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Hope beguiles us of present care; it furnishes the mind with pleasing ideas; it cheers and sustains us under the pressure of immediate difficulties. But hope will be abused if we do nothing hut hope, or if we allow it to deceive us as to what is true, and the duties placed before us, or what we have for the time to deal with.

—*R. Chambers.*

Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara.

OF

Sri Vadideva Suri.

(Translated by Harishatya Bhattacharyya M.A., B.L.)

(Continued from page 309.)

Sutra 15.

The Non-self is other than the Self (*i.e.*, knowledge).

Commentary.

The Non-self is the object of knowledge; it may be a conscious or an unconscious Being.

Here the Nihilists (Sunyavadins) come in and urge that there is no real Non-self and no real Self or knowledge. There can be no Reality in this so-called universe,—no real Object, no real Subject. As regards the Non-self, these Nihilists urge;—Is it an Atom or a Gross Thing or Of the nature of both or Of the nature of neither? If it be an Atom, we ask, How do you know an

Atom,—by Perception or by Inference? If by the former, we ask, By means of the Transcendental Perception of the Sages or By the ordinary Perception like that of ours? In the first case, nothing is proved (as we are not Sages). In the second case, it is impossible, as we cannot have Perceptions of Atoms even in a dream, our Perception being always of gross things *e.g.*, a pillar or a pitcher. If, however, the knowledge of Atoms is said to be derived from Inference, we ask, Is the Inference, based on the knowledge of a relationship between the 'Proven' (Sadhya) and the 'Mark' (Hetu) or Is it drawn otherwise? The second case is impossible as there can be no such Inference. In the first case, the question is, Is the relationship known through Inference or throug Perception? Not certainly through Perception. For, the Atoms themselves being super-sensuous, an invariable relation of a 'Mark' with them is also unknowable through Perception, If it be said that the said relationship is known through Inference, we commit the fallacy of 'Mutual Dependence',—the knowledge of Atoms depending on Inference and the Inference depending on the knowledge of Atoms. If it be said that the relationship is known through another Inference we commit the fallacy of 'Infinite Regression'. Hence it is that Inference cannot give us the knowledge of Atoms. Further,—it may be asked, Are the Atoms eternal or non-eternal? In case they are eternal, are they potent (*i.e.*, capable of doing something) or impotent? The second alternative is weak as impotent things like a tree in the sky are are non-existent. If they are potent, do they produce effects gradually, or simultaneously. If gradually—do they change natures from time to time or do they remain unchanged? If they do not change natures,—do they produce the latter effect with the same nature in them with which they produce the former effect or do they produce the former effect with the same nature in them with which they produce the latter effect? In both these cases, the former and the latter effects would be simultaneously produced. Similarly, if it be held that the eternal Atoms change their nature every time they produce any effect, they would be non-eternal as change is the mark of impermanence. If it be held that the Atoms produce all their effects simultaneously, they would be non-existent after the first moment, as nothing remains for them to effect. Hence Atoms are not eternal. Now, if they are non-eternal, are they momentary

or persisting (for some time)? If they are momentary,—is their genesis accountable or non-accountable? If it is non-accountable are we to understand that the Atoms have no cause or that they have no Genesis or that they are themselves their cause or that their cause is formless? In the firss case, Atoms are either eternally existent or eternally non-existent because of the philosophical principle, "Anything whose cause is not known, is either eternally existent or eternally non-existent." In the second case, they may be held not to come into existence at all, at any time. In the third case, the position becomes inscrutable as anything which is itself non-existent cannot be the cause of its existence. In the fourth case, the Atoms become eternal, as their existence in the causal form is admitted before thair genesis. If the genesis of the Atoms is held to be accountnble, what is their cause,—Gross Thing or finer Atoms? Not certainly, the Gross Things,—as the Atoms have been admitted to be the ultimate reals. If the finer Atoms are the cause,—do they produce them, being themselves existent or non-existent or both existent and non-existent or neither existent nor non-existent? If these be held to be existent, do they exist when they produce their effects or do they persist (even after the production of their effects)? The first cannot be the case;—for as at the time of the production of the effects, these Atoms have the attribute of productivity, they cannot have the further attribute of existence. If it be contended that their existence means their productive activity (*i.e.*, existence and productivity mean the same thing), then the Ether-atoms would be identical in essence with the Water-atoms, as both have one and the same existence. The second alternative is unacceptable as that would be rejecting the hypothesis of momentariness. If it be held that these finer Atoms produce their effects in and through their Non-existence, they should always produce them as they are eternally non-existent. They cannot be held to be both existent and non-existent, as it involves the Contradictions.—(1) If they are existent, how can they be non-existent? (2) If they are non-existent, how can they be existent? Similarly, the position that they are neither existent nor non-existent is not good as the principle is that of the two alternatives if one is denied the other is affirmed and that both cannot be denied. Hence it is that you cannot hold the Atoms to be momentary. Nor can you hold that they persist for some time owing to the difficulties, already considered. Besides, if the Atoms

be held to persist for some time, do they remain, impotent or potent for the while? In the first case, they are non-existent like the scent of the sky-lotus. In the second case, is their effect something non-existent or existent or both or neither? The first case need not be considered. In the second case, it may be asked, how is the effect effected and how can the Atoms persist in impotency after the effect is done? The third and the fourth hypothesis are involved in difficulties, already considered. Hence the theory that the Non-self or the objective Reality consists in Atoms cannot be maintained.

