

THE  
**Military Panorama,**  
OR  
**OFFICERS' COMPANION**  
FOR  
*July 1813.*

EMBELLISHMENTS.

*Portrait of Maj.-Gen. William Thomas Dilkes.  
Map of Spain and Portugal, with the Retreat of the British Army  
under Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Moore, in 1809.*

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## TO CORRESPONDENTS.

The Review of an Edition of the Classics has been received, and is under consideration. We confess it is due to the Army, that the great inaccuracies and omissions which prevail throughout that publication should be noticed; and the only aversion we feel to give publicity to the communication, arises from the idea, that our motives may be subject to misconception.

A Review and Narrative of the Campaign in America, embellished with a correct Map of the Seat of War, &c. drawn and engraved expressly for the Military Panorama, is in preparation. Maps of the Retreat of the French Army in Russia, will be given in the following Numbers.

We are aware of the malicious attempts of the Officer alluded to in Antonius's Letter; and shall, when we have obtained some information on points to which we are now directing an enquiry, give to the Army a full and correct statement on the subject. Antonius is requested to accept our best thanks for his good wishes; and we beg to inform him, that the communications of the Officer in question were never gratuitous.

Major Roberts's "Plan for forming a Rallying Square" has been received, and will appear in our next. We beg this intelligent Officer to accept our best thanks for his communication.

The "Treatise on the State of Europe, with Propositions for the Restoration of a Balance of Power, by the exertions, political and military, of Great-Britain, Russia, and Prussia," will be given in our next.

Crito is recommended to forward his statement to Head-Quarters, where the public abuse and fraud he complains of will, we are confident, have strict and impartial investigation. The coals allowed by Government for consumption in Barracks and Magazines, cannot legally and honorably be removed for consumption into the private dwelling of any Officer.


The following Postscript to the "Military View of the United States, and their Vulnerable Points exposed, by a reference to the Conduct and Opinions of General Washington," we regret, was not received sufficiently early for insertion after the valuable article to which it relates.

P.S. The recent accounts from America induce me to refer to the situation in which our dominions there may be placed, *by our having lost the sovereignty of the Lakes*. Upper Canada must be abandoned. Without the Lakes, all that Sir George Prevost can do will be to defend Lower Canada. By the papers laid on the table of the House of Lords, his whole force did not then exceed 9,100 men. Reinforcements may have arrived to give him 10,000; but, he will be lucky if he secures his Upper Canadian army. With this force he has to defend Quebec, and garrison Halifax. But we have reason to rejoice, that, all circumstances considered, our positions still afford us powerful means of offence.

June 27, 1813.

Military Essays, Reviews of Military Works, Biographical Notes, Journals, and every Military operation, will at all times be particularly attended to. Authors of such communications may rest assured that the Editor will observe inviolable secrecy as to their names, and when requested will communicate personally on the subject of their communications.

As the Panorama is published in a manner that will always render it a useful and necessary, but also an elegant work for the confined library of the scholar, and to deserve a prominent place on the shelves of the scholar and the collector, it consequently requires very considerable time for printing and binding, and it is therefore requested that those correspondents who are desirous for an early publication of their favours, will transmit them at the commencement of each month, directed to the Editor, 38, Orchard-Street Portman-Square.



# Major General W. J. Dickes.

*Engraved for the Military Panorama*

by H.R. Cook from a Picture by S. Woodforde R.A.

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THE  
**Military Panorama,**

OFFICERS' COMPANION FOR JULY 1813.

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MILITARY BIOGRAPHY.

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*Maj.-Gen. WILLIAM THOMAS DILKES, Third Foot Guards.*

"Love and honour."\*

**A**LTHOUGH it would very justly be considered as a great weakness on our part, were we to refrain giving to the army memoirs of living military men, from the opinion some individuals may indulge that the object is to court particular favor; yet it must be confessed that the task of recording the biographies and delineating the professional services of living officers, is at all times an invidious and arduous duty.

The family of Major-General Dilkes is originally of Maxtoke Castle, in Warwickshire, where the elder branch still resides. The original name is Dilke: the final *s* was added by Admiral Sir Thomas Dilkes, great grandfather to the present Major-General; he married the Lady Mary, daughter to Marrough O'Brien, sixth Lord and first Earl of Inchiquin, and widow of Henry Boyle, of Castle Martyr, Esq. (whose son was many years Speaker of the Irish House of Commons, and created Earl of Shannon in 1756.) General Michael O'Brien Dilkes, only son of Sir Thomas and Lady Mary, was Governor of the Royal Hospital at Kilmainham, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, and Colonel of the 50th regiment of foot; he had three sons engaged in the service of their country, two of whom survived the General. The eldest, Thomas, was Major of the 40th regiment, and served in America during great part of the war, but from considerable pecuniary disappointments on the death of his father, he found himself obliged to quit a service he

\* Motto of Major-General Dilkes' family.

was warmly attached to; he left two sons, the eldest of whom is the present Major-General Dilkes, the second a Captain in the Royal Navy.

Major-General Dilkes was born at the Royal Hospital Kilmainham, in 1767; he received his education at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; in 1780 he was appointed Ensign in the 49th regiment, and continued at the said academy until 1782, when he joined the 103d regiment in Ireland, as Lieutenant, under the ever-revered General Abercrombie. In March 1783, he purchased an Ensigncy in the 3d Foot Guards; from Jan. 1788 till Jan. 1789 he served as Aid-de-Camp to the late Gen. O'Hara, then commanding at Gibraltar. In 1790 he was appointed Adjutant to his regiment, the 3d Foot Guards; in 1792 Lieutenant and Captain, and in 1793 he embarked with the first body of troops, consisting of three battalions of Foot Guards under Major-General Lake, and a brigade of the line, 14th, 37th, and 53d regiments, under Major-General Abercrombie, with a small detachment of artillery, the whole not exceeding 4000 effectives; and moreover the regiments of the line had been hastily completed by independent companies, and were extremely raw and untutored in the art of war.

The subject of this memoir served with very distinguished credit during the whole of the campaigns in the Netherlands, and was present at all the principal occurrences. In the gallant affair at Lincelles, in August 1793, the conduct of the Guards gained for those regiments wreaths of never-fading honor. The Prince of Orange, commanding the Dutch troops in the Netherlands, had made large detachments from his camp for different enterprizes, and was therefore under the necessity of requesting his Royal Highness the Duke of York to send three battalions to the support of the Dutch troops at Lincelles. The three nearest battalions, which happened to be those of the first, Coldstream, and 3d regiment of Guards, were accordingly ordered to march under the command of Major-General Lake for that purpose. Previous to their arrival, however, the Dutch troops had lost the post and retired by a road different to that by which the British was advancing; they had further neglected to dispatch any person for the purpose of meeting General Lake, and to apprise him of their route.

The head of the English columns was close to the works before the British General entertained the most distant idea that the Dutch had retired, or that the enemy were in full possession and strongly entrenched. Thus deceived in his expectations, Major-General

Lake had no alternative but to attack at once, in spite of the enemy's superiority of numbers, and of the obstacles of ground, or to retire; and he knew that, by retreating, he would expose the flank of the Duke of York's corps, and, moreover, would have presented the enemy a favorable opportunity of entirely defeating the detachment under his command.

Major-General Lake therefore determined on an immediate attack: the enemy occupied a redoubt of uncommon size and strength upon a rising ground across the high road in front of Lincelles; the road itself was defended by other works strongly palisaded; woods and ditches covered their flanks. The battalions were instantly formed, and advanced under a very heavy fire with an order and intrepidity for which no praise can be too high: after firing three or four rounds they rushed on with their bayonets, stormed the redoubt, and drove the enemy through the village; the latter rallied under the protection of other troops, and for some time kept up a severe fire, but they were again defeated, and entirely put to the rout.

It must be very evident that, in the above affair, the conduct of the British General was more conspicuous for gallantry than prudence: he certainly should have ascertained whether the Dutch retained possession of the post of Lincelles previous to his columns reaching the entrenchments. However, the promptness with which he took his resolution for an attack, and the vigour with which he formed it, deserved and obtained the greatest praise from his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

In May 1795, Major-General, then Captain Dilkes, returned to England with the last body of the troops which had been employed in the campaigns in Flanders. In February 1797, he was promoted to a company in his regiment, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and in the following year, he embarked with the Guards for Ireland, during the rebellion, and remained in that country till June 1799. In the month of August of the latter year, Lieutenant-Colonel Dilkes embarked again with the expedition to the Helder, and was present in the different actions that took place in that short, disastrous, yet honorable, campaign to British courage, discipline, and perseverance under the greatest hardships.

The public in general are apt to draw conclusions, when judging of events, not always in consonance with the causes by which they are produced, but from their successful or unfortunate issues. The fallacy of such conclusions cannot be more fully demonstrated

than in the expedition to the Helder.—The principal objects of the expedition were to effect the re-establishment of the former legal constitution of Holland, and to restore the Stadholderate to the House of Hanover. A plan of co-operation was concerted between Great-Britain and Russia, in the confidence that numbers of the Dutch, opening their eyes to their real interests, would combine with those, whom they might justly consider as their deliverers, as soon as they saw they could, with safety, act according to their sentiments and wishes. These confident expectations were indulged by the speculative government of the time; and for the accomplishment thereof, the British troops embarked were in as irregular a condition as any that ever left the shores of Britain; the regiments that were ordered for service had their complements of men made up from skeleton regiments, which last were afterwards wholly recruited, many of them with additional battalions, by volunteers from the English militia in the dresses of their different regiments, &c. But supposing that the expedition had succeeded so far, as to obtain possession of the capital of Holland, and the Stadholder once more reinstated in the government, was it possible for him to have been maintained in his authority, while the French republic existed? In addition to the facility with which French troops could be marched into Holland, the general coldness of the inhabitants towards the House of Orange, and the impossibility of keeping a sufficiently large British army in that country, all conspired to render a permanent re-establishment of the old government extremely difficult, if not impossible. The British troops, under their illustrious General, accomplished every thing that was practicable. In the field they displayed the utmost valor; and, notwithstanding the greater part had never before been employed on foreign service, they exercised the greatest moderation and humanity when victorious; and with cheerfulness and calm fortitude submitted to the greatest privations.

In 1800 Lieut.-Col. Dilkes returned to Ireland with the same brigade, from which he was removed in the August of that year, by being attached to the light infantry battalion, *then* supposed to be first destined for service. In 1804, he took the command of the 3d regiment of Guards; in the brevet of October, 1805, he was appointed Colonel, and in 1808 Colonel on the Staff to command the brigade of Guards in London.

In February 1810, the subject of this sketch received orders to serve in Portugal, with the rank of Brigadier-General, and to take

the command of the brigade of Guards serving there; but his destination was shortly after changed to the command of the brigade of Guards\* ordered to Cadiz, for which place Brigadier-General Dilkes embarked in the month of March. Early in the following year he again embarked with this brigade, in the expedition that sailed from Cadiz, under Lieutenant-General Graham; and considering his rank at that period, he may be regarded as particularly fortunate in being employed on so memorable an occasion, as next in command to that highly-distinguished officer.

The troops ordered for the service marched from Isla on the night of the 17th of February, and embarked the next morning at day-break in Cadiz Bay. In the evening of the 21st, the expedition sailed; it arrived off Tarifa on the following day; but as the weather proved unfavorable for a landing at that place, it proceeded to Algesiras, where the troops landed on the morning of the 23d. On the 24th they marched to Tarifa through a beautiful and romantic track of country, without any other road than merely a mule path, which was found scarcely practicable for the advance of the cavalry: all the artillery, therefore, was sent onwards by water.

On the 27th, the Spanish troops, under General Lapena, arrived from Cadiz, and landed at Tarifa; they had been embarked in open vessels, even before the British, and were consequently much exposed to the inclemency of the weather during the whole period, and in very confined and crowded situations. However, they were in readiness to march on the next morning, thereby exemplifying that patience and submission under great hardships and privations, which constitute the best military feature of the Spanish character. During the halt of the British at Tarifa, measures were adopted to render the road towards Medina Sidonia practicable.

The allied army† marched on the 28th to Facinas, always en

\* This brigade consisted of six companies of the 1st Foot Guards, forming one battalion, under the late General, at that time Colonel Wheatley, and afterwards commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sebright; two companies of the Coldstream regiment, and three companies of the 3d Foot Guards, forming another battalion, under the Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel Onslow of the latter regiment.

† Statement of the forces under the command of General Lapena and Lieutenant-General Graham.

Van-guard	- - - - -	2,100
Prince Anglona's Division	- - - - -	4,000
Reserve { British	{ - - 4,300 }	5,100
Spanish	{ - - 300 }	
		-----
	Total Infantry	11,200
	Cavalry	800
	-----	
	Total	12,000

bivouac; in the night between the 1st and 2d of March to the neighbourhood of Casa Vieja; a long fatiguing night march across a country much intersected with water-courses. On the morning of the 3d, a battalion of Walloon guards and the regiment of Cuidad Real, joined the reserve, (as the corps under Lieutenant-General Graham's command was styled;) the former was incorporated with the brigade of Guards, the latter with Colonel Wheatley's brigade\*: the army marched during the whole day, and halted in the vicinity of Vejar at night. In the evening of the 4th, the troops were again in motion, and continued to march until the morning of the 5th, when the van-guard proceeded to attack the enemy's position opposite the point of Santi Petri, and the reserve halted on the east side of the heights of Barrosa, (by some called Cerra del Puerco †.)

The attack of the van-guard on the enemy's lines succeeded in this operation; it was supported by half of the Prince of Anglona's division, the other half remaining on the heights already mentioned, and it should seem, that previous to the movement of the British to that point, which the Spanish Commander thought it necessary to strengthen, General Lapena offered Lieutenant-General Graham his option, whether the latter should move for that purpose with his corps, or continue posted on the heights; but the Lieutenant-General declining to make an election, the former decided that the reserve should march, leaving two battalions to join the remainder of the Spanish forces, to preserve the position on the heights. In addition, however, to two battalions of Walloon and Cuidad Real Guards, Lieutenant-General Graham left Colonel Brown's battalion, composed of flank companies, which was posted at the Torre Barrosa. The Lieutenant-General, therefore, had every reason to suppose the General-in-Chief would remain on that position during the day ‡.

\* Colonel Wheatley was appointed to the command of a brigade of the line in a few weeks, perhaps two months, after the arrival of the brigade of Guards at Cadiz, when the command of the 1st Guards devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Sebright, as alluded to in the first note. Colonel Wheatley's brigade, on the expedition, was composed of three battalions of the line.

† This arose from a change of plans; the original intention was to have proceeded to Medina Sidonia, and from thence towards Puerto Real, thereby, if successful, cutting off the French forces in Chiclana.

‡ This will be seen by the following extract of a letter from Lieutenant-General Graham to the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, dated Isla de Leon, March 24, 1811.

" When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, I left the General on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his

Lieutenant-General Graham's division being halted on the Eastern slope of the Barrosa height for about two hours, was marched about twelve o'clock through a wood towards the Torre Bermeja, (cavalry patroles having previously been sent towards Chiclana without meeting with the enemy); on the march the Lieutenant-General received notice that the enemy had appeared in force on the plain, and was advancing towards the height of Barrosa.—Lieutenant-General Graham considering the position as the key to that of Santi Petri, he immediately countermarched, in order to support the troops left for its defence; and the alacrity with which this manœuvre was executed, served as a favorable omen. Before the British troops could get entirely disentangled from the wood, the Spanish troops on the Barrosa hill were seen retiring from it, while the enemy's left wing was rapidly ascending, at the same time his right wing stood on the plain at the edge of the wood, within cannon shot. A retreat in the face of such an enemy, already within reach of the easy communication by the sea bank, must have involved the whole of the allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow edge of Bermeja, nearly at the same time.—The British General, therefore, determined on an immediate attack,

*intention of quitting it*, and when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so, to support troops left for its defence, and believing the General to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack which was made so near to the spot where the General was supposed to be, and though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army.—The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy an expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions (Walloon Guards and Ciudad Real) which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood; but notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come up at the close of the action.

"Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea beach, to form in the plain, and to envelope the enemy's left; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might not have been expected from such decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion, a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit. Our wearied men would have found spirits to go on, and would have trusted to finding refreshment at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour's ride of the scene of action the General remained ignorant of what was passing, *and nothing was done.*"

Major Duncan opened a powerful battery of ten guns on the centre. Brigadier-General Dilkes, with his brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Brown's (of the 28th) flank battalion; Lieutenant-Colonel Norcott's two companies of the rifle corps; and Major Acheson, with a part of the 67th Foot; (separated from the regiment in the wood); formed on the right. Colonel Wheatley's brigade, with three companies of Coldstream Guards under Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson; and Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard's flank battalion; formed on the left.—The right wing proceeded to the attack of General Ruffin's division on the hill, while Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard's, and Lieutenant Colonel Busche's detachment, 20th Portuguese, were warmly engaged on the left with the enemy's tirailleurs.—General Laval's division, notwithstanding the havoc made by the battery above mentioned, continued to advance in very imposing masses, opening his fire of musquetry, and was only checked by that of the left wing; the latter now advanced, firing, and a spirited charge made by the three companies of the Guards and the 87th regiment, supported by the remainder of the wing, decided the defeat of General Laval's division.

Of the immediate operations relating to the right wing, consisting of the brigade under Brigadier-General Dilkes, the following is a correct statement. At the time the troops were halted on the East side of the heights of Barrosa, Lieutenant-General Graham's orders were conveyed for Brigadier-General Dilkes' brigade, as well as that of Colonel Wheatley, to proceed towards Santi Petri. The column accordingly began its march (left in front Colonel Wheatley's brigade leading) over the hill, and, descending the other side, entered a fir wood, so thick as to be almost impracticable to the guns and mounted officers.—Brigadier-General Dilkes had advanced about a mile, when a Staff officer overtook the brigade, seeking General Graham, and reporting that the enemy had made his appearance in the plain they had just quitted; it was not understood that the enemy were in considerable force, and the natural impression was to face about, and return to meet him, but it was judged proper to wait the Lieutenant-General's orders, which were not long delayed, and the column retraced its steps rear rank in front.—Before quite clear of the wood, Brigadier-General Dilkes formed his brigade, countermarched the divisions, and a deployment was shortly after completed; the battalion styled a detachment, composed of companies belonging to the Coldstream and 3d Guards, forming in second line to the 1st regiment.—During this movement, an appli-

cation being made for a party to cover the guns, Brigadier-General Dilkes sent three companies of the first-mentioned battalion for that service, which were afterwards employed on the left during the action.

The line now advanced obliquely to the right, towards a corps of the enemy, which occupied the heights the British had so lately passed, and a heavy fire of artillery and musketry was kept up on both sides; but the line continuing their advance with distinguished gallantry, that part of the enemy's force immediately opposed to them was obliged to withdraw towards another corps upon his right. The British still advanced, bringing forward the right shoulders, and thereby threatening the enemy's left, who at length formed that flank *en masse*, continuing his retreat down the hill, and ascending another rising ground, halting occasionally, and keeping up a severe destructive fire. At one time the enemy were perceived to push forward two or three divisions from the *masse*, as was conceived, to charge the British line, but the well-directed fire of our troops, still advancing, obliged him to desist; and the British were too exhausted with their difficult march, &c. to return the compliment.

Soon after our troops had began to descend the hill, the enemy's cavalry were observed posted on his left, and it was constantly expected that he would charge a weak part of our line; he had actually made a movement seemingly for that purpose.—Major-General Dilkes, and his Aide-de-Camp, were at this period dismounted, both their horses having been shot under them. The British cavalry now arrived on the field of action, and immediately charged the enemy, who, after a slight hesitation, advanced to the encounter, both parties meeting at a hand gallop; they mixed, dispersed, and reformed, the enemy retiring, and our hussars pursuing the stragglers. It was about this period the Walloon Guards arrived on the right of Brigadier-General Dilkes' brigade.

After the defeat of the enemy's cavalry, he continued to retreat obliquely to his right, still firing, until some artillery being brought up, his complete retreat was decided, and the line received Lieutenant-General Graham's orders to halt.

Sir Thomas Graham has borne ample testimony to the distinguished part taken by the Guards in this gallant battle. Then, as on every other occasion in which they have been engaged, the conduct of this corps reflected high honour on their commander, and Major-General Dilkes has been often heard to express in the warm-

est terms, his admiration of the gallantry displayed by, and gratitude for the support he received from every individual of the brigade he had the honour to command. But it was not the first time he had witnessed their bravery; many had been his associates in former campaigns, and more particularly in the affair of Lincelles, a day every Guardsman looks back to with pride and satisfaction.

The annexed extract of a dispatch dated 30th March, 1811, from Lord Liverpool to General Graham, will best convey the sentiments with which the account of the conduct of the troops in the action of Barrosa was received by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, the Houses of Parliament, and by the Commander-in-Chief.

"The Prince Regent has likewise felt the highest gratification in observing the unanimous spirit with which the officers and soldiers under your command vied in the execution of your orders, and the steady discipline and unconquerable valour which at length accomplished a decisive victory over an enemy nearly double their numbers, and of long experience and high reputation in war.

"The severe loss which has been sustained in this action by the gallant troops whom you, sir, so worthily led, has been a subject of deep regret to the mind of the Prince Regent; but such a conflict could not but be attended with the fall of many brave men, and the partial sacrifice has probably saved the allies from the most calamitous events. The memory of those who conquered, and of those who fell in the hour of victory upon the heights of Barrosa, will be ever cherished by the British nation; and their names will hold a conspicuous rank among the bravest and worthiest of our heroes.

"His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased to direct that, as an honorable ensign of the distinguished merit displayed by the General and Field Officers in the direction of departments, or in the command of corps on this memorable day, a medal shall be worn by them, bearing the glorious name of Barrosa."

In addition to the medal which Major-General Dilkes was honoured with by his sovereign for the distinguished share he bore in the battle of Barrosa, he received the thanks of his country in both Houses of Parliament, and the City of London honoured him with its freedom, and a sword of the value of one hundred guineas.

The following letter, dated 29th of March, 1811, from His Royal Highness the Duke of York to Major-General Dilkes, is a further flattering testimonial of the gallant conduct of that officer, and the troops he commanded, in the battle of Barrosa.—It is extracted from the Brigade Orders of the 28th of April, and does infinite honour to the head and heart of His Royal Highness.

"I take the earliest opportunity in my power of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 9th of March, and of thanking you for your

obliging attention in communicating to me thus early, what relates to the distinguished conduct of my gallant old friends, the Guards, under your command in the glorious and severely-contested action of the 5th. While I congratulate you and them on the successful result of an action in which their efforts were so conspicuous, and so deserving of the admiration with which all have viewed them, I cannot conceal my deep feelings of regret, that it has been attended with so severe and painful a loss of officers and men, which upon this occasion, perhaps, makes a deeper impression upon me, as many of the latter were old soldiers, and faithful companions, whose meritorious exertions I have myself witnessed, and had occasion to approve upon former occasions.

"I have read with great satisfaction, in Lieut.-Gen. Graham's dispatch, the high and well-earned encomiums bestowed upon your conduct, and that of the officers and men engaged under your command; and as a brother Guardsman, (a title of which I shall ever be most proud) and Colonel of the corps, I trust I shall not be considered as exceeding the limits of my station in requesting that you will yourself receive and convey to the brigade under your orders, my sincere and cordial thanks for having so gloriously maintained, and indeed, if possible, raised the high character of a corps in whose success, collectively and individually, I shall never cease to take the warmest interest."

Shortly after the action of the 5th of March, the brigade of Guards were ordered home, and Brigadier-General Dilkes returned to England with them.—Previous to his leaving Isla, however, he issued the following Brigade Orders.

"*Isla, 29th April, 1811.*

"Brigadier-General Dilkes cannot suffer the brigade to be thus broken up without requesting the officers and men will accept his assurances of the high sense he entertains of their general conduct, the cheerful alacrity with which they have discharged their duties upon all occasions, and of the consequent gratification he has derived from a command at all times honourable, but which since the memorable 5th of March, he has felt still more elated with. He now, with pleasure, repeats his admiration of the gallantry exhibited by them on that day—fortunate are those who participated in the glory of it—himself doubly so. To those who continue under his command, the Brigadier-General expresses his satisfaction at still retaining them; to those who are now separated from him, he offers his assurances of heartfelt good wishes for their happiness and success wherever the fortune of war may conduct them."

In the brevet of June 1811 this officer was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and again had the command of the brigade of Guards in London. In this same year a severe domestic calamity prevented him accepting a command under Lord Wellington at the moment it was offered him, and it appears that under these circumstances he did not think it right to continue on the Home Staff, from

which he obtained permission to retire. Since this period the Major-General has not neglected the renewal of his offers of service to the present illustrious Commander-in-Chief, but we believe, as yet, they have not been called for.

Many reports having been circulated relative to Major-General Dilkes declining the above-mentioned offer, we feel it necessary to add a few remarks on that subject. We have heard it said that Major-General Dilkes declined joining Lord Wellington's army on this occasion because the great object of his ambition and expectation was not thereby promoted, namely, continuing to command abroad or at home, some part of a corps with which his services had been so fortunate. It appears to us that Major-General Dilkes' attachment to the Guards is but natural; he has served with them in his various ranks, and generally in the most active stations; but whatever may have been his private feelings on this point, we feel confident that he would have sacrificed them for the benefit of the service, and we are therefore perfectly convinced that the real and true cause was, the lamentable event above alluded to. With regard to any uneasiness the Major-General may have entertained on the subject of the offer, it could have arisen on no other foundation than it having been heretofore an invariable practice, that General Officers holding commands in the Guards, have not been removed therefrom, unless by promotion, or employments in some superior situation.

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### GENERAL SARRAZIN.

BY HIMSELF.

BORN in France the 15th of August 1770, Captain of Infantry in 1792, Engineer in 1794, Colonel of the 14th regiment of dragoons in 1796, General in 1798, and exchanged by the English government as a Lieutenant-General, the 8th of October 1798, for the English General Sir Harry Burrard, an Ensign, a Serjeant, and five Soldiers, I received orders from the Directory to repair to the army of Italy, commanded by General Joubert; no sooner arrived at this destination, than I was intrusted with the command of a column consisting of eight battalions, to join the army of Rome, commanded by General Championnet. The Neapolitan army having been beaten was pursued by the French, who took possession of Naples. This movement leaving defenceless the Roman states, where a spirit of disaffection was general, determined the General in Chief to leave at Rome the reinforcement I had brought him.

It was not long before the great propriety of this measure was made apparent. Civita Vecchia rose up in arms, and I received orders to march and bring the inhabitants to submission. The chief command of this expedition was confided to General Merlin, a good Grenadier, but totally unacquainted

with the art of war. After having invested and reconnoitred the place, I designed to open the trench and proceed according to the rules prescribed for sieges. The General having seen the commencement of the first parallel, fell into a strong fit of laughter, and asked if I was making graves to bury our troops alive? "I am waiting for fifty ladders that are to be sent from Rome," said this stupid commander, "and the very evening they shall arrive, I will carry the place without removing a handful of earth;" he then ordered the workmen away. The ladders came: in vain had I represented to him, that the place was too strong to be taken by a scalade; my remonstrances were disregarded. The 62d regiment twice attempted to scale the ramparts, but was driven back with the loss of six hundred killed or wounded. Two days previous to this silly and rash operation, I had been sent for to Naples by General Championnet.

All the environs of Salerno were occupied by the Neapolitan insurgents. After having subdued Cithara, a village upon the sea coast between Salerno and Amalfi, I marched upon Santa Lucia, near Nocera, in the high road from Lacava to Naples. 20,000 insurgents, half of them armed with firelocks, were stationed upon the heights lying to the east of Santa Lucia. I had only with me the 30th regiment of infantry, and the 19th regiment of horse chasseurs, with a company of light artillery. At the very moment I was going to attack them, a Neapolitan on horseback appeared at some distance, from our advanced posts, and laid down a basket, which I sent to take up; it contained the virile members of some French soldiers, with this written paper, "We are ten to one; before twenty-four hours are elapsed, you will all have experienced the same fate as the brigands of whom we here-with send you a sample."

I had no occasion to harangue the troops; it was quite enough to show them the contents of the basket. I forbade any firing till we were upon the heights, where the enemy was encamped, and which was ascended in a charging step: every thing that opposed us was overthrown; our cavalry stationed upon the highway to pursue the runaways, made them repent of their cruelty, the more so as those who had been so barbarously murdered, were almost all of the 19th regiment of Chasseurs. I was upon the point of taking Nocera by storm, when the principal inhabitants, with the bishop at their head in his pontifical robes, were announced to me. The troops requested orders to attack with loud outcries, that they might plunder the town guilty of the assassination of their comrades. I succeeded in calming their indignation, and it was agreed upon to allow a gratification to the soldiers. This event took place on the 1st of March, 1799. General Macdonald wrote me a very obliging letter upon the success of this operation, with orders to repair to the Pouille, a province of the kingdom of Naples, to replace General Broussier, recalled to France and implicated in the disgrace of General Championnet. When Broussier gave me up the papers of his command, he noticed to me a list of contributions, which he had required in consequence of his instructions; they were very exactly paid. These riches were likely to have been fatal to me, and to my troops.

