. We are too apt to conclude that all's well that ends well and neglect the lessons taught by hard experience. In the first article 'Miles' severely criticises the officers of our army. Many of them have, he says constantly and systematically ignored the most commonplace experiences of war, and exposed our men to horrible slaughter

under totally unnecessary conditions. They seem to have taken their principles of war from Rudyard Kipling's "Fuzzy-Wuzzy". On the Boer side, on the other hand, some one or other has applied at least to a large part of the Boer tactics the wide experience of the past. 'Miles' gives a sketch of Jackson's wonderful campaigns in the American Civil War as an illustration of how war should be conducted. The characteristic of all Jackson's strategy was that he invariably endeavoured to attack and almost always succeeded in attacking his enemy where they did

not expect him, and that in every instance he so acted as to oblige them to conform to his movements and in no instance did he conform to theirs. Our officers, 'Miles' says, appear to make no study of the lessons of the past, and consequently their leading, however brave, is lacking in intelligence.

In the last article Mr. H. W. Massingham also utters 'A Cry for Capacity'. He says that nothing has emerged more clearly from the present crisis than the essential deficiency on the intellectual side of a nation strong indeed and wholesome in character but poorly represented in almost every department of mental activity. The army remains largely an aristocratic preserve and the valour of this class does not compensate for its want of seriousness. The public encourages bravery instead of brains. Our schools and universities are federations of athletic clubs and act less as intellectual centres than as schools in the art of social and political advancement.

The Hon. Auberon Herbert recounts the unfortunate misunderstandings, foolish pretensions, high-handedness, and wrongheadedness on both sides which form 'The Tragedy of Errors' in South Africa. He throws the blame of the deadlock in the negotiations between Mr. Chamberlain and the Transvaal Government on Sir A. Milner, who sent Mr. Chamberlain two telegrams from Mr. Conyngham Greene without explaining that one of them was private, and thus misled him into treating as part of a definite agreement what had only been the subject of private conversation. This aroused the suspicions of the Boers and gave a wrong twist to the negotiations, and so we blundered into a war which might easily have been avoided by the use of common sense and patience on both sides.

In reply to Sir W. Besant's attack on him for his criticism of Rudyard Kipling Mr. R. Buchanan says that Sir Walter fails to see that far higher issues than those of mere writing and selling books underlie the question of morality in literature—that literature indeed, although only a part of life, only fulfils its function

when it is the noblest and purest part of it; and he maintains that under one condition only is the slaying of our fellow-men justifiable, or at least pardonable—the condition of righteous self-defence. The view of 'The Ethics of Criticism' presented by Mr. Buchanan seems reasonable. If a man believes that the influence of any author is pernicious, it may be his duty to denounce him. The public good is of more consequence than the private income and credit of the author. To assume that the critic is animated by envy and malice is mere impertinence; to assume that he is necessarily wrong because the crowd is against him is mere stupidity. But if the slaying of our fellow-men is pardonable when done in righteous self-defence, surely it is still more justifiable when done in righteous defence of others in as far as altruism is higher than egoism.

Mr. R. Wardlaw Thompson thinks our Government has made a poor bargain in the arrangement by which Samoa has been handed over to Germany, and he asks the question whether the transference of the subject peoples of the world by one Power to another altogether without regard to the wishes of the people themselves is quite in accord with Christian ideas of duty.

Some light is thrown on the state of the law with regard to 'Good-stuffs as Contraband of War' by Mr. T. Barclay, member of the Institute of International Law. Contraband is of two kinds: absolute contraband, such as arms, ammunition, &c., and conditional contraband, consisting of articles such as food, which are fit for but not necessarily of direct application to hostile uses. It is with regard to this latter kind of contraband that there is difference of opinion. The Institute of International Law after many years of controversy in 1896 declared conditional contraband abolished, but added, "Nevertheless the belligerent has at his option, and on condition of paying an equitable indemnity, a right of sequestration or pre-emption as to articles, which, on their way to a port of the enemy, may serve in war or in peace."

