

The Law of Duty:

CHECKED 1901 SUGGESTED

MORAL TEXT-BOOK,

BASED ON THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS TEACHING OF
DR. JAMES MARTINEAU.

PREPARED FOR

INDIAN STUDENTS

Madras:

PRINTED AT THE LAWRENCE ASYLUM PRESS—BY G. W. TAYLOR

1889.

PREFATORY NOTE.

THIS little work—of which only a small edition has been printed—is a tentative one, and invites criticism and suggestions from all who feel the need of the introduction of such a book. It has been prepared in view of the proposed Moral Text-book for use in Indian colleges and schools—a suggestion that emanated from the Education Commission, and has since been endorsed by the Government of India. The compiler is not sanguine enough to suppose that the book in its present form will satisfy that need : such a work will naturally have to pass through stages of adaptation and growth : but a beginning should be made somewhere and by some one.

The proposed Moral Text-book was to be “based on the fundamental principles of Natural Religion.” Theism is now the belief of all English-educated Hindus who profess to have a religion : and as an education, if it is to be worth having, must be based on a firm moral foundation, so it is on a theistic basis that any theory of Ethics worthy of the name must take its stand. Correspondence with some scholars in England, who have made the subject their special study—among them Principal Fairbairn of Oxford—led to the adoption of Dr. James Martineau’s two recent works, (a) “Types of Ethical Theory,” and (b) “A Study of Religion,” as the basis of the Text-book. These are now recognized as the best

standard works on Ethics and Natural Religion ; and they have been most favourably received by Native papers in this country as well as by Journals at home. The special fitness of Dr. Martineau to be a guide to Indian thought, (under the required conditions of religious neutrality,) lies not merely in his being a Theist rather than an orthodox Christian ; but in his Theism being more intelligible and more akin to the Hindu mind than that of Butler, Paley, Flint, and other writers, while pervaded, at the same time, by a rare scientific insight. His Ethics—in which a prominent place is given to Reverence and Veracity—and his Religion are both based on the underlying intimate relation between the individual soul and the universal Spirit—a thought so dear to the highest Hindu conception. Dr. Martineau's "Study of Religion" has been selected as the Text-book in Natural Theology in the B.A. Honours Course of the Calcutta University ; so that a Moral Text-book based on his teaching would be in harmony with the spirit of that University, and would, in an elementary stage, lead up to its highest study.

Having carefully perused these two works, the present writer felt that if Dr. Martineau's own positive teaching, detached from its historical and controversial setting, (which forms the bulk of the works), could be presented to Indian students, in a somewhat simplified and popularised form, it could not fail to do them an immense amount of good ; especially at the present crisis of their social and national life.

This has been here attempted, with supplementary and explanatory paragraphs; while a considerable portion of the work is devoted to sketches of illustrative types of lofty character and heroic deeds, where special prominence is given to such virtues as courage, self-sacrifice, veracity and fidelity. Morals may be best taught through biography; and the sacred flame of noble convictions and lofty conduct is best communicated through the examples of manly and devoted lives.

It will perhaps be thought at first sight that the work is more like a treatise on Ethics than a Moral Text-book; and that the chapters on Religion are too philosophical. This has been felt by the writer himself; but he thinks that the objection will be found to be more apparent than real; and that, in the hands of a competent and sympathetic teacher, it would not prove too difficult. The preparation of a book that might be read alike in Matriculation and in B.A. classes, is, however, not an easy matter; and possibly this one, in its entirety, would have to be restricted to colleges, and the biographical portions, with a few other selections, be found suitable for schools. Still, if carefully and continuously read, the teaching will be seen to be of a very practical nature: and the purity and vigour of Dr. Martineau's English—in itself a study of the highest order—and his fondness for not only ingenious but highly instructive and often humorous metaphors and illustrations—his disposition to think not in the abstract but in the concrete—render his deepest teachings clear and attractive.

Moreover, it has been assumed that the kind of book now called for was intended to be something more

than a Moral Reader ; that its study should prove a mental discipline as well as a moral training ; that it should be systematic rather than fragmentary in form—the Ethics and the Religion being mutually related and dependent, and constituting together a complete whole. The one subject throughout—the lesson to be pressed home on the student—is the LAW OF DUTY ; but this would be very imperfectly presented without a brief criticism of the human consciousness, as implying a kindred universal Consciousness, and would be useless if the principles of Morality were not shown to be principles of Reason, and grounded in Eternal Truth. Both Natural Law and Moral Law are represented as having their seat in the Divine Being ; thus yielding a kindred Morality in God and man, and, hence, the possibility of a communion between the two.