A man of war, called *Le Génereux*, which had escaped from the battle of Aboukir, had landed at Brindisi a battalion of the 8th regiment of light infantry, commanded by Colonel Godard. The very day this intelligence

reached me, I received orders from General Macdonald immediately to evacuate *La Pouille*, and to repair to Naples, by forced marches. The disaster of Scherer upon the Adige, rendering the co-operation of the army of Naples necessary to make head against the Austro-Russians, I immediately wrote to Colonel Godard to hold himself in readiness to effect a junction with me, and to take proper measures to make a brisk sally either by day or night, as soon as he should hear the firing of six pieces of cannon, at the interval of a minute between each. I was at Bari, which is three good days' march from Brindisi. I took the choice of my column, consisting of three thousand infantry, six hundred dragoons, and the company of light artillery. I left the remainder with the treasure in garrison at Bari. The third day of the march being still within three leagues of Brindisi, whilst my troops were making a halt, in order to prepare for an engagement, I ordered the signal agreed upon to be given. It turned out that it was unnecessary, as at that moment the arrival was announced to me of the garrison with their Colonel Godard, who came to me with tears of joy from my having snatched him from inevitable death; they had been surrounded by 10,000 of the insurgents under the orders of Cardinai Russo, who had refused entering into any kind of treaty with them, replying to all their proposals, that they should all be put to the sword, to revenge the death of so many unfortunate people slaughtered at Trani and Andria, two considerable towns, which had been taken by storm, and pillaged under General Broussier.

As I had not a moment to lose, I retrograded to Bari. The troops of the cardinal, who upon news of my arrival had raised the blockade of Brindisi, conveyed themselves with rapidity towards Matera and Ponte de Bovino, to take possession of the passages of the Appenines, which General Oliver, who had occupied them, had abandoned, to join Macdonald. My letter, which was to inform him of my movement towards Brindisi, only reached him at Avellino, and he continued his march towards Naples. I was greatly blamed for not having executed my orders, as they then concluded me as lost with all my troops, who amounted to 6000 men. I was surrounded by 60,000 peasants, of whom 30,000 men were posted upon the Appenines. My position was critical. It was held out to me, that, if I would restore the contributions I had in possession, they would leave the road free for me to rejoin the army. The perspective they had given the garrison of Brindisi, made me appreciate such a proposition at its just value; for, when they had received the money, it would only have rendered them more insolent, and more enterprising. I had recourse to stratagem.

My conduct had made me friends. I had endeavoured, by mild proceedings, to obliterate the remembrance of my predecessor's barbarous conduct. I proposed to establish myself chief of the country, subordinate to the King of Naples, one of whose governors I meant to become, as soon as the grand army should have quitted the kingdom. I ordered a general meeting at Bitonto, of all the magistrates of provinces between the Appenines and the Adriatic Sea. Many chiefs of the insurgents repaired thither; they appeared to be sincere. The conferences lasted three days. That the deputies might not be frightened, I had only kept with me 400 dragoons, and three pieces of light artillery; the remainder of my column, with the treasure, was stationed at Trani and Braletta, associating with the inhabitants in the most

cordial manner. The number of deputies was about two hundred. My design of getting them from guarding the entry of the Appenines was completed. I did not lose a moment in celebrating our reconciliation by a sumptuous feast, the honours of which I had done by four Neapolitan officers, who were not in my confidence. I quitted the guests under the pretext of accompanying a very handsome lady to her lodgings, whom they had destined for me in marriage. My dragoons were on horseback outside of the town. It was near midnight, when we put ourselves in march. I rejoined my infantry, and we reached the entry of the Appenines, of which we took possession without touching a trigger, as the insurgents were fully persuaded that every thing was done with the friendly connivance of those of their chiefs who had repaired to Bitonto to negotiate. During this march I caused my column to halt upon the field of battle of *Cannes*, so celebrated for the victory obtained by Hannibal over the Roman consuls Varro and Paulus *Aemilius*. This ground is a vast plain, almost uncultivated, terminated on the east by the Adriatic sea, on the north by the plain of Foggia, on the west by the Appenines, and on the south by the river Ofanto, called by the ancients *Aufidus*.

When my arrival was announced to Macdonald, he was very much astonished, and asked if it was I alone. The ~~size~~ of my troops was related to him, with my whole loss for a month, which did not amount to fifty men, and they, chiefly victims to their eagerness for plunder. What caused him perhaps as much pleasure as he had before experienced surprise, was the safe arrival of the contributions. This expedition gave him so favourable an opinion of me, that though so ill as not to be able to get on horseback, he charged me with the retaking of Castellamare, of which the English had possessed themselves on the 26th of April.

I attacked the town on the 29th, which was taken after a brisk engagement, and the fort surrendered the same day. I marched upon Sorrento and Massa, which were carried without much resistance. During this expedition, which Macdonald had considered requisite to the more quietly effecting his retreat towards the north of Italy, the army took the direction of Capua, towards Rome. Our march was slow, and our stay in Tuscany very badly calculated.

The 13th of June, 1799, the army marched towards Modena. Macdonald appeared uneasy. The divisions which were to have made an attack, by the way of Bologna, did not arrive. Our troops, huddled together upon the high road, were very much incommoded by the cannonading of the enemy. I had got the ditches sounded which covered the position of the Austrians. I told Macdonald that if he would give me full liberty, I would in one hour be master of Modena; he had the goodness to answer me, that the manner in which he always treated me, rendered my request unnecessary, and that I might be sure that he would always previously approve whatever I might do, even should I not succeed. Thereupon I immediately ordered to beat the charge; I crossed the ditch with fifteen hundred grenadiers, commanded by Colonel Coutard. I forbade firing, but ordered them to make loud shouts. The Austrians made a charge of musketry, and retreated into the town, which we entered with them promiscuously.

The 19th of June, second day of the battle of Trebia, a mere whim saved the army from a complete rout. Whilst I was gone reconnoitring, with the

7th and 19th regiments of horse chasseurs, General Oliver had stationed my infantry nearly upon the border of the Trebia, in a deep hollow. I was very much surprised at this disposition. General Macdonald, who felt that I was in the right, and who wished to excuse General Oliver, said jocularly, that they would be brought nearer again for the distribution of the provisions. After breakfast, which was taken in the open field, I observed that if the Russians were to attack us, in my present position, we should be either taken prisoners, or drowned, without being able to defend ourselves. The reply was, that it was my concern, and that I was free to do what I might conceive most advantageous for the defence of the left bank of the Trebia. It required a long time to get the stragglers together, and to put the arms in condition. It was three o'clock in the afternoon when I commenced my movement; I had not gone a quarter of a league, when I fell in with the Russian columns, marching to attack us. The Cossacks, who thought to surprise us, perceiving we were under arms, fell impetuously on us, making loud shouts. This was the first time I had seen the Russian troops, of which we had frequently received such a dreadful description. General Salm's column, which was upon the left, was attacked and overturned. General Salm was wounded, but his troops rallied on observing the steady countenance of mine.

A brisk firing having commenced between the two vans, the Cossacks pursuing their favourite manœuvre, marched themselves upon my rear, between me and the Trebia, with a view of cutting off my communication with the French army. I marched my two regiments of chasseurs in column, by squadrons, towards them in good order and in silence: it was essentially necessary to proceed cautiously, in order to begin with a success, and to re-animate the spirits of my troops, somewhat damped by the reports which had been circulated concerning the daringness, the cunning, and the cruelty of the Russians. The Cossacks were about 1500: I had 1200 chasseurs; as soon as we were within pistol shot, they wheeled about and retired at full gallop. The 7th regiment rushed into the midst of them, killed nearly 200, making but few prisoners, as they preferred being killed to surrendering. This action took place on the borders of the Trebia, in presence of the whole French army, who did not fail to shout aloud for joy.

The contest sustained by the infantry, wore a less satisfactory appearance: the Russians, after the first discharges, attacked us with the bayonet; and by their superior numbers, as also their audacity, caused us to lose some ground. The cavalry was under the necessity of charging the Russian infantry, which was overthrown, but the second line obliged the cavalry to draw back and to re-pass upon the first line, which did it much injury: there might be seen Russian grenadiers mortally wounded, who yet found sufficient strength to take up their muskets, fire them off, or give strokes with their bayonets, till they were overpowered and killed outright. The engagement lasted till ten o'clock at night: we kept possession of the left bank of the Trebia. At the moment that all was nearly over, an howitzer, thrown by the Russians, fell by my side, killed my horse and two ordnance chasseurs, and wounded me in the right thigh. Macdonald, who had been informed that I was mortally wounded, came to me as some soldiers were carrying me to Placentia; he expressed his concern, and left me with tears in his eyes. As soon as I learnt that the battle of the following day was

lost, I got myself conveyed to Leghorn, whence I proceeded to Genoa by sea: I obtained leave to go to France. Bernadotte had just then been nominated minister of war; he was anxious to have me near him, and intrusted me with the superintendance of the office for the movement of troops, as also for nominations.

Bernadotte's resignation of the ministry of war, the particular circumstances of the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, my letters of service for la Vendee, those for the army of the Rhine, under the orders of Moreau, and my command of the camp at St. Renan, near Brest, and at Amiens, would require details too long for the limits I have prescribed myself. I pass over with equal silence, my discussions with Murat, now king, my stay at Paris during the peace of Amiens, and my campaigns in America and Germany. I shall find occasion to speak of them elsewhere. The works which I have published since my arrival in London, contain the principal particulars of my commands in 1807, 1808, 1809, and 1810, at Ghent, Bruges, Cadzand, and Boulogne; with the regard to my stay in England, and of the manner in which I am treated, I shall be able to speak definitively upon the motives of this conduct towards me, only after having obtained a decision from Parliament: till then, all my calculations must be uncertain, that alone excepted, which I ground upon the justice of the constituted authorities of the British empire.

#### *AN ARMY*

IS a vast body, the soul of which is composed of a world of conflicting passions, which a skilful leader turns to the advantage of his country, and of his prince. It is a motley concourse of men, who swear implicitly to obey the orders of their Chief, with whose ultimate intentions they are totally unacquainted: it is a multitude consisting principally of untutored beings, who, perfectly careless of their individual reputation, achieve prodigies in order to establish and secure the fame of conquerors and of kings. In it are *libertines*, who need the stern hand of martial discipline to keep them in check; *cowards*, who must be urged to battle; and *stiff-necked clowns*, who in order to be rendered efficient, must be tamed and coerced to their duty.

*Leisure Moments in the Camp, &c.*

#### *MILITARY BON MOT.*

A CLASSICAL Lieutenant of my acquaintance being asked what he thought of a very fine lady, who, though verging on her eighth lustre, was far advanced in pregnancy, answered, "She is like a stately orange tree, at once in bloom and bearing fruit."—"Miscero autumni ac veris honoris;"—"parading at the same time autumnal and vernal honours."

**RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS.**

(Continued from page 243.)

THE Order of the Day, issued by the Marshal General Kutusoff Smolensko to the troops from Wilna, on the 2d of January, is alike deserving of notice.

Brave and victorious troops! you are at last upon the frontier of the empire. Each of you have been the preserver of the country: Russia has bestowed upon you this title. The rapid pursuit of the enemy, and the extraordinary difficulties that you have supported in this campaign, astonish all nations, and have acquired for you immortal glory. Such brilliant victories are without example. During two whole months your hand has daily punished the miscreants. The road that they have pursued is strewed with dead bodies. Their Chief, in his flight, sought for his personal safety alone. Death has raged in their ranks: thousands fell together and perished. Thus has the wrath of the Almighty burst over them, and thus hath He protected His people.

Not resting ourselves in the midst of our heroic actions—we must still proceed farther: we must pass our frontiers, and endeavour to accomplish the defeat of the enemy in the face of their allies. But we will not follow the example of their rage and frenzy, which disgrace the soldier. They have burnt our habitations—have violated our sanctuaries? but you have beheld in what manner the arm of the Almighty has punished their impiety. Let us be liberal, and make a distinction between the enemy and the peaceable inhabitants! Justice and clemency towards the latter will manifest most certainly, that we do not seek to enslave them, nor aspire to a vain glory; but that our object is to free from misery and destruction even those who have taken arms against Russia. The constant desire of His Majesty the Emperor is, that the tranquillity of the inhabitants be not disturbed, and that their property may remain in perfect safety. At the same time that he makes known this his sacred desire, he firmly relies that each soldier will pay the utmost attention thereto, and that not one of them will dare to forget it, and I call upon the Commanders of Corps and Divisions, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, in order that they may accordingly strictly adhere to this instruction.

At Wilna, on the 6th of January, the Emperor Alexander issued the annexed most just and animating proclamation—a proclamation which cannot fail in creating at all times a spirit of interest and universal admiration.

“ God and all the world are witness with what objects and what forces the enemy entered our dear country. Nothing could avert his malevolent and obstinate intentions. Proudly calculating on his own force, and on those which he had embodied against us from almost all the European Powers, and hurried on by desire of conquest and thirst for blood, he hastened to penetrate even into the bosom of our great empire, to spread

amongst us the horrors and all the misery of a war of devastation, and to come upon us by surprise, but for which he had long been preparing. Having foreseen, by former proofs of his unmeasured ambition and the violence of his proceedings, what bitter sufferings he was about to inflict upon us, and seeing him already pass our frontiers with a fury which nothing could arrest, we have been compelled, though with a sorrowful and wounded heart in invoking the aid of God, to draw the sword, and to promise to our empire that we would not return it to the scabbard so long as a single enemy remained in arms in our territory. We fixed firmly in our hearts this determination, relying on the valour of the people whom God has confided to us; and we have not been deceived. What proofs of courage, of bravery, of piety, of patience, and of fortitude has not Russia shewn? The enemy, who penetrated into her bosom with all his characteristic ferocity and rage, has not been able to draw from her a single sigh by the severe wounds he has inflicted.

It would seem that with the blood which flowed, her spirit of bravery increased; that the burning villages animated her patriotism, and the destruction and profanation of the temples of God strengthened her faith, and nourished in her the sentiment of implacable revenge. The army, the nobility, the gentry, the clergy, the merchants, the people, in a word, all classes, all estates of the empire, neither sparing their property nor their lives, have breathed the same spirit—a spirit of courage and of piety, a love equally ardent for their God and for their country. This unanimity, this universal zeal, have produced effects hardly credible, such as have scarcely existed in any age. Let us contemplate the enormous force collected from twenty kingdoms and nations, united under the same standard, by an ambitious and atrocious enemy, flushed with success, which entered our country; half a million of soldiers, infantry and cavalry, accompanied by fifteen hundred pieces of cannon. With forces so powerful, he pierces into the heart of Russia, extends himself, and begins to spread fire and devastation. But six months have scarcely elapsed since he passed our frontiers, and what has become of him? Let us here cite the words of the Holy Psalmist—

"I myself have seen the ungodly in great power, and flourishing like a green bay tree."

"I went by, and lo, he was gone: I sought him, but his place could no where be found."

PSALM xxxvii. v. 36, 37.

This sublime sentence is accomplished in all its force, on our arrogant and impious enemy. Where are his armies, like a mass of black clouds, which the wind has drawn together? They are dispersed as rain. A great part wetting the earth with their blood, cover the fields of the Governments of Moscow, Kalouga, Smolensko, White Russia, and Lithuania. Another part, equally great, has been taken in the frequent battles, with many Generals and Commanders. In fine, after numerous bloody combats, in the end whole regiments, imploring the magnanimity of their conquerors, have laid down their arms before them. The rest, composing a number equally great, pursued in their precipitate flight by our victorious troops, overtaken by cold and hunger, have strewed the road from Moscow to the frontiers of Russia with carcasses, cannons, waggons, and baggage; so that, of those

numerous forces, a very inconsiderable part of the soldiers, exhausted and without arms, can, with difficulty, and almost lifeless, return to their country, to serve as a terrible example to their countrymen of the dreadful sufferings which must overtake those rash men, who dare to carry their hostile designs into the bosom of powerful Russia.

To-day we inform our well-beloved and faithful subjects, with a lively joy and grateful acknowledgments towards God, that the reality has surpassed even our hopes; and that what we announced at the commencement of this war, is accomplished beyond all measure: there is no longer a single enemy on the face of our territory, or, rather, there they all remain, but in what state?—dead, wounded, and prisoners. Even their proud Chief himself has with the utmost difficulty escaped, with his principal officers, leaving his army dispersed, and abandoning his cannon, of which there are more than 1000 pieces, exclusive of those buried or thrown into the water, which have been recovered, and are now in our hands. The scene of the destruction of his armies surpasses all belief. One almost imagines that our eyes deceive us. Who has been able to effect this? Without derogating from the merited glory of the Commander-in-Chief of our armies, this distinguished General, who has rendered to his country services for ever memorable, and without detracting from the merits of other valiant and able commanders, who have distinguished themselves by their zeal and ardour, nor from the general bravery of the troops, we must confess that what they have accomplished surpasses human power.—Acknowledge, then, Divine Providence in this wonderful event. Let us prostrate ourselves before his sacred throne, and evidently seeing his hand chastising pride and impiety, instead of boasting and glorying in our victories, learn from this great and terrible example to be modest and peaceable executors of his law and his will; to resemble not those impious profanators of the temples of God, whose carcasses, without number, now serve as food for dogs and crows. God is mighty in his kindness and in his anger. Let us be guided by the justice of our actions, and the purity of our sentiments, as the only path which leads to him. Let us proceed to the temple of his sanctity, and there, crowned with his hand, thank him for the benefits which he has bestowed upon us; addressing to him our ardent supplications, that he will extend to us his favour, and to put an end to the war; granting us victory on victory, and the wished-for peace and tranquillity.

The Emperor remained sixteen or seventeen days at Wilna, where his Imperial Majesty issued many regulations and decrees for the restoration of order in various provinces which had suffered, and for prevention of disease from the infection of prisoners, and from the number of dead bodies and quantity of carrion still above ground. In the neighbourhood of Wilna, sixteen thousand corpses were piled up in heaps, for the purpose of being consumed by fire, when sufficient wood could be procured: numbers were uncollected in the roads and villages; and the mortality in the hospitals at

Wilna was for a time very great. The Emperor repeatedly visited all the hospitals.

Marshal Macdonald in his retreat from Riga was pursued by the Marquis Paulucci, who divided his force into two columns, the one marching from Mittau on the 22d of December, by Frauenberg toward the coast; the other by Grunhoff, more inland; they both, however, united at Polangen, and from thence proceeded on the 27th to Memel, which they occupied, making the garrison prisoners, and getting possession of the magazines, &c. Count Wittgenstein's army, advanced along the course of the Niemen toward Tilsit, in the neighbourhood of which place a detachment under Colonel Tettenborn had a slight affair on the 28th of December. On the 30th, however, Count Wittgenstein having entirely cut off Macdonald from D'York, the latter signed an agreement to remain neutral with the troops under his command, consisting of thirty battalions of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry, with thirty pieces of artillery. The terms granted to the Prussians were extremely liberal. A detached corps, under General Mussenbach, was included, in the event that orders could reach him: these orders were in time, and with the addition of the corps in question, the Prussian troops included in the convention, amounted to 15,000 men. Marshal Macdonald, however, availed himself successfully of stratagem, and, while treating for conference, had made progress in removing the remainder of his force in the direction of Labiau. He was closely pursued during the night from the 1st to the 2d Jan. and lost 600 prisoners; but reports being received of a French corps in force at Wehlau, it became necessary to direct the attention of the principal part of the pursuers to an attack upon that post. Macdonald, left with little more than 5,000 men, now attempted to effect a speedy junction with some of the troops from Koningsberg, who with that view came out to meet him, but were compelled to fall back by General Steinheil, whom Wittgenstein had dispatched to frustrate this part of the French plan, he himself in the meanwhile closely pursuing Macdonald. Tchichagoff, who had also by this time reached the Pre gel, advanced along the course of that river, preceded by Platow with his Cossacks, through Gumbinnen and Insterburg towards Koningsberg. General Schepelow, however, who commanded Wittgenstein's van-guard, reached that fortress first, by the way of Labiau, where the French in vain attempted to make a stand on the 4th of January.

On the 6th of January, Koningsberg, the ancient capital of Prus-

sia, was occupied by Count Wittgenstein's advanced-guard, under the orders of Major-General Schepelow. Marshal Macdonald occupied the town, with a corps d'armée, composed of the old French Guards, and some troops who had escaped the general destruction of the enemy's Grand Army. The wreck of his particular corps, constituting part of this total, was reduced to 2,500 men; after the Prussians separated from them, there remained to him in all about 7,000 men. At the approach of the advanced-guard, which briskly pursued, the enemy, without halting, passed by Koningsberg, and abandoned it to Major-General Schepelow, who entered it without meeting any resistance. The French fled in the greatest confusion towards the Vistula; but there were taken in Koningsberg 1300 prisoners, besides 8000 sick, 30 pieces of the battering train from before Riga, &c. Count Wittgenstein arrived at Koningsberg on the 7th. On the 9th he followed the army, which continued driving the remains of the French toward the Vistula. On the 12th Admiral Tchichagoff and Count P—— took possession of the fortresses of Marienwerder, Marienberg, and Esling; and on the following days, having crossed the Vistula and the Nogat, a branch of the same river, they pursued the French in different directions, on the roads to Dantzig, Starogard, and Graudentz.

When the Russians entered Marienwerder on the 12th of January, the Viceroy of Italy and Marshal Victor were scarcely able to escape from the Cossacks. General La Pierre, four officers, and 200 men were made prisoners; likewise a courier, expedited by Napoleon to the Prince of Neufchatel, with dispatches. On the road to Nuenberg, Lieutenant-Colonel Adrianoff, in pursuing the enemy, met a squadron of Baden troops, destroyed it almost entirely, and took 47 prisoners. The corps from Elbing and Marienberg, being drawn from the Nogat, attempted to make a stand at the tête-du-pont at Derschow, about four German miles from Dantzig; a sanguinary affair took place, but the enemy were soon compelled to abandon their post, and retired, part upon Dantzig, and the remainder upon Stargardt, pursued by the Russians. It appears that the troops stationed in Dantzig advanced to the Pregel, to favour Marshal Macdonald's retreat; and that they made no resistance at Elbing, having abandoned their artillery before their arrival at that place. The attack upon Marienwerder seems to have been nearly a surprise, and Beauharnois narrowly escaped being made prisoner.

Whilst these operations were going on in the neighbourhood of the Baltic coasts, some advances, though slower, were made against

the Saxons and Austrians, beyond Warsaw. General Sachen\*, who was at Ruzana, advanced against Regnier with the Saxons, and General Wasillchitkoff, who was at Grodno, against Schwartzenberg with the Austrians. Sachen, on the 25th of December, took possession of the town of Brescz Litow, and from thence proceeded along the Bug to Grannym. Wasiltchikoff, having been joined by four regiments of Don Cossacks, pursued Schwartzenberg along the course of the Narew, and the latter dividing his corps into three columns, gradually approximated to Warsaw, by the way of Ostrolenka and Pultusk.

The Prussians, in every direction, received the Russian troops in a friendly and open manner, and provided them willingly with provisions and their horses with forage, for which they gave them their receipts. In return for their good conduct, the most rigorous discipline and subordination were observed, to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants.

The retreat of the French armies through the kingdom of Prussia was, like that from Moscow, marked by the most savage ferocity and devastation; the abandonment of magazines, tumbrils, and other stores. Some idea may be formed of the misery of their retreat, by two returns which were intercepted of the 4th French Voltigeurs and 6th Tirailleurs. The former, when it left Smolensk, consisted of 32 officers and 427 privates, of whom there remained under arms on the 16th of December, only 10 officers and 29 privates. The latter, consisting of 31 officers and 300 privates, mustered, on the 31st of December, only 14 officers and 10 privates.

The Emperor of Russia moved, in the night of the 7th of January, from Wilna, to join the division which comprehends the guards, and the head-quarters of the whole army were at Merez, on the 10th of January; on the 13th of January they were at Ratschky, and the emperor crossed the Niemen near Moretz on that day, amid the acclamations of his brave troops, and continued to march with a division of his army, in a western direction, through Berjuiki, Krasneple, and Subalki, to Lique, where he established his head-quarters on the 19th. Generals Miloradovitch and Dokteroff†, with the troops which crossed the frontier at Grodno, moved in a

\* General Sachen commanded the centre at Pultusk and Eylau; commanded at Zechern, two miles in front of Heilsberg, and repulsed the French; as he did soon after in the neighbourhood of Wormdit.—*Vide Sir Robert Wilson.*

† It was this gallant officer who reinforced Prince Gallitzin at the affair of Golymin, on the day of the battle of Pultusk, and enabled him to drive back the enemy from every point.

line parallel to that of the Emperor, on his left, whilst General Sachen's column was still farther to the left. There were also intermediate corps to keep up the communication between each of these columns. The Austrians remained upon the Bug, with a view to create a diversion in favour of the army retiring upon Dantzic, as long as their own line of retreat might remain open.

In the meantime Count Platow, with his gallant Cossacks\*, continued to pursue the enemy to the suburbs of Dantzic, and surrounded that city with his troops to cut off all communication with it, where he was joined by detachments under Major-General Hovawsky and Kachocosky.

The situation of Prussia was, at this period, exceedingly singular. The capital in the hands of a French garrison; the inhabitants looking eagerly for the arrival of the Russians, and flattering themselves that the King, with the troops he was collecting in Silesia, would declare against their oppressors the French. What were the real intentions of that sovereign, or whether he was yet decided how to act, it seemed difficult to discover. In the month of January, Berlin daily exhibited scenes of tumult and disorder; the populace having repeatedly risen against the French, whom they occasionally succeeded in confining to their barracks. Meanwhile a regency had been established in the name of the king, at Koningsberg, of which the ex-minister Stein, who had been an object of French persecution, was the president. This regency had issued a proclamation, calling on the loyal and patriotic inhabitants of Prussia to come forward and rescue their king and country from French

\* The following account of the Cossacks is extracted from Prince Potemkin's memoirs.

"The Russian army was considerably increased under Potemkin. He submitted to the empire a nursery of soldiers, who till then had been nominally its subjects, but of very little service. The Cossacks had formed a volunteer militia, governed by republican laws, which no one before him dared to attempt to alter, and which Potemkin abrogated. He formed the Cossacks into regiments, and subjected them to the same recruiting laws and discipline as the other troops. He afterwards employed them in their true character at the outposts, but regulated their service according to the principles and tactics proper for this kind of warfare, to which they never had attended before. He showed by the effect which these changes produced with Cossacks, of what utility they might be to the Russian army. Potemkin esteemed them much, and was beloved by them. They almost adored Suvaroff, who, equally fond of them, taught them to serve with the greatest distinction. Having been but recently organized, the Cossacks are not what they may become. If the Russian government continues its attention to the improvement of those troops, it may convert the brave, intelligent, faithful, numerous, indefatigable, and warlike Cossacks into the principal instrument of its successes, and the terror of its enemies."

thraldom; nor was the call in vain. The young men were eagerly running to arms, and joining their brethren under the command of General D'York, who had been nominated, by the regency, Commander-in-Chief of the patriotic army.

By the declaration of Buonaparte in his exposé issued at this period, that fresh French troops were going to the Oder, "to set bounds to the system of Russian invasion;" it is to be observed that the Oder was now the acknowledged bound of the French hopes of defence, and the entrenched camp at Cunersdorf was declared to be the point of assemblage for a new grand army. Meanwhile Dantzig, Warsaw, Thorn, and indeed all the fortresses beyond the Oder, were left by the enemy to their fate. The former, as already mentioned, was closely invested, and all communication cut off, by the cordon which Platow had drawn round it; and St. Cyr had in vain attempted to re-open the communication.

The advance of the Russians and their extraordinary rapid progress, with the wide extent of country over which they were spread at this period, from Mecklenberg to Silesia, seemed to prove that they must be supported by an almost universal insurrection; otherwise their conduct would have been inconsistent with the most obvious rules of prudence; and instead of the line of the Vistula, or the entrenched camp in front of the Oder, which Buonaparte had lately acknowledged as the bounds of the French hopes of defence, his expectations were confined to the army of observation of the Rhine. The military ardor of Russian troops, and their disinclination to retreat, has always been remarkable.

The head-quarters of the Russian army, which were on the 19th at Lique, had been moved by the 26th, nearly 120 miles, to Willenberg, in a direction rather inclining to the westward of the Warsaw road, by which means they had got into the rear of the Austrian position at Pultusk. Previously to this, General Miloradovich, supported by Winzingerode, Wassilchikoff, and Pahlen, had advanced as far as Prasnitz, the Austrians gradually retiring before him, and successively abandoning Smadovo, Novogrodck, and Ostrolenka, on the river Narew. Regnier now retired to Posen, from which place Davoust had marched to Stettin, on the side of Dantzig, Count Weronzow had advanced to Bromberg, and made himself master of the large magazines collected there by the enemy, to cover which, and to observe Thorn, General Tchichagoff approached the latter fortress. Count Rostopchin, the brave and virtuous governor of Moscow, was now appointed minister of the interior of Russia, and the Ex-Prussian Minister Stein, whose enmity to Buonaparte

had called forth a furious proclamation against him, was made a Russian cabinet minister; Kutusoff, Wittgenstein, and their brother generals, had the most distinguished honors heaped upon them, and every disposition was shown to reward exertions against the common enemy.

On the 7th of February, Major-General Count Woronzoff continued his march to Posen with his detachment, keeping open the communications on his right with Tschernischeff's detachment; and on his left, with the corps under Winzingerode; whilst Admiral Tschichagoff's corps, invested the fortress of Thorn on all sides. General Miloradovitch's corps, on the 5th of February, crossed over to the left bank of the Vistula. Major-General Paskewitsch, with the 7th corps, took possession of Sakroczin, and pushed posts of Cossacks for observations as far as Modlin, under the very guns of which they made 30 prisoners. On the 6th of February, Gen. Miloradovitch, in order to induce the enemy to quit Warsaw, caused his troops to approach nearer to the place, and detached parties of cavalry, who surrounded a great part of it.