In continuance of his article in the

January issue of the *Contemporary*, Professor Conway gives an account of the new methods of research applied to the study of Indo-European origins in the epoch-making work of Kretschmer. Mr. Norman Hapgood contributes an article on the great art critic, Eugène Fomentin. Mr. Philip Alexander Bruce describes the condition of the negro in the Southern States of America. He makes him out to be very dark indeed in all respects. Freedom has not improved him. Loss of contact with the white population has led to physical, mental, and moral deterioration. The profound antipathy which the white population feel for him is explained by the disgusting crime of rape, which was almost unknown in old days, but has become frightfully common of recent years.

There is a great deal of interesting information in an article by Miss Ada Cone on 'French Women in Industry'. Up to the end of the thirteenth century French women were comparatively free in industries, but about that time Judaism and Romanism undid the work of pure Christianity. From the thirteenth century to near the end of the eighteenth century all trades were in the hands of men. Even the right to make women's garments for wages was reserved exclusively to men. To-day, however, there is a larger proportion of women (in industry) who earn their living than of men who earn their living; and wherever art and handicraft enter as values there the greatest number of women is found. The art industries still in the hands of men are stationary or in decadence, while those in the hands of women are in a state of great prosperity.

Miss Frances Power Cobbe gives 'Recollections of James Martineau', whom she describes as the sage of the nineteenth century. One of the most remarkable things about Martineau was that though he lived to extreme old age he never ceased to grow. His erudition was wonderfully deep and varied; but it was always subordinate to his wisdom, which was built on it rather than of it. His tone was not that of a pro-

phet or of a priest but of a guide. He was extremely tender-hearted and sympathetic, and, unlike Newman, always ready to lend his help to any cause which met his approval. He regarded Bain, and the philosophical school to which he belonged, with great distrust. Miss Cobbe and her friends used to speak of the Bain and the antidote. Mr. Philip H. Wicksteed also contributes 'Personal Impressions of Dr. Martineau'.

THE *Nineteenth Century* with great timeliness reproduces an article by the late General Sir George Chesney entitled 'The "Confusion Worse Confounded" at the War Office'. The article was originally published in 1891, and is remarkable in so far as its warnings are now, nine years after, being fulfilled before our eyes. The article is prefaced with an introduction from the pen of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, who explains the outlines of a scheme of army reorganisation. It seems now beyond all doubt that the country has attempted to run a vast imperial business on insufficient capital, and it is of the most vital importance for the future of the Empire that the country should now be thoroughly awakened from its somnolent and insecure condition. The scheme originally propounded by Sir George Chesney, and now reiterated and expounded by Mr. Wilkinson, refers, not to the raising of an army, but to the general management of the army when raised. It deals with the relation of the Commander-in-Chief to the Administrator-General, and with the relations of these to Parliament on the one hand and to the various departments on the other. The scheme propounded should be, we presume will be, carefully considered by experts.

Of more practical importance to the general public is an article on the Militia by the Right Hon'ble Sir Herbert Maxwell. The writer discusses the problem "how the national resources shall be disposed so as to provide a mobile force adequate and always ready for any emergency that may arise within the limits of the Empire, without dangerously denuding the home defence." That the resources are adequate there can be no

doubt. The difficulty at present is not to obtain volunteers, but how gracefully to refuse offers of help. The Militia at present is roughly a body of 125,000 men. This is capable of indefinite expansion if efforts are made to render service in the Militia more attractive. It is worth noting that Sir Herbert Maxwell holds that the ballot, which it is now proposed to resume, is not necessary. He holds, and probably holds rightly, that if sufficient inducements are held out, the Militia may be immensely enlarged.

