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# THE JAINA GAZETTE

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If I stoop  
Into a dark tremendous sea of cloud,  
It is but for a time. I press God's lamp,  
Close to my breast ; its splendour, soon or late,  
Will pierce the gloom. I shall emerge one day.

—Robert Browning.

## JAINA SIDDHANTA.

BY

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INDORE.

THE creed of the Tirthamkaras, is the truth and siddhanta ! Hence it is universal. True knowledge is always intended for the benefit of all mankind, of all living beings ! " The omniscients of old, the saints with souls which were purer than the purest ideals conceivable by men, and stronger than adamant in their body and more lustrous in the light of their souls than the sun or many suns, these saints saw these eternal principles of life and embodied them in their teachings. These teachings are for all souls high or low. There is no barrier of creed, caste, condition or colour to their investigation and adoption\* \* \* Truth is open; it will be ours. Only let us work for it and deserve it. And in our task the glorious Sri Nemi Chandrajī and before him Sri Umaswami (24 A.D.) and

Kundakundacharya (8 B. C.) are of the greatest help. Let them be published broadest, in all languages and in all countries, so that no one can say, "I want to see, but have no light," Jainas, you possess the gem and the light. Bring it out. Show the path to your brethern. If you do not, you *fail in your duty and characteristics as Jainas.*" True!!!

The light must not be hidden in the bushel ; it must be placed in the Light-house to guide the sailors in the dark sea of samsara. Our Sastras, the oysters of myriad pearls of knowledge, need, the labours of us all.

## AN URGENT AFFAIR.

### What is Jainism ?

THE grandeur and the glory of Jainism depend greatly on the vast bulk of Jaina literature in which are to be found some of the greatest and most sublime works on philosophy, ethics and religion, not to speak of the many masterpieces in the fields of poetry, history, grammar, lexicography, medicine and mathematics.

The important mines of Jaina Philosophy contain the rich and precious gems handed down to humanity out of compassion and infinite love by the four and twenty Tirthankaras of yore. These great Spiritual Victors crossed the sea of Samsara and while so doing they perceived millions of poor souls fretting and foaming in the dark, far and near in the troublous waters of the deep ocean of this mundane existence. It was they that showed the true Path of Salvation to the struggling humanity as consisting of Samyak Darsana, Samyak Jnana and Samyak Charitra.

This is the one only path leading to that ultimate Haven of peace and bliss, light and beauty. But may we ask as to how many are on this true path ? Or may we ask as to what measures have been taken to preach broadcast the existence of such a true path in Jainism ? How often has it been reiterated that the Jaina principles of Love and Universal fraternity are bound to have a great solacing influence on the struggling humanity ? Are there

not unmistakable evidences to show that all other systems of philosophy have failed to bestow permanent peace and bliss on this world ?

Are there not already unequivocal signs testifying to the enormous potency of the great basic principle of Jainism—namely the theory of *Ahimsa*—in the regions of politics, economics, sociology and religion ? Will not the Jains wake up at least now and see that the divine message of Love, Peace and Brotherhood of all living beings reaches the distant shores of the world and thus put an end to all the sin and strife, sickness and sorrow which so much embarrass the world now-a-days.

### The Question of Questions.

The one most important work which must be deemed as an urgent affair now is the preservation and propagation of the Jaina Siddhantha. Above everything else we believe that the honour, the life and existence, the rights and privileges of the Jains in future depend almost entirely on their present work in immortalising the Jaina Sacred Lore. It may be said with all emphasis at our command that the publication of the Jaina sacred books is bound to have far-reaching and invaluable and immense and salutary effects on the entire humanity as a whole to an extent and in a way perhaps as yet unthought of by any man at present.

### Viewed Variously.

It was Dr. Johannes Hertel, M.A., Ph. D. who wrote :—  
 “. . . India, on the civilisation and literature of which all my studies are concentrated and I am especially interested in Jain religion and Jain literature, the civilising influence of which on Jambudvipa is scarcely able to be overvalued. I am really full of admiration for the noble work which monks and laymen are doing for the welfare of India, and one of the noblest works which laymen may possibly do is to enable the Jain Scholars to publish the huge mass of excellent Jain books which must perish if they are not preserved by printing.

“Your aim to publish the Siddhanta with its commentaries is indeed a work which is much wanted and desired for by western as

well as by eastern scholars. May Saraswati the Goddess of learning, protect your work, in order that the holy books of the Jains may be printed in good and beautiful editions as they deserve."

".....Jain literature is *by far* superior to that of the Buddhists and the more I became acquainted with Jain religion and Jain literature, the more I loved them.....It is a merit merely of Jain authors to have cultivated in *Sanskrit* as well as in *Prakrit*, in prose and in verse an easy and natural style which makes their tales delightful to the reader.....One discovery brought me to the study of Jains and their literature, *viz.*, that all the *Panch Tantra* editions published in Europe are *Jain* reductions of that celebrated work.....I have examined a vast amount of manuscripts and should of course be pleased to make known the materials still extant, as well and as completely as possible.

"Eastern religions are precious for their own Dvips and Jainism is no doubt the best religion for Jambudvipa.

