

India

FOR THE

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IMPORTANT NOTICE.

In future "INDIA" will be forwarded only to persons in respect of whom subscriptions have been actually received at the London Office. To this rule there will be no exception.

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NOTES AND NEWS.

IN his Indian Budget statement (July 26), Lord George Hamilton referred by anticipation to Mr. Souttar's amendment in favour of a free national grant in sympathy with the famine-stricken Indian people. He "objected to and opposed premature proposals to the Imperial Exchequer" (INDIA, vol. xiv, p. 66, August 3, 1900); and he stated that "after consultation with my advisers, I am of opinion that I shall be able, with that [the unexpended £9,000,000 loan power] and other resources, to meet any demands which the Viceroy or the Government of Bombay may make between now and the end of October" (INDIA, vol. xiv, p. 65). Now we are past October and well into November, and Parliament is to meet on December 3. The business of Parliament is, it is said, to be restricted to the voting of necessary moneys for the South Africa campaign. But it is to be hoped that Parliament will insist on having some explanation of Lord George Hamilton's financial intentions as from the "end of October," and on redeeming the honour of the country by voting an adequate free national grant to India. Did not the *Times* itself affirm (July 28) "that the case for a grant-in-aid to India under existing conditions is very strong?" Did it not also, after speaking of the loyal demonstrations in India, say: "When we welcome generous and uncalculating loyalty, it is unwise to put forward the Imperial Government in the character of Mr. Gradgrind?" And did not the faithful *Standard* stigmatise the rejection of the amendment as "ungracious?" Let the Government now seize the opportunity to do the gracious act at last.

The main area of release from the grip of the famine, according to the latest Viceregal telegram, is the Central Provinces, where, it is anticipated, relief operations will shortly be concluded. Bombay is still suffering, if not so severely, and "the relief must last to December, and later should no rain fall." The Governor of Bombay, indeed, reports that "beneficial showers" have fallen in parts of the Deccan and Karnatak, but we are afraid they do not amount to much. For "rain is generally much wanted for the rabi crops"; indeed, "without it, the unirrigated crops in many districts will be deficient." Besides, the "usual sowings" have been "greatly retarded." In parts even the water supply is "deficient." The language of the weekly official reports is disquieting rather than reassuring, at any rate so far as concerns the outlook. However, the number of persons on relief has fallen by a quarter of a million, and is given at 777,000. The number of cholera cases in the famine-stricken districts has decreased to 86 for the week ending November 3, but the deaths are 63, a slightly larger number than in the preceding week, and a considerably larger proportion. The deaths on relief works and gratuitous relief have fallen from 909 to 798, but this gives 2·3 (instead of 2·2) per thousand. The need of help is still pressing.

No. 20. VOL. XIV.

The Punjab Land Alienation Bill has now passed the Imperial Legislative Council, and its promoters are beginning to recognise that there are still difficulties to be overcome. Even so strong a supporter of the Bill as Lord Curzon spoke of it as "a venture" which it should be the Government's duty to "watch with the warmest sympathy and interest." But opponents and friends of the measure are alike in thinking that the Bill cannot stand alone. Lord Curzon spoke of it as the first serious step in a movement intended to benefit the agricultural classes; and Sir Harnam Singh, who led the opposition to the Bill, insisted that a system of agricultural banks was a necessary sequel of such a measure. In this, as in his whole attitude towards the Bill, Sir Harnam Singh has the warm support of the *Tribune*.

The *Pioneer* seems to be the only Anglo-Indian paper that gives adequate prominence to the speeches of Sir Harnam Singh and Sir W. Mackworth Young on the Punjab Land Alienation Bill. Sir Harnam denied that there was any political necessity for the measure. The Punjab had always been loyal. It was the agricultural classes mainly that had given Punjab soldiers to the Indian Army. On their return home, they would find that they had been impoverished from the most benevolent motives and a mistaken belief that political danger would ensue if the present agricultural arrangements were allowed to continue. It would be difficult for them to comprehend the grounds of policy pursued by the advocates of the measure. . . . For half a century the people had been enjoying full proprietary rights, which had been solemnly guaranteed to them by the British Government, and now, for no valid reasons assigned, and no fault of their own, their credit was to be curtailed and the value of their lands considerably reduced. They might fairly ask what they had done to deserve this severe treatment. . . . He held that when the proposed measure became law it would create needless discontent and difficulties.

Probably not another member of the Council understands the question better than Sir Harnam Singh, who stood alone against the passing of the Bill into law.

Next to Sir Harnam Singh in knowledge of the subject is Sir W. M. Young, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Sir Mackworth Young's official acquiescence does not detract from the force of his restrained criticisms, or rather suggestions. He "expressed himself more in sympathy with the Punjab revenue authorities of the past, and he quoted Sir Charles Aitchison, Colonel Wace, and Sir James Lyall. Personally, he would have preferred following Sir James Lyall's programme, wherein the restriction of the power of alienating land had no place, nor was interference contemplated with the discretion of proprietors."

He would direct his best attention during the remainder of his term of office to the working of the Act, and earnestly hoped that it might conduce more than he anticipated to the welfare of the agricultural population of the Province. He held that the legislation of the Bill needed to be supplemented by a system of agricultural banks, and he had listened with much satisfaction to the announcement of Mr. Rivaz that the Government of India had such a system under consideration, and to that of the Finance Member that he regarded the project with special interest and proposed shortly to take it in hand.

The establishment of agricultural banks, on a sound basis, would no doubt do much to obviate some at least of the difficulties that are foreseen by those who distrust the policy of the Act.

Dr. T. H. Thornton, who has been discussing the Punjab Land Alienation Act with Mr. J. D. Rees in the columns of the *Times*, maintains that the remedy is worse than the disease. He lays just emphasis on the ominous disapproval of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and Sir Harnam Singh ("a singularly well-informed Native member of the Council?"). He sums up his view as follows (*Times*, November 13):—

Minimise, by all means, the peasant's need for money-lenders' aid

—e.g., by moderate assessments, prompt relief in abnormal seasons, establishing markets for sale of produce, simplifying the cumbersome rules regulating advances for agricultural improvements, promoting the establishment of agricultural banks not worked by Government but under State control, discouraging rash - creditance on marriages (much can be done in this direction by personal influence). Protect the peasant borrower from fraud by placing the money-lender under licence and regulation, as is now the case in England; but do not damage the credit of the entire peasant community by placing fresh restrictions on the sale, not merely of ancestral lands, but of lands acquired and brought into cultivation by their own industry.

Recalling the serious reduction of the value of the peasants' silver ornaments by the currency legislation, Dr. Thornton adds a pertinent analogous caution. "If the value of their land is reduced as well," he says, "even the most prudent among them will find it difficult to tide over bad times, while the difficulty of obtaining loans will stimulate their propensity to hoard rupees instead of spending them productively in weed-sinking and extending cultivation."

The full reports of the Viceroy's speech in the Legislative Council (October 20), in which he reviewed the famine, has been anticipated in most substantial points by the summary already sent over. "We cannot, I think," said Lord Curzon, "be accused of having failed to anticipate or to provide for this great drought." Such has been the official claim from the first. Whether and how far it is valid remains to be tested by the promised Commission, and otherwise. "If indeed," said Lord Curzon, "a special characteristic should be attributed to the campaign of famine relief in the past year, it has been its unprecedented liberality." In Bombay, at least, there would seem to be room for evidence on this point; at any rate it is not to be settled solely on the basis of Lord Curzon's statement of facts, but on a wider range of comparison. The excess of mortality over the normal was estimated by Lord Curzon at 750,000, including 230,000 deaths from cholera and smallpox; and he stated that "to say that the greater part of these died of starvation or even of destitution would be an unjustifiable exaggeration." When full enquiry is made, we shall hope to see the contributory causes, as well as the statistics, very carefully set out and verified, and meantime we reserve judgment. Of course the Government will learn by this experience. But we regret that Lord Curzon should not have made specific reference to the fundamental question of prevention of famine, apart from provision "for the execution of a continuous programme of preventive works in the future." The attention of the Commission may be definitely drawn to this point; but, in any case, there will be serious dereliction of duty if the enquiry does not go deep into the economic causes of famine.

There was much in Lord Curzon's recent speech on the famine to revive the hopes of the sorely pressed cultivators. He declared that the rapidity of the recovery of the country will depend "not least upon the liberality of the Government in respect to revenue remissions." Again he said:—

It will not do for us to sit still until the next famine comes and then bewail the mysteries of Providence. A famine is a natural visitation in its origin; but it is, or should be, a very business-like proceeding when once it has started.

The concluding sentiment is excellent, but to speak of famines as a "natural visitation" is unworthy of Lord Curzon. A failure of the rains is a natural visitation, but this only produces famine where the poverty of the people makes provision against famine impossible. It is, indeed, very desirable that when famine is upon the people, everything should be ordered in a business-like way; but would it not be even better to order the finances and expenditure of India in a business-like way, making the revenue more in accord with the resources of the country, and doing without everything that the people cannot afford? Would it not be only business-like for the rulers of India to cut their coat according to their cloth, and carry on the administration in such a way as to be no longer so terrible a burden to the country?

The *Times of India* heartily supports Lord Curzon, both in sparing the cultivator, and in enquiring into the lessons of the famine. As to the former it says:—

If we are business-like we shall see to it that the broken cultivator, after having been set on his feet again, is not cast down by burdens heavier than he can bear, or by exacting from him the full payment

of a hard and fast bargain that was struck with him in better times. We shall see that the settlements of a province like Guzerat, where the Viceroy admits the crops almost wholly failed, are put in some sort of relation to his actual condition, so that the cultivator's capacity, not the potentiality of the soil that belongs to him, shall be the true measure of the demand to be made upon him.

The *Times of India* objects to some of the criticisms on famine relief as organised by the Bombay Government, and appeals to future enquiry. By all means let enquiry be made, but when the Viceroy himself puts the mortality due to famine, or disease resulting from famine, at three quarters of a million in British India, it is hardly to be wondered at that there has been some severe criticism.