On the 4th of February, the enemy wishing to procure provisions from the villages about Dantzig, made a sally on the left wing, towards Brentau, but was immediately received by the Cossack regiment of Rebritow and the 1st Baschkir regiment, under the command of Major Latschkin, who, after having very much weakened the enemy and made some prisoners, notwithstanding his obstinate endeavours, obliged him to retreat. At the same time a strong column of infantry, with a number of cavalry, appeared on the Russian left flank, opposite the village of Nenkau, and at first drove in their advanced posts. A Cossack chief, named Meinikow, taking advantage of this movement, collected several detachments of Cossacks, rode round the enemy's wing, and falling unexpectedly upon his rear, threw him into total confusion; the consequence was, that the whole column was cut off from the city, and not a single man returned into the fortress: 600 men were cut down on the spot, and 200 privates and 73 officers were made prisoners. Gen. Tschernischeff, with his detachment, took possession of the villages of Schochau, Friedland, and Flatow. The victorious Russian troops were every where met by the inhabitants with joy, and acknowledged as their deliverers. Prince Schwartzenberg's corps was, by their motions, forced to retreat; and on the 8th of February, General Miloradovitch took possession of the city of Warsaw. On his arrival at the village of Wilanow, he was met by the deputies of the corporations of the nobility, merchants, and clergy, headed by

the prefect, sub-prefects, and mayors of the city, who presented to him bread, salt, and the keys of Warsaw.

On the 6th of February, in consequence of a disposition made by Count Wittgenstein, Major-General Count Sievres, commanding in Koningsberg, received orders to march against Pillau, with all the troops and artillery then in Koningsberg, and to which were added 2000 infantry and batteries of artillery from the army, and to summon the French garrison to surrender. In pursuance of these orders General Count Van Sievres arrived, on the 6th of February, with those troops, about 6000 men strong, and a proportionable quantity of artillery, in the village of Old Pillau, within 2000 paces of the fortress:—the troops posted themselves partly in front of this village and partly on the heights situated at the right and left of it, and partly on the Nehrung point, at a proper range of shot, and the commanding General immediately sent the following summons, for the surrender of the citadel and the Nehrung fort, to the Commandant of the French garrison.

"GENERAL,

" You must be convinced that both the town and fortress of Pillau are surrounded by so very superior a force that all resistance on your side would not only be fruitless, but merely tend to increase the effusion of blood, of which there has already been too much this war, and would unnecessarily expose the town to devastation.

" I therefore summon you, General, to evacuate the fortress, and to accept a capitulation for the Imperial French troops, which shall be made as favorable as the condition in which they are situated will allow.

" I beg you to receive the assurance of the most perfect respect, with which I have the honor to sign myself, General, your very obedient servant,

COUNT VON SIEVRES,

" Commanding General of the Imperial Russian  
troops lying before Pillau.

" Head-quarters, Old Pillau, January 25, (6th Feb.)"

This proposal led to the happy conclusion of a convention, according whereto the Imperial French troops on the 8th of February, at eight o'clock in the morning, quitted the town and fortress of Pillau, and the fort of Nehrung, which had been garrisoned by them ever since the month of May, 1812.

In conformity to the convention made with the garrison, the Imperial French General Castella was to march out with the troops under his command, with their arms, ammunition, and baggage, and to retire with the same to the left bank of the Rhine, where they were to be released from all obligations. Such Imperial Russian subjects as might possibly be found among the garrison of

Pillau, were to be delivered up to the commanding Russian General. An Imperial Russian Officer was to accompany the column to its place of destination, their baggage not to be subjected to any search, the French General, Castella, having declared upon his word of honor that there was nothing amongst it belonging to the Russians.

The garrison, which marched out, consisted of about 1,200 men, and the number of their sick left behind amounted to about 400.

On the 9th the Imperial Russian troops returned to the army, and only the Royal Prussian troops that were in the town and citadel remained behind to garrison them.

The Imperial Russian Colonel, Baron Von de Pahlen, was appointed governor of the town.

On the 6th of February, the Emperor Alexander, with 28,000 men arrived at Polotzk; he was received with unanimous acclamations of joy. Indeed the mild and sagacious policy of the Russians in entering the provinces of the north as friends and deliverers, and restoring the national functionaries, gave great assistance to their exertions. Their advance into Europe was accompanied with every circumstance calculated to endear their cause to the nations around them. They resorted to the press, as the most formidable auxiliary which they could use for the overthrow of the oppressors of Europe. They disseminated proclamations and other publications over the Continent, and their conciliatory offers were hailed with eagerness at Warsaw, Berlin, Hamburg, and Dresden. The press, which has been so long fettered by the French—worse than fettered, compelled to disseminate falsehood throughout Europe, since the successes of the Russians, began again to exercise its legitimate functions.—Wherever the allies carried their arms, the press was occupied in exposing the malignant and deceitful policy which has been so invariably pursued by the revolutionary tyrants.

Lord Cathcart, who had now concluded a treaty with the Danish minister at St. Petersburg, the basis of which friendly arrangement were a free trade to Norway, the recal of the Danish letters of marque, the exclusion of all French privateers from Danish ports, and the mutual release of prisoners, quitted that capital on the 31st of January, where he had continued ever since the departure of the emperor, for the head-quarters of Alexander; and on the 6th of March, was with him at Kalitsch, a place about 150 miles from Dresden and 50 from Breslaw, in Silesia.

(*To be continued.*)

*A Military View of the United States,  
AND THEIR VULNERABLE POINTS EXPOSED BY A REFERENCE TO THE  
CONDUCT AND OPINIONS OF GENERAL WASHINGTON.*

To the Editor of the *Military Panorama*.

Sir,

THE peculiar situation of affairs between this country and the United States, and the possibility that a common respect for our national honour, and ordinary regard for the peace and safety of our colonies, may *compel* us (for I trust that nothing but *compulsion* will induce a British minister to enter into the conflict) to a more active prosecution of warfare—these circumstances combined, have induced me to call your attention, and that of your military readers, to the attempt I propose to make of a display of some of the means of annoyance in our power, and, if we should be forced to it in self-defence, of re-conquest.

When the subject first occurred to me, I thought that the most useful way to bring it before you would be to put it into the shape of a commentary on the transactions of the war of the Revolution. Before I perused the documents necessary to refresh my memory on the subject, I naturally thought that the errors of the past, properly exhibited, would be the best way to prevent them for the future; and, that an examination of the detail of the American War, would have proved the best source of information: but, on a reference to it, I found the blunders so gross, the negligence so glaring, the incredulity so great, and that contempt of an enemy which will always insure defeat, so predominating a motive in the minds of our officers, both civil and military, that I determined to cast the books aside, and consider the subject altogether as a new one. Hence, with the map in my hand, I began to search for the present position of each party, and to endeavour to shew to which party the superiority now belongs.

Should any of your readers disagree with me on this subject, I should think an attentive re-perusal of any History of the American War would produce in their minds a conviction similar to that in mine.

A mere reference to the mad attempt of the three attacks made at Bunker's Hill on an hidden enemy, where our gallant soldiers marched up to certain destruction—to the inconsiderate conduct of General Gage in detaching troops to Concord, whence arose the af-

fair of Lexington—to the supine conduct of General Howe in suffering himself to be shut up with 8,000 well-disciplined troops in Boston by an unorganized body of men, irregularly armed, with a scanty portion of powder, with little artillery, without that enthusiastic ardour with which their previous successes at Lexington and Bunker's Hill inspired them; greatly discontented, impatient to return home, disobedient to their officers; and, in short, as General Washington observed, dangerous only to themselves; and, he might have added, to General Howe—to the subsequent affairs of White Plains, Trenton, Princeton, &c. &c.—to the mad attempt to occupy Philadelphia—to the wretched system of detaching the troops into the Southern Departments, in order to be destroyed by fever, and make permanent enemies of those whose hostility would have proved but temporary, instead of directing the efforts of the army against the sources of rebellion—to the infatuated system to which every officer seemed blindly attached, of rejecting the advice and opinion of every one capable of giving them with correctness, judgment, and patriotism—to the blind contempt of the character of Washington, whose every step from his taking the command at Boston, ought to have proved to them the little chance he saw of success—to the stupidity which prevented their beholding in his acts the most serious apprehensions of defeat, if the British army were not drawn in the first instance from Boston, and, in the second, from the strong positions in the Highlands—to the falling into the snare, laid by this *Rebel Chief*, which led to the catastrophe at York Town:—to all these circumstances I would appeal, as well as those intemperate acts of some of our civil governors, one of whom dared, in a slave country, to arm the slave against his master, and thus to risk an indiscriminate massacre of friend and foe: but there is not now a boy of fourteen, who has been at a regimental drill, or seen a regiment change its front, who would be guilty of such errors. Hence I do not think them worth an allusion.—The art of war, thank God! is changed. We are now aware that cavalry is as necessary to an army as infantry\*.

\* As proofs of the justice of these charges, I make the following extracts from Marshall's Life of Washington:—

" The utmost address was used to conceal from the enemy the alarming deficiency which has been stated; but when it is recollect ed in how many various directions, and to what various authorities application for assistance was unavoidably made, it will appear scarcely possible that these efforts at secrecy could have been completely successful. It is more probable that the communication which must have been

Therefore, let us return to the more interesting part of our subject.

Speaking of the peace of 1763, Chief Justice Marshall says, "by *made to the British General were not credited*\*; and that he could not persuade himself to believe, that a body of troops, circumstanced as was the American army in other respects, would be hardy enough to maintain the position they occupied, if destitute of ammunition. He knew well that the want of powder must be rendered still more fatal to them by other wants which could not be relieved. That of bayonets was peculiarly distressing. Their deficiency in this article was very considerable, and was of public notoriety.

"The people of New England were incomparably better armed than those of any other part of the Continent; but even among them this important weapon was very far from being common, and the government had not yet even attempted to lay up magazines of arms to be delivered to their soldiers. The army was also in such need of tents, as to be unavoidably lodged in barracks, instead of encamping in the open field, a circumstance extremely unfavourable to any sudden collection of its force, and not less unfavourable to health and discipline.

"As the troops had been raised, not by Congress, but by the Colonial Governments, each of which had a different establishment, no uniformity existed among the regiments. In Massachussets the men had chosen their officers, and felt no inferiority to them. Animated with the spirit of liberty, and collected for its defence, they were not immediately sensible of the importance of discipline, nor could they, in an instant, be subjected to its rules. The army was consequently found in a state of almost entire disorganization; and the difficulty of establishing the necessary principles of order and subordination, always considerable among raw troops, was greatly increased by the short terms for which enlistments had been made. The time of service of many was to expire in November, and none were engaged to continue longer than the last of December. The early orders issued by the General, evidence a loose and unmilitary state of things, even surpassing what might reasonably be inferred from the circumstances under which the war was commenced."

—*Marshall's Washington*, vol. ii. p. 308.

"It is not," said General Washington, in a letter to Congress, "in the pages of history to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket-shot of the enemy for six months together without ammunition, and at the same time to disband one army, and recruit another, within that distance, of twenty odd British regiments, is more than, probably, ever was attempted. But if we succeed as well in the latter as we have hitherto done in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life."

The want of ammunition was not the only alarming difficulty to be encountered. The condition of the troops in respect to arms, was almost equally critical. The soldiers composing the first army, had, generally, brought with them into the field their own fire-arms. Indifferent as these were, it was necessary to retain, at least, as many of them as were in any degree fit for use. To effect this, inspectors were appointed to examine them, and fix their value, and notice was given that two

\* For a confirmation of this circumstance the reader is referred to some anecdotes of the Revolutionary Leaders, in a work entitled "Democracy Unveiled." It is there asserted that even Putnam offered his services to General Howe, and extensive information, if his rank as Colonel was secured to him. General Howe neither took any notice of the messenger, nor paid any attention to the message.

establishing these great natural boundaries to the British empire in North America, every cause for future contest respecting that

months pay should be stopped from every soldier who should leave the camp without this previous examination of his arms, and without giving up such as should be deemed fit for use. The arms were either so generally useless, or, notwithstanding these precautions, were so generally carried off, that only sixteen hundred and twenty muskets were retained; and thus, this source of supply, bad as it was, did not fulfil the hopes which had been formed of it.

"The recruiting officers were directed to enlist only those who had arms; but they reported, that they must depart from those instructions, or recruit no soldiers. The neighbouring governments, as well as that of Massachusetts, were applied to without success; and persons sent with money to make purchases in the country, were not more fortunate. In the beginning of February, General Washington informed Congress, that there were then in his army near two thousand men without fire-arms of any sort; and, at that time, his whole effective rank and file, independent of militia, amounted only to eight thousand eight hundred and fifty-three. His incessant representations and complaints on this all-interesting point, were unable to procure, for a considerable time, any supply." *Idem, vol. ii. p. 340.*

"The situation of the army, on Long Island, had now become extremely critical. In front was a victorious enemy, from whom much was to be apprehended, in case of assault, but whose numbers, and formidable train of artillery, rendered the destruction of their works, by regular approaches, inevitable. The movements of the fleet too, indicated an intention to make some attempt on New York, and, so soon as the wind should be favourable, to force a passage into the East River: should they succeed in this attempt, and attack him by water, while the army might assault him by land, they would render his retreat extremely difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The troops, too, being obliged to lie in the lines, without shelter from the heavy rains which fell, were excessively fatigued and dispirited. Under these circumstances, it was determined to withdraw from Long Island; and this difficult movement was effected, on the night of the 28th, with such silence and dispatch, that all the troops and military stores, with the greater part of the provisions, and all the artillery, except such heavy pieces as, in the deep roads made by the excessive heavy rains which had fallen, could not possibly be drawn, were carried over in safety. Early the next morning, the enemy perceived the rear-guard crossing the East River, out of reach of their fire." *Idem, vol. ii. p. 518.*

"General Washington continued in his lines, expecting an attack; to prepare for which, his sick and baggage were removed into his rear; but as a considerable part of the day had been exhausted in gaining the hill which had been occupied by McDongal, all attempts on his intrenchments were postponed until the next morning, and the whole British army lay on their arms the following night, in order of battle, and on the ground they had taken during the day.

"The night was employed by General Washington in strengthening his works, removing his sick and baggage, and preparing, by changing the arrangement of his troops, for the expected attack. His left maintained its position, but his right was drawn back to stronger ground. Perceiving this, and being unwilling to leave any thing to hazard, Howe resolved to postpone further offensive operations till Lord Percy should arrive with four battalions from New York, and two from the post at Mamara Neck. This reinforcement was received on the evening of the thirtieth, and preparations were then made for the attack next morning. *In*

Continent, with any potentate of Europe, appeared removed for ever."

What are these "great natural boundaries?" The St. Lawrence and the lakes from Quebec to Detroit, a distance of 800 miles, 600 of which are navigable for vessels of 400 tons burthen: this is the boundary on the north-west side. The other great boundary was formed by the cession of all the eastern divisions of the Continent; hence all causes of alarm were removed.

The exultation on the part of the people, not only of the colonies, but of the mother country, may be easily imagined, when we recollect what distress and apprehension preceded this scene of "unrivalled brilliancy \*."

*the night, however, and during the early part of the succeeding day, a violent rain fell, which induced a further postponement of the assault.*" *Idem, vol. ii. p. 578.*

\* To those whose contempt of the American character is so great, I would beg to refer the language and feelings of Mr. Marshall: he continues—

" Thus the great object of the war in that quarter had been gained; and France now held the country, for hostilities had been commenced. With an inferior force the French had been successful in every campaign, and had uniformly obtained advantages over the English, and gained ground on their colonies: nor were they less fortunate elsewhere. The flame of war, we have seen kindled in America, had communicated itself to Europe and Asia; and in every quarter of the world, where hostilities had been carried on, the British arms had been attended with defeat and disgrace. Those were not wanting who believed the character of the nation to have changed, and its antient courage to have been lost. The most gloomy predictions respecting its destinies were uttered, and serious apprehensions seemed to have been entertained by many, of its being no longer able to maintain that high station it had so long filled among the nations of Europe.

" But this inglorious scene was about to be succeeded by one of unrivalled brilliancy; and from the point of extreme depression, to which their affairs had progressed, the brightest æra in British history was now to commence.

" Far from being really broken by misfortune, the spirit of the nation was never higher than at present; and more of indignation than dismay was inspired by the ill success of their arms. The public voice had at length made its way to the throne; and imperiously forced on the unwilling monarch a minister, who has been very justly deemed one of the greatest personages of the age in which he lived.

" Mr. Pitt had long been distinguished in the House of Commons for the boldness and the splendor of his eloquence: his parliamentary talents, and the independent grandeur of his character, had given him a vast ascendancy in that body, and had made him the idol of the nation. In 1756, he had been introduced into the councils of his sovereign; but, dissenting essentially from the system adopted for the prosecution of the war, he retained his station for a very short time. The public affection followed him out of office; and the national disasters continuing, it was found impracticable to conduct the complicated machine of government without his aid. In the summer of 1757, an administration was formed, so as to conciliate the great contending interests in parliament, and Mr. Pitt was placed

"The campaign," says Chief Justice Marshall, "of 1756 had closed, leaving the affairs of Great-Britain in North America in a more gloomy situation than at any former period. By the acquisition of Fort William-Henry, the French had obtained complete possession of the lakes Champlain and George, which afford the easiest admission either into Canada, or from that province into the northern British colonies. By the destruction of Oswego, they in like manner had acquired the dominion of those lakes which connect the St. Lawrence with the waters of the Mississippi, and unite Canada to Louisiana. By means of Fort du Quèsne too, on the Ohio, they maintained their ascendancy over the Indians, and held undisturbed possession of all the country west of the Alleghany mountains, while the English settlers were driven to the Blue Ridge."

Let us now return to the present situation of affairs, and think, if but for a moment, that we are in search of a spot, where the scenes of a "bright era" may be presented to our imaginations, at its head. The controlling superiority of his character gave him, in the cabinet, the same ascendancy which he had obtained in the House of Commons; and he seemed to dictate the measures of the nation. But a very short time was necessary to show, that in this extraordinary man were combined qualities seldom united in the same person. His talents for action seemed even to eclipse those he had displayed in debate; and in directing the vast and complicated movements of a war extending on both elements over every quarter of the world, he unfolded a vigor of mind, a clearness of judgment, and a decision of character, surpassing the expectations even of those who had been long accustomed to admire the firmness with which he had pursued his political course. His plans, partaking of the proud elevation of his own mind and the exalted opinion he entertained of his countrymen, were always grand; and the means he employed for their execution never failed to be adequate to the object. Possessing, without limitation, the public confidence, he commanded all the resources of the nation, and drew liberally from the public purse; but the money was at all times faithfully and judiciously applied in the public service. Too great in his spirit, too sublime in his views, to become the instrument of faction—when placed at the head of the nation he regarded only the interest of the nation; and overlooking the country or the party which had given birth to merit, he searched for merit only, and employed it wherever it could be found. From the elevation of the House of Brunswick to the British throne, a very considerable portion of the people, under the denomination of Tories, had been degraded, persecuted, and oppressed. Superior to this narrow and shortsighted policy, Mr. Pitt sought to level these enfeebling and irritating distinctions, and to engage every British subject in the cause of his country. Thus equally commanding the strength and wealth of the kingdom, with perhaps greater talents, he possessed certainly greater means, than any of his predecessors;"—*Marshall*, vol. i. page 490.

May the future historian of our own times copy these sentences, word for word, substituting the name of Wellesley for that of the illustrious character, whose portrait is so accurately drawn. If Chatham had his Wolfe, Wellesley has his Wellington.

and yield the relief, which is necessary, to our minds wearied with the uniform success of the modern Attila:

The tracts of territory that we should look to, as the more immediate objects of attention, will be those portions of the United States, which are bounded on the N. E. by the Kennebec through the Wilderness, where it almost unites with the Chaudiere, to Quebec; on the N. W. by the Lakes; on the S. E. by the Atlantic; on the S. W. by the Hudson.

On the N. E. we have nothing to fear, having our own Province of New Brunswick in our rear. On the contrary, much advantage may be derived to the power possessing naval preponderance, from the numerous ports of Maine, its spacious bays and navigable rivers.

On the N. W. we are supported by the Lakes and the St. Lawrence; this line is strengthened by the fortresses of Quebec, Kingston, Niagara, Erie, and Detroit; places of great importance, not only as dépôts for stores, but of greater consequence as points, whence combined attacks, on one or more given spot, may be made.

In safe possession of these, we shall then have only to discover where is the position in the United States, the occupation of which will enable us to effect the object in view.

" As had been foreseen by General Washington, the great effort was now to be made on the Hudson. A variety of considerations suggested the policy of transferring the seat of war to this part of the Continent. Such is the formation of the country on the sea coast, being divided into islands assailable in every direction by a maritime force, that it requires for defence, against a conjoint attack by land and water, not only complete fortifications but a very formidable army also. The same cause which render this part of the United States so vulnerable to an invading enemy, commanding the sea, secure that enemy in the possession of it, after it has been acquired. It must always be found extremely difficult to drive even an inferior army from this post, without first obtaining a naval superiority.

" The British General was invited to New York, not only by the facility with which that position could be taken and retained, but by the great and superior advantages it offered in the prosecution of the war. Long Island, of the secure possession of which he could not entertain a doubt, unless his force should be insufficient to make any impression whatever on America, was a fertile country, abounding in provisions, and would of itself furnish large supplies to his army. From this post, too, it was optional with him to carry the war eastwardly into New England; northwardly, into the state of New York; or, westwardly, into the Jerseys and Pennsylvania; or, if too weak to attempt the conquest of either, he could retire into a place of security, and either harass the American army and the adjacent country or carry on expeditions against distant parts of the Continent. In fact, it enabled him to command perfectly his own operation, and to choose the scene of action. The possession of the Hudson, too, would open to him the most direct communication with Canada, and enable him very greatly to interrupt the intercourse between the eastern and southern states. In addition to these circumstances, he would cover his friends, who, in turn, would recruit his army, and supply it with those necessaries, the want of which he had so severely experienced in Boston."

" General Washington soon received evidence of the difficulty attending his efforts to preserve this important river from an enemy possessing so powerful a fleet as was now to act against him. *Two frigates passed his batteries, without injury, and sailed up towards the high lands; the passes of which were of essential importance, and were very weakly defended.* It was apprehended that on board these frigates might be a small body of troops, and arms for the numerous disaffected of that country, with whose aid, sudden possession might be taken of these important positions. It was impossible still further to weaken the army at New York, for the defence of these passes, and therefore the militia were called upon to maintain them. *The frigates, however, did not make the attempt which was apprehended from them; but, by retaining this station, they cut off the communication, by water, between the army at New York and that at Ticonderoga.* To remove this interruption, a plan was formed to set the frigates on fire, by means of a fire-ship. This plan, though considerable address and courage were manifested in the attempt, failed in the execution, and only a tender was burnt. The frigates returned, but this fact demonstrated a truth which the General had before believed, that a ship with a fair wind would pass his batteries at pleasure, unless stopped before them by obstacles in the channel."—*Marshall*, vol. ii. page 487.

These extracts, and from the publication of one who drew his information from the private and most voluminous portfolio of Washington, are sufficient to prove to us, that the possessors of the Hudson, if they should be masters of the Lakes\*, are lords of the Continent, at least of all the valuable parts of it. The correctness of the opinions of this (now) venerated character, or the truth of his assertions, cannot be doubted.

The line formed by the Hudson is 160 miles long, the distance between New York and Albany. The most commanding spot is 60 or 70 miles from New York; it is called West Point, and the possession of it gives the control of the navigation of the Hudson. Connecting itself with the line is the Mohawk, which runs in a N. W. direction from Utica, near to which town it joins the Lake Oneida, and thence to Fort Oswego on the Lake Ontario.

As to the navigation of the River Hudson, it is here necessary to observe that to Hudson, 140 miles from New York, it is navigable for vessels of 350 tons.

The Mohawk is only large enough for barges. At the little falls above Herkimer it is locked, so that the navigation is uninterrupted from Schenectady to Utica. There is an 18 miles portage between Albany and Schenectady, occasioned by the Cohoos fall; of course, at the latter town, the barges load and unload. Hence the principal military line of defence of the state of New York, if any

\* The recent intelligence from the United States respecting York, and the burning of part of our lake navy, seem to make this questionable. Are there no records of the Illustrous Chatham in the archives of the Colonial Secretary?

power were as mad as we were in the last war to attack it in front, may be said to form an angle, the corner of which is Albany, the extreme points New York and Oswego.

That part of the state of New York to the northward, within this angle, was not, comparatively speaking, known during the last war, except the route by which General Burgoyne came from Canada.

Since that time there have been considerable settlements on the left bank of the Black River, through which a tolerable road has been made to Utica for carriages. It is traversed on horseback, with great ease, in three days. The road may be said to commence from Sacket's Harbour, a distance of 80 or 100 miles.

An advance by this road would, it is presumed, be not very difficult; particularly, as from the nature of the country, on the right bank of the Black River, it is incapable of settlement. Indeed, it seems to have been intended to serve as an immense reservoir of water to supply the St. Lawrence and the Hudson. The country *on the bank* of the former river is to be excepted. The part which is represented as thus inhospitable and unfavourable to settlement is very evident on the face of a correct map.

The banks of the Mohawk will, it is apprehended, afford some good military positions.

Turning towards the N. E. we shall discover the distance of our positions from Boston, Hartford, and Springfield, to be about 200 miles.

A post at Hartford or Springfield connected with that at Hudson, would belt the country, and at the same time check the lower part of the river Connecticut.

To Portland the distance is not more than 120 miles.

To Old Fort Western, and the Penobscot, about the same distance.

The country between Norridgewock and Quebec is unsettled. It has recently been surveyed by an order from the state government of Massachusetts.

Hence, if we take all the distances and positions into consideration, we shall find that the portion of the lands and states which may be said to contain the military strength of America, will be contained in an oblong of less than 300 miles by 200. The four corners may be said to be New York, Oswego, the Penobscot, and the St. Lawrence, between Montreal and Quebec; the latter in our possession. On examination, Great-Britain will be found placed on superior ground; and one on which she will prove herself to be

possessed of all the power to be derived from great superiority of position.

Let us now, therefore, turn to a consideration of the positions which would thus give us the preponderance.

1. The Bermudas. 2. Nova Scotia. 3. New Brunswick. 4. Quebec. 5. Kingston. 6. York, or Toronto. 7. Fort George, at the mouth of the Niagara. 8. Fort Erie. 9. Detroit.

Here then are eight positions whence the territory of the United States may be threatened with invasion, at one and the same moment.

From the Bermudas, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, the Atlantic shores, and its eastern frontier, may be threatened.

Of the other part of the line, the St. Lawrence is the great boundary link. Its value is well known.

From Quebec, the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, may be assailed.

From Kingston, York, and Fort George, the whole western front of the State of New York may be invaded.

Of Detroit, and its influence on the Ohio, we need take no notice at present. Valuable information is not wanting on the subject\*.

\* "In the beginning of the autumn of 1784, General Washington made a tour as far west as Pittsburgh; after returning from which, his first moments of leisure were devoted to the task of engaging his countrymen in a work which appeared to him to merit still more attention from its political than from its commercial influence on the Union. In a long and interesting letter to Mr. Harrison, then governor of Virginia, he detailed the advantages which might be derived from opening the great rivers, the Potomac and the James, as high as should be practicable. After stating, with his accustomed exactness, the distances and the difficulties to be surmounted, in bringing the trade of the West to different points on the Atlantic, he expressed unequivocally the opinion, that the rivers of Virginia afforded a more convenient, and a more direct course than could be found elsewhere, for that rich and increasing commerce. This was strongly urged as a motive for immediately commencing the work. But the rivers of the Atlantic constituted only a part of the great plan he contemplated. He suggested the appointment of commissioners, of integrity and abilities, exempt from the suspicions of prejudice, whose duty it should be, after an accurate examination of the James and the Potomac, to search out the nearest and best portages between those waters and the streams capable of improvement, which run into the Ohio. Those streams were to be accurately surveyed, the impediments to their navigation ascertained, and their relative advantages examined. The navigable waters west of the Ohio, towards the great lakes, were also to be traced to their sources, and those which empty into the lakes, to be followed to their mouths. These things being done, and an accurate map of the whole presented to the public, he was persuaded that reason would dictate what was right and proper."—For the execution of this latter part of his plan he had, also, much reliance on Congress: and, in addition to the general advantages to be drawn from the measure, he laboured, in his letters to the members of that body, to establish the opinion, that the surveys he recommended would add to the revenue, by enhancing the value of the lands offered for sale.

With your permission I shall at a future period resume it:—

Such are the relative situations of the two powers—if we are defeated in an attack, we have a never-failing support in a great na-

"Nature," he said, "had made such an ample display of her bounties in those regions, that the more the country was explored, the more it would rise in estimation."

The assent and co-operation of Maryland being indispensable to the improvement of the Potomac, he was equally earnest in his endeavours to impress a conviction of its superior advantages on influential individuals in that state. In doing so, he detailed the measures which would unquestionably be adopted by New York and Pennsylvania, for acquiring the monopoly of the western commerce, and the difficulty which would be found in diverting it from the channel it had once taken. "I am not," he added, "for discouraging the exertions of any state, to draw the commerce of the western country to its seaports. The more communications we open to it, the closer we bind that rising world (for, indeed, it may be so called) to our interests, and the greater strength shall we acquire by it. Those to whom nature affords the best communications, will, if they are wise, enjoy the greatest share of the trade. All I would be understood to mean, therefore, is, that the gifts of Providence may not be neglected."