"I would show my countrymen what noble principles and lofty thoughts are in *Jain religion and in Jain writers*, and would give them faithful translation of their best story books to make them acquainted with Jaina manner of seeing and judging the world and would make them by this to adhere to the sublime principle of the Ahimsa, and so on. On the other hand, I should be glad to give to the Jains critical editions of good tales in their literature, which would be appreciated not only by themselves but also by Brahmin, Vyshnava and other scholars in India and would not only raise their interest for Jain literature, but also for Jaina religion and perhaps win them over to it....."

*His Highness the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda addressing the Jain Conference at Ajmere, gave the following advice :—*

"I am sorry to miss in your programme any provisions for research work in your history and sacred books. The history and tenets of your creed are hardly known to non-Jains beyond the narrow circle of a few Oriental Scholars. It was believed for centuries by all outsiders that Jainism was an off-shoot of Buddhism and its study was neglected on account of this belief. And who dispelled



this misunderstanding? Not the members of your community. A German Scholar was required to announce to the world that Jainism was independent of Buddhism, and was able to prove that your 23rd Tirthankara was not a mythological personage and that he lived as early as 700 B. C. The age of blind belief is gone, and the world is not going to believe in anything on mere authority however old it may be. You shall have to establish by the concrete evidence of science and sound reasoning that your religion antedates the vedas, if it is to be accepted by the world of Scholarship. In the first place, you must find out where and what your Scriptures are. *Most of them are buried in the archives of Pattan and Jaisalmer.* For centuries they have remained uncared for—the food of moth and worm. I fear some of them have already perished. It will be advantageous in the interest of your religion and its preservation to have a central collection, if the custodians are inclined to be liberal and part with them for a noble purpose. They may be edited, translated and printed.”

Dr. F. W. Thomas, M.A., Ph. D., *President, Jaina Literature Society, London* asks in all earnestness, “May we not hope for an uniform publication of the whole canonical collection? It is not yet possible for a scholar to point to a shelf or shelves in his library and say “there is the Jaina Canon.” And so many books and essays have a tentative character through the impossibility of examining the whole collection. Would it not be possible and a great help to future studies and editions, if the whole could be made available in a preliminary but complete edition?”

Again the whole situation has been briefly and beautifully portrayed by Mr. Mohanlal D. Desai, B.A., L.L.B., *Bombay* :—

“The idea of turning out publications of the Sacred books of the Jains into English with introduction, translation, commentaries, explanatory notes, charts of various descriptions and appendices and thereby of promulgating the truth of Jaina philosophy as much as it deserves in the world, does not only affect the interests and knowledge of the students of Jainism, but the very existence of Jainism and the Jains. Without it we would in a short time be

considered as non-entities. We are coming to the verge of our very existence. Now let us be more active and work up the movement without delay. *Now or Never.* Time is rosy. We have before our eyes all the materials to help us to bring out this golden series of Jaina work which would be quite *indispensable* to students of Jainism. We should not, and shall not, spare pains and brains to bring together the scattered materials and also to allow our original Manuscripts to see the light of day; for is not our ideal Lord Mahavira, and are not He, His Apostles, and the host of *Acharyas* who have left invaluable legacy to us, the grand personalities whom we should *adore and revere.* In what better way can we do that?"

In this connection we quote the highly significant words of the learned historian, the late *Mr. Vincent A. Smith* who is of opinion that, "The Jains possess and sedulously guard extensive libraries full of valuable literary material as yet very imperfectly explored, and their books are specially rich in historical and semi-historical matter.....The Jain community includes an unusually large proportion of wealthy men, who can well afford to spend money on any public object which arouses their interest.....My desire is that the members of the Jain community and more especially the wealthy members with money to spare, should interest themselves in archeological research, and spend money on its prosecution, with special reference to the history of their own religion and people."

### Conclusion.

Now therefore the whole case stands before the Jaina public fully discussed through various standpoints, Jain and non-Jain eastern and western, secular and religious and literary and historical. To sum up, there is an unequivocal consensus of opinion as to the urgency and importance of the Preservation and Propagation of the Jaina Siddhanta.

Again we would just request our readers to consider the enormous influence that Jainism had on Indian literature, philosophy, religion, manners and customs in the past and the sacred and infallible origin of the Jaina Siddhanta and the necessity for the

same at present when the whole world has just emerged out of a devastating war, which was indeed the climax of several centuries of materialism when all thoughts about soul and god and religion were compelled to recede in the background. The whole world now pants for rest, for a new creed, for a new faith of Love and Universal Brotherhood. Will the Jains who are the custodians of such a unique system of faith still keep quiet and allow the Jaina sacred literature in which is embodied the divine message of Love, Truth and Joy, to be cribbed, cabined and confined. Will not the Jains propogate the message far and near and thus end all the woe and misery, intrigue and selfishness which so much stare mankind in the face everywhere at present.

There is not the slightest doubt that the more Jainism is expounded and preached and scientifically examined the more will it be widely accepted and practised. The more Jainism is followed the greater will be the peace and goodwill, health and happiness of all living beings in this Universe.

### To Give Effect.

It is with this great and grand object of the Preservation and Publication of the Sacred Books of the Jains that the Devendra Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd., was started by Mr. C. S. Mallinath Jain. In order that the Co., may begin work as early as possible the learned and rich Jains are requested to kindly take large numbers of shares in this Company at once. Each share is of Rs. 10 only. The Company requires only Rs. 5000 shares. Are there not Jains who can purchase all the shares? And still it is indeed regrettable to see that all the shares are not yet sold. We would exhort all our readers to patronise the Co., by not only themselves becoming shareholders but by also requesting their numerous rich friends to do likewise if they had not done so already. This, it is needless for us to point out will tantamount to performing *Sastra Dhana* and therefore they will merit not only the praise of posterity but will also derive great peace, joy and *Punya*.