Lord Curzon's reply to the address of the Bombay Corporation (Nov. 8) embodied several memorable declarations. Thus he put aside the praises heaped upon him for the Government measures in the struggle against famine and plague. According to the report of the *Times'* Bombay correspondent (*Times*, Nov. 10), he said:—

When I see or hear the head of the Government praised for the efficiency or liberality of the measures taken, or given credit for their success, I feel almost a sense of shame. For I think of all the accumulated advice and experience that has been freely placed at his disposal by those who know so much more than he does. I remember the brave men who, with no reward to hope for and no public applause to urge them on, have month after month, whether in scorching heat or through soaking rains, spent their energy and strength in fighting the real battle whenever the enemy threatened or the worst danger lay. Theirs is the true credit. It is only on their behalf and as their official head that I can accept with contentment what I could not without injustice appropriate to myself.

There is a just rebuke in this clear and sensible estimate of his position. True, it may be simply the generosity of pride; but that would be a harsh supposition, and probably a very mistaken one. Lord Curzon has simply displayed an anxious and humane sympathy. He has really yet to win his spurs in legislation and administration, and it is hopeful to observe that he is not allowing even a genuine flattery to overpower his naturally strong judgment.

Lord Curzon claimed—and, we do not doubt, justly—that he had tried consistently "to hold the scales even." "Experience," he said, "has shown me that it is not always an easy task"—which may well be believed—"but experience has also convinced me that it is always the right one"—about which there can be no question. Summarily he said:—

These little drawbacks of misunderstanding on one side or the other may sometimes worry and sometimes impede, but they do not for one moment affect the conviction with which I started two years ago, and which I now hold, if possible, more strongly still, that it is by Native confidence in British justice that the loyalty of the Indian peoples is assured, and that the man who either by force or fraud shakes that confidence is dealing a blow at British Dominion in India. If to justice we can add that form of mercy which is best expressed by the word "consideration," and which is capable of showing itself in almost every act and incident of life, we have, I think, a key that will open most Indian hearts.

We do not require to remind our readers how consistently we have urged the necessity of British practice of justice and "consideration" in their relations with the Indian people. We most earnestly hope that Lord Curzon's impressive declaration will be laid to heart by every Anglo-Indian in whatever sphere.

The part that is played by India in the Imperial system, Lord Curzon demonstrated fully and convincingly. He also answered, with a somewhat contemptuous negative, the strange question that some wisacre had put to him, whether he was at all disillusioned with his work, and whether his love for the country had at all diminished. These things seem matters of course. It is more striking that he should have held the balance openly between officialism and the public in these incisive terms:—

I can see no reason why in India, as elsewhere, the official hierarchy should not benefit by public opinion. Official wisdom is not so transcendent as to be superior to this form of stimulus and guidance. Indeed, my inclination, whenever the Government is attacked, is not to assume that the critic must inevitably be wrong, but that it is quite conceivable that he may be right. In any case I enquire. . . . The opinion of the educated classes is one that it is not statesmanship to ignore or to despise.

This attitude is obviously and conspicuously right. The only weak link in it is in the Viceroy's means of adequate enquiry, but even these a strong man can make efficient. Further, Lord Curzon said:—

There remain a multitude of ways in which the Government may

endeavour, and in my opinion should endeavour, to enlist public opinion upon its side. It can take the public into its confidence by explaining what to the official mind seems simple enough, but to the outside public may appear quite obscure. In framing legislation it can profit by external advice instead of relying solely upon the arena of official wisdom. It can look sympathetically into grievances instead of arbitrarily snuffing them out.

Good. The proof of the pudding is in the eating of it. Yet what, for instance, of the passing of the Punjab Land Alienation Bill? For all Lord Curzon's excellent intentions, there are not a few things that, "to the outside public, appear quite obscure."

The *Times of India* falls foul of Raja Peary Mohun Mookerjee for an address which he gave in Calcutta as President of the British Indian Association, on "Indian Famines and their Causes." But after attacking the Raja for attempting to make the British Government to some extent responsible for the Famine—he even suggested that food had to be exported in famine time to pay the heavy taxes—the *Times of India* itself condemns that Government in good round terms:—

No Native understands better than do the English in India that the principal fault of our Government, and the main cause of whatever discontent there is among the unsophisticated masses, are the inflexibility of our management, our rigorous adherence to system, commonly spoken of as "red tape," and the too often tactless earnestness with which we insist upon doing good to the people in our own way rather than in theirs.

What more could the most ardent advocate of the employment of Indians in the high offices of Government say? The *Times of India* is a veritable Daniel come to judgment."

We learn from the *Times of India* that the Collector of Broach, who entered the employment of the Government by way of the Statutory Civil Service, has issued a circular of which the following is a translation:—

It has come to my knowledge that the village officials leave their villages without orders and go out on private business, and give in writing information about Government work to persons other than Government officers, without orders and without informing their superiors. For Government servants to do this is quite improper. Without the orders of the Mamlatdar of the Taluka, the village should not be left; and, without obtaining my special permission, to no outside person whatever information or evidence about Government business should be given. If hereafter anything of the kind has taken place, and if in respect of any village anything of the kind is seen to have happened, the severest action will be taken against such village officers. Dated 10th September, 1900.

G. D. PANE, Collector of Broach.

This has been endorsed by every Mamlatdar and sent round by each to the patels under him. The endorsement is dated 18th October.

The *Times of India* particularly directs attention to the dates of this circular and of its endorsement. It was evidently drawn up when Mr. Gokuldas Parekh was holding his enquiry. It was not however issued till the Government enquiry was ordered, and then it was "scattered broadcast as though the purpose of those responsible for it were to prevent the tendering and preparation of evidence to be laid before the Court of Enquiry." If this be so "there is no question as to its impropriety." Our contemporary, feeling certain that the Government desires a full and free enquiry, confidently believes that instructions will be given for the withdrawal of the circular.

There are some curious admissions in the remarks of the *Pioneer* on the *Kaldas* case. We are told that "such people would not have been worth powder and shot from the Government if it had been a case of a criminal prosecution, involving serious punishment in case of conviction." On which it may be noted that the actual sentence required the defendants to find heavy bail or go to prison for twelve months. They were poor men, and might very well be unable to find sureties, in which case the punishment would be decidedly heavy. The *Pioneer* goes on:—

Nor had they ventured far enough on the path of sedition to make such a course equitable. . . . A disaffected tendency runs through them (the articles): but articles far more mischievous and venomous have often passed without any notice.

This is a fairly strong condemnation of the prosecution. The excuse offered for the Government is that (1) there was an attempt to publish in Benares, for circulation in the

Deccan, what would not have been suffered in the Deccan itself, and (2) "the tone of the paper would probably soon have become more pronounced." To prosecute men for what they would probably become is indeed curious justice.

The *Madras Mail* has the accustomed analysis of Congress statistics. Because the Province in which the Congress is held is more largely represented than other parts of the country, Anglo-Indians deny that the Congress is representative. If it were always held in the same Province, there might be some foundation for this argument, but as it moves its seat every year, each Province in turn has the preponderance. And it is found that the programme of the Congress is endorsed equally wherever that body meets. The small effect on its decisions of the varying local character of the majority is itself an eloquent testimony to the growing unity of India. The *Madras Mail* admits that the number of Mahometans in attendance was larger this year than usual, but it rejects the most obvious explanation—that their indifference to the Congress was abating—without offering any other solution.

The declaration of that ultra-loyal body, the South African League, against Asiatic labour has filled the *Tribune* with gloomy forebodings as to the treatment of Indians in South Africa. It fears that the good feeling brought into existence by the sacrifice and devotion of the Indian community in Natal during the war will be laid aside as soon as the war is over. Nor can the *Tribune*, though the interests of the Chinese are not in its care, avoid a passing reference to that curious contradiction, the eagerness of the West to force its way into China, and its determination that the Chinese shall not come into its territories. Is the same contradiction to be exemplified in the relations of India and Australia? Are special facilities to be given to the Australians to enter the Indian Civil Service, while special laws are to be passed to keep Indians out of Australia?

The *Times of India* administers a severe drubbing to the *Times* of London for countenancing aggressive measures towards Tibet, which have been industriously advocated at intervals by irresponsible persons in India. It takes for its text the suggestion that, in consequence of the news of the Thibetan mission to the Tsar, "it is no longer necessary to restrain Nipal, which has rights in Thibet to which we cannot pretend." It says:—

For the present we must accept the message as it reaches us [by Reuter's agency]; and it certainly constitutes in that form the most shamelessly unrighteous suggestion which has ever emanated from a responsible English journal. In plain words, the Government of India is asked to let loose upon the inoffensive people of Thibet a torrent of ruthless invaders with primitive notions of humanity, in order to punish them for their perfectly legitimate conduct in sending a Mission to Russia. . . . We can conceive no more mischievous act than such a reversal of policy as would be implied by instigating the Nipalites to enter Thibet in order to forestall Russia.

"If an unsuccessful raid more than a hundred years ago constitutes 'rights,' then" the *Times of India* admits, "Nipal is justified in following the advice of the *Times*. But," our Bombay contemporary insists, "she has no other claim; and a border people who vary the monotony of administration by occasional assassinations are not suited to embark upon a career of conquest under the ægis of Great Britain."

In the further discussion of the subject, the *Times of India* makes this suggestive statement:—

Within the period of recorded history, no rulers of India have ever established themselves to the north of the great mountain barrier. It is a grave question whether it would be politic to exceed the geographical limitations which Nature seems to have placed upon the territories controlled from the plains of India. . . . We could never contemplate with equanimity the co-existence of a defensive frontier on the line of the Himalayas and a "political" frontier somewhere in the wilds of Thibet.