"But the light in which this subject would be viewed with most interest, and which gave to it most importance, was, its political influence on the union. 'I need not remark to you, sir,' said he, in his letter to the Governor of Virginia, that the flanks and rear of the United States are possessed by other powers, and formidable ones too: nor need I press the necessity of applying the cement of interest to bind all parts of the union together by indissoluble bonds; especially of binding that part of it which lies immediately west of us, to the middle states. For what ties, let me ask, should we have upon those people, how entirely unconnected with them shall we be, and what troubles may we not apprehend if the Spaniards on their right, and Great Britain on their left, instead of throwing impediments in their way, as they now do, should hold outlets for their trade and alliance? When they get strength, which will be sooner than most people conceive, what will be the consequence of their having formed close commercial connections with both, or either, of those powers? It needs not, in my opinion, the gift of prophecy to foretel. The western settlers (I speak now from my own observations) stand as it were upon a pivot. The touch of a feather could turn them any way. Until the Spaniards (very unwisely as I think) threw difficulties in their way, they looked down the Mississippi; and they looked that way for no other reason than because they could glide gently down the stream, without considering, perhaps, the fatigues of the voyage back again, and the time necessary for its performance; and, because they have no other means of coming to us but by a long land transportation, through unimproved roads! Letters of the same import were also addressed to the governor of Maryland, and to other gentlemen in that state. To a member of the national legislature, he observed, 'There is a matter which, though it does not come before Congress wholly, is, in my opinion, of great political importance, and ought to be attended to in time. It is to prevent the trade of the western territory from settling in the hands either of the Spaniards or British. If either of these happen, there is a tie of separation drawn between the eastern and western country at once, the consequence of which may be fatal. To tell any man of information how fast the latter is settling, how much more rapidly it will settle, by means of foreign emigrants, who can have no

tural boundary. On the other hand, should the Americans be defeated, they have not that resource.

High American authority (Mr. Adams,) has assured us, that 50,000 men, on paper, were employed by Great-Britain in North America, but not more than 30,000 effective ever shewed front; and 10,000 of these were wasted at New York.

Their material and organization were defective. Of their commanders let us say nothing—"De mortuis nil nisi bonum."

Thus, Sir, have I endeavoured to call your attention to a subject which *may*, perhaps, prove important; although it must be the devout wish of every friend of his country and his race, that a stop may be speedily put to this terrible war—so unnatural a one has never disgraced the pages of history. Thank God! we have been forced into it.

You will, perhaps, forgive my intruding upon your attention, if I avail myself of the opportunity of writing upon a military subject, to give a hint which may, perhaps, meet with a favourable reception from some of your youthful readers at the military academies. It is that, as in the medical theatres, they make given diseases the subject of debate and discussion; so in the military academies they should agitate questions that would elucidate past events, point out past errors, and perhaps, in a measure, serve to preclude future military disaster.

Hence, let the following discussion take place.—On the causes of the success of the British arms in the war of 1756, which ended so brilliantly; and, subsequently, another on the causes of their defeat in the war of 1775. This would much elucidate both transactions. Were a premium of a small medal offered for the best essay, it might excite laudable ambition to excel. Perhaps the great patron and author of the regulations that have given rank, consequence, and regularity to our army, may deign to regard this hint. Should it meet with His Royal Highness's approbation, and any part of this paper prove of service or amusement to your numerous readers, it will confer no small gratification on,

16th June, 1813.

Sir, yours, &c.

PHIL. CONG. AM.

*particular predilection for us, of the vast fertility of the soil, of the population to which the country is competent, would be unnecessary; and equally unnecessary would it be to observe, that it is by the cement of interest alone we can be held together. If, then, the trade of that country should flow through the Mississippi, or the St. Lawrence; if the inhabitants thereof should form commercial connections, which we know lead to intercourses of other kinds, they would, in a few years, be as unconnected with us as those of South America."*

P. S. A good map of America is yet a desideratum. There are, I believe, excellent materials, but no encouragement to their publication. This, in a country with an army like ours, is strange. A knowledge of the geography of all countries is the *first* duty of a soldier—hitherto it has been the *last* of a British officer. As in other branches of the art military, the ignorance of it is not now so evident. But we still want patronage in geography. Ought it not to come, as in France, from the military department, inasmuch as it is the basis of military success?

#### CONSIDERATIONS FOR OFFICERS,

WHOSE DUTIES HAVE CALLED THEM TO EMPLOYMENT UPON OR  
NEAR THE SCENES OF ANCIENT RENOWN, WITH REMARKS  
ON THE WRITINGS OF POLYBIUS, &c. &c.

SIR,

THE liberal curiosity of the present age, fed by the spirit of enterprize, (which, under the permissive patronage of the House of Brunswick, has penetrated into so many different regions of the globe,) has in no respect, perhaps, been more agreeably employed than in illustrating, by recent discoveries, the geographical knowledge of the antients. The study of geography, in its lowest and simplest form; is delightful; in its connection with manners and government, it is instructive; and when associated with the actions and fortunes of those masters of our race, the Greeks and Romans, it becomes full, most assuredly, of a very high and peculiar interest. Upon this quarter of the globe at least those people have impressed, in indelible characters, their laws, literature, and language; and the scenes, upon which were performed those exploits, by which such great and permanant purposes have been achieved, cannot but be regarded by every generous and thoughtful mind with emotions of reverence and affection\*.

But while the military geography of antiquity (if I may so express it) comes thus recommended to us, its study is, I fear, not unfrequently attended with that sort of uneasy feeling, which the incomplete view of what is interesting is apt to produce. Erudition and industry united have undoubtedly done much towards giving us the clear pages of the antient geographers and historians, whose powers of description we must not, I presume, disallow,

\* See the manly and spirited declaration by Johnson in his tour to the Hebrides,  
" Far be from me and my friends that frigid philosophy, which could pass unmoved  
over the plains of Marathon, or remain unaffected amidst the ruins of Iona,"  
I quote from memory.

without exposing ourselves to the imputation of something even worse than ingratitude; but of the luminous comment, and full practical understanding of their descriptions, which can only be derived from exact typographical details collected on the spot, and fixed and illustrated by science, we may still be permitted, anxiously, to express our want.

It is a want, however, of which let us hope, (even without the indulgence of any unreasonable anticipations,) we may now expect, at least, a partial supply from the use and application of the opportunities presented to so many of our countrymen, whom either curiosity, interested adventure, or professional avocation, has borne, of late, to some of the most brilliant theatres of antient exertion. Among these, military men have, already upon many occasions, contributed to encrease the knowledge, while they have nobly upheld the glory, of their country; and for the extension and improvement of this purpose, some of your pages, sir, will, I trust, be occupied in no very unseemly way, by an address to the members of that proud profession, whose duties have called them to employment upon or near the scenes of antient renown.

Nothing, at the same time, can be more simple, nothing of more easy accomplishment, than the object here intended. To ascertain the bearings, fix the features, as well as to establish the identity of the spot, is all that is required from the traveller or visitant, when he has once reached the points of his enquiry. The points here offered, sir, through the medium of your pages, to the notice of the army, have been selected from authors, who were either actors on the scenes they describe, or contemporaries, whose condition and opportunities enabled them to draw their materials from the highest and nearest authorities. In the order of selection my own purpose has, in course, obliged me to pay attention to the actual situations, in which the persons, most likely to accomplish it, are at present placed. I therefore, sir, proceed to describe, from Polybius, the scenes of some very extraordinary and resourceful achievements in Sicily. The military and statesman-like qualities of the historian require no eulogy from me; but the value of his work may be shortly stated (as it seems to be described) from Polyenus, when speaking on the subject of his own labours, in his dedication to the Emperor Antonine, he says, “ε τοδιμαστι μνον, αλλα χνη επιρρη αγων, αθεληματο ναι χρημα γενοι.”—“ It is most valuable not only to those engaged in war, but to all persons, even in time of peace.” In the fifth chapter (of the first book) of Polybius, we

read, that hostilities, between the two republics of Carthage and Rome, after wasting the fields, and blazing along the coasts of Sicily, became concentrated upon and about Mount Eryx, subsequently rendered so conspicuous, in the pages of Roman history, by the eventful scenes which were then exhibited. "It was now," says the historian, "the eighteenth year of the war. Amilcar, the father of Hannibal, having drawn together the naval forces, sailed away to plunder the coast of Italy. When he had wasted all the lands of the Brutii and the Locrians, (part of the modern *Calabria*,) he steered his course to Sicily, and encamped in a certain place upon the coast between (1) Eryx and Panormus (*Palermo*,) whose situation was in all respects so advantageous, that an army could be no where lodged with more convenience or security. It was a rough and craggy mountain, rising from the plain to considerable height, whose top was more than a hundred stadia (*about eleven English miles*) in circumference. The lands beneath the summit were rich in husbandry and pasture, it was free from noxious animals, and was refreshed by breezes from the sea. On every side were difficult precipices, and the spaces between them (*i. e.* the passes or paths) were so narrow as to require but a small protecting force. From a watch tower on the very top, every thing passing below might be seen; the harbour, near it, was deep and spacious, and lay commodious for vessels sailing from Drepanum and Lilybæum (now *Trapani* and *Marsala*) to Italy. The mountain could only be reached by two passes on the land, and one on the sea-side.

In this spot it was that Amilcar had the boldness to encamp, amidst his enemies, without an ally near him, and with no resources but in his immediate army; yet even thus he continued to engage the enemy in desperate contests, and to annoy them by constant alarms. Sometimes he actively engaged with his fleet in predatory excursions and against the Roman camp, lying within five stadia, (*rather more than half an English mile;*) in the district of Panormus, he urged an almost indescribable number and variety of attacks. With more force than taste, perhaps, Polybius has suffered himself to be called off from his narrative, to illustrate here the position of the combatants, by comparing them to two vigorous and adroit wrestlers, always threatening to throw, and never throwing, each other.

In fact, no decisive action upon this scene of exertion ensued, as the very closeness of combat, while it prevented the full push of

strength, afforded to each a ready retreat into his respective fortified position; but fortune, not long afterwards, removed these combatants into a still narrower space, and engaged them in a still closer struggle. It had been already told (in chapter the 4th) that the Consul Junius, while the Romans were employed in the siege of Lilybeum, had contrived and executed the surprise of Mount Eryx. The project was so completely successful, that he not only seized the city of Eryx itself, but the temple of Venus near it, (2.) “Eryx,” says the historian, “is situated on that part of the Sicilian coast, which looks towards Italy, between Drepanum (Trapani,) and Panormus (Palermo;) but lies nearest the former, and is most difficult of access on that side. It is the largest of all the Sicilian mountains,  $\text{\AA}$ etna alone excepted. On the top of it, a level, stands the temple of the Erycinian Venus, which, in splendour, wealth, and beauty, is acknowledged to be far superior to all the other temples in the islands. Below the summit lies the town, the ascent to which is long and difficult. The Consul having placed some troops on the top, and on the road to Drepanum, designed to act chiefly on the defensive; and was persuaded, that by guarding carefully both these two posts, he should be able to keep possession both of the town and of the mountain.

Into this quarter, however, thus guarded, Amilcar found means to introduce himself, by gaining possession of the city that lay between the two posts. The Romans on the top, being thus besieged, maintained their post, and encountered, with the most amazing fortitude, the dangers to which they were exposed. On the other hand, the courage and firm resistance of the Carthaginians were such as will scarcely obtain belief; for it is not easy to conceive by what means they were able to sustain the efforts of the enemy, exposed as they were to their attacks, both from above and beneath, and having no way, by which they could receive supplies, except one single passage that lay open to them from the sea. Here then the parties remained at bay until two years, when the war was brought to an end by the great maritime victory of the Consul Lutatius.”

These extracts are taken from Hampton’s translation, and remain nearly unaltered, except by omissions. In all topographical descriptions the slightest terms are occasionally of so much consequence, that I must lament (under my present circumstances) the want of the original, for the purpose of verification. A better map also, than the one now lying before me, I could have wished for; but both these desiderata are perhaps of the less consequence.

as the object of these lines is enquiry, rather than instruction. The first part occupied by Amilcar can, in course, derive (in the judgment of the distant reader) no great precision, with respect to its exact situation, from the very lax expression of its being between Eryx and Panormus, a distance of near fifty miles by the opening of the compasses. The shape of the coast also scooped into gulfs, and extended into promontories, increases (upon the map at least) the difficulty of determining a scite, respecting which, however, the historian seems to have left us abundance of data in his description. 1. It is a mountain rough and craggy, having its stages of habitable ground connected by pathways few and difficult. 2. It has a summit nearly eleven miles in circumference, and upon that summit is a spot, whence the eye, from the watch-tower built there, could traverse and examine the whole subjacent plain. Queries. Is there a spot of this character? and if there be, are there ruins or other signs of building upon it? (3.) The two passes on the land and the one on the sea side, are, I presume, features of no very dubious nature to the practised eye of a military observer. (4.) The mention of refreshing breezes from the sea may afford some guidance with respect to the aspect of the sea-side; if we can be informed of the prevalent breezes or winds during the summer, the season, we may suppose, when the value of the refreshment, given by them, would be most sensibly felt. (5.) The description of the harbour, near the port, as far as it was deep and spacious, must, in course, be read and attended to with reference to the draught of the vessels then employed; but the circumstance of its alledged commodiousness for shipping, sailing from Trapani or Marsala, excites in my mind (as I view the map before me) a strong feeling of its lying to the westward of the Capo de St. Vito. The mountain itself might, by its elevation, be taken out of this exactness of immediate situation, as the eye of the describer might discern it in so many points of view.

2. With respect to Eryx I am at a loss to understand what the historian means by his observing, "that it is situated on that part of the Sicilian coast which looks towards Italy;" unless this same circumstance of great elevation, mentioned immediately afterwards by him, insensibly occupied his mind to the exclusion of the surrounding country, over which it rose with so superior a height\*.

\* In one sense the whole northern coast of Sicily may be said to look towards Italy, and in that case the meridian of Eryx would nearly pass through Tivoli; but, if this be all that is meant, it is so wild and indistinct as to form no feature whatever in the description.

The position of the city, seized by Amilcar, (between the Romans and the *single passage*, by which it was connected with the sea,) are here chief objects to be remarked; although a full description of the mountain would be very desirable, not forgetting an account of the present condition of the plain at top, where stood the celebrated temple.

Such, Sir, are some of the intimations, which, through your assistance, I submit to the army stationed in Sicily, or to any other gentleman, whose opportunity and curiosity may at once allow and impel him to visit the place; and which I should, in common with several of my friends, feel great satisfaction in having noticed in such a way as to give us the information here asked. I am, Sir,  
yours,

Z. A.

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#### NARRATIVE OF THE EXPEDITION TO AND CAPTURE OF JAVA.

BY AN OFFICER IN THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S SERVICE.

*Transport Venus, Sangor Roads, April 29, 1811.*

"I HAVE volunteered for foreign service, and came from a station 1500 miles up the country, in the short space of two months, and with the good wishes of every officer in my regiment. We have suffered many inconveniences—there is no accommodation or comfort for officers; but our little troubles are nearly at an end, or else about to encrease; for we are now within two or three degrees of Batavia, which, I learn, is the object of the expedition. As I have been taken up the whole voyage with attending a sick friend, who lately fell a sacrifice to this climate, and have now little time, I must hasten to finish my letter, and give you a short account of the forces. First, the advance commanded by Colonel Gillespie, the flank companies of the 59th, 69th, 78th, 89th, one rifle company—my corps, a light infantry battalion, royal marines; one squadron horse artillery; two squadrons 22d dragoon body-guard; Bengal pioneers. The line consists of 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th volunteer battalions; marine regiment; Madras pioneers; and 80 pieces of cannon. The Governor-General, with all his Staff, is with us; Sir Samuel Achmuty, many field-officers, one 74, and six frigates, two brigs, and many cruisers. I have been very busy browning the men's arms, colouring the red jackets, dismounting all bright ornaments from our caps, to avoid, if possible, the sure and fatal aim of the Dutch riflemen."

*Cantonments of Wetterfueden, Batavia, Sept. 2, 1811.*

"Batavia, and nearly the whole of the island of Java, has fallen to our gallant troops, who have had some arduous and fatiguing duty to perform. I have not time to give you a detailed account of our operations at present, but will the moment we get settled. We have had two considerable actions, in which, I regret to say, our loss has been severe, but yet small to what might have been expected from the nature of the service we had to perform; the general opinion is, that 50 officers and 300 men are killed and wounded, but I hope not so many; the returns are not yet known, as the last action was only fought on the 26th of last month—when the list is published you shall have a copy. I am under orders of embarkation this day to go round to Soara Bay—a fine settlement on the other side of the island; it is not expected to make much resistance—indeed it would be useless, every strong position being in our possession. Gen. Jansen (the Captain-General) has refused to capitulate, and is wandering about the island with a few followers; we must take him prisoner in the end—his army is completely cut up and dispersed. We landed Aug. 4."

"P.S. Since writing the foregoing, the return has been published; viz. killed, 1 lieutenant-col. 3 captains, 7 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 7 serjeants, 91 rank and file, Europeans. Wounded, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 14 captains, 36 lieutenants, 7 ensigns, 33 serjeants, 2 drummers, 513 rank and file, Europeans. Killed, 1 subadar, 2 jemidars, 2 havildars, 23 rank and file Bengal volunteers. Wounded, 2 subadars, 4 jemidars, 9 havildars, 107 rank and file, 1 drummer, Bengal volunteers. 11 Europeans, and 2 natives missing. Total 887."

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*Fort Klutton, Dec. 21, 1811.*

"As I promised to give you a detailed account of the campaign, it will be useless recapitulating what I wrote in my former letters, acquainting you with the strength and disposition of the English army—they will inform you, that I was in the post of honour, the advance. The fleet of men of war and transports arrived off the city of Batavia, about ten o'clock on the morning of the 4th of August. Orders were given for the advance to land with the greatest expedition, and occupy such advantageous position as could be found. We did not, however, land till about two o'clock in the afternoon, to the eastward of Batavia, five marches at a place called Chilling-Ching, which we effected without the loss of a single man

—the enemy, to our great surprise, not attempting to oppose us, which, I believe, many heartily thanked God for; as, had they drawn up some field-pieces with their light infantry, they would have made a dreadful slaughter, as the sea-shore is defended by an immense thick jungle—this we pushed on through, and occupied a fine position on the main road to Batavia, where we remained for two days, until the cavalry and artillery were landed; and, in fact, the whole army—the enemy did not attempt much, they only attacked an advanced picket the first night, but were beaten back with loss. On the second day the alarm was sounded, and we learnt the army was coming down from Batavia to attack us; the line immediately took up a position, and we moved out to meet them; but, after marching a number of miles, and scouring the jungles right and left, we returned, as the enemy had evidently thought better of it. This was the most dreadful day I ever experienced; from seven o'clock in the morning till sunset, we were exposed to the burning rays of the sun, without a morsel to eat or drink; many Europeans and Sepoys died in the jungles for want; and some officers will never recover the effects of the sun. In the morning we moved on about five miles, the direct road to Batavia, which runs along the sea shore, with a large canal, inland, running parallel. The communication to the city is by a large bridge, which the enemy destroyed; we advanced, without opposition, to within one march of the broken bridge—this was on the 9th. At twelve o'clock at night we marched off, and having crossed the canal by a bridge of men-of-war's boats, advanced to take a battery, defending the road to the city; the enemy evacuated it, and retreated to the city, which, to our great mortification, we beheld shortly after in flames; this we well knew to contain the company's spice stores, of immense value, and appeared a perfect death-blow to our expectations of prize-money—it was not, however, so bad. A deputation of Dutch burghers came from the city (we were about two miles off) to give it up to us, saying that Gen. Jansen had first fired the public godorins, and retreated, leaving no protection whatever to the numerous inhabitants, and that the slaves would plunder and murder them. This was joyful news; we pushed on, and took possession of the city, and succeeded in extinguishing the flames, and saving much of the prize property; though I regret to say, a million pounds of coffee was burnt, besides a quantity of pepper, whereby the army lose 100,000 rupees of prize money. At three o'clock in the morning of the 10th, the advance received orders to

attack the enemy's military cantonments of Wetterfueden, which is three miles interior of Batavia, we moved on in the greatest silence, and arrived at a bridge defending the cantonments ; this we found not destroyed—it was immediately passed, and we were nearly in the heart of the cantonments when the action commenced by the fire of the enemy's piquet ; this was not returned by us, but our troops advanced in double quick time through the cantonments, and came direct upon the army of the enemy, who were ready to receive us, being alarmed by their piquet. They were strongly posted on the main road, leading to Fort Cornelius, with their horse artillery, and completely flanked by a jungle on both sides, lined with riflemen, &c. It was now just day-light, and the action became general, by very heavy discharges of musketry and grape, with a galling fire from the jungle ; our troops returned four or five volleys, when the signal to cease firing and charge was sounded, which was obeyed in the most gallant manner. Major Butler, of the 89th, charged and took the whole of their flying artillery ; and their line, with their choice Europeans, were routed—although broken, the action continued for two hours with their riflemen, every hedge was lined with them ; and many of our men were shot by cannon being put over a hedge close to their heads. Our troops now dispersed right and left, and cleared the jungles. The enemy were pursued as far as their advanced batteries, seven in number, in front of Cornelius : here ended the battle ; for we were obliged to get under cover from a tremendous fire of round and grape.

" By this short, but brilliant action, we took their grand military cantonments, capable of containing 15 or 20,000 men ; their best troops were beaten from a choice position by a handful of men ; their arsenal, with 800 pieces of cannon, shot, shells, and ammunition : their horse-artillery, 300 men killed, 300 men prisoners ; their second in command Gen. Alberti, and three field-officers, killed. Our loss was trivial—about 100 men and three or four officers. The advantage of that day's action was, that Wetterfueden now became *our* advanced post, and our piquets were pushed as far as the jungle, on either side of the road ; their seven batteries stood on a plain of about one mile and a half, surrounded by cultivation and jungle ; Fort Cornelius was in their rear, towards the interior of the country : the batteries were alternately retired and disposed on either side the road, mounting in toto 150 pieces of cannon, 18 and 24-pounders : before this tremendous position we began erecting our batteries, with every possible expedition, on

the edge of the jungle, which was so thick the enemy could not see us. Our batteries were, one twelve 18-pounder, and one six mortar battery, on the right of the road, and one eight 18-pounder on the left.

I need say little of the hardship of digging trenches and making batteries, exposed day and night to the climate, and the enemy's fire, which was kept up five days without intermission. On the 15th of August (Buonaparte's birth-day,) they fired, as a salute, 200 rounds of cannon shot at us; thank heaven we were hid by the jungle, but many brave fellows fell. Our batteries were nearly finished by the night of the 21st; but the enemy having ascertained our position, stormed our batteries at daylight on the 22d, and succeeded in taking one, but were driven back in less than five minutes; in pursuing the enemy, we were, as usual, fired on with round and grape, which killed several officers and men; we, however, went on with our work: and such was the description of our army, that not a shot had yet been fired, except by advance light-infantry; our impenetrable silence astonished and alarmed them. On the 23d our batteries were ready to open—every bosom heaved—every heart throbbed with anxiety and expectation. At gun-fire, in the morning, the old General, Achmuty, a brave veteran, came up to the batteries. At ten o'clock our first angry shot was fired, and immediately followed by a salvo—although at the risk of our lives, every one looked out to see the effect of the shot; it was a moment when a soldier's feelings cannot be described; pride and exultation were the chief passions; for we were now able to return their compliments, and shew them how we could stand to our guns. The enemy opened the whole of his batteries with a heavy and well-directed fire; and I must do them the justice to observe, they were determined not to be in our debt. On the 24th, the fire from our side was terribly heavy, and had done great damage; although we dismounted their guns constantly, they were as quickly replaced. I was employed with my company the whole of this day, carrying up ammunition to the batteries, which, about eleven o'clock, were obliged to stop for want of; indeed, our guns were so hot, we could scarce fire them. My duty this day was replete with danger; I had to make several trips of about a quarter of a mile to the rear of the batteries, and every shot that missed them we were exposed to; but such is the chance of war, I escaped, and lost only one of my men, whose legs were carried off. I was amply rewarded by receiving three cheers from the men working the guns.

and as I had 60 men, and every one with an 18-pound shot, and a cartridge on his shoulder, it was a famous supply : towards evening the enemy's fire slackened. On the 25th our fire was, as usual, very successful ; and, before night, we had dismounted every gun they could bring against us, and blown up two magazines. At twelve o'clock at night, orders came to form the storming party : my battalion composing part, I was roused up out of a delicious sleep, the only one I had had for 15 days. The advance were now so exhausted, by want of food and rest, that we had eagerly looked for this moment, and the call of duty was never more joyfully obeyed. The column was soon formed under the command of Colonel Gillespie, consisting of the flank companies of His Majesty's 14th, 59th, 69th, and 78th, some royal marines, 4 companies of my corps, and 4 companies of the 4th volunteer battalion. We were to storm on the enemy's right, and another column under Colonel Gibbs was to storm on the left. We moved off about half past twelve, took a circuitous route in the jungle, and continued marching incessantly until gun-fire in the morning ; how many miles we went God knows, but just at gun-fire we came close to the first grand battery—we were in close column, and the silence of death prevailed. It certainly was a most awful moment, for however a soldier may attempt to despise death, when he knows the next instant he may be sent to eternity, with all his sins unrepented, he has the feelings of the man, though imperious duty bids him smother them—but a truce to moralizing, no time was to be lost; we pushed on, and came upon their European piquet, who were instantly bayoneted—every soul except the officer. Secrecy was now at an end ; the screams of these poor fellows alarmed the troops, who commenced the most destructive fire of round, grape, and musketry, that could be made. It was truly appalling ; and none but British troops could have withstood it ; we huzzaed, pushed on, and gained the battery in two minutes. Here was death again in all its horrors, for many of our troops had got round the rear, and entered the gate-way, thus preventing all escape, and the battery, which was full of men, we entirely destroyed. A smart fire from a battery, in the rear of the one we had gained, galling us considerably, the troops called out to push on for it ; and as I always persuade myself a soldier who stays in the rear is in the most danger, I went on with the men of my own company. We had got possession of the second battery about a moment, when one of those escapes, which sometimes a man encounters, happened : a large

magazine full of powder and shells, situated nearly in the centre of the first battery, blew up with a dreadful explosion; although the hottest part of the action, an instantaneous silence ensued; not a shot was heard for the space of a moment. Conceive the horror of our feelings—at least 200 men, and from 16 to 20 officers blown to atoms! nearly the whole grenadier company of the 59th destroyed; mangled limbs, bodies, and shells, bestrewed the battery I was in, and for many yards round—ten officers of my corps were blown up, and the guns (18-pounders) blown over the ditch of the battery. The action now went on; we found still another battery to take; after a little breathing, we pushed on and gained it, though most obstinately defended.

I had some hope our day's work was finished, the seven batteries being stormed and taken; but not so: immediately in the rear of these batteries, in a parallel line, and in front of Fort Cornelius, was a masked battery of flying artillery, from 16 to 20 guns: these opened a terrible fire of grape upon us, and rendered the last battery almost untenable, for the shot came through the fascines. Our only chance was now charging the guns, which was done in the most gallant manner; although I firmly believe not more than 50 men, Europeans and Sepoys, composed the party, and five officers—six or eight guns were taken by this party outright, but their line of infantry, in the rear, beat us back to the battery. I returned with little chance of escaping; for the guns being manned again, opened a hot fire of grape, (the whole copper halfpence—every wound death,) and very few of the brave fellows left, returned again; myself and three officers got safe in. In the interim, the battery had been filled with fresh men, and Colonel Gillespie came in shortly afterwards, who, being informed of our affair, ordered the men to fall in and charge again; he led us on in the most noble manner; we completely took the guns, and killed all the horses that could not be made off with. We now received a heavy volley of musketry from about 3000 men, which was answered only by the sound to charge. Our two columns had now joined, and nothing could withstand them; the enemy broke and dispersed in every direction, the principal body taking the main road to the interior—every individual was now hot in the pursuit, the enemy only making faint stands where a house or hedges afforded cover. We had pursued them nearly three miles, when the cavalry came charging up the road. We gave them three cheers, and had the grand sight of seeing two squadrons of English dragoons charge between 2 and

3000 men ; for General Jansen, in a fit of despair, had formed all the infantry he could collect, across the road, determined to resist us ; they fired on the dragoons, which killed one Lieutenant and some privates. Our dragoons broke them, and made dreadful slaughter for six miles, pursuing the enemy as far as Buytenzerg, a fort ten miles from Cornelius. The retreat was sounded by our bugles, by an order from Col. Gillespie ; and we retired to Cornelius, having been engaged five hours : it was allowed by the oldest soldiers and king's officers to be the hottest engagement they had been in ; and that the business of Buenos Ayres was not to be compared with the dreadful discharges of grape and musketry the troops here experienced.

I regret to say we lost near 60 officers, and 1000 men. One regiment alone lost 16 officers, but the enemy suffered infinitely more ; for ten miles the road was literally covered with killed and wounded. I never beheld so dreadful a spectacle ; and the heaps of dead, in and round the batteries, were so numerous, that the pioneers were two days in burying them. The advantages of this brilliant action were, the entire possession of the island, by taking what was termed an impregnable place : we had beaten and annihilated the enemy's army, known to consist of 10,000 men, who would never be able to face us again. It is supposed we killed that day 3000 men, took 4000 privates prisoners, with 400 officers, the whole of their horse artillery, from 20 to 30 fieldpieces, 150 pieces of cannon in the batteries, besides mortars and military stores in Fort Cornelius, and a valuable quantity of spice, though the richest was burnt by the enemy in their retreat ; this malicious conduct made our troops give them little quarter.

I have now given you a faithful detail of our operations from personal knowledge, and what I actually saw, as correct as I can charge my memory ; and thus ends nearly the whole of the campaign. As I before said, I had returned with the troops to Fort Cornelius, I assure you, nearly exhausted, although my spirits had been kept up by the noise and firing.—I felt the effects of being without meat or drink for eleven hours ; after partaking plentifully of a kettle of coffee (which my faithful servant had prepared, and followed me with through the action unknown to me,) a fowl I borrowed, and some boiled rice ; I, the first time for 22 days, pulled off my cloaths and boots, gave my shirt to wash, and washed myself ; the luxury of that moment I would not have changed for worlds. I had, *sans ceremonie*, borrowed a bed, pillow, and counterpane out of a

French officer's house : I took up my quarters in an empty hut, and being conscious I had done my duty, shared the fatigue and the glory which was my reward, I stretched out my limbs, and slept with all the independence of an Englishman.