Before we conclude we are compelled to review the strangely inexplicable attitude of some sections of the Jaina community to-

wards Jaina leaders and institutions. Unfortunately, it gives us no pleasure to remark and yet the truth has to be told that most of the Jains are lukewarm in their support of Jaina activities. That is why we Jains cannot boast of a specific leader or leaders. There can be no leader without a following and support. An unbiased review of the history of Jaina activities in India during the past three decades would reveal to the reader's mind that the Jains are not wanting in masterminds. Even as the writer pens these words the names of four or five illustrious personalities flash across his mind who would be only too ready to guide the destinies of our community if only the Jaina public are aware of their responsibilities, and are prepared to co-operate with their leaders.

Some Jains are not content with merely denying all support to our leaders but even go to the extent of stigmatising them in unwelcome and pungent phraseology. The natural result is that these great personalities, at the height of their modesty and innocence, recoil themselves into seclusion and silence. And when the guiding lights are hushed into darkness, oblivion enraps the community. Instances are not wanting to support our contention. Among others Babu Chaitan Das, Mr. C. R. Jain and Sri Sital Prasadji have been unjustifiably criticised. The late Kumar Devendra Prasad again and again deplored the fatal lethargy that had come upon the Jains. Pandit Ajit Prasadaji, M.A., L.L.B., gave up the Jaina Gazette as beyond hope when he pronounced "Our Death" in December 1918 only because of the extreme callousness of even the educated Jains.

### Heart-Rending Situation.

It is this state of disorganisation in our community that has emboldened some critics to heap all sorts of unwarranted abuses on the innocent heads of the Jains and the infallible philosophy of the *Arhantas*. We cannot for a moment believe that the descendents of a race which could produce literary lions and philosophic giants such as Akalanka and Umaswami, Samantabhadra and Kunda Kunda, can be no better than puny pigmies in the self same country to-day.

The worst feature of the situation is that the state of affairs has been so rotten that even learned Jains are found to fall off from our ranks here and there. May not this malady be cured? Yes. Indeed!

### A Rosy Dawn.

Fortunately for the community the firmament is becoming clearer and clearer of all the dull and dark clouds. There is a spirit abroad to revive Jainism and to reinvigorate the All-India Jaina Association which has been in a state of somnambulence for some years past. Some of the learned and rich Jains are giving their wholehearted support to the Jaina Gazette. We only pray to, Bhagvan Sri Mahaviraswami that this healthy spirit of Love of Jainism may actuate the entire community and make them patronise this urgent and unique undertaking for the Publication of the Jaina Siddhanta namely the Devendra Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd., Madras.

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## Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara

OF

Sri Vadideva Suri.

Translated by *Harisatya Bhattacharya, M.A., B.L.,*

(Continued from page 259 of Vol. XIX No. 11.)

*Sutra, 3.*

Generality is of two kinds viz., the Class-essence and Substantial Identity.

*Commentary.*

What appears as common to a whole class of things or beings is the *Tiryak-Samanya* or the Class-essence or Species Idea. What appears as unchanged amidst the changes which a thing or being undergoes is its *Urdhata-Samanya* or Substratum.

*Sutra, 4.*

The Class-essence consists in what makes the individuals of a class appear as similar to each other; as for instance, 'Cow-hood' in Sabala, Sabaleya etc.



*Commentary.*

The Class or Species Idea is that essential quality which is common to all the members of a class.

The Sangata philosophers object to the above position of the Jainas. According to them, a Class-essence is impossible. Everything has its own strictly peculiar qualities and there cannot be any quality common to two things. All things are dissimilar to each other and hence there cannot be any class-essence. The Jaina thinker proceeds to criticise the Sangata position in the following way. You say, that a thing is strictly individual i.e., dissimilar to all other things. Now, is this individuality external or internal? If a thing is but *externally* different from another, there is still the possibility of its being *internally* or *essentially* similar to that,—in which case class-essence is proved. If, however, you say that a thing is *essentially* dissimilar to another, then how do you explain the fact that a number of things (i.e., the things of a class) *appear* to be similar to each other? If you say that Generality or Class-essence does not pertain to the external or the internal nature of a thing,—well, this is simply to indicate your position and not to prove it. Again, what is that individuality which is said to be the nature of a thing? Is it something real? If so, the question is: Is the thing a strict individual externally or internally? The difficulties of both these positions have already been indicated. If individuality is nothing real, then how do you account for our apprehension of Generality? If the Sangatas answer that it is our *Basana* or imagination that is responsible for our apprehension of Generality, the Jaina contention would be that we may imagine many things but that the objects of our imagination need not be actual. We may imagine that one thing resembles another but that is no reason why the former should actually appear to be similar to the latter. Again, imagination always corresponds to the state of things actually perceived. So, if, as you hold, Generality is absolutely non-existent, it would be impossible even for imagination to generate an idea of Generality. Again, what does *Basana* do in this connection? If its function is to consider all the particular things and put into them a sort of a class-idea, then this *Basana*,—itself a principle of unification and classification,—becomes a General