Just so. And this applies word for word to the position on the North-West frontier. On the latter point, too, however, the *Times of India* is tolerably sound. The financial question, with all its serious mischiefs and involvements, happily has this one good effect, that it restrains for the time the spirit of military adventure beyond the "defensive frontier" and "the geographical limitations" placed by Nature. No; the Lawrence policy is not yet "dead."

HUNTER'S "BRITISH INDIA."

THE large conception of Sir William Hunter's "History of British India" must unfortunately remain unfulfilled, yet the author has been able to complete one great section of it—the account of the successful struggle for commercial supremacy in the 17th century, which was the necessary, or at least the substantial basis of British political ascendancy. The first volume related the history of the Company from its establishment down to the disastrous expulsion of its servants from the Spice Archipelago. The second volume, which we now welcome, narrates the origin and development of the first British settlements on the coasts of Bombay, Madras, and Bengal, and the relations of the Company at home with Charles I, the Commonwealth, the Protector, the restored Charles II, and the Parliaments of William III and Anne, bringing the story down to the union of the Old and New Companies under the Earl of Godolphin's award (September 29, 1708). The concluding chapter has been written by the editor, Mr. P. E. Roberts, on the basis of a rough outline sketch and the materials which Sir William Hunter left. The work thus covers the first century of British history in India, and places its readers in a better position than ever before to understand aright the subsequent developments. The main streams of events are clearly marked out. Now and again, indeed, the annalist ousts the historian, and sometimes there is difficulty in realising the significance of the picture formed from details that lie in the records but are not presented to the reader. But such a result is probably an inevitable consequence of the overpowering mass of materials.

It is curious, though perhaps not surprising, that the Directors, in these early times, "lamentably failed to realise the conditions which determined the actions of their representatives in India." Says Mr. Roberts, in his "Introduction" :—

By a strange fatality they saw only a check or a repulse in each great forward step made in the East. The advance to the peninsula appeared as a flight from the Spice Islands. Each of the three great capitals of British India was founded in their despite. They entered the name of Francis Day, builder of Madras, in the Company's Black Book. They received Bombay from the king as relieving him of an onerous burden. Gerald Angier, its real founder, they snubbed and neglected. They only acquiesced in the establishment at Calcutta "because we cannot now help it."

Their business, however, was commerce, and they naturally determined "to avoid the acquisition of territory and political power as long as possible." They were far away from the actual facts, too; and perhaps, in comparison with their modern analogues, they have little reason to blush for their lack of prescience or of unconscionable pushfulness. The settlement at Surat—the first English settlement in India—was due to the foresight and persistence of Thomas Aldworth, factor and merchant, in utilising Captain Best's victory over the Portuguese (1612) to obtain from the Mughal Governor the grant of a foothold. "Through the whole Indies," he wrote home, "there cannot be any place more beneficial for our country than this, being the only key to open all the rich and best trade of the Indies." Surat, indeed, was the chief maritime city of India in ancient times. Within twenty years of ups and downs, the English at Surat established their reputation as peaceful traders, and came to be regarded by the Mughal Viceroy as a useful sea-police to repel the Portuguese and to keep open the pilgrim ocean highway from Surat to Mecca; and the Company recognised the Surat President as the chief of the English in India. In 1631 we obtain a glimpse of a Gujarat famine :—

In 1631 a Dutch merchant reported that only eleven of the 200 families at Swally survived. He found the road thence to Surat covered with bodies decaying "on the highway where they died, [there] being no one to bury them." In Surat, that great and crowded city, he "could hardly see any living persons"; but the corpses "at the corner of the streets lie twenty together, nobody burying them."

¹ "A History of British India." By Sir William Wilson Hunter, K.C.S.I., M.A., LL.D., a Vice-President of the Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. II. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co. Price 16s.

Thirty thousand had perished in the town alone. Pestilence followed famine. The President and ten or eleven of the English factors fell victims, with "divers inferiors now taken to Abraham's bosom"—"three-fourths of the whole settlement. "No man can go in the streets without giving alms or being in danger of being murdered, for the poor people cry aloud "give us sustenance, or kill us." "This, that was in a manner the garden of the world, is turned into a wilderness."

But the English stuck to Surat, and only three years later the President entered into negotiations with the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa, which resulted in a commercial convention, "the basis of the settlement of the Indies." The independent action of the President is notable. "In 1657 the Company decided that there should be but one Presidency in India—and that Surat."

The first two attempts to settle on the Madras coast failed: at Pulicat, through Dutch opposition; and at Pettapoli, in consequence of pestilence. The second two attempts failed: at Masulipatam, through the subsequent growth of Madras; and at Armagaon, our first fortified post in India, through the poverty of the place. In 1639 Francis Day, a member of the Masulipatam Council and Chief at Armagaon, set about founding Madras. "Without waiting for permission from home, Day built an embrasured factory and christened it Fort St. George in honour of England." The Company, "uneasy about the money already sunk in fortified factories on the Madras coast, viewed the new settlement as a hazardous experiment," but left the Surat Council to pronounce upon it. Surat approved. But—

six years later the Company at home had not forgiven its servants at Madras for the new expenses into which they had plunged. In 1645 it summoned one of them [Mr. Cogan] before its Court "to answer the charge of the building of Fort St. George." It only let him off on the ground that "it was the joint act of all the factors"; and "if it should not prove so advantageous for the Company hereafter, it can be charged upon no man more justly than upon Mr. Day."

Madras, however, thrived on its good relations with Golconda. In 1653, it was raised, from a subordinate agency to Bantam in Java (!), to an independent Presidency. Difficulties supervened again, indeed; but, on the strength of Cromwell's charter of 1657, the Company "resolved to make Madras its effective headquarters in Eastern India, and in 1658 declared all its settlements in Bengal and the Coromandel Coast subordinate to Fort St. George."

From Madras the English crept up the coast gradually to Bengal, all in the way of business. The foundation of the factory of Balasor in 1633 was primarily due to the stout heart of Ralph Cartwright, and its maintenance was due to the firmness of Francis Day, who, on visiting it in its troubles nine years later, declared that it "is not to be totally left." So it was made a port of transhipment to Hugli town in 1650. But the Hugli and other agencies, which sprang up quickly, could not be effectively controlled by the Company, which would have withdrawn from the Bengal seaboard but for the reorganisation under Cromwell in 1657, when "a commission to Bengal put down malpractices and re-established trade." "In the lowest grade of the new staff appears the name of a youth, Job Charnock—the future founder of Calcutta." "Bengal thus took its rank as one of the five important seats of the Company's trade, and was placed, together with Bantam and the Persian factories, under the control of Madras, itself subordinate to the Presidency of Surat."

The wonder is that the Company struggled through its multiplied troubles abroad and at home. Now here and now there, it is on the point of throwing up the sponge, yet somehow it pulls through. The leading Directors were men of experience, ability, and tenacity; and their leading servants in India were men of unconquerable determination and persistence, and often of bold initiative. The relations of Charles I. and the Company present the King in a melancholy light, prodigal of good wishes to the Company, yet confederated against it with Courten's rival Company, to which he granted a license in 1635. Cromwell, however, was straightforward and businesslike.

Sir William Hunter thus sums up his action :—

He found the English in the East struggling, humiliated, in despair. He left them with their future assured. He was the first ruler of England who realised that the India trade was no private preserve of the sovereign and his nominees, but a concern of the nation, to be maintained by national diplomacy and defended by the national arms. His union of conflicting Anglo-Indian interests in 1657 anticipated the great Parliamentary fusion of those interests fifty years later. Under his charter the East India Company trans-

formed itself from a feeble relic of the mediæval guild into the vigorous forerunner of the modern Joint Stock Company.

It is interesting to note that "both the grandson and great-grandson of the Protector lived to be Governors of Bengal"—Sir John Russell (1711-18), and Sir Henry Frankland (1726-28)—and that "the Protector's descendants long formed one of the powerful family connexions of the East India Company."

The Company's loyalty gained and kept the staunch and consistent friendship of Charles II: "In the long conflict between the royal policy and the popular will Charles II found in the East India Company his one unailing ally." He "found it a trading body; he left it a nascent territorial power, with the right of coinage, the command of fortresses and of English and Indian troops, the authority to form alliances and to make peace or war, the jurisdiction over subjects, and other attributes of a delegated sovereignty." Bombay, the Queen's dowry, brought the King nothing but trouble and expense, and when he resolved to get rid of it he gave the Company the first chance. So "in March, 1668, Bombay, together with all its stores and munitions of war, passed as a thing of nought from the Crown to the Company, at a quit-rent of £10 a year." The making of Bombay was the work of three strong Presidents of Surat—Sir John Oxenden (1662-69), Gerald Aungier (1669-77), and Sir John Child (1682-90). The work of these three men "summarises the progress of the Company in Western India under the Restoration." The strictly commercial policy defined by Sir Thomas Roe in 1616 was now reluctantly modified:—

On the 14th of January, 1686, the Court of Directors gave their solemn adhesion to the conclusion which had been forced on their servants in the East—namely, that since the Native Governors have taken to "trampling upon us, and extorting what they please of our estate from us, by the besieging of our Factories and stopping of our boats upon the Ganges, they will never forbear doing so till we have made them as sensible of our Power as we have of our Truth and Justice." Then follow the epoch-making words: "And we after many Deliberations are firmly of the same Opinion, and resolve with God's blessing to pursue it."

Sir W. Hunter shows that the declaration of this new policy was no abrupt departure, as it has usually been misrepresented, but was "gradually forced upon the Company from 1684 onwards."

In the next ten years (1688-98), under Parliament, Sir Josia Child is the most prominent figure, and the period ends with William's memorable grant of the charter of 1698 (September 5). As we have already stated, Mr. Roberts contributes the concluding chapter describing the "Strife and Union of the Companies." The work, terse as it unhappily is, effects a great clearance and lays solid foundations. And yet one cannot but feel that much has been lost, if much has also been gained, by compression into two volumes.

INDIA'S CONSTANT ADVERSE BALANCE.