The book thus deals, not with philosophical subtleties, but with moral realities, where the divine majesty of Conscience is supreme—the authority of God being enforced through the authority of Conscience. The young are taught to understand moral distinctions, and to see the issues of moral conflict : they are counselled to take their stand on a few great convictions, and never to flinch from them ; to feel that goodness and truth are worth living for, fighting for, and dying for : they are made familiar with a ‘ *Scale of worth* ’ among their springs of action ; are shewn that they must come to the dividing of the ways, and make choice between a motive that is lofty and a motive that is mean ; that they must set DUTY above pleasurable

inclination and selfish gratification, and exercise rational SELF-SACRIFICE for noble ends.

In Part II., which treats of Religion, the two great sources of religious belief are briefly presented, viz., (a) the principle of Causality, and (b) the sense of Moral Obligation. Under the first head will be found much useful and interesting information bearing on Design in Nature, which would afford instructive and stimulating reading in any fairly advanced class-room.

With regard to the printed form of the book, all of Dr. Martineau's *ipsissima verba* (which have been retained wherever practicable) is set forth in the smaller type—excluding, however, the chapter headings and lines of poetry, for which he must not be held responsible. Throughout the work, and especially in Chapters VI. and VII., which are also in small type, brevity and simplicity necessitated abridgment and slight alteration; but the Doctor's exact words are always within inverted commas. Many valuable and striking paragraphs have thus had to be reluctantly sacrificed; and the one anxiety has been, lest, in the process adopted, the work of the great master should be marred.

With these explanatory observations this little book is left to its fate. Whether it has succeeded to any extent, or failed altogether, is for its critics to determine. Should it never be used for the express purpose for which it has been prepared, it may yet find a place and meet a want; and help some seeking souls to take a firmer foot-hold in the path of Morality and Religion.

April, 1889.

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PART I.

MORALS.

Introduction.

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.”—*Pope.*

“Stern Lawgiver ! yet thou dost wear
The Godhead’s most benignant grace ;
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face :
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,
And fragrance in thy footing treads
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh
and strong.”—*Wordsworth.*

Veracity of our
faculties. “The first condition of a sound mind is to plant a
firm trust on all beliefs and feelings
involved in the very exercise of the
natural faculties.” The first condition,
alike of science and of ethics, is faith in the true :
and there is no reason why we should doubt the
veracity of our own faculties. As we cannot get out-
side ourselves, or test the faculties we have by some
other faculties which we have not, we cannot but trust
our faculties, or be the victims of universal scepticism.
We may not be able to prove these things which all
men believe ; but others believe them and act on them
as much as we do.

Knowledge
implies distinction. We cannot know an object except by *distinguishing*
it, in some way or other, either from
ourselves, the knowers, or from other
objects with which it can either be
compared or contrasted. This is the essential law of
our intelligence.

“Both the perceptive faculty and the moral faculty give us a *Self* and an *Other than Self*: in the former, it is *Self* and *Nature*, in the latter, *Self* and *God*. To believe in nothing *beyond* the *Self*, is to resolve everything outside the mind into a subjective dream, is to say that ‘Mind makes nature,’ i.e., that Nature is purely an ideal fiction of our thought; it is also to make the mind its own law-giver—its own god—which is absurd, since nothing can be *binding* to us that is not higher than we. Conscience does not *frame* the law that holds us; it simply *reveals* it. Honour is higher than appetite, not because we *feel* it so; but we feel it to be so, because it is so.”

On the other hand, to believe in nothing beyond material Nature, is to say that ‘Nature makes mind,’ i.e., that our minds are the mere camera on which the world of reality throws its various images.

Thus I can only know the world in which I live by distinguishing it from myself who live in it; just as I can only know God because I start from my own consciousness, with which I contrast His. All knowledge thus implies at least two terms. Apart from knowing other things I cannot know myself, for knowledge implies distinction, and Self could never be known except in the apprehension of what is not Self: and unless I start from myself, together with all my powers and feelings and aspirations, God is for me unknowable.

