


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Love thyself last. The world shall be made better.
By thee, if this brief motto forms thy creed ;
Go, follow it in spirit and in letter.
This is the true religion which men need.

—“ Ella Wheeler Wilcox. ”

The Psychical Faculties in the Jaina System.

BY

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Howrah.

THE account of the operations of the Mind, given by Kundakundacharyya, Uma-svami and Nemichandra is some what different (although essentially similar to) that, given by Badi-deva and others. We propose to describe the problems of the Jaina psychology from the standpoint of the former school of thinkers, in this short essay.

Kundakundacharyya points out the peculiar marks of a psychical being.

“ The Soul, as it is, exists ; is conscious ; has the power of understanding ; is potent ; is active ; enjoys the fruits of actions ; is limited by the body ; is not corporeal ; is mixed with Karma (Matter) ” *Panchastikaya* 27.

Nemichandra also says.—

“ The Soul has the power of understanding ; is formless ; is the agent ; is of the same size as its body ; is the enjoyer of the

fruits of the actions; moves in incarnations; is (substantially) perfect; has the tendency to move upwards." *Dravyasamgraha* 2.

It would be seen that so far as psychology is concerned, the most important characteristics of a psychical being are consciousness and the power of understanding. Kundakundacharyya means this, when he says.—

"The soul and the other existents are the reals. The qualities of the soul are consciousness and the power of understanding" *Panchastikaya* 16.

It is interesting to study the Jaina conception of Chetana or consciousness. The term stands for (1) the passive experience of agreeable or disagreeable phenomena (2) the consciousness of purposive activity (3) the more complicated psychical state, associated with, rather leading to pure knowledge.

"As conscious, the souls experience in the three following ways. Some experience merely the fruits of karma; some, their own activity; some again, knowledge. *Ibid* 38.

These three modes or aspects of consciousness may be looked upon as the successive stages in the process of evolution of the fully developed conscious nature. The first form of consciousness consists simply in the passive feeling of the agreeable or the disagreeable; It is scarcely to be distinguished from the vitality of the lower forms of life. It is consciousness, no doubt, but of the lowest form. The second mode of consciousness is better developed and more complicated. For whereas the first form is simply the passive consciousness of being acted on from the outside, the the second consists in the awareness of the animal's own purposive activities. Such a consciousness is possible only in animals. The last mode of consciousness is associated with knowledge and is possessed only by man and superior being. This view of consciousness unmistakably suggests the remarkable theories of the modern psychology of the evolutionary school.—(1) that human consciousness is developed from forms of sub-human consciousness presumed to be present in sub-human animals, (2) that life and consciousness are probably co-extensive.

Kundakundacharya says.—

“All immobile organisms (e. g. plants) have feeling (of being acted on) only; the animals have feelings of their own purposive activity; the beings who are above the merely organic or animal nature, possess knowledge.”

This theory of consciousness conclusively proves that the early Jaina thinkers clearly grasped the basic principles of the evolutionary psychology of modern times. It shows also that there was in ancient India a considerable amount of clear and sober thinking about the nature of animals, plants and beings, low in the scale of life and mentality. By attributing to them a consciousness of their own purposive activity, the Jaina theory certainly rejects the notorious Cartesian doctrine that the sub-human creatures are unconscious automata. It does more than that in as much as it foreshadows the celebrated theory of Sir J. C. Bose which is rapidly gaining ground, that the operations of life-consciousness are traceable even in plants.

Chetana or Consciousness culminates in pure and perfect knowledge. It seems that the Jaina psychologists were able to discover that knowledge itself has grades and modes. This will appear from their description and classification of Upayoga, the other distinguishing characteristic of a soul. Kundakundacharya observes.—

“Understanding is of two modes,—Cognition and Sensation.” According to Nemichandra also, Upayoga or understanding is divided into two species i.e., Darsana or Sensation and Jnana or Cognition. Of these, Cognition is of 8 kinds and Sensation of 4. Uma-svami says.—

“Understanding is the distinguishing characteristic of the soul. It is of two sorts (viz., Jnana or Cognition and Darsana or Sensation). The first is of 8 kinds and the second, of 4.” *Tatvartha Sutra Ch. II. 8 and 9.*

Darsana or Sensation is the first determination of the psychic mass. The knowledge given by sensation is wanting in details and definiteness; yet it is a distinct advance from the merely vital or organic state towards the psychical. The four modes of Sensation are thus described.

“ Sensation is of 4 kinds.—Visual, Non-visual, Clairvoyant and Pure,—in the purview of the last of which, come all the phenomena in their variety and infinity.” *Panchastikaya* 45.

Nemichandra also says,—

“ Understanding is of two modes viz., Sensation and Cognition. Sensation is of four kinds.—Visual, Non-visual, Clairvoyant and Pure.” *Dravya Samgraha* 4.

Darsana does not give anything definite.

“ Darsana is said to consist in the sensation of the (vaguest) generality of objects in which the form and specifications are not recognised.”

Thus Visual Sensation may be said just to consist in the consciousness that the eyes are affected; Non-visual sensations are similarly affections of the Ears, the Tongue, the Skin and the Olfactory Organ. The last two modes of sensation are of the supernormal types. The Clairvoyant Sensation is sensation of the mysterious parts or aspects of material things. The pure Sensation consists in sensing all the things of the universe.

The process of understanding is more complicated when it is Jnana or the process of Cognition. Cognition is of 8 sorts.

“ Cognition is of 5 species.—Abhinibodhika, Sruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala. Kumati, Kusruta and Vibhanga also are connected with Cognition.” *Panchastikaya* 41.