THE Indian Government's Director-General of Statistics, Mr. J. E. O'Connor, has recently reviewed the course of India's international commerce during the financial year 1899-1900, that is, the twelve months ending with last March. This review chiefly consists of trade comparisons between this (famine) year, and the one preceding which was one of tolerable productiveness, also glancing back at the other famine year of 1896-7. Mr. O'Connor points out that it is easy to trace "a close resemblance" in the abnormal climatic conditions of those two years and in the distressing consequences to the populations affected; but there is contrast rather than similarity in the monetary and commercial circumstances of the two periods, to which reference may be made later on. Our concern just now is not with these two years' details, which are large and serious enough, but with the one dominant and constant factor which runs through all the records of India's international commerce; that is, the great excess of the exports over the imports, the striking disparity between her outgoings and incomings. An illustration of this great fact is supplied in the review of the year under notice, by the Director's having, very properly, set out the figures of the four previous years as basis of comparison for the whole lustrum—1895-1900. This valuable detailed table is here set out; and below will be found the two lines of

total exports and imports, showing the aggregate excess of the former during the period:—

	1895-96.	1896-97.	1897-98.	1898-99.	1899-1900.
EXPORTS.					
Foreign merchandise re-exported	4,717,516	4,033,637	8,751,173	8,371,196	3,292,491
Indian merchandise	109,545,624	99,880,660	98,756,101	109,350,277	106,688,096
Gold	2,503,317	2,300,141	2,372,743	2,336,646	2,008,196
Silver	1,728,984	2,725,750	4,761,486	5,071,533	5,941,844
Total Exports	118,495,441	108,840,188	104,671,443	120,129,654	116,926,227
IMPORTS.					
Merchandise	69,316,805	71,793,820	69,226,663	68,380,341	70,711,844
Gold	5,029,289	4,491,179	7,281,222	8,840,222	11,447,867
Silver	52,230,715	5,259,174	13,135,354	6,948,666	9,535,645
Total Imports	86,576,809	84,669,184	89,742,949	86,264,268	91,670,377

On casting up the totals on each side of this account, this result will appear:—

	Rx.
TOTAL EXPORTS	569,061,907
„ IMPORTS	435,222,186
INDIA'S DEFICIT on her five years' } International trade } Annual average EXCESS EXPORTS in } the five years	133,839,721 Rx.26,767,944

For our regular readers no explanation is needed to emphasise the significance of India's having had in these five years, as in every similar period during the last thirty, to send out of her scant resources sums represented by hundreds of millions—a constant sinking fund to which there is neither bottom nor balance. For those to whom this portentous question is new, it may be well to go over two or three of the underlying circumstances. For instance, by far the larger part of these exports, for which there is no commercial return, represents large sums disbursed in this country as part of the Indian Government's annual expenditure. These disbursements of India's revenues here have much the same—but to India far more depressing—economic effect as would result in the United Kingdom if any considerable portion of our Exchequer's payments had to be spent, say, on American administrators, French financial experts, or sent to Germany for a large part of our army expenditure. It will be said that it is impossible that this country could ever be thus laid under tribute to foreign administrators or military directors; but, by way of illustration, the effect on our monetary and commercial finance of such a position is, at least, conceivable. Moreover, until our public men and economic statisticians can thus conceive, and put themselves so far in India's place, they labour in vain to comprehend this imperial problem. And until such writers and politicians—statesmen are another matter—will condescend to this effort to realise the facts, they should leave the "condition of India" question alone.

To return to the figures, the annual Rx. 26,750,000 are represented to the extent, on an average during the period, of about £17,000,000 sterling as disbursed here, or about Rx. 23,000,000 as cost to India. The difference of a couple of millions represents so much of the bankers' and other mercantile profits as comes through the exports. It may be asked whether certain portions of the £17,000,000 do not represent some commercial return received by India. There is one large item included in these Government remittances that may be so considered as regards about three-fourths of it. That is under the head of "Railway Revenue Account," averaging in recent years a total of nearly £6,000,000 sterling as paid out here, and rather over Rx. 9,000,000 as drawn from India. The other fourth may be taken to represent the million or two of dead loss on the whole annual railway transactions, which has to be drawn from India's general revenue to square up the shareholders here. But it must be remembered that although the larger part of these six millions is a trade return, in that it represents traffic receipts, it is disbursed in this country, thereby adding to our national income, and by so much worse for India in that it does not go back into its commercial or investing funds. It may be remarked that "stores" for military and other public works, telegraphs, stationery, etc., amounting to rather over one million sterling (of which the largest item is military, therefore unproductive) are equivalent to a material import. That is so; but, as these stores have already been counted in the figures of imports quoted above, the payment for them as part of the Home Charges here does not affect our argument as regards

the uncompensated balance. However, these and other secondary or by-issues have been fully discussed in detail by witnesses before the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure, and also in the appendices pertaining to the 1898 Currency Committee's Report. But, on the other hand, after making allowances as above, there is a large addition that needs to be made to India's adverse balance of Rs. 26,000,000—that is, the loans raised in England during the five years and debited to India. These seem to have been about nine millions sterling at the end of 1899; and there is the three millions more taken up towards the close of the last Parliament. It will be seen that the twelve millions is equivalent, by so much, as an addition to the deficit during the five years. It may be admitted that the "enfaced" Indian stock returned to India—about four millions—might be counted as an addition to her imports; but this is more than set off by the Treasury Bills and other temporary loans taken up, most of which is destined to become permanent debt.

By way of summarising this statement of India's chronic commercial deficit, reference may be made to an article in these columns two years ago (June 24, 1898).¹ In this paper were shown—based on official records and compiled by the *Economist*—the total results of the sixty-one years ending with 1896-7 being India's adverse balance of Rs. 1,026,000,000 (during the larger period these being sterling pounds). The crushing weight of this unproductive burden is accentuated when there are added certain enhancing adjustments, as carefully worked out in the Blue-books, already alluded to, of the Royal Commission and the Currency Committee; but we only ask for that thousand millions to be taken as basis of consideration by competent financiers and economists. So just now it is this other side of the shield we ask them to scan. India's loss or sacrifice in that constant depletion has mainly been Britain's gain and national profit—that, too, including the factor of compound interest which has its full effect in our free and facile organisation of commerce and industry. Well, indeed, did a Civilian Famine Commissioner recently affirm: "Britain owes millions on millions to the Indian peasant." This emphatically indicates the primary way of real relief for which India pants. This is simple enough, though hard for the unjust steward to realise—namely, that this inevitable burden of Empire *must* be shared by this imperial master country.

OUR LONDON LETTER.

WESTMINSTER, Thursday.

YIELDING to necessity, Lord Salisbury has decided to call Parliament together in the first week of December. The decision proves that though the Government has undergone a sham reconstruction it retains its old vices, of which not the least conspicuous is a fatal inability to make up its mind. At the close of the General Election members were assured that their services would not be required till after the New Year. Many of them are now abroad, and all had made their arrangements on the understanding that the vacation would last till February. Ministers seem to live from hand to mouth. They never take thought for the morrow, with the result, when confronted by the slightest difficulty, that their actions present an appearance of panic, and Europe derives the impression that we have again been caught napping. Objections, both loud and deep, have been heaped on Lord Salisbury since last Tuesday. The most devoted of Tories has no desire to eat his Christmas dinner at St. Stephen's.

Following precedent, the Government ought to have called Parliament together immediately after the election. The Chancellor of the Exchequer must have known four weeks ago what he confesses now—that the means at his disposal were insufficient to carry on the war till the end of January. The lethargy of the Prime Minister in reconstructing the Ministry may have been designed to silence Sir M. Hicks-Beach's impromptu, for it is generally understood that the latter had

been demanding an early meeting of Parliament ever since the close of the polls. If the delay was deliberate it should perhaps be attributed to Mr. Arthur Balfour, whose great idea of Parliamentary leadership is to get the work of six weeks scrambled through in half the time by the childish device of making a holiday depend on the completion of a certain allotted task. Fortunately such pedagogic schemes are easily frustrated. Mr. Balfour may say to the House of Commons: "If you get through your six weeks' work in a fortnight you will be allowed to go home for Christmas;" but, on the other hand, the House of Commons may say to Mr. Balfour: "Unless you withdraw two-thirds of your programme and begin again in February we shall be under the painful necessity of keeping you here till Easter." In a contest of that kind it would be the pedagogue who would suffer.

Something of this sort happened in October of last year. On that occasion, also, Parliament was summoned to grant supplies; Mr. Balfour hit on the brilliantly puerile idea of making the Queen's Speech apply not only to the special Session but to the ordinary subsequent Session which was to open in the following February. In other words the latter Session was to be treated as a continuation of the first. The First Lord of the Treasury however soon discovered that he had reckoned without the Opposition. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman asserted the right of members to review the whole policy of the Government either in October or at the beginning of the resumed Session, and as the Government were not prepared for a prolonged autumn sitting, pledges had to be given for a renewal of the debate in February. History will probably repeat itself next month.

As Parliament will meet again at the beginning of February the demands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer will probably not be so great as some people anticipate. Hitherto Sir M. Hicks-Beach has invariably asked less than was really required. His tendency has been to under-estimate the cost of the war. "Now that the elections are over"—to quote Mr. Powell Williams's memorable phrase—one of the chief temptations to minimise the cost of the campaign no longer exists; but from force of habit Sir Michael may be expected to limit his demand to something on account. The instalment of last August was to complete the war. It brought the expenditure up to £70,000,000. A further £10,000,000 will doubtless be required next month, and after that we may look for periodical drafts up to the expected grand total of £100,000,000. Up to the present the war has been costing us nearly two millions sterling a week, and even now the weekly bill must be considerably over a million. In mortality the expenditure shows a weekly average of two hundred lives.

