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If my mind be not engaged in worship, it is as though  
I worshipped not. —“Confucius.”

## The Idea of God in Jainism.

*Observed from the point of view of the Comparative  
Science of Religions.*

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THERE is not much difficulty in describing the Jaina view about god, a theme which has already been dealt with by many writers.\* But it is not my intention only to give a simple explanation

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\*. The most clear explanation of the existence of the idea of God in Jaina religion—which can be easily understood also by the non-Jainas—is, according to my opinion the booklet “*Jainism not Atheism*” by H. Warren, although I do not agree with all the arguments, brought forward by him. It is also too theological, and still more apologetical, than scientific, and therefore he tries more to prove the existence of the idea, than its features.

Much more difficult it is to gather the views on the Jaina idea of God in the “*Key of Knowledge*” by Champat Rai Jain, where

tion of the Jaina view of the idea of god : my task is more complicated. I shall try to subject the Jaina ideas about god to a critical analysis, to compare them with the ideas about god in Buddhism as well as in other religions, and by these investigations to try to ascertain whether the Jaina God or Gods are real gods at all, or are misrepresented by this word, being rather of a different nature and of a different intellectual origin. I do not say that I am able to solve completely the problem, but I shall be quite satisfied if I define the main idea underlying the problem, indicate how it might be solved and more especially discover the starting point of proper investigations.

It is not at all easy to determine the notion of "god" in general so that its correctness may not be disputed. So many definitions of religion have already been put forward that it would be a subject for a special essay to classify and criticize them\*. But

the Jaina ideas are obscured by the accumulated heaps of non-Jaina ideas from the western erudition of the author. This makes the book very difficult to be understood by non-Jainas or by men who do not know anything of Jainism, and seek information.

The dogmatical explanation may be collected from the *Tattavārthadhigama Sūtram* specially from the Chapter X and from the *Panchāstikāyasāra*. The complete theological idea, of God however, is explained more profusely and more exhaustively in "*Nyāyakusumāñjali*" by Nyayavijaya with the English and Gujarati commentary by Prof. Hiralal R. Kapadiya, mainly in the Chapter IV. vv. 32-36. While Nyayavijaya hands down the most difficult notions of the Jaina entolgy in a clear manner in his very succinct verses, Prof. Kapadiya tries to explain the matter in a form accessible easily to the western reader too.

Entirely different point of view is offered by Jagmenderlal Jaini, in his *Outlines of Jainism*. He says expressly on the 28th page : "A personal God has no place in Jainism : He is not needed." And he is from his point of view right.

\*. The philosophical definitions of "God" are always based on the respective religion of its author, and therefore most of them are not absolute and independent from a religious prejudice. Specially all the western definitions of the notion "God" are influenced by Christianity, and therefore they are not applicable for the oriental ideas of God. This is the greatest difficulty in the problem. The Christian idea of God—God by himself is the only absolutely perfect being, which is in possession of highest intellect and best

we are not concerned to-day with philosophic notions, and therefore, we do not need at all to concern ourselves here with philosophical definitions of "god." We are here concerned with the pure religious idea of god, that is, what is considered to be god by the different religions in different places and times. If we consider all these ideas, as far as the different religions are known to us, we must acknowledge that the differences in the ideas are so great that we can hardly bring them within the limits of a single scientific definition, as it is sometimes difficult to find out even the points common in the different ideas of god in the different religions. The result of such investigations is that it must be accepted as a fact that the idea of god does not spring out of a uniform substratum and we are compelled to include that god is simply a conventional denomination of a certain religious idea, of a leading, authority behind all precepts, laws and rules embodied in a religion. If we accept this view of the position as correct, we cannot give any definition of the idea of "god," but we must look into the different groups of religions in order to get the necessary presuppositions for further investigations.

At first the primitive religions must be considered, that is, those religions in which the religious ideas were produced by the primary processes of the human mind, led chiefly by the emotions and sensations. It is uncertain whether these religions knew the idea of God at all. It is easily possible that we impute to them ideas which were quite strange to the minds of men in the first stage of development. It is at least certain that in the very primitive religions the authority for the precepts and the laws

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will, but has no body, so that nothing more perfect can be imagined, is not absolutely unadaptable to the Indian, and specially Jaina views, but from the scientific point of view is not correct, as it does not comprise the whole notion of "God" as it is known to us from all the religions, which we know in the development of the mankind. The Christian notion of God is too narrow. And so are most of the notions of God defined by the different philosophers. Therefore I do not adhere to any philosophical definition of God, but I simply ascertain it empirically as a supposition of the different religions for the purpose to have an authority for their religious dogmas and ordinances.

depended on physical power and strength, supported by shrewdness and cunning. Traces of this very low stage of religions are to be found even now in many of the more developed religions, but it is particularly prominent in the religions of the Australian and Pacific tribes, although the development of even their religions has continued to the present time. For example, the idea of taboo is really incompatible with the idea of god, and introduced in a religion with a developed idea of god—as it was in the Polynesian religion—pushed the idea of god into the back-ground and developed a new authority in the hierarchy\*. Thus the Polynesian Tangaroa, after having finished the act of creation, reclines in the highest heaven, inaccessible to anyone, even by means of prayer, and does not in any way care about the world and the human beings.

A further step in religious development was the growth of the anthropomorphistic, animistic idea of god, which is the typical feature of all primary but already somewhat developed systems of religions. Man in this stage sought the authority for precepts and laws in an impenetrable past. From the living grand-father and perhaps still living great-grand-father the source of the authority was pushed more and more into the past and finally became a mere attribute of an imaginary ancestor. At first this ancestor was not supposed to live after his time of life had elapsed, that is after he had established his family or tribe, but very soon the necessity

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\* The idea of Taboo, as an exemption from the common use, connected with the idea that this property can be transferred to any other person or thing, which come into any connection with the already tabooed thing or person, destroys the proper idea of God by the very moment, when God becomes to be considered as taboo. Then since the very moment the God ceases to be the authority and the origination of the religion, and becomes a source of fear of the people, because by the chain of tabooing man can be deprived of every facility and of every commodity, as it used to happen on the Pacific islands just before the original religion made place to the Christianity, when the Areoii by conferring the Taboo to everything of which they took fancy became a terror of the whole Pacific, what finally facilitated the spread of Christianity. These Areoii were really a new hierarchy, consisting from the tabooed people and spreading their taboo by touch, sight and even by meer wish.



arose for having a living authority which could enforce the keeping of his precepts and laws, and therefore the ancestor was afterwards supposed to be continuing to live either in the neighbourhood of his supposed tomb or near the village of his own people, and later on, when his presence in the midst of his people grew undesirable, elsewhere in the world or outside the world, where the dead were supposed to reside\*. From the mere fact that the ancestor was the originator of the family or the tribe, the idea that the ancestor was also the creator of the world was developed. In this way the idea of god, the creator, was originated. In the different religions god is considered after having finished the act of creation either as the preserver and caretaker of the world and his people or as a being totally excluded from the management of the world as in the case of the Polynesian Tangaroa. A still further step in the development of religion was the incorporation of the ancestor-god-creator in different phenomena in nature especially physical phenomena. It was the intellectual process which is generally called mythological apperception and which led as a sequel to the development of an elaborate mythology\*\*

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\* Reverence towards the ancestors can be found everywhere on the world, as it is only a further extension of the reverence of the child towards his parents. There is also some historical truth in the supposition, that the remote ancestor is the originator of the tribe. This reverence towards the ancestors turned very soon in the direct worship of ancestors. But the combination with the godly principle realized much later and not everywhere completely. It seems to be a typical semitic feature to deify the ancestors which spread from them also to the other nations.