“We begin, then, with the *self-conscious man*, as the better known. We must be able to know ourselves, for we are continually *telling* our own thoughts, and feelings, and purposes; and if we tell them, we must know them; and know them by self-reflection. They are thus real *facts* which we have shown to us. The sense of shame is as *true* as the sound of thunder; and as different from it as it is true. Hence a *classification* of

mental phenomena, involving an inner order, and thence the discovery of *Law* become inevitable."

What, then, as a matter of experience, do I find in my intelligence ?

The Perceptive Faculty.

(1). Apart from all the different states and phases of my consciousness, I find I believe in my own personality and self-hood, as the indispensable permanent condition without which they could not exist. *Therefore I believe in my own Self as a reality.* There is a 'Person Within,' who is behind the phenomena of the internal world. Mere sensations and feelings are not independent realities; there could be no such things without a sentient being, a feeling consciousness. It is of man only that we can predicate consciousness in the full sense of the term. "Nature," says Schelling, "sleeps in the plant, dreams in the animal, wakes in the man." The concrete reality is '*I feel.*' It is 'I' that am conscious of a series of successive feelings. The 'I' or 'Ego' is the underlying reality of all sensations. The sensations pass away, but 'I' remain; and I am conscious that I have felt them: and this is as different from the sensation itself as any thing can be. It is just because there is a conscious *Self* capable of retaining its identity throughout a continuous flow of sensations, and of remembering them, that sensations can gather round it. Further, sensations are before and after one another; but the self-conscious 'Ego' that knows them is above the ever passing phenomena of time, and is itself the ground of time. It is this timeless consciousness which connects the past with the present, that enables us to recall those whom we saw years ago; and that thus makes experience possible. Forgetfulness is thus not the

Belief in personal identity.

The Self different from sensations.

What is forgetfulness?

real forgetting of the facts of life by the self-conscious 'Ego;' but only the withholding of them from expression in our phenomenal life. So in dreamless sleep, dreamless sleep; we seem to lose our self-consciousness and past experience; but it is not really so, as we see on waking, when we recognise the relation between our experience before sleep and after. It is only our phenomenal life that suffers a suspense; and the 'Ego' only ceases for a time to be the subject of that flow of sensations and ideas which make up this life.

Surely this implies the presence and action in us of an Eternal Consciousness, as the ground and cause of our life: and to conceive of Him as thus living in us—the very Life of our life—is true Theism.

The first judgment or axiom, then, on which experience is based, is the principle of *personal identity*, according to which a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. It is this that makes reason and all knowledge possible and trustworthy. Apart from this belief, nothing is true and nothing false. Without this absolute beginning, thought has no existence, or it revolves for ever in a circle.

(2). "But we also, (psychologically), know *more than ourselves*; and what is thus known must be something *unlike* the knower; for knowledge, as we have seen, implies distinction. The eye sees, not vision, but light. It is undeniable that we seem to ourselves to have cognisance of external things; and there is no reason to distrust this primary judgment. The same act which reveals the 'Ego' reveals no less the 'non-Ego'—the Other than Self, or Nature; and in learning ourselves, we discover what is beyond and above ourselves."

The growth and progress of my ideas necessitate for me the belief that there is a settled order of things

outside me; with which I progressively get into communion. *Therefore I believe in the world as a reality.* And every man who studies science, or enters into society, or eats a meal, or takes exercise for the promotion of health and enjoyment, *acts* on the belief in an external world.

After the principle of identity, reason gives us the ideas of Time and Space—conceptions that are woven into all our thinking and imagining. In the very act of apprehending an *object*, we are, by the very law of our thought, compelled to think of it as occupying a *place in Space*; and in the very act of apprehending an *event*, we are, by the very law of our thought, compelled to think of it as occupying a *period in Time*. If we never perceived an object, the conception of Space would never wake up in us: if we never noted an occurrence, the conception of Time would never come to us. But the first touch of experience quickens into realisation these latent ‘forms’ of our thought.