On the 27th we returned into quarters at Wetterfueden, and those regiments were sent out which had not shared in the actions, (for you will perceive, by this narrative, the advance fought both,) to drag guns, pile shot, level fortifications, bury dead, and other work.

*Solo, the Capital of Java, and residence of the Emperor,*  
*January 20, 1812.*

I must resume my narrative, to acquaint you how I came here. We had remained very quiet in quarters at Wetterfueden for about 20 days, when our battalion, with some others, received orders to embark for Samarang, a settlement on the sea-coast, distant 200 miles from Batavia, General Jansen having assembled a large force there. We had a pleasant ten days' sail, and arrived in the beginning of October off Samarang ; the troops were landed in the evening, and took possession of the town. The next morning we marched to attack the General's position, three miles inland on the main road to this place ; it consisted of four fortified hills. We came in sight of them just at daylight ; the troops advanced at a firm and steady ordinary parade step towards their batteries, which fired very sharp on us ; but finding their cannon-shot and grape not able to impede our progress, they retired on their infantry ; and seeing us preparing to charge, sent a flag of truce, and surrendered, with General Jansen at their head. Thus ended the war with one of the finest coup-de-mains ever effected by the British army. In 22 days we had totally defeated the French and Dutch army, and our sovereignty was acknowledged.

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*ROMAN GREATNESS OF MIND.*

ST. EVREMONT, speaking of Roman magnanimity, expresses himself in these terms :—“ Un peuple si magnanime aimoit autant périr, que choir ; et tenoit pour une chose indifférente de n'être plus, quand il ne seroit pas le maître des autres.” To this magnanimous people it would be the same to perish, as to cease to command supremely ; to them it was a circumstance of unequivocal indifference, not to exist at all, as to exist without possessing imperial dominion. Such a turn is worthy of the Roman mind, and of the happy genius of the Petronius of France.

*CAMPAIGNS IN THE PENINSULA.*

[Continued from page 256.]

MEANTIME the Juntas of Ciudad Real (the capital of Upper La Mancha) and of the four kingdoms of Jaen, Grenada, Cordova, and Seville, which compose the province of Andalusia, formed a central assembly in La Carolina, where two deputies from each province met to consult upon speedy measures for fortifying the gorge of Despenaperros; this pass of the Sierra Morena being considered as the Thermopylae, where the progress of this new barbarian might be withheld. Here an army was necessary, and there was none: the Marquis de Palacios was sent by the Supreme Junta to form one under his command. The Juntas of Andalusia and La Mancha raised new levies for this service: officers and men, who had deserted from the Central army, many of them scattering alarm and sedition where they fled, re-entered in this new establishment. The marine battalions and brigades of artillery were ordered hither from Cadiz, leaving only 300 men in that city, besides the volunteers. Fourteen pieces of cannon had been fortunately stopped at Manzinares, on their way to Madrid; these were now mounted upon the works which were thrown up to defend this important position. The Plata road also, by which the enemy might have passed the Sierra, was occupied by a detachment of 300 men; before the middle of Dec. 6000 foot and 300 horse had assembled at La Carolina, and their number increased daily. But it was not towards the Sierra Morena that Buonaparte was looking, his attention was chiefly fixed upon the English army; and the road by which he thought to reach Andalusia, was through Estremadura, hoping to overtake the Supreme Junta in their flight; having reached them at Truxillo, his armies might divide, one marching to take possession of Lisbon, the other to take vengeance for Dupont at Seville and Cadiz: there was no force in Estremadura which could oppose any obstacle to this plan.

When the pass of Somosierra was lost, Sanjuan, who commanded them, cut his way, sword in hand, through a squadron of Poles, and by bye-roads reached Segovia, where he found the troops who had retired from Sepulveda. From thence he marched to Guadarama, united with the Estremaduran troops under General Heredia, and descended to the Escurial, because he was without provisions.

in the pass. There they received orders to hasten to Madrid, and enter that city by the gate of Segovia. On the way, exaggerated reports were spread of the strength of the enemy; traitors and cowards exciting alarm, suspicions increased the insubordination of the soldiers, the artillery and baggage-men forsook their charge and fled, and several corps broke up and dispersed. The whole of Heredia's vanguard dispersed in this manner, in spite of all Sanjuan's efforts to detain them; "they would rally," they said, "at Talavera;" this word went through the army, and served as a pretext for every one who chose to fly. The two Generals had only a handful of men with them when they approached Madrid, and then they discovered that the city had been betrayed. No other course remained for them than to repair themselves to Talavera, in the hope of rallying what would still form a considerable force. The rabble of the army, sufficiently faithful to their appointment, beat their way to that city, plundering as they went along; and there Sanjuan met them, unhappily for himself. The wretches, who had been most conspicuous in subverting all discipline, and instigating the troops to break up, began to apprehend punishment, if the army should again assume a regular form, and this was likely to be the case immediately; for above 20,000 men (many having escaped from Madrid) were now collected there, and the government had already begun to take measures for re-equipping them. It was easy for these villains to raise a cry of treachery against Sanjuan: all men knew the importance of the position at Somo-sierra, and how much the traitors, who betrayed Madrid, had affected to rely upon it, making the people feel that reliance which they themselves only feigned. But there were few who knew with what insufficient means the General had been supplied; he had scarcely more than 7000 men, and only 8 pieces of cannon. Measures for strengthening the post had been unprovidently or wilfully delayed; for this, however, Sanjuan was not responsible—and whatever fault had been committed by his cavalry, he, it was well known, had distinguished himself by his personal exertions. The cry, however, against Sanjuan, became general: a friar went, at the head of a party, to the convent of the Augustines, where he had taken up his quarters, and they cried out, that they had come to put Benito Sanjuan to death. Sanjuan attempted to expostulate with them, but in vain; he drew his sword to defend himself, and immediately he was pierced with their bullets: the rabble dragged the body to a gibbet and hung it there. Next they sought for



( SPAIN )  
and  
PORTUGAL,

with the March of the  
BRITISH Columns  
on the Retreat of Gen. S. John Moore

Land Miles	—	Sea Miles
British Land Miles	—	British Sea Miles
French Land Miles	—	French Sea Miles
Spanish Land Miles	—	Spanish Sea Miles
Portuguese Land Miles	—	Portuguese Sea Miles

British Land Miles

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900

Herrida, that they might kill him also; but he was fortunate enough to elude their search. As soon as their fury was allayed, the instigators of these excesses secured themselves by flight; and the troops, who had been misled by them, perceived the consequences of their lawless conduct. If Sanjuan had indeed been a traitor, they felt that they ought to have delivered him up to the proper tribunal; by taking vengeance into their own hands, they had made themselves obnoxious to the laws. When too could they trust? whom were they to obey? instead, therefore, of forming a new army, as they had designed, at Talavera, they dispersed again, not having now any rallying place appointed, but each man going whither he thought best. Some took the road to Andalusia, some to Avila; the Estremadurans, who were the most numerous, went to their own homes: no punishment was ever inflicted on the assassins of Sanjuan.

The dispersion of the soldiers called forth a severe edict; pronouncing sentence of death against any officer who absented himself from his colours without permission, and confiscation of his property for the relief of the widows and orphans of soldiers in his parish. Soldiers were made liable to the same penalty; any person, who harboured a deserter, was to be punished by confiscation of his property; and the same penalty was denounced against all magistrates who suffered deserters to remain within their jurisdiction. But all who, within fifteen days, presented themselves to the nearest authority in order to rejoin the army, were exempted from the pains in this decree. Four days after the murder of Sanjuan and the dispersion of his army, two divisions of French cavalry, under Milhaud and Lasalle, entered Talavera; they found the body of the Spanish General still on the gibbet, and this murder furnished Bonaparte with a new subject of invective against the Spaniards. This was but a small part of the force which was destined to proceed in this direction. As soon as Morea had performed the whole of his impious bargain with the Tyrant, Lefebvre was ordered to advance with his division from Valladolid towards Lisbon. First he advanced to Segovia, which he entered unresisted. In one place only, between Valladolid and the capital, did this part of the French army experience any opposition. The pass of Cacerama was open to them; General Hope had been stationed there, but was recalled by Sir John Moore, and there were no native troops to supply his place. But when the enemy descended upon the Escorial, and proceeded to take possession of that

palace, (the magnificent monument of a victory, which Spain had achieved over France in open, honorable war, and in a fair field,) they found the peasantry assembled to defend the seat and sepulchres of their kings. Undisciplined as they were, ill armed, and with none to direct their efforts, they stood their ground till they were overpowered by practised troops, superior in numbers as well as in arms; and the French, after the slaughter of these brave peasants before the gates, took up their quarters in the palace of the Philips.

Lefebvre entered Madrid on the 8th of December. Buonaparte reviewed his division in the Prado, and dispatched it to Toledo, while Sebastiani, with another division, marched for Talavera. In that city, by the 19th, about 25,000 French were assembled. The wiser inhabitants fled before their arrival, preferring all the miseries of emigration to the insults and atrocities which these barbarians perpetrated wherever they went; for the exaction of heavy contributions, which reduced half the people to beggary, was the least evil which those towns endured which fell under the yoke of the French. The Spanish government exclaimed loudly against the enormities committed; their appeal could be of no avail against a tyrant, who, in the very origin of the war, had shown himself dead to all sense of justice, humanity, and even of honour, which sometimes supplies their place, or against generals and officers, who could serve him in such a cause. Such men could be taught humanity only by the severest retaliation, and unhappily this was not yet in the Spaniards' power. The language, which the government addressed to their own subjects, might be more effectual. It had been happy for Spain if the government had acted as wisely and energetically as it wrote; but it should be remembered, in justice to the Spaniards, that the dispersion of the troops was, in many instances, an act of self-preservation, so utterly were they left without supplies of food or clothing, by the inexperience or inattention of every military department.

Never did men suffer more patiently, never did men fight more bravely, than Blake's army. There was no want of courage at Tudela; and of the remains of the army, which fought there, a large proportion was, at this very time, defending Zaragoza, with a heroism unexampled in modern times, upon any other soil. Wherever, indeed, a new army was to be collected, soldiers were not wanted. After Sanjuan's death, Don Josef Galluzo was ap-

pointed to the command; he took his post at the bridge of Almarez to defend the left bank of the Tagus, and in a few days had collected about 8000 soldiers, many of them without arms, most of them barefooted, and now unhappily accustomed to flight and desertion. Nevertheless they assembled, for every man felt individually brave; and it was only the discipline, which, by preventing them from feeling confidence collectively, made panic contagious in the moment of danger. The province of Estremadura immediately provided money for those troops; this province, though the least populous in the Peninsula, had particularly distinguished itself by its exertions; it had raised and equipped, wholly at its own expence, 24,000 men, and had supplied ammunition and arms of every kind from Badajoz to the other provinces. There are four bridges between Talavera and the confluence of the Tietar with the Tagus; the Puente del Arzobispo on the Archbishops, the Puente del Conde on the Counts, the bridge of Almarez, and the Puente del Cardinal on the Cardinals. With his present feeble and inefficient force, Galluzo had no other means of protecting Estremadura, than by breaking down, or defending these bridges; if he could effect this, the province would be secure from an attack on the side of Talavera; Almarez was the most important of these points; here he planted ten pieces of cannon and two mortars, and stationed 5000 men. The more surely to prevent the enemy from winning the passage, he ruined the bridge; but so firmly had this noble pile been built, that when the mine was fired, the explosion only served to injure it, without rendering it impassable. Don Francisco Trias was sent with 850 men to the Puente del Arzobispo; on his way he met the engineer, who had previously been dispatched to break it down, but who had been prevented from attempting it by the enemy; so that this bridge was already in their power. Trias, therefore, took his position with a view of curbing the incursions of the French on this side, and ordered Don Antonio Puig, with such assistants as he could procure from the magistrates of Talavera la Vieja, to destroy the Puente del Conde; and provide for the defence of that point, and of three fords upon the same part of the river. When this officer arrived, he had neither a single soldier under his command, nor arms for his peasantry; this latter want was soon supplied; the peasantry were zealous, and some of the stragglers joined him. The bridge of the Cardinal was assigned to the keeping of a battalion of Walloon Guards, and a squadron of the volunteers of Estremadura, under Brigadier Don Francisca Duran-

miel. Galluzzo also stationed his reserve at Jaraicejo, under Brigadier Don Josef Vlasquez Somosa, and sent another Field Officer to Truxillo to collect and organize all the stragglers who might either voluntarily join him, or be detained by the patrols. While the General made these dispositions for the defence of the province, the Junta of Badajoz made the greatest exertions to supply the wants of this army, and its efforts were well seconded by the Estramadura people. Half a million of reales was raised in loans and free gifts within a week; all the cloth of Torremocha and of other clothing towns was applied to the use of the army; no other work was carried on in the monastery of Guadaloupe than that of making earthen vessels for their cooking, and Commissaries were sent to the sixteen villages nearest Almarez to see that rations of bread for 5000 men were daily delivered there. These measures were so effectual, that the troops were soon comfortably clothed, and after the first day they had no want of any thing. It was, however, scarcely to be hoped that so small and ill-compacted a force could maintain its ground in a country, which offered them no advantages for defence against such an army as the French had assembled in Talavera. After some skirmishes with the advanced-guard at Almarez, and some slight attacks upon the Puente del Conde, which were designed chiefly to keep the Spaniards on the alarm, and divert their attention from the side where the real attack was intended, Sebastiani crossed the Puente del Arzobispo on the 24th of December, and attacked Trias in front on his right flank with very superior numbers. The patriots did not yield to this superiority till after a vigorous resistance; being overpowered, they retreated, taking the road by the Sierra to Castenar de Ibor. On the same day, about two hours after noon, the Puenta del Conte was attacked, and the fords. The bridge was bravely defended by Don Pablo Murillo, who now made those talents known by which he afterwards signalized himself so conspicuously in Galicia. Puig guarded the fords, and they repelled the enemy every where till night, when, being informed of the defeat of Fries, and that Sebastiani had proceeded by Peralena de Garbin and Bohonar towards Almarez, Puig perceived that he must inevitably be taken in the rear, if he continued in his present position; he retreated to Peralena de Garbin, behind the French, and from thence to Castanar de Ibor.

The news of these disasters reached Galluzzo, about ten at night. Immediately he apprehended that the object of the enemy, who

were marching by Valdecasa, Valdecanas, and other points, to Romangordo and Miravete, was to cut off the retreat of his whole division. To prevent this he ordered all the artillery, except four pieces, which formed a battery on the left of the bridge, to retire with the main force to Jaraicejo, for which place he himself set off at midnight with his Aid-de-Camps and the cavalry, leaving three companies in charge of the remaining battery, under Captain Don Xavier de Hore. This officer was attacked, on the following morning, by the French; the battery was ill placed, and Hore perceived that the ammunition carts were within the reach of the enemy's fire. He ordered them to be removed behind a bank which would shelter them; the muleteers were no sooner out of his sight than they cut the traces and fled with their beasts, imitating the conduct of some infantry, who now took to flight. The enemy soon made themselves masters of the bridge and the battery, and secured some prisoners, though but few; for before the French could lay planks over the broken bridge, and pass in sufficient numbers, most of the Spaniards effected their escape, and afterwards rejoined the General at Miajadas.

Galluzo's first thought was to make a stand at Jaraicejo, and with this intent he dispatched orders to General Henestrosa to join him from Truxillo with all the troops which he had collected, and requested the Junta to supply him with as large a force of armed peasantry as possible. But no sooner did he learn that the bridge of Almarez was forced, than he gave up this purpose, and resolved to fall back upon Truxillo, apprehending that the enemy might intercept his retreat. His apprehension degenerated into panic, when false intelligence was brought him that the French had entered Deleitosa, a village somewhat less than eight miles to the south-east. This intelligence was followed by other reports equally false and more alarming, which the knavish and the traitorous invented, and the fearful and the suspicious easily believed. The retreat had been begun in perfect order; but before the army reached Truxillo, it was in a state of total disorganization. Galluzo, confounded at the first approach of danger, (for if he had deliberately resolved to attempt resistance, the pass of Mirevete would have been the place which he would have chosen, after the bridge was forced,) called a council of war; and it was agreed that the defence of Estremadura was no longer possible, and that he should retreat into Andalusia. A chapel, which had been converted into a powder magazine, was now blown up, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy.

This explosion, and the preparations which were made for further flight, excited the utmost terror in the inhabitants of Truxillo, and their lamentations increased the confusion and alarm of the soldiers. It now became a route, most of the troops deserted, plundering the towns and villages through which they passed. Those who still followed the General, were now under no restraint; they went through Miajadas, Medellin, and Quintania, and in four days reached Zalamea, above 100 miles from Jaraicejo. Here it had been appointed to halt, and here Galluzo found himself with not more than 1000 men. Nothing could be worse than the conduct of the men during their flight; some sold their muskets, some threw them away; houses were broken open, and upon one individual a piece of church plate was found, a species of robbery which excites peculiar horror in Spain. The officers, instead of endeavouring to restrain these excesses, were, some of them, active themselves in pillage; it is probable, indeed, that had they done their duty, the men would have discharged theirs; for those officers, to whom the more difficult task of bringing off the artillery had been entrusted, and who were therefore picked men, effected their object, though without an escort; they lost only 2 pieces of cannon, and carried 17 to Miajadas, from whence part were sent to Badajos: the rest followed Galluzo to Zalamea. Trias also effected a far more dangerous retreat than his Commander, in good order. He set forward from Castanar for Fresnedoso, and, when within a mile of the place, learnt that the French were there, having won the bridge of Almarez. He had now to tread back his steps, and endeavour to reach Jaraicejo; after a day's march he found that the French were there also, and making for Truxillo, again discovered the enemy in possession of the place to which he was bound. Nevertheless he preserved discipline in his little troop; and that preserved confidence: instead of losing his men by desertion, he collected stragglers as he went, and arrived at Zalamea with a larger force than Galluzo himself had brought there. Before the incapacity of Galluzo was thus decidedly manifested, it had been in agitation to remove him from the command, and appoint Cuesta in his place, which was now immediately done.

(*To be continued.*)

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## REVIEW.

*Memoir concerning the Commercial Relations of the United States with Great Britain; to which is added, An Essay upon the Advantages to be derived from New Colonies. Translated from the French of M. De Talleyrand.* Lloyd, Harley-Street. 8vo. pp. 32. 1813.

WE have read this translation with the highest pleasure. The energetic and liberal writings of M. De Talleyrand have long proved him to be a perfect master of the correct system of political economy; they have thrown a light upon many interesting topics, of which the statesmen of Europe appeared ignorant, and to which we might otherwise have been perfect strangers at this moment. The advantages that might accrue to the French Empire, from attention to the colonial system, together with the most profitable method of employing her resources, are scientifically laid down in this little tract; and it abounds with real information on other important subjects. We therefore recommend it to the careful perusal and consideration of our readers, under the conviction that it will be found deserving of any time which may be bestowed in examining its able suggestions. Where advantages are pointed out, as within the reach of an enemy, we should not delay the moment which may prevent or impede their reaping them.

## MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE.

[Continued from page 268.]

SIR,

Deptford, June 6, 1813.

THE same motives which induced my letter to you of the 10th of December last\*, impelled me to put on paper answers to a few of your military observations, page 461, of the same volume, which, from a desire to see the opinions of others, and well satisfied with the matter of a more active nature which has supplied their place, have lain in my portfolio unheeded till this moment that I receive your last number.

The regret that I experience to see any matter relative to Military Economy left in doubt, and the still greater degree of regret that I should feel at the retirement from your valuable pages, of the correspondent who induced my first letter, have made me trouble you again to convey to the Military Public some facts on the Military Observations No. 3, and on the valedictory letter of A BRITISH

\* Inserted, vol. i. page 467.

OFFICER. Indeed, Sir, you must not suffer him to retire; the Military State is in too much want of *data* like the facts he has produced; and while I intreat him now most respectfully to believe that I have no wish to draw him into fruitless argument, and shall hereafter shew him I have not; yet I am sure that polite and sensible writer will quickly see, that the very agitation of such topics, *in a proper sphere*, like the present, cannot fail to be highly useful. And if he be, as is most likely, *my* superior officer, he will readily excuse the freedom with which I have observed upon his letter, by the recollection that in the republic of letters, as in a *rational mess*, all are (*decorously*) equal.

Due order requires me first to notice the article on the CLAIMS of officers upon the REGIMENTAL MEDICINE CHEST, and the attendance of the Medical Staff. Upon this I do not hesitate an instant to say, *they are indubitable*, though the facts upon which my assertions are grounded, are too scattered, and perhaps, individually, unsatisfactory to occupy your pages.

I am aware, as your "Military Observer" has stated, that the answer of a Military Surgeon is, (too generally,) equivocal on the subject; but this arises, like all our military, or rather *unmilitary* anomalies, from the imperfect state of the Medical Department of our army for a long period; and also from the habit of officers, in consequence of that imperfection, preferring to pay for private attendance, or by pecuniary recompence, seeking a more perfect attention from the Regimental Surgeon.

How imperfect the Medical Staff of our armies and regiments have been to a late period, is too well known. In the Military Code of Henry V. on service, the dependants of the Staff are thus classed—"shoemakers, taylors, barbers, physicians, or washer-women\*!!" And it is much to be feared that the scientific inquiry, and vigilant industry of a Baron LARREY †, are not often to be found yielding their laudable exertion among our troops. The recent appointments, however, of the Medical Board, and increase of the Medical Staff, may, it is to be hoped, improve the department generally, *if a due attention* be paid to their regulations. And

\* See Upton de re Militari, apud Grose.

† Were I of the *medici*, I would give my days and nights to the volumes of Larrey. (*Memoires de Chirurgie Militaire et Campagnes*.) They should accompany me to the hospital and the field; and when I had them by heart, I would rush to the seat of war—but hold! This is "reckoning without the host," alias, "the Commanding Officer." I forgot I had been prevented in my own line already by the silliest means.

at all events, the establishment of the York Hospital, and similar institutions, with the directions respecting them, as well as the *reasonableness of the thing*, will confirm my statement with respect to the indubitable claims of officers on the Regimental Staff and Medicinal Chest.

*Secondly*, I am to notice the case which I would willingly think extraordinary, *though I scarcely know how*, respecting the travelling expences of witnesses, on the part of the defence, to Courts Martial. I can explicitly answer, that, at least on *special* occasions, these can be obtained, on application to the Secretary at War; and certainly, without them, the evidence of witnesses of the civil classes would be almost legally prohibited.

*Thirdly*, As to the difference between the English term *cashiering* and *dismissal*, it appears, according to the result of my reading, to be this; that *cashiering* carries with it ignominy, sometimes even marked by ludicrous ceremonies, and altogether such as to preclude a return to the service; while *dismissal* is unattended with any other effect than what is sometimes termed, in modern proceedings, “*displacing*” from a certain corps.

In the use of these terms, however, by Courts Martial, their sense is very frequently confounded, and sometimes risibly: cashiering (from the French term “*to break*”) is also, in general terms, improperly applied to disbanding, as,

The broken soldier,  
Shoulder'd his crutch and shew'd how fields were won.      Goldsmith.

Thus, Sir, according to the finish of your enquiring observer, (p. 462,) I may add—*Audiique vocatus Apollo*, although his godship has only, and at so late a period, commanded so humble an *orderly* to answer!

I now return to the last letter of “*A BRITISH OFFICER*,” and am to express my delight and gratitude, at the considerate manner in which the writer speaks of Military Law, and my entire acquiescence in his feelings on its importance. That after all which has been done, the practice of Military Courts should still be at variance, according to the will of Presidents and Acting-Judge-Advocates, is dreadful; and those who prepare the Mutiny Act, I should conceive, must be thankful for the information of such an anomaly.

Your correspondent is pleased to express a desire to see the volume in which I attempted to digest so much of the military

law as was necessary to general military economy, and the practice of the Military Courts: if he will do me the honor to acquaint me how it will reach him, I shall *con amore* for the subject, feel great satisfaction in presenting him with a copy, and still more to have his remarks on those parts which he should find inefficient on service. And though the volume certainly cannot boast of being authorized by government, yet I am at liberty to say, that it has been submitted to many ministers and generals, without any censure, and with some approbation; the introduction of whose letters would submit to the charge of Sheridan's *puff oblique*, a work which has not required even a common advertisement to exhaust its first edition.

The witty remarks of "a British Officer" on his fundamental causes of complaint on the long duration of Courts Martial, excites in me, Sir, a wonder as to the causes requiring such protracted sittings, in respect to which I would be thankful for the public to be satisfied, as also with regard to—

The conduct of appointments to Courts Martial in the Peninsula generally;

Whether all prisoners are at present removed from the army for trial to Lisbon?

What are the apparent causes of such numerous crimes? and their nature?

And what the ordinary decisions on them?

The fact, with respect to the French Judge-Advocate, is remarkably striking, as regards the appointment of deputies in that important branch of the service. Yet it matters little whether he be French or English, if he knows not his duties. The French *Juge Militaire* has, indeed, a very different code to encounter from his own\*; but what can be more heterogeneous than the case I described to you in my letter, (vol. i. p. 468,) of a Paymaster holding *in defiance of the king's regulations*, at least five separate occupations, and adding to these the strange contrast in character, that of becoming *porter-dealer* and *Deputy-Judge-Advocate*, with no other view than the mere paltry gain. Indeed, this becoming liberality of government is, perhaps, the worst feature in the matter; since, if it were not allowed, no officer would be selected from

\* It is nevertheless curious, and the numerous processes and tribunals would seem so entirely to preclude the possibility of injustice, that I have thought it right to give it to the English reader in a translation nearly finished; *fas est ab hoste doceri*.

interest, and the allowance is certainly superabundant if the choice is to be made from the regiment. Indeed, in the appointments of Judge-Advocate to the extended regimental Courts Martial, I regret to perceive, in all that have come to my knowledge, neither Paymaster or Adjutant, the latter of whom has, from time immemorial, been deemed the legitimate substitute, without any new appointment or pay.

The respect with which your Correspondent has inspired me, Sir, will immediately induce me to farther consider the subject which "A BRITISH OFFICER" thinks has not obtained my mature consideration.

As to the question, however, Is a man guilty or not of an assault who rebukes another, and does not seriously hurt him? it admits of a prompt and certain decision, under the prescriptions of the common or the military law.

An assault at common law, to which it is most directed, is an extensive crime, and may be committed by offering a blow, or by terrifying speech; it involves two wrongs, one against the individual, and another against the public; and may therefore both be prosecuted by an action for damage, and by indictment; but by it "rebuke" would hardly, in any case, amount to assault: perhaps it would to scandal; but this not being of the same nature, could not be found, though a duellist acquitted of murder is found guilty of manslaughter. In the military law, however, it is expressly provided for (Art. of War, § 7. art. 1.) in these terms, "No officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier, shall use any *reproachful* or *provoking speeches or gestures* to another, upon pain, if an officer, of being put in arrest; or, if a non-commissioned officer or soldier, of being imprisoned, and asking pardon of the party offended, in presence of his superior officer." And in respect to a superior officer, it comes closer; (Art. of War, § 2, art. 5.) since any officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier, who shall even lift up any weapon against him, being in the execution of his office, shall suffer death, or other punishment." But charges of this kind seem to come best, and have frequently been punished \*, under the sweeping description of conduct "scandalous and infamous," and "contrary to good order and military discipline." And in such a case, nothing seems to me more probable, than that

\* I do not occupy your pages with quoting many cases to which I could easily refer; some are doubtless in the memory of every one.

a court might justly find a prisoner guilty *in part*, in this way, not guilty of scandalous or infamous conduct, but of having used certain improper or provoking expressions, of rebuking, &c.

In truth, Sir, I am, although "fond of depositions and defence, as far as they tend to elucidate, or, in the language of Blackstone, "to investigate truth at any rate," (and sometimes deriving a profit from them) an enemy to multiplied Courts Martial; since the utmost of my reading, and *it* at least has not been a little, and what experience an observant life has given me, have always shewn me, that the army frequently requiring them, had something in it radically wrong, and generally to be traced to its Commanders; I therefore desire to prevent them, as far as I am able, and when they occur, endeavour to *measure* their punishments, and preserve the letter and spirit of Military Law. Let the military force of the country, I say, preserve, if its Commanders will, their distinctions of rank and dress, their brevets and embroidery—it matters not whether a man of honour wear fringe or tags, or is to the right or left, in front or rear; but let them be uniform in their military affections and energies; let them, as far as human infirmity will allow, view the army as their family, and every comrade as a brother, and no man will mistake for a mere profession of gain, an army formed on principles of patriotic virtue—whose universal parole is, "*God and our Country.*" I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT SCOTT, Lieutenant.

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#### MAPS OF GERMANY AND AMERICA.

SIR,

CONSIDERING how much the country is indebted to every one who adds to its geographical knowledge, standing in the situation of Editor of the Military Panorama, you will be very deficient if you do not render the thanks of the army to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, for the pains he has taken, and the aid he has afforded, in behalf of the excellent Map of Germany recently published by that intelligent geographer, Mr. Arrowsmith—it was a great desideratum. Another of the American Continent is as much so. Materials are not wanting, but patronage. Considering the prominent situation which that country now occupies, I cannot forbear expressing my hopes, that the attention of another member of the Royal Family, who well knows, and is much interested in that country, may be exerted on this occasion. G.C.

*Note.* The officers of the army are under the greatest obligations to the Duke of Cambridge for His Royal Highness's indefatigable exertions, whenever an opportunity has offered for benefiting the service. G. C. may rest assured, that the attention of His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, to whom, I suppose, his letter also alludes, will be employed on every occasion that promises advantages to society, and more particularly to the Military profession.