Elements of the ancestor worship are hiding in the Jaina religion too, as the liberated soul lived before their liberation in this world of men.

\*\* Mythology has originally really nothing to do with religion. Mythology is only a product of a special kind of apperception, characterized by supposing certain causal connection where are none, or where are quite different causes mostly unknown to the man of that stage of development or different grouping of the supposed causes. It is evident that that every kind of human understanding and acting can be subject of mythology. For instance the Alchemy is a mythological stage of chemistry, Astrology that of Astronomy etc. Only when the mythology begins to search the causes of the different phenomena in the world of supernatural

From this conception of the idea of God, only a short way leads to the idea of God as it was developed in the great systems of the secondary religions or as they are commonly called world religions. Both Christianity and Islam have arisen from a common Semitic source, deriving from it their pure animistic idea of god. Both consider god as a creator, attributing to him the qualities of the highest spiritual being, gifted with absolute perfectness. This is only an intellectual development of the original rude animisms. The Christian God is more anthropomorphic than Allah. That is due most probably to the non-Semitic influences, which were at the time very strong in Palestina and were still stronger in the countries of Europe, where Christianity spread, but much smaller in the little accessible Arabia. Their conception of god is supposed to be the highest step in the development of the animistic god. All later developments of the idea of god in Europe sprang not from religious feelings. They were based on intellectual, philosophical thinking and therefore cannot be considered here.

But a very different development of the idea of god can be observed in India, where philosophy and religion did not become as divorced as in Europe, and religion therefore participated much more in the general intellectual development of man. The original animistic ideas were much more compounded with the physical elements in consequence of intellectual influences. This process was rendered more complex by the influences produced by the mixing of different races from the remotest times in spite of the rigid caste rules. From this source arose the conspicuous dimorphism of the old Indian religion which is reflected in all its offsprings even of the most modern times\*. Some of the philosophical systems

and with the traditional ancestors, it starts to become a part of the religion, in which it places the phenomena. In this way the Greek, Slavonic, German, and really all A-yan mythology got its religious character. The Indian mythology is purely religious. But even this mythology is not religion itself. This fact is very important to be known in dealing with any religion, but especially with the Indian religions. The up to now entire failure in emending and explaining the myths is due, that the emendators and explanators did not realize this particular feature of the mythus.

\*. The dimorphism of the Indian religions appears in the fusion of double elements, viz., the animistic elements, based on

(e.g., samkhya in its most radical form) by means of this intellectual treatment of religions came to deny the existence of god, as a consequence of the complete negation of the spiritual principle in the world.

Of course the religions very soon started a reaction against this too radical consequence of intellectual development and even philosophy produced new ideas, pushing the question into the back-ground. But notwithstanding this reaction, two religious systems did accept the idea of negation. They did not apply it to god in general, but only to his creative power and to his participation in the actual act of creation of the physical world. It was principally the doctrine of the Jainas, which adopted these revolutionary ideas, while the other religious system, which followed the same line of evolution, viz., the doctrine of Buddha, went further on, keeping a more close relationship with the most negative school of samkhya philosophy. We have now reached the actual subject of this treatise and it is necessary to go more largely into details.

The Jaina idea of god as already remarked has been explained not only in ancient times but also in modern times, so that the basis for our analytical investigations are thoroughly prepared. We must, however, bear in mind that all these sources describe and explain the Jaina idea of god from the point of view of the Jaina religion and abstain from any scientific analysis of the idea, leave alone criticism of the idea. It is quite natural that any religious idea cannot be criticised by an adherent of that religion, more

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the ancestor worship and the physical elements based on the products of the mythological apperception. Manifestation of this dual elemnetal basis in the present forms of the Indian religion is on one side the elaborated brahmanical ritualism, turning in its extremes Tantras even to magic and sorcery, on the other side the philosophical speculation, based on the pure religious but leading in its extremes to scepticism and even to real negation of the religious elements, then up to the very limit of the religion.

The causes of this strange dimorphism are not yet elucidated, but are supposed to be derived from the original social conditions in India, viz., mixing of different races with different religious ideas.

especially the idea of god. This can be done only by an impartial outsider and that is the main object of this treatise.

In order to be able to analyse and criticise the idea of god in Jaina religion, we must at first collect all the facts known to us about the god or gods in the Jaina religion, i.e., not only the philosophical doctrine but also the popular belief and the people's customs, and consider the god as an object of worship by the widest circles of Jaina laymen.

The Jaina doctrine teaches that god (Paramatman) is the perfectly liberated Jiva (mukta siddha) \* This liberated soul has,

\* The Jaina definition of God is

*Parikshina-sakala-karmā īśvarah.*

i.e., "who exhausted the entire Karma is Isvarah" More profusely the idea is explained by Yogendra Acharya in his Paramatma-prakasa, 330 :

*kevaladamsananānasuhu vīrti jo ji anamtu,  
so jinadeuji paramamuni paramapayāsu munamtu. 330.*

"The soul which has perfect perception, perfect knowledge, infinite bliss, and infinite power, is a perfect saint, and being self-manifested, is known as Jina-deva."

But not always the idea is pronounced in the Jaina scriptures so distinctly. Regularly it is only involved, to be understood from the idea of perfectness of the Siddhas. So, for instance in the Panchastikayasara 28, is spoken of the Lordship of Atma in this way :

*kammamalavippamukko udhaham logassa amtamadhigamtū,  
so savvanānadarasi lahadi suhamanimdiyamanamtam. 28.*

"Atma which is free from the defect of Karma gets to the highest point of the universe, knows all and perceives all, and obtains the transcendental bliss everlasting."

The same *ibid.* 36 and 37.

*na kudoci vi uppanno jahmā kajjam na tena so siddho,  
uppādedi na kimci vi karanamāvi tena na sa hodi. 36.  
sassadamadha ucchedam bhavvamabhavvam ca sunnamidaram ca,  
vinnānamavinnānam na vi jujjasi asadi sabbhavē. 37.*

"36. The Siddha is not to be born again at any time in Samsara. Hence he is not to be an effect. Nor is he to bring about a change in anything else, therefore he is not a cause either. 37. That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection and yet dead from

accordingly, no influence on and even no connection with the human world, as it is expressly stated in the "Key of knowledge" by C. R. Jain p. 1063. The author has, however omitted to quote an authority from the canonical literature of the Jainas in support of his statement\* The Paramatman of the Jainas must be regarded only as a stage in individual evolution, and the last and highest one.

Samsara ; that he is the negation of all extrinsic qualities and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature ; that he has knowledge perfect and yet devoid of knowledge imperfect ; these eight attributes will not be associated with him if "Nirvana is interpreted nihilistically."

In the more modern works of Jainas the idea of Siddha being God is expressed more frequently and more clearly. For instance Nyayavijaya in his Nyaya kusumanjali IV. 33 defines God in this way ;

*devam lakshayan tat-añjāprakāram nivedayati :*  
*sarva-jno vijitā 'khlā ntara-rīpus-trailōkya-sampūjitah*  
*satyārtha-pratipādaśaś-ca bhagavān nirdhāryatām namabhih.*  
*vishnu-brahma-mahesa-sankara-jinā-rhat-tīrthanāthādibhi*  
*rnāmñā sthāpanaya tamarcata janāh ! dravyena bhāvena ca. 33*

"One who is omniscient, who has conquered all the internal enemies, who is an object of worship for the three worlds and who is propounder of truth is called God."