A meeting of the Liberal members of the House of Commons will probably be held before the assembling of the new Parliament, in order to settle the leadership question. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman is speaking in Scotland to-night, when he may have something to say on this matter that will tend to clear the air. He is credited with a loyal desire to remain in the position in which he has done such remarkable service to the party since Sir William Harcourt's withdrawal from the leadership, and if Sir Henry continues in that mind there is no doubt that he will again receive the unanimous confidence of his colleagues and followers.

Of the new Ministerial appointments, not the least interesting is that of Lord Hardwicke as Under-Secretary for India in succession to Lord Onslow, who has now been transferred to the Colonial Office. Lord Hardwicke's promotion, like that of Lord Londonderry, Sir Edward Carson, Mr. Arnold-Forster and, in a minor degree, Mr. Grant Lawson's, is the reward of revolt. He enjoyed the distinction about eighteen months ago of inflicting a defeat on Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords. The issue was the momentous one of the Cromwell statue—a memorial which was supposed to be Lord Hardwicke's unconquerable aversion. He has not yet enlightened a curious world as to the manner of his reconciliation. The statue is still in its place, and Lord Hardwicke will have to pass it every afternoon on his way from Downing Street to St. Stephen's. As Under-Secretary, this enterprising peer should be at least equal in ability and insight to his predecessor. He has some knowledge of the ways of the city, is understood to be the proprietor of a leading weekly review, speaks with force if not with fluency, and has ideas.

Irish politics are again coming to the front, with an accompaniment of police batons, broken heads, and national con-

¹ For those who have filed this journal or know where to find its bound volumes there are, in addition to the above reference, the following:—April 29, p. 260, "The Indian Tribute"; May 27, p. 323; July 8, p. 11, "True and False Rupees." 1899: Feb. 24, p. 95; March 10, p. 120, "England and the Indian Debt"; June 9, p. 279; October 27, p. 209, "Indian Trade and India's Burdens." 1900: June 29—besides numerous passages in our Parliamentary Reports.

ventions. The next convention having been fixed for the first week in December, it seems to be doubtful whether the reinvigorated Nationalist phalanx will make its appearance at Westminster at all this year. At present the majority are more concerned with the crushing of Healyism than with the business of Parliamentary warfare. But before long the whole party will be trying conclusions with the new Secretary, Mr. George Wyndham, and as that gentleman is perhaps only too eager to enhance his reputation we may look forward to lively times. Not only do the Nationalists threaten a renewal of the original Parrell tactics, but some of the Ulster Unionists, led by the discarded Mr. T. W. Russell, are evidently contemplating mischief. So long as the two parties refrain from coalition their attacks will be embarrassing, but if once they join hands the movement may fall as flat as the much-vaunted agitation for a revision of the financial burdens of Ireland. Paradoxical as it may seem, Irishmen fight the common enemy more effectively when they are at the same time fighting one another.

NOTES FROM BOMBAY.

LORD CURZON'S SPEECH.

THE PREVENTION OF FAMINE.

[FROM AN INDIAN CORRESPONDENT.]

BOMBAY, October 27.

Last week I simply referred to the exhaustive and elaborate speech made by the Viceroy on famine and cognate matters on the eve of his tour round the Indian peninsula. No doubt you have already the full text of it before you, and will know what are its strong and weak points. If I may criticise it, I would say that on the whole it was a disappointing speech. I expected that his lordship would make some important announcement in reference to the measures which his Government contemplate to prevent famine. But of this there was not a word. True it is that a long and glowing account, not unadorned with rhetoric and Curzonian egotism, of the work done by the Government of India in connexion with relief operations was given. But neither that account nor the one as to the economic loss sustained by the peasantry was at all needed. We have been long since made familiar with it. Perhaps it may prove useful on your side, where the elections are just over and where the great British nation, imbued with the "Imperialistic" spirit of the hour, is eager to learn what England's greatest pro-consuls are doing in India, Africa, Australia and elsewhere, so that its heart may swell with pride and that it may lay the flattering unction to its soul that all is going well; and that it was impossible to expect something better in the best of all possible Governments. And in its present mood the nation is unlikely to give an earnest ear to the thoughtful few who may choose to tell it that there is a vast difference between the official romance and the actual reality of the situation in this country. So that we should not be surprised, as a reflex of that powerful rhetorical speech, to find later on a paragraph in the Queen's Speech of a similar character. Lord Curzon has taken some credit to himself for his historical instinct. It is, therefore, a matter of regret that in this speech that instinct should have deserted him. None denies the excellent and benevolent works rendered by his Government to the famine-stricken. I have borne unstinted testimony to it in my previous notes. But his lordship was trifling with history when he compared the work done by the predecessors of the British in India in the eighteenth century, with that done at the close of the nineteenth with regard to famine. Now may it be asked what Europe, which was often visited with calamitous famine in the eighteenth century, did then? Was its standard of benevolence anything better than that of the Mogul emperors? Is it not the fact that organised famine relief institutions are only of yesterday? Is it not a fact that the standard of charity towards the starving has been a better one owing to the humanity of the nineteenth century? Then why make this unhistorical comparison? Again, have not our rulers proclaimed on the housetop times out of number that the ways of the Mogul emperors and their predecessors are not the ways of the enlightened British? Do not the British set themselves up as every way a "superior" race in point of intellect and administration? Why, then, should the British try to put themselves

on a level with their inferior predecessors in government and then invite the nations of the world to behold their own miracles of famine work? To me it seems that they would have belied all their pretensions to superior enlightenment and humanity had they preferred to do aught less in connexion with famine than they have done. This is not the way to institute comparisons, and I for one regret that the Viceroy indulged in clap-trap.

But leaving this part of his speech alone, let us examine what practical problem did his Excellency set before the public as to the prevention of famine in future. Not a word. We look in vain for a single statesmanlike pronouncement on the subject. No doubt we are all pleased to read that irrigation is to have greater attention from the Government. That has become inevitable after the calamitous effects of the famine which is now slowly leaving the land. It has become a vital necessity that wherever possible and practical, the State should stimulate the construction of wells, tanks, reservoirs and so forth, specially in what are called "insecure areas." The subject has now been well thrashed out; and every tyro in administration admits that irrigation must demand in future greater and greater attention from the responsible authorities.

But the *crux* of the problem has not yet been approached. The disappointment lies there. Either the Government of Lord Curzon has been still incubating on this problem and has failed to find a solution, or it has not thought of it at all. If the former, then, the sooner we are told what is its future plan of preventing famine in the land the better. It is admitted on all hands that famine is the result of growing pauperism in the land. How then to prevent that pauperism becomes the crucial question. Assuming that famine does not make its appearance for another seven years, is it possible that in the interval steps will have been taken to diminish that pauperism? For it should be remembered that though food may be in the country, if there be no money with the famished to buy that food one need not be surprised if the same phenomenon which presented itself last year is repeated—namely, that those who have no powers of resisting the inroads of famine should flock to the relief camps at the very outset. Unless, therefore, the State rises to its great responsibility and devises practical means whereby the day labourers and others may be in a better position to endure the hardships of famine, we do not expect anything better. If anything, we may find ourselves in a worse position. It is here that we have to find fault with Lord Curzon. His statesmanship has been silent on this crucial point. But let us hope that as soon as he reaches Calcutta he may be able to make a pronouncement on this burning question which may reassure the people. Tinkering of famine codes will certainly not solve that question, and all such efforts are destined to prove a failure. Possibly, the Commission that has been so magniloquently talked of may be asked to give an expression of its opinion. We shall wait with curiosity both as to the composition of this Commission and the scope of its reference. Commissions, one after another, have only proved a blind. They have only demonstrated the helplessness of Government to tackle intricate problems. Hence the barrenness of practical statesmanship.

As a cognate instance of this barren statesmanship, I may refer you to the recent proceedings of the Viceregal Legislative Council on the passing of that ill-digested piece of legislation known as the Punjab Land Alienation Act. Simla seems to have gone into raptures over that tentative enactment which its author seems to think will work miracles in the condition of the indebted agriculturists of the Punjab. Even the Viceroy had to speak in hesitating and faltering tones, albeit prompted with the optimism of Mr. Rivaz. But, *per contra*, there was that calm but effective speech of Sir Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant-Governor. His words of warning need to be closely studied. He has made what is really a plain declaration that he is slow to believe in the efficacy of the Act. On the contrary, he tells his colleagues that the Government of India in this matter has gone against the deliberate opinion of himself and his predecessors; and that the Act is likely to do more harm than good, though he for one would be rejoiced to learn later on, when experience has been gained, that it has falsified his anticipations. Now, when a Lieutenant-Governor on his own authority, and on that of his experienced predecessors, speaks in this strain we may understand what will be the ultimate practical outcome of the new fangled legislation. And he is not alone in that view. There was Sir

Harman Singh, as representing native Punjab. He was, at the time of voting, of course, in a glorious minority, because official etiquette demands that officials in the Council should vote not according to their conviction and conscience, but according to what the Government wishes. And so the Lieutenant-Governor was prevented by this code of political ethics from voting with that honourable gentleman. But Sir Harman Singh, though alone in Council, has the whole of the country at his back. It is important that Englishmen should realise how, when it suits its purpose or certain forgone conclusions based on immature or ill-digested data, the Government of India forces down the throat of the people revolutionary agrarian legislation of the character of this precious Punjab Land Alienation Bill, despite protests, and despite even the opinion of those responsible authorities of the Province who from experience have known what is good and not good for the indebted Punjab agriculturist. It is questions of this character that help to bring out the true instincts of the statesman, and I for one have ruefully to state that so far Lord Curzon has fallen short of that standard. He has simply allowed himself to be swayed by the plausibilities of his so-called "responsible advisers."

THE FAMINE IN INDIA.

777,000 ON RELIEF.

RAIN GENERALLY MUCH WANTED.