idea. Then again, if we say that *Basana* is the cause of our belief in the reality of class-essence, we must hold that the class-essence must be real ; for otherwise *Basana* would not be able to produce it. The Sangatas contend that there need not be any class-essence ; that the fact of absolute individuality being perceived and attended with the operation of *Basana* accounts for our assimilation of things. The Jainas ask : Does the fact of individuality generate the idea of a Class-essence in all cases ? If so, then, an elephant, a horse, a wave,—things or beings which are really different from each other—should have appeared as similar to each other. If the Sangatas contend that the fact of individuality is competent to assimilate things only when they are really similar to each other,—well, this is really admitting the doctrine of class-essence. The Sangatas may urge that although there is no class-essence, a thing may so appear as to give an idea of its having a class-essence ; and thus the manifestation of a thing as being possessed of a class-essence is no proof that a class-essence does really exist. The Jainas answer that if the Buddhist contention that “ things are not what they seem ” were accepted, we might as well obliterate the differences between the conscious and the unconscious phenomena. The upholders of the Advaita theory say that although the things and the beings of the world appear to us, some to be conscious and some to be unconscious,—none of them has a nature of its own. The Jainas point out that the Sangata position is similar to this Advaita doctrine. Now, Brahman cannot be said to be the nature of the things and the beings of the world ; Brahman is said to be neither conscious nor unconscious and such a Being cannot exist ; because, in order to exist, it must either be conscious or unconscious. Thus, it is that Brahman is not the nature of the things and the beings of the world ; they are what they appear to be,—either conscious or unconscious. In the same way, if a thing appears to be possessed of a class-essence, it must be admitted that there is such a thing as a class-essence. Finally, it cannot be said that there is no class-essence on the ground that a thing cannot have two contradictory essences viz., the class-essence and the individual-essence. The answer is that just as knowledge can be the harmonising principle of contradictions, so a thing can have two

contradictory aspects. Hence, like the reality of individuality, we must believe in the reality of the class-essence.

*Sutra 5.*

'Identical Substance' is the Subst-atum which remains the same in all modifications, antecedent and subsequent e.g., Gold considered in relation to 'Kataka', 'Kankana' etc., (ornaments, made of gold.)

*Commentary.*

Derivatively, the word, '*Dravya*' (Substance) means 'that which goes to (i.e., stands under or is modified into) the modes'. Modes and aspects may and, as a matter of fact, do change but the Substance underlying them remains the same.

The thinkers of the school of Suddhodana's son (*Buddha*) deny the reality of a Substance which persists through all the times. They contend that it can be conclusively proved that everything is momentary and that consequently there cannot be anything like a permanent Substance. "Whatever is existent is momentary. Sound etc., which are objects of enquiry, are existent" and the conclusion of the Buddhists is that all things e.g., Sound etc. are momentary. The Existence of a thing consists in the fact that it produces an effect. So, if a permanent Substance exists, it must be supposed to be of productive activity. But this is impossible. If Thing-hood be supposed to be permanent, it must produce at the present time along with its present effects, the effects which it produced in the past and which it would produce in the future. If the objector says that a thing is unable to produce its past and future effects at the present time, the Buddhist would contend that there is no reason then why a thing would be able to produce its past and future effects at the past and the future times respectively. It may be argued that a thing can produce the past and the future effects but that it does not do so, because it is not attended at the present time with its Subsidiaries. In answer to this argument, the Buddhist contends,—why does the thing depend on its Subsidiaries? Do the Subsidiaries generate the Thing itself? Or, do the Subsidiaries help the Thing? Or, does the Effect of the Thing depend on these Subsidiaries? The first of these alternatives cannot be supported ;

the thing is already taken as determined either as permanent or as due to its own cause. The second alternative also is unsubstantial. All depends on the capacity of the Thing itself. It is said,—“If the Thing is itself able (to produce its effects), what is the use of the Subsidiary help? If the Thing is itself unable (to produce its effects), what is the use of the Subsidiary help?” And for this reason the third alternative also is untenable. You cannot say that the Effect is dependent on many conditions and does accordingly require the Subsidiaries. For, the Effect is not an independent phenomenon—it is nothing but the Effect of the Thing. If it were an independent phenomenon, it could not be called the Effect of that Thing. If the thing be absent, no amount of Subsidiaries can generate the Effect. “Whatever does not produce Effects is non-existent; for example, the Lotus in the sky; the non-momentary Thing-hood does not do so.” In other words, the Buddhist contention is that a permanent substance cannot have the productive potency; for, in that case it would have produced the past and the future effects along with the present; but without productive potency, nothing can be real and existent. Hence the Buddhist conclusion is that the permanent Substance is unreal and non-existent.

