India

FOR THE

No. 95. New Series. / No. 189. Old Series. WEEK ENDING FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1899. Registered as a Newspaper. Price..... 2d. / By Post, 2½d.

NOTES AND NEWS.

THAT there should be great differences of opinion on the Punjab Land Alienation Bill was only to be expected. It is, however, unfortunate that these differences extend even to the causes of indebtedness. The *Englishman* which champions the Bill with great warmth, begins by brushing aside as belated all arguments drawn from the abstract political economy of Mill and his predecessors; but it is not in such arguments that the strength of the opposition lies. It then goes on to consider how that indebtedness arose which the new legislation is intended to remedy, and it finds the cause in the smallness of the Government demands:—

> Because we asked for a low land-revenue agricultural land in the Punjab increased rapidly in value, with the result that the envious money-lender cast his eyes upon it. The simple peasant was inveigled into borrowing a few rupees, and presently, by means which he could not understand but dumbly acquiesced in, his ancestral acres were seized by the money-lender.

Further on, our contemporary, contrasting the misery in Native States with the happiness under English dominion says:—

> The Punjabi pays a revenue he hardly feels, and has besides the protection afforded by settled rule under honest and sympathetic officials.

Now throughout, the *Englishman* takes the ground that (1) rents in the Punjab are low, (2) because of their being so low, the agriculturists borrow, and (3) they borrow not because they must or will, but because the money-lender inveigles them into borrowing. Well might the Government pray to be saved from their friends.

This article appeared in the *Englishman* of October 4, and several of the points in it had been answered by anticipation in the *Tribune* of September 30:—

> It is not because the "bania usurer" possesses some mysterious power of fascination that he draws unwilling victims into his meshes. The Sirkar's dues must be paid, and paid in time to escape the "pressure" from the Tahsil minions. The times are hard and the income from the produce of the fields and from a few other scanty sources barely suffices to keep the wolf from the door.

Lord Curzon invited discussion on the new measure, but it is difficult to see what advantage can be derived from a controversy in which one side attributes the evil to the lightness and the other to the heaviness of the land-tax. There is, however, an artificial air about the theory of the *Englishman*. The peasant "rapidly" growing in wealth and only borrowing because of the temptations held out by the usurer makes a curious picture and one quite out of harmony with the usually received accounts of the Indian rayat. If it be true, it must be true of the Punjab only; and it would seem then, that the indebtedness in other parts of India has a different cause. If the peasant of Madras borrows because of his poverty, and the peasant of the Punjab because of his wealth, it would seem that the former has the first claim on Government protection, and what becomes then of the elaborate reasons put forward by Lord Curzon for beginning with the Punjab? In that case we are driven back to one sole reason: the Punjabi makes a better soldier, when he holds the position of a landowner. He is to be protected that he may make the better food for powder.

A cynic might thus find by combining the two views the true source both of the evil and the remedy in the militarism of the Indian Government. Extravagant military expenditure requires heavy taxation which begets indebtedness, and the fear of losing one of its chief recruiting grounds makes the authorities look on that indebtedness as dangerous. But this is perhaps to lay too much stress on one side of the matter, for its military side is not the only one on which our rule is expensive. The idea, however, that the land tax in the Punjab is low seems preposterous. If it is so, then the Punjab is not the province where the Government should first offer protection. It seems much more probable that the evil of indebtedness in the Punjab, as elsewhere, has two sources—one the heavy land tax, strictly enforced, and so from time to time driving the cultivator to borrow, and, secondly, the strict enforcement of debt by our courts. The proposed legislation may be considered as an attempt to undo the effects of the latter of these causes, but it is open to question if much advantage will be gained by dealing with one cause while the other is left in full operation. If the rayat cannot pay his land tax without borrowing, it is difficult to see how he will gain by making it more difficult for him to borrow. It will only be to exchange the pressure of the usurer for that of "the Tahsil minions," as the *Tribune* expresses it. This is a point which the supporters of the Bill, whose good intentions are obvious, should deal with. To deny that the rayats have any difficulty in paying the land tax is only to discredit their other arguments.

If it be asked where the money-lender gets his security if the rayat can only just pay the land-tax, the answer is practically furnished by the *Englishman* and by Lord Curzon. The security is not the margin between the low land-tax and his income. It is the margin between his present mode of living and that mode which would just keep body and soul together. The *Englishman* and Lord Curzon affirm that when he is sold up by the money-lender he becomes less valuable as a soldier. What is this but to affirm that then his scale of living is depressed? The land-tax can only be said to be low, in that in good years it leaves the owner more than a bare subsistence. In bad years he borrows on the security of this margin. How far will it help him to deprive him of this power of borrowing, if the need of borrowing in bad years remains as strong? To save the rayat from any lowering of his low standard of comfort is indeed a work of the greatest importance; but it seems that one part of any successful plan must be either to make the land-tax more flexible, if it be kept high, or else to make it so low that bad years can easily be provided for out of good. The first plan is generally considered inimical to good cultivation. Is there any argument except the expensiveness of Indian Government against the second?

At a time when we are hearing so much of the moderation of the land tax and the reasonable character of new assessments in India it is curious to find a grievance of the rayats put forward by the *Times of India*. It has received a petition from certain landowners of the Thana district complaining of the new assessment of their lands. These complaints may be divided into two heads, and certainly, as our contemporary insists, require an answer. The first relates to procedure. When the revision survey was held the usual notification to landowners to bring to notice any improvements they had made was not issued, so that they fear improvements made by the rayats may have been taken into account in fixing the revised assessment, contrary to the Act of 1886. The second and more important was that the original assessment on the Taluka, or group of villages, had been increased 36·6 per cent., while in thirty particular villages the increase has been from 68·2 to over 190 per cent. Now this is an infraction of the "Magna Charta" of the Bombay rayat, the Government Resolution which prescribes that the increase on a taluka

"shall not exceed 33 per cent.; on a single village—unless the circumstances have been specially reported to Government—66 per cent.; and on individual holdings 100 per cent." The *Times of India*, after mentioning a previous case in which the resolution was set at nought, adds:—

The additional revenue thus arising is an advantage to the State upon which Government is justified in setting store. They would lose it by observing the rules marked down in the well-known limitation resolution. But, on the other hand, what would they gain? They would gain the settled confidence of the people at large, who would feel that no matter what might happen there were limits to the demand that might be made upon the cultivator which would never be passed. A diffused confidence of this kind has a money value to the State which might well be set in the scale against the proceeds of enhancements which are scarcely more disturbing to the people directly affected than to their neighbours.

These are weighty words. Is Saul also among the prophets?

The famine came under discussion in the Viceroy's Legislative Council at Simla (October 20), on a statement of the agricultural prospects by Mr. Rivaz. Mr. Rivaz thus indicated the extent of the distress:—

The area which is seriously affected comprises 100,000 square miles in British territory, with a population of about fifteen millions, and 200,000 square miles in Native territory, with a population also of about fifteen millions. Unfortunately, this area includes five-sixths of the Central Provinces and also the South-East Punjab, which suffered severely in the last famine, and where the gravity of the situation is much increased by the depressed condition of the population. Taking all India, as compared with 1896 we have just half as large an area in British territory seriously affected, with a population one-third as great, while in the Native States the area of grave distress is more than three times as large, with more than twice the population.

The region of anxiety has been considerably lessened, though in wide tracts that have just escaped, the pressure of high prices is heavily felt. The Viceroy's telegram to the Secretary of State on October 25 contained these details:—

Relief now in progress in six districts in Bombay, eleven in Central Provinces, seven in Punjab, three in North-Western Provinces, five in Berar, also in Ajmere and Rajputana. On relief: Bombay, 62,000; Punjab, 71,000; Central Provinces, 122,000; Ajmere, 77,000; Rajputana, 30,000; Berar, 39,000—total, 392,000.

The arrangements in British territory are stated to be timely and equal to the worst strain.

We can only repeat our earnest hope that the officials are nowhere deceiving themselves as to the condition of the people. The Central Provinces, apparently, will be the part of British territory to suffer most severely. The Native territory will be hit hardest in Rajputana, where the Viceroy anticipates "the suffering will be in excess of any since the sad year of 1868-69." We think the Government is thoroughly right in being "careful to do nothing to diminish responsibility or slacken the energies of the Native chiefs or durbars." Lord Curzon said:—

On the other hand, we may do much—and in Rajputana we are endeavouring to do much—by the loan of officers and the offer of expert advice, to systematise and co-ordinate local action. We can further help the Native States with loans from the Imperial Exchequer, and may, by individual acts of assistance or relief, contribute to lessen the strain.

All which assistance, we trust, will be contributed with judicious caution as well as with sympathy. We must really assume, too, that the facts correspond with the representations of Lord Curzon and other officials—quite honest representations, undoubtedly—that the lessons of previous famines have been very seriously laid to heart. Lord Curzon expressly admitted that "we have had upon the present occasion long warning of the coming scarcity;" so there will be no avoidance of the fullest responsibility. There is a pleasant ring of sympathy in Lord Curzon's reference to this "sorely-tried country and its patient and unmurmuring population." True, indeed: "sorely-tried," "patient," and "unmurmuring." But what, then, becomes of all the chatter about "sedition"? There seems to be some reason for the glad hope that Lord Curzon is really holding himself aloof from the shibboleths of the more noisy and short-sighted Anglo-Indians.

Two points in connexion with plague measures engage the attention of the *Mahratta*. One is the complaint of the *British Medical Journal* that the European doctors sent out to India for plague duty are under-paid, and that therefore the supply is not equal to the demand. But as the *Mahratta* asks, "Why employ European practitioners when there are plenty of duly qualified Indian doctors ready to serve for even less? Why ask English medical men to make these sacrifices for the Empire, when it is so much more obvious a duty for Indians to serve their own people? At Poona Dr. Reade has borne testimony that the Native medical practitioners were well qualified for the work and were trusted implicitly by the authorities; but he thought it unfair, considering their social connexions with the people, to employ them on such a delicate duty. It is wonderful how ready the British are throughout the world to take all the work of the world upon themselves. Unfortunately, this engrossing of work evokes no gratitude. Strange as it may seem the medical men of India are ready to undertake the duty of plague inspection themselves, and that at even lower salaries than those which evoke the scorn of the *British Medical Journal*.