The Secretary of State for India has received the following telegram from the Viceroy on the subject of the famine:—

Numbers declining rapidly in Central Provinces, where relief operations will be brought to an end shortly; less rapidly in Bombay, where relief must last to December and later should no rain fall. Number of persons in receipt of relief:—Bombay, 337,000; Central Provinces, 269,000; Berar, 82,000; Rajputana Native States, 7,000; Central India Native States, 9,000; Bombay Native States, 26,000; Baroda, 24,000; Punjab Native States, relief discontinued; Central Provinces Feudatory States, 9,000; Haidarabad, 14,000.—Total, 777,000.

The Secretary of State has also received the following telegram from the Governor of Bombay:—

Following are figures for week ending November 3:—Famine-stricken districts—86 cases of cholera, of which 63 were fatal. Total number of deaths among numbers on relief works and gratuitous relief 798, or 2.3-10 per mille. Beneficial showers in parts, Deccan Karnatik. Rain is generally much wanted for the rabi crops, and without it the unirrigated crops in many districts will be deficient. Usual sowings greatly retarded. Water supply deficient in parts.

THE MANSION HOUSE FUND.

The Mansion House Fund for the relief of the sufferers from the Indian Famine amounted on Wednesday night to £386,700.

THE "INVESTORS' REVIEW" FUND.

We take the following from the current issue (November 10) of the *Investors' Review*:—

Subscriptions to our little fund, from which not a penny is deducted for advertisements in newspapers or any other kind of charges, may be sent to A. J. Wilson, at this office; cheques to be crossed "Union Bank of London, Indian Famine Fund."

LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS.

Amount acknowledged last week ..	£865	5	1
Jas. F. Fuller, Esq., Perth ..	10	10	0
Collected at a Lecture to Woodburn Women's L.A. by Miss Alison Garland, per INDIA ..	1	0	0
Rev. and Mrs. Hamel ..	2	0	0
Proceeds of Concert by Cuckfield Musical Society, per INDIA ..	1	14	0
Total to date ..	£880	9	1

MR. DADABHAI NAOROJI AT SHEPTON MALLET.

[FROM A CORRESPONDENT.]

The little Somerset town of Shepton Mallet was honoured on Wednesday, November 7, by a visit from this distinguished Parsee politician, on the invitation of Mr. and Mrs. Chambers, of Waterloolod, who, it will be remembered, were instrumental in procuring sometime ago a visit from Mr. Romesh Dutt. A son of Mr. Chambers is closely associated with the advanced party of Indian politicians, and Mr. D. Naoroji, in the course of his speech, paid a tribute of grati-

tude to Mr. Chambers' championship of the cause of the natives of India. The Rev. Canon Johnson, R.C., of Litton, East Harptree, occupied the chair at Wednesday's meeting at the Town Street Hall, supported by Messrs. Chambers, J. R. Allen, J. T. Hyatt, Henry Hyatt, Herbert Hyatt, Rev. L. T. Badcock, &c., and later in the evening by Mr. John Higgins. There was a good attendance, many ladies being present.

Canon JOHNSON, in opening the meeting, referred to the progress of the age and the desire to know more of the country to which we belong, her colonies and dependencies; and also alluded to some of the leading events of the century politically, especially the extension of the franchise, the emancipation of the slaves, the dealing with sinucures, and the abolition of the tax on newspapers, and the financial questions of the country. He showed in brief that these questions affected India as well as England, and advances in England saw corresponding advances in the position of their great Indian Empire. He considered an honour had been conferred upon the town by the visit of Mr. Naoroji, and it showed that gentlemen's great love of his country that he should come so far, at considerable personal inconvenience and cost, to make known to them what was the voice of India.

Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI at the outset of his speech said that he was sometimes taxed with not speaking enough about the good England had done for India, but he did not think he could pay England a higher compliment, or show her greater respect, than that he should be desirous that the connexion should continue for a long time. He did not think that he could better describe the good England had done, and might do, than by the fact that he could come before an English audience with full liberty of speaking what he thought about the bad as well as the good rule of the British in India. So far as the rule in India was good rule, and something like British rule, they were grateful for it; but their misfortune was that the proportion of un-British rule was far greater than the good British rule. People in this country were misled and ignorant of the real character and the true spirit of the rule of their servants set over the people of India, a rule that was often mischievous and injurious to them. The reason he was there that night was that he wished those present as people of England to know something of what were the romances of British rule in India and what were the realities. His health had prevented him coming before to speak to them on the famine, but still he had been asked specially to allude to the famine in India, and he would make that the subject of his speech. He attributed the bad effects of the famine largely to the way in which India had been ruled and impoverished by the British. The drought was not the real cause of the famine in these days, for if the people had no food in one place and they had money, they could buy what they wanted from elsewhere. This question of famines was for that reason becoming one of the burning questions of India and of England, and it would grow one day into the biggest domestic question of the time, and would be the paramount question of the great British Empire. With India England must stand or fall. He could give them his authority for the statement. It was Lord Curzon—the nobleman who was now ruling India as Viceroy for England—Lord Curzon had said: "If we lose our colonies it does not matter, but if we lose India the sun of the British Empire will be for ever set." No truer words were ever uttered. The famines of India would inevitably lead to the whole consideration of the Indian problem. Here they had had British rule in India for nearly 150 years, and what was the ultimate result of that rule? They were always told that it was most beneficial. That was what they were told by Anglo-Indians. They were told it was the most beneficial rule that India had ever enjoyed. They were constantly reminded too that England had made India prosperous. It was very strange, then, that in India millions upon millions were starving from year's end to year's end. It was only when famines came that they heard much about the starvation and destitution, but it was the normal condition of large numbers in India. There were millions in India who hardly knew what it was to have one full meal in the course of a day from year's end to year's end; and was that rule a beneficent rule? They might make any declaration they liked about the benefits of British rule, but here was the plain result—that nine-tenths of the people of India were in a state of impoverishment of which they could not form any idea. Instead of producing £3 or £4 worth of food per head of the people per annum, India did not produce as much as 30s. per head per annum. He did not believe that the people of England were aware of what was taking place in India. They were taught that they had expended hundreds of millions of money and poured out their blood to make the Indian Empire what it is. He asserted that the whole of the money had been found by India, and four-fifths of the blood had been Indian blood. The whole cost of the administration in India was found by that country, which had no voice in the spending of the money. England took away badly out of India £30,000,000 a year, with the result that nine-tenths of the people were in a state of impoverishment of which they could form no idea. He asked was that fair. India did not object to pay for the cost of the administration of the country; but he reminded them that at the dinner given by the Lord Mayor at the Mansion House to Lord

Roberts, it was distinctly stated by a high official that they needed European civil servants and the European soldiers for the purpose of maintaining England's power in India. It was entirely for England's interests that this British civilian and military service was needed in India. "The White Man's burden," as Kipling called it, meant a very different thing to the Indian to what it did to the white man. It meant to the Indian that the burden was the white man upon the Indian's shoulders. The Indian was willing to take his fair share of the burden, but was it fair to put upon his shoulders the whole charge of what was to him a foreign service inimical to his native interests and perhaps even injurious to him and tended to his impoverishment? He urged that if there was to be a partnership between England and India it should be a fair one and that the Indian should have a fair share in the profits, that he should have the rights of a citizen in the earning of the profits by filling offices for which he was fitted. He reminded the meeting of the way the public money was spent in India, unlike it was in England, where every item of the public expenditure was discussed by the people's representatives in Parliament; in India the Budget was passed in a single day and the legislative council had in reality no voice in the expenditure of the revenues raised. But it was not the money raised and spent in the country that was the fault, but the manner in which it was drawn bodily out of the country, which bled it year after year the drain of India, which was the cause of that desolation and impoverishment which led to the evils of famine. Three-fourths of the remedy of any disease was the true diagnosis of it, and he submitted with regard to India that he was now laying before them the true state of affairs. They were told by the Anglo-Indian Press that the country was happy and prosperous, but if they believed that, they were being misled because it was not so. It was true, perhaps, from the point of view of the Englishman, to him it was prosperous, but not to the impoverished and destitute native. The policy of England towards India was declared by the Act of 1833 to be as follows:—"That no native of the said territories, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the said Company." The Queen in her proclamation of 1858 said:—"And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity only to discharge." This was reaffirmed in 1887, and India asks that English people should see this policy honourably carried out, and not evaded as it was at present. As soon as that Act of 1833 was passed, evasions of every sort were practised by Anglo-Indians, and everything possible done to render it a dead letter. English people were not aware of that. He appealed most strongly to the honour of Englishmen to see that this Act of the British Parliament, that the solemn declarations of their beloved Queen to her Indian subjects should be observed; that the honour of the English people should be upheld, and that Indians should be able to feel that they had what they desired above all things—the rights of citizens of this great country, that they should not be treated as helots or slaves, but should have the rights of citizenship. In that way England would be carrying out what she recognised as her duty. She would be inaugurating quite a new idea for the conquerors of a country, setting a noble example to the future, to be attempted generations and nations to follow. On commercial grounds he showed that India would be far more valuable to England, to her people, in a flourishing condition than the whole of the other nations of the world, and he eloquently appealed for justice to India and the honourable redemption of England's pledges to that Empire. In the course of the debate questions were asked which gave Mr. Naoroji an opportunity to enlarge upon the disabilities under which native politicians and journalists laboured in India by being liable to prosecution for sedition in case of speaking out as openly as he had on that occasion. A particularly animated debate ensued. Mr. John Higgins and Canon Johnson contended arguments of Mr. Naoroji, and the latter replied with great spirit. The proceedings terminated with votes of thanks.

MR. S. H. SWINNY AT PETERSFIELD.

THE CAUSES OF INDIAN FAMINE.

[FROM A CORRESPONDENT.]

On Friday, November 9, Mr. S. H. Swinny lectured, on behalf of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, before the Petersfield Literary and Debating Society. The Rev. G. Sampson took the chair, and there was a good audience. All listened most attentively to the lecturer's views on the causes and the remedies of famine in India.