Abhinibodhika, otherwise called Mati-jnana is sensuous knowledge. Sruta is knowledge based on testimony. Avadhi-jnana consists in a sort of clairvoyant perception. Manahparyaya is telepathic knowledge. Kevala-jnana is identical with omniscience. Kumati, Kusruta and Vibhanga are fallacious forms of Mati, Sruta and Avadhi jnana respectively.

It would be seen that the modes of Cognition which are of logical importance are the first five.—Mati, Sruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala. Uma-svami classifies these five forms of knowledge under two heads,—Pratyaksha Pramana and Paroksha Pramana.

“ Modes of Cognition are Sensuous, Authoritative, Clairvoyant, Telepathic and pure. They are the two sources of valid know-

ledge. The first two are the indirect sources. The remaining are the direct sources." *Tattvartha Sutra. Ch I. 9, 10, 11, and 12.*

Nemichandra also observes.—

"Cognition is of 8 modes viz., Knowledge and Ignorance of the Sensuous, the Authoritative, the Clairvoyant, and the Telepathic and the pure. From a different standpoint, Cognition is either Pratyaksha or direct or Paroksha or indirect." *Dravya-samgraha. 5.*

It is to be observed, however, that the Pratyaksha and Paroksha of Uma-svami and Nemichandra do not signify the same thing as those of Badi-deva. The Pratyaksha of the latter gives clearer and more distinct matter than the Paroksha. Hence Badi-deva includes not only Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Omniscience but also Sensuous knowledge in Pratyaksha. Uma-svami, on the other hand, defines the Pratyaksha as knowledge which is directly evolved from within the Soul itself and which is independent of any external help. Hence Clairvoyance, Telepathy and Omniscience (whose natures will be shortly described) are Pratyaksha Pramana according to him. On the other hand, Sruta-jnana being dependent on testimony and Mati-Jnana on the Sense-organs and the Mind cannot be called Pratyaksha. These are Paroksha or indirect sources of knowledge. Ultimately, however, the difference between the school of Uma-svami and the latter school amounts only to this,—that whereas Umasvami relegates all the modes of Mati-jnana to the status of the Paroksha-Pramana, the latter school chooses to include the Perceptual mode of Mati-jnana into the Pratyaksha, regarding the rest viz., Memory Inference etc., as forms of the Paroksha-Pramana.

Mati-jnana is sensuous knowledge or rather knowledge which is either perception or one dependent on perception. It is based on previous Darsana or sensation i.e.,

As Kundakundacharyya says.—Mati-jnana with its various modes is developed stage by stage from pure sensation. This will appear from a consideration of the modes of Mati-jnana, which are thus described.—

“Mati-jnana or Sensuous knowledge is of three kinds viz., Upalabdhi or Perception, Bhavana or Memory and Upayoga or Advanced understanding.” *Panchastikaya* 42.

It would be seen that the three modes of the Sensuous knowledge are expanded into five by Uma-svami.—

“Mati or Perception, Smriti or Memory, Samja or Conception. Chinta or Induction and Abhinibodha or Deduction are essentially one.” *Tattvartha Sutra Ch. I. 13.*

Thus, knowledge is dependent on sensation and is gradually developed and evolved through the process of Perception, Recollection, Generalisation, Induction and Ratiocination. These psychological processes may be arranged in an order of ascending or descending series. It would be noticed that this gradation of the psychological faculties by the Jaina school is not different from what is found in the works of the modern psychologists of the West.

The process which is operative immediately after the Darsana or Sensation and which is first in the scale of the developing knowledge is Upalabdhi or Mati-jnana proper. This is identical with the process of Perception. The Jaina Psychologists divided Mati-jnana proper into two kinds viz., Indriya-nimitta i.e., that which is dependent on the sense-organs and Anindriyanimitta i.e., that which is dependent on the mind. As Uma-svami says.—

“That (Perception) is dependent either on the senseorgans or on the mind.” *Ibid*, 14.

It seems that what Locke meant by Ideas of Sensation and Ideas of Reflexion and what modern psychologists express by Psychoses obtained by Extraspection and Psychoses obtained by Introspection are essentially the Indriya-nimitta Mati-jnana and the Anindriya-nimitta Mati-jnana respectively of the Jaina school.

The Anindriya-nimitta Mati-Jnana consists in a knowledge of the operations of one's own mind. Such knowledge it is clear, is dependent on nothing but the introspective mind. The Indriya nimitta Mati-jnana, on the other hand, is dependent on the sense organs. No doubt, the mind also is operative in the generation of the Indriya-nimitta Matijnana. But as in addition to the operation of the mind, that of the sense-organs is necessary in the

genesis of such a perception, it is called the Indriyanimitta Mati-jnana in contradistinction from the Anindriya-nimitta Mati-jnana which is dependent on the operation of the mind alone. The Indriya-nimitta Mati-jnana is of five modes in as much as perception is either Visual, or olfactory, or Tactile or Auditory or that through the Tongue.