The Jains object to the above Buddhist position in the following way. According to the Buddhists, Existence consists in productive activity and productive activity is a matter of Perception (*Pratyakṣha*). Now, what does Perception actually perceive in such a case? Does Perception perceive only the cause when it is said to cognise productive activity? This cannot be; because if it perceives simply the Cause, the Effect remains outside its purview (so that Perception cannot be said to perceive the productive activity). Similarly, Perception cannot be said to perceive only the Effect; for the difficulty will be the same as before, in as much as the Cause remains unperceived. Productive Activity implies both a cause and an effect and so, if Perception be said only to perceive the cause or the Effect—and not both,—it cannot perceive Productive Activity. If it be maintained that the nature of the thing (under observation) is at once the Cause and the Effect, so that when either of the Cause and the Effect is perceived, the other may also be said to be perceived,—well, the Jaina answer is that the Cause and

the Effect cannot be totally identified. If the Cause and the Effect are absolutely identical,—one,—who does not know that Smoke is caused by Fire,—may infer that Fire causes Smoke as soon as he sees Fire and that Smoke is caused by Fire as soon as he sees Smoke. If lastly, the Buddhist maintains that Productive Activity is perceived by Perception which perceives both the Cause and the Effect,—it may be pointed out that it is impossible for Perception to perceive both Cause and the Effect because Perception is strictly momentary. The Buddhists may urge that Productive Activity is cognised through the *ideation* of the Cause and the Effect. In that case, they are bound to give up the contention that Productive Activity is a matter of *perception*. If it be said that Ideation deals exactly with the matters of Perception (and hence Productive Activity may be said to be determined by Perception), the Jainas point out that Productive activity implies a *relationship* of cause and effect, that this *relationship* is not a matter of perception and that consequently, the relationship of Cause and Effect (and with that, Productive Activity) cannot be a matter of Ideation. For these reasons, it may be said that the Buddhists cannot prove how they get the idea of Productive Activity. And accordingly, the Buddhist doctrine of existence also is unproved.

Not only is the Buddhist doctrine of Productive Activity unproved but it is doubtful if it can serve as the valid Mark for the conclusion,—a thing is momentary. For a thing having both persistence and impermanence can be of productive potency. The Buddhists contended that phenomena emerge one after the other. A pitcher, for instance, has a nature at one moment ; then, when it is carried on her head by the servant-maid, it produces another effect *viz.*, weariness in the servant. Now, you may say that the capacity for causing weariness was already in the pitcher and that it actually produced weariness in the servant when it was carried on her head. But this is not the right theory ; for if the pitcher had already the nature of producing weariness, why did it not produce it before it was carried on the head ? For, it is said, “ If the Cause is not present, Effects are delayed. But if there is the potent Cause, why are they (the Effects) not produced ? ” The Jaina philosophers point out that the above Buddhist contention is not



valid. We do not make the absolute statement that the pitcher has the nature of producing weariness. The Correct position is that in its *Substantial* aspect, the pitcher has the capacity to produce weariness but that in the aspect of its *Modification*, it may not have that Capacity. The Buddhists argue: There is the Seed, which according to you is the *Substantial Substratum*. This seed, being connected with earth, air, heat etc., becomes *modified*, and produces the Shoot. This new potency appearing in and through the modification was absent in the Seed; it is generated in the Modification. Now, is this potency in the Modification different from the seed? If it is different, then how can it be connected with the seed? If it be said that the potency in modification is connected with the Seed by being its Subsidiary, the question would still be, How can the Subsidiary which is different from the Seed be connected with it? If it be said that the connection is made possible through some Intermediary,—well, the question would be, How can the Intermediary come in contact with the Seed? This must be through another Intermediary and that, through another and so on. This means Infinite Regression. If, on the otherhand, the Substratum is identified with the potency in Modification, then the so-called Substratum becomes momentary in as much as the potency in Modification has admittedly a genesis in time. If lastly, it is maintained that the Substance is both identical with and different from the potency in Modification,—well, this position is not sound in as much as momentariness of phenomena is not admitted in full therein. To the above Buddhist argument, the Jaina answer is as follows:—We accept this last position. There is no inconsistency if we maintain that in its substantial aspect, a thing is permanent and in the aspect of its modification, it is non-eternal. If you say that Substance is momentary because it is identified with its modes which are admittedly non-eternal, the answer is that Substance is different from the modes as well. You cannot say that identity and difference,—contradictory attributes—cannot be predicated of one and the same thing (*viz.*, Substance). The poet, for example, sings:—"Intense anxiety is pressing the heart but is not breaking it into (two) pieces. The body is disordered but it is not unconscious."

Internal pain is burning the life but is not reducing it to ashes. Destiny is causing wounds by striking at the vital parts but is not killing the life." In the same way, contradictory statements can be made. We do not mean of course that Substance is identical with the Modes in the same way as it is different from them. Substance is Substance and Modes are Modes,—it is thus that Substance is different from the Modes. Substance is identified with the Modes *i. e.*, not differentiated from them, when we take into consideration the thing as a Unitary whole. The Buddhists themselves admit that the one perception is both 'undetermined' (*Avikalpa*) and 'determined' (*Savikalpa*), both 'free from mistake' (*Abhranta*) and 'mistaken' (*Bhranta*), both 'cause' (*Karana*) and 'effect' (*Karya*). Hence the Buddhists cannot contend that identity and difference are absolutely contradictory and cannot be predicated of one and the same thing. And accordingly, a real or existent thing *i. e.*, that which is invested with productive activity, can be both momentary and permanent. This shows that the doctrine of Productive Potence which is made by the Buddhists the Mark for the establishment of Non-permanence of things is a fallacious Mark, technically called the 'Doubtful uncertain.'