The same author in his Adhyatmatattvaloka II, 15, defines God in another way, laying more stress on His being "Vitaraga":

*devam lakshayati :*  
*na rūgaroshādika-dosha-doshā-leśo yatrāsti buddhih sakalaprākāśā*  
*suddhasvarūpah paramesvaro 'sau satāmmatodeva padābhidheyah.*

"The Supreme Soul who is free from an iota of faults as attachment, anger etc., whose knowledge is all-illuminating and who is pure, is called the true God by the wise."

\* The author says : "Hence, the Siddhatmans in nirvana, whose being consists of pure effulgence of Spirit, and who have neither a material body nor any other kind of connection with matter, cannot communicate with men. Neither do the Holy Ones entertain a desire for such communication ; for the attainment of nirvana, the ideal of Perfection and Bliss, is possible only on the destruction of all kinds of desire, and is, consequently, indicative of the state of absolute desirelessness on Their part."

For support of this doctrine all such instances from the Jaina religious books can be quoted, where the immoveableness of the



The individual, who is on his way to attain this last stage, can communicate with men in his last but one stage and during that time he can display his authority. So do all the Jainas or Tirthankaras before attaining Nirvana, and on this account they can be considered as gods.\* It is much more difficult to prove the god-liberated souls is spoken of. For instance Panchastikaya-sara I, 79.

*"payadi-ttthidi anubhūgappade sabamdhehim savvado mukko, uddam gacchadi sesū vidisūvjjam gadim jamti"* 79.

"When Jiva gets liberated from the bonds of Karma which are of different aspects of substance, duration, fertility, and extensity, he reaches the summit of the upper world." And in the same book 99—100, where the learned author explains, why Akasa should not be taken also as the condition of motion and rest :

*"āgāsam avagāsam gamana-ttthidi kāranehim dedi jadi, udh-dhamgadi-ppadhānū siddha citthmmti kīdha tattha."* 99.  
*"jahmā uvaritthānām siddhānam jinavarehim pannattam," tahmā gāmana-ttthānam āyūse jūna natthitti."* 100.

"99. If Akasa, in addition to accommodating other things, conditions their motion and rest, then why do these Siddhas whose tendency is to go upwards come to stay at the summit of the world? 100. Because the Siddhas or the perfect ones stay in the summit of the world—So it is revealed by the great Jina. Therefore there cannot be in Akasa either the condition of motion or of rest." Also Nyaya-Kusumanjali II, 1-8. can be quoted in support of the doctrine.

\* The same idea is pronounced by Champat Rai Jain in, "The Key of Knowledge" in continuation of the above quotation (note 8) by saying : "It is thus clear that revelation can take place only prior to the nirvana of a Tirthamkara, that is to say during the period marked at one end by the acquisition of omniscience and at the other by the entry in nirvana."

This being an authority for the religious dogmas and ordinances is the chief feature of a Tirthankara, what is styled in Jaina way of expression by Prof. Hiralal R. Kapadiya, in his commentary to Nyayavijaya's Nyaya-Kusumanjali I, 10. p. 36 thus : "One who establishes a Tirtha is called a Tirthamkara. A Tirtha means a four-fold collection—male and female ascetics (Sadhus and Sadhuis) and gentlemen and ladies (Sravakas and Sravikas). It also means Dvadasangi and as he is the real cause of it, he is hence also called a Tirthankara." It is evident from this quotation, that the Tirtha is considered by the Jainas as "religious community" or "church" producing the "ford" or "path" towards the Liberation, and the Tirthankara the cause of it.

hood of the other muktas, who have had no opportunity to display their authority on mankind, if we require god to be more than a simply perfect one.\* There is still another question to be settled namely whether a being who cannot communicate with man is a perfect one, or not. Notwithstanding these difficulties we can at this stage of our investigation accept as a preliminary fact that the Paramatman in the Jaina religion is the equivalent of god in other religions.

Paramatman, regarded from the standpoint of the Jainas is a soul absolutely liberated from all solid matter in which fact indeed lies its perfectness. This perfectness is considered as consisting in liberation from bodily bonds, omniscience and freedom from any connection with the material world.\*\* If it is a fact that every liberated soul (muktah-siddhah) is god, the number of gods in the Jaina religion is really an infinite one, as the attainment of liberation depends only and solely on the karmans of men. On the other hand if the question is considered from the standpoint, that perfectness includes unity, the muktas must be regarded as coalescent in the stage of perfectness. That is already presumed

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\* The absolute perfectness is quite sufficient as a property of a being to render it a God. But the Christian scholar requires more detailed definition of the idea of perfectness and therefore the following exposition for the support of the thesis that all muktas are Gods seems to me to be necessary.

\*\* Heaps of quotations from the different Jaina scriptures—canonical as well as non-canonical can be gathered. I select only a few of them, to reproduce the same idea in the original Jaina expression.

Davva-Samgaha 14.

*"nikkammā attagunā kimcūnā caramadehado siddhā,  
loyaggathidū niccū uppādavayehi sanjuttā."*

The Siddhas are void of Karmas, possessed of eight qualities, slightly less than final body, eternal, possessed of rise (Utpada) and fall (Vyaya), and existent at the summit of Loka.

Davva-Samgaha 51.

*"natthattakammadeho loyūloyassa jānao datthā,  
purisūyāro appā siddho jhāeḥa loyastharattho."*

Meditate on the Siddha the soul which is bereft of the bodies produced by eight kinds of Karma, which is the seer and knower of

by the supposition of omniscience.\* Beside the perfect ones, the *muktas*, which are *paramatman*, there are, according to the Jain belief, several groups of *devas* who (in rendering the doctrine in English, must be styled as gods or deities. That is, however, only a quantitative and in no way a qualitative difference. The Jain doctrine about these *devas* is summarised in Chapter IV of the *Tattvarthadhigama Sutra*. According to this work, there are four groups of *devas* with further subdivisions into classes and grades. For our purpose only the main division is of importance. These four groups are : *Bhavanavāsī*-residential gods, *vyantara*, peripatetic, *jyotishka*, stellar, and *vaimānika*, heavenly ; the translation is that of J. L. Jaini.\*\* The *devas* are not *muktas*, but they

*Loka* and *Aloka*, which has a shape like a human being and which stays at the summit of the universe.

*Panchastikaya-sara* 31 and 32, compares the perfect ones with the imperfect souls in order to show the nature of the later.

“*agurulahugā anantā tehi anamtehim parinadā savve, desehim asamkhādā siyalogam savvamāvannā.*” 31.

“*kecittu anāvannā micchādamsanaḥasūyajogajudā, vijudā ya tehim bahugā siddhā samsārino jiva.*” 32.

31. The spiritual qualities of *Jiva* are infinite. *Jivas* assume different forms through the manifestation of these infinite attributes. Taking the point of world-space some souls through their complete manifestation may fill the whole world. 32. Others are not so fully manifested. These are filled with false faith-blinding emotions, erroneous knowledge and perception. The former class of souls are free from these defects and are called the perfect ones. And the latter are the *Samsari-Jivas*, or the imperfect ones. Each class contains infinite number of individuals.

Compare on this object also the quotations in note 7.

\* This point is explained more thoroughly below.

\*\* Cf. *Tattvarthadhigama Sutra*, IV. 1, 10—12, 16.