The second point is the character of the plague measures taken at Nagpur, which differ widely from those in other places; for at Nagpur the Deputy-Commissioner has issued a notice on behalf of the Chief Commissioner in which it is ordered that no plague patient shall be removed to hospital without his consent, nor shall those who have been in contact with him be sent to a segregation camp against their will. Yet at Poona it was insisted that the removal of plague patients to hospital was necessary under the Venice Convention. The *Mahratta* warmly welcomes the new departure, which it believes by removing all motives for the concealment of cases, and by ensuring general co-operation, will render "the work of plague administration very smooth and ultimately effective." It hopes that the new experiment may be allowed a fair trial to the end.

Mr. Herbert Roberts asked (October 23) whether the House of Commons would have an opportunity of considering the provisions of the new Calcutta Municipal Act before it comes into operation in April next. Lord George Hamilton replied that he did not propose to depart from the ordinary procedure prescribed for Acts passed by the Local Legislature and reported to the Secretary of State. The answer is about as illuminative as the answers vouchsafed to Native interpellations in the Bombay Legislative Council. But in the debate on Mr. Roberts's amendment to the Address (February 14), Lord George himself acknowledged that the Bill was "a serious matter." He ought to have discovered by this time that the Act is a still more "serious matter." "He hoped the House would accept his assurance that he would, to the best of his judgment, impartially consider the many provisions of this Bill when it came finally before him." Very well. But then he will have to recognise that not one of the arguments on which he defended the Bill in that debate has survived the criticism to which they have been subjected. Why, the very action of this municipality of alleged incompetence has long since overturned the very foundation of the whole legislative project. "The primary object of this legislation," said Lord George Hamilton, "was to fight against the plague." Let him look up the plague record in Calcutta. Let him also give impartial consideration to the "Notes of Dissent" by Messrs. Surendra Nath Banerjea, Norendro Nath Sen, and J. G. Apcar.

We wrote (INDIA, vol. xi, p. 81) on February 17, 1899, these words:—

The withdrawal of the amendment without a division shows that Mr. Roberts and his friends have confidence in Lord G. Hamilton's solemn undertakings to preserve the representative character of the municipality and to review the Bill impartially when it comes finally before him.

Let Lord George Hamiliton send it back then to have its "representative character" restored. We shall be specially interested to see how he rewards the confidence reposed in his solemn word. Sir Henry Fowler, too, will have something to say. Sir Henry "did not see any evidence to justify the statement that the system had broken down, and that they should introduce into an experiment not ten years old the novel principle of substituting nominated officials for popular elected bodies and throwing to the winds an efficient popular government." "At all events," he said, "the Bill should be kept in reserve until the House on a future day and in a clearer light had a better opportunity of pronouncing a sound judgment upon it." We look to Sir Henry to carry these views into acts, considering how vastly worse the Act is than the Bill was. The eyes of Calcutta—nay, of all India—will be eagerly fixed on the House.

The *Tribune* is amazed at the idea expressed by Mr. James of taking a provision from the Punjab Act for the use of the Bombay Province—a new example of that search through India for retrograde precedents; for did not the Calcutta Municipal Act borrow some of the least popular parts of the Bombay civic constitution? The *Tribune* does not hesitate to speak of the Mofussil municipalities of the Punjab as "shams," and in every way unfit to afford examples to Bombay. But it seems that Calcutta and Bombay are not to have a monopoly of reaction in municipal affairs. According to the *Hindu*, "the Madras Government has ruled that it shall have power to veto the election of any man as municipal councillor if he is likely to bring the municipal administration into contempt or if his being a municipal councillor is dangerous to the public peace." No proof is necessary. The *Hindu* may well ask if this is "local self-government."

The Rangoon outrage, despite the local attempts to smother it, has smitten the official conscience and compelled official attention. The Commander-in-Chief, we learn, has removed all the non-commissioned officers and men concerned from the army. This we suggested as the least that could be done in the matter; and we must hope that the dismissed men will not be allowed to re-enter the army by another door. We do not know yet what is to be done by way of censure of the officers whose apathy and neglect have admittedly been direct causes of the failure of justice. In the case of some at least of them the War Office at home has to be consulted. But we understand that when the War Office has pronounced on such of them as are officers of the British Army, the decision as to all of them will be pronounced and executed. We look for firm and even-handed measures, such as to mark decisively the resolution of the authorities to do justice. Meanwhile the Government of India in the Home Department has taken up the case of the civil executive, and made their apathy "the subject of official action." We shall note the outcome of this enquiry. The very atrocity of the case seems likely to work the beginnings of a reform that has failed to obtain so much as a start from scores and hundreds of smaller outrages not a whit less shocking in principle.

The Governor-General in Council has done himself credit by the prompt issue of an Order on this unsavoury business, an Order that will rank with Lord Lytton's famous Minute on the Fuller case. Lord Curzon "desires to place on record the sense of profound horror and repugnance that has been felt by the Government of India at the incident in question." While "aware that it has been reprobated by the entire service, and that it reflects only the unthinking passions of a few and not the disposition of the mass," he rightly points out that "the effect of even an isolated case may be serious and wide-reaching." The effect indeed reaches far more widely than the illustrations he cites can be taken to indicate, and that too with more serious consequences. Lord Curzon properly stigmatises the offence, in all its conditions, as "revolting," and declares that "it is scarcely less regrettable that the efforts which were made to detect and to punish the offenders by the processes of military and civil enquiry should have resulted in complete failure." This scandalous failure is just the test point of the whole matter. It shows how far a man's comrades, and even his superiors, will go, even to the peril of their own position and reputation, in screening him from justice when his offence is against a Native of India. Lord Curzon has been prompt. Let him be thorough. So far he has done exactly what we would have wished him to do in the matter, and his tone is the tone of all our comments on the case. Let him face the real issue now. That issue is this: What is to be the temper of mind of Anglo-Indians to Indians generally? In the Rangoon case and many others it has chanced to be soldiers that were the culprits; but soldiers are by no means the only offenders. There must be one rule binding every Englishman in India, and that rule must prescribe that every Englishman shall treat every Indian in the spirit of a gentleman. Let us insist on an English attitude, not the attitude of domineering contemptuous bluster. Lord Curzon is to be congratulated so far, and especially because in such a case it is from the temper of the highest authorities that the cue is taken.

Is Lieutenant Villiers Stuart incorrigible? Our readers probably did not expect to hear of him again after his escapade in caning the *Granthi*. Yet here he is once more. According to the *Tribune* three clerks of the Public Works Department on their way to their office passed through the Abbottabad cantonments on the morning of September 26. They met the gallant lieutenant, and mindful of the fate of Bhai Kaur Singh they carefully salaamed. But this did not save them. One held an open umbrella, and the lieutenant seizing it shut it and threw it away, remarking: "Did you not know that you were in cantonments and were going with an open umbrella." Curiously enough the lieutenant who thus shows himself again so hasty in action seems to have written to the *Granthi* in excellent taste after their little affair. But as the *Tribune* says, the rules obtaining in cantonments make it certain that cases like these will occur. How for instance is an ordinary man to know an officer in mufti; and yet it is an offence not to salute him? The rules require revision.

Replying to a question from Mr. Buchanan on October 19, Lord George Hamilton stated that "all the charges, both ordinary and extraordinary," of the Indian contingent to South Africa will be defrayed "out of the British Exchequer." In the course of the debate next evening, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman spoke very plainly on the use of India as "a reservoir from which to draw troops for our own purposes," and left the question of financial adjustment open for future consideration. This attitude is satisfactory, and we hope that an early opportunity will be taken for concluding some definitive settlement. But, while satisfied with the justice of the British assumption in this instance of the "ordinary and extraordinary charges" of the Indian contingent, we think it should be made plain that this formula covers all incidental charges. The British exchequer obviously ought to pay its due share of the pension charges in relation to such troops. And, of course, the general excess of British troops in India is a large and pressing question which Sir William Wedderburn's proposed amendment to the Address would have promptly raised if Mr. Balfour had not, by consenting that Parliament should be prorogued and not adjourned, granted the usual opportunity for discussion at the beginning of the new year. We see that the *Times*' Simla correspondent estimates (October 20) that "the absence of troops in South Africa saves India £11,000 per month"—say £132,000 a year. This is no unimportant sum to have saddled India with, even for one year; and how many years has she paid for this unnecessary force? Further, how many more thousands of British troops that could be dispensed with are similarly paid for, unnecessarily, by the depleted Calcutta exchequer? Evidently on this head there is room for a sensible relief of India's finances.

We are glad to see that Professor A. F. Murison, LL.D., whose efforts on behalf of justice to India are no less indefatigable than they are able and disinterested, has written in *Commercial Intelligence* of October 7 and 14 two admirable articles upon "Our Brightest Jewel: I.—How we box it up," and "II.—How we neglect it." In the *Morning Herald*, also, of October 17 Dr. Murison had a signed article upon the Calcutta Municipal Act. It is pleasant to find the channels through which sound information about India is permitted to reach the British public being thus multiplied.

The *Hindu*, believing that the amendment of the Assam Coolie Immigration Act is near, looks with confidence to Mr. Cotton to change "the infamous system of recruitment now in vogue." One point the *Hindu* makes is very important. The position of the coolies is determined by two laws, Act XIII of 1859 and Act I of 1882. These cover much the same ground and for most purposes the planter has the choice of which he shall proceed by, but the former, being much the less favourable to the coolie, is generally chosen. Thus, as regards enlistment, Act I requires that the agreement executed by the coolies should be attested before a Magistrate in their presence. Under Act XIII a verbal agreement is sufficient, and in contending versions of this the planter obviously has an advantage. Engagements under Act I have, therefore, almost ceased to exist. The *Hindu* believes that 99 out of every 100 cases of dispute between planters and coolies are due to the "hole and corner shifts fostered by Act XIII."

"OUR RULE"—MAINLY BY RULERS.[1]

THIS book—a thick and well printed volume of over 500 pages—deals with the British possessions in Asia. The first eleven papers, occupying considerably more than half, give brief accounts of each of the political divisions of India, the last being devoted to the Native States. Other papers on India deal with the history and literature of the country, the position of women, famines, the administration of justice, by Mr. Dutt, and industries, by Sir M. M. Bhownaggree. But as regards the first eleven papers which, as we have said, comprise more than half the book, one thing is very noticeable. With the exception of that on Burma and possibly one other, they are all by ex-officials, and of these ex-officials only one is an Indian. Mr. Dutt indeed is excellently well fitted to put forward the case of the people of India; but what is one among so many? Ex-governors and ex-commissioners may be amiable and well-informed, but they cannot always be considered impartial witnesses on burning questions. It is as if an account of Ireland were entrusted to officials of Dublin Castle. We are told that these papers were for the most part originally given at South Place Chapel. It is easy to guess what the founders of that institution would have thought, in the days before the first Reform Bill, of an exposition of the British Constitution by members of the Tory Ministry, nor is it likely that W. J. Fox, whose name is associated with South Place, would have paid much respect to a work on the fiscal system of England written by eminent occupants of the two front benches when the leaders on both sides of the House were opposed to the repeal of the Corn Laws. Yet between the leaders of educated opinion in India and the great mass of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy there are differences of opinion at least as deep and as important as those between Whigs and Tories at the time of the Reform Bill, or between Free Traders and Protectionists during the agitation against the Corn Laws. To call the parties to a suit under the guise of expert evidence is a confusing proceeding, even if equal fairness is shown to both sides. To call eight such witnesses on one side and only one on the other is to give up all claim to impartiality.