The Jaina psychologists are far from maintaining that a fully developed Perception is a simple psychosis, suddenly taking the place of Sensation. As a matter of fact, they point out that no less than four processes are involved in the genesis of a perception properly so called. Their analysis of perception will be found not to differ materially from that given by the modern psychologists of Europe. Perception is developed from Sensation. It is a complex process involving Attention, Retention etc., The Jaina writers express this by saying that Perception is of four modes. Their own descriptions, however, show that we are justified in looking upon these four processes as stages in the progressive development of perception, rather than its four modes or types. The four processes are.—

“ Avagraha or Grasp, Iha or Attention, Avyaya or Determination and Dharana or Retention ” (are the four modes or stages of Perception. ” *Ibid*, 15,

The description of these four processes of Perception may not detain us long. (I) Avagraha is Darsana, only a little bit advanced. If in Darsana we have the sensation that our senses are affected, in Avagraha, we have the consciousness that something outside is affecting the senseorgans. What that something is Avagraha does not tell us. It consists simply in grasping a vague indeterminate something disturbing the consciousness mass. It gives only a feeling of what the modern psychologists call. ‘ Extensity ’ (as distinguished from ‘ Extension ’), or as James calls it, a feeling of ‘ Roominess. ’ Hence the Jaina thinkers (i.e. Uma-svami) choose to say that ‘ Vyanjana, ’ i.e. Something vague and indeterminate though manifest and not ‘ Artha ’ or determined object is the matter of Avagraha. In this connection, they point out that Visual Perception and Introspective Perception (Chakshu-Indriya-Nimitta and Anindriya-Nimitta) can have no Avagraha-stage.

"(Avagraha) is not possible in the case of the Eye or of the Mind." *Ibid* 19.

Why ? Apparently, the reason is that according to the Jaina thinker, the eye and the mind cannot turn to an object without distinguishing some of its parts and consequently determining it in some way, (2) Iha works upon the material, furnished by Avagraha and consists in an inclination to know the Something of Avagraha more fully. Iha thus is Attention directed to it. (3) Avyaya is the third stage in the development of the percept and consists in a detailed idea of the object on which Iha was fixed (4) Dharana is the process of perceptual Retention, giving the percept some persistence in one mind. When this stage is reached the process of perception may be said to have reached its culminating point. This finishes Upalabdhi (or Mati-jnana proper) which consists in perception.

We shall not attempt an elaborate description of Smriti, Samjna, Chinta and Abhinibodha here, for this can be met with in any logical treatise of the later Jaina school. Smriti is recollection or reproduction ; Samjna, otherwise called Pratyabhijna consists in comparison and conception ; Chinta or Tarka is induction ; Abhinibodha, more commonly called Anumana, consists in deductive reasoning.

The above are the five modes of Matijna, or Sensuous knowledge i.e., knowledge consisting either in sensuous perception or one dependent on or developed from it. The other great Paroksha Pramana or indirect source of valid knowledge, according to the Jaina thinkers, is Sruta-jnana or Authoritative knowledge. Sruta-Jnana may be said to embody the highest and the most advanced knowledge, arrived at by the most perfect form of Mati-jnana. It is based on Mati-jnana and consists in truths discovered, developed and revealed by the most perfect of the rational souls. Sruta-jnana is authoritative knowledge, the validity of which is unchallengeable. It is a system of Scriptural truths, the holiness of which is unimpeachable. Nevertheless, it is connected with and as a matter of fact, dependent on sensuous knowledge. As Umasvami says.—

"Authoritative knowledge is preceeded by Sensuous knowledge ; it is of two kinds.—the first of which is of twelve and the second, of many modes." *Ibid* 20.

The two kinds of the Jaina Scriptural truths are (1) Anga-prābishta i.e., those that are embodied in the 'Angas' or the Jaina sacred books and (2) 'Anga-vāhya' i.e., those that are outside such scriptures. The first class is composed of 12 modes e.g., the Sutra- Kṛitanga etc., etc., while the second includes many subdivisions e.g., the 'Samayika' 'Prakirṇaka' etc., etc., We shall not enter into the dogmatology of the Jaina faith here.

The Sruta-jñāna is thus finished, cut and dried, ready-made unimpeachable system of truths, which we are profitted by making use of. Kundakundacharya divides it into four classes.

"They say that the Sruta-jñāna or authoritative knowledge is of four kinds.—viz., Labdhi or Integration, Bhavana or Consideration, Upayoga or Mediation and Naya or Interpretation." *Panchastikaya* 43.

From the description of these four modes of authoritative knowledge it would appear that it is far more reasonable to look upon these processes as four steps to the progressive explanation of a phenomenon than as so many independent and mutually exclusive kinds of scriptural knowledge. In other words, the so-called modes of the Sruta-jñāna are practically the four ways in which the accumulated mass of knowledge in a man may be applied or utilised to the interpretation of phenomena that are pressing upon his mind every moment.

The Sruta-jñāna embodies a system of absolute truths and thus furnishes principles of explanation of phenomena. Labdhi is the mode of Sruta-jñāna, through which a phenomenon is explained being referred to an idea with which it is associated. This is of course, the most primitive and ordinary way of explaining a thing. What is the nature of A?, well, since A is known to be associated with B whose nature is already well known, the nature of A is determined in terms of B. This is Sruta-jñāna of the Labdhi-type. It may be observed, however, that the phenomena of the world are of too complex a nature to admit of such a simple explanation. Hence although the nature of B may be already known and the fact of its association with A, a great deal of concentrated attention on the nature of B may be necessary in order that the true place, significance and function of A may be determined. Bhavana consists in this more advanced way of explaining a phenomenon and implies a diligent direction

of attention to the nature and the various aspects of an idea (i.e. B), which is already known, in order that the true nature of the phenomenon (i.e. A), which is associated with it may be rightly understood. Upayoga is the third stage, consisting in the understanding of A in the light of B, through the process of Bhavana, just described. Thus, these three processes.—Labdhi, Bhavana and Upayoga may be arranged in serial order. Labdhi is the rough and ready way of interpretation ; It consists in referring an idea to its associated one in an off-hand manner. Bhavana is more circumspect and attempts to explain every link in the concatenation of phenomena. Upayoga consists in such fully developed interpretation. It thus seems that what Avagraha, Iha and Avyaya are to Mati-Jnana,—are Labdhi, Bhavana and Upayoga respectively to Sruta-Jnana.