“*bhavanavāsino 'sura-nāga-bidyut-suparnagni-vātā-stānitodadhi - dvīpa-dikṣumārāh.*” 10.

“*vyantarāh kinnara kimpurusha mahoraga gandharva yaksha rūkshasa bhūta piśācāh.*” 11.

“*jyotishkāh sūryā-candramasau graha nakshatra prakīrnaka tārakāśca.*” 12.

“*vaimānikāh.*” 16.

are beings in different stages of individual evolution, some of them having even bodily sexual intercourse, others having at least the sexual enjoyment by means of touch, sight of beauty, sound and mind and only a few are free of sexual desire. \*The number of the stages in the individual development which are to be assumed by the different classes of devas are also different. Only the devas residing in the highest part of the Brahmaloaka are in the last but one stage, and they shall be born in their next incarnation as human beings and shall attain liberation. Therefore, they are called Laukantikas i.e., whose "loka" has come to an end.\*\* These devas of the Jainas with their names and classifications resemble in many respect the devas of the Hindus, especially the Vedic gods. But we do not find in this enumeration all the modern Hindu gods or even the complete Vedic pantheon, a fact, which is most important in the comparative study of the Indian religions.

In the modern Jaina belief these devas are considered as minor gods or deities, who are an indispensable link in the individual development of man, and an important element in the construction of the world, in which respect the Jaina view is very akin to the similar theory of devas in Buddhism although in the latter the existence of devas at least in the oldest stages of the doctrine—is doubted and is not considered at all sure and essential for the doctrine itself. \*\*\*

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With regard to translation I suggest for Bhavana-vasins, Gods in worldly abodes, for Vyantaras either outside Gods or simple Outsiders, for Jyotishkas, Astronomical deities, which expressions agree more with the scientific requirements.

\* Tattvarthadhigama-Sutram IV., 7—9.

"kāya-pravicārū ūatsanāt." 7. "śeshāḥ sparśa rūpa śabda manah pravicārāḥ 8. "pare pravicāra." 9.

\*\* Prof. H. R. Kapadiya in a personal discussion suggested another explanation of the word, viz., "having the ends (i.e., the corners) of the world," then "living in the corners of the world." Against this etymology of the world speaks the fact that they are called also Deva-rishi (Cf. The Jaina Gem Dictionary by J. L. Jaini.)

\*\*\* More explicate exposition of the Bauddha view is given below:

(To be continued).

# **Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara**

OF

**Sri Vadideva Suri.**

*Translated by Harisatya Bhattacharya, M. A., B. L.*

*(Continued from page 47 of Vol. XIX No. 2.)*

*Sutra 10.*

A word is a combination of letters which are related to one another and which are unrelated to the letters of another word ; a (similar) combination of words makes a Sentence.

*Commentary.*

Ordinarily a word must consist of at least two letters ; some single letters e.g. 'A' etc. are by themselves complete words and signify 'Vishnu' (the God, who pervades all) etc.

*Sutra 11.*

A word signifies its object by means of both its natural and applied forces.

*Commentary.*

The above doctrine is opposed to (1) the view of the Naiyayikas according to which a word expresses its object only by its Applied (i.e., acquired force and has no natural force and to (2) the view of the Buddhists (the sangatas) according to which a word cannot express an object even by means of its Applied force.

The Jaina argument directed againsts the Naiyayikas is as follows :—'Applied Force' (*Samaya*) is the significance or meaning applied to a word by men. 'Applied Force' is thus subject to the will of man. The will of man, however, cannot determine the nature or real relationship of objects and phenomina. If that were so,—well, the object might have been the signifier and the word, the signified. The Naiyayikas may contend : "That which has the Generalities (*Samanya*) e.g. the general essence of 'Ga' the general essence of 'O' etc. etc. is the Signifier i.e., the word ; the rest are the Signified i.e., the objects,—just as that which in addi-



tion to having the essence of substantiality has the essence of Fire is what produces Burning and not that which has the essence of Water." This argument is not valid. Without a supersensuous Natural Force, the essence of Fire cannot be a productive cause. The Essence of Fire exists even when phenomena other than Burning occur. If the Nyaya position were true, the Essence of Fire might as well be the cause of the Removal of Thirst, just as it is held to be the cause of Burning. Thus without the supposition of a supersensuous Natural Force, the causality of the Essence of Fire cannot be admitted. Similarly, what has the Generalities e.g. the general Essence of 'Ga', the general Essence of 'O' etc. etc. cannot be held to be the Signifier i.e., the word, unless there be supposed in it a determining Natural Force. The Naiyayikas argue:—Why should we suppose a Natural Force? The Essence of Fire along with its attendant conditions is competent to produce Burning; there remains nothing to be done by the alleged Natural Force. The argument again, that Fire might as well be the cause of the Removal of Thirst like that of Burning, is not valid. We cannot determine at our will (non-existent) relationship between phenomena. We follow the state of facts as observed and act accordingly. Water would not remove cold nor Fire, Thirst at our will. We determine Fire and not water, to be the cause of Burning and act accordingly,—because reliable and authoritative persons have so determined or because we have the positive experience that wherever there is Burning there is Fire and the negative experience that wherever there is no Fire, there is no Burning (*Anvaya Vyatireka*). Now, this Naiyayika argument also, is fallacious; Fire is found to cause Burning; but the very self same Fire is not found to do so, when some Mystic processes etc. intervene. This shows that although the Fire has the experiential Essence of Fire, it does not burn at the time because the said Mystic processes etc. have suppressed the supersensuous Natural Force or Power. The argument that we know Fire to be the cause of Burning because the authoritative persons have so determined or because we have the positive and the negative experience is only a statement. If Fire causes Burning by its Nature alone, why does it not remove Thirst as well? The Naiyayikas urge, however, that just

as our positive and negative experience tells us that Fire is the cause of Burning, it is also apparent from it that the Non-existence of the obstacle to Burning is the cause as well. In the case where Fire is found not to burn we are not to suppose that some supersensuous Natural Force vanished from Fire but we are to hold that obstacles to Burning are present and that consequently there is a derangement of the conditions of Burning. This Naiyayika argument is invalid. The Non-existence of the Obstacles is Non-existence (*Abhava*) and as such, necessarily opposed to Existence (*Bhava*). How then, can Non-existence be the cause of an Existent fact (viz., Burning)? The Nyaya-philosophers contend :— 'Non-existence can be the cause of existence. Let us take an example. It is said that Non-performance of daily duties causes Sin. Here Non-performance which is of the nature of Prior-Non-existence (*Pragabhava*) is said to be the cause of Sin, an Existent fact.' The Jainas point out that the Non-performance of daily duties does not mean pure Negation but that it really implies (positive) Performance of acts consisting in the Non-performance of the daily duties. The Naiyayikas quote :—"The Non-existence of the Enemy and the Friend *causes* respectively Pleasure and Pain. The Non-existence of the thorns *makes* one lay his foot on the road." The Jainas point out that really speaking, here also the Non-existences are not the causes. The causes of the Pleasure, the Pain and of the Laying of the Foot are (the positive) facts of knowledge concerning the Non-existence of the Enemy, the Friend and of the Thorns. And the positive facts of knowledge are generated by positive phenomena opposed to the existence of the Enemy, the Friend and the Thorn. The Naiyayikas say :—"Let Negation also be capable of generating an Existing fact,—just like an Existing fact. Non-existence does not consist in absolute impotence; it means something capable of being known as non-existent. Existence or a positive fact means something capable of being known as existent and Non-existence or a negative fact means something capable of being known as non-existent." The Jainas urge that this argument is unsound in as much as Non-existence as conceived by the Naiyayikas is diametrically opposed to Existence and as such, cannot be its cause. The Jainas develop the following