EDITOR.

#### ON THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

SIR,

THE subject to which I wish to call the attention of the public is, the Medical Department of the Army, a subject which it is the duty of every individual to inquire into; for, although it may not be their own lot to fall under its control, yet a father's, son's, or brother's existence, may depend upon its duties being performed in the most attentive and skilful manner.

In 1804, more particularly, the late Board found a very considerable difficulty in procuring Medical gentlemen to enter into the army; in fact, the number that was required could never be procured. In consequence of which, the pay of the Army Surgeons, and Assistant Surgeons was increased, agreeably to the accounts which they have published. Another encouragement, as they were pleased to term it, was also held out; viz. Every Regimental Surgeon of our regular forces, after thirty years' service, on *full pay*, shall have the unqualified right of retiring on half pay, at the rate of fifteen shillings *per diem*, subject to the usual deductions. Thirty years' service on full pay! This might answer, indeed, if there was war *ad infinitum*; but where a medical officer is not allowed to enter into the service until he is 22 years of age, and when the short period to which a man's life is confined, together with the hazards of war, and the great probability of his being put upon half pay during 30 years, the length of such a period must be next to an impossibility to attain. Again; the Surgeons of the Forces, who are considered to rank one degree superior to the Regimental Surgeons, are allowed 15 shillings a day; yet after 20 and 30 years service, they are only to derive the same advantages as Regimental Surgeons. These regulations, as one may well suppose, have only partly succeeded in inducing medical men to enter into the service.

The medical profession is pursued chiefly by the younger sons of gentlemen, who are, perhaps, independent in regard to themselves; and, although they may not have a sufficiency for the whole of their family, are yet able to give that kind of education

have patents in their pockets, and bring in a few additional pounds to the revenue. I could wish ministers would seriously reflect, particularly at this moment, which is of most consequence, the lives and health of their fellow creatures, or the income these people bring in. Let them also recollect, that when they grant these patents, ignorant as they must be of the medicine's good or bad qualities, they take the responsibility upon themselves, as to their application. If these quacks must be supported, at least let the Medical Officers of the army and navy be supported also. Were they put down, there would then be opportunities of employment for the gentlemen of the army and navy ; and instead of hearing every day of the numberless melancholy accidents caused by these patent engines of destruction, we should have those peculiar advantages which must always arise from extensive knowledge and experience.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

March 17, 1813.

DECIUS.

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#### CHARACTER OF THE SPANISH TROOPS.

BY CAPTAIN T. H. COOPER.

THE Spanish army bears strong marks of the weakness and defects of its government. A Spanish regiment, when drawn up in line with the troops of any other service, looks like an assemblage of beggars. These beggars are, nevertheless, the descendants of those men who once domineered over Europe, and conquered America. They might still return to what they originally were, if they had the same leaders. The Spaniards are, perhaps, indebted to their ignorance for having preserved their national character, in spite of their change of sovereigns and the corruption of their government. They have the same ground-work of elevation of mind, pride, and courage. As to military matters, the Spaniards are still as backward as in the year 1740. Military science has remained stationary amongst them from that period; their manœuvres and regulations are what those of others were sixty years ago. Their troops are neither disciplined nor instructed; their pay is very uncertain, and the maintenance and appearance of their soldiers detestable, with the exception of the Spanish and Walloon Guards. The Spanish are naturally slow and indolent, but capable of retaining and continuing to act upon any given impression. There are no troops more sober, more patient under hardships, and

more submissive to their officers. The affection or attachment, however, which the latter acquire, does not proceed from the care they take of the soldiers; the officers are regardless of them, for the soldiers have little or nothing to do except with the Serjeant-Major; he is the person who directs the company. Their constancy and courage are the same as in the wars of Italy and Flanders, but disorder and negligence render these military qualifications useless. The Spanish soldier is driven into scenes of disorder and rapine by wretchedness and misery. At a siege they have, during the night, undone the trenches and the works that covered them, in order to steal the earth bags, and sell them for a few pence. The phlegmatic character of the Spaniards, which prevents their passions from being readily roused, keeps them, when once excited, in a longer state of duration. To see the dejected and rueful countenance of a Spanish regiment, as it marches silently into action, one would suppose it to be the effect of fear, when, in fact, it is nothing but the habitual disposition of the individuals. The people of several provinces in Spain are singularly proper for a war of stratagem, and for contests among mountains. The Miqueletti were famous in this species of warfare, and are still well calculated to make excellent regular troops or light infantry. Their cavalry was in great repute during the wars of Spain and Italy. Their horses and horsemen possess the same properties; their mien is superior to that of the infantry; but as military science has not made the same progress among them as in other nations, they are still inferior, on this head, to other cavalry. The kind of horses in use among them is rather that of the Dragoons and Hussars, than of the heavy horse; but activity and speed being the principal qualities of cavalry, the Spaniards are more susceptible of these qualities in their own country than elsewhere, because the change of climate, and difference of nourishment, affect their horses. As to the men, in general, they are as capable of serving in warm countries as in those of a more northern direction; while, on the other hand, the inhabitants of the north decay and perish in warm climates. The Spanish Cannoneers have as much address as those in other services, as well as an equal degree of coolness and firmness; but the listlessness and ignorance which pervade all parts of their administration, (although the Cannoneers may be as good in Spain as elsewhere,) prevent the corps of artillery and engineers from making any progress. The artillery is clumsy, heavy, and badly kept up. Few officers in the Spanish service occupy the situations they ought. The court, not having solid

favours to bestow, gives military rank to those who are importunate. These imaginary promotions are full of inconveniences to real service. The regular promotion is very slow; and an officer, who has no interest at court, must expect to moulder away in subaltern situations. The Spanish army is capable of being brought to excellence sooner, and with more facility, than many others; because it possesses, within itself, courage, high points of honour, a spirit of subordination, and firmness in undergoing hardships: at present it is every where in a notorious state of inferiority, which is calculated to degrade and humble a nation at once brave, haughty, and naturally fitted for war.

### MILITARY ESSAY.

[Continued from page 271.]

#### THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

BY A FIELD OFFICER.

AS the fate of a campaign may, in a great measure, be decided by the ability or incapacity with which the duties of this General Officer are performed, it is assumed that besides profound knowledge of his profession, of tactics, and of men, he is possessed of activity and general talents.

General Thiebault, in his work upon a Divisionary Etat-Major, remarks, that "there are few duties so little understood as those of the General-in-Chief of the Staff, although this Officer is the very person who may have it in his power to be the most useful or injurious to the army."---He is responsible for all the operations of his deputies; by him all the reconnoissances, the marches, and the forage are verified; by him all the orders of the Commander-in-Chief are signed; and his orders are considered as of equal value with those of the Commander-in-Chief.

The principal duties of the Chief of the Staff may be classed under six distinct heads.

The first relates to the general plan of the campaign, and to a perfect knowledge of the resources of the country which is the theatre of war.

Under the second are embraced the camps and the positions to which the army might move; together with the most eligible places connected with those camps and positions, with the establishment of magazines.

The third includes the subsistence and stores for the army, and an ample knowledge of the resources of the Commissary-General.

The fourth relates to the Medical Department, and to the arrangements made by the Inspector-General of Hospitals for the care of the sick and wounded.

The fifth, to the disposition and movements of the divisions, troops, or detachments which compose the army, and to the orders of such dispositions and movements.

The sixth, to the dispositions, movements, and force of the corps, which compose the *enemy's* army, as well as to a knowledge of the characters and talents of their Generals.

The Commander-in-Chief confides alone to the Chief of the Staff the general plan of the campaign, and he is instantly informed of all the events which might probably change it. He is supposed to be sufficiently acquainted with the theatre of war, and with the history of the campaigns which have been there carried on, to enable him to discuss the plans which he proposes to the Commander-in-Chief in the most detailed manner. He should fully comprehend and be able to take in at one view, the general plan of operations, and be capable of distinguishing with precision between great, but still surmountable difficulties, and absolute impossibilities.--- Exclusive of a general knowledge of the country where operations are to be carried on, he should possess a more detailed one, to enable him to direct a levy of contributions, if necessary, and to have horses or mules, and carriages, provided. He ought to have a perfect knowledge of the principal camps and positions throughout the country, whether offensive or defensive; and his choice should be determined less by their local strength than by their connection with what relates to magazines for forage and provisions. This talent, which most proves the genius of a General, should be particularly distinguished in the Chief of the Staff: for let particular tactics be ever so perfect, no movement can possibly be combined or executed without a thorough knowledge of posts, positions, and country. The Chief of the Staff proposes the camp, or position, to the Commander-in-Chief, who decides, after having made a most accurate inspection of the advantages or inconveniences which might attend either. Unless a Chief of the Staff is possessed of all this necessary information, though partial advantages may be gained in the field, yet it is impossible to be completely successful.

The Chief of the Staff instructs the Commissary-General in every thing relative to all the necessary supplies of the army: he arranges with him the marching of every species of convoy; the places where the magazines are to be established; and also the provinces from which provisions may be drawn. The Chief of the Staff might find it expedient to have magazines established where they might not possibly be wanted, from the intention of concealing an operation; for it may be sometimes necessary to deceive even the Commissary-General.

He should likewise be furnished, at certain specified periods, with a state of the quantities of provisions and forage that are to be relied on; the proportion provided by the country; what part has been furnished by government; and finally, what part may be required from various distant sources, for all the supplies of the army.

It should be the duty of the Chief of the Staff to hold a conference with the Inspector-General of Hospitals, the chief Staff Surgeon, and the Staff Physician, relative to the erection of hospitals; and he should be assured that nothing is wanting for their information, in the supply of stores, or in the article of medicine, surgical instruments, apothecaries' apparatus, and hospital utensils. Nothing should escape his vigilance. The Inspector-General should be required to select purveyors for the hospitals in the rear, of known humanity and integrity; otherwise the lives of many brave men may be sacrificed by negligence or rapacity.

Directions are given by the Chief of the Staff, that the purveyors or contractors for hospitals, who provide cooks and clerks of the infirmaries, have registers kept of the sick, and assist in the visits made by the General Officers.

It further belongs to the Chief of the Staff to visit in person the hospitals of the army, at certain periods, in order to be assured that the necessary duties towards the sick and wounded are strictly performed. As the duties of the surgeons and physicians of an army are at times highly laborious and extensive, they cannot be supposed to occupy themselves minutely with the subordinate details relating to attendance on the sick and wounded; yet such inspections being extremely necessary to the comfort and speedy recovery of those in hospital, the Chief of the Staff might reasonably think it expedient to direct that an officer from the sixth department of the General Etat-Major should be selected, to superintend those minor, yet essential details, and to report accordingly.

The Chief of the Staff is supposed to be perfectly informed of the nature of the camps to which the army might find it necessary to march; and the moment he perceives that the enemy is enabled to act upon the flanks, or communications of the camp or position \* occupied by the army, he prepares to abandon it as no longer tenable.

He is also informed of the columns of march that should be opened, under various circumstances; together with the communications that should be kept up, to facilitate the operations.

He has measures taken to get possession of those posts which cover a country abounding in provisions, in order to take advantage of them, as well as to prevent their being rendered available to the enemy.

It is his duty to have tables formed of the different corps upon the frontiers, of those which arrive; and those occupying the various posts or places in the interior. Distinct columns should mark their route, their halting-places, and the exact time of their arrival at the army, or the different points to which they may be detached, that supplies might be every where provided.

He should know how to calculate, with the greatest accuracy, the time required for a march, or movement of any kind, with a given number of troops; and he should be perfectly acquainted with the environs of the different camps or positions, to enable him to decide on the posts, which it might be necessary to occupy for their protection.

He is to be prepared, at all times, to communicate to the Commander-in-Chief the position of the troops; the particular instructions given to the Generals of Divisions, or officers commanding detached corps, and also the

\* There are two ways of forcing an enemy from a position---by a general attack, or by acting upon his flanks, his communications, or his line of operations. At the battle of Talavera the French attempted both ways. They failed in the first, by a most brilliant victory gained by the British army; but a corps of theirs moving towards one of the flanks of the army, rendered the position, after the battle, very critical.

In 1797, when the Duke of York assaulted the strongly-entrenched camp at Famar, near Bouchain, and completely routed the enemy's army, the scattered remains of which were collected, and withdrawn to the strong camp of Cæsar, near Cambrai, this position was certainly a good one, till the fall of Valenciennes, when the Duke was enabled to march a large body of cavalry, supported by horse artillery; and after forcing all the strong posts upon the Scheldt, turned the enemy's flank, and cut off his principal communications, reducing him to the necessity of fighting or retiring.

information collected by the second department of the General Etat-Major, relative to espionage; and the different accounts of the deserters and prisoners, together with the state of provisions and forage.

When the Quarter-Master-General has submitted his observations upon the nature of the camp or position that is to be occupied, the Chief of the Staff determines upon the disposition of the troops, that are to be encamped, and points out to the Quarter-Master-General where the different divisions of infantry and cavalry are to be placed; where the park of artillery is to be formed; where the Commissary's magazines are to be established; and where the hospitals should be situated.

Any change, which might be made in the general disposition of the troops, should be instantly reported to him, and marked on the plan of the camp, or position, which is furnished by the Quarter-Master-General.

The Chief of the Staff should be constantly occupied with informing himself of the strength of the enemy's army, and the description of troops of which it is composed; the camps or positions it occupies; where his magazines are established; the sources from which they are supplied; together with the talents and characters of the principal officers of his army.

Before a general engagement, the Chief of the Staff ascertains, first, the actual position of the enemy, its strong and weak points, how its flanks are covered, and the nature of the posts and country extending beyond those flanks: then the enemy's force, and the number of troops which may possibly be engaged; an exact knowledge of which must be so necessary to determine upon the general disposition of the army.

He then instructs the Adjutant and Quarter-Master Generals as to the measures which are to be taken, should the battle terminate in victory; or if unfortunately in a defeat, the points of *ralllement* for the divisions, and those for the rendezvous of the moveable hospitals, baggage, and stores.

As the strength of an army, upon a day of battle, not only consists in the most perfect distribution of the different parts which compose it, according to the nature of the ground, but also in the most advantageous movements of those different parts from the order of battle, the Chief of the Staff is to be perfectly prepared with the most intelligent Staff Officers to direct such movements.

He issues the orders to the Generals of Divisions relative to the disposition of their brigades for the attack, or the ground that is to be occupied and maintained against the enemy.

During the engagement, his post is near the Commander-in-Chief, who should have foreseen and informed the Chief of the Staff of the probable event. If successful, he takes the necessary measures to render the victory as decisive as possible, by ordering out strong detachments, to prevent the enemy from rallying; not allowing him a moment to recover breath, but pursuing him, and, if possible, converting his retreat into a complete rout, attempting also to cut off some of his corps; and, if thought expedient by the Commander-in-Chief, the principal part of the army is to be prepared to follow as rapidly as possible.

Should, however, the necessity of a retreat be anticipated, he instantly orders the reserve depots which have been placed in the rear of the second line, and also the brigades of artillery, to retire, with the exception of those which may be necessary to cover the retreat. He then directs the select

corps or detachments to move to the several commanding points which were previously determined on. When such measures have been taken, he issues special orders that the utmost attention shall be paid to the wounded.

From this concise detail of the duties of this General Officer, how very necessary must it appear, that he should recommend, for the formation of his Staff, the most active, intelligent, and zealous officers he can find !

He should establish a regular system for all his deputies, which ought to be adhered to most inviolably. All his arrangements should be formed with the greatest method, and his orders should be concise, clear, and simple.

As the Adjutant and Quarter-Master Generals may be considered as the deputies of the Chief of the Staff, they relieve him of that multiplicity of business, which at first appears above the intellect of any one individual : but how much more unreasonable, to expect that all those duties should be performed by a Commander-in-Chief, who ought to be occupied with the more important matters !

In the course of all the fortunate or unfortunate events of a campaign, and under every circumstance a Commander-in-Chief may find himself, an efficient Chief of the Staff should have expedients and resources to surmount all possible difficulties.

What a support must an officer, of the description here given, prove to a Commander-in-Chief, who, instead of having his mind harassed, and his attention divided, by all the minute details of an army, is alone occupied with his general plan, and has but to direct the movements for its execution.

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*Correspondence from the Theatre of War in the Peninsula.*

[Continued from page 272.]

*Portugal, 10th April, 1813.*—THE time of year generally allotted to the re-establishment of military discipline being arrived, (the spring months) we are beginning to break up. The Marquis has issued his orders and directions for the practice of the manœuvres he judges to be most essential.—In pursuance to this order we are all at work.—The Noble Lord having furnished the general outline, leaves it to the Generals of Divisions to enforce the execution of the orders, according to their own discretion: that produces particular opinions, which are given as guides to the Generals of Brigades.—These gentlemen have all something left to the guidance of their own judgment, which is issued to the Commanders of Regiments and Corps, to whom falls the most material part of the whole, the immediate drill of their battalions; for if the component parts of a brigade are perfect, the brigade is perfect; and if brigades are perfect, the division is perfect: the incompetency therefore of any one battalion disfigures the whole machine, as does the unsteadiness of one man destroy the appearance of a battalion. It therefore falls upon a certain number of officers to advance the machine progressively towards its perfection.—Now as the Lieutenant-General of Division gives his directions for the practice of the whole, very much depends on his temper and judgment; how far he considers the state of health of the men, and to what extent he admits that consideration to interfere with or impede the discipline of the corps: the lives, therefore, and health of the men of a division, is now left to the discretion and judgment of the Lieutenant-General of the division, as far as what relates to him as Commander of the division. Such power I believe, generally, to be delegated to very safe hands—perhaps there may be instances where it might be more advantageously placed, for prudence, judgment, temper, and information are not the certain attendant attributes of rank: how cautiously, therefore, should a Commander select the per-

sons on whom his power, his capability, his chance of success depends. I will suppose a young, violent, ignorant, hot-headed, inexperienced officer is entrusted with the control of a division; must it not be expected that every misfortune will follow; that instead of meeting such a body in the field the Commander-in-Chief, from the strength of numbers, had every right to tell upon, he finds a miserable division, incompetent brigades, weak battalions, officers disgusted, and hospitals crowded.—This imbecility, this incompetency, this ignorance, violence, rashness, and inexperience, may also be found in Brigade Generals, as well as officers commanding battalions, particularly among those who have recently arrived in the Peninsula: unaware of the mode of conducting troops, occasioned by the heat of climate, and other causes, they often are red-hot martinet, and lose both temper and character, because they, considering themselves all-sufficient, overlook the causes that necessarily occasion certain relaxations, and deviations from Dundas. To what cause are we to attribute the astonishing diminution of numbers that appeared in certain battalions very soon after their landing at Lisbon? Was it sudden change of climate? Certainly not in respect to one regiment that landed 1300 men from Gibraltar; again similar distress did not result to all the regiments that came from Great-Britain: it seemed more from the effect of bad management—the enormous weight a soldier is obliged to march under—the long, repeated, and distressing marches made to get them to the army, so harass the men, that under those circumstances it has been frequently ascertained more than one-third, generally half, and often two-thirds of the original numbers, are left behind on the road. It requires very cautious attention, and progressive practice to fit a young soldier to undergo the fatigues of a long march, the heat of climate, and bearing sixty pounds weight, at the least, on his shoulders: that men can be brought to do this is sufficiently proved; but all depends on the mode adopted.—At this moment the army is recovering its strength and vigour, but as the weather advances in heat, great care must be taken that in the practice of field-exercises too much is not required from men lately recovered from diseases: great care must be taken to prevent the mania of drill from undoing all that the medical officers have effected; unfortunately, mounted officers, exempt from the inconvenience of labouring under heavy burdens—from the fatigues of pedestrian exertion in intense heat, do not enter into the distresses of the men; and either to evince their zeal, their service, activity, or for their own particular amusement, keep driving on with field exercise, heedlessly incautious of the mischief they are doing, until the melancholy state of hospitals miserably proves their indiscretion—until the pallid countenances and debilitated bodies of their men point out their rash, inconsiderate, and reprehensible conduct. Medical men are certainly the most competent judges of the constitution, strength, and power of the soldier; and it is the bounden duty of all officers to consult and respect their opinions.—It will hardly be credited what the soldier undergoes and effects in this country—successive marches of fifteen or twenty miles under a scorching sun, carrying nearer seventy than forty pounds weight on his shoulders, and this done patiently, but good-humouredly: parched with thirst, choaked and begrimed with sweat and dust, still the noble fellow perseveres, and perhaps when at the close of a heavy, tedious march, his spirits are at once renovated, his exhausted strength is invigorated, if there is a prospect of engaging the enemy—every distress slumbers in the hope of glorious achievement.—How incumbent is it then for officers who witness such gallant conduct—how imperative is it their duty to mitigate their sufferings—to promote their interests—to shield them from unnecessary distresses—to consult and increase their comforts—to watch over them in sickness, and to guard their health!—Let this be the practice, and our Noble Chief will find an army ready to execute his plans, gain laurels for themselves, and heap honours on his head.

*25th May, 1813.—THE 1st, 2d, 4th, 6th, and 7th divisions are encamped with their right on Miranda-de-Douro.—Sir Thomas Graham is at Miranda.—Lord Wellington and General Hill's divisions at Salamanca.—Sir Thomas Graham inspected us yesterday evening, and we are to advance on the 27th.—There are very few Frenchmen in the troops of our enemy; and I therefore think that we shall issue a proclamation to the Germans and Dutch, offering to send them home, which might be very beneficial. It is evident, from the dépôts and hospitals being established on the frontiers of Portugal, Lord Wellington has no expectation of again retiring on that country.—We are most comfortably tented, and have plenty of provisions.—Various are the reports respecting the amount of the enemy's force. Ours is 60,000; and I am convinced the Marquis would not divide his army on the Douro if the enemy were in very great strength.*

### *Extracts from Army Regulations, General Orders, and Courts-Martial.*

[Continued from p. 272.]

#### *Abstract of a Bill for the more speedy and effectual Trial and Punishment of Offences committed by Soldiers detached in the Peninsula of Spain and Portugal.*

WHEREAS, owing to the frequent change of place of Armies serving in the Peninsula of Spain and Portugal, and to other circumstances, great delay and difficulty frequently occur in proceeding to trial and punishment for acts of violence and plunder committed against the persons and property of the inhabitants and residents of such countries, which encourage the commission of such crimes; and it would tend to the prevention of such offences, and the enforcing due discipline, order, and good conduct, if greater facility should be given to the bringing to trial immediately and on the spot, any persons belonging to such armies who may be accused or suspected of plunder, robbery, house-breaking, or the malicious burning or destroying of houses, out-houses, or other buildings, murder, rape, or any act of violence, stealing, or any other crime or crimes, offence or offences.

Clause 1. Empowers Commanding Officers to assemble Courts Martial for trying Offenders in certain cases.

2. Courts-Martial so assembled, may try and punish Offenders.

3. Officers commanding Stations may, on complaints made to them, assemble Courts-Martial; but that no Sentence shall be executed under the authority of this Act, until the General commanding in chief shall have approved and confirmed the same.

4. Empowers Courts-Martial to summon and examine Witnesses, who shall be liable to be punished for perjury; and that Sentences under the authority of this Act, shall, after such approval and confirmation, be valid.

#### *REDUCTION OF VOLUNTEER CORPS.*

(CIRCULAR.)—*Whitehall, 17th March, 1813.—My Lord, I HAVE it in command from the Prince Regent, to acquaint your Lordship, that, as the establishment of the Local Militia precludes the necessity of continuing, under present circumstances, the services of the greater part of the volunteer infantry of Great Britain, and consequently the propriety of subjecting the country to the expence of further maintaining the whole of this force; His Royal Highness deems it expedient that the volunteer infantry of the county of Essex, should, after the 24th instant, be released from their military engagements.*

It is with the utmost satisfaction that I discharge the additional duty, which the commands of the Prince Regent have imposed upon me on this occasion, of requesting that your Lordship will convey to the commanding officers of the several volunteer corps of infantry in the county of Essex, and through them, to all the commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates of the corps, those assurances of the high sense entertained by His Royal Highness, of the loyalty and patriotism which they have so zealously and constantly manifested in the cause and service of their country, and by which they have established a just claim to its lasting remembrance and gratitude.—I have the honour to be, &c.

SIDMOUTH.

*His Majesty's Lieutenant of the County of —*

*"Head-quarters, Freynada, March 14, 1813.—The various Orders which have been issued at different times by the Commander of the Forces, to prevent the misconduct and outrages committed by the soldiers of the army, on their marches through the country, have been generally occasioned, immediately by some disaster that had occurred, and by the fall of one or more soldiers, in contests with the inhabitants, for the protection of that property of which the soldiers were desirous of depriving them.*

*"The Commander of the Forces, therefore, trusted that his repeated Orders on this subject would have been obeyed, and particularly as they contain directions for the adoption of a line of conduct applicable to every case that can occur, which, if adopted, must prove a remedy for the evil, and must prevent the outrages complained of, and their consequent misfortunes.*

*"Ensign Ross, of the 92d, was brought before a Court Martial for neglect of those orders; and for which crime the General Court Martial, of which the Hon. Colonel O'Callaghan is President, have sentenced that he should be reprimanded; and he is hereby reprimanded accordingly.*

*"The Commander of the Forces trusts, however, that the Officers of the Army will consider the object of the Orders, the neglect of which is now under consideration, and will find motives for attending to them, in their desire to save the lives of their men, which might be wanting in the example before them, in the consequences of a neglect of those Orders."*

## GAZETTES,—

*Military Dispatches,—Promotions, &c. in the Army.*

(Regularly continued from page 293.)

The LONDON GAZETTE.—Published by Authority.

From SATURDAY, April 17, to TUESDAY, April 20, 1813.

*War-Office, April 20, 1813.*

1st Regiment of Dragoon Guards—George Quicke, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Brooke, promoted. Commission dated April 15, 1813.

6th do.—William Stewart, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Hay, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.

18th Regiment of Light Dragoons—Cornet Robert Curtis to be Lieutenant, without purchase. Dated April 15, 1813.

19th do.—Lieutenant Colin Anderson to be Captain of a Troop, by purchase, vice Bacon, who retires. Dated April 15, 1813.—Cornet John Hammersley to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Anderson. Dated April 15, 1813.

Staff Corps of Cavalry—Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel George Scovell, from the 57th Foot, to be Major-Commandant. Dated April 15, 1813.—Lieutenant Lewis

- During, from the 15th Light Dragoons, to be Captain of a Troop. Dated April 15, 1813.—Lieutenant John Gitterick, from the 12th Light Dragoons, to be do. Dated April 15, 1813.—J. Rooke, Gent. to be Cornet. Dated April 15, 1813.
- 3d Regiment of Foot—Lieutenant John Chapman, from the Royal Berkshire Militia, to be Ensign.—Ensign Thos. Barrett, from the 2d Somerset Militia, to be ditto.
- 5th do.—Ensign George Frederick Greaves, from the 99th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Oughton, who exchanges. Dated April 15, 1813.—Assistant-Surgeon William Griffin, from the 85th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Lear, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.
- 6th do.—Lieutenant Libanus Tilley to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Campbell, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.—Ensign Thomas Dutton to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Macbean, promoted. Dated April 14, 1813. Ensign Alexander Hogg to be Lieutenant, vice Lewis, promoted in the 5th West India Regiment. Dated April 15, 1813.
- 9th do.—Lieutenant Richard Storey, from the 2d Somerset Militia, to be Ensign.  
*To be Captains of Companies, without purchase.*
- 10th do.—Lieutenant Francis Innes, vice Dudingstone, deceased. Dated April 14, 1813.—Lieutenant E. Broomfield, vice Sutherland, placed upon half-pay. Dated April 15, 1813.  
*To be Lieutenants, without purchase.*
- Ensign James T. Tisdall, vice Innes. Dated April 14, 1813.—Ensign Luke Horner, vice Broomfield. Dated April 14, 1813.  
*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*
- Charles Campbell, Gent. vice Horner. Dated April 15, 1813.—Lieutenant Thomas L. L. Galloway, from the North Lincoln Militia.  
*To be Captains of Companies, without purchase.*
- 11th do.—Lieutenant G. M. Fahie Mercer, vice Porter, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 14, 1813.—Lieutenant Andrew Leith Hay, from the 29th Foot, vice Baird, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.  
*To be Lieutenant, without purchase.*
- Ensign William Trimble, vice Mercer. Dated April 15, 1813.  
*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*
- Richardson Mason, Gent. vice Scott, promoted in the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 14, 1813.—Edward Hobson, Gent. vice Trimble. Dated April 15, 1813.
- 13th do.—Ensign William Whitehead to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Morgan, superseded. Dated April 15, 1813.—Edward F. Keily, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Whitehead. Dated April 15, 1813.
- 19th do.—Lieutenant Adam Callander, from the North York Militia, to be Ensign.  
*To be Ensigns.*
- 22d do.—James Stewart, Gent. by purchase, vice Ball, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.—Lieutenant Richard Monk, from the Royal Cheshire Militia.—Ensign Charles Calveley, from the Royal Cheshire Militia.—Lieutenant James Chambers Park, from the Ayrshire Militia.
- 23d do.—First Lieutenant Thomas H. Browne to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Gourlay, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.—Second Lieutenant John Wingate to be First Lieutenant, vice Browne. Dated April 15, 1813.—Lieutenant George Dunn, from the 1st Somerset Militia, to be Second Lieutenant.  
*To be Ensigns.*
- 27th do.—John Galbraith, Gent. by purchase, vice Sampson, promoted. Dated April 18, 1813.—B. Slattery, Gent. by purchase, vice Maclean, promoted. Dated April 14, 1813. . . . . Mac Andrew, Gent. without purchase, vice Acton, who resigns. Dated April 15, 1813.  
*To be Lieutenants, without purchase.*
- 28th do.—Ensign John Evans, vice Huddlestone, deceased. Dated April 18, 1813. Ensign Robert Henry Mitchell, vice Wright, appointed to the 11th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 14, 1813.—Ensign and Adjutant . . . . . Bridgeland (to have the rank). Dated April 15, 1813.  
*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*
- Anthony Tatton, Gent. vice Evans. Dated April 14, 1813.—William Campbell, Gent. vice Mitchell. Dated April 15, 1813.
- 31st do.—Benjamin Sayer, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Clarke, promoted in the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Captains of Companies, without purchase.*

22d do.—Lieutenant Anthony Graves, vice Sherston, promoted in the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 14, 1813.—Lieutenant John C. Dennis, vice Gibson, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Lieutenants, without purchase.*

Ensign Hibbert Newton, vice Munton, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 13, 1813.—Ensign William Peyton, vice Graves. Dated April 14, 1813.—Ensign Thomas Lawler, vice Dennis. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

John Shugley Poole, Gent. vice Newton. Dated April 13, 1813.—John Birtwhistle, Gent. vice Peyton. Dated April 14, 1813.—Alexander Stewart, Gent. vice Lawler. Dated April 15, 1813.