It has been shown that the Buddhist theory of Productive Potence, serving as a Mark for the conclusion that all things are momentary, is (i) Unproved, and (ii) Doubtful-uncertain. The Jaina commentator now goes further and (iii) argues that that Mark is Contradictory in as much as Productive Activity cannot be determined with regard to an absolutely momentary thing. The Buddhists argue that a thing is momentary *i. e.*, has no permanent nature because different effects emerge in serial order. Now, 'Series' or 'Serial order' may be of two kinds *viz.*,—Spatial Series and Temporal Series. Spatial Series consists in the order in which rows of water-fowl-pairs swim down a stream. Temporal series is the order in which various things *e.g.*, honey, snail *etc.*, *etc.*, successively find their place in a pitcher. Now, you cannot talk of a Spatial or a Temporal Series, if you hold things to be absolutely momentary. Serial order supposes relationship between things, effects or phenomena in the series. So, if you maintain that a thing

is absolutely momentary, it perishes after its moment of existence, absolutely unrelated to any other thing,—so that any Spatial or Temporal Order concerning it, is impossible. If a thing is absolutely momentary, it is not also possible to talk of more than one effect, *simultaneously* produced by it. It is for the following reason. The Buddhists may argue that a thing which consists in a momentary nature may produce itself and at the very same time generate its cognition in the percipient's mind. The Jainas contend that the production of such simultaneous effects is impossible according to the principle of the Buddhist doctrine. For, the question is,—Does the thing produce its knowledge with the same nature with which it produces itself? This is impossible; because thereby knowledge would be identified with the thing itself. Does, then, the thing produce itself with the same nature with which it produces the knowledge? This also is impossible; because thereby the thing would be identified with its knowledge. Has, then, the thing one nature in producing itself and a different one, in producing its knowledge? In that case, you cannot say that the nature of a thing is absolutely momentary; for, there must be a persistent principle to separate and differentiate from one another the two different momentary natures. The Buddhists may urge that there need not be two natures in a thing; the one nature which produces the thing, produces a different effect (viz., its cognition) being attended with different ingredients. The Jainas turn the argument in their favour in this way: The Substance which is permanent and identically persistent, goes on producing varied (momentary) effects, being attended with varied conditions. And thus, the doctrine of Productive Potence does not prove the absolute momentariness of things;—it is thus proved that the said doctrine, serving as a Mark, is a fallacious one, technically called the '*Contradictory*.'

The Buddhists further contend that as things are found to be of a perishable or destructible nature, they must be held to be non-eternal and sure to perish. The fact that things are of destructible nature will be evident from this that a pitcher etc., are smashed as soon as they are struck with great force. The Buddhists, point out that the Destruction of a thing is not dependent on any external

cause. The blow of a hammer is said to destroy the nature of the pitcher; but what is this nature? Is it imperishable? If so,—then no cause in the world whatsoever would be able to destroy it. Or, is the nature perishable in itself? If so, then the destroying causes are clearly useless and redundant. As it is said.—“If the thing is perishable by its nature, nothing is done to it by its destroying causes. If it is imperishable by its nature, nothing is done to it by its destroying causes.” Then again, what is Destruction, brought about by the destroying causes? Is Destruction something not different from the nature of the thing? In that case the destroying causes become useless and abortive. Or, is Destruction something different from the nature of the thing? Now if Destruction is different from the nature of the thing, the question is,—Is Destruction contemporaneous with the nature or does it come after it? The first alternative cannot be true for in that case Existence and Non-Existence of a thing could have been simultaneously perceived. If then, Destruction is what follows or comes after Existence (i.e., the nature of a thing), how is it that the pitcher no longer generates its cognition and produces the usual effect when it is said to be destroyed? A piece of cloth, for example, may be made from thread etc; but the making of the cloth is no reason why the pitcher should cease to exist, to produce its knowledge and its usual effect. It may be argued that the making of the cloth does not negative the nature or existence of the pitcher because cloth is not opposed to the nature of the pitcher; but the Destruction or non-existence of the pitcher negatives its nature because it is opposed to it. The Buddhists ask: What do you mean by Opposition? If the Opposite is that which destroys a thing, then it must be held to destroy it by producing Destruction. And thus Destruction itself is not explained. If, again, you say that Opposition means Destruction itself,—how do you explain that it is the pitcher—and not any other thing of the world—that must have the Destruction, in connection with the Hammer etc? If it is said that in such a case, the Pitcher and Destruction are related, the question is what is this relation? You cannot say that Destruction is the effect of the pitcher, for it has been admitted that Destruction is the Effect of the Hammer-blow etc. Nor, can you say that the

relationship here is one of Contact, for Destruction is not a tangible substance that it may come in Contact with the Pitcher ; besides, if the relationship were one of Contact, we must admit that Destruction is contemporaneous with the nature or Existence of the Pitcher. The relationship cannot be one of Qualification which subsists between the pitcher and the piece of land it occupies. Fourthly, the relationship cannot be one of Non-difference. The pitcher cannot be identified with its Destruction because it has already been premised that Destruction is different from the nature of the thing. Nor can you say that the Pitcher is in some respects identical with its Destruction ; for, in that case you cannot speak of them as mutually opposed to each other. It is thus established that the nature of a thing is perishable *per se* and that its Destruction is not dependent on any external cause.