sylogism,—“Non-existence cannot produce Existence; because it is diametrically opposed to Existence; that which is so cannot do so; as for example, the Horns of a Horse; So is it; therefore, it cannot.” Non-existence, in this argument, is to be understood in the sense of the Naiyayikas; it means either Prior Non-existence (*Pragabhava*) or Posterior Non-existence (*Pradhvamsabhava*) or Reciprocal Non-existence (*Parasparabhava*); it does not include Absolute Non-existence (*Atyantabhava*) here, because the Naiyayikas themselves admit that this mode of Non-existence cannot be the cause of Existence. The Nyaya position is that although Non-existence is opposed to Existence, it can be the cause of it. The Jainas, however, hold that Non-existence can generate Existence because the former is in some sense, not different from or opposed to the later. The Jaina philosophers develop the syllogism referred to, simply to show that if you hold Non-existence to be opposed to Existence, you cannot argue that the latter can originate in the former. The Naiyayikas try to refute the syllogistic argument by pointing out that the Jainas cannot show how they come across their idea of Non-existence. For if they say that it is got through the Pratyaksha or Perception, it is clear that thereby they are led to admit that the Pratyaksha, an Existent fact can come out of Non-existence. Anumana cannot give the idea of Non-existence for to establish Non-existence, Anumana must have the idea of Non-existence at first; this requires another Anumana and this, another and so on. It is not the province of Upamana or Analogy to deal with Non-existence. The Naiyayikas say that if the Jainas contend that the idea of Non-existence is got through mere Supposition (*Vikalpa*), then it is inadmissible, as it is not a piece of valid knowledge. Thus the philosophers of the Nyaya school maintain that the Jaina syllogism is invalid as the Abode, Non-existence is not proved. The Jainas answer that the syllogism is quite sound; the idea of Non-existence is got through mere Supposition. That which is non-existent cannot be got otherwise than through Supposition. The very fact that we use words denoting objects which are non-existent, shows that we get the idea of Non-existence through Supposition. The Abode in a syllogism is often yielded by Hypothetical Supposition. The Example in the syllogism

under consideration—the Horns of a Horse—is also given by Supposition. This Example proves that a Non-existent fact cannot give rise to something Existent. Hence the example in the given syllogism is also sound. It cannot be argued that as the Jainas maintain that Non-existence is not opposed to Existence, the *Hetu* or Reason in the syllogism,—“Because it (Non-existence) is diametrically opposed to Existence”—is contradicted by the Jainas themselves. For, as already pointed out, the Jainas were considering in the syllogism, Non-existence as conceived by the Naiyayikas themselves. Besides,—the Jainas do not maintain that Non-existence is identical with Existence. Thus the syllogistic argument, as developed by the Jaina philosophers, conclusively establishes that Non-existence cannot be the Cause of Existence. Then again, if the Non-existence of the Obstacles is held to be something different from the Essence of Fire, Fire itself becomes of the nature of the Obstacle. And if so, how can Fire generate Burning? Next,—it may be asked: If the Non-existence of the Obstacles be held to be the Cause, why is not the Effect (Burning) produced if one of the Obstacles only is present, although there is the Non-existence of the Obstacles, so far as the rest of the Obstacles are concerned? A Pitcher, for instance, which is produced by a Potter, would not cease to be produced if one of the Potters of the world is non-existent; it would be produced by the other Potters of the world. If the Obstacles are held to be each different from the other in nature (and not similar to one another, as in the case of the Potters) and their Non-existence means the non-existence of all of them,—then we may say that Burning would never be effected; the collective Non-existence of all the Obstacles is an impossibility; in the world, there is always one or the other Obstacle to Burning. If it be contended that the Non-existence of those Obstacles only is the cause which are known to have the power of suppressing Fire, the Jainas point out that this contention is really based on the conception of some supersensuous Force or Power. It is also unproved how the Non-existences of the other Obstacles can serve as the subsidiary conditions to the Cause. Hence the argument is fallacious,—“Non-Existence which also is of the nature of Existence

can be the Cause. It is not fair to admit any supersensuous Force."

The philosophers of the Aushapada school (Nyaya) try to set aside the Jaina theory of the Natural Force in the following way:— 'What is your theory of the Obstacle? Is the obstacle inoperative, or operative? If the obstacle is inoperative, then a Horn, a Fly, a Pot etc., might as well be called obstacles (to Burning). If it is held to be operative, is it productive or destructive? If the former,— does it produce a Force, opposed to the power of Burning or does it produce a different quality or nature? The former cannot be the case, as there is no evidence for it; the Non-existence of Burning is effected if there is the Obstacle; the latter is not found to generate an opposite Force. If you admit that the Obstacle generates a different quality or nature, you admit thereby that the Non-existence of the Obstacle produces Burning and that Non-existence can be the cause. If you say that the Obstacle is destructive, does it destroy the Force (or Power) or does it destroy the Nature? If the Obstacle is held to destroy the Power of Burning, how can Fire burn again? If you say that another Power of Burning is generated we ask: To what is this generation due? To what gives rise to it or to the Non-existence of the Obstacle, or to the Group of conditions due to Space, Time etc., or to something supersensuous? The first alternative is meaningless; we say that the power of Burning is generated when there is the Non-existence of its obstacle; we could not say so, if the generation were due to what gives rise to Burning. If you admit the second position, then you admit causality in Non-existence and need not suppose a supersensuous Force. Thirdly, the Group of conditions due to Space, Time etc., cannot be the cause; as it is present even when the Obstacle exists. If you admit the fourth alternative and say that Something supersensuous generates the power of Burning, what then, is the use of supposing further a supersensuous Force for the generation of Burning? Hence it is not reasonable to suppose that the Obstacle destroys the Force. And similarly, it is unreasonable to hold that the Obstacle destroys the Nature." The Jains maintain that *the Obstacle destroys the Force*. That Force, once destroyed, is regenerated from another Force, inherent in Fire itself. The Naiyayi-



kas contend :—‘ When the Obstacle is present, does this ‘ another Force ’ exist or not ? If it does not, how is it generated ? If you say that it is generated from still another Force,—the position obviously leads to Infinite Regression. If you hold that it exists, then you must hold that it generates the Force, (i.e., the power of Burning) at the time the Obstacle is present.’ The Jainas answer that at the time when the Obstacle is present, this ‘ another Force ’ is also existent and does generate the Force, (viz., the power of Burning) but that the Obstacle destroys the Force as soon as it is generated. As soon as the Obstacle is removed, however, the Force becomes manifest. Thus is established the doctrine of the supersensuous Force. In the same way, it is to be understood that a Word signifies its Object through its inherent Natural Force. It cannot be contended that if the Natural Force is admitted in a Word, it alone is competent to express its sense, so that the Applied Force becomes useless. The Applied Force is useful in a subsidiary way just as Water, Soil, etc., are necessary in the origination of a seed-shoot. It is said that if a Word be supposed to have a Natural Force, it cannot have different meanings ; the word, ‘ *Chaura* ’ (thief), for example, is understood by the people of the South, to mean ‘ crying ’ ; such differences in the meaning of a Word,—it is contended,—show that a Word cannot have a Natural Force. The Jainas criticise the position by pointing out that all Words have the power of signifying all Objects ; the particular significance of a Word is determined by the particular conditions of a country which thus attach what we call the Applied Force or the Acquired Meaning to a Word.