Mr. SWINNY said that the present famine was generally regarded as the worst of the century—worse even than the famine of 1897, which was known as the Great Famine. Especially was this shown in the terrible loss of cattle, which boded so ill for the future of agriculture. And of course it was more difficult for the people to support themselves now, because they had so lately emerged from a similar period of suffering from which they had not had time to recover. They had, in fact, had to meet the present calamity with diminished resources. It was of the utmost importance for us to consider the causes of famine, and how they might be obviated, for we never knew when another terrible crisis would come upon us. But before dealing directly with this question, he would take two points about which some controversy had arisen—the measures taken to meet the distress in the Native States, and the pauperisation supposed to result from the opening of relief works. There was a great tendency among officials in British India, when anything went

wrong, to lay the blame on the maladministration of some contiguous Native State. Some little time back there had been several robberies by gangs in the neighbourhood of Agra. The police were at fault and said the robbers must have taken refuge in native territory where the laxity of the police was notorious. But it turned out in the end that the chief of the robbers was not only a resident in Agra itself, but an honoured guest at the Agra police mess. (Laughter.) Now in the matter of famine relief we had the testimony not only of the Indian Press, but of one of the greatest Anglo-Indian papers, the *Times of India*, that the arrangements in many of the Native States such as Gondal and Morvi, Jaipur and Jodhpur, were excellent. In fact it could not be said whether British or Native States were best, for each had its own advantages; the British being the more regular and uniform, the Native the more flexible, with greater knowledge of the people and more power of adapting its measures to their wants. As to the second point, the fear of the authorities that opening relief works and receiving the people on easy terms would pauperise and degrade them, there was little in the Indian character to give rise to such an idea. In fact India was the last country in the world where such fears could be justified. The Indians were slow to move and slow to change their mode of life, and therefore very unlikely to leave their homes to seek the relief works save under the compulsion of want. India had done without a poor-law, because the joint family, whatever its disadvantages, had this great advantage, that each family provided for its own poor. But although there was little fear of the relief works causing moral degradation, yet in another way the Government had no little cause for disquiet. The financial burden was the evil in the situation. This, and not sedition, or foreign aggression, was the real danger to India. And in the ordinary and impoverished taxpayer it might well seem to the Government that those who had escaped the famine might themselves be too poor to succour the famine-stricken. In the poverty of the country we struck the real cause of famine. The Government would only assign one cause—the failure of the rains, while obviously it was the inability to make provision against that failure that produced famine. If Anglo-Indians consented to go a step further in the enquiry, they spoke of the over-population of the country; but in reality the population of India, excluding Burma, only increased at the rate of .94 per cent. per annum, much less than that of many European countries, and the same as that of Japan. This was an increase which a healthy community ought easily to provide for. Nor was it easy to see how a nation could be said to have insufficient food to feed the people when food was exported and vast tracts were occupied by opium.

Only two nations of Europe in the present century had suffered from famine, Ireland and Russia. In Ireland there were few manufactures, and great payments had to be made abroad. In Russia there were few manufactures in proportion to the population, and heavy taxation. In India all three disabilities were found together—the vast majority of the people had to live by agriculture, the taxation was enormously heavy considering the resources of the country, and a great amount had to be transmitted abroad every year. The first of these three causes of famine was the most generally admitted. Every one deplored the loss of the village industries of India, but it was not so easy to get them up again. On the other hand, the second cause was much more open to remedy. The unfortunate Indian peasant had to pay 500 per cent. on imported salt, and from 2,000 and 4,000 per cent. on the value of salt produced in the country. If he left the enlightened and progressive rule of England and betook himself to Goa, which was still governed by benighted and retrograde Portugal, he found that this prime necessity was much more lightly taxed and therefore much cheaper. But worse even than this was the heavy assessments on the land, combined with rent and taxation, revised at intervals in most parts of India and rising at each revision. It was certain that the land-tax was collected with great rigour. Now it was asserted that the relief money and the advances made to the famine-stricken farmers had been seized in part on the way to the farmers in order to pay their rent. These allegations were to be the subject of a Government enquiry. But perhaps even worse than this was the drain of wealth from India to Europe, which amounted in one year to over £20,000,000. And not only did India have to export all this wealth in order to pay Home charges, pensions, interest on debt, etc., but as a result it had to force a market for its goods, and so sell cheaper and buy dearer throughout its foreign trade. In fact, as J. S. Mill had shown, India had to pay what was from the economic point of view a tribute. One item, trifling in itself, showed how unjustly India had been treated. The rich colonies of Australia and Canada paid nothing towards the salary of the Colonial Secretary or the expenses of the Colonial Office, while India had to bear the entire cost of the India Office. Could this be said to be a just and generous arrangement? It was necessary, then, if every drought was not to produce a famine, to abate these two evils—to lessen the taxation of the country and the heavy drain of wealth to Europe. This could only be done by reducing expenditure and by employing more Indians in the public service. It was not true that Indian officials were untrustworthy. The Indian Post Office lost less by theft in proportion to the amounts dealt with than did the English Post Office. The Indian judges had shown themselves worthy colleagues of the English. Why should not Indians be equally worthy colleagues of the Executive officers of Government? Indian Government was an excellent machine, but too expensive for the country. And if it was necessary to save in civil administration, it was at least equally necessary to save in military expenditure. He was glad to see that Lord Curzon, laying aside his former prejudices, had declared for a policy of peace on the North-West frontier. (Applause).

At the close of Mr. Swinny's address, Col. H. B. HANNA, the great authority on frontier politics and wars, moved a vote of thanks, and in doing so, emphasised the need of economy in India, and especially in military expenditure. He joined in the lecturer's praise of Lord Curzon for abandoning the policy of expansion on the

North-West frontier—an expansion which led to a considerable outlay on Civil administration, while the military outlay was a crushing burden on the finances of India.

The vote was seconded by Mr. WYSON, Revenue officer, who in a vigorous and amusing speech carried into further detail the comparison between the economic conditions of India and those of his native country, Ireland. Mr. Wood addressed some earnest words to the meeting on the duty which England owed to India, contrasting this with the blatant Imperialism which was more concerned with the glories than the obligations of Empire.

Mr. BLAIR expressed the wish that a large measure of Home Rule and local self-government should be given to India. Mr. JONES put a question on irrigation.

The chairman summed up the discussion very ably and impartially, and the vote of thanks to the lecturer was agreed to unanimously.

Mr. SWINNY, in replying, said that it gave him much pleasure to find that they were all agreed on the necessity of seeking out the causes of famine and the duty of removing those causes. He quite agreed that it was most desirable to extend gradually, but persistently, self-government in India. Both political parties had concurred in giving back Mysore to the Indians, and that State by the excellence of its administration had more than justified the step. As to the very important question of irrigation, there was no doubt that much had been done in the past. Near the mouths of some of the rivers on the Eastern Coast of India considerable tracts had been rendered fertile, and now supported a large population. In the North, too, such great works as the Sutlej canal had been a success. But it was generally admitted: (1) that the best things had already been done; (2) that irrigation in some instances had attendant evils—the salts being washed out of the ground and the fertility therefore decreasing unless they were replaced by heavy manuring, which is out of the power of the ordinary cultivator; (3) that some parts of India could gain nothing by irrigation. Therefore it was evident that irrigation was not a complete cure. Indeed, to carry irrigation out, money was a necessity, and this could not well be found without mortgaging the future, so that we were brought back to the same difficulty as before—the poverty of the country.

LORD CURZON IN BOMBAY.

IMPORTANT SPEECH.

CRITICISM ESSENTIAL TO GOOD GOVERNMENT.

EDUCATED INDIAN OPINION ENTITLED TO RESPECT.

The Bombay correspondent of the *Morning Leader* telegraphed as follows on Friday last:—

BOMBAY, Friday.

Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, made a remarkable speech in reply to the address of the Bombay Corporation.

British rule (his Excellency said) rests on justice. The Viceroy acts as umpire, and must hear both sides. Officials have no monopoly of knowledge; criticism is recognised as essential to good government; and educated Native opinion is entitled to respect. The governing of the Empire on any other lines would be bound to fail.

The speech was greatly cheered, and the news of it is received with satisfaction in Indian circles.

The following was the account of the speech telegraphed by Reuter's correspondent:—

BOMBAY, November 8.

Lord Curzon arrived here yesterday evening. His Excellency will receive an Address from the Municipality to-day.

Bombay is *en fete* in honour of the Viceroy's visit.

LATER.

The presentation of the Address to Lord Curzon from the Municipality was witnessed by a great throng of spectators.

The Address declared that his Excellency's rule had deepened the loyalty of India to the Queen. India had been deeply touched by his profound feeling for the famine stricken, and was grateful for his stern and impartial adherence to principles of justice. Within two years he had won their hearts, captured their imaginations, and gained the respect and admiration of the whole country.

Lord Curzon, in replying, thanked the presenters of the Address for their recognition of what he described as a characteristic of the warm-hearted Indian people. The most conclusive testimony of the loyalty of the princes and people, he continued, was the fact that between twenty thousand and thirty thousand soldiers have been spared from the Indian army for wars elsewhere. India had thus borne her share in the great outburst of Imperial sentiment. The prompt despatch of an Indian contingent to South Africa a year ago had saved Natal. Indian regiments had rescued the Peking Legations. These services had been rendered while India was distracted by famine and plague, and weighed down by her own troubles.

If her arm reached to China in the East and to South Africa in the West, who would doubt the range of India's influence or her share in the Imperial destinies? The guiding principle of his administration was to hold the scales even. This was sometimes difficult, because by one party he might be suspected of disloyalty to the rights of his countrymen, and by the other of imperfect sympathy with its aspirations or aims. Despite these drawbacks, he still held the conviction that by Native confidence in British justice the loyalty of the Indian peoples was assured.

He disputed the contention that no one ever wanted reform in Asia. He regretted that his term of office was so short. He hardly had time to begin. He deprecated an official tendency transcendently superior to public opinion, urging that statesmanship could not despise or ignore the opinion of the educated classes. The Government should hearken to both sides of the case, and look sympathetically upon grievances, instead of arbitrarily snuffing them out.