39th do.—Volunteer Norman J. Bond to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Grace, who resigns. Dated April 15, 1813.

42d do.—Alexander Mercer, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice John Grant, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.

45th do.—George Creadsole, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Yates, promoted in the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.

46th do.—Peter Grant, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Carne, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.

47th do.—Volunteer J. Campbell, from the 6th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Lindsey, killed in action. Dated April 15, 1813.—Sergeant James Jackson to be Quarter-Master, vice Haggard, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.

51st do.—Lieutenant John Ross to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Hickey, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.—Ensign Frederick Mainwaring to be Lieutenant, vice Ross. Dated April 15, 1813.—Ensign and Adjutant William Jones to have the rank of Lieutenant. Dated April 15, 1813.—Gentleman Cadet Edward Glasgow, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Mainwaring. Dated April 15, 1813.

52d do.—Dayhort Macdowall, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Snodgrass, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.

53d do.—Robert George Scott, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Hutchinson, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.

58th do.—Lieutenant Rowland Clute to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Newport, who retires. Dated April 15, 1813.

61st do.—Lieutenant Hugh Eccles to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Macleod, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.

69th do.—Ensign Henry Lockwood, from the Tipperary Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase. Dated April 15, 1813.

71st do.—Lieutenant Alexander Grant to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice M'Intyre, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Lieutenants, without purchase.*

Ensign Norman Campbell, vice Ross, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 14, 1813.—Ensign Thomas Commeline, vice Grant. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

William Moore, Gent. vice Campbell. Dated April 14, 1813.—Dugald Grant, Gent. vice Commeline. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

73d do.—Lieutenant Thomas Deacon, from the Derbyshire Militia.—Lieutenant Charles R. Eastwood, from the Worcester Militia.

74th do.—Lieutenant William Whitting to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Langlands, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.—Ensign William Black to be Lieutenant, vice Whitting. Dated April 15, 1813.

83d do.—Lieutenant Thomas Young, from the North Lincoln Militia, to be Ensign. 85th do.—Lieutenant G. F. O'Conner, from the 73d Foot, to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Kelly, appointed to the 87th Foot. Dated April 15, 1813.—Lieutenant Robert Charlton, from the Derbyshire Militia, to be Ensign.

*To be Ensigns.*

\*7th do.—Volunteer Walter Grady, vice D. Ireland, deceased. Dated April 14,

1813.—Volunteer ..... Hilliard, from the 5th Foot, vice W. Ireland, deceased, Dated April 15, 1813.

99th do.—Ensign James Oughton, from the 5th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Graves, who exchanges. Dated April 15, 1813.

92d Regiment of Foot—Captain John Macpherson to be Major, without purchase, vice M'Donnell, promoted in the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 15, 1813.—Lieutenant John Warren to be Captain of a Company, vice Macpherson. Dated April 15, 1813.—Ensign John Grant to be Lieutenant, vice Warren. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Ensigns.*

Peter Forbes, Gent. vice M'Kie, promoted in the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 14, 1813.—William Grant, Gent. vice Grant. Dated April 15, 1813.

96th do.—First Lieutenant Thomas Smith to be Adjutant, vice Robertson, deceased. Dated April 15, 1813.

98th do.—Joseph Lynam, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Gee, promoted in the 7th Foot. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Lieutenants, without purchase.*

4th West India Regiment—Ensign G. L. Thomas, vice Macdonald, deceased. Dated April 13, 1813.—Ensign C. Miller, vice Webster, who resigns. Dated April 14, 1813.—Ensign W. B. Scott. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

Quarter-Master Thomas Gordon, vice Thomas. Dated April 13, 1813.—E. W. Stewart, Gent. vice Miller. Dated April 14, 1813.—J. Buchanan, Gent. vice Scott. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Adjutant.*

Lieutenant J. Crole, vice Dalton, promoted. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Quarter-Master.*

Sergeant-Major William Fair, from the 95th Foot, vice Gordon, appointed an Ensign. Dated April 15, 1813.

6th do.—Lieutenant W. Killikelly to be Captain of a Company, vice Cameron, deceased. Dated as above.

7th do.—Lieutenant J. Anderson to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Generes, who retires. Dated as above.

Royal African Corps—Ensign W. S. Saunders to be Lieutenant, vice Hugh Mackay, deceased. Dated as above.

1st Ceylon Regiment—Assistant-Surgeon H. Marshall, from the 2d Ceylon Regiment, to be Surgeon, vice Bath, promoted on the Staff. Dated as above.

3d do.—Henry M'Cabe, Gent. to be Second Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Shordiche, who resigns. Dated as above.

4th do.—Assistant-Surgeon to the Forces James Adams to be Surgeon, vice Leath, promoted on the Staff. Dated as above.

7th Royal Veteran Battalion—Captain J. Tinley, from the 9th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, vice Colclough, placed on the Retired List. Dated as above.

*To be Lieutenants.*

18th Royal Veteran Battalion—Ensign J. Mackie, from the 92d Foot. Dated April 14, 1813.—Regimental Quarter-Master James Mason, from the 1st Dragoons. Dated April 15, 1813.

*To be Quarter-Master.*

Quarter-Master George Woods, from the 52d Foot. Dated April 15, 1813.

STAFF.

*To be Assistant-Commissioner-General to the Forces.*

Deputy Assistant-Commissioner-General A. Küper. Dated November 28, 1812.—Deputy Assistant-Commissioner-General George Ainslie. Dated March 29, 1813.—Deputy Assistant-Commissioner-General Wm. Swainson. Dated as above.

*To be a Deputy Assistant-Commissioner-General to the Forces.*

Robert Cotes, Gent. Dated March 22, 1813.

HOSPITAL STAFF.

Surgeon John Leath, from the 4th Ceylon Regiment, to be Surgeon to the Forces. Dated April 15, 1813.—Assistant-Surgeon W. T. Gylyb, from the 4th Ceylon Regiment, to be Apothecary to the Forces. Dated as above.—Purveyor's Clerk James Surtees to be Deputy Purveyor to the Forces. Dated as above.

*To be Hospital-Mates for General Service.*

Henry Tedlie, Gent. Dated April 7, 1813.—James Kane, Gent. Dated as above.  
 —James Brady, Gent. Dated as above.—Andrew Smith, Gent. Dated as above.—John Williamson, Gent. Dated as above.—J. R. Gillespie, Gent. Dated as above.—John Freer, Gent. Dated as above.—Warrant-Hospital-Mate C. Eklus. Dated April 15, 1813.

**BARRACKS.**

Joseph Travers, Esq. to be a Barrack-Master to the Forces in Great-Britain. Dated March 19, 1813.

*The King's German Legion.*

1st Regiment of Light Dragoons—Cornet J. Freudenthal to be Adjutant, with the rank of Lieutenant, vice Baerthing, who resigns the Adjutancy only. Dated March 27, 1813.—George Schreiker, Gent. to be Cornet, vice Freudenthal. Dated April 6, 1813.

2d Battalion of Light Infantry—Solomon Earl, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Meuron, promoted. Dated April 10, 1813.

**MEMORANDUM.**

The appointment of Cornet S. Freudenthal, to be Lieut. in the 1st Light Dragoons of the King's German Legion, vice Schamhorst who retires, as stated in the Gazette of the 6th instant, has not taken place.

*The undermentioned Officers are superseded, being absent without leave.*  
 Lieutenant Cartwright, of the 38th Foot.—Lieutenant Fraser, of the 4th West India Regiment.—Hospital-Mate Meallin.

**ERRATA** in the Gazettes of the 21st March 1797, and 8th November 1800.  
 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons—For Edw. Geils, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice *Sale*, promoted, read Edward Geils, Gent. to be Cornet, &c. vice *Boyle*, promoted.—For Robert Torrens, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice *Boyle*, promoted, read Robert Torrens, Gent. to be Cornet, &c. vice *Sale*, promoted.

**THE LONDON GAZETTE.—Published by Authority.**

*From TUESDAY, April 20, to SATURDAY, April 24, 1813.*

*Downing-Street, April 22, 1813.*

A DISPATCH, of which the following is a copy, was this day received by the Earl Bathurst, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, from Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in North America.

*Quebec, February 8, 1813.—MY LORD, I have the honour to congratulate your Lordship upon the signal success which has again attended His Majesty's arms in Upper Canada.*

Brigadier-General Winchester, with a division of the forces of the United States, consisting of upwards of 1000 men, being the right wing of Major-General Harrison's army, thrown in advance, marching to the attack of Detroit, was completely defeated on the 22d of January last, by Colonel Proctor, commanding in the Michigan territory, with a force which he had hastily collected upon the approach of the enemy, consisting of a small detachment of the 10th Royal Veteran battalion, three companies of the 41st regiment, a party of the Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, the sailors belonging to the Queen Charlotte, and 150 of the Essex militia, not exceeding 500 regulars and militia, and about 600 Indians; the result of the action has been the surrender of Brigadier-General Winchester, with 500 officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the American army, and with a loss on their part of nearly the like number in killed and wounded. For the details of this affair, which reflects the highest credit upon Colonel Proctor for the promptitude, gallantry, and decision which he has manifested upon this occasion, I beg leave to refer your Lordship to his letter to Major-General Sheaffe, herewith transmitted.

I have also the honour of transmitting to your Lordship, returns of the killed and wounded on our part, and of the prisoners taken from the enemy, the latter of which, your Lordship will not fail to observe, more than exceeded the whole of the regular and militia force which Colonel Proctor had to oppose to them. Major-General Harrison, with the main body of his army, consisting of about 2000 men, was reported to be four or five days march distant from Brigadier-General Winchester's division, advancing in the direction of Detroit.

I think it not improbable that, upon hearing of the disaster of this division and the loss of his supplies, he may commence his retreat; but should he persevere in his endeavours to penetrate further into the Michigan territory, I feel the fullest confidence in the skill and bravery of Colonel Proctor, and the troops under his command, for an effectual resistance to every attempt of the enemy in that quarter.

A small detachment from the royal artillery at Fort George, with the light infantry company of the 41st regiment, have marched to reinforce Detroit; they are to be replaced on the Niagara frontier by troops now in motion from Montreal. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) GEORGE PREVOST.

*To the Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, &c. &c. &c.*

Sandwich, January 25, 1813.—SIR, In my last dispatch I acquainted you, that the enemy was in the Michigan territory, marching upon Detroit, and that I therefore deemed it necessary that he should be attacked without delay, with all and every description of force within my reach. Early in the morning of the 19th, I was informed of his being in possession of Frenchtown, on the River Raisin, 26 miles from Detroit, after experiencing every resistance that Major Reynolds, of the Essex militia, had in his power to make, with a three-pounder, well-served and directed by Bombardier Kitson, of the royal artillery, and the militia, three of whom he had well trained to the use of it. The retreat of the gun was covered by a brave band of Indians, who made the enemy pay dear for what he obtained. This party, composed of militia and Indians, with the gun, fell back 18 miles to Brown's Town, the settlement of the brave Wyandots, where I directed my force to assemble. On the 21st instant, I advanced 12 miles to Swan Creek, from whence we marched to the enemy, and attacked him at break of day on the 22d instant; and after suffering, for our numbers, a considerable loss, the enemy's force posted in houses and enclosures, and which, from dread of falling into the hands of the Indians, they most obstinately defended, at length surrendered at discretion; the other part of their force, in attempting to retreat by the way they came, were, I believe, all or with very few exceptions, killed by the Indians. Brigadier-General Winchester was taken in the pursuit by the Wyandot Chief, Roundhead, who afterwards surrendered him to me.

You will perceive that I have lost no time; indeed it was necessary to be prompt in my movements, as the enemy would have been joined by Major-General Harrison in a few days. The troops, the marine, and the militia, displayed great bravery, and behaved uncommonly well. Where so much zeal and spirit were manifested, it would be unjust to particularise any; I cannot, however, refrain from mentioning Lieutenant-Colonel St. George, who received four wounds in a gallant attempt to occupy a building which was favourably situated for annoying the enemy; together with Ensign Kerr, of the Newfoundland regiment, who, I fear, is very dangerously wounded. The zeal and courage of the Indian department were never more conspicuous than on this occasion, and the Indian warriors fought with their usual bravery. I am much indebted to the different departments, the troops having been well and timely supplied with every requisite the district could afford.

I have fortunately not been deprived of the services of Lieutenant Troughton, of the Royal Artillery, and acting in the Quarter-Master-General's department, although he was wounded, to whose zealous and unwearied exertions I am greatly indebted, as well as to the whole of the Royal Artillery for their conduct in this affair.

I enclose a list of the killed and wounded, and cannot but lament that there are so many of both, but of the latter I am happy to say a large proportion will return to their duty, and most of them in a short time; I also enclose a return of the arms and ammunition which have been taken, as well as of the prisoners, whom you will perceive to be equal to my utmost force, exclusive of the Indians.

It is reported that a party, consisting of 100 men, bringing 500 logs for General Winchester's force, has been completely cut off by the Indians, and the convoy taken.

Lieutenant M'Lean, my acting Brigade-Major, whose gallantry and exertions were conspicuous on the 22d instant, is the bearer of this dispatch, and will be able to afford you every information respecting our situation. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HENRY PROCTOR, Colonel-Commanding.

*To Major-General Sheaffe, &c. &c. Fort George.*

*Return of Prisoners taken after the action at Riviere au Raisin, on the  
22d of January, 1813.*

1 brigadier-general, 1 colonel, 1 major, 9 captains, 6 lieutenants, 10 ensigns,  
1 brigade-major, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 2 surgeons, 27 serjeants, 435 rank  
and file.—Total, 495.

N.B. The Indians have brought in and delivered up several prisoners since the  
above return was taken: they continue to do so this morning: so that this return is  
not perfectly correct, nor can a correct one be procured until they arrive at Sand-  
wich.

(Signed) FELIX TROUGHTON, R.A.

(A true copy.) Act. Dep.-Assist.-Qr.-Mr.-Gen.

(Signed) J. HARVEY, Lieut.-Col. and Dep.-Adj.-Gen.

*Return of Killed and Wounded in the Action at Riviere au Raisin,  
22d of January, 1813.*

Royal Artillery—1 serjeant, 1 gunner, killed; 1 lieutenant, 1 corporal, 1 bom-  
bardier, 5 gunners, wounded.

10th Royal Veteran Batt.—2 privates wounded.

41st Foot—15 privates killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 3 serjeants, 1 corporal, 91  
privates, wounded.

Royal Newfoundland Regiment—1 private killed; 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 3 corporals,  
13 privates, wounded.

Marine Department—1 seaman killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 midshipman, 1 gunner,  
12 seamen, wounded.

1st Essex Militia—2 privates killed; 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 7 pri-  
vates, wounded.

2d do.—3 privates killed; 1 ensign, 3 privates, wounded.

Staff—1 lieutenant-colonel wounded.

Total—1 serjeant, 1 gunner, 21 privates, 1 seaman, killed; 1 lieutenant-colonel,  
2 captains, 6 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 midshipman, 6 serjeants, 5 corporals,  
1 bombardier, 6 gunners, 116 privates, 12 seamen, wounded.

General total—24 killed, 158 wounded.

*Names of the Officers wounded.*

Royal Artillery—Lieutenant Troughton.

41st Foot—Captain Tallon and Lieutenant Clemow.

Royal Newfoundland Regiment—Ensign Kerr.

Marine Department—Lieutenants Rollette and Irvine, and Midshipman Richardson.

1st Essex Militia—Captain Mills, and Lieutenants McCormic and Gordon.

2d do.—Clad Garvin.

Staff—Colonel St. George.

(Signed) FELIX TROUGHTON, Lt. R.A.

(A true copy.) Act. Dep.-Assist.-Qr.-Mr.-Gen.

(Signed) J. HARVEY, Lieut.-Col. and Dep.-Adj.-Gen.

3d Western Regiment of Norfolk Local Militia.—Ensign Francis Bidden Allison to  
be Lieutenant. Dated April 6, 1813.—Benjamin Crofts, Gent. to be ditto.  
Dated April 7, 1813.—John Freeman, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 8, 1813.  
—John Eastoe, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 9, 1813.

Norfolk Rangers Yeomanry Cavalry—Lieutenant Nicholas Raven to be Captain,  
vice Hill, deceased. Dated April 6, 1813.—Cornet John Overton to be Lieu-  
tenant, vice Raven, promoted. Dated April 7, 1813.—Charles Hill, Gent. to  
Cornet, vice Overton, promoted. Dated April 8, 1813.—John Whiteman, Gent.  
to be ditto. Dated April 9, 1813.

South Hants Regiment of Militia—William Adlam, Gent. to be Lieutenant.—  
Poulteney Poole Sherbourne, Gent. to be Ensign.

South West Regiment of Militia—Charles Rich, Esq. to be Captain, vice Lyell,  
resigned.—Osborn Rich, Gent. to be Lieutenant.—Robert Longcroft, Gent. to  
be ditto.

Royal South Lincoln Militia—Frederick Webb, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated  
March 29, 1813.—William Law Lowe, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated as above.—  
Joshua John Moore, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated March 31, 1813.

Wiltshire Regiment of Militia—Daniel White, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated March  
12, 1813.—John William Cowell, Gent. to be ditto. Dated March 27, 1813.

King's own Regiment of Stafford Militia—Thomas Fernybough, Gent. to be Lieu-  
tenant. Dated April 17, 1813.—Jacob William Hinde, Gent. to be ditto, vice  
Henney, resigned. Dated as above.

Southern Regiment of Northumberland Local Militia—John Easterby, Esq. to be Captain. Dated April 5, 1813.—Ensign William Whittaker Spence to be Lieutenant. Dated March 25, 1813.—Edward Dodd, Gent. to be ditto. Dated as above.—John Parker, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 5, 1813.

2d Regiment of Bedfordshire Local Militia—Lieutenant Charles Green to be Captain, vice Golding, resigned. Dated April 9, 1813.—John Bedford, Esq. to be ditto, vice Sandys, resigned. Dated April 10, 1813.—Samuel Barton, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated as above.—Ensign Samuel Fountain, Gent. to be ditto. Dated as above.

Anglesey Local Militia—J. B. Sparrow, Esq. to be Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant. Dated December 14, 1812.—Captain Sir W. B. Hughes, Knt. to be Lieutenant-Colonel, vice Merrick, resigned. Dated February 8, 1813.—John Williams, jun. Esq. to be Major. Dated December 15, 1812.—Lieutenant Owen Roberts to be Captain, vice Sir W. B. Hughes. Dated February 8, 1813.—Ensign John Lloyd to be Lieutenant. Dated December 30, 1812.—Ensign James Fisher to be ditto. Dated December 31, 1812.—Ensign Hugh Williams to be ditto. Dated January 1, 1813.—Ensign Henry Price to be ditto, vice Roberts, promoted. Dated February 8, 1813.—Ensign William Hughes to be ditto, vice Poynter, resigned. Dated February 9, 1813.—Richard Griffith, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated December 30, 1812.—Thomas Owen, Gent. to be ditto. Dated December 31, 1812.—Auwy Jone, Gent. to be ditto. Dated January 1, 1813.

### THE LONDON GAZETTE.—Published by Authority.

*From SATURDAY, April 24, to TUESDAY, April 27, 1813.*

*Downing-Street, April 26, 1813.*

A LETTER, of which the following is an extract, has been received from Lieut.-Col. Bourke, dated Corunna, April 14, 1813.

An official account, which I have received from the Governor of Castro Urdiales, reports the investiture of that place, on the 18th ultimo, by about 3000 men under Gen. Palombarin, who, after different attempts, in all of which he was beat off by the garrison, retired, on the 25th, towards Bilboa and Durango. The immediate cause of his retreat, was the approach of Gen. Mendizabel, with the division of Longa and other corps, to the relief of the place. The enemy lost, in the different attacks, and in a skirmish with the force under General Mendizabel, on the 26th, near 600 men, in killed, wounded, and missing. The greatest excesses and barbarities were committed by the Italian troops in the villages in the neighbourhood of the place, during the period of the siege. General Mendizabel has since returned with his troops to Valmaseda and Ordanna, leaving a battalion of Colonel Longa's in garrison in Castro.

*War Office, April 27, 1813.*

- 1st Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Jos. Edward Greaves, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Maxwell, promoted. Commission dated April 22, 1813.
- 3d do.—Lieut. James Hadden, from the half-pay of the 40th Foot, to be Lieutenant, without purchase. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 5th do.—Lieutenant Edward Houghton to be Captain of a Troop, without purchase, vice Gordon, promoted. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 15th Regiment of Light Dragoons—Hospital-Mate John Williamson to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Mostyn, appointed to the 6th Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 18th do.—Cornet Vohn Dolbel to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Ball. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 21st do.—Cornet Robert Whaley to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Evatt, who retires. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 23d do.—Cornet Frederick Cowderoy to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Pemberton, who retires. Dated April 22, 1813.
- Staff Corps of Cavalry—Lieut. James Dryden, from the 2d Regiment of Life-Guards, to be Captain of a Troop, without purchase. Dated April 22, 1813.—John Bickerton Gent, to be Cornet, without purchase. Dated April 22, 1813.

- 1st Regiment of Foot—Lieut. Duncan Cameron (the 1st,) from the Royal East Middlesex Militia, to be Ensign.—Quarter-Master-Sergeant . . . . . Munns to be Quarter-Master, vice Price, promoted in the 4th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 14th do.—Captain William Fawcett to be Major, by purchase, vice Wood, promoted in the 85th Foot. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 18th do.—Ensign W. S. Hall to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Johnstone, appointed to the 21st Light Dragoons. Dated April 22, 1813.—Ensign Joseph Crips, from the 96th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Hall. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 27th do.—William Kater, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Ferde, promoted. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 28th do.—Lieut. Mathew Semple to be Adjutant, vice Gilbert, who resigns the Adjutancy only. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 30th do.—Lieut. John Powell to be Captain of a Company, vice Hitchin, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.—Ensign Purefoy Lockwood to be Lieutenant, vice Eagar, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.—Thomas Moneypenny, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Lockwood. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 33d Regiment of Foot—Lieut. William Bain, from the Royal East Middlesex Militia, to be Ensign.
- 36th do.—Lieut. William Hicks Milles to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Creswell, appointed to the 8th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.—Ensign John Lintott, from the 50th Foot, to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Milles. Dated April 22, 1813.

*To be Ensigns.*

- 37th do.—Lieut. William Ralph, from the Royal East Middlesex Militia.—Ensign John Fleming, from the 3d Royal Lancashire Militia.
- 38th do.—Lieut. John Harrison to be Captain of a Company, vice Annesley, deceased. Dated April 22, 1813.

*To be Lieutenants, without purchase.*

- Ensign Robert Dighton, vice Harrison. Dated April 22, 1813.—Ensign Robert Read, vice W. White, deceased. Dated April 23, 1813.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

- Volunteer T. Walsh, from the 3d Foot, vice Dighton. Dated April 22, 1813.—Volunteer J. Curran, from the 1st Foot, vice Read. Dated April 23, 1813.
- 40th do.—Richard Rudd, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Nowlan, who retires. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 41st do.—Lieutenant Francis W. Small, from the 2d West India Regiment, to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Creighton, promoted in the 99th Foot. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 43d do.—Ensign and Adjutant Lawrence Steele to have the rank of Lieutenant. Dated April 21, 1813.—Ensign John Echlin Matthews to be Lieutenant, vice Whalley, deceased. Dated April 22, 1813.—John Maxwell Williams, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Matthews. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 44th do.—Ensign John O'Reilly to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Keane, who resigns. Dated April 22, 1813.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

- Lieut. Simeon Farrar, from the 1st Royal Lancashire Militia.—Lieut. Henry Woodcock, from the West Kent Militia.
- 45th do.—Lieut. John Harris to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Purefoy, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 52d do.—Quarter-Master-Sergeant Benjamin Sweeten to be Quarter-Master, vice Woods, appointed to the 13th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.
- 65th Regiment of Foot—Ensign Wilkins George Terry, from the Royal Cumberland Militia, to be Ensign.
- 70th do.—Ensign Thomas Trigge, from the West Essex Militia, to be Ensign.
- 71st do.—Lieut. Richard Greenhalgh, from the 1st Royal Lancashire Militia, to be Ensign.
- 73d do.—Lieutenant George Donridge Bridge, from the East Essex Militia, to be Ensign.
- 74th do.—Lieutenant John M'Donald, from the Royal East Middlesex Militia, to be Ensign.
- 81st do.—Robert Beadle, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Palmer, promoted in the 27th Foot. Dated April 22, 1813.

- 83d do.—Ensign Charles Irwin, from the 3d Royal Lancashire Militia, to be Ensign.  
 87th do.—Gentleman Cadet Terence O'Brien, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice M'Keldon, superseded. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 95th do.—William Campbell, Gent. to be Second Lieutenant, vice Baird, deceased. Dated March 25, 1813.—Lieut. Duncan Cameron (the 2d) from the Royal East Middlesex Militia, to be Second Lieutenant.  
 96th do.—William Alexander Cunningham, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Crips, appointed to the 18th Foot. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 98th do.—Lieutenant J. Norman Creighton, from the 41st Foot, to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Dane, appointed to the 4th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 Royal Waggon Train—Cornet Charles Bott to be Lieutenant, vice Gerrard, who resigns. Dated April 22, 1812.—Troop-Sergeant-Major Robert Parkinson to be Cornet, vice Bett. Dated April 22, 1813.—Lieut. Thomas Newton, from the Sussex Militia, to be Cornet. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 2d Ceylon Regiment—Brevet Major William Willermin, from the Royal Staff Corps, to be Captain of a Company, vice Perks, deceased. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 3d Royal Veteran Battalion—Captain George F. C. Colman, from the 31st Foot, to be Captain of a Company, vice Munro, appointed to the 9th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 4th do.—Captain John Dane, from the 98th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, vice Anderson, deceased. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 5th do.—Quarter-Master-Sergeant James Burke, from the 28th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Ferguson, placed on the Retired List. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 6th do.—Captain Thomas Levett Metcalfe, from the 79th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, vice Fraser, placed on the Retired List. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 9th do.—Captain Alexander Munro, from the 3d Royal Veteran Battalion, to be Captain of a Company, vice Crooks, placed on the Retired List. Dated April 22, 1813.  
 11th Royal Veteran Battalion—Lieut. William Webb, from the 24th Light Dragoons, to be Lieutenant, vice Beecher, placed on the Retired List. Dated April 22, 1813.

## STAFF.

Captain John Jordan, of the 27th Foot, to be Deputy Adjutant-General to the Forces serving in the Ionian Islands, with the rank of Major. Dated April 22, 1813.—Captain Thomas Drake, of the 95th Foot, to be Deputy Quarter-Master-General to the Forces serving in the Ionian Islands, with the rank of Major. Dated April 22, 1813.

## HOSPITAL STAFF.

*To be Hospital-Mates for General Service.*

Warrant-Hospital-Mate James Ewing. Dated April 22, 1813.—Warrant-Hospital-Mate Thomas Laidlaw. Dated April 22, 1813.—Warrant-Hospital-Mate Robert Moorhead. Dated April 22, 1813.—Warrant-Hospital-Mate James Hurst. Dated April 22, 1813.—Warrant-Hospital-Mate John Wyer. Dated April 22, 1813.—Warrant-Hospital-Mate Francis Moran. Dated April 22, 1813.

*The King's German Legion.*

3d Regiment of Light Dragoons—Frederick du Fresnoy, Gent. to be Cornet. Dated April 15, 1813.  
 5th Battalion of the Line—Lieutenant Charles Baron Linsingen to be Captain of a Company, vice Charles Wurm, who retires. Dated April 16, 1813.—Ensign Louis Guissman to be Lieutenant, vice Linsingen. Dated April 16, 1813.  
 Sicilian Regiment—Ensign Charles Thom to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Mole, who resigns. Dated April 15, 1813.—James Gilbee, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Thom. Dated April 15, 1813.

## MEMORANDUM.

The appointment of John Freer, Gent. to be Hospital-Mate for General Service, as stated in the Gazette of the 20th instant, has not taken place.

*The undermentioned Officers of the King's German Legion are superseded, never having joined.*

Ensign Gustav von Hengel and Ensign von Luttwitz, of the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry; and Ensign Antonio de Younge Bleck, of the 2d Battalion of Light Infantry.

ERRATUM in the Gazette of the 20th instant.

For Purveyor's Clerk James Surtees to be Deputy Purveyor to the Forces,—Read Purveyor's Clerk Charles Surtees to be Deputy Purveyor to the Forces.