The Sangatas (Buddhists) object to the Jaina doctrine that a Word signifies its Object by means of its Natural and Acquired Forces, in the following way. They ask : What is the nature of the Object, signified by a Word ? Is it of the nature of Generality ? Or, of Individuality ? Or, is it of the nature of both Generality and Individuality ? The first cannot be the case, as Generality has no ‘ productive potency ’ and has not existence like the Sky-lotus. The second also cannot be the cause ; Individuality consists in the strictest form of particularity ; such strict particularity cannot be a matter for conception and hence cannot be expressed through a

Word. Even if such particularity can be embodied in language, it is clear that a Word is useless when it is used because it does not express the nature of the Object at that time when the Word is used (because the Object has undergone change during the time between the formation of the word and the actual use of the Word) In the third case, we ask : Does the Word express Generality and Individuality in their exclusiveness or in their identity, You cannot hold the first alternative position for the reasons, just stated. The second position is not maintainable, as Generality and Individuality contradict each other and cannot be identified. The Buddhist conclusion is that a Word does not signify an object. Our idea is strictly particular ; one idea is strictly different from all others ; a particular idea has its own particular cause and corresponds to one particular thing ; hence every idea is strictly particular. The internal idea of our mind is externalised and owing to the faculty of conception, it is generalised. When a Word is heard, it simply generates an idea of the object, similar to a previous idea. A word is thus ' *Apoha* ' i.e., that which excludes the dissimilars. Really, however, there is nothing which is signified ; and really, there is nothing which signifies. The relationship of the signifier (the Word) and the signified (the object) is really one of cause and effect. It is the mental ' *Apoha* ' or idea which reflecting itself in the faculty of conception, is the word and which, externalised and ' re-ified ' in that form is the object. The Jaina philosophers point out that the Buddhist themselves admit that an idea, although strictly particular can be generalised; it thus appears that the object corresponding to the idea is both particular and general ; and from this, it may safely be said that what is signified by a word is generality and Individuality identified in some sense. It is thus established that a word signifies an object. The Jainas further contend that a word signifies its object no less truly than Reasoning (Anumana). The Buddhists urge that Reasoning is a valid and reliable source of knowledge, as it leads to objects, (i.e., real facts), although in a mediate way. The Jainas answer that a word might similarly be held to signify its object mediately. The Buddhists point out that there are Words e.g., ' Sky-lotus,' ' The Past ', ' The Future,' etc. etc., which do not correspond to

actually existent facts. The Jainas criticise this Buddhist contention by pointing out that we have such syllogistic arguments— 'There *was* Rain : as the mountain streams are found to be swift ; ' 'The Bharani-constellation *will* rise ; as Rebati-constellation is sun , ' 'The horns of an Ass are *non-existent* ; as such phenomena are opposed to the matters of all valid knowledge ;—and say that although all these arguments have actually, non-existent facts as the matter of their conclusion, yet no one would reject them as unsubstantial. The Buddhists argue that if a Word be said to correspond to an object, then the words of a cheat e.g., "They are drowned in Alubu (a green-vegetable-fruit)" become the expressions of true facts. The Jainas point out that although there are such syllogistic arguments as, "This is a reality ; because it is knowable,"—we do not rely on them. The Buddhists contend that the syllogistic argument is unsound because the Mark in it, *i.e.*, 'knowability' has not the characteristic *viz.*, its 'Retgression from the Dissimilar Abode' and that hence the reasoning is unreliable. The Jaina philosophers would argue in the same manner that the said words of a Cheat are unreliable as they do not come from a reliable and authoritative person. The Buddhists urge that it is not possible to determine whether the words heard come from a reliable person or not. The Jainas ask : Why should it be so ? Do you mean to say that there is no person who can be relied on ? Or, that even if there be such reliable persons, it is impossible to know that they are reliable ? Or, that even if they are known, they remain silent ? Or, that even if they speak, they would speak falsely ? Or, that even if they speak truly, their words would be unintelligible to us ? Well, these are worthless arguments ; even the Buddhists themselves treat with due respect the words or in junctions of their mothers, fathers, brothers, teachers, and of the Sugata (the Buddha). Hence, even according to the Buddhists, there are reliable Authorities. The Buddhists advance the further argument that the understanding of the significance of the Authoritative person's sayings involves Reasoning (Anumana). It is in this way :—"That person intends to express the object signified by the word, 'Tree' ; because he has used the word, 'Tree' ; like myself, on former occasions." This reasoning is followed by the

reasoning :—"The intention of the person is valid ; because it is the intention of a reliable person ; like the intention of mine." It is contended by the Buddhists that it is thus that the object is inferred from the word. The Jainas point out that this argument is identical with the Vaiseshika argument and is set aside by the criticism of the inferential theory of the Word, advanced by the Vaiseshikas. It may further be urged that even the Buddhists would admit that such syllogistic arguments would not be applied if a person, calls a Room, a 'Tree' instead of calling 'an object having branches etc.' the 'Tree.' It is accordingly more reasonable to hold that a Word signifies its object directly. Then again, the Jainas criticise in the following way, the Buddhist doctrine,—Our idea corresponds to one particular thing. What do you mean by the 'one particular thing' ? When we perceive, do we have the idea of one single object only in our mind ? This cannot be, because along with the idea of the object perceived, we have the ideas of the objects from which the former object is differentiated. Or, are we to mean by 'one particular thing,' Identical Substratum which remains unchanged, though its Modes change ? This cannot be, as such a Substratum is not admitted by the Buddhists. Finally, it cannot be said that 'one particular thing' which is the object of the idea, is the fact that it is different from all other things. For, such a fact cannot be a concrete object for an idea. The Jainas criticise the Buddhist theory that 'one idea is strictly different from all others.' If every idea is different from all others, then it may be said that no idea is different from other ideas, because all ideas have the general characteristic of being different each from the others. Secondly, it may be noted that an idea in order to be different from another, must be similar to it in some respects. The Jainas point out that a similar line of argument would expose the fallacy of the Buddhist positions e.g., 'each idea is due to its own particular cause' etc. etc. Next, the Jainas ask,—If the idea, 'reflected in the faculty of conception,' is itself the object, signified by the Word, how is it that the object is treated as something external to us ? If it is contended that the object is really internal and subjective, then our cognition of the object as external to us, becomes invalid.

If the Buddhist argue that there is no harm in our cognition of the object as external to us becoming invalid,—the Jainas would ask: How would you then explain our tendency to approach nothing but Fire, when we want Heat? Lastly the Jainas point out that the relationship of the Signifier and the signified (word and object) cannot be explained away as one of cause and effect. In that case, the word might be looked upon as the cause of the idea or sensation of sound; and as such, might as well signify the idea or the sensation (instead of signifying the object). Then again, just as word or sound is said to be the cause of the idea or the sensation, so the absolutely particular characteristics of the object under observation also may be looked upon as the cause of the idea, although indirectly; and may consequently be the signifier. Thus the Buddhist theory leads to the destruction of the relationship of the signifier and the signified.

The Jaina doctrine is thus established that a Word signifies an object which has both Generality and Individuality.

*(To be continued).*

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## THE JAINA EDUCATION FUND ASSOCIATION, MYSORE.

At the invitation of the public of Bellur and surrounding villages a Special Session of the Association was held on Sunday the 29th April 1923, in Bellur under the Presidency of the Sriyutha N. Dharanppa, Merchant and Honorary Magistrate of Mandya. A large and distinguished gathering of members and visitors was present.