Like Dharana which is the fourth stage in the development of Mati-jnana of the sensuous type, we have Naya, which, as Kundakundacharyya points out, is the fourth mode of Sruta-jnana. The parallelism may be carried a step further. Dharana, consisting as it does, in the mental retention of a percept, is practically the extreme limit of the sensuous Mati-jnana, if not altogether outside it. In the same manner, Naya which consists in explanation of a phenomenon by emphasising its particular aspect, is the farthest limit of the Sruta-jnana. No doubt, Naya refers to the accumulated mass of knowledge, in explaining a phenomenon ; but it refers not to the whole of it but to a particular aspect of it. It may be said that Naya explains a thing more by looking to its various modes and particular aspects directly, than by referring it to a mass of authoritative knowledge with regard to it. Hence, we say that Naya is the extreme limit of the Sruta-jnana. Indeed Uma-svami, instead of looking upon it as a mode of Sruta-jnana, chooses to consider it as a special form of knowing things. He thus differentiates it not only from Sruta-jnana but the entire category of the Pramana,—as will be apparent from his aphorism.

“ Valid knowledge is acquired through the Pramanas and the Nayas.” *Tattvarthasutra. Ch. I. 6.*

The Naya is primarily divided into two modes viz., the Dravyarthika i.e., that having Substance for its object and the Paryayarthika i.e., that having mode for its object. The former

again is subdivided into three classes and the latter, into four,—so that ultimately we have seven kinds of the Naya. These are.

“The Naigama or the Transferred, the Samgraha or the General, the Vyavahara or the Specific, the Rijusutra or the Straight, the Sabda or the Verbal, Samabhirudha or the Actual and the Evambhuta or the Such like are the Nayas or ways of expression or explanation.” *Ibid.* 33.

The Naya is the way of explaining a thing from particular stand-points. A thing or a phenomenon has admittedly various modes or aspects. To approach the consideration of it from any of these modes or aspects is the business of the Naya. The seven classes of the Naya indicate seven different stand-points from which a thing can be considered. It is better,—as our description would show,—to look upon these seven modes of the Naya as seven progressive ways of having a more and more limited conception of a thing or phenomenon under consideration.

(1) The Naigama. According to Badi-deva, Siddha-sena Divakara and other logicians of the Jaina school, it consists in viewing a thing composed of various parts and aspects as an undifferentiated abstract unity. Pujya-pada and some other logicians describe the Naigama in a different way. According to them, it consists in describing a thing or phenomenon not as it really or essentially is, but as it appears when something external is foisted on it. Thus when a man carrying wood, water and other raw materials is asked what he is doing and he answers ‘I am cooking meals,’—his reply may be said to be based on the Naigama Naya. He explains the wood, water, fire and other materials which he carries, not by giving an account of their true and essential natures but by referring them to the purpose for which they are carried. The Naigama Naya thus consists in a figurative description of its object. It is said to be of three modes, viz., the Vartamana, the Bhuta and the Bhavya,—the Present, the Past and the Future. The example just given is one of the first mode. Because a series of present things are explained by a present purpose. The Bhuta Naigama is illustrated in the following way. If on the Deepavali day, one says ‘This day is the day of the Lord’s attainment of liberation,’—He may be said to have the Bhuta-Naigama point of view. Because what he says is not strictly or literally true; the Lord Mahavira attained liberation

centuries ago; the man's words figuratively express the fact that the day on which Lord attained his liberation was such and such a day of the week or of the month. This is the Naigama Naya of the Bhuta type, because the characteristic of something past is transferred to something present. In the same manner, where the marks of a future phenomenon are figuratively applied to a present one, we have an instance of the Naigama Naya of the Bhavya type. For example, if a good man is called the Siddha or the perfect one, it would be due to the Bhavya-Naigama point of view. The good man is not yet a perfected Being. He is called what he will be in some future time.

So, these are the three types of the Naigama which consists in describing a thing not in and through its essential nature but by presenting it through some phenomenon, external to it. The Naigama Naya may thus be said to be approaching its object but not yet touching it. It gives an explanation from the outside and does not hold out any of its essential and actual features. The next type of Naya looks the phenomenon in the face and picks out and emphasises one of its essential aspects.

(2) The Samgraha. This Naya consists in viewing a thing from the standpoint of its class or species. When in considering the nature of a thing, we shut our eyes to its peculiarities and look only to the attributes which it has in common with the other members of the class, we have the Samgraha or the Collective view. This Naya authorises us to call an individual thing by the name of its class.

(3) The Vyavahara. This is the counterpart of the preceding Naya. It consists in emphasising the peculiar and distinguishing features of an individual thing,—ignoring for the time being the class-essence or the universal which is immanent in it.

(4) The Riju-sutra. This mode of the Naya limits the extent of its subject-matter still further and consists in understanding a thing in and through its present state only.

(5) The Sabda. This Naya and the following two deal with the significance of a word. What meaning is to be attached to a word? The three Nayas give three answers, each Naya restricting the meaning more and more than the preceding. The Sabda Naya attributes the widest possible meaning to a word. According to it, synonyms mean the same thing and refer to one and

the same object.—although the synonyms may differ in gender, number etc.

(6) The Samabhirudha. This Naya limits the meaning of a word and holds that the significances of the so-called synonyms are different and need not refer to one and the same object. If we attend to the derivations of words, we may find out such differences in the significations of synonyms.

(7) The Evambhuta. According to this Naya, a name is to be attributed to an object, so long as the object exercises the activity which is connoted by the name. As soon as the object ceases to energise in the said way, the name is to cease to be applied to it. This Naya accordingly limits the meaning of a word to the exact possible extent.

These are the seven modes of the Naya. There is an altogether different account of the Naya, given by the Jaina thinkers, which also we may briefly notice here.