Of course there is a great difference between the experts. Where Lord Wenlock is simply dull Lord Harris shows a fine modesty, a sympathy with the people, and a genial pride in the great province he once ruled, which disarm criticism. But all alike, wise or foolish, they agree in sounding the glories of our rule in India. They seldom deign to meet the arguments of their critics. Numbers of questions of the most vital importance are never even mentioned—save of course by Mr. Dutt. The cursory reader might well close the book with the belief that India was of all the governments in the world the most successful and the best adapted to the wants of the governed. But if, with the assistance of Mr. Dutt, they read between the lines they will find occasions on which their faith will waver. Sometimes the writers are betrayed into a half-confession. Sometimes, it would almost seem by inadvertence, they blurt out a disagreeable truth. It is seldom indeed that they are so candid as Mr. Luttman-Johnson, a high Imperialist who is longing for war and expansion on the North-East frontier. Mr. Luttman-Johnson in his paper on Assam sets out to tell us what "advances" other than territorial expansion have been made in that province, and gives as his first heading "Increase of Taxation." This is indeed an "advance" common to most parts of our Indian Empire, but few venture to call it by that name.

Mr. Dutt sums up the weaknesses of our government of India under two heads—expensiveness and exclusiveness. It is too costly and disregards too much the claims and the co-operation of the people. As regards the former even Mr. Luttman-Johnson says:—

> If we cannot make India pay its way without taxing the people above their means—if we cannot make each province pay its way—we must admit failure. No blessings of civilisation can atone for this fundamental delinquency. This is the bed rock of administration.

It is, therefore, all the more important that on this subject there should be no misunderstanding. Yet we have Sir James Lyall saying:—"Apart from the land-tax, which is really rent due to the State, there is no country so lightly taxed as India." Now, if one leaves aside the assumption contained in the remark concerning the land-tax, it is difficult to see what Sir James means by calling India lightly taxed. If he means that to an Englishman the taxation per head seems to be of small amount, that is, of course, true. But every rupee of taxation in India is raised in a country where vast masses of the people are on the very margin of existence, where the wealthy form an insignificant minority, and where in consequence the greater part of the revenue is paid by the poor out of their poverty. How idle, then, are all comparisons with the taxation of richer countries. Mr. Baillie tells us that in Sind, salt that costs three halfpence to produce sells for five shillings. Very few countries can show anything like this. And salt, be it remembered, is of the first necessity to a vegetarian people. Nor does Lord Harris make matters much better by saying that the octroi in Bombay city paid per head on other necessaries of life taken together exceeds the tax on salt; for the municipalities, as we know, are always being urged to greater expenditure by Anglo-Indians. Two incidental facts are mentioned which have some indirect bearing on the cost of our government. One is the loss sustained by Sind through the great number of camels and trained camel-drivers sent to Egypt for purposes of war. The other is that when the Thugs were put down, many villages were no longer able to pay the Government revenues; but nevertheless the land-tax is "rent due to the State," and never a share in the proceeds of robbery.

As to the exclusiveness of our rule, Mr. Dutt has shown how the necessity of Indian co-operation has been admitted over and over again. How unfounded are the pretences of Indian incapacity appears in another sphere from Mr. Luttman-Johnson's account of the steamers on the Brahmaputra:—

> Hitherto it had been thought necessary to provide European commanders and engineers on river steamers. The new service could not afford this, and was therefore entirely conducted by Native commanders and engineers on small salaries, all Bengalee Mussulmans. A short experience proved that this new departure was a success. The experiment was soon extended to the rivers of Bengal, which are now covered with small but very commodious steamers, commanded and engineered by Natives, doing an enormous passenger business.

But nowhere is this Anglo-Indian tendency to exclusiveness better—or worse—shown than in Mr. Lee-Warner's paper on the Native States. Readers of INDIA will remember two recent references to that subject, the one the note on the plague administration of Mysore, the other Mr. Steevens's account of the prosperity of Hyderabad, and the reliance of the people when threatened with pestilence. The former is an admirable case in illustration of Mr. Lee-Warner's cold remark that from these States "in course of time we may obtain here and there an example worth following." But both the references suggest to us other ways in which the existence of these States is beneficial. These States form an outlet for the energies of Indian statesmen and administrators which they cannot obtain under our rule. They keep the people self-reliant, for, as Mr. Kennedy remarks in his account of the North-West Provinces, in our dominions "every little village is looked after in a fashion scarcely known outside a petty German principality." One omission is common to Mr. Lee-Warner and almost all the other contributors to the book. They make no mention of that capital fact in Indian finance, the "tribute" to Europe—the enormous excess of exports over imports and the consequent disadvantage to the whole sea-borne trade of India. It is curious that those who rely with such implicit faith on J. S. Mill and other classical economists in their exposition of the population question, even though Indian statistics give them little support, nevertheless ignore the teachings of Mill on the subject of the "tribute" though they can be supported by a great array of statistics. Mr. Lee-Warner blames the Native Princes for starving their administration. It is too cheap for him. He blames them still more for extravagance on themselves. But he ignores the difference between expenditure spent in the country and expenditure a great part of which is sent out of the country. Yet this difference is fundamental.

We have left ourselves no room to deal with Sir Raymond West's introduction, though he says many wise and apposite things in a rather undecided way. Nor is there time to deal with Sir Mancherjee Bhownaggree's attack on the higher education of Indians in the name

[1] "India, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, British North Borneo, Hong Kong." The British Empire Series: Vol. I. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, and Co., Limited.

of industrial progress and technical training. But there is one subject that at the present moment can hardly be passed over—Famines in India. Mr. Baines, who writes on the subject, is a man of some philosophic insight. He does not descend to the fatuous level of Lord Wenlock, who remarks:—"I need hardly say that Government has no power over the elements." But whatever the late Governor of Madras may say, is it not the "elements" that make a famine? A failure of the rains causes a bad crop, but it is the failure to provide against the evil day that causes the famine. And yet we look in vain for any note of this distinction in what Mr. Baines writes. At one time, great numbers of the peasantry kept a store of grain for use in times of scarcity. But, whether from poverty, or over-assessment, or from fear of the strict enforcement of debt by our courts, they do so no longer. This should surely be taken into account in singing the praises of famine administration in India.

"STALKY AND CO."[1]

THE late Walter Bagehot, a very shrewd observer of men and things, said of the teaching of Dr. Arnold with its continual insistence on high ideals, that it was the worst possible for a super-sensitive, over-conscientious boy like Arthur Hugh Clough, though it was the best possible for the average boy, "the small, apple-eating animal whom we know," who would not take it too seriously. What shall we say of Rudyard Kipling's teaching, now that he has deliberately come forward, not merely as the authentic portrait-painter but as the avowed panegyrist of the average British boy? Surely that his teaching is excellent for the schoolmaster who has forgotten his own boyhood, but almost entirely bad for the average British boy himself.

Excellent for the schoolmaster, we have said. The man who lives all his life amongst boys may easily misunderstand them utterly. He necessarily stands, from his position, in a more or less artificial relation to them. They can hardly help posing before him to a certain extent; and if they find that there is profit or amusement to be derived from the game they will infallibly do it to a very large extent. To the schoolmaster who has allowed the professional screen to grow up between himself and his boys, such a book as this may come with the force of a revelation. He will find therein set down with astonishing accuracy how boys are apt to think and talk and act when they are unobserved, and what manner of judgment they are apt to pass upon their masters. Incidentally, if he is pleased (as may not unnaturally happen) with his own wit, he may learn the precise amount of value to be attached to sycophant laughter. Mr. Kipling has never shown more realistic power than in this book. He has reproduced his boyhood and its surroundings with a fidelity nothing less than amazing. He has forgotten nothing: one is tempted to add—but that is to anticipate our complaint—that he has learnt nothing either. Such as it is, the book may be invaluable, not only to schoolmasters but also to maiden-aunts. These latter will learn from it the futility of presenting copies of "Eric, or Little by Little" and "St. Winifred's, or the World of School" to frankly brutal specimens of the unregenerate British boy.

But what of the effect upon the British boy of "Stalky and Co."? Read it he certainly will, and with vast enjoyment. The leading literary journal has already told us that his verdict upon it is—"Spiffing!" But what good will it do him? The question is not an impertinence, for Mr. Kipling's prefatory verses are an avowal of a moral purpose. Here he says in effect that the life described in the book is the best of all possible preparations for manhood, teaching "Truth and God's Own Common Sense, which is more than knowledge." He complacently surveys his former school-fellows, scattered over the face of the globe, but each of them "diligent in that he does, keen in his vocation"; and he decides that for this they have to thank their schoolmasters who had proved to them with many floggings that it was "safest, easiest, and best, to obey your orders." And this moral is enforced, with a slight but significant variation, in the concluding story of the book, in which Stalky, grown to manhood and bearing his "white man's burden" with a light heart, is revealed to us duplicating upon two savage tribes a trick he had successfully played upon one of his masters in the days of his youth. As Mr. Kipling, therefore, makes no secret of his moral, but on the contrary puts it forward as prominently as he can, we are justified in asking how far it is a good one, and in particular how far it is good for the British boy to whom it is mainly addressed.