First of all he would propose to discard the name 'Militia' and use the name 'Reserve Battalions', a suggestion of much value. For it is a simple matter of fact that for the past twenty or thirty years it has been recognised that few but the loafers and lower classes generally have cared to connect themselves with the Militia. Other changes are suggested, such as dress and general recognition, all of which will prove helpful. But we question if these changes would suffice. More important than all these would be, we imagine, a higher rate of pay. This with the other advantages, combined with the enthusiasm now awakened in the country, would in all probability be sufficient for some time to come. They certainly should be tried before the ballot is resorted to.

An article of great interest is one contributed by Colonel Lonsdale Hale on 'Our Peace Training for War. Guilty or not Guilty?' Many critics have contended that the peace training of the last quarter of a century has proved inadequate. Since we have been so long foiled and outmanœuvred in South Africa, the contention is not unnatural.

An examination, however, of our disasters in South Africa proves that some of them at least were due not to the peace training, but to neglect of it. Sir William Gatacre is a type of the modern highly-educated general officer. At a Kriegsspiel in London two years ago General Gatacre, who was acting as umpire, called the commanding officer of the attacking force and asked him at 4-30 P.M. what he now proposed to do. "Attack," was the reply. "No," said the

General, "you have marched your troops for some hours, you have not halted them, or allowed them to cook, it is late, you will defer the attack until to-morrow morning." But General Gatacre did not act so at Stormberg. Nor was peace training responsible for the affair at Nicholson's Nek. Two battalions and a mule-carried mountain battery set out at night along a road that led through the hills. No cavalry accompanied the column, and thus the scouts ahead prescribed by the peace-training were non-existent. The disaster to General Wauchope's Brigade was, however, a different matter. In that case the troops marched in quarter column almost right up to the guns. Now this is in exact accordance with the instructions laid down in Part VIII. of *Infantry Drill*, 1896. The lesson is that this rule is an anachronism, and must at once be expunged from the Drill-book. Another criticism of the Drill-book is directed against the place it gives to field entrenching. This all-important feature in modern warfare has been largely neglected in our peace training, though it has been demonstrated more than once that it is of the very highest importance in modern warfare.

It may be remembered that in the January number of this Magazine we gave the substance of a somewhat remarkable article by Dr. Mivart on 'The Continuity of Catholicism', and pointed out that he was hardly justified in his claim that the Romish Church maintained a continuity of doctrine while at the same time she allowed the greatest breadth and laxity in belief. Dr. Mivart claimed that great changes had come over the belief of Romanists, but they had come gradually and without official recognition, and they had caused no disruption and therefore no breach of continuity in the doctrine of the Church. He rejoiced in the remarkable freedom of belief permissible within her pale. The answer to Dr. Mivart appears in the present number of the *Nineteenth Century* from the pen of the Rev. Father Clarke, S. J.

The Jesuit Father declares that the article is "one that will be read

with sorrow and distress by every loyal and well-instructed Catholic throughout the English-speaking world, not so much on account of the harm that its startling and extraordinary statements are calculated to do to the cause of truth, as for the state of the writer himself, and the grave scandal that he has given by the wild theories and extremely ill-sounding propositions that he has put forward." Dr. Mivart, he says, knows no theology, and does not understand what is meant by continuity of Catholicism. "No jot or tittle of Catholic dogma can ever be changed or modified in its original meaning." Father Clarke goes on to declare that Dr. Mivart is not and never has been a Catholic at all. Though in the Church he has never been of it. Which of the combatants represents the real attitude of the Roman Catholic Church has been shown since this article was written. Dr. Mivart has been condemned by the Church, and once again it has been shown that freedom of belief when openly expressed is not tolerated within her pale.

Mr. R. B. Townshend contributes an interesting talk which he calls 'Some Stray Shots and a Moral'. The substance of the talk concerns shooting, chiefly in the Red Indian country, and the moral is the importance of teaching boys the art of rapid shooting with an air-gun. One should act as time-keeper, while the other loads, fires, and loads again as rapidly and with as much accuracy as can be attained by practice. Nine shots a minute is rapid work. "I have seen," he says, "ten shots fired in the time, and every shot hit the ring. You may be sure that any one who can do that would be an uncomfortably formidable opponent behind a Lee-Metford." Boys will love Mr. Townshend for this suggestion.