Mr. M. L. Vardhamaniah as President of the Association opened the proceedings with a review of the work done since its last Session during Dasara in Mysore. In the course of his very instructive address, which followed, he traced the origin and development of the Association and explaining its aims and objects appealed for generous contributions towards the Fund of the



Association. He then considered some of the vital problems that confront the Jaina Community of to-day and urged unity and co-operation as essential for its regeneration. He emphasised the necessity of making the best use of the special opportunities that are now before them, cautioning at the same time that communal love and brotherhood are more helpful to the progress of a community than communal hatred and jealousies. Continuing, he made some relevant observations on the defects of the present day system of popular education and said that technical and industrial education which is more useful and in fact more in demand should be adequately provided for from the earlier stages. He closed with an exhortation regarding the responsibilities of parents and students in respect of the welfare of their fellow brethren and society at large.

The President of the Session, Sriyutha N. Dharanappa, then made a lengthy speech in the course of which he dealt with the glorious traditions and the history of Jainism and of its priceless contributions to India's literature. He advised the modern students to seriously study Jainism and to spare no pains in giving it as wide a publication as possible. He wished libraries to be opened in all Jain centres and appealed for generous help for their development. He touched upon the discords that at present prevail and said that unity is vital for all progress, without which all efforts are fruitless. He then addressed the students saying that mere acquisition of academical degrees does not complete a man's real education but that character is the most important part of it, for the formation of which they should pay their greatest attention in their youthful days. They have great duties to discharge towards the propagation of Jainism and they should sincerely leave no stone unturned to fulfil them to the best of their capacities.

Speeches of other members followed, of which particular mention may be made of those of Mahavidwan Dorbali Jinadasa Sastriyar of Sravanabelagola and Sriyutha Shroff Padmarajiah of Saligrama who spoke on the comparative merits of Jaina Philosophy and religion and were very highly appreciated by the audience.

Discussion of propositions was then taken and the following were among the most important that were moved and passed :—

1. That this meeting desires to place on record their great sorrow at the demise of its most benevolent patron, Sriman Mothikhana M. Padmnabhiah of Bangalore, to whom the Community owes a deep debt of gratitude for his valuable gifts, particularly the Bangalore Boarding House.

2. That this Special Session desires to express on behalf of the Jaina Community in general their feelings of loyalty and gratitude to the Government of His Highness the Maharaja for the valued privileges they have bestowed on the Association with a prayer for their gracious continuance.

3. That a Sub-Committee, Members of which to be nominated by the Managing Committee of the Association, be formed to study the report on constitutional reforms and draft recommendations relating to the interests of the Jaina Community, for submission to Government.

4. That with a view to bring about better co-ordination and efficiency, it is necessary to form a Thirthakshetra Committee of influential Members (to be nominated by the Managing Committee) to supervise the affairs of all Jain Temples in the State and to publish a report annually together with a certified statement of accounts thereof.

5. That the Jaina Community assembled in the Special Session desire to express their dissatisfaction with the interference of Government in the affairs of Sravanabelagola which is a Jahagir granted to His Holiness the Swamijee and is regarded as of utmost sacredness by all Jains throughout India, and very much regret the recent action of Government in regard to the nomination of a Vice President as they have gone quite against the wishes of the Jahagirdar who is the head of this holy place and of the members of the Community in general; and that it respectfully prays the Government of His Highness the Maharaja to give consideration to the representations of the Jaina Community and His Holiness the Jahagirdar and to cancel the present election system and permit His Holiness to nominate his Agent for the post of Vice President in future.

Subscription lists were then sent round and a collection of Rs. 1,500 was made towards the fund of the Association, promi-

nent among the donors being Messrs. N. Dharanappa, President, and A. Padmarajiah of Mandya, who subscribed Rs. 501, each.

The Meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the Chair and to Sriyutha Gangappa to whose enthusiastic efforts the success of the Conference was mainly due.

## NOTES AND NEWS.

Elsewhere we are publishing a very learned and interesting article on "The Idea of God in Jainism" by Dr. O. Pertold, (Consul for the Czecho-slovak Republic). We are sure that our readers would peruse it with great pleasure and profit. Since the article is highly suggestive and thought-provoking, we hope our readers would kindly ventilate their views on the topic through the columns of the Jaina Gazette as soon as Dr. Pertold's series of articles on the subject will be over.

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We hope that our numerous readers are by this time well acquainted with the famous argumentations of Sri Vadi Deva Suri so excellently translated for the English-knowing public by Mr. Harisatya Bhattacharya. Superfluous readers are likely to lose interest in a translation that appears month after month. But a close and careful reader would find that the translation of Pramana-Naya-Tattvalokalamkara published in our Gazette has none of the discordant effects of a translation about it while each instalment of it in every number has got one central topic to deal with, with all the relishing attributes of a complete essay in all cogency. Thus, in this number we publish the discussion on the Jaina Doctrine that a word signifies an object which has both generality and Individuality and this topic is complete in itself.

## Bharat Jain Mahamandal.

We hear with great relief that the Bharat Jain Mahamandal which has been living in a state of temporary torpor for sometime past is now being renewed into activity and vigour. The Mahamandal was founded in 1899 and during its life of about a quarter of a century it has been associated with the illustrious names of such selfless workers as B. Deva Kumar, Danveer Seth Maneckchand, Messrs. Chaitan Das, Ajit Prasadji, J.L. Jaini, Benarsi Das, C.R.

Jain, B. Sultan Singh, B. Jagmander Das, B. Maneckchand Jaini, Sri Sital Prasadji and others. An organisation which has been connected with such master minds of our community must not thus be allowed to take care of itself. It is indeed unpalatable to say and to hear that there is something wrong some-where in the community. However it has to be told, it being nothing but absolute truth. It is the duty of the leaders of our community to diagnose the disease spots in our organisation and apply the necessary remedies.

That an organisation of the kind of the Mahamandal is quite indispensable for the welfare of the community is a fact too well known to need any elaboration at our hands. It is only under such a broad banner that the Jainas of all sects can freely meet one another and concert measures for their common progress. Unfortunately for the Jainas, they have more than once forgotten, that they are pre-eminently Jains but have only remembered that they are Digambaras or Svetambaras. Little does the ordinary Jaina think that he is as much the follower of the Arhat as his friend who is also a Jain but by chance is born a Digambara or a Svetambara as the case may be. He grows ferocious at these petty distinctions and is prepared to spend thousands to vindicate the claims of his own sect and villify those of his opponents. At a time like the present in the history of our country when the social, political and religious destinies of India are cast into the melting pot, it is but prudent on the part of the Jainas to meet on a common platform and resolve about their future.

We are strongly of opinion, as we have very often said that Jainism has a Universal message to offer for the pacification and betterment of the world. The celebrated Jaina doctrine of Universal love, "Live and Let Live," is being preached by the world's Greatest thinkers, political and religious. In order that Jainism may fulfil this great world-mission, the Jains, the custodians of this message must gird up their loins and prepare themselves for this great task. To accomplish this, Jainism must maintain its independence as it has always been doing from time immemorial. It was this independence that gave Jainism a dignity, a cohesiveness, an individuality and a self-sufficiency of which no other religion

can justly be proud. Again it was this unique independence that enabled Jainism to successfully withstand the philosophical onslaughts of Buddha, Sankara, Ramanuja and others. It is for the Jains to prove what their sacred literature contains and to justify their existence. In order to do this a central organisation is necessary and to supply the same the Mahamandal is revived into life. By aiding and taking part in the activities of the Mandal a Jaina may be said to discharge his religious as well as social and political duties. For, we believe that a true Jaina would be a true citizen since Jainism enjoins on him all the rules of citizenship within its code of ethics. For instance Prof. A. B. Latthe, M.A., M.L.A., has shown by a table how the five minor rules of conduct (the five *anu-vratas* of Jainism) cover the same ground as the twenty-three chapters and 511 sections of the Indian Penal Code.\* Thus it is believed that in a country where Jainism is practised more and more, peace and good-will will reign to a greater and greater degree. For unlike the modern politicians, the Jaina thinker cannot conceive of a state apart from its religion.