Mr. Kipling, as we have seen, pours unlimited scorn (not in the best taste) upon the clerical ideal of school life, upon the ideal expressed in Dean Farrar's widely-circulated school stories. His own ideal seems at least as much open to exception on the score of narrowness. He has given us an extraordinarily faithful picture of a particular type of boy in a particular type of school. That school, let us hasten to add with thankfulness, is not a typical English public-school, nor are his heroes really typical English public-schoolboys. The better boys at a good English public-school have a refinement which is wholly lacking to the barbarians of these stories. In writing of masters Mr. Kipling has had to draw more upon his imagination than in writing of boys, and his portraits seem proportionately less accurate. Let us hope that at "Westward Ho!" the Common Room conversation was not quite so foolish as he has reported it. The misfortune is that the boys described by Mr. Kipling are such real boys, and their animal spirits are so infectious, that every boy-reader is likely to be carried away by the fun and vigour of the narrative. Such readers will not, in most cases, stand in need of the very limited ideal of manliness here glorified. But they are likely to be insensibly, yet seriously, injured by having a standard in other things set before them distinctly lower than that to which they have been accustomed, and vastly lower than any that has been presented to them with the authority of their elders. Already it is unnecessary to use the language of prediction. The present writer knows one great public school in whose vocabulary the term "leper," derived from "Stalky and Co.," has superseded the comparatively inoffensive "ass." The coarseness of the book is not confined to language. In the appropriately named "Unsavoury Interlude" a practical joke with a dead cat is related with infinite gusto. When the three heroes of the narrative go out to enjoy the beauties of Nature—and of smoking—on the Devonshire coast, one of them "with great deliberation spat on the back of a young rabbit sunning himself far down where only a cliff-rabbit could have found foot-hold." Mr. Kipling makes one of his heroes a great reader of Ruskin. Has he himself ever read that passage in which Mr. Ruskin takes the incident of a boy "deliberately" spitting over the edge of a bridge into the stream below as typical of the foulness of much of our boasted civilisation? Mr. Kipling has expunged from the English ideal, amidst the cheers of an admiring mob, that quality of "manners"—*mores*—to which Wordsworth a century ago gave the foremost place, and to which William of Wykeham in earlier days assigned both the first place and the last. The hopes which "The Day's Work" raised in certain readers will be dashed, the distrust which "The White Man's Burden" awakened will be confirmed, by a perusal of "Stalky and Co."

[1] "Stalky and Co." By Rudyard Kipling. London: Macmillan and Co.

THE PEOPLE OF INDIA:
THEIR MANY MERITS BY MANY WHO HAVE KNOWN THEM.

Collected and Edited with an Introduction by ALFRED WEBB, *(President Tenth Indian National Congress).*

VII.

RT. HON. SIR RICHARD TEMPLE, Bart., P.C., G.C.S.I., K.C.S.I. *Finance Minister of India; Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal*, 1874-7; *Governor of Bombay*, 1877-80.

'Personal kindness and charity have always been amongst the most loveable characteristics of the Natives. These sentiments have induced men to support not only their female relatives and their aged or helpless connexions, which is well, but also their able-bodied and idle male relatives, which is not well.' . . . . 'The sympathy of Natives also spreads beyond the circle of relations, friends or dependents. It extends to the miserable wherever met with, to the living community at large, and to the needs of posterity yet unborn. The charity of Natives is, indeed, often misdirected, but is generously pro-

fuse. Every Native, who makes a fortune, immediately gives away a part of it to works of public usefulness or charity.' . . . . 'Many educated Natives have long cast away the last shreds of their belief in the mythology, the sacred story and the future world of Hinduism. But they do not become irreligious men, nor Atheists, nor Materialists. They believe in the immortality of the human soul, in the existence of abstract principles of right and wrong, in the omnipresence of a Supreme Being, who is the creator and preserver of all things, who is absolutely just and good, to whom all men are accountable after death for deeds done in this life.' . . . . 'Possibly the people of India, having, with some exceptions and reservations, a sober, orderly, and law-abiding character, may be compared favourably in respect of crime with the people in more advanced countries.' . . . . 'The Native character, as a whole, may be disparaged by some whose experience is short and whose knowledge is not profound. But with an Englishman who lives and labours in the country, the wider his acquaintance with the Natives and the deeper his insight, the greater is his liking for them. He who has the best and longest acquaintance with the Natives esteems them the most.' . . . . 'He who has the best data for an opinion regarding them and the firmest ground on which to found his belief will have the most hopeful faith in their mental and moral progress.' . . . . 'Many of their virtues are of a type or mould different from the Anglo-Saxon, but their domestic qualities shine with a quiet unobtrusive light which deserves the admiring gaze of even the most civilised nations.' . . . . 'There is, in their disposition, a cheerful and courageous patience nurtured in the midst of national tribulation, a willingness to submit the unruly will to the dictates of a venerated law, and a reliance on an Almighty Power as the refuge of the weak, and the helper of the helpless, which are akin to the best forms of religion. Those primeval characteristics which denote the refinement and elevation of human nature in all climes, and which are nurtured in the oldest epic poetry of the East and West, have ever been, and are to this hour, exemplified in the natives of India. Though there is with them a calm resignation to the decrees of ill, yet the remembrance is never lost of the eternal benevolence, in the thought, that

"Unseen, it helpeth ye with faithful hands,
Unheard, it speaketh stronger than the storm."'

'*India in* 1880,' *Sir Richard Temple, G.C.S.I., C.I.E. Murray*, 1880.

[After the Bengal famine of 1874, which involved in suffering a proportion of a population of 20,000,000, in reply to a deputation who came to thank him for his services.]

'I acknowledge the good conduct of their countrymen at large during the crisis, the munificence of all the Natives in the vast area of distress who could afford to give—the self-reliance of the poor who, instead of being pauperised by relief, relinquished the bounty of the State the moment that prosperity returned—the universal charity in all the villages, which both before and after the famine obviated the necessity of a poor-law—the fortitude with which all classes of both sexes had faced the common danger—and I called them to join me in thanking Providence for having mercifully preserved us.'—'*The Story of My Life*,' *Right Hon. Sir R. Temple, Bart., G.C.S.I.; 2 vols., Cassell and Co.*, 1896.

LIEUT.-COLONEL JAMES TOD. *Served in or for India*, 1799 *to* 1823; *Political Agent to the Western Rajpoot States.*

'If "the moral effect of history depends on the sympathy it excites," the annals of these States' [Rajpoot States] 'possess commanding interest. The struggles of a brave people for independence during a series of ages, sacrificing whatever was dear to them for the maintenance of the religion of their forefathers, and sturdily defending to death, and in spite of every temptation, their rights and national liberty, form a picture which it is difficult to contemplate without emotion.'—'*Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*,' *Lieut.-Colonel James Tod, 2 vols., 4to, Smith, Elder, and Co.*, 1829.

SIR WILLIAM WEDDERBURN, Bart., M.P. *Served in Indian Government*, 1859 *to* 1887.

'I can say that my experience of the Indians is altogether favourable. I have received at their hands countless kindnesses; and so far as I can recollect, during my twenty-one years spent in India, I never received an unkindness from one of them. They are gentle, intelligent, law-abiding, and very grateful for sympathy shown to them. Allow me to relate a short experience, as illustrating their equitable and forgiving nature. As a magistrate I committed a man for trial before the Court of Session for forgery; he was convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. It afterwards turned out that he was innocent, and the victim of a conspiracy, so the sentence was reversed, and he was liberated. A little after, when I was in my tent, I was informed that this man was outside and wished to see me. It was a painful thing to see him under the circumstances, but I called him in and said how sorry I was for what had happened, and asked him whether I could do anything for him by way of compensation? He said, No, he did not want anything; but he had heard I was worrying myself about the case, and had therefore come to beg me not to do so. He was quite satisfied with the way I had tried his case. He then made his salaam and departed, having walked many miles to perform this kindly act.'—*Supplied in MS.*

'The Indian village has thus for centuries remained a bulwark against political disorder, and the home of the simple domestic and social virtues. No wonder, therefore, that philosophers and historians have always dwelt lovingly on this ancient institution which is the natural social unit and the best type of rural life: self-contained, industrious, peace-loving, conservative in the best sense of the word.' . . . . 'I think you will agree with me that there is much that is both picturesque and attractive in this glimpse of social and domestic life in an Indian village. It is a harmless and happy form of human existence. Moreover, it is not without good practical outcome.'—'*The Indian Ryat*,' *Sir W. Wedderburn, Bart.; Harrison and Sons*, 1883.

SIR MONIER WILLIAMS, K.C.I.E., C.I.E. *Hon. LL.D. Calcutta; Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford.* (*Writing in* 1887.)

'What, then, are the best means of promoting this much-to-be-desired goodwill and sympathy between the people of England and the people of India? This is the question I have set myself to answer in the present lecture, and the answer is not difficult. I have nothing new to suggest, no special mission, no wonder-working panacea of my own to proclaim, no startling discovery to pronounce. I can only insist on principles well known to everyone around me; I can add nothing to the trite truisms already familiar to all of us. How are goodwill and sympathy promoted between any collection of individuals of widely different characters who have to live in daily intercourse with each other. They must learn mutual forbearance, they must consider one another to provoke unto little acts of kindness—little abstinences and wise reticences—they must be charitable in judging of each other, in making allowance for each others infirmities, in thinking no evil of each other, in bearing, believing, hoping and enduring all things. In a word, they must cultivate mutual charity.' . . . . 'If we are wanting in common charity—including, of course, in that the exercise of kindly feelings towards the people committed to our rule—then it is clear that all our doings in India are nothing worth. We may make laws, administer justice, preach the gospel, educate the people, lay down railroads, telegraphs and telephones, develop the resources of the country, tame and control the forces of nature for the public weal—nay, more, we may bestow all our goods to feed the famine-stricken poor—but our rule will not be rooted in the hearts of the people, our legislation will be as hollow as sounding brass, our preaching and teaching as unmeaning as the tinkling of a cymbal, our Empire as insecure as a tower built on sand, which some great storm will suddenly sweep away.' . . . . 'We are not all of us as charitable as we ought to be in our everyday ordinary relations with our Indian brethren—not as fair as we ought to be in our judgment of their character, our estimate of their capacities, our toleration of their idiosyncracies, our appreciation of what is excellent in their literature, customs, religious and philosophic.' . . . . 'I am deeply convinced that the more we learn about the ideas, feelings, drift of thought, religious and intellectual development, eccentricities, and even errors of the people of India, the less ready shall we be to judge them by our own conventional European standards—the less disposed to regard ourselves as the sole depositories of all the true knowledge, learning, virtue, and refinement of civilised life—the less prone to despise as an ignorant and inferior race of men who compiled the laws of Manu, one of the most remarkable literary productions of the world. . . . . Above all, the less inclined shall we be to stigmatise as benighted heathens the author of two religions, however false, which are at this moment professed by about half of the human race.' . . . . 'We can avoid denouncing in strong language what we have never sufficiently investigated, and do not thoroughly understand.' . . . . 'I deeply regret that we are in the habit of using opprobrious terms to designate the religious tenets of our Indian brethren, however erroneous we believe those tenets to be.' . . . . 'I deplore, too, the ignorance displayed in regard to Indian religious usages. * * * Again, we are apt to indulge in a wholesale condemnation of caste and to advocate its total abolition, forgetful that as a social institution it often operates most beneficially.'—'*Modern India and the Indians*,' *Sir M. Monier-Williams, K.C.I.E.; Trübner and Co.*, 1887.