*Office of Ordnance, April 24, 1813.*

Artillery of the King's German Legion.—First Lieutenant Ernest Thielen to be Adjutant, vice Stockmann, who resigns the Adjutancy only. Dated April 15, 1813. Hospital-Mate C. Bentzhausen to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Heise, promoted. Dated as above.

Royal Sappers and Miners.—William Stratton, Gent. to be a Sub-Lieutenant. Dated April 1, 1813.

1st Regiment of Ayrshire Local Militia.—Peter McTaggart, Esq. to be Captain, vice Torrance, resigned. Dated April 8, 1813.—Ensign Gavin Caldwell to be Lieutenant, vice M'Lownan, resigned. Dated April 9, 1813.—John Simpson, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Caldwell, promoted. Dated April 13, 1813.—John Kennedy, Gent. to be ditto, vice Kirkwood, resigned. Dated April 12, 1813.

2d do.—Ensign Hugh McWhinnie to be Lieutenant, vice Fowles, resigned. Dated April 8, 1813.—Ensign Robert Montgomerie to be ditto, vice Black, resigned. Dated April 9, 1813.—Ensign David Campbell to be ditto, vice King, resigned. Dated April 10, 1813.—Ensign David Smith to be ditto, vice Johnstone, resigned. Dated April 12, 1813.—Ensign Hugh Brown, vice Love, resigned. Dated April 13, 1813.—John Fullerton, Gent. to be Ensign, vice McWhinnie, promoted. Dated April 8, 1813.—John Robertson, Gent. to be ditto, vice Montgomerie, promoted. Dated April 9, 1813.—Robert Crawford, Gent. to be ditto, vice Campbell, promoted. Dated April 10, 1813.—James Murdoch, Gent. to be ditto, vice Smith, promoted. Dated April 12, 1813.—John Deans, Gent. to be ditto, vice Brown, promoted. Dated April 13, 1813.

2d Regiment of Carmarthenshire Militia.—Major John Rees to be Lieutenant-Col. vice Pugh, resigned. Dated April 8, 1813.—Captain John Howell Bevan to be Major, vice Rees, promoted. Dated as above.—Lieutenant Richard Rees to be Captain, vice Bevan, promoted. Dated as above.

### The LONDON GAZETTE.—Published by Authority.

*From TUESDAY, April 27, to SATURDAY, May 1, 1813.*

Joseph Hammond, Gent. to be Adjutant to the 5th Regiment of North York Local Militia, vice Ray, resigned. Dated April 5, 1813.—William Dawson, Gent. (from the late Workington Local Militia) to be Adjutant to the Whitehaven Corps of Local Militia Artillery, in the county of Cumberland. Dated April 26, 1813.

1st Regiment of Carmarthenshire Local Militia—Captain Thomas Beynon to be Major. Dated April 17, 1813.

1st Royal East Gloucester Local Militia—Lieutenant Josias Vereker to be Captain, vice Elton, deceased. Dated November 26, 1812.—Thomas Smith Porter, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated December 21, 1812.

2d Royal East Regiment—Edmund Dawson, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated September 19, 1812.

Royal West Regiment—Lieut. Richard Smith to be Captain, vice Croft, resigned. Dated October 22, 1812.—Thomas Dawson, Gent. to be Lieutenant, vice Smith, promoted. Dated as above.

Royal North Regiment—Captain William Wilson Curry to be Major. Dated February 15, 1813.—Lieutenant Francis John Bargier to be Captain. Dated as above.—Lieutenant Sidenham Teast to be ditto. Dated February 15, 1813.—Lieutenant Edwin Shute to be ditto. Dated February 17, 1813.—Lieutenant Henry Smith to be ditto. Dated February 18, 1813.—Lionel Bigg, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated February 15, 1813.

Sevenoaks and Bromley Regiment of Local Militia—His Grace the Duke of Dorset to be Captain, vice Willmott, resigned. Dated April 27, 1813.—Ensign William Turner to be Lieutenant. Dated March 25, 1813.—Ensign Thomas Sale to be ditto. Dated March 26, 1813.—Ensign James Bradley to be ditto. Dated March 27, 1813.

- Berstead and Malling Regiment—Henry Leigh Spencer, Esq. to be Captain. Dated March 17, 1813.
- 2d East Kent Regiment—Samuel C. Farnston, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated March 30, 1813.—Stephen Wright, Gent. to be ditto. Dated March 31, 1813.
- 3d or Northern Regiment of Oxfordshire Local Militia—Richard Edmonds, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated April 13, 1813.
- 4th Regiment of North York Local Militia.—. . . Backhouse, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated March 25, 1813.—Richard Hird, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 17, 1813.
- 1st Regt. of Essex Local Militia—Ensign Hayward Henry Rush to be Lieutenant, vice Scraton, promoted. Dated April 5, 1813.—Ensign George Focock to be ditto, vice Bernard, resigned. Dated as above.—Edward Bayne, Gent. to be ditto, vice Gordon, resigned. Dated as above.—Walter Bridge, Gent. to be Ensign, vice White, resigned. Dated as above.—John Fisher, Gent. to be ditto, vice Cunningham, appointed Quarter-Master. Dated as above.
- 3d Regiment—Thomas Barstow, Esq. to be Captain, vice Hodges, deceased. Dated March 26, 1813.—John Bawtree, jun. Esq. to be ditto, vice Tabor, deceased. Dated as above.—Lieutenant Robert Tabor to be ditto, vice Dawson, resigned. Dated as above.—Lieutenant William Kendal Dawson to be ditto, vice Miller, resigned. Dated as above.—Ensign Robert Heckford to be Lieutenant, vice Tabor, promoted. Dated as above.—Ensign James Cook to be ditto, vice Dawson, promoted. Dated as above.—Charles Hill Buxton, Gent. to be ditto, vice Cooper, resigned. Dated as above.—Henry Argent, Gent. to be ditto, vice Cole, resigned. Dated as above.—James Blyth, Gent. to be ditto, vice Clarke, resigned. Dated as above.—Francis Lufkin, Gent. to be ditto, vice Golding, resigned. Dated as above.—Robert Swinborne, Gent. to be ditto, vice Barton, resigned. Dated as above.—Francis Salmon, Gent. to be ditto. Dated as above.
- 4th Regiment—Mundford Allen, Esq. to be Captain, vice Ruggles, resigned. Dated March 16, 1813.—Ensign Samuel How Tweed to be Lieutenant, vice Haffell, resigned. Dated as above.—John Giblin, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated February 24, 1813.—Samuel Legerton, Gent. to be ditto. Dated as above.
- 1st Regiment of Surrey Local Militia—Thomas Alexander Roberts, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Foster, promoted. Dated April 12, 1813.
- 2d Regiment—William Walter Gretton, Gent. to be Lieutenant, vice Butcher, resigned. Dated April 17, 1813.—James Firth, Gent. to be ditto, vice Mitchell, resigned. Dated April 18, 1813.—Joseph William Snuggs, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Street, resigned. Dated April 17, 1813.
- 3d Regiment—Ensign Robert Brine to be Lieutenant, vice Perkins, resigned. Dated April 17, 1813.—Ensign Joseph Ede to be ditto, vice Cooper, resigned. Dated April 18, 1813.—Henry Anderson, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Brine, promoted. Dated April 17, 1813.—Peter Davey, Gent. to be ditto, vice Ede, promoted. Dated April 18, 1813.
- 4th Regiment—George Thomas, Gent. to be Quarter-Master, vice McLeod, resigned. Dated April 15, 1813.
- Princess Charlotte's Regiment of Volunteers—George Potter, Gent. to be Second Lieutenant. Dated April 9, 1813.—Henry Kitchener, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 10, 1813.—Robert Charles Broadwater, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 11, 1813.—John Jackson, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 12, 1813.—Matthew Kirby, Gent. to be ditto. Dated April 14, 1813.

## ERRATUM in the Gazette of the 17th ultimo.

5th Regiment of Surrey Local Militia.—For *William Henry Dawson*, Esq. to be Captain, read *Thomas William Dawson*, Esq. to be Captain.

The LONDON GAZETTE.—Published by Authority.

From SATURDAY, May 1, to TUESDAY, May 4, 1813.

War-Office, May 4, 1813.

2d Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Hospital-Mate James Kane to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Rentall, appointed on the Staff. Commission dated April 29, 1813.

5th do.—Hospital-Mate Thomas C. Speer to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Harrison, promoted in the 38th Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.

- 6th do.—John Hayward, Gent. to be Veterinary Surgeon, vice Blinman, placed upon half-pay. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 2d Regiment of Dragoons—James Gape, Gent. to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Home, promoted. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 9th Regiment of Light Dragoons—Cornet William B. Armstrong to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Bernard, who retires. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 15th do.—Ensign Edward Byam, from the 88th Foot, to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Fitz-Clarence, appointed to the 16th Light Dragoons. Dated April 29, 1813.—Conrad Dalwig, Gent. to be Veterinary-Surgeon, vice Feron, placed upon half-pay. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 16th do.—Captain Thomas Penrice, from the 60th Foot, to be Captain of a Troop, vice Sewell, who exchanges. Dated April 29, 1813.
- Staff Corps of Cavalry—Troop Quarter-Master Henry Blakeley, from the 9th Light Dragoons, to be Cornet, vice Bickerton, whose appointment has not taken place. Dated April 28, 1813.—Sergeant-Major John Forsey, from the Cavalry Depot, to be ditto. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 1st Regiment of Foot Guards—Edward Pardoe, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Hutchinson, promoted. Dated April 29, 1813.
- Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards—Septimus Worrell, Gent. to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Nixon, who resigns. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 4th Regiment of Foot—Lieutenant Arthur Gerard, from the North York Militia, to be Ensign.
- 5th do.—Henry Freehorn, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Foote, promoted in the 49th Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 6th do.—Ensign S. W. Swiney to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Tilsley, promoted. Dated April 29, 1813.—Ensign George Bailey, from the Cambridge Militia, to be Ensign.
- 8th do.—Gentleman Cadet Edward Murray, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Frazer, appointed to the Royal Staff Corps. Dated April 28, 1813.—Augustus Keiley, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Blythe, promoted in the 49th Foot. Dated April 28, 1813.
- 9th do.—Lieut. Walter Snow, from the 47th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Finley, appointed to the 7th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 28, 1813.—Ensign Henry Sanders to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Reed, promoted in the 62d Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 11th do.—Charles Blois Willis, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Hobson, whose appointment has not taken place. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 14th do.—Lieutenant Thomas Savage to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Fawcett, promoted. Dated April 29, 1813.—Ensign William Jappie to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Savage. Dated April 29, 1813.—Ensign James Beare, from the Royal Bucks Militia, to be Ensign.
- 15th do.—Gentleman Cadet Jos. Thomson, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Cleather, appointed to the Royal Staff Corps. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 18th do.—William Roper, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Shepperd, who retires. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 23d do.—Ensign George Allan, from the Cambridge Militia, to be Second Lieut.
- 31st do.—Lieutenant Richard Gethin to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Colman, appointed to the 3d Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 33d do.—Lieutenant John Alderson, from the 1st West York Militia, to be Ensign.
- 34th do.—Lieutenant Thomas Eyre, from the 3d West York Militia, to be Ensign.
- 36th do.—Assistant-Surgeon W. Harrison, from the 5th Dragoon Guards, to be Surgeon, vice Reed, deceased. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 37th do.—Ensign George Chapman, from the North Hants Militia, to be Ensign.
- 42d do.—Ensign John Orr to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Dickinson, deceased. Dated April 29, 1813.—George Gerard, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Orr. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 44th do.—Surgeon Oliver Halpin, from the Royal Corsican Rangers, to be Surgeon, vice Job, appointed to the 5th Dragoon Guards. Dated April 29, 1813.
- 46th do.—Sergeant-Major J. Madigan, from the 6th Foot, to be Adjutant, (with the rank of Ensign,) vice Hamilton, promoted in the 4th West India Regiment.
- 47th do.—Major-General the Honourable Alexander Hope, from the 74th Foot, to be Colonel, vice General Fitz-Patrick, deceased. Dated April 28, 1813.
- To be Lieutenants, without purchase.*
- 49th do.—Ensign E. Danford. Dated April 29, 1813.—Ensign E. Morris. Dated

April 21, 1813.—Ensign F. Dury. Dated April 22, 1813.—Ensign J. Sewell. Dated April 23, 1813.—Ensign S. Richmond. Dated April 24, 1813.—Ensign W. Winder. Dated April 25, 1813.—Lieutenant J. W. Birmingham, from the 4th Foot. Dated April 26, 1813.—Ensign R. Alexander, from the 1st Garrison Battalion. Dated April 27, 1813.—Ensign S. Blyth, from the 8th Foot. Dated April 28, 1813.—Ensign J. H. R. Foote, from the 5th Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

Ensign E Glasgow, from the 51st Foot, vice Danford. Dated April 20, 1813.—Donat O'Brien, Gent. vice Morris. Dated April 21, 1813.—Gentleman Cadet . . . . Black, from the Royal Military College, vice Dury. Dated April 22, 1813.—John Stevens, Gent. vice Sewell. Dated April 23, 1813.—John Hazen, Gent. vice Richmond. Dated April 24, 1813.—Richard Gregory, Gent. vice Winder. Dated April 25, 1813.  
51st do.—Gentleman Cadet Thomas Troward, from the Royal Military College, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Glasgow, appointed to the 49th Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.

*To be Lieutenants by purchase.*

52d do.—Ensign W. Hanter, vice Brooke, promoted in the 58th Foot. Dated April 28, 1813.—Ensign W. C. Yonge, vice Kinloch, promoted in the 99th Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.

*To be Ensigns without purchase.*

53d do.—Second Lient. James Colt, from the Royal Glamorgan Militia.—Ensign G. Hamilton, from the Forfar Militia.

57th do.—Lieutenant W. Mann to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Scovell, promoted in the Staff Corps of Cavalry. Dated April 29, 1813.—Ensign P. Aubin to be Lieutenant, vice Mann. Dated April 29, 1813.

60th do.—Captain W. H. Sewell, from the 16th Light Dragoons, to be Captain of a Company, vice Penrice, who exchanges. Dated April 29, 1813.

62d do.—Ensign W. Dundee to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Walter, promoted. Dated April 29, 1813.—Lieutenant Henry Law, from the Wiltshire Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

73d do.—Lieutenant George Hughes, from the 2d Royal Surrey Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

74th do.—Major-General James Montgomery, from the 64th Foot, to be Colonel, vice Major-General Hope, removed to the 47th Foot. Dated April 26, 1813.

79th do.—Lieutenant J. Barwick, from the 72d Foot, to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Metcalfe, appointed to the 6th Royal Veteran Battalion. Dated April 29, 1813.

85th do.—Lieutenant J. W. Boyes, from the 4th Garrison Battalion, to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Grinsell, appointed to the 50th Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.—Lieutenant T. Hunt, from the Royal South Gloucester Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

91st do.—John McKenna, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Pierce, who retires. Dated April 29, 1813.

95th do.—Ensign W. Cooper, from the East Kent Militia, to be Second Lieutenant, without purchase.

103d do.—Lieutenant G. H. Hazen, from the 70th Foot, to be Lieutenant, without purchase. Dated October 6, 1812.

*To be Ensigns, without purchase.*

Royal Staff Corps—Ensign D. Frazer, from the 8th Foot, vice Horton, promoted. Dated April 28, 1813.—Ensign Edward Cleather, from the 15th Foot, vice Pardy, promoted. Dated April 29, 1813.

Royal Waggon Train—John Bickerton, Gent. to be Cornet, without purchase. Dated April 29, 1813.

1st Garrison Battalion—Ensign John Balderson, from the 3d Garrison Battalion, to be Ensign, vice Alexander, promoted in the 19th Foot. Dated April 29, 1813.

3d do.—Captain T. Richardson, from half-pay of the 8th West India Regiment, to be Captain of a Company, vice Foster, who exchanges. Dated April 29, 1813.

—Ensign Edward Mockler, from half-pay of the 8th Garrison Battalion, to be Ensign, vice Balderson, appointed to the 1st Garrison Battalion. Dated April 29, 1813.

5th Royal Veteran Battalion—Captain H. Odum, from the Royal African Corps, to be Captain of a Company, vice Stewart, placed on the Retired List. Dated April 23, 1813.

## HOSPITAL STAFF.

*To be Surgeons to the Forces.*

Dr. A'Halliday, from half-pay. Dated April 29, 1813.—Surgeon W. C. Bach, from the Duke of Brunswick Gels' Corps of Light Infantry. Dated April 29, 1813.

*To be Assistant-Surgeons to the Forces.*

Hospital-Mate John Pickering. Dated April 29, 1813.—Assistant-Surgeon B. Nicholson, from the North Cork Militia. Dated April 29, 1813.

*To be Hospital-Mates for General Service.*

Patrick M'Kenzie, Gent. Dated April 29, 1813.—John Ligertwood, Gent. Dated April 29, 1813.—John Mounteath, Gent. Dated April 29, 1813.—James Lawrence, Gent. Dated April 29, 1813.—Andrew Mackay, Gent. Dated April 29, 1813.—Manus M'Nulty, Gent. Dated April 29, 1813.—John Smith, Gent. Dated April 29, 1813.

*The King's German Legion.*

2d Regiment of Dragoons—Major Charles Baron Mayell, from the 1st Dragoons, to be Lieutenant-Colonel. Dated April 26, 1813.

2d Battalion of Light Infantry—Alexander Maclean, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Grame, promoted. Dated April 25, 1813.

1st Battalion of the Line—William Best, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Wickmann, promoted. Dated April 24, 1813.

*The Duke of Brunswick Gels' Corps.*

Cavalry—Captain ..... Deete, from the Retired List, to be Captain of a Troop, with temporary rank, vice Schopp, who resigns. Dated April 29, 1813.

*De Roll's Regiment.*

John Thomas Joseph O'Gorman, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice De Büren, whose appointment has not taken place. Dated April 29, 1813.

## MEMORANDUM.

The date of Lieutenant Robert Dighton's Commission in the 38th Foot is the 7th of September, 1812, and not the 22d of April, 1813, as stated in the Gazette of the 27th ultimo.

Lieutenant Hazen, of the 70th Foot, who was superseded, as stated in the Gazette of the 18th of October, 1812, is reinstated in his rank.

*The undermentioned Officers are superseded, being absent without leave.*

Lieutenant ..... Maclean, of the 12th Foot.—Lieutenant ..... Beale, of the 16th Foot.

ERRATA in the Gazettes of the 18th of October, 1812, and 20th of April, 1813.

70th Foot—For Ensign G. J. P. Meertens to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Hazen, superseded—Read Ensign G. J. P. Meertens to be Lieut. without purchase, vice Hazen, appointed to the 108d Foot.

For Lieutenant Fraser, of the 4th West India Regiment, to be superseded, being absent without leave—Read Lieutenant Fraser, of the 1st West India Regiment, to be superseded, &c.

## The LONDON GAZETTE.—Published by Authority.

From TUESDAY, May 4, to SATURDAY, May 6, 1813.

Office of Ordnance, May 4, 1813.

*Medical Establishment for the Military Department of the Ordnance.*  
Temporary Assistant-Surgeon Joseph Priest to be Second Assistant-Surgeon, vice Browne, deceased. Dated April 26, 1813.

Henry Savage, Gent. to be Adjutant to the Eastern Regiment of Dorsetshire Local Militia, vice Oakley, resigned. Dated May 1, 1813.

Belper Regiment—Captain William Hunter Hunter to be Major, vice Hall, promoted. Dated April 17, 1813.—Captain James Fletcher to be do. vice Crompton, promoted. Dated as above.—Lieutenant John Fletcher to be Captain, vice Statham, resigned. Dated as above.—Ensign Edward Turton to be Lieutenant, vice Fletcher, promoted. Dated as above.—Ensign Thomas Moore to be do. vice Ward, resigned. Dated as above.—Ensign William Wilkes to be do. vice Frost, resigned. Dated as above.—Ensign William Harrison to be do. vice Har-

rison, resigned. Dated as above.—Ensign John Wright to be do, vice Harvey, resigned. Dated as above.—George Newman, Gent. to be do, vice Walker, resigned. Dated as above.—John Outram, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Turton, promoted. Dated as above.—Thomas Wrangg, Gent. to be do, vice Moore, promoted. Dated as above.—Edward Wheatley, Gent. to be do, vice Wilkes, promoted. Dated as above.—John Whysall, Gent. to be do, vice Harrison, promoted. Dated as above.—Peter Brown, Gent. to be do, vice Wright, promoted. Dated as above.—T. Wilders, Gent. to be do, vice Williams, resigned. Dated as above. Derby Regiment—Lieutenant John Wallis to be Captain, vice Hubbard, deceased. Dated as above.—Lieutenant Francis Severne to be do, vice Brown, resigned. Dated as above.—Lieutenant James Oakes, jun. to be do, vice Gilbert, resigned. Dated as above.—Lieutenant George Fritche to be do, vice Swift, resigned. Dated as above.—Ensign George Wallis to be Lieutenant, vice Emery, resigned. Dated April 24, 1813.—Henry Cox, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated April 17, 1813.—John Whitehurst, jun. Gent. to be do. Dated as above. Wirksworth Regiment—E. Bownes, Gent. to be Lieut. Dated April 19, 1813.—R. Gregory, Gent. to be do. Dated as above.—T. Pearson, Gent. to be do. Dated as above. North York Militia—Richard Bell, Esq. to be Captain, vice Constable, resigned. Dated April 27, 1813. 1st Regiment of North York Local Militia—Robert Sweetnam, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Richardson. Dated April 22, 1813.—Ralph Lodge, Gent. to be do, vice Spencely. Dated as above. Dogmersfield Troop of Yeomanry Cavalry—Pawlett Mildmay, Esq. to be Lieut. Loveden Regiment of Local Militia—Samuel Barrowcliffe, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated November 26, 1812. Lindsey, Kesteven, and Lincoln Regiment—Thomas Mason, Esq. to be Captain. Dated April 22, 1813.—Francis Parr, Esq. to be do. Dated as above.—John Greetham, Esq. to be do. Dated as above.—William Hall, Esq. to be do. Dated as above.—John Landsdale Milnes, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated as above.—John Connington, Gent. to be do. Dated as above.—William Blyth, Gent. to be do. Dated as above.—William Jerroms, Gent. to be do. Dated as above.—Cornelius Barber, Gent. to be do. Dated as above.—Brotherton Straw, Gent. to be do. Dated as above.—John Harmston, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated as above.

#### DEATHS.

At Rhode Island, North America, on the 28th of January, Robert Nicholas Achmuty, Esq. the only surviving brother of Major-General Sir Samuel Achmuty. At Coimbra, April 12, Mr. G. William Mills, of the Commissariat Department. At Dominica, January 28, Capt. Alex. Cameron, 6th West India Regiment. At Bath, May 21, the Rt. Hon. John Lord Elphinstone, Colonel of the 26th Regt. At Ellere, in the E. Indies, in Sept. 1812, Capt. Thomas Jenkins, 16th Nat. Infantry. At Nairn, suddenly, Captain Carmichael, late of the Inverness Militia. At Batavia, on Tuesday, the 29th of July, 1812, Captain Thomas Clode, Aide-du-Camp and Secretary to the Hon. the Lieutenant-Governor. The following is an extract from a letter received from the Government-House at Batavia:—"This gentleman was the engineer, and was building the new fort at Banca, since called Fort Nugent; the hardships and privations in this service were so great, that few escaped the ravages of the climate: he proceeded to sea in hopes of recovering his health, but died immediately after his landing at Java. He possessed a fine temper, and was highly accomplished. His name is never mentioned in the Governor's family without the deepest regret. As a mark of friendship and respect, his brother officers have raised a handsome monument over his remains."

On the 12th of May, 1812, Lieut. John Addison, of the Hon. East India Company's 8th Regiment of Native Infantry, aged 22.

At Java, on the 22d of June, 1812, Lieut. Hector Maclean, 14th Regiment.

In Spain, on the 16th of May, Duncan Mackintosh, Esq. Surgeon to the Forces.

At Newport, Isle of Wight, on the 25th of May, in her 27th year, Elizabeth, wife of Capt. C. Reynolds, 2d Ceylon Regiment. She had borne a long and painful illness, aggravated by other calamities, with patient resignation, and has left a disconsolate husband to mourn, in her loss, that of a monitor, wife, and friend.

Lieut.-Generals—Fraser, 6th West India Regiment.—Whetham, 60th Foot, Lieut.-Governor of Portsmouth, May 18, 1813.

Lieut.-Colonel—Ruddell, Lieut.-Governor of Sheerness.

Majors—Stannus, 14th Foot, 1812.—Bacon, 69th Foot, March 15, 1812.—Horton, 34th Foot, April 17.

Captains—Robertson, 8th Foot, May 15, 1813.—Adamson, 14th Foot, May 15,

1813.—J. Campbell, 59th Foot, July 3.—Ralph, 59th Foot, June 16.—Bowen, 59th Foot, August 2, 1813.—Leith, 59th Foot, August 12.—French, 59th Foot.—Perks, 2d Ceylon Regiment.

*Lieutenants*.—Handley, 9th Dragoons, drowned at sea.—Newton, 22d Dragoons, July 1, 1812.—J. Munroe, 1st Foot, June 4.—Annesley, 3d Foot.—Thompson, 10th Foot, killed near Alicant.—Ferris, 24th Foot, Oct. 24.—Dickinson, 22d Foot, March 22, 1813.—Whally, 43d Foot.—Cruice, 52d Foot, Oct. 22, 1812.—McDougall, 75th Foot, killed near Alicant.—Baird, 25th Foot.—Robertson, 93d Foot.—L. Davis, 2d West India Regiment, Feb. 12, 1812.—Edwards, 8th West India Regiment, Feb. 24, 1813.—Coghlan, 7th West India Regiment, March 16, 1812.—J. Chartres, Royal African Corps, Jan. 26, 1813.—Dewar, Canadian Fencibles.—Colburne, 2d Light Infantry, King's German Legion, May 1, 1813.—Wyk, 2d Line, King's German Legion, April 18, 1813.—Hazlebach, 3d Line, King's German Legion, killed near Alicant.—Dodd, Dublin County Militia.

*Ensigns*.—Nugent, 80th Foot, June 3, 1812.—Butler, 99th Foot, April 10, 1813.—Baumeister, 8th Royal Vet. Battalion, killed at Bremerlie, March 25, 1813.

*Paymasters*.—Campbell, 72d Foot, Dec. 12, 1812.—Fillingham, Royal West India Rangers, Jan. 26, 1813.

*Surgeon*.—Maxwell, Londonderry Militia, March 26, 1813.

*Assistant-Surgeons*.—Oakley, 2d Foot, Dec. 26, 1812.—Browne, Royal Artillery, Feb. 17, 1813.

*Apothecary*.—Clough, Staff, Feb. 9, 1813.

*Veterinary Surgeon*.—Thomas, 22d Dragoons, August 1812.

At Edinburgh, on the 20th of May, Mary Frances, daughter of Major Hastings. At Southampton, East Indies, James Hunter, Esq. Lieut.-Colonel on the Bengal Establishment.

At Penyminale, on the 24th of July, 1812, aged 18, Ensign Booth, 34th Regt.

Friday, the Hon. John de Courcy, eldest son of the Right Hon. Lord Kinsale, Lieut.-Col. of the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards. His death was occasioned by excessive fatigue with the army in Spain, from whence he returned only a few days previous to his decease.

At Llangoilien, on the 24th of May, Captain Braitle, East Kent Militia.

At Fetterdale-House, on May 20, Ensign E. Leslie, of the German Legion.

At Inverness, on the 23d of May, Colonel Halket, Inspecting Field Officer, formerly of the 55th Regiment.

At Stranraer, on the 27th of May, Lieut. John Kirk, of the 26th Regiment.

At Sandymount, near Dublin, on the 5th of June, Emily, 7th daughter of Major Hart, Inspecting Field Officer of the Dublin district.

On the 10th of June, Mrs. Godwin, widow of Major Godwin, late of the India Company's Bombay Establishment.

At Cootum, on the 15th of Sept. 1812, Lieut.-Colonel Robert Price, of the 15th Regiment of Native Infantry, who, for steady adherence to his duty during the disturbance at Madras, had been appointed to the command of the Palamcotta District by the Government of Onadyas.

At Edinburgh, June 7, Philip Dundas, eldest son of General Francis Dundas.

#### MARRIAGES.

On April 13, W. F. Linsingen, Esq. son of Lieut.-Gen. Baron Linsingen, and a Captain in the 1st Light Dragoons, King's German Legion, to Miss Stundt.

At Inverness, on the 18th of May, Captain Gordon, of the 2d Regiment of Foot, to the widow of the late Lieut.-Colonel Ross, 57th Regiment.

At Woodbridge, on the 18th of May, Captain Gages of the South Lincoln Militia, to Miss Morley.

At Swansea, on the 29th of May, John Olive, Esq. M. D. Surgeon of the East Middlesex Militia, to Miss Hodson.

At Beckley, in Sussex, on the 18th of May, the Hon. and Rev. James Douglas, to Miss Murray, daughter of the late General Murray.

At Vallay, on the 8th of May, the Rev. N. Maclean, to Isabella, youngest daughter of Major A. Macdonald, of Vallay.

At Bellary, on the 17th of August, 1812, Major R. McDowell, 24th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, to Miss Sheffield.

On the 10th of June, Major Wells, 43d Regiment, to Miss King.

#### BIRTHS.

At Ipswich, on the 15th of April, the lady of Major Kater, of a son.

At North End, on the 31st of May, the lady of Lieut. T. Pritchard, of a son.

In Gloucester-Place, on June 6, the lady of Col. Hughes, M. P. of a daughter.

At Chelsea, June 6, the lady of Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, of a daughter.