The Jaina thinker always conceives of a state based on spiritual foundations which is indeed in harmony with the earliest conditions of society, in days of yore, when the key to the whole composition of society was its religion. Religion was the one conclusive motive and sanction of all social order in that early time, as it continued to be for many centuries afterwards; and the heads of religion were of course the rulers of Society.

"It is because of the rule of such conceptions of civil magistracy, as an authority, resulting from the priestly function of the head of each social group, that we find primogeniture the ruling order of succession alike to eldership, to chieftainship and to kingship: and it is because of this same rule of religious thought in social organisation that we find every Magistrate, even those of the later times when Magistrates were elected, exercising some priestly function, as if to supply a necessary sanction for his Civil powers. The Magistrate was always next to the gods, was always their interpreter and servant."

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\* *An Introduction to Jainism*, by A. B. Latthe, M.A. pp. 65-69.



Thus in everyway the political life of the city spoke of religion. In short Politics was a religion. And we wish that some such state of society must return if the existing misery and sorrow of the nations must vanish. Instances of a strong nation preying upon a weak neighbour are not wanting. Such a sad state of affairs would disappear only when Politics and Religion go hand in hand. And it must be further told that even the internal solidarity of a state will greatly depend upon its spiritual foundations. It was an admirable saying of Plutarch "That a city may as well be built in the air, as a commonwealth or kingdom be either constituted or conserved without the support of Religion." And the religion which stands on the grand fulcrum of Universal fraternity and which deeply concerns itself with national morality and welfare is Jainism. But only a very few men will be found ready to hear the claims of a religion, that is professed by only a few millions of people, to be considered as being one of the greatest faiths preached for the moral welfare of the entire humanity. The standard by which the modern public judge the soundness of a theory is the number of men who are willing to say "yea" to it. Even students of comparative philosophy are first drawn towards only those religions which are numerically strong. Thus it was that Hinduism and Buddhism first attracted the attention of the oriental scholars. It is only of late that the great orientalists of the west had their eyes slowly opened to the hitherto ignored treasures of Jaina Philosophy and literature. The Jainas must rise up to the occasion and demonstrate the theosophical nature of Jainism. It must be said that Jainism is in fact the essence, the abstract, the undercurrent, in short the religion of religions.

And it is the religious duty of every right thinking Jaina to spare no pains or brains to preserve and propagate the divine message contained in the Jaina sacred Literature. It is with this exalted idea that "**The Devendra Printing & Publishing Co., Ltd.**" has been floated in Madras. And again it is to concert measures for the social, religious and political advancement of the Jaina community that the **Bharat Jaina Mahamandal** has been revived. We hope that all educated and wealthy

Jainas would patronise these two invaluable institutions by becoming shareholders and members thereof.

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At the fourth sitting of the Universal Religious conference Mr. Bhatina, the Chairman for Zoroastrianism remarked that if Ahimsa is taken to its logical conclusion, just as the Jainas do and that too after Dr. J.C. Bose has discovered that plants have life, it is impossible to live at all. He also said that according to Zoroaster the whole world is for the benefit of man and that man and innocent animals were the creations of God whereas the wild animals and insects such as bugs and mosquitoes, which kill, hurt or annoy man were the creations of *Harum* or Devil; and as such he contended that it was the duty of every man to put an end to the creations of Devil since he created all these beings only to irritate and oppose God. Mr. C. S. Mallinath, rose up and said, "Who is this devil that created all these so called wild beings which molest mankind. May I know if it is the Devil without or within man himself. It is man that has designed such a course for himself. The all-powerful man has at the height of his selfishness come to think that the whole world is for him. Every living being has as much liberty to live and move about freely as man himself.

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We are told that if Ahimsa is interpreted just as the Jainas do we cannot live. My only answer is that the Jainas do live and have been living from time immemorial practising the doctrine of Ahimsa. I am glad I am myself a Jain. The discovery of Dr. Bose that vegetables have life forces was only too well known to the ancient Jaina thinkers. And hence their theory of Ahimsa. They do not want a Grahastha or householder to give up every vegetable and die of hunger. Specific stages are fixed in the course of a man's life during which he is expected to give up one attachment after another until at last he may require almost nothing for food or dress. But the Grahastha is allowed to take only the single-sensed vegetables which is enough to keep body and soul together in a healthy condition. The ascetics are prohibited from even plucking a fruit or leaf from a tree. Certainly this testifies to a man's powers to control his self, to conquer his

attachment to his body and to walk towards the Kingdom of God. It all depends upon how a man views a question from the earthly or the spiritual standpoint. But even then I believe that a man of true conscience would not countenance Himsa for the sake of anything under any circumstances from any point of view.

A public meeting of the Jains of Jaipur assembled in the premises of the "Vir Sevak Mandal" passed the following resolutions unanimously on the 28th April, 1923.

(1) Resolved that this meeting emphatically protests against the proposal of the recent Nandgaon Sessions of the Bombay Prov. Digambar Jain Sabha, extricating Jain-Dharma Bhushan Brahmachari Sital Prasadji from the Editorship of "Jain Mitra" which though an organ of the Prov. Sabha is yet an all-India Jain paper.

(2) Resolved further that a copy of the above resolution be wired to the Managing Committee sitting at Surat with a request to reject the Nandgaon proposal and that copies of the resolutions passed be sent to the press.

### All-India Jaina Association.

K. L. Ajmera Jain, Provincial secretary writes :—

The first session of the All-India Jain Association (Rajputana Province) was held at Mahavirji on the 3rd April, under the presidentship of Captain Dr. Brijratna Kasliwal Jain, M. B. B.S., I. M. S. of Orai.

Messages from various leaders of the community were received and read, prominent among them being the following from Sjt. Rai Jagmanderlal Jaini Bahadur, M.A., Bar-at-law, Chief Justice, Indore High Court and President of the All-India Jain Association.

Message: "Not by mere words but by life the true eternal Heart of Jainism is to be shown to the world to reduce the troubles, pains and miseries of the mundane souls in the Universe. May your branch of the Mandal succeed at the feet of Lord Mahavira."

Speeches were delivered by Mr. Champat Rai Jain, Bar-at-law, Babu Brijbhushansaran B.A., LL. B., Vakil. B. Karpoor Chandra Patani, Brahmachari Chhoteylal, Pandit Makhanlal Shastri, Lala Gaindilal Gangwal and Babu Kesarlal Ajmera.

The following office-bearers were then unanimously elected for the coming year.

President, Mr. Sultansingh Jain, B.A.,

Provincial Secretary, Mr. Kesarlal Ajmera Jain,

Treasurer, Seth Ramchandra Khinduka

With a vote of thanks to the chair, the meeting came to an end with shouts of "Jain Dharma Ki Jai" and "Mahavira Swami Ki Jai."