HORACE H. WILSON. *Served in or for India*, 1808 *to* 1860; *Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford.*

'I lived, both from necessity and choice, very much among the Hindus, and had opportunities of becoming acquainted with them in a greater variety of situations than those in which they usually come under the observation of Europeans. In the Calcutta mint, for instance, I was in daily personal communication with a numerous body of artificers, mechanics, and labourers, and always found among them cheerful and unwearied industry, good humoured compliance with the will of their superiors, and a readiness to make whatever exertions were demanded of them; there was among them no drunken-

ness, no disorderly conduct, no insubordination. It would not be true to say that there was *no* dishonesty, but it was comparatively rare, invariably petty, and much less formidable than, I believe, it is necessary to guard against in other mints in our countries.' . . . . 'Frankness is one of the most universal features in the Indian character.'—*Quoted in Max Müller's 'India: What Can it Teach us?'*

J. Young. *Secretary Sassoon Mechanics' Institute.* (*Within recent years.*)

'Those races,' [the Indian] 'viewed from a moral aspect, are perhaps the most remarkable people in the world. They breathe an atmosphere of moral purity, which cannot but excite admiration, and this is especially the case with the poorer classes, who, notwithstanding the privations of their humble lot, appear to be happy and contented. True children of nature, they live on from day to day, taking no thought of to-morrow, and thankful for the simple fare which Providence has provided for them. It is curious to witness the spectacle of coolies of both sexes returning home at night-fall after a hard day's work, often lasting from sunrise to sunset. In spite of fatigue from the effects of unremitting toil, they are for the most part gay and animated, conversing cheerfully together and occasionally breaking into snatches of light-hearted song. Yet what awaits them on their return to the hovels which they call home? A dish of rice for food, and the floor for a bed. Domestic felicity appears to be the rule among the Natives, and this is the more strange when the customs of marriage are taken into account, parents arranging all such matters. Many Indian households afford examples of the married state in its highest degree of perfection. This may be due to the teachings of the Shastras, and to the strict injunctions which they inculcate with regard to marital obligations; but it is no exaggeration to say that husbands are generally devotedly attached to their wives, and in many instances the latter have the most exalted conception of their duties towards their husbands. Those who have a numerous progeny are held to be especially favoured of heaven, children being considered indispensable to conjugal bliss. A Hindu bard sings thus concerning the blessings conferred on parents on their children:—

> "The love that children waken is the bond
> That binds their parents strongest to their faith;
> By fond affection, still there needs this tie,
> To make their happiness complete and lasting."

Moreover, the ties which bind relatives together are very strong, and whenever one member of a family attains to a position of influence and responsibility in life he endeavours to help his poorer kinsfolk to posts which will secure them from want. This is in contrast to the indifference with which, in more civilised countries, a man who has acquired wealth and affluence too often treats his less fortunate relations. Another remarkable feature in Native character, and one which is peculiar to all classes of the community, is sobriety. Rich and poor alike practise this highly commendable virtue, and hence crime in India, as shown by statistics, is relatively far smaller than in other countries.'—*Supplied in MS. by Mr. Talcherkar.*

William S. Caine (M.P. 1880-95). *Author of 'Picturesque India,'* 1890; *'Young India,'* 1891. (*Writing in* 1899.)

'I do not think Englishmen realise fully the brain power of the Hindu, or the revolution in Hindu society that is being slowly evolved from the University system of India. Some 30,000 young Indians matriculate every year at the five great universities, of whom about 18,000 have graduated during the last five years, an average of 3,600 a year, in B.A., B.Sc., Law, Medicine, and Engineering. An increasing number come to this country for post graduate work, mostly in Law, at the various Inns of Court, and in Medicine at London and Edinburgh; while an appreciable number go to Oxford, mainly for the Covenanted Civil Service, and others to Cambridge. One of these last, Mr. Paranjpye, has just taken the highest honour which can be obtained in any university in the world—the Senior Wranglership at Cambridge.' . . . . 'Mr. Paranjpye's parents are poor farmers at Murdi, a village in the Ratnagiri district, on the coast of South Konkan, in the Bombay Presidency.' Neither of them has ever been to school, his mother, like most Indian women, being unable to read or write. Their life, like all Indian agriculturists, has been one long struggle for livelihood, and has little of the enjoyments or comforts possessed by an English agricultural labourer.'. . . . 'In May, 1885, Professor Karvé, a relative of the Paranjpye's, who had himself struggled from poverty to a high position in educational work, paid a visit to his native district. Staying for a few days at Murdi, he took a fancy to Rhagumath, then a lad of nine, making him a present of an English alphabet. The boy learned with such extraordinary speed and facility that the Professor begged him from his parents, and from that day bore all the expense of his keep and education. For about a year Rhagumath lived with Professor Karvé in a neighbouring village, thoroughly mastering English, fitting himself for Anglo-Vernacular school-life.' . . . . [He passed on to Fergusson College.] 'There was now 400 scholars at Fergusson College, a fine pile of buildings, equal to any College in India. The students are mostly Brahmins, sent there from just such village homes as Paranjpye's, the fees being almost nominal, and the boarding charges about ten rupees a month. To make these low fees possible all the professors enter into a mutual contract of self-denial, from the principal downwards, contenting themselves with a salary of about £50 a year for a term of twenty-one years. I know all these professors well, having spent much time in their company during various visits to India, and having entertained some of them in this country as welcome guests in my own house. All of them are men of the highest University positions and intellectual attainments. There is not one who, if he turned his back on the plough to which he had set his hands, could not readily make an income tenfold that of the pittance he receives from the funds of the College. A finer, nobler, more self-denying body of men the world cannot furnish.' . . . . [After recording Paranjpye's career in India and at Cambridge.] 'His College' [at Cambridge] 'would gladly give him the first vacant fellowship and assimilate him into the life of a great university where his remarkable powers would win him a first position and a generous income. Other friends urge a scientific career, or the English bar, at either of which he would command success. He could readily obtain high and lucrative employment in the Education Department of India. Mr. Paranjpye sets all those tempting opportunities quietly aside. His one ambition is to do for others what his cousin and the other professors of Fergusson College have done for him, and, when he has finished his post-graduate work at Cambridge, he will drop quietly into his place as Professor of Mathematics at Fergusson College, on a salary of £50 a year, finding his highest reward in the successes of other young Indians, stimulated and encouraged by his own story.'—*'Abkari,' October,* 1899.

Henry J. S. Cotton, C.S.I. *Indian Service* 1867 *to* 1899. (*Writing in* 1885. *Second extract.*)

'The people of India possess an instinctive capacity for local self-government, which centuries of misrule has not eradicated.' . . . . 'The domestic life of the Hindu is indeed in itself not more immoral than that of a European home. Far from it.' . . . . 'The affection of Hindoos for the various members of the family group is a praiseworthy and distinctive feature of national character, evinced not in treatment only, but in practical manifestations of enduring charity; the devotion of a parent to a child and of children to parents is most touching. The normal social relations of a Hindoo family, knit together by ties of affection, rigid in chastity, and controlled by the public opinion of neighbouring elders and caste, command our admiration, and in many respects afford an example we should do well to follow.' . . . . 'The stability of the Hindu character could have shown itself in no way more conspicuously than by the wisdom with which it has bent itself before the irresistible rush of Western thought, and has still preserved, amidst all the havoc of destruction, an underlying current of religious sentiment, and a firm conviction that their social and moral order can only rest upon a religious basis.'—*'New India; or, India in Transition,' Henry J. S. Cotton, Bengal Civil Service; Kegan Paul, Trench and Co.,* 1885.

J. B. Knight, C.I.E. *Indian experience from* 1852 *to* 1881; *Member of Bengal Legislative Council; Served on Calcutta Municipality, on Port Trust, on Trades' Association.*

'"The Indian character is," as you say, "a vast theme to generalise about," and except on the ground that all Indians are human beings of the Asiatic variety, impossible. Yet, on broad lines, the evidence in favour of Indian character is overwhelming. We challenge disproof of our assertion that all who come intimately and continuously in contact with Indians in any part of India learn to love and esteem them. Yet we must admit that many missionary estimates seem to contradict us. Their acquaintance is both intimate and continuous. Yet their verdict is unfavourable. But missionaries look at Indians from a special point of view, with a particular bias, so we must set their verdict on one side. In all other cases ignorance and prejudice fully account for the ill opinions expressed. The Malcolms, the Elphinstones, the Macphersons, the Lawrences, Nicholson, Munro, Tod, and a host of others give abundant proof that to know Indians is to love them. We wish a large number of English in India knew Indians even as little as we do; it would make such a difference on both sides; but there are many difficulties in the way that can only be removed by determination and steady effort. The initiative must come from the English. In the old days of British rule a friendly intimacy did exist between the men of the two races, but as English women increased in numbers this ceased. In the present day an effort is being made by some to bring about a more healthy and friendly condition of things, but as yet only a few have succeeded in breaking down the barriers. We have not heard of a single instance of disappointment or regret where this has been done. In our own case we can say with pride and gratitude that we have formed many warm friendships among Indians, friendships that made it very bitter to us to leave India, that have stood the test of many years of absence.'—*Supplied by Mrs. Knight.*

DR. MOUATT. *Professor and Principal Calcutta Medical College; Address delivered in* 1868.

"'Gratitude'—I sometimes hear many of my countrymen exclaim, who ought to know better—"has no place in their [Indian] hearts. The word is unknown alike to their learned and their vulgar tongues." When I hear such expressions I always say: "Stop a minute, my friend; you travel too fast. You jump at your conclusions without thought or reflection. Have you rejoiced in their joys, have you sympathised with their sorrows? Have you thrown your doors open to welcome them; have you ever attempted to cultivate their friendship or to meet them as your social equals? Until you do these things you are not qualified to condemn them, or to assume that which has no existence, save in your own prejudices and want of knowledge." So far as my limited experience extends I can give the most emphatic denial to the charge. . . . . Among no people with whose history I am acquainted does the grateful memory of their real benefactors live and flourish in freshness and vigour more than with the Hindus who are the subjects of the British Government.'—'*Reis and Rayyet*,' *Calcutta, May* 7, 1898. *Supplied by Mr. Venkanah.*

BY THE EDITOR.