But there is a third idea which wakes in our thought the moment we move among outward objects—and that is the idea of *Cause*. The very first resistance our movement meets, flashes upon us this pregnant conception. It is from our own personal experience—from the exercise of our will—that we first gain the idea of Cause; and we discover an antithetic relation between Self and not-Self; thus getting hold of our primary belief in man and the world. I explain my own activity by the notion of myself as Causal Will; and attribute the various phenomenal acts that follow, to the central power within me which is myself or *my Will*. Thus Cause signifies the relation of phenomena to *something which is not phenomenal*,

but real ; and we transfer the idea of Cause, which we first gain from ourselves, to external phenomena, as the key by which to explain them. When we trace the origin of these ideas—Space, Time, and Cause—to the very make of our minds, we have the strongest presumption that they reflect the *reality* of things.

Reality of these ideas.

(3). Thus all my knowledge of the outside world leads me up to the conclusion that there exists some Eternal Being as its source and its upholder ; a ‘Person Without,’ who is behind the phenomena of the external world : and *therefore I believe in God as Cause.*

Belief in God as Cause.

When I attempt to explain Nature, I apply the conception which I have already learnt from myself, and look upon the phenomena of Nature as themselves due to some Causal Will ; and this, being non-phenomenal Will, is God. Thus all that happens in Nature has one kind of Cause, and that Cause a *Will like ours*. Further, if Will supplies whatever meaning there is in the word causality, it must be taken to include *intention*, for Will is of the very essence of intention or purpose ; and so we are led, by an *à priori* necessity, to look upon the universe no less than upon the person of a fellow-man, as pervaded by intellectual power, and must assume *purpose to be everywhere*. If evolution means the development of the better and the higher from the lower and the worse, it necessitates the conception of some grand presiding plan which the long histories of the world are slowly working out ; and such a plan or purpose cannot be an unconscious one. In this way we discover the signs and evidences of God’s causal volition in Nature.

This Cause a Will like ours.

Will includes intention.

The Moral Faculty.

“ But we have within us, not only a *perceptive* faculty, but a *moral* faculty, or conscience. Each faculty is supreme in its own sphere ; perception, among the objects of sense ; conscience as to the conditions of duty : so that the one faculty has no need and no claim to contradict the other. Moral objects cannot be handled and tasted ; and sensible objects cannot be appreciated by the moral faculty : the two faculties have different spheres.

[Note — It is to be understood that by different ‘faculties’ is meant, not separate *agents*, but distinct *functions* of one and the same self. The proper *subject* is always the Ego, which *knows, wills, feels* ; the *knowing* function being never absent in man from either of the other two, as in the inferior animals.]

“ Now we have seen that, on the simple testimony of our perceptive faculty, we believe in both the perceived object and perceiving self ; and what we readily grant to the testimony of perception, we must as readily concede to the implicit beliefs of our moral consciousness.”

Looking then from the religious side ; just as all my knowledge of the outside world leads me up to God as Cause, so I also learn that my moral feeling of obligation within, leads me to the conclusion that there exists some Eternal Power that ordains the obligation ; and *therefore I believe in God as Perfection*,—the source and upholder of the *moral* life of the world. Since we cannot rid ourselves of the conviction that causation is a veritable fact, and means *more* than succession and contiguity and sequence, so we have the same irresistible conviction that moral responsibility is also a fact. Indeed, the primary fact of our moral nature is the sense of *ethical obligation*. Moral conduct can only be conceived as *conscious obedience to law*, in other words, as a rational act. The theory of the moral law must be founded in

reason. To make it a mere deduction from experience, is to reduce right and wrong to a question of temperament, of surroundings, of latitude and longitude.

It is Conscience that *reveals* the law, and the Will, as the subject, that is bound to *obey* it.

Conscience re-
veals Law: 'This fact,—viz., the feeling that we are constrained by duty while at the same time free in the application of our limited powers,—compels us to postulate a higher Will to which ours is under obligation; to seek a higher unity. Conscience gives us *the Law of Duty*; and in so doing, it implicitly recognises a source of obligation, viz., also a Lawgiver. a Divine Being *who gives us the law*.

Tennyson, in one of his profoundest poems, ascribes moral authority to "heaven-descended will;" and it is the unique characteristic of conscience that it associates man's sense of his own personality with his apprehension of the personality of God. Morals are thus connected with God or the Universal Spirit, on the one hand, and with man, on the other. The human consciousness implies a kindred universal consciousness, yielding therefore a kindred law in the individual and the universal. The law is original in the Universal Spirit, and derivative in man; and it is manifested in the individual, in order that through him the end of the universal may be fulfilled.

A kindred law
in God and man.