Other articles that may be read with interest are Sir Algernon West's account of 'The Two Reports of the Licensing Commission'; Mr. Henry Wallis's 'Ancient Egyptian Ceramic Art'; 'Neutrals and the War', by Mr. John Macdonell, C.B.; and the regular monthly diary on the

'Newspapers' by Sir Wemyss Reid. The last, which is for January, is not cheerful reading. We anticipate that the February talk will have another tone.

THE war is bound to claim its articles month by month, and some of them contain little that is new; but the *Fortnightly* has managed to gather some freshness round the subject. One article entitled 'A Lance for the French' deals with the attitude of France to England in connection with the Boer war. The irritation, says Mr. Thomas Barclay, the writer of the article, dates from the Fashoda affair. The middle and upper classes were chagrined that France should have had to accept an ultimatum. The bitterness of that incident had not passed away when there came the Dreyfus affair. In this matter France got no sympathy from England, and it was an affair that was far more than a mere trial. France was in danger of being hopelessly divided into violent opposing factions because of the clerical, military, and Jewish interests that were involved in the question. England looked only to the way in which the trial was conducted, and did not see how pressing was the need of a speedy solution of the question for France at almost any cost. Mr. Barclay says that really we have no good ground for being irritated at the French, and not only that, but we actually owe to France all that graces and adorns existence. France, on her part, ought to remember that England is the purchaser of 32 per cent. of all she exports to foreign countries. Such considerations ought not to embitter France and England, but rather to unite the two countries.

Another fresh article is one on 'The Dutch Church and the Boers', by the Rev. W. Greswell. The Dutch clergy, with the power that they possess among their people, have done much to stir up hostility by their utterances; of that there can be no doubt. What are the reasons which have led the Dutch clergy to take up the attitude of opposition to the British? For one thing the Dutch Church used to be a privileged State Church, and all these privileges

went when Cape Colony came into the hands of Britain. And then the Dutch Church has never cordially adopted the spirit of the Slave Emancipation Act of 1834.

It is interesting to read what Mr. W. H. Mallock has to say on 'The Logic of Non-dogmatic Christianity' in the light of Dr. St. George Mivart's recent onsets upon authority. Mr. Mallock some time ago pointed out that the result of the Biblical criticism which is now so rife is fatal to the doctrinal position of every church but the Church of Rome. His contention was and is that, as the Church of Rome is founded on the principle of its own corporate living and continuous infallibility, it has nothing to fear from the criticism of Scripture. The question that Mr. Mallock now considers is whether Christianity without dogma has any reasonable claim to be called Christianity at all, indeed whether it is really a religion, and if it is a religion whether it is not a sign of Protestantism in its final stage of decomposition. Mr. Mallock's argument proceeds by way of a criticism of Mrs. Humphry Ward's statement that she is still entitled to be called a Christian though she believes that miracles never happen, that Christ was nothing more than man, and that the root of Christianity is a mere "human reality." He certainly fastens upon the weak point of Mrs. Ward's position. If Christ is simply one among many teachers who have come as 'revealers of the divine will, we deprive Him of any real authority. At least it is always possible to call what He said into question, and to ask whether on certain points His teaching was not the result of the conditions in which He lived. In so far as such doubts arise, so far is the authority of Christ impaired. Mrs. Ward would appeal to our moral sense as the proof of Christ's authority. Mr. Mallock says that Christianity becomes truly operative only when we abandon the feeling, and depend upon the intellectual knowledge, that it is true. It is this point that makes it possible for him to assert that Christianity requires not only a Christ who speaks with authority,

but also a society or church which will be the authoritative expounder of His teaching. One cannot but regret that Mr. Mallock should find it necessary to say that Christianity must have not only an authoritative Christ, but also an authoritative church. If Christ speaks with authority, what need is there for any society to fall back upon that authority? Much of Mr. Mallock's criticism is trenchant, and, we believe, true, but the appeal to an authoritative church is just as likely to lead to error as the appeal to an infallible book. Yet such appeals are sure to be made, and constantly repeated, so long as Christianity is presented as a bundle of truths requiring intellectual assent, and nothing more. The essence of Christ's authority surely lies in the power which He possesses to mould the life that comes into actual contact with Him, not simply to form belief or produce feelings, however right and proper these may be.