In Madras, in 1894, I conversed with a sewing machine agent, who had travelled and done business over the globe. His principal trade now was with Indian tailors and seamsters—selling machines to be paid for by monthly instalments. I asked the proportion of bad debts in such business. He said he had found them as high as ten per cent. in the United Kingdom. "And in India?" But one per cent., and such chiefly with Europeans. "Practically we have no bad debts with the Natives. If it comes that they cannot pay instalments they will give back the machines." In open crowded bazaars or market places and on railway platforms in India were money changers. They sat at tables upon which were piles and heaps of coins of various denominations. Could money be thus exposed at similar gatherings in Europe?

[These estimates of the character of the Indian people by over sixty of those who have known them and are qualified to form an opinion are here drawn to a conclusion. Comment upon them is unnecessary. Should additional testimonies to like effect be forthcoming they will be included in the collective form which, if it is thought desirable, may be given to the whole.]

NOTES FROM BOMBAY.

THE DEEPER CAUSES OF FAMINE.

[FROM AN INDIAN CORRESPONDENT.]

BOMBAY, October 6.

While all the talk on your side is about the hostilities which have at last broken out between the British and the Boers here it is all about the distressed condition of Gujerat and Kathiawar, which have begun to feel the first effects of want of rain. We do not trouble ourselves greatly about either President Kruger or Mr. Secretary Chamberlain and his unrighteous war which will entail untold sacrifice of blood and treasure. It is an unequal war, for the strength and resources of the little Republic cannot last long against the might and wealth of England. If we are at all interested in the deplorable event, it is in the moral which the war must teach. The brave and independent Afridis, though possessing but the rudimentary "resources of civilisation," showed how well they could hold their own in their native fastnesses. Even the Afghans displayed prowess against overwhelming odds before Bala Hessar, under the intrepid Mahomed Jan. And when a community or nation, be it Asiastic or African, fights for independence, it is dangerous to forecast the ultimate results of the warfare. It is fruitless to conjecture what the Boers may do for their country under the exasperating circumstances created by the Colonial Secretary and fanned by the fiery spirit of the Jingoes. But the trampling down of the weak has been the policy of Great Britain ever since her more adventurous sons set forth from the silver sea to build or make empires abroad. India was an easy prey to the empire-makers of the eighteenth century. The country was weakened by internecine struggles, and force and fraud were considered not unworthy means to acquire the country to gain a foothold in which an imperious and "Imperialist" Queen and an avaricious King sent ambassadors to the Court of the Great Mogul. The Transvaal war is a chip of a block that has been seen before in Asia, Africa and America, and which will be seen there again. The Transvaal is destined to be destroyed. But the historian of the next century will have to record on a mournful page how the struggle was forced on a brave people in no way a match in resources and strength for England, and how flimsy were the pretexts which served to mask it.

India is therefore listless. Her heart is full of woe for her famishing people. There has been a condition of chronic lamentations these four years. Famine succeeded by plague and plague succeeded by famine again, with but a short interval of respite from starvation, is a doleful story. Again the question comes to the front, Why the people have no staying powers the moment the monsoon fails. In former years somehow they *were* able to withstand the ravages for the first three or four months. It is not so now. It would seem as if every famine only proclaimed in louder tones the dismal cry of the people that they are going downward and downward in their resources. Six months ago the Finance Minister spoke in glowing terms of his surplus of four crores, part of which he ascribed to his "bumper harvests." He forgot to tell his colleagues at the Council table that the "bumper harvests" brought no prosperity to the household of the rayat. Whatever prosperity there might be was in the coffers of the State, which were filled with the land revenue, current and suspended, collected with relentless rigidity. The "bumper harvests" enriched the *sowcar* and through the *sowcar* the Imperial treasury. But what escaped the Finance Minister was well-known to one of the representatives of the people who did not miss the opportunity to remind him how part of the surplus was obtained. The rayat borrowed of the *sowcar* and it was the *sowcar* who filled the Imperial treasury. The rayat from year to year goes from bad to worse. Thanks to the State land laws—the fountain and origin of subsequent woes and financial embarrassments to him—he is more and more irretrievably lost to the *sowcar*. The *sowcar* is the product of British polity in connexion with the land laws. Between these two the poor peasant has been crushed like the earthen pipkin between two iron pots.

Yet there are State optimists who proclaim from divers platforms, and even from front benches, that it is to the reckless disregard of Malthusian principles that the rayat mainly owes his misfortunes. In their glowing enthusiasm for the benefits of the *pax Britannica* these apologists have never cared to dive below the surface and discover the true causes of the impoverishment of the Indian peasantry. On the contrary, whenever they are directly charged—that is to say, whenever their land revenue policy is directly charged—with the mischief wrought on the peasantry, they proclaim that they are so benevolent as to demand much less than their immediate predecessors in the country did. But they forget that whatever was taken from the peasant, be it more or less, never wrought this degree of impoverishment on him. It did not throw him into the jaws of starvation and death immediately on the failure of the rains. He and his family had enough to eat and enough to tide over the distressing period. He may have eaten less, but he was not thrown on the charity of the State or of private individuals the moment the want of rain created scarcity. Why? Because the Native Governments almost invariably adjusted their demand to the annual condition of the actual produce.

All that has been changed. The Survey Settlement Officer came first and the tax-gatherer followed him. Their combined efforts slowly drove the fairly prosperous peasant into the hands of the *sowcar*. Then, as the Survey Officer once more came round, followed by the tax-gatherer with his improved Land Revenue Code, the *sowcar* further tightened his hold on the indigent wight. So that the net effect of the land revenue policy of the last hundred years has culminated in a hopelessly indebted peasantry with insufficient food year in and year out, and with nothing but starvation staring them in the face the moment the monsoon fails. Famines, we are told, are a providential visitation. But the question is why were famines in India a century ago so much less terrible calamities than they are to-day? It is idle to talk of population growing inordinately. That is not a fact, as the Census proves. The plea of improvidence and want of thrift, too, though frequently heard, was exploded long ago by an official Commission. Yet when it suits their purpose the official optimists fail not to fall back, in the absence of cogent reasoning, on their fallacies, which mislead the ignorant.

In brief, it is the land revenue policy of the State that demands urgent reform, as Sir John Caird effectively pointed out in his separate memorandum nearly twenty years ago.

The agrarian problem, even in times of plenty, is assuming serious proportions, and every successive Government which delays to find a solution of it, leaves its successors a graver and more formidable task. Reform this policy and you will find that with it the condition of the peasant will be ameliorated to no inconsiderable an extent. The horrors of famine will be greatly diminished, the sustaining powers of the rayats will be materially increased, and a more cheerful condition will be established than the grim and gruesome one now yearly witnessed.

India has within a tougher and more permanent enemy than the Cossack on the border of the Hindu Kush. That is the grim monster of chronic starvation among millions. Let England, with her practical statesmanship, kill this monster instead of spending millions on repelling the external enemy who hitherto has done little or no injury to the country. Is it not strange that a civilised power like Great Britain, with her boundless resources, cannot devise means to stamp out famine from India? She has only to move in the right direction. Has she got the right type of statesmen to achieve that purpose? If not we know what is certain to happen. Vice-regal platitudes and State Secretaries' eulogies will never do any practical good. These are pabulum for ephemeral consumption. They only obscure the real situation and postpone the evil day which is certain to arrive if this most pressing problem is not looked squarely in the face and satisfactorily solved. The Indian Government must cease to continue an ostrich-like policy.

THE RANGOON OUTRAGE.

PROMPT ACTION BY LORD CURZON.

IMPORTANT ORDER IN COUNCIL.

THE GOVERNMENT'S "SENSE OF PROFOUND HORROR AND REPUGNANCE."

It is now authoritatively announced that the Commander-in-Chief in India has removed from the army all the non-commissioned officers and men of the West Kent Regiment who were concerned in the appalling outrage at Rangoon.

Disciplinary measures in regard to the officers of the regiment are under consideration, but these may probably involve delay by reason of the necessity of reference to the Home authorities.

Meantime it is stated that the Government of India in the Home Department is taking notice of the apathy of the civil executive in the matter, and the following extremely important order of the Governor-General in Council has been gazetted:—

"The Governor-General in Council, who is invested with the supreme control of the army in India, is unable to pass by without a formal expression of the opinion of the Government of India on the recent occurrence, in which a regiment of her Majesty's army has been implicated at Rangoon. The Governor-General in Council does not claim to review the verdict of the court of justice, nor to interfere with the disciplinary powers vested in, and to be exercised on the present occasion by, the Commander-in-Chief. There will, however, be an inevitable delay in the issue of these orders owing to the necessity of reference to England.

"In the meantime the Governor-General desires to place upon record the sense of profound horror and repugnance that has been felt by the Government of India at the incident in question. The Governor-General is aware that it has been reprobated by the entire service, and that it reflects only the unthinking passions of a few and not the disposition of the mass, but the effect of even an isolated case may be serious and wide-reaching. Heroism on the battle-field or self-sacrifice in the struggle with human suffering—virtues for which her Majesty's soldiers in India have earned a proud and just reputation—are thereby alike depreciated.

"That the offence itself should have been committed under the conditions that have been publicly disclosed is revolting; but it is scarcely less regrettable that the efforts which were made to detect and to punish the offenders by the processes of military and civil enquiry should have resulted in complete failure, owing in the main to the negligence and apathy that were displayed in responsible quarters in the earlier stages of the investigation. These matters will be made the subject of official action.

"The Governor-General in Council is anxious to say no word which might seem to imply that the army as a whole is involved in the disgrace that has fallen upon one of its regiments. With the officers of the army, however, rests the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of their men, and in their custody are placed the honour of the service and the credit of the ruling race. Similarly, it is for the soldiers of her Majesty's forces in India to uphold the honourable traditions of the uniform which they wear, and in the irksome and sometimes uncongenial conditions of service in a distant land to practice that discipline which is their duty as soldiers, and that self-restraint which is incumbent upon them as men. The Governor-General in Council is confident that in neither case will this appeal be disregarded."

THE TRADE OF INDIA AND INDIAN BURDENS.

[From the "Investors' Review."]