The Nayas are the different ways of conceiving the nature of an object. They are six in number. These six Nayas are especially employed in the investigation of the nature of the soul. Primarily, the Naya is of two modes viz., the Nischaya Naya and the Vyavahara Naya. The first conceives the soul in its fulness grasps it as a concrete whole, a plenary reality. The latter mode of the Naya chooses to attend to a particular aspect of the soul. The Nischaya Naya again is either *Suddha-nischaya* or *Asuddha-nischaya*. The *Vyavahara Naya* is primarily subdivided into *Sadbhuta* and *Asadbhuta*. Each of these two is either *Upacharita* or *Anupacharita*. Thus we have the six Nayas.

(1) The *Suddha-nischaya*. This Naya consists in a statement of the essential characteristics of the soul,—the characteristics which are eternal and which run through all its course.

(2) The *Asuddha-nischaya*. This Naya examines the nature of the soul in its *Asuddha* state i.e., contemplates its nature in its material environment although the soul is regarded still as a whole,—i.e., an indistinguishable totality of substance and attributes.

(3) The *Upacharita-sadbhuta-vyavahara*. This Naya attributes to the Soul a quality or faculty, which, although it belongs to it, is manifested only when the soul is brought into relation with something foreign to it. Thus according to it, *Mati-jnana*

or sensuous knowledge is a faculty of the soul. But it is only figuratively so. It cannot arise unless soul comes in contact with material bodies.

(4) The Anupacharita-sadbhuta-vyavahara. This Naya attributes to the soul some faculty e.g., Jnana or knowledge which is really inherent in it.

(5) The Upacharita-asadbhuta-vyavahara. This Naya brings the soul into relation with something which is really foreign to and easily separable from it. When one says, 'This house is *mine*,' his statement is based on this Naya point of view, because it relates the soul to something viz., the house which has nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of the soul.

(6) The Anupacharita-asadbhuta-vyavahara. This Naya brings the soul into relation with something which, although it is foreign to and different from it, is often found with it. The familiar example of this point of view is to say. This is my (i.e., my soul,) body.'

This finishes the account of the Naya which consists in a mode of explanation of the system of verities, called the Sruta-jnana.

The three forms of knowledge which still remain for our consideration are supernormal faculties of the Adhiva or Clairvoyance, the Manahparyaya or Telepathy and the Kevala or Omniscience. These are the only Pratyaksha Pramanas or direct sources of valid knowledge according to Umasvami and Nemichandra.

The Avadhi-jnana is the super lucid or clairvoyant perception of the peculiar aspects of material bodies i.e., bodies having form and magnitude. This fact differentiates the Avadhi-jnana from the Manahparyaya which consists in a Telepathic knowledge of the contents of other men's minds. Telepathic knowledge is considered by the Jaina thinker to be of far greater purity than clairvoyance.

The Avadhi-jnana is of three modes viz., the Desavadhi, the Paramavadhi and the Sarvavadhi. As Kundakundacharyya says.—

"The Avadhi is of three kinds viz., the Desavadhi, the Paramavadhi and the Sarvavadhi." *Panchastikaya* 44.

The range of Desavadhi is limited by spatial and temporal conditions, while that of Paramavadhi is not so limited. Sarvavadhi is the faculty by which we may perceive the non-sensuous aspects of all the material things of the universe. The Desavadhi is subdivided into two kinds.—Bhavapratyaya or congenital and Gunapratyaya or acquired. The faculty of Desavadhi is connate in the superhuman beings of the heaven and the hell. As Uma-svami says.—

“In the case of the Gods and the denizens of the hells clairvoyance is connate.” *Tattvartha Sutra Ch I. 21.*

The acquired mode of the Desavadhi is due to the destruction or subsidence-in-part of the obstacles that hinder the operation of clairvoyance. The Gunapratyaya-Avadhī may be acquired by all beings who have minds. It is of six modes.

“The other is of six modes and is due to the annihilation or subsidence-in-part of its hindrances.” *Ibid, 22.*

These six are.—

- (1) Anugami—Clairvoyance which never leaves its possessor.
- (2) Ananugami—Chairvoyance which is lost after some-time.
- (3) Varadhamana—Clairvoyance which is ever increasing
- (4) Hiyamana—Clairvoyance which is ever decreasing.
- (5) Avasthita—Clairvoyance which is constant and steadfast.
- (6) Anavasthita—Clairvoyance which is inconstant and unsteady i.e., changeable.

The Manahparyaya-jnana is a sort of telepathic knowledge, consisting in the perception of the contents of other people's minds. It is always an acquired faculty and can never be connate in any being. The telepathic knowledge is of two kinds.

“The Manahparyaya is of two kinds—Vipulamati and Rijumati.” *Panchastikaya, 45.*

Or, as Uma-svami observes.—

“The Manahparyaya is of two modes viz., the Rijumati and the Vipulamati.” *Tattvartha Sutra Ch. I. 23.*

The difference between the two is one of range and extent only. The Rijumati faculty can know the thoughts of beings that are

within from 4 or 8 Krosas to 4 or 8 yojanas from the knower. The spatial range of the Vipulamati varies from 4 or 8 yojanas to 2½ dvipas. As regards the temporal limit, the Rijumati can know the thoughts of the person during his life time. The farthest temporal range of Rijumati is 7 or 8 incarnations before and after the present existence of the person under observation. The Vipulamati relates to from 7 or 8 to innumerable incarnations.

The difference between the Avadhi and the Manahparyaya is thus indicated by Umasvami.—

“The difference between the Avadhi and Manahparyaya relates to purity, place, possession and object.” *Ibid* 25.