Neither can it be said that the Non-self is a Gross Thing. For the question arises: Is such a Gross Thing eternal or non-eternal? It cannot be eternal for the reasons for which an Atom could not be held to be eternal. Nor is it non-eternal, for in that case, what would be its cause,—a Gross Thing or the Atoms? The first view gives no explanation. If, however, the Atoms be said to be the cause of Gross Things, it is practically maintaining that the Objective Reality is of two natures *viz.*, that it is both Atomic and Gross.

Even this third position is not reasonable. Are the Atoms composing a Gross Thing inter-related or unrelated? If they be supposed to form things, although unrelated, there would be no reason why the Atoms of the three worlds would not be continually making up Gross Things. On the otherhand, if the Atoms, composing a thing, are to have some sort of relationship with each other, the question is, What is the relationship? Is it enough that they should exist in the same locality? If so, then the Atoms of this world should prodnce one big Gross Thing, as all have the same locality. If it be contended that by the term 'same locality', it is meant the locality where some Atoms by their co-existence produce a Gross Thing,—then we may answer that you commit the fallacy of 'Mutual Dependence', in as much as you define 'same locality' as the place where a Gross Thing is produced and you say that a Gross Thing is produced where the Atoms have the 'same locality'. Are we then to suppose that the Atoms; composing a Thing have contact or 'Sam-yoga' with each other? If so, we ask, Is this Contact eternal or non-eternal? In the first case, the Atoms would be eternally producing the given Gross Thing. If the Contact is non-eternal, whence does it arise? Does it come from outside? This is inconceivable. Is then the Contact due to

the Atoms themselves? This being supposed, the question is,—Do the Atoms come into relationship with each other to produce the Contact or do they not? If they do not, there arises the difficulty, already referred to. In the other case, the fallacy of 'Infinite Regression' is committed, in as much as one sort of Relationship is attempted to be explained by another and that by another and so on. Further,—the question is, What is Contact? Is it something identical in essence with the Atoms? This is impossible, as there can be no such Atom as Contact? Or, is Contact a different phenomenon from the Atoms? This being supposed, we ask,—Is it altogether different or different only in some respects? To say that, Contact is different from the Atoms in some respects is to point to contradiction. If, however, Contact is altogether different from the Atoms, the question is,—Does it *really* subsist between the Atoms or does it *not*? In case it does not, you cannot speak of a relationship between the Atoms. If it *really* subsists, does it subsist by means of Contact or 'Samavaya' or Identity or Causality or External Relationship? Not certainly by means of Contact,—as Contact being itself an attribute cannot have itself as its attribute. Not also by means of 'Samavaya', as it is quite possible to have simultaneously many facts of Contact, made to subsist between Atoms. It is also not reasonable to say that Contact subsists between Atoms, because it is identical with them,—as the difference between Contact and Atoms is already admitted. It is also not reasonable to say that Contact subsists between Atoms, as it is generated therefrom;—because this position has already been criticised. It is also not true to say that Contact subsists between Atoms by means of an External Relationship;—because it has been said to *really* subsist between them. Besides,—what is the extent of the Contact? Does it mean that the wholeof an Atom mixes itself up with the whole of another? In that case, a Gross Thing would mean a single big Atom. Or, do the parts of an Atom mix with the parts of another? This means that an Atom has parts,—which is inadmissible. Hence it is that the relationship between Atoms cannot be expressed in terms of Contact. In the same way, it may be shown that relationship cannot also be expressed in terms of Activity..... .....Hence it is that the position that Reality is both Atomic and Gross is not maintainable.

Lastly, the position that the Non-self is neither Atomic nor

Gross is not reasonable. For, of the two alternatives, if one is denied the other must be admitted. You cannot deny both if your position is to mean anything.

Hence it is that there cannot be any Object.

Now, if there is no Object, there cannot be any Subject which knows it. For, the question is, Is the Subject contemporaneous with the Object or is it not? In the first case, all the Objects of the three worlds would be simultaneously known without exception by the Subject (as the hypothosis means that a Subject knows things *because* it is contemporaoeous with them). In the second case we ask,—Is the Subject formless or has it any form? In the first case, the Subject would be unable to determine the Objects which have forms. If, however, the Subject be supposed to have a form, the question is,—Is this Form different from Knowledge or is it the same? In the second case, there is really no Form as Knowledge or the Subject and the Form are held to be identical. If the Form of the Subject is different from Knowledge, it may be asked,—Does this Form consist in Consciousness or does it consist in Unconsciousness? If the Subject's Form is Consciousness, this is practically a begging of the question; for, we may ask, How does this Conscious Form know the Object? And at once the old questions crop up,—Is the Form which is Conscious of the Object formless or has it a form? If, however, the Form of the Subject be supposed to be Unconscious, the questions are, Is this Unconscious Form cognisant of the Object or si it not? If it is not cognisant, then it may give false information to the Subject. If, however, it be supposed to be cognisant, at once the old questions arise,—Is the Form which is so cognisant of the Object formless or has it a form? So, we have the 'Infinite Regression'.

Hence it is that there is no such thing as real Knowledge or the Subject.

The ultimate conclusion of the Nihilists accordingly is—Nothing really is! All is void!

To the position of Nihilism, the Jainas Object in this way: Is your reasoning based on the Pramanas or not? If not, then your reasoning is admittedly unreasonable. If it is based on the Pramanas, what is their nature? Do they consist in Objects or do they consist in Knowledge? In any case, Nihilism becomes unproved. If it is held that the Pramanas are themselves unreal,—

then Nihilism, based on them, becomes unreal also. If it be argued that the debate (already given) leads to no consistent position and that Nihilism is accordingly the ultimate position, it may be said that the very debate shows that the position of Nihilism is refuted. For the principle is,—

> "If a debate has any substantiality, how do you prove absolute Nihilism? If a debate has no substantiality, how do you prove absolute Nihilism"?