Thus man in his own personal life recognises the double power; the power of the Universal Will which meets him as Cause in all the natural laws of creation, and the power of the Moral yoke which is fastened on his own individual will, to keep him loyal to all the higher springs of action whenever they compete with the lower for his allegiance, and to punish him with remorse and self-abasement whenever he is disloyal to the Moral Law within him.

Turning now to our Moral Consciousness, ~~what do~~
we find ?

CHAPTER I.

Fundamental Ethical Fact.

[“There is an instinct, a sentiment of what is good and right that Providence has engraven on all hearts, which is anterior to reason, and which leads the philosophers of all ages to the same fundamental principles of Ethics.”—*Turgot*.]

“As men, we instinctively pass judgments of right and wrong. We *approve* what is right; recognise merit; and express our sympathy by assigning honour to a righteous act; we *disapprove* what is wrong; recognise demerit; and are constrained to award disgrace in order to mark our displeasure. Language is a faithful and abiding record of our natural and spontaneous feelings. The very word *Morals* (Latin *Mores*) means established ways or habits, which implies that the sentiments of right and wrong are the characteristics of human nature. Similarly, as an individual, I speak of *my Duty*, which expresses that there is something *due* from me—which I *owe*—which I *ought* to do: there is a *debt* which others have a *right to demand* from us, and which we are *bound* to pay. There is something within that *binds* or (Latin) *obliges* us to act in a certain way; and which implies that there is a *rule of usage* without us. This class of words is embedded in human speech; and as long as the *words* are there, the *ideas* they express cannot be destroyed.”

Amid diversities of men, arising from nationality or party or sect, there are certain *universally recognised facts and truths* which all receive. All are agreed, *e.g.*, that we *ought* to live in harmony with the physical world, that we *ought* to keep our appetites and passions under the control of an enlightened intelligence, and that we *ought* to conduct ourselves in full sympathy with our own nature, and with the nature of things around us. Act in accordance with your

nature, was the ancient Stoical maxim ; which means the same as the grand Shakesperian canon of being true to oneself. Be what you are, *i.e.*, what you *ought* to be. For man to realise his idea or his true nature, is to realise his ideal. In matters of pleasure and enjoyment, we *ought* to act consistently with all we know to be right ; we ought *not* to live in our animal nature in such a way as to destroy our social nature or our religious character. We *ought* to live in obedience to the laws of our being. So, too, we recognise our *obligation* to do that which tends to form and enlarge our social relations, in our own homes and in society. Conduct which tends to alienate man from man, which leads to class feeling, and which creates the spirit of hatred in a community, all acknowledge to be *wrong* conduct.

Objects of Moral Judgment.

(1). “ *What is it that we judge, i.e., condemn or approve ?*

We judge persons, not things. *Persons* exclusively, and not *things*. We do not applaud the gold mine, nor blame the destructive storm. Objects of nature, or products of art, are wholly indifferent to Conscience ; and if ever we invest them with ethical epithets, it is by poetical personification, and because we regard them as the possession of some *mind*. When we *approve* a horse, or *condemn* a ship, or *admire* a picture, we have in mind the skill of the producer. The approbation or disapprobation which we feel towards human actions is directed towards them as *personal* phenomena : their moral character goes forward with them out of the person, and is not reflected back upon them from their effects. Benefit or mischief may accrue as a *consequence* ; but there are in themselves wholly characterless.”

Moral obligation has reference to our *acts* themselves, and not to their *results*. Its motto is, *Do what you ought, come what may*. To show that certain conduct is likely to result in ‘agreeable feeling’ to the individual or to others or to posterity, is not to invest

Morality in acts,
not in results.

an act with 'moral obligation.' At best, they are ~~moral~~ motives, the strength of which will be found to vary indefinitely as characters or circumstances vary. Are we not often under the obligation of acting quite irrespective of the *future*? Nor can the fear of the police constable, punishment inflicted by law, or public opinion, ever explain the moral sense. The idea of 'right' or 'moral good' is an idea that stands by itself, and cannot be resolved into any other, such as the idea of 'happiness' or 'pleasure' or 'greatest usefulness.' 'Moral' is one genus; 'natural consequences,' meaning pains or pleasures, another genus. The idea of 'right' is an ultimate and intuitive perception, like that of 'sweetness,' 'colour,' 'beauty.' Since every human being has the capacity of acquiring it, it is innate in man. It is not due to experience as a cause; nor does it depend for its obligation on calculations taken from experience. 'I ought' to do so and so, because it is morally right for *me* in the given circumstance: 'I ought not', because it is morally wrong for *me*.