Some very instructive information can, with patience, be extracted from the annual "Statistical Abstract relating to British India," the latest number of which has just made its appearance. By availing ourselves of the figures thus brought together, we propose in this article to look into the question of India's power to bear the load we have laid upon it. Necessarily our examination of the question cannot be exhaustive in any single essay, but it may be possible to bring out one or two vital facts upon which fresh enquiries might be based. And naturally the question that first of all thrusts itself upon the mind is whether the foreign trade of India provides enough margin to enable that country easily to meet the permanent obligations imposed upon it by England. This is the question of questions, but, unhappily, a complete answer to it is impossible, because, for one thing, the statistics available cover only a limited portion of the field of enquiry.

If, however, we eliminate all accidental aids in the form of new capital subscribed here for public works to be executed in India, and come down to the bare figures of imports and exports, it becomes comparatively easy to demonstrate that India is one year with another altogether unable to meet the British Government's demands in London. Let the reader look at the following table, which goes back for only ten years from the latest date the abstract gives us, the year ended March 31, 1898. Out of those ten years it will be seen that in four alone did the excess value of the exports over that of the imports cover the amount of the Indian Council's drawings in London and leave a surplus. Each of the other six years gave a large deficiency—that is to say, the whole surplus value of the exports of India, merchandise and treasure, was not enough to meet the English demands upon the Indian revenue. But the question naturally arises, Is this mode of presenting the facts a fair one? Putting aside the fall of the rupee as a disturbing element, must we not add to the value of the exports a considerable percentage representing the profit obtained by the exporter when the goods are sold at their point of destination?

Year.	Total drawings on Indian Treasuries, in rupees.	Excess of Exports over Imports. Total over-sea trade including Government stores and treasure.	Excess (+) or deficiency (−) in trade balance to cover drawings.	Average exchange value of the rupee.	Amount in sterling required.
		Rupees.	Rupees.	*s.* *d.*	£
1888–89	208,901,000	155,484,000	−53,507,000	1 4·379	14,262,859
1889–90	224,187,000	187,100,000	−37,087,000	1 4·566	15,474,496
1890–91	211,869,000	84,410,000	−137,459,000	1 6·089	15,969,034
1891–92	230,828,000	273,050,000	+42,222,000	1 4·733	16,093,854
1892–93	284,784,000	302,790,000	+35,006,000	1 2·984	16,532,215
1893–94	157,236,000	151,210,000	−6,026,000	1 2·546	9,530,235
1894–95	309,790,000	349,390,000	+20,000,000	1 1·100	16,905,192*
1895–96	310,854,000	322,900,000	+12,046 000	1 1·638	17,664,492
1896–97	257,870,000	197,300,000	−60,540,000	1 2·451	15,526,543
1897–98	138,128,000	105,900,000	−32,228,000	1 3·354	8,836,688†

* £6,000,000 Treasury bills, issued in London, and £4,000,000 of it added to permanent debt in forty years.

† £6,000,000 Treasury bills issued in London. Total floating debt at this date, £8,594,016.

Probably this ought to be done, but suppose we added an all-round ten per cent. to the value of these exports, the position would not be very much changed, because there is one item of expense to India left out of account in both totals, and that is the cost of freight. The great bulk of the over-sea commerce of the peninsula is carried on in British ships, or ships of other nations than India. It follows that both the imports and exports of India have to be charged with the cost of carriage. This would take away something from the profits obtained on the goods sold out of the country and add something to the price at which the imports may be valued on arrival—how much we have no means of knowing.

On the whole, then, it is best to take the figures as they stand—for the average of years, at any rate—and the warning they give us is not a pleasant one. Its emphasis would be modified slightly for the worse if we were to add in the land trade statistics relating to business between India and neighbouring Asiatic countries. This trade for the last seven years

shows an aggregate excess of import over export values of about 49,000,000 rupees. To that slight extent therefore, they worsen the position of the Indian people in relation to their foreign creditor. These figures, it may be added, embrace not only the value of the merchandise imported into and exported from British India, but the value of Government stores and of treasure, or bullion and specie, out and in, so that we may take them as broad and fairly trustworthy indications of the country's position.

One remarkable thing about these figures is the extraordinary instability they disclose in the course of Indian trade. It is up and down, up and down, never five years prosperous, never for long particularly progressive. The largest total surplus of exports over imports shown in the decade tabulated was that for 1891-2; 1892-3 was also good, and the country was at that time apparently on the way to great prosperity, thanks in part to the stimulus given to exports by the falling exchange, but next year, the year after the closing of the mints, the excess of exports over imports fell to just one half the total of the previous year. Then there was a rebound during the succeeding two years to be followed by the extreme leanness of the two years ending with March 31, 1898, the years when the trade felt most severely the consequences of the last appalling famine, and when the import trade was first galvanised by the efforts of the Government of India to force up the rupee.

But with it all the trade of India does expand. Since 1893-4 the value of the imports of merchandise alone has never been under 729,000,000 rupees. This part of the trade indeed is steadier, and on the whole more progressive than the exports, for the exports of merchandise have fluctuated between 976,000,000 rupees in 1897-8 and 1,143,000,000 rupees in 1895-6, so rapid are the ups and downs. The exports of 1897-8 harked back to the total for 1888-9, and almost reached it. In the intervening years, apart from the highest figure attained—that for 1895-6—the total never reached 1,100,000,000 rupees. These figures are for merchandise alone. Doubtless price has some considerable influence on this stagnation, but it cannot have much on the wild fluctuations in totals from year to year because prices, except for wheat, have not fluctuated much recently in a favourable sense; their tendency, rather, is steadily downward. The fact that this is the case aggravates rather than diminishes the burden laid upon the people of India by our fixed demands against them.

But if India for a great number of years has been unable on the average to meet the obligations we have, without forethought or calculation as to her resources, laid upon her, how is it that she has strength to go on without foundering under our hands? We have often explained this point. It is because we are always feeding her with fresh supplies of our capital under one guise or another. What the total amount is that we have sunk in India this "Statistical Abstract" does not permit us to state. There are many tables devoted to an account of the debt of India, but none of these include the whole capital of the guaranteed railways or of the numerous British companies organised to cultivate tea and coffee, to carry on manufactures of various kinds, and to conduct banking and mercantile business within the dependency. We should like if the industrious compilers—who get together in this annual volume a marvellous amount of information on a variety of interesting subjects—would devote some attention to this most important division of their subject, and construct in tabular form an account of the total amount of English money at present sunk in India, and its growth for a series of years, exhibiting the increases or decreases of it. On page 335 such a table is given showing a total capitalisation of 331,233,000 rupees, an increase of 4,148,000 rupees in ten years; but no effort is made to distinguish British from Native enterprises. Without some such statement it is quite impossible to realise how far India is sustained against the danger of insolvency by fresh help from the capitalist, other than the usurer who lends direct to the Government or the railway companies. Unaided, however, by help of this kind, we can still get some rough idea of the rapidity with which fresh railway money at least is poured into the peninsula to seek remunerative employment there. Taking the account of the obligations of the Simla Government, as set forth on pages 134 and 135, we find that the Government's debt in India has expanded from 1,113 million rupees in 1888 to 13,013 million rupees to March 31, 1898, while the debt in England has within the same period risen from £84,140,000 to £123,275,000.

This represents only a portion of the progress, because railway capital has been poured into the country to an amount in excess of the total debt figures already quoted. Leaving the guaranteed railways, whose total capital is hid in annuities to the extent of at least £40,000,000, on our side we find that the total expenditure on State railways out of capital rose from 915,400,000 rupees in 1888-9 to 1,323,200,000 rupees in the end of March, 1898, an increase of 407,800,000 rupees. Within the same period the capital expenditure on irrigation works rose by about 62,000,000 rupees. Also since 1890-1, when the last reduction in guaranteed railway nominal capital took place, 85,000,000 rupees have been added to the capital expenditure of the guaranteed railways. It follows that some 555,000,000 rupees at least have been spent out of capital in these ways within ten years, and probably almost the whole of this capital, which we may take at £55,000,000, owing to the loose methods of Indian accounting, has been found in England. This is at the rate of £5,000,000 per annum, and to the extent that this money has been found by us, the dead weight of the steadily-expanding fixed "home charges" on the Indian people has been counterbalanced.

After all, however, the rapidity with which Indian resources are being mortgaged, and mortgaged beyond endurance, can be measured most significantly by taking the growth in the amount of bills of exchange drawn by the Secretary of State in London on the Indian Treasuries each year. In the book before us we have a tabulated statement of these drawings for five quinquennial periods. In the first of these periods, ended March 31, 1878, the average annual amount of bills drawn was 132,630,000 rupees; in the succeeding one, ended March 31, 1883, the average was 188,775,000 rupees; in the third, ended March 31, 1888, it was 181,538,000 rupees, a slight decrease on the average of the preceding five years, but still an immense expansion upon the quinquennium ended March, 1878. We come next to the five years ended March 31, 1893, and find the average drawings for that period to have risen to 228,132,000 rupees; while in the period ended with March 31, 1898, the average was 234,757,000 rupees in spite of the severe abstention of the Government in the last year of the five. These bills represent all sorts of items besides debt interest, and we know that the unproductive charges, as they are called, for pensions, civil and military, for furlough allowances and other outgoings as well as for military supplies, paid out of new loans sometimes, and relays of British troops are all included. But allowing for all these, most grave in their import though they are, the expansion of the total drawings has unquestionably been due in no small degree to the increase in the fixed burdens of State debt and railway capital imposed upon the Indian people. And one remarkable thing about some of the years is the occasional sudden drop in the Secretary of State's drawings. The full extent of that drop will be seen in the table given above, which shows that both in 1893-4 and 1897-8 the Secretary of State was obliged to pause to avoid collapse.

When in the latest of these "go easy" years it is noted that, coincident with supended drawings, the surplus balance of exports over imports was the lowest in any year of the ten given, it is surely reasonable to infer that had the ordinary drawings of the Secretary of State been maintained in that year an end would at once have been put to the attempt of the Indian administration to screw the rupee up to a permanent 1s. 4d. exchange value. Indeed, these figures and the debt movements together, as far as revealed, let us into the secret of the means used to keep the rupee up. In order to prevent bankruptcy the Indian Government, directly the country exhibits signs of complete exhaustion, substitutes a floating debt in London for Council drawings on India, and often an increase in the fixed debt as well, for in 1896-7 £2,400,000 of 2½ per cent. sterling stock was issued, and in 1897-8 a floating debt to the amount of £6,000,000 in India bills was also created. No quinquennium passes without a sensible increase in the purely Treasury debt alone. But for this dangerous method of relieving the Treasury the finances of India would to all appearance at the present moment have been in the hopeless confusion which usually precedes a State's determination to compound with its creditors. No wonder that Lord Curzon and all the official classes are preaching the doctrine that what India requires is large amounts of new capital to develop and make marketable her wonderful resources. To us this mere preliminary glance at these few vital figures teaches the very opposite lesson. India has had too much of our capital thrown into it without forethought or calculation as to what it implied in the way of a dead weight laid upon the Indian people. More capital poured in now with the same regardlessness of consequences can only put off the immediate evil day at the expense of an increase in the ultimate rapidity of the decadence.