The Jaina position is that the Object has a dual nature. The Object are the products of the atoms; yet atoms are not their sole and sufficient cause; they depend on other conditions also. All inconsistencies are harmonised if this dual nature of the Objects is recognised. Of course, the conception of such a dual nature is impossible, if we limit our attention to one and the same aspect but it is quite possible if we look to the different aspects. Thus, if we consider their ultimate essence, we may regard all phenomena as identical with each other but if we treat them as modes of that essence, they become different from each other. Identity and Difference,—two natures, so to say,—are thus predicable of one and the same thing. The Jaina contention is that if we attribute such a dual nature to an Object, all the Nihilistic arguments against its reality, will be set aside.

The Vedantins or those who hold the theory of the Brahman, here step in and urge that Nihilism ought to be refuted, as it ignores the ultimate reality of the Brahman which is the Soul. According to them the individuals are unreal and the Brahman is the only Reality.

The Jaina philosophers criticise the Vedanta position in the following way: What do you mean by the unreality of the individuals? Does unreality mean absolute Non-existence or False appearance or Indescribability? In the first two cases, you are led to deny yourself. In the third case, the question is, Why is a thing indescribable? Is it so, because there is no expression for it in language? Or, is it so, because there is nothing to give birth to an expression for it in language? Or, thirdly, is it so, because it has no substantiality? The first is not the case, as everything has a corresponding expression for it in language. The second hypothesis also is untenable; for what gives birth to an expression in

language is either a piece of knowledge or an object. As everything arouses a peculiar piece of knowledge, a thing cannot be said to be wanting in a cause to give birth to an expression for it in language,—if knowledge be held to be the cause of the expression. The Vedantins may say, however, that it is the object that gives birth to a word and that a thing is indescribable in words as objects which cause corresponding words, do not exist. The Jainas ask: What do you mean by the non-existence of the objects? Do you mean that objects do not exist as reals? Or, do you mean that they do not exist as unreals? In the first case, you are led to the position that an unreal thing can nevertheless be perceived. In the second case, you admit the reality of the objects. Nor is the position maintainable that the objects do not exist either as reals or as unreals; for both the alternatives cannot be rejected. Hence it is that things are not indescribable because they are wanting in causes that produce words corresponding to them. Thirdly, things are not indescribable because they have no substantiality? For, what do you mean by unsubstantiality? Does it mean unknowability? Surely, it cannot be said that a thing is not knowable, for as a matter of fact all things are known. The Vedantin argues that a thing may be known but that it is known differently from what it really is. To this, the answer is that if it were so, we would have known that all our knowledge is false. Besides, the 'Pratyaksha' or direct knowledge shows that things are not indescribable; for we use different names for different objects. Similarly, Inference shows that things are not indescribable. Hence it is that individual things are not unreal in the sense of being indescribable.

All things are real,—this is the conclusion of Jainism which thus rejects the theory of the Vedantic Brahman.

Sutra 16.

The certain knowledge of the Self consists in the clear illumination of the Self just as that of the outside Thing, in that of the outside Thing. I know the young elephant along with my Self.

Commentary.

This Sutra indicates that the Self is knowable just as any outside object. The Self, Knowledge or its process is as much knowable as any outside Object *e.g.*, an young elephant.

Sutra 17.

Admitting that the outside as the Object of knowledge can be clearly known, who will not admit that like the Sunlight, knowledge itself is (Self—)-illumining also?

Commentary.

"As the observers admit that the Sunlight in and through which various objects such as the mountain, the town, the forest etc., are revealed, is itself revealed, so it should also be admitted that knowledge in and through which various objects such as the pitcher etc., are known is itself knowable."

The followers of Bhatta, however, contend that the Self is not directly knowable as this would imply contradiction in knowledge and that accordingly it is to be held observable only indirectly. The Jaina philosophers object, however, to the Mimamsaka position and maintain that the Self is directly knowable. They argue: What is the contradiction if introspection is possible? If it is meant that the possibility of introspection implies that knowledge must exist before it is known,—well, let this be so; we do not maintain that knowledge generates itself. If, however, it is contended that introspection implies the contradiction that knowledge is its own subject and object, we may say that the contradiction will disappear if we consider, the example of Light. Just as illumination is the property of Light, so is self-consciousness, of knowledge. The Mimamsakas may of course argue,—let knowledge be conscious of other things and not of itself just as Light illuminates its surrounding things. It may be pointed out, however, that Light while revealing other things, reveals itself also and that it reveals itself, not with the help of other Lights but in and through itself. In the same way, Knowledge may be said to be conscious of itself and that, *directly*. Indeed, the parallellism of Light and Knowledge is almost complete. Just as we may talk of Light as self-illumining and self-illumined, so we may talk of Knowledge, as self-conscious and known.