(2). "It follows that what we judge is always the *inner spring* of an action, as distinguished from its outward operation; that is to say, classes of conduct are to be distinguished not according to external circumstances, but according to the *motives* involved. According to the Sermon on the Mount, the eye of lust and the heart of hate are called to account with the adulterer and the murderer: and our moral consciousness declares that the worth of goodness is not to be measured by the scale of its external benefits, by the magnitude of the result, but by the purity of the source."

An act may be apparently good, but really bad. We may *feign* kindness and generosity, while we are *really actuated* by low and selfish motives, seeking only our own interests. A politician, desir-

Acts outwardly good, but inwardly bad.

ous of making his own position secure, may become a great benefactor to his people: he does not *really care* about the sorrows he soothes and the gifts he bestows; he is only thinking of himself—his own name and fame. Utilitarian morality is bound to commend him; since the action, measured by its external benefits, is good, and it has nothing to do with a man's motives: but from the standpoint of moral obligation, he has not done a single good action. Hypocrisy, so long as not discovered, may produce the same *effect* as virtue. When once the *motive* of an act is left out of view, and the act itself only estimated by its *result*, morality has lost its *inward sanction*.

(3). "If moral quality is thus discerned in the *inner spring of action*, it can be known, in the first instance, only by internal self-consciousness; though it is at the same time evident that the *presence of others* is indispensable to the development of this part of our nature; just as external objects are requisite to the unfolding of our perceptive power. In both instances, the non-Ego is the means of discovering us to ourselves; and the two discoveries are simultaneous.

(4). "Were the inner spring of action a mere blind force propelling us, we should pass upon it no moral judgment. An animal, driven hither and thither by impulsive instincts, is no more liable to be approved or condemned than a lunatic. Such impulses do not constitute *character*.

We judge not mere impulses but volitions. We judge only our *volitions*. The *moral life* dwells exclusively in the voluntary sphere; and but for that would have no existence.

(5). "In the voluntary state, then, there must be not less than *two impulses* present at the same time. If we did not see one spring of action side by side with *some other spring of action*, we could not judge it. In explaining the process of choice, it is evident that two or more conflicting inner impulses must exist in the mind *together*; giving rise to comparison, deliberation, preference, volition. and it depends upon *us*, and not upon them, which of them we follow. It is because we feel conscious of being *their* master,

and not they ours, that we *reproach* ourselves when we take a wrong course. We feel the solicitations to be mere *phenomena*, but brought before a *personality* that is more than a phenomenon—a free and judicial Ego able to

This involves free-will *decide* between claimants that have entered our court. Either free-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion. The ordinary rule, which, in awarding penalties of wrong, takes into consideration the presence or absence of violent temptation, assumes a *personal power of resistance* never wholly crushed, but sometimes severely strained. Moral judgment postulates moral freedom—a personal power of preference in relation to the inner suggestions and springs of action that present their claims."

Appetite and Reason.

Two brethren travelling together, whereof one was esteemed wise, the other little better than a fool, came

A Parable.

to a place where the ways parted. The foolish brother, espying one of them to be fair and pleasant, and the other dirty and uneven, would needs go that way, though his wiser brother told him that in all reason that must needs be the wrong way and a dangerous one; but he followed his own eyes, not his brother's reason: and his brother being more kind than wise, though against his reason, followed his foolish brother. They went on and fell into the hands of thieves, who robbed them, and imprisoned them till they could redeem themselves with a sum of money. These brothers accuse each other before the king as author of each other's evil. The wiser complained that his brother would not obey him, though he was known to be wiser and spake according to reason. The other complained of him for following him that was the fool, affirming that he would certainly have returned back had he seen his brother confident and following his own reason. The king condemned them both: the fool, because he did not follow the direction of the wise,—and the wise because he followed the wilfulness of the fool. So will God deal with us at the day of judgment in the scrutinies of conscience. If appetite refuse to follow reason, and reason do not refuse to follow appetite, they have both of them taken incompetent courses, and shall perish together.—*Jeremy Taylor.*

To follow desire is to live an animal life. To choose between our desires, to control them, to exercise

Will, is to act like men. Aristotle truly says that a man is the father of his actions as he is of his children. Who reproaches a man born blind? but we justly reproach one who becomes blind *through vicious habits*.