In other words.—

(a) The Manahparyaya is purer than Avadhi.

(b) The spatial range of the Avadhi is wider than that of the Manahparyaya. While the whole universe can be known by the Avadhi the Manahparyaya cannot extend farther than the Manushyottara Saila, the ultimate limit of human birth and habitation.

(c) The Avadhi-jnana can be possessed by men and some of the sub-human beings; the Manahparyaya is attainable only by the saints.

(d) The object of the Avadhi is always gross; that of the Manahparyaya is obviously fine.

The last form of knowledge is Kevala-jnana. It is identical with Omniscience. As Umasvami says.—

“All substances with all their modes are the objects of the Kevala.” *Ibid* 29.

It is the highest knowledge attainable by conscious beings. Nothing remains outside its range. It evolves from within the Soul and is never dependent on any sense-organ or object of knowledge. It is the pure, perfect and absolutely self-determined knowledge. As Kundakundacharyya observes.—

“The Kevala is not dependent on the objects of knowledge. It is not Sruta-jnana. For a being who has Kevala, knowledge and non-knowledge do not exist. The Kevala-jnana is thus to be understood.” *Panchastikaya* 46.

It is thus that we propose to finish this short study of the Jaina psychology. The Jaina account of the psychical faculties

is highly interesting and instructive not simply because it shows how the mind works but because it shows how the progressive rational mind develops stage after stage. For throughout the Jaina description of the mental faculties, the idea is clearly manifest that the principle of consciousness is an evolving and developing reality. In applying the principle of evolution to the psychical reality, the Jaina psychology places itself side by side with the most modern of the psychological systems. The crowning merit of the Jaina psychologists is that they not only acknowledged human consciousness to be an evolution from the sub-human consciousness but held the psychical life of man himself as a subject of continuous and progressive development. Leaving aside the supersensuous faculties like the Avadhi, the Kevala etc., we may thus recapitulate the principles of the Jaina psychology.

The lowest form of consciousness consists merely in the passive experience of agreeable or disagreeable phenomena. This form of consciousness develops in some animals into a consciousness of purposive activity. This again leads to the more complex forms. The first is Sensation. Sensation, although a more advanced mode of consciousness than these just described, is still but crude sentience consisting in the consciousness that the sense-organs are affected. Next is the process which we have called Grasp. It is more advanced than Sensation in as much as it includes the consciousness that something outside is affecting the sense-organs. The processes of attention and determination work upon the matter yielded by Grasp and present the something-the object of Perception-in its details. Next operates the process of Retention and thus the Perception of the object is completed. Recollection revives the idea of the object of perception and Conception forms the class-ideas by comparing the idea with its similars. Induction utilises these general ideas in establishing general truths, and deduction verifies and carries further the results of Induction. Thus is developed a system of unimpeachable authoritative truths. These truths supply us with principle of explanation and help us in arriving at exact conceptions of the things under our observation. Ordinary explanation is simply Integration of one idea to its associated one in an off-hand manner. The processes of sustained consideration and Mediation explain every link of the Integration. Explanation is logically complete

and scientific, when the object under observation is viewed from its particular aspects and the word signifying it represents its exact nature.

This is the order of mental development according to the principles of the Jaina psychology. Who will fail to observe that this embodies a substantially accurate idea of the intricate operations of the faculties of the developing and evolving mind?

Bhava Karma.

THE following reflections were originally written as part of a letter to a friend. I am sorry I cannot use all English words because I do not know quite how to express in English those words which are not in English.

What is the dravya of bhava karma? Is it ajiva or jiva? I believe it is generally regarded as ajiva (i. e., invisible matter). But there seems to be the following reflection. Suppose two different kinds of dravya (substance) are in combination and thus produce a new thing; then suppose we ask the question: what is the substance of this new thing? the answer would have to be that the new thing was one substance only from one point of view while from another point of view it could not be said that it was any particular one substance, because it is a compound of two different substances, so that the question is not rational? it should be preceded by the question: Does this new thing consist of one substance? or, reverting to the main question as to what the substance of bhava karma is, it should be preceded by the question: Does bhava karma consist of only one substance, or are there two different kinds of substance in bhava karma, jiva and ajiva? Apparently the answer must be that bhava karma is made up of two substances, not one, so that bhava karma is a modification (paryaya) of two substances in joint activity, and bhava karma cannot exist when the two substances are separated or cease to act jointly.

If out of the six different kinds of substances acknowledged by the Jain philosophy the only two which can combine are pudgala and jiva (matter and soul), and if their combination can

produce only one thing, namely, karma, then there can be no other example like karma by which to illustrate the idea ; but doubtless approximately analogous examples may be found in the world of matter where one kind combines with another kind to produce a new thing. For instance, brass is a combination of copper and zinc and is different in colour from either. Suppose we ask the question : of what metal is the yellow of brass ? or Does the yellow of brass belong to copper or to zinc ? Is it copper or zinc that exhibits the yellow of brass ? the answer would have to be that the yellow is not exhibited by only one metal, it is exhibited by two metals in combination or joint activity. So is it not wrong to suppose that bhava karma or any other karma is a paryaya of only one dravya (is a modification of only one substance, matter) ? Does it not take two substances, soul and matter, in combination, in order that there may be such a thing in existence as bhava karma ? Does bhava karma consist of only one dravya ? There is no bhava karma in an arm-chair ; there is no bhava karma in a Siddha (pure soul). There is bhava karma in a cat, man, tree, deva, or narakin, but these things cannot be said to be one dravya (substance), they are soul and matter combined, as a brass candlestick is zinc and copper combined.