The Mimamsakas, however, turn their argument in this way. What we really see is but an illumined object, consisting of parts; it is these parts which account for our Knowledge of the illumined object and not the fact that Light illumines itself. Similarly, Knowledge also is composed of simpler elements; these elements

explain Knowledge and it is not proper to call Knowledge self-conscious. The Jaina reply to this objection is:—How are these simpler elements known? If it is said that these are known by Knowledge, then it is apparent that Knowledge and its simpler elements explain each other. Then again, the question is: Are these simpler elements conscious elements or not? If these are unconscious, then they cannot explain Knowledge which is a conscious process, just as an unlighted Light cannot reveal its surrounding objects. On the other hand, if these elements are already conscious elements, then certainly Knowledge is not explained by them in as much as it is presupposed by them. If, however, it is argued that the consciousness of the simpler elements is explained by their still simpler constituents, then we may contend that the position involves the fallacy of 'Infinite Repression.' It may be pointed out that if we follow such a line of thought, we shall be driven to the position that the ultimate elements of Knowledge are self-conscious. If so, what is the harm if Knowledge is said to be self-conscious?

The Mimansakas further contend that 'Arthapatti' or negative reasoning establishes that Knowledge is knowable only indirectly. It is in this way:—Knowledge illumines outside objects only; this would be impossible if knowledge itself were not known but indirectly. The Jainas, however criticise this position and ask: How do you explain this revelation of objects by Knowledge? Is it due to any property of the Soul or of Knowledge or of the Object itself? The first cannot be the case as this would be in direct contradiction of the principle of Prabhakara's philosophy (according to which the Soul is devoid of all properties). The second also cannot be the case as Knowledge being momentary vanishes even before the full revelation of the object takes place. The third hypothesis is also untenable, as the revelation would have been the same to all minds, if it were due to any property of the Object; nay, we find that even the same Object appears differently at different times to the same mind. Again, what is this property of the Object? Is this property something material or something psychical? If it is material, how can it give rise to a consciousness of the Object? If it is something psychical, the question is, How is it known? If it is known by itself, then practically the fact is admitted that Knowledge is knowable directly. If the property is to be known through another piece of

Knowledge, we question:—Does the said property of the Object persist as long as the Object persists? Or does it persist only so long as the organs of sense remain in touch with the Object? Or, thirdly, is it impermanent like Knowledge itself? The first cannot be the case for then an Object would be continually perceived even though our eyes are turned from it. The second also cannot be the case; the contact of the sense-organs with the Object being only a *condition* of the genesis of Knowledge, the property of the Object which causes its consciousness cannot be said to be conterminous in time with that. The third hypothesis also is untenable, as what is impermanent cannot be known by a psychosis which comes after it. Hence it is that the Mimansaka philosophy fails to explain why Knowledge should exclusively know the outside Objects. It follows that the argument based on negative reasoning is valueless so far as the possibility of introspection is concerned.

The philosophers of the Yanga (Nyaya) school contend on the other hand that it is God's Knowledge only that can be directly self-conscious. Human Knowledge is different from Divine Consciousness and is accordingly conscious of itself only through retrospection. A psychosis is directly conscious of an external Object; it is only when another psychosis follows it and we begin with its help to reflect on the form and matter of the preceding psychosis that we come to have a Knowledge of the Self *i.e.*, of Knowledge itself. Introspection as a direct observation of the Self is impossible; it is possible only through reflection and retrospection.

The Jainas, however, claim to have a different conception of God and turn the first part of their opponent's argument against themselves. The Jainas reject the theory of a Divine 'Demiurgus' or Architect; according to them, the Supreme Being is a fully developed Being; a God is the human Soul, possessed of Pure Knowledge; His consciousness is not *essentially* different from the consciousness of man. Hence they argue that if the Divine Knowledge is directly self-conscious, there is no reason why the human Knowledge also should not be so. The Jainas reject also the theory that a psychosis is knowable only through another. It is material objects only which require other things for their determination. A pot, for example, is to be determined in relation to other things. This does not show, however, that a phenomenon

which is in no way material—as, for example, the Self or Knowledge—should also be determined and known through phenomena, similar to it. Hence there is no reason why the Self should not be directly self-conscious. Lastly, the 'Yanga' position that Knowledge becomes known only when we take, a retrospective view of it and reflect on and question about its matter is untenable. We are never conscious of these alleged stages of self-consciousness. It is not a psychological fact that we are first conscious purely of an external Object and then after some time we become conscious of the Knowledge itself. Then again, self-consciousness is often had without reflection and retrospection. And lastly it may be pointed out that if each posterior psychosis be supposed to give rise to a knowledge of the prior psychosis (which again gives rise to the knowledge of its prior and so on) all psychosis would be filled with the knowledge of the psychosis only and there would not be any consciousness of external objects. Hence it is not safe to maintain that every psychosis is known through the succeeding psychosis.

The Jaina conclusion is that the Self is directly knowable.

Sutra 18.

The validity of Knowledge consists in its agreement with the knowable (*i.e.*, what is to be determined).

Commentary.

The Pramana reveals the true nature of things.

Sutra 19.

The invalidity of Knowledge consists in the opposite of that (*i.e.*, difference with the Knowable).

Commentary.

What makes a phenomenon appear differently from what it really is, is not a Pramana or valid Knowledge. It should be noted here that the object of invalid Knowledge must always be an external Object. Because one's own Self cannot be said to appear differently to himself. Hence it may be safely said, "all Knowledge with regard to the Self is valid and not fallacious; but with regard to the external Object, some forms of Knowledge are valid and some are fallacious".

Sutra 20.

Both of them (*i.e.*, the Validity and the Invalidity of Knowledge) originate from the Non-self but their consciousness is due to the Self and the Non-self.

Commentary.

The Non-self is the abode of the various *Gunas* and *Doshas* (*i.e.*, clear, apparent or determinable attributes and unclear, mystifying or indeterminable attributes). These determine whether our Knowledge regarding the Non-self is valid or invalid; the Gunas help the origination of valid Knowledge and Doshas, that of Fallacy. Hence it is that the Non-self is the ultimate cause of the Valid and Invalid Knowledge.