Man alone is free, for he exists for himself; and is an individual, in the completest sense; and more than

that, he is a person. 'Thing,' 'individual,' 'person,' as the scholastics have it, (*ens, suppositum, hypostasis*); these are the three degrees in the evolution of being. With the dawn of reason, which rendered man's liberty possible, he became master of his fate, by emancipating himself from the yoke of instinct, as no other animal is emancipated. A *free volition*, of which the presentiments and germs may be found in the lower animals, is the essence of *personality*. It is the basis, as of ethics, so of jurisprudence and of politics. It is to personality that 'rights' attach, and all rights imply correlative duties; while from each duty there issues a right.

The liberty of the individual is of course not absolute.

It has limitation in its own organism and in society. The law of heredity, and social environment and circumstances, *influence* us; the spirit of the age (*Zeit-geist*) *moulds* us; but these do not *determine* our moral life. As to present character, we are ourselves *forming* it, little by little, by the direction we are ourselves giving to our lives. No man is *of necessity* what he is; and although one may have greater difficulties to contend with than another, yet no man is doomed because of the past, or because of present environment. The foul stream of heredity may be in great measure turned back; and even the heredity of evil be turned into an heredity of goodness. The great lesson to be learned from the law of

Lesson heredity teaches

heredity is the sense of *personal responsibility* that rests on each ; for our lives will either prove a curse or a blessing to those who spring from us.

The elements of our physical constitution are determined in great part by the way in which our ancestors *chose* to live. It is the same with the moral temperament we inherit. Our heritage of good or ill is due to the *free* acts of past generations. So that, when we come to reflect, we find that our social environment into which we are born has been *itself* formed in the past by powerful individualities. "The great difference between nations in which healthy political religious revolutions have occurred, and those which have stuck fast in the rut of superannuated traditions, is due to the appearance of powerful pioneers who have prepared the way of progress by a supreme act of liberty." The idea of *adaptation* can never be identified with that of obligation. Duty constantly requires us to break with our social environment, as did Socrates, to run counter to it, and rise above it. The grandest passages in history have been those in which pioneers of progress have fallen victims to the social persecutions of their times. By the free self-devotion of one brave citizen, the most cruel crimes have been abolished.

The Roman thirst for gladiatorial shows was not quenched for full one hundred years after Rome had been, in name, a Christian city. After the defeat of the Goths, under Alaric, on Easter Day, A.D. 403, the joy of the city was consummated by a savage combat in the Coliseum, which proved to be the last. The people were applauding the cruel sport, when a bareheaded and barefooted Christian hermit sprang into the arena, and called upon them to cease from the shedding of innocent blood. He was met by angry opposition, and

Illustration from
Roman history.

with the words, "Back, old man!" "On, gladiators!" But still he stood between them, striving to be heard. "Down with him," they cried; and the gladiator laid him dead. He had met the death he had nobly resolved upon; but not in vain. The hard hearts of the people relented; and from that day "there was never another fight of gladiators." The barbarous custom was abolished throughout the Empire. That one supreme act of self-sacrifice on the part of an obscure individual, wiped from the earth the crime of centuries.

CHAPTER II.

Mode of Moral Judgment.

"Yet still there whispers the small voice within,
Heard through gain's silence, and o'er glory's din:
Whatever creed be taught, or land be trod,
Man's conscience is the oracle of God."—*Byron*.

"We have now to determine how the mind proceeds in estimating its own impulses and volitions.

(1). "When two conflicting and incompatible influences appear *at once*, and contest the field, we are made aware of their difference, and are driven to judge between them. The moment this condition is realized, we are sensible of a contrast between them—not analogous to the difference between loud and soft, or between red and sour—but in the sense that one is *higher*, *worthier* than the other, and in comparison with it, has a clear *right to us*: a notion that is unique and unanalysable. A child, *e.g.*, not above the seductions of the jam-closet, finding himself alone in that too trying place, makes hurried inroads upon the sweet-meats within tempting reach; but has scarcely sucked the traces from his fingers before he is ready to sink into the earth with compunction, well knowing that the appetite he has indulged is *meaner* than the integrity he has violated. A passionate boy will vent his impatience on any inanimate object that obstructs his purpose, but let his paroxysm spend itself on a sister, and send her wounded and crying away; and the instant remorse brings home to him how much *higher* is the affection