Imperial Parliament.

Thursday, October 19.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE TROOPS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

CHARGES BORNE BY THE BRITISH EXCHEQUER.

Mr. Buchanan asked the Secretary of State for India whether he could undertake that no part of the expenses connected with the despatch and transport of the forces from India to South Africa, or of their pay or maintenance during such service, should be borne by the Indian revenues.

Lord G. Hamilton: Yes. Her Majesty's Government have approved of all the charges, both ordinary and extraordinary, being defrayed out of the British Exchequer.

THE RANGOON OUTRAGE.

DISCIPLINARY MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION.

Mr. Herbert Roberts asked the Secretary of State for India whether he would state whether any action had been taken by the Colonel of the Royal West Kent Regiment, or by the military

authorities in India, with regard to the expulsion from that regiment of the men implicated in the outrage upon a respectable Burmese woman named Mah Goon at Rangoon.

Lord G. HAMILTON: The failure to detect the perpetrators of this outrage is receiving the most careful attention and consideration of the Government of India and of the commander-in-chief, and the disciplinary measures decided upon will shortly be announced.

Mr. J. G. S. MACNEILL: Is this regiment still at Rangoon?

Lord G. HAMILTON: I think it is, but it is under orders for Aden.

Mr. MACNEILL: The sooner the better.

Friday, October 20.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE TROOPS IN SOUTH AFRICA.
IMPORTANT DISCUSSION.

The House went into Committee of Supply to consider the Army Supplementary Estimates. Mr. J. W. Lowther occupied the Chair.

On Vote A, the vote for 35,000 men of all ranks required for army service in addition to the number already voted, in consequence of the military situation in South Africa,

In the course of the debate, Mr. WYNDHAM said: I have already said something on this vote in reply to a question by the leader of the Opposition; but I will repeat my point. At the beginning of hostilities, the scope and duration of which no man can confidently predict, it is at least prudent to put a superior limit to the margin from which you may be called upon to draw men from time to time and add them to the establishment of the home army which was voted by the House. The forces at our disposal which are covered by this vote of 35,000 I will name in the succession in which they may be called upon. In the first place, we must take power to cover the 5,800 men whom we have borrowed from the Indian establishment. That is a rigorous application of the views held on this subject, because it is sometimes said that it is not necessary to add them to the British establishment. In the second place I name the men who will be retained with the colours, and who, but for the mobilisation, would have gone in the ordinary course to the Reserve. . . . The scheme for sending 10,000 men had been prepared weeks before in the War Office, in two alternative forms. First, to send the men from home; secondly, to send them from India and the Mediterranean. The second was adopted as the most expeditious, and the least likely to dislocate the roster of reliefs. From India there were sent three cavalry regiments, three batteries of field artillery, and four battalions of infantry, at a total cost of £897,000. The 1st battalion Northumberland Fusiliers was sent from home, but that battalion was in reality a foreign battalion. It had no fixed station at home, and was on the foreign strength. It had been placed on Salisbury Plain to recover from the fatigues of Omdurman and of Crete. (Hear, hear.) Three battalions were sent from the Mediterranean and three batteries of field artillery at Aldershot. I should like to dwell on these measures from two points of view. The first is that such battalions are fit for service on emergency. As to numbers, while the seven battalions which formed the original garrison of South Africa had an average strength of 994, the four sent from the Mediterranean had an average of 925, the two from home an average of 815, and the four from India an average of 920. And as to the age of the men, men who come from India must, by the terms of our contract with India, be over twenty years of age, and in the other battalions despatched the conditions were practically the same. I wish, therefore, to emphasise the fact that those battalions were not battalions of boys, nor were they "squeezed lemons." These measures, therefore, give us in all in South Africa 24,746 Regulars, trained and mature men. (Cheers.) The other point of view is represented by the question whether such transference of strength from one part of our Empire to another is legitimate. I answer yes, for a temporary purpose such as this. Consider the case of the Indian contingent. The Viceroy had approved the plan months beforehand, and had himself indicated the number of units which he could spare.

Mr. DAVITT: Can the hon. gentleman give the date of that request?

Mr. WYNDHAM: I think it was in July. We did not ask him for the troops, but we asked him whether, if we were hard pressed in South Africa, he had any troops which he could lend to this country. It was he himself who indicated the number of troops he could spare. It was surely reasonable to hold that he could, for a temporary purpose, spare three cavalry regiments out of nine, three batteries of field artillery out of 42, and four battalions of infantry out of 52—or, in all, 5,800 men out of 74,000, while he retains an army of 140,000 Natives officered by white men. (Cheers.)

Sir H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, in the course of his speech, said: There was one point on which the hon. gentleman touched as to which I should like to say a word or two, and that is the borrowing of some regiments from India. I do not say that it is not a great advantage to this country to be able to do that, but it introduces a very serious element into the financial relations between the two countries. The financial relations between the Imperial and the Indian authorities with regard to military matters have always been a matter of controversy, and I believe that, although Royal Commissions have sat to consider the question, none of them has ever come to any conclusion. We have on the part of this country always argued that we are entitled to charge India with almost everything that can possibly be held to be advantageous to her purposes in our military system, because she can always fall back and rely upon us and because this country is the reservoir for the military purposes of India. But India contends that she ought only to pay for the article she receives and should pay nothing for those subsidiary advantages of which I have spoken. (Hear, hear.) If we are to begin to use India on a large scale as a reservoir from which to draw troops for our own purposes, the argument shifts materially (hear, hear), and I am afraid the case for some greater consideration for India will be greatly strengthened. (Hear, hear.) And when it is said that the excuse here is that the maintenance of a coaling station at the Cape of Good Hope is necessary for Indian purposes, I do not think that is a consideration so direct or so strong as materially to modify what I have just said. (Hear, hear.) Although this is no affair of mine, and I do not propose to meddle with it myself, yet there has always been a strong opinion among well-informed men acquainted with India that the military expenditure of India is too great and that the force maintained there is larger than is required for Indian purposes; and I believe the theory put forward by India has always been of late years that the number of British troops maintained in India is certainly more than is required at present, and if it is found that you can casually take away 5,000 or 10,000 men without any difference being discovered, the position will be materially altered. (Hear, hear.) But these are rather considerations for the future. I have no objection whatever to raise to the fact that these regiments from India have been made use of if in the opinion of the Government of India they are available.

Colonel MILWARD said he regretted that Native troops from India under English officers were not included in the force as a proof of the solidarity of our Empire and its defences.

Mr. DAVITT reminded the Under-Secretary for War that a promise was made last Session that in the dread eventuality of war Mark IV. ammunition would not be used.

Mr. WYNDHAM said the Indian troops had left their Mark IV. ammunition behind, and orders had been given for them to be supplied with other ammunition.

Monday, October 23.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT.

Mr. HERBERT ROBERTS asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Calcutta Municipal Bill had been passed into law by the Bengal Legislative Council, and whether more than half the elected members of the present Corporation of Calcutta had resigned their seats as a protest against the action of the Government in reference to the Bill referred to:

And whether, in view of these circumstances, this House would have an opportunity of considering the provisions of the new law before it comes into operation in April next.

Lord G. HAMILTON: My answer to the two first questions is in the affirmative.

As regards the third question I do not propose to depart from the ordinary procedure prescribed for Acts passed by the Local Legislature, and which are reported to the Secretary of State.

THE TROOPS FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

Major WYNDHAM-QUIN asked the Under-Secretary of State for War, if he would state what were the reasons that induced the Military authorities in India not to despatch the 16th Lancers, now at Umballa, for active service in South Africa:

And, why, considering this regiment was first on the roster for active service, another cavalry regiment was selected in its place.

Mr. GEORGE WYNDHAM: The selection of the regiments to proceed from India to South Africa rests entirely with the Commander-in-Chief in India, and the Secretary of State does not propose to enquire why any particular regiment was selected.

HEALTH OF BRITISH TROOPS.

Sir JAMES FERGUSSON asked the Secretary of State for India, if he could inform the House how the returns of admission to hospital for venereal disease compared with those of previous years.

Lord G. HAMILTON: The admission rate for venereal diseases among British troops in India (including those on field service) was 363 per 1,000 in 1898, against 486 in 1897, 511 in 1896, and 522 in 1895.

This is a considerable decrease, and is the more gratifying because the new Cantonment Rules, to which it is, no doubt, mainly due, had not fully come into operation at the time when the Return was made. The rate was lower in 1898 than in any year since 1887; and the figures of 1898 showed a greater reduction on those of 1897 than has ever been recorded in any previous year, but they are still sadly high, and I hope and expect under the present system to see them much further reduced.

Sir J. FERGUSSON: Can my noble friend give any statement as to her Majesty's ships in the Indian ports?

Lord G. HAMILTON: No, Sir.

PUBLIC MEETINGS ON INDIAN QUESTIONS.

THE WORK OF THE BRITISH COMMITTEE.

On October 16 a lecturer on behalf of the British Committee addressed a meeting of the Bentham Women's Liberal Association. The President presided over a large attendance.

On October 18 Miss Alison Garland gave a lantern lecture at the Liberal Club, Prestwich, on "India and its People." There was a crowded audience.

On October 21 Miss Garland delivered a lecture at the Failsworth Liberal Club, when the room was filled to overflowing. The lecture was illustrated by lime-light views.

Among other prospective meetings which will be addressed on behalf of the British Committee are the following:—

October 24.—Ripponden.
,, 26.—Sowerby Bridge.
,, 27.—Otley.
November 1.—Gainsborough.
,, 6.—Aspatria.
,, 7.—Cockermouth.
,, 8.—Maryport.
,, 20.—Leamington.

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Printed by A. BONNER, 1 & 2, Took's Court, London, E.C., and Published for the Proprietors at 84 & 85, Palace Chambers, Westminster, S.W.