Lord Curzon met with an enthusiastic reception. He afterwards visited the Native town, and no Viceroy has ever been more cordially greeted here.

Commenting on Lord Curzon's pronouncement, the *Morning Leader* wrote:—

The important telegram that we print this morning from our Bombay correspondent shows that Lord Curzon is continuing in the path of "courage and sympathy" which he marked out for himself as Viceroy of India. His Viceroyal tour has brought him to Bombay where, in reply to an address from the municipality, our Correspondent reports him as saying:—

British rule rests on justice. The Viceroy acts as umpire, and must hear both sides. Officials have no monopoly of knowledge; criticism is recognised as essential to good government; and educated native opinion is entitled to respect. The governing of the Empire on any other lines would be bound to fail.

To English ears these phrases may perhaps sound like platitude, just as many Englishmen could see no special cause for remark in Lord Curzon's treatment of the Rangoon outrage, his recantation in frontier policy, and his protest against what the Simla Correspondent of the *Standard* described a few days ago as "needless noting and minuting, the enormous delays, and the utterly unbusiness-like methods" of the secretariats. The fact remains, however, that it is in India a really remarkable and memorable thing to discover a Viceroy who has views of his own and the strength to assert them against the dead weight of bureaucratic officialism by which he is surrounded. Lord Curzon has proved himself a Viceroy of this rare type, and therefore, when it was lately rumoured that he was to be brought home to the Foreign Office, the whole Native Press exclaimed that India could not afford to lose a ruler who added firmness to justice and sympathy to both. We congratulate Lord Curzon upon the confidence he has won—confidence which augurs well for the future of a country too often cursed with well-intentioned but weak rulers who have been puppets in the hands of irresponsible advisers.

INDIAN GOVERNMENT EXTRAVAGANCE.

[FROM THE "INVESTORS' REVIEW".]

A tabular compilation of some interest and value has been issued by the Government under the title "East India Income and Expenditure," but we do not propose now to enter into any profound analysis of its contents. Two or three facts, however, stand out with prominence and may be mentioned here. One of the most significant is the movements of the land revenue before and after the famine of 1896-97. Up to 1895-96 there had been a comparatively steady growth in the land revenue. Taken at 15 rupees to the pound it was £16,020,000 in 1888-89, and in 1892-93 it was £17,400,000. By 1895-96 its total was screwed up to £18,315,000. Then in the next year—the famine year—it dipped to £16,937,000, but the following year it again rose above £18,000,000, and in 1898-9 it was £19,364,000. The figures for the last three years here given demonstrate the ruthlessness with which arrears of rent were collected by the officials, and there cannot be a doubt that the determination to get this back money out of the cultivator sensibly increased the misery of the famine still gnawing at the vitals of our dependency. The Indian bureaucracy, in other words, functions purely like an automatic tax grinder. Not only so, but we believe the steady increase in the land revenue shown by the years preceding the famine of 1896-97 has in great measure been without warrant from an improvement in the position of the country. On the contrary, all reliable testimony goes to show that the people of India are becoming poorer and less able to sustain the burdens we have put upon them than they used to be.

The revenue must be had from somewhere, and, after all, there is little except the rent of the land from which to draw any increase in it. The receipts from taxation have indeed grown, until in 1898-99 they reached a formidable total of £20,052,000, thanks principally to the imposition of additional Customs duties and to an increase in the Excise,

In 1888-89 the total revenue from taxation was only £14,610,000. Items do show a slow development, and even the salt revenue has gone up about £1,000,000 in the course of the eleven years whose figures are before us, but the whole of the figures are indicative of anything except steady progress in wealth by the country, and had it not been for the addition to the Customs tariff, which brought the revenue from that source up from £558,000 in 1888-89 to £3,127,000 in 1898-99, there would have been no great expansion in the total. Against the larger land and tax revenues, moreover, there has to be placed a remarkable decrease in the opium income. That ranged between 24,000,000 and 24,600,000 in the five years ended with 1892-93, or an average of £1,000,000 per annum for that period, but in 1897-98 the net receipts fell to £1,856,000, and in 1898-99 only amounted to £2,230,000. In all probability the disturbed condition of China must still further diminish the profit our Government in India derives from this monopoly, and drive it again to devise methods whereby to exhaust the resources of the Indian people.

It never thinks of reducing expenditure, this Government. That also grows automatically and in a fashion most ominous to see. The burden of debt goes on increasing, but is disguised by the way these tables are drawn up. According to the figures set forth therein, Debt Service has fallen from £2,630,000 in 1888-89 to 2,131,000 in 1898-99. But this is a wholly delusive method of exhibiting the truth about our extravagance. In actual fact the interest on debt in 1888-89 was £6,032,000, and in 1898-99 it was £6,596,000. This seems a small increase, but even that is only a part of the burden, for "interest on other obligations," as the item is euphemistically described, rose from £292,000 in the first year of the eleven to £2,118,000 in 1898-99. The net total above quoted is arrived at by deducting amounts chargeable to railways and amounts chargeable to irrigation, and supposed to be, or actually, paid by these public works, and in regard to other obligations by abstracting receipts derived from loans to port trusts and municipal bodies, advances to landlords, interest received, and floating balances lent in London, and such like. The gross weight of the Indian debt, however, has risen in the eleven years from about £6,323,000 to £8,614,000. That is the sum no matter how provided, the Indian people have to pay to us every year. It is the same with the Indian army, which was £16,721,000 in 1888-89 and £16,158,000 in 1898-99. The cost of getting the revenue mounts in a similar manner, and although the commercial services, as the post-office, telegraphs, railways, and irrigation works are described, give improved results, in the sense that the direct burden imposed upon the taxpayer is less, the entire weight of them borne by the Indian community steadily grows. The money taken away, and only that portion of it representing the actual expenditure within India in any sense goes back. For one reason or another India has now to remit to Government account alone nearly £20,000,000 to England every year, but the weight of the load is relieved by borrowings in London.

Reverting to the army, it has had to be noted that the increase in its cost has not been balanced by either the enlargement of the numbers with the colours or increased efficiency. Upon this point some interesting figures have been brought together from the annual "Statistical Abstract relating to British India" by an able writer in the Calcutta newspaper, *Cypriote*. Summarising these figures, we find that in the ten years ended March 31, 1898, the entire cost of the army of India slightly exceeded one fourth of the entire revenue for that period. It is a cost steadily growing. In 1889, taking always March 31 as the date, it was 202,000,000 rupees, and in 1898 270,000,000 rupees. On the first of these dates the strength of the European army in India was 69,266, and on the last, 67,741, while that of the native army fell from 128,642 to 126,036. Thus we have an increase of nearly 70,000,000 rupees in the cost of its maintenance increased. For example, in 1889 the average number of men constantly sick—this is to say, sick every day of the year—was in the European part of the army 30 per 1,000, and in 1898 it was 90 per 1,000. In 1899 it was 94 per 1,000, and in 1897 101 per 1,000. This means that some 6,000 men were always ill out of an army of 67,000. The death ratio has also tended to rise, although with remarkable dips and variations. It averaged about 15.5 per thousand in the five years ended with March 31, 1893, and nearly 18 per 1,000 in the quinquennium ended with the same date in 1898, but the two last years in the second of these periods were unfavourably affected by the fact that fighting was going on in the North-West frontier. The same tendency is not shown by the health statistics relating to the native army, but neither do they indicate that enlarged expenditure has materially influenced the sickness and death rates. At the present time the ratio of sickness amongst our European troops in India is of the highest significance because we have no reliefs to send there. Not only are the numbers because of European service reduced by the drafts sent to South Africa, but the usual rotation of battalions has had to be suspended, and yet our men continue to die and to be invalided home at the rate of about six per thousand per annum. By this attrition alone we must have between 4,000 and 5,000 fewer white fighting men in India than we had a year ago, allowing for the absence of the African contingent. And strangely enough the cost of the medical establishments in India has been steadily rising. It was £1,183,000 rupees in 1889-90 and £2,324,000 rupees in 1898-99. It would be foreign to the purpose of this article to discuss the meaning of these figures, but it must be pointed out that the burden imposed upon the Indian people by our steadily-growing expenditure has, at least in regard to the British army, been in no way justified by results. We grind the faces of the people for nothing.

PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO INDIA.

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The Skeleton at the (Jubilee) Feast (Congress Green Book I.), by Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN, Bart. (being a series of suggestions for the prevention of famine in India). Post free, 7d.

Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure: Evidence-in-Chief of the Indian Witnesses. (Congress Green Book II.) Post free, 1s. 10d.

The Proposed Separation of Judicial and Executive Functions in India. Memorial to the Secretary of State. With two Appendices. (Congress Green Book III.) Post free, 1s. 2d.

Two Statements presented to the Indian Currency Committee (1898), by Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI.

Speech by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., in the House of Commons, August 14, 1894, on the Debate on the Indian Budget.

Ditto do. in the House of Commons, February 12, 1895, on the Debate on the Address.

Ditto do. on British Rule in India (1898).

Presidential Address by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., delivered to the Indian National Congress at Lahore, 1893.

Presidential Address by Mr. A. M. Bose, M.A., delivered to the Indian National Congress at Madras, 1898.

Speeches of Mr. Alfred Webb, M.P., President of the Indian National Congress, 1894-5.

Valdatory Address of Mr. Alfred Webb, M.P., delivered at Bombay, January 17, 1895.

Speeches of Mr. D. E. Wacha delivered at the 9th, 11th and 14th Sessions of the Indian National Congress.

Is the Government of India Responsible to Anyone, and if so to Whom? Speech delivered at Croydon by Mr. W. C. BONNEREE.

The Famine in India. Speeches delivered at a Public Reception to Mr. Vaughan Nash on his return from the Famine Districts, July, 1900.

Mr. A. O. Hume's Farewell to India. Speech delivered at Bombay, 1894.

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