If it be argued that the atman (soul) cannot identify himself with his bhava karma (anger for instance), and that therefore its substance must be ajiva (material), the reply presumably would be that if the soul does not identify himself with his bhava karma, then there is no bhava karma, there is only pudgala (matter invisible of course) storming about, and such activity is not bhava-karma. From the nischaya point of view there is no such thing as karma, either dravya or bhava (at least I understand so) ; there are only matter and soul ; so in asking the question as to the dravya of bhava karma we are assuming the existence of karma ; and if from the nishchaya point of view karma does not exist at all, then we must be speaking from the only point of view in which karma does exist, namely, the vyavahara, where its dravya consists of jiva and ajiva (matter and soul) combined. I suppose anger which is not given way to cannot be called bhava karma. If anger floods the man and the man remains motionless, silent, and mentally calm, while the internal sand-storm is sweeping over him, and he does not perform any

rash action under the influence of the storm, then such a storm is mere pudgala (matter) and cannot be called bhava karma; but if the man behaves rashly while the storm is on, that is to say while he feels it in himself, then his behaviour is bhava karma and the man's behaviour is the joint action of the two substances, matter and soul (himself), and is not the action of ajiva only, as it would be in the first case.

Perhaps some more experienced person can confirm, correct or elaborate the above reflections.

H. WARREN.

Notes and News.

Proceedings of the meeting of the members of the Mysore Jaina Education Fund Association held in the hall of the M. L. Jain Boarding House, Old Post Office Road, Mysore, on the 21st July 1921 at 9 A. M., for electing and deputing a representative to the Mysore Representative Assembly of 1921.

M. L. Vardhamaniah, Esq., the President, was in the chair and there were 6 Members present representing nearly all the important Jaina Centres of Mysore State.

In opening the proceedings of the meeting, Mr. M. L. Vardhamaniah read the notice convening the meeting and the Government Order relating to the grant of privilege to depute a Member to the Representative Assembly and narrated the work done since the Association met during Dasara last October. He then spoke exhorting the members to shake off their present phlegmatic habits and venture out for public life and public service forgetting all the petty differences they have now been engrossed in and join together for a common cause to work to bring about a speedy advancement of education in the community. Be more alert and unite together, he said, or we do not count for anything at all in the near future.

Mr. M. Anantharajiah proposed that a resolution be sent to Government thanking for the privilege granted.

The same being unanimously accepted, it was resolved :—

That the Members of the Jaina Education Fund Association, Mysore, assembled in the M. L. Jain Boarding House on Thurs-

day the 21st July 1921 beg to express, on behalf of the Association, their sincere thanks and gratitude to the Government of His Highness the Maharaja for the grant of privilege to depute a member to the Representative Assembly.

The following gentlemen stood for election :—

- (1) Shroff Padmarajiah, Esq., Merchant, Saligrama.
- (2) Upadra Nagarajiah, Esq., Merchant, Saligrama.
- (3) H. Shantharajiah, Esq., Merchant, Hassan.
- (4) V. Brahmappa, Esq., Merchant, Vedilveni, Kolar Dt.

Votes were accordingly taken for them and the following was the result :—

No.	Name.	No. of Votes.
1.	Mr. Shroff Padmarajiah	24
2.	Mr. Upadra Nagarajiah	30
3.	Mr. H. Shantharajiah	2
4.	Mr. V. Brahmappa	12

Mr. Upadra Nagarajiah of Saligrama was declared duly elected.

Mr. Upadra Nagarajiah proposed to move the following subjects at the ensuing session of the Representative Assembly and the same were accepted by the Association :—

- (i) Construction of a Bridge across the Hemavati at Mandagere on the way to Shravanabelagola.
- (ii) Nominating Assistant Commissioners from among the Graduates of the Jaina community.
- (iii) Concession in Lighting charges for Temples, Musjids, Chattrams, Boarding Houses, etc.
- (iv) Construction of a Bridge across the rivulet at Kerlapur in Ramanathpur Road.
- (v) Some statistical interpellations in regard to Jain Temples in the state.

OTHER SUBJECTS THAT WERE DISCUSSED.

Mr. A. Shantharaja Sastry proposed that at least six scholarships be awarded as an encouragement to Vaideek students of the Jaina community in the state.

It was unanimously accepted.

Mr. G. K. D. Vajrañbhaiah moved that a Committee be appointed to collect subscriptions to the Fund during marriage and other ceremonial functions, the constituents of which should belong to the respective places wherein their work as members of the Committee lies.

It was carried and a Committee was appointed representative of all the districts of Mysore.

Mr. M. L. Vardhamaniah proposed that our expression of sympathy and condolence on behalf of the Association be sent to the bereaved family of Mr. A. Nagarajiah, the late treasurer of our Association for his unfortunate and untimely death at Bom-madi; the same was accepted.

The Meeting terminated at about 12 noon with Cheers to His Highness the Maharaja and the Chair.

Proceedings of the General Meeting held in the Digambar Jain Pathasala Mudabidre at 9 a. m. on Saturday 4th June 1921.

Sri Aramane Dharmasamrajya of Mudabidre was voted to the Chair proposed by Sri M. Anantarajayya and Seconded by Sri Anadka Dharmapala Setti.

Resolution 1. This meeting prays for the happiness of the soul of Sri Kumara Devaprasadji who took so much interest in the collection, preservation and publication of Jain literature throughout India. Condolence to his family to be wired by the Chairman.

Resolution 2. A nonsectarian Society should be formed at an early date for the preservation and publication of Jain literature at Mudabidre with a limited capital :

Speakers : Sri Surala Aramane Nabhirajayya, M. R. Subrahmanya Sastri, R. Tatacharya and N. Rajagopala Krishna Rao.