But the consciousness that we have valid Knowledge or otherwise, is sometimes due to the Self and sometimes to the Non-self. Where from the observation of the same phenomenon, the same knowledge arises too often, we have an intuitive consciousness that we have Pramana or valid Knowledge. But where the same phenomenon is observed and at each time, the Knowledge is varying, we come to have an intuitive consciousness that we have Apramana or invalid Knowledge. It is thus that where the observation of a phenomenon is repeated many times, the consciousness comes of itself, whether we have Pramana or Apramana. In such cases, the Pramana-hood or otherwise is forced on our consciousness, as it were, and we have not to examine the grounds on which the Pramana-hood or otherwise might be based. But in the case where the observation is not repeated, we have to depend on the nature of the Non-self for having the consciousness that we have Pramana or otherwise; here that consciousness cannot be intuitive.

Thus it is that both the Pramana-hood and the Apramana-hood depend on the nature of the Non-self; but the consciousness that we have Valid Knowledge or otherwise is sometimes due to the Self *i.e.*, to Knowledge itself (in other words, intuitive) and is sometimes due to the Non-self (*i.e.*, not intuitive).

The above Jaina view is opposed to the contentions of the Mimansakas,—1. That the Validity (the Pramana-hood) of Knowledge as well as its determination (the consciousness that we have Pramana or valid Knowledge) are due

to the Self, 2. That the Invalidity of Knowledge as well as its determination are due to the Non-self. Shortly put, the Mimansaka argument is:—There is no such thing as a Guna, inhering in an Object under observation, which helps the origination of Valid Knowledge. The Object under observation exists either as it is in itself or in a deranged condition. In the first case, the Object exists as it is,—irrespective of our Knowledge, and our Knowledge of it becomes Pramana or valid Knowledge without being indebted to any Guna or special attribute, inhering in the Object and striving to generate valid Knowledge in us. And the Knowledge of the validity of our Knowledge is always intuitive because the validity of our Knowledge is not dependent on any external Object. If on the other hand, the object has Dosha (for although an Object may not have Guna, it may have Dosha) *i.e*, does not exist as it is in itself, our Knowledge regarding it becomes Apramana. Hence the Invalidity of Knowledge may be attributed to the Non-self. And as the Knowledge that we have Apramana is dependent on a consideration of the true nature of the Object, the consciousness of the Invalidity of Knowledge may also be said to be always due to the Non-self.

To the above argument, the Jaina reply is that if there can be Dosha, there can be Guna also in a thing. The argument that experience does not point to the existence of Guna, cannot hold water; for the same argument may be turned against the theory of the existence of Dosha also. If Dosha be supposed to be a matter of 'Pratyaksha', it may be urged that Guna also is such. If Dosha is a matter of 'Anumana', Guna also is so and so on. Thus the Jaina contention is that if the Mimansakas admit the existence of Dosha, there is no reason why they should not admit the existence of Guna in things. Thus, there is Guna in outside objects; and if Dosha in things causes the Invalidity of our Knowledge, it can be argued that Guna generates Valid Knowledge. So, the Jaina position is vindicated that the Non-self which is the abode of Guna and Dosha, causes the Valid and the Invalid Knowledge.

In the same way, it may be argued that if the consciousness that we have Valid Knowledge may be due to the Self *i.e.*, may be intuitive (as is admitted by the Mimansakas), there is no reason why our consciousness of the Invalidity of Knowledge should not be intuitive. Thus it is that the consciousness that we have Valid

Knowledge or that we have Invalid Knowledge may both be intuitive in many cases.

Here is the end of the First Chapter, named—
"The Determination Of The True Nature Of
The Pramanas."
(To be continued.)

Sri Manatunga Muni.

CENTURIES ago there ruled over the rich kingdom of Malawa a king named Boja, famous for his erudition and patronage of Pandits and Scholars. He had his Capital at Ujjain which was one of the greatest and most famous cities of India in those days. It is said that Kalidasa, Bana and Bardrahari were contemporary authors who flourished at the Court of Bhoja Raja.

One day a brilliant disputant and a great preacher of the Jaina Religion, Sudatta by name and a vysia by caste came to the Royal Assembly with his young son. The king at first inquired about the welfare and prosperity of Sudatta in consonance with the custom of those days and then asked, "Is your son receiving regular education." "Yes" replied the scholar, "He has just begun and he is studying, "*Nama Mala*" written by Thananjaya Kavi for youngsters." Thereupon the king desiring to see Thananjaya Kavi invited him to his court and requested him to compose a master-piece befitting his profound scholarship and poetic skill. On hearing this, Kalidasa, moved by jealousy, said, "This Jaina scholar was till very lately studying under one Manathungasuri. Whence has he got the capacity to compose any treatise ?"

Thus greatly provoked by Kalidasa's belittling and insulting words Thananjaya Kavi challenged him to enter into a philosophical controversy. He was determined to win a decisive victory over Kalidasa. But when the latter found himself attacked by the invincible weapon of *Syadvada* and when he realised that his position was not tenable any longer he told the king that he had a desire to enter into discussion with Manatungasuri—the Guru of his opponent. Since the king had always evinced a keen interest and delight in all controversies among scholars, he sent

some of his officers to bring the learned muni to the Royal Assembly.