The Jainas point out that a similar argument may be developed against the fact of Generation of things. It may be asked for example. What is the nature of a thing which is said to be generated by the generating causes ? If the nature is existent *per se*, then the generating causes are unnecessary. If the nature is not existent by itself, then no generating causes can change it and make it existent. Besides, the Buddhists themselves cannot admit that a non-existent thing is produced by generating causes. It is said, —“ If the nature of a thing is existent *per se*, nothing is done to it by its generating causes. If it is non-existent by itself, nothing is done to it by its generating causes.” Then again, what is this Generation ? Is it something not different from the nature of the thing generated ? In that case, the thing is not generated. Is then, Generation different from the nature of the thing generated ? If so, the thing cannot be generated at all. If you say that the thing can be generated even though Generation be different from its nature,—it may be asked, why is this particular thing,—and not any other thing in the world—generated on a given occasion ? If it be urged that the given thing is generated because the given thing is related to Generation, the answer is that the alleged relationship is inexplicable in as much as it cannot be one of Causation etc., etc., [See above]. The Jainas thus point out that an argumen<sup>t</sup>



analogous to the Buddhistic one would show that all things are self-existent and uncaused.

The correct doctrine is that a thing has both origination and decay. A pitcher is made out of the Substance, called Earth, attended with various other causes viz., the Stick, the Wheel etc. etc., A pitcher is destroyed also by (i.e., by reason of) that Substance, attended with other causes viz., a severe blow of a hammer etc. Destruction is not absolutely different from the Pitcher (i.e., the Pitcher, as an existent thing) because in both the phenomena the Substratum, Earth is identical. The fact of Destruction being Opposed to the Pitcher consists in its being the Destruction of the Pitcher. Destruction is Opposed to the Pitcher but Cloth is not Opposed to the Pitcher—Why? Because, the Substratum Earth remains identical in both Destruction and the Pitcher (as an Existent phenomenon) just as it is identical in Generation and the Pitcher,—while there is no such common Substratum in Cloth and the Pitcher. Destruction, however, is not absolutely identical with the Pitcher; because it is its non-existence. You cannot say that such a doctrine would not make Opposition a real fact; because, a line of argument similar to yours, would make Generation also an impossible fact.

Hence it is that the doctrine is unproved that the nature of all things is perishable *per se*. Truly speaking, the doctrine of absolute perishableness of the nature of things makes it impossible for things to have even a momentary existence.

Thus it is proved that a thing is possessed of a Substratum which remains identical through all its antecedent and subsequent modifications.

(To be continued.)

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## The Casket of Gems.

(Continued from page 271).

### Siksha Vratas.

#### Samayika.

கட்டு விடுகாறு மெஞ்சாம லேம் பாவம்

விட்டொழுகல் சாமாயிகம்.

99. Refraining from the commission of the five sins in all respects for a particular period of time till the tie loosens is called the *Samayika* vow.

The time that a tie takes to loosen of its own accord is the period for doing *Samayika*.

கூடற மயிர்முடி முட்டி நிலையிருக்கை

கூறிய கட்டென் றுணர்.

100. The above said tie is made by tying a knot in one's tuft of hair (on the top of his head) or his garment or by closing the fist.

ஒருசிறை யில்லம் பிறவாழி யானும்

மருவுக சாமா யிகம்.

101. *Samayika* should be performed in private dwellings, temples (and such other places as forests, and banks of rivers, lakes and seas.)

சேதியம் வந்தனை பட்டினி யாதியா

யோதிய கால மதற்கு.

102. The hours of worship in the morning, noon and evening and the days of fasting are the prescribed time for doing *Samayika*.

பெற்ற வகையினுற் சாமா யிகமூப்பின்

முற்ற நிறையும் வதம்.

103. If *Samayika* is practised according to the prescribed method it perfects the five vows.

தனிய னுடம்பிது வேற்றுமை சுற்றம்

இனைய நிலைக்கப் படும்.

104. "This body is alone and separate; my relatives are different and distinct from me."—This should be the subject matter for meditation during *Samayika*.

இறந்ததன் றீமைக் கிழித்தும் பழித்தும்  
மறந்தொழியா மீட்ட றீலை.

105. Repenting and blaming oneself for one's past sins and safe guarding oneself from them without forgetting (the evil effects of sins) are the important subjects for meditation).

தீயவை யெல்லாம் இனிச் செய்யே னென்றடங்கி  
தூய்வகையி னிற்றலு மற்று.

106. Becoming pure by controlling oneself not to commit any sin in the future is another.

ஒன்றிபு மொன்றாதுந் தான் செய்த தீவினையை  
நின்று நினைந்திரங்கற் பாற்று.

107. One should meditate on and repent for the sins committed knowingly and unknowingly.

தனக்கும் பிறர்க்கு முறுதிச்செய்த செய்கை  
மனத்தினிற் சிந்திக்கற் பாற்று.

108. One should meditate only on such words and deeds that will bring spiritual good to oneself and to others.

பிறர்கண் வருத்தமுஞ் சாக்காடுங் கேடு  
மறந்து நினையாமை நன்று.

109. It is good that one forgets and never thinks of misery death and adversity to others.

திருந்தார் பொருள்வரவும் தீயார் தொடர்பும்  
பொருந்தாமை சிந்திக்கற் பாற்று.

110. One should think of the unfitness for use of the wealth of the unrighteous and of the friendship of the wicked.

கூடியவை யெல்லாம் பிரியவுங் கூட்டின்மை  
கேடினமை சிந்திக்கற் பாற்று.