Resolution 3. This society shall be named the Saddharma Prakasaka Samiti with headquarters at Mudabidre, Karkal Taluk, South Kanara, with a capital of 1000 shares each of Rs. 10, members holding not less than 15 shares being eligible for directorship.

Resolution 4. The following gentlemen be requested to Subscribe for not less than 15 shares :—

Sri Kattamar Raghuchandra Ballal, Surala Aramane Nabhirajayya, Mudabidre Aramane Dharmasamrajya, Mudabidre

Puttana Setti Padmanabha Setti, Anadka Dharmapala Setti, Sowcar Anantayya Setti, Bettakeri Chandappa Setti, Nellikar Sampageadi Chandappa Setti, Tamanangadi Sankappa alias Jayakumara Setti, Chikkayya Setti Jinaraja Setti, Mantradi Aramane Chandrajayya, Pananil Srivarma Setti, Venur Krishnayya, N. Rajagopalakrishna Rao, M. Anantaraja, Sowcar Gurupur Raghunath Pai, Saraph Chandayya Setti, Kallamundkur Nemiraja Padival, Renjal Branabettu Nemiraja Heggade, Padubidre Adirajarasu Kinyakka Ballal, Ermala Kumarayya Arasa Maram Heggade, Kuluru Bidina Devaraja Karnantaya Ballal, Kukkundur Puvani Mudya, Navur Gummanna Ajlar, Konde Nagaraja Setti Konde Krishnaraja Setti, Puttana Setti Devaraja Setti, Kattemar Cheluvayya Ballal, Edapadavu Chendayya Heggade, Agari Bomma Setti, Antara Channappa Setti, Gundila Manjappa Ajri, Nellikar Doddamana Chandayya Setti, Surala Aramane Nagendra Tolahar, Surala Aramane Gummannayya, and others.

Resolution 5. Sri Dharmasamrajya, Anantaraja, Chikkayya Setti Jinaraja Setti, Andilka Dharmapala Setti, N. Rajagopala Krishna Rao, Raghuchandra Ballal, Nabhirajayya, Venur Krishnayya, Nemiraja Padival, and Pattana Setti Padmanabha Setti are empowered to interview the gentlemen named in Resolution 4 and collect funds and shares for the Society.

Resolution 6. The Chairman shall do the duties of the Secretary and Sri Sowcar Anantayya Setti those of the Treasurer till the Society is registered.

Resolution 7. The necessary rules for the registration of the Society shall be framed by the Chairman with the help of Sri N. Rajagopalakrishna Rao as early as possible and placed before the next general meeting.

Resolution 8. The next meeting shall be held in 30th June 1921.

Resolution 9. The meeting approves of the proposal of Sri Rajagopalakrishna Rao of holding the next Session (May 1922) of the Kannada Literary conference in South Kanara and resolves upon holding it at Mudabidre the centre of Jain Kannada literary activity.

Resolution 10. Though the conference will be held at Mudabidri, all gentleman of the Madras Kannatak are requested to help their mite towards making the conference a success.

Resolution 11. The bills Reception committee for the Kannada Literary conference be appointed.

1. Svasti Sri Charukiriti Panditacharya Varya Swamiji of Danasala Mutt Mudabidre. — President.

2. Sri Puttana Setti Padmanabha Setti. — Vice President.

3. (1) Sri Aramane Dharmasamrajya } Provisional
(2) Sri N. Rajagopalakrishna Rao. } Secretaries.

4. Sri Sowcar Anantayya Setti. — Treasurer.

Resolution 2. Rs 5 shall be the subscription for a member of the Reception Committee for the Kannada Literary conference.

Resolution 13. Besides the office-bearers named in Resolution 11, the meeting thanks the following gentlemen for expressing their willingness to become members of the Reception committee:—

Sri Surala Aramane Nabhirajayya, Konda Nagaraja Setti, Kalle Purani Heggade, Kallamundkur Namiraja Padival, Anadka Dharmapala Setti, Chikkayya Setti Jinaraja Setti, Tammanangud; Sankappa alias Jayakumara Setti, Mudabidre Aramane Jagatpalayya T. Kumarayya, R. Tatacharya, Kolake Paramesvara Mayya, Venur Krishnayya, M. R. Subrahmanya Sastri, Jamalabad Mukund Rao, Bettadakevi Chandappa Setti, Konde, Krishnaraja Setti, Mantradi Aramane Chandrarajayya, Mantradi Dharmapala Setti, Nellikar Srivarma Setti, Nellikar Sampayyadi Chandappa Setti, Sowcar Gurupur Raghunath Pai, Venur Lokanatha Sastri, Sarvotama Malya, Ponnechar Venkatesa Bhet, and M. Anantaraja.

All the above resolutions were carried unanimously.

The following are the shares signed by the gentlemen present :—

Mudabidre Aramane Dharmasamrajya 21, Kattemar Raghu-chandra Ballal 3, Surala Aramane Nabhirajayya 15, Padmanabha Setti 15, Bettakeri Chandappa Setti 15, Sowcar Anantayya Setti 15, Sankappa alias Jayakumar Setti 15, Jinaraja Setti 15, Venur Krishnayya 15, Anadka Dharmapala Setti 20, N. Rajagopala Krishna Rao 15, R. Tatacharya 16, K. Nagaraja Setti 15, Konde Pachappa Setti 1, Mudabidre Aramane Jagatpalayya 2, Chite-kayya Setti Nagaraja Setti 1, M. Pachappa Setti 1, Lokanatha Setti 1, Kolake Paramesvara Mayya 1, M. R. Subrahmanya Sastri 1, Mudabidre Nemiraja Setti 1.

(Signed) M. DHARMA SAMRAJYA,

Chairman,