Judge O'Connor Morris writes on 'Wellington', his article being called forth by Sir Herbert Maxwell's recently published life of the great Duke. Mr. Morris praises that part of Sir H. Maxwell's book which deals with Wellington's connection with India—a part of his life which later became obscured by greater feats. It was in India, says Mr. Morris, that Wellington showed that he had the capacity of a statesman as well as of a soldier. The contrast between the two brothers was striking, and is thus put by the writer of the article:—"Lord Wellesley belonged to the class of our rulers in India who have carried out a policy of war and conquest; Wellington was an advocate of moderation, of a strict regard to good faith, of the respect for treaties, of, if possible, peace." In India he was far more averse to war than the men in civil life supreme in Calcutta. His most noble service in this land was the example he set of integrity in public service, and in the strenuous efforts which he made to put down corruption in all its forms. The effects of his efforts are even now apparent in a prestige which England would never have achieved in India if she

had been content to go on with the old system of presents and bribes. In the life as a statesman which Wellington lived after Waterloo, Sir H. Maxwell points out two dominant principles which do much to explain apparent inconsistencies in the Duke's career. One of these principles was that the Government of the king must be strong; the other, that the conduct of affairs must not be handed over to Whigs and Radicals, for the Whigs had sympathised with Napoleon. Thus he opposed parliamentary reform because he thought such reform was incompatible with a strong Government. Yet in 1832 he was ready to pass a large measure of parliamentary reform in order to drive Lord Grey from power, and thus to get the Tories once more at the head of affairs.

Dr. R. P. Scott contributes an article on 'The New Education Office and the Interests of the Empire'. He notices three ways in which the recently passed Education Act helps towards a better treatment of the problems connected with education. First, it provides for the amalgamation of the various central authorities now engaged in the superintendence of public education. Secondly, it provides for the appointment of a Consultative Committee, to consist of university men and men fitted to represent various educational interests. This Committee can advise the Board of Education when any matter is referred to it by the Board. Thirdly, the Act provides for the inspection of secondary schools. The new Education Office is to be divided into three parts, all under one permanent chief secretary, and severally undertaking the superintendence of the three great branches of education below the universities. The three natural divisions of the office would be Primary,

Science and Art and Technical, and Secondary. The danger in such division is that it may ignore the fact that a good higher technical education must rest upon a good secondary education, just as a technical education in its lower grades must rest upon a sound primary education. Some of Dr. Scott's closing remarks are worthy of note in this country. The new Act, he says, gives a blow to the old idea of the Government Department as an ideal wisacre, and sets up in its place the idea of "officials who would be none the less efficient as administrators in a free country for being, above all things, conscious of the complexity of the problem under their observation, aware of its bearing on other problems of national life and government, always therefore in the attitude of mind of the intelligent learner who by his questions teaches both himself and his informants, never satisfied with hearsay or reading only, but insisting on seeing the real facts at work, and while steadily working towards some aim, never unready to look ahead further still, and by discovering a basis of fundamental agreement to compose shallow rivalries, and to harmonise unnecessary antagonisms between different workers in the same field."

'The Ruskin Hall Movement' is described by Messrs. Dodd and Dale. In the recently established Ruskin Hall at Oxford labouring men are to be given a year's course which will give them an elementary knowledge of history, and political economy, and political science. In an article entitled 'The English Terence', Mr. G. Barnett Smith writes on Richard Cumberland, the novelist and dramatist. Canon MacColl replies to Mr. Dibdin's criticisms, and Major Griffiths writes upon 'The War Office'.