Manatunga Muni was a Yati who had renounced all attachment to the world and hence he did not consent to proceed to the Royal Court, saying, "What business have I with the king? Am I, a Sanyasi, going to receive any boon from the king? What connection is there between a king who is a master of all temporal affairs and earthly bliss and a muni like myself who has severed all connection with *Samsara* (worldly existence)?" Thus he went on reasoning until the king's officers were satisfied and returned to the court. On arrival at the palace they told the kiug what all transpired between them and the muni in the forest. As soon as Kalidasa heard this he promptly said, "This Jaina Muni afraid at the mere thought of a Royal Assembly of Scholars, has not the courage to come here." But the king thought that the muni had insulted him by not complying with his invitation and took it to be Criminal disobedience to the mandate of a Ruler. Further, thinking that such total disregard of the King should be punished forthwith, he gave orders to his men to bring the muni, a prisoner.

Thereupon the royal men-at-arms lost no time in bringing the muni to the Court, a captive.

But the pious muni took the 'Mowna Vrata' (vow not to speak to anybody on any account) and was entirely absorbed in *Dhyana* (meditation). Many and Varied were the questions that were put to him by the king, the ministers and other members of the Royal Assembly to all of which he replied not, standing in still silence and serene contemplation. Greatly enraged at the muni's obstinate silence ordered him (muni) to be put in chains and imprisoned. Accordingly the Muni, of matchless piety and conduct was thrown into the state prison.

He had to undergo a series of grave sufferings and difficulties during the first two days of his incarceration. But on the third day he worshipped Bhagavan Audi Jinasa by composing a Stotra-Mala (a string of praises) brimming with the nectar of Bhakti. Whereupon the chains broke to pieces. Out flew the gates of the Prison. The Muni walked his way to his peaceful abode. The prison guards greatly dismayed and struck with terror reported this wonderful event to the King. On hearing this he

caused the Muni to be brought back to the Royal Assembly once again. But the king greatly shuddered to see the muni set free by superhuman agencies. In order to relieve the king's anxiety and to terrorise the Muni, Kalidasa invoked his guardian deity *'Kali'*. At once there appeared on the spot, the Goddess Kali with her dreadful presence. Just at the same time, Chakraesvari the *Sasana Devi* of Audi Jinasvara made her appearance on the scene. *Kali* was almost disarmed of her cruel intentions when she perceived the calm, and beautiful countenance of Chakrasvari bright with piety and virtue, ready to help, those who were really in need of it. "Without doing any injury to anybody, administering to the requirements of pious souls," *the Sasana Devi* said "is the Characteristic of Gods and Goddesses."

Much ashamed at the wise words of the other Devi Kali took the vow of Ahimsa and disappeared. The King, in his turn took the Ahimsa Vrata from Manatunga Muni.

How far the Story and the personages alluded to in it are historical, we shall not pause to discuss here for reasons more than one. But the story as a whole throws a great light on Manatunga Muni's sterling character and strength of mind. The little that we know about him is enough to inspire us young and old, rich and poor to set Religion above temporalities, to regard soul force as mightier than physical, to acquire strength by suffering, to believe that a superhuman force guides the destinies of mankind and overrides the laws of kings and emperors alike.

Now our readers will be very eager to know what was that mysterious and marvellous "*Stotra-Mala*" which the great Muni composed during his imprisonment and the first recital of which broke asunder the fast locks and bars of the prison-cage. As was already pointed out, the Muni was jubilant with devotion or "Bhakti" and therefore his stotra is called to the present-day as the "**Bhaktamara Stotra**." The Stotra-mala consists of 48 beads or Slokas, every one of which is an inestimable precious gem in itself, comprising a world of wisdom in a nut shell.

Bhaktamara Stotra is the first of the five Stotras of the Jainas popularly known as the *Pancha Stotras*. It is being recited early in the morning every day by almost every Jaina, be he a Swetambara or Digambara. It is said to possess very charming qualities and is believed to have a wonderful effect on the devotee

who makes it his foremost duty to recite it every morning as soon as he quits his bed.

For the benefit of our readers who do not have the opportunity to read the Stotra, as it is, in Sanskrit, we propose to publish in the ensuing issues of *the Jaina Gazette* a free English Translation of the substance of the Slokas in the Bhaktamara Stotra.

"BHAKTA."

Awake and Arise!

Dear Sir,

Kindly publish the following humble suggestions in your esteemed monthly—*the Jaina Gazette.* The readers of the Gazette are perhaps quite aware of the glory of the Jainas and Jainism in India some centuries ago. How they dwindled down in number as well as in public esteem owing to foreign invasions internal wars and Religious persecutions is too well known to need any repetition here. Those disastrous days have gone and fortunately the whole of India is emerging on to a new era of Literary renaissance, Social freedom and Political emancipation. Not only India! The whole world is restless and every nation and community is striving its utmost to make the best of the times. But in these troublous days, one is greatly puzzled and perplexed as to what he should think or say about politics. Till the horizon is clear let me refrain from soaring in that uncertain region. This is only by the way.