111. One should meditate on the separation of all things that seem related, the unrelated character and immortality (of the soul.)

உள்ள மொழிசெய்கை தள்ளல் விருப்பின்மை  
யுள்ளார் மறத்த லிறப்பு.

112. Losing control over mind, speech and deed, indifference to the observance of meditation, forgetting (its time and the subject-matter of reflection these are the transgressions.)

நல்லறச் சார்வு நவையற நீக்கலும்  
பல்வகையாற் பார்க்கப் படும்.

113. It should be sought in many ways to perform righteous deeds and avoid sinful ones.

(To be continued).

## NOTES AND NEWS.

The Second Universal Religious Conference was held during the Christmas holidays under the auspices of Sri Satchidananda Sanga in the Hindu High School Hall, Triplicane, Madras, when about twenty systems of faith were represented. We are glad to note that the Lecture on "Jainism" by Mr. C. S. Meghakumar was highly interesting, instructive and impressive and was heard with rapt attention. We hope to publish the lecture in our next number.

On the 15th Dec. 1920 the Anniversaries of the Bharat Varshiya Digambar Sastry Parishad and Ratnatraya Samvardaka Sanastha were held in Shedval (Belgaum Dt.) under the distinguished presidentship of Sri Nemisagar Varniji Maharaj and Pt. Virchand Gandhiji respectively. Many learned discourses were delivered on the occasion which were heard with rapt attention by the huge audience of nearly 4000 people both ladies and gentlemen and Jain and non-Jain. Some useful resolutions were passed and many important questions were asked and answered in the Sastri Parishad. The Jain Pathasala with 80 students is turning out good work under Mr. Shantinatha Sastri. The Ruler of Nimbolkar was thanked for his prohibition of cow-killing.

We regret the melancholy death of L. Gauri Shankar Saraf of Kasur. The following donations were announced at the time of his death. Amar Jain Hostel, Lahore Rs. 50 ; Amar Singh Jain Jiva Daya Fund, Amritsar Rs. 20 ; Kanya Pathasala, Ludhiana Rs. 20 ; Kanya Pathasala Rawalpindi Rs. 20 ; Jain Pathasala, Faridkot Rs. 20 ; Jain School, Delhi Rs. 15 ; Mahavira Jain Library, Sialkot Rs. 10 ; Jain Sabha, Hoshiarpore Rs. 15 ; Jain Gazette, Madras Rs. 5 ; Jain Pardis, Deoband Rs. 5 ; Jain Path Pardarshak, Agra Rs. 5 ; Jain Jagat, Delhi Rs. 5 ; Jain Orphanage, Delhi Rs. 5 ; Orphanage Ferozepore Rs. 5 ; We convey our sincere condolences to the bereaved family.

The opening Ceremony of Shri Vijaya Dharma Laxmi Jnanamandir Library was performed with great eclat on the 13th Nov. 1923, under the presidentship of Shriyut Kannomalji, M.A., Judge. In A Library in Agra.

his learned speech Muni Shri Vidya-Vijayaji remarked. "According to the wishes of the late Acharya, Shri Vijaya Dharma Suri, the Library has been established for the benefit of the general public." The Library stocks some twenty thousand books on almost all subjects in diverse languages including Sanskrit, Hindi, Prakrit, Gujrati, Bengali, Marathi, English, German and other foreign languages. Among these there are some seven or eight thousand very old manuscripts preserved from very ancient times. All these books both printed and manuscripts had been collected by the late Acharya, Shri Vijaya Dharma Suri. To this vast collection have been added the Books of the Laxmichandra Jain Library which has been amalgamated in the above Library. The well-known Danvir Seth Laxmi-Chandraji Baid of Agra, who had already spent several lacs of rupees in building a grand Jain Temple at Agra, the Pratishtha celebrations of which had recently been celebrated in a magnificent manner, has erected a spacious building for the Library and has on this occasion set another example of this magnanimity by donating 25 thousand rupees towards the Library funds. The Telegram announcing this donation had been received just in the midst of the celebrations. Leading Dailies, Weeklies and Monthlies in all languages, numbering above one hundred are received in the Reading Room of the Library. The meeting was attended by a large gathering of Professors, Teachers, College and School students, Doctors, Lawyers, Government officials like Shriyut Irfan Ali Beg I. S. O. Assistant Collector and the general public. The presidential address and the Learned speech of Muni Shri Vidya Vijayaji were followed by the speeches of B. Chandmalji, Vakil, B. Indra Chandrji, the Deputy Collector Mr. Irfan Ali Beg and the famous Journalist Mr. Krishnalalji Verma. Acharya Shri Vijaya Indra Suri delivered an eloquent lecture in the end.

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Sri Kshullak Srutasagara Swamiji's *Kesh loch* was performed at the feet of Sreyobhadraswami near Guruga-lore on Sunday 25th November at about 11 A. M. A large pandal was erected where the Swamiji took his seat. He was immersed in full *dhyana* when the ceremony was performed. There was a grand procession in which a *Murti* of Sri Neminath and the Kshullak were taken round the town along the main streets with a crowd of men and women following with shouts of 'Jain Dharmaki jai' and "Srutasagaraswamiki jai." The whole ceremony was *Vairagya*—inspiring and soul-stirring.

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