Coming back to Jaina literature we may say with all emphasis at our command that the Jainas have been grossly negligent of that invaluable treasure-house of rich gems and precious diamonds. No other Community in India has been so fortunate as the Jainas in getting a vast and rich and valuable heritage. Theirs are the greatest master-pieces in Sanskrit, Prakrit, Tamil, Canarese and Gujarati. Their contribution to Indian philosophy and ethics and science has been equally great. But at present there are hundreds of thousands of Jainas who are totally ignorant of these and who spend their precious life time and hard-earned money in tamashas and communal feasts and festivities. To them we would make a request in all humility to spend a part of their money in the preservation and publication of Jaina Works, both

those of the Digambaries and Swetambaries. Every day that is wasted hastens them a pace nearer and nearer to oblivion. It is their duty to preserve in an immortal form the thoughts and sentiments of their great ancesters, failure to do which would spell ruin to themselves. It is this neglect of their duty, it may well be said, that is the root-cause of all the evils that are heaped upon the Jainas by their non-Jaina brethren. They are considered to be Hindu dissenters, reviled as atheists, scorned as imbecile citizens and discarded with contempt as know-nothing money bags and impediments on the road to national progress. All these and much worse even, are said about the innocent adherents of a time-honoured indigenous system of faith in which Ahimsa (non-injury) and Satya (truth) are the Chief Principles of Life and Paramatma Svaroop (God-head) is the final goal of all temporal existence. I, of course, concede that such misrepresentations reflect much on the gross ignorance of the speakers themselves, of men and matters related to Jainism. But in the same breath I cannot help saying that the inactivity on the part of the Jainas indirectly conduced to such a spirit of misrepresentation. Even in this twentieth century of wide culture, research and reasoning no less a scholar than Dr. H. S. Gour, M.A., has thought it safe to incerporate such false notions in his compendium on "*Hindu Code*" and is sanquine of escaping the ordeal of bold and open contradiction. But as far as we know, Messrs J. L. Jaini, and C. R. Jain have already taken the cudgels in defence of Jainism and are doing all that they can. It is left to Messrs A. B. Lathe and Peary Lal who are both Jains and Members of the Imperial Logislative Assembly to see that these offensive paragraphs are deleted from the Code before it will be passed by the Legislative Assembly.

There are several cases of gross misrepresentation of facts to be seen in all provinces which will continue to exist as long as the Jains continue to be negligent of their high responsibilities. Lest my letter should grow long and as such tedious let me in brief put forth my suggestions before the readers of the Gazette for their early consideration.

i. The task of the Preservation and Publication of the standard works on Jainism and treatises on miscellaneous subjects by Jaina authors, must be entrusted to a body of scholars, educationists and wealthy men.

ii. That a Central Jaina Public Musuem be established.

iii. That a Joint-Stock Company be opened to manage both i. and ii. and to own a High-class Printing Press and to publish *The Jaina Gazette* the only authoritative organ of the Jaina Community and the All-India-Jaina Association. The same Company may open branches at different provinces to conduct vernacular periodicles in the interests of the Community. Similarly it can undertake to publish Jaina works both in Sanskrit and Vernacluars.

Such an undertaking, I venture to think, is not an impossible thing among the Jains who are proverbially the richest people in India. In these days of improved Linotype and Rotary and cheap paper a well-formed printing and publishing company can do a great deal for the sake of the Jaina Community. As I conclude this letter, I recall the words of Milton "Awake, Arise or be for ever fallen" which indeed may God forbid.

Yours etc. "A JINADASA".

Notes and News.

Special Notice to Subscribers.

Some of our Subscribers complain that the V. P. P. of *the Jaina Gazette* is sent for Rs. 3-5 as. whereas the Subscription is only Rs. 3. Let us point out that the revised postal regulations are such that the minimum charges of a V. P. P. are As. 5. At present all V. P. Packets have to be sent registered which msans an additional cost of annas two plus half-anna for book packet postage. Since there is no provision for pies in V. P. P. we put it to the nearest anna *viz.*, 3/3. (Subscription Rs. 3 + Registration fee As. 2 + packet postage ½ Anna.)

Secondly when the V. P. P. reaches the destination the postman takes an additional charge of As. 2 as money order fee as per revised postal regulations. Thus V. P. P. costs As. 5 to the Subscriber besides his Subscription.

Hence it is that we have very often asked our Subscribers to remit their Subscriptions per money order.

For these reasons payment by money order is cheaper and more convenient both for the subscribers and ourselves and is therefore, recommended.

Such of those subscribers whose subscriptions expire by December 1921 are requested to remit their subscriptions for 1922 per m. o. failing which we may be obliged to send V. P. P.'s which indeed will be costlier.

Only back numbers of the Jaina Gazette are sent per V. P. P. for the realization of the subscriptions. But the current issues of the Gazette are sent in the usual course.

Visva-Bharati.

(Sir) Rabindranath Tagore the Great poet laureate of Asia founded his Shnnti-niketan University known as *Visva-bharati* on the 23rd Dec. 1921. A great number of scholars and pandits, Eastern and Western were present on the occasion. An association called *Visva-Bharati Parishad* was also formed and a constitution for the University was adopted on the same day.

It is needless for us to point out that the Univerity is the first of its kind in India. Among other laudable objects the following are some mentioned in the constitution of the University.

"1. (i) To study the mind of Man in its realisation of different aspects of truth from diverse points of view.

"(ii) To bring together, as a step towards the above object, the various scattered cultures of the East, the fittest place for such endeavour being India, the heart of Asia, into which have flowed the Vedic, Buddhist, Semitic, Zoroastrian, and other cultural currents originating in different parts of the Orient from Judea to Japan; to bring to a realisation the fundamental unity of the tendencies of different civilisations of Asia, thereby enabling the East to gain a full consciousness of its own spiritual purpose, obscuration of which has been the chief obstacle in the way of a true co-operation of East and West, the great achievements of these being mutually complementary and alike necessary for Universal Culture in its completeness.

"(iii) And with such Ideal in view to provide at Shanti-niketan aforesaid a centre of Culture where research into and study of the religion, literature, history, science and art of Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh, Moslem, Christian and other civilisations may be pursued along with the culture of the West, with that simplicity in externals which is necessary for true spiritual realisation, in amity, good-followship and co-operation between

thinkers and scholars of both Eastern and Western countries, free from all antagonisms of race, nationality, creed or caste, and in the name of the one Supreme Being who is Shantam, Shivam, Advaitam."

"4. To provide for research and instruction in such branches of learning as may be deemed desirable and found practicable and for the exchange of cultures between the East and West and for the advancement of learning and dissemination of knowledge generally."

That it will not be a mere copy or reproduction of any antiquated or medieval institution will be clear from the following object:—

"7. To purchase or sell, construct, maintain, found, initiate, organise or assist and generally deal in or with, all or any description of the following:—Buildings and building materials; Agricultural machinery and produce, and foodstuffs raw or manufactured; Printing, publishing, typefounding, book-binding; Books, manuscripts, libraries; Pictures, statues, inscriptions and objects of artistic or antiquarian interest; Musical instruments and accessories; Textile machinery and products, bricks, tiles, pottery and china ware; Mills, foundries and workshops for working in metal, wood or other materials; Produce-golas, co-operative stores, dairies and creameries; Banks and all forms of associated dealing in credit."

Article V of its memorandum of association, quoted below, shows how broad-based its membership is.

"V. The membership of the Visva-bharati and of its Constituent Bodies shall be open to all persons irrespective of sex, nationality, race, creed, caste or class and no test or condition shall be imposed as to religious belief or profession in admitting or appointing members, students, teachers, workers, or in any other connection whatsoever, except in respect of any particular benefaction accepted by the Visva-bharati of which such test is made a condition by the instrument creating such benefaction, provided however that no benefaction shall be accepted which in the opinion of the constituted authorities involves conditions or obligations opposed to the spirit and object of this clause. And provided further that nothing in this clause shall be deemed to prevent religious instruction being given in any manner approved

of by the authorities concerned to those not unwilling to receive it by teachers duly and properly authorised for that purpose."

We wish a long and successful career to the University. We hope that ere long some Jaina young men would be going to shanti-niketan to receive their education.

The Congress.

The 36th Session of the Indian National Congress that met at Ahmedabad was momentous. The audience was enormously great. Every delegate and visitor seemed to have realised in full their responsibilities to discharge their duty to their motherland. The brave and out-spoken spirit of the gathering may be seen from the fact that there was no great opposition to Mahatma Gandhi's resolution but by Mr. Hasrat Mohani who fought for a change in the Congress Creed in order to definitely lay down the attainment of Swaraj without the British Empire. Fortunately for India sobriety prevailed and Mahatma Gandhi won the day by declaring that he stood for the Congress Creed to remain in tact. To-day his hope of getting redress of the Khilafat and the Punjab wrongs through the British Government was ever so much greater than fifteen months ago. He warned all against alienating the sympathies of the moderates and others, making the present easy task one of great difficulty.

Mr. Gandhi's resolution is printed in full below.

"Whereas since the holding of the last National Congress the people of India have found from actual experience that by reason of the adoption of non-violent non-co-operation, the country has made a great advance in fearlessness, self-sacrifice and self-respeet and whereas the movement has greatly damaged the prestige of the Government aud whereas on the whole the country is rapidly progressing toward Swaraj, this Congress confirms the resolution adopted at the Special Session of the Congress at Calcutta and reaffirmed at Nagpur and places on record the fixed determination of the Congress to continue the programme of non-violent non-co-operation with greater vigour than hitherto in such a manner as each province may determine till the Punjab and Khilafat wrongs are redressed and Swaraj is established and the central authority of Government of India has passed into the hands of the people from irresponsible corporations and whereas the reason of the threat uttered by His Excellency the Viceroy in his recent speeches and the consequent repression started by the Government

of India in the various Provinces by way of disbandment of volunteer corps and forcible prohibition of public and even committee meetings in an illegal and high-handed manner and by the arrest of many Congress workers in several Provinces and whereas this repression is manifestly intended to stifle all Congress and Khilafat activities and deprive the public of their assistance, this Congress resolves that all the activities of the Congress be suspended as far as necessary and appeals to all quietly and without any demonstration to offer themselves for arrest by belonging to the volunteer organisations to be formed throughout the country."

Others resolutions are concerning these.—(1) The enlistment of Volunteers on a pledge (2) Exhorting all persons over 18 to immediately join the volunteer organisations (3) Suspension of all Congress activities in order to concentrate all attention on Civil disobedience (4) The appointment of Mahatma Gandhi as the sole executive authority of the Congress and investing him with the full powers of A. I. C. C. and also with the power to appoint a successor in emergency (5) Authorising neither Mahatma Gandhi nor his successors to conclude any terms of peace with Govt. of India or the British Govt. without the previous sanction of the A. I. C. C. to be finally ratified by a Sperial Congress (6) Congratulating all those patriots who are now undergoing imprisonment for the sake of their motherland.

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Laughing Gallery.

(*From all Sides.*)

Great minds have great thoughts. General Smuts thinks the best thing to do in the South African Indian question is "to induce Indians to return to their own country." We wonder how this genius managed to keep this discovery to himself so long!

* * *

An accused in the Gnrudwara case at Amritsar is said to have searched about in the Court room with a lighted Oandle for justice. He might have found justice in the Viceroy's residence, where it is always to be had in plenty.

* * *

A youth who had been taught that Socrates had a wife who was unpleasant to him and that the great philosopher drank hemlock, when asked the cause of his death replied, "Socrates died from an overdose of Wedlock."

Dharmaseelan Press, Madras.