Impulses 'higher' and 'lower.'

he has slighted than the resentment he has allowed. The thirsty traveller, alone in the desert, would seize without a thought, the draught from a spring; but if he have a companion dying of fever, he knows that his appetite must give *precedence* to his compassion, and he holds the cup of cold water first to another's lips.* In these cases, which are fair representations of all our moral experience, the impulses appear at once in their true relative light when their field is disputed by a rival. And no analysis or research is required; we cannot follow both; and their claims are decided by a glance at their face.

"But the terms 'higher' and 'lower' are *comparatives*. In what scale is one impulse 'higher' and another 'lower'? Of pleasure? Not so, or I should enjoy the stolen sweet-meats without drawback, instead of being ashamed at them. Of beauty? Not so, for I have no such feeling from my pug-nose, though I wish it were straight. The sort of good whose degrees affect me here involves a sense of *Moral worth*, and a consciousness that I am *not at liberty*, though perfectly able, to go with the lower impulse.

(2). "We thus have light thrown on the whole method of the moral sentiments. Each pair of impulses, that competes for our will, enters the field in turn, reveals its competitive place and claims, and falls into the line of appointed order.

We thus become sensible of a *Graduated Scale of Excellence* among our natural principles, as acknowledged by our own comparing Self-consciousness; quite distinct from the order of their intensity, and irrespective of the range of their external effects.

(3). "The sensibility of the mind to the gradations of this scale is precisely what we call *Conscience*;—
 Conscience. the *knowledge with one's Self* of the better and worse; and the more delicate the knowing faculty, the finer are the shades perceived. Whoever feels no difference of worth between one impulse and another, or only a difference resembling a relish in one viand that is not in another, and yields himself alike to appetite or affection, to resentment or compassion, is without a conscience. It is of the very essence of duty to feel that we have *no right* to dispose of ourselves by caprice; and it is only in proportion as a man is alive to *other differences* than those of pleasantness among the several springs of action, that he has an awakened moral sentiment. Conscience is thus the critical perception we have of the relative authority of our several principles of

action; and its proper place is to watch the forces of our nature, and keep everything in its place."

The *diversity* of Moral Judgments among men is much more concerned with what is wrong, by way of excusing it, than with what is right, by way of condemning it. The first principles of morals are self-evident truths, of which a reasoned contradiction cannot be given. There is very general agreement as to the forms of rectitude, such as truthfulness, justice, benevolence. And yet we find that the rational nature of man can accept and act upon a tacit contradiction of these first principles.

The explanation is that there are *dispositions* belonging to our nature, and impelling to action, such as selfishness and malice, which may lead to both wrong *acting* and erroneous *thinking*. Such dispositions, which sway the conduct, have power to bias the judgments. What a man inclines to do, that he is ready to think right. Further, while there may be no difficulty in deciding as to what is morally right, and right in all circumstances, there is often great difficulty in adapting the general principles to particular cases. But all such diversity of opinion does not concern the *standard* of moral distinctions, only the *application* of the standard. Men may agree that benevolence is morally right, and yet may differ as to the duty of helping a beggar. Add to this the fact that prevailing opinions may be accepted on authority, without independent investigation; and that the practice sanctioned may often be in harmony with an evil disposition common to our nature. Where social custom establishes a practice, unreasoning acqui-

essence is easy. And once more, the moral sentiments

False judgments. cluster around a false judgment, as readily as around a true. If a man,

whether correctly or incorrectly, only approve an action, he will experience self-approbation in doing it; while a sense of shame and remorse will follow disapproval. If an Indian believes that the Deity requires him to wash in the Ganges, he may have a sense of remorse in neglecting what he regards as duty. Moral sanctions may thus gather around even gross immorality. But all these divergencies do not affect the reality of self-evident moral principles; and man, as a rational being, in deciding every question of morals, may either seek a clear view of moral

A clear view of
Moral Law requir-
ed.

law, and so accept self-evident truth, capable of vindication by every test; or he may accept a current rule of conduct, the rational insufficiency of which may be proved at every step. (See Calderwood's *Hand-book of Moral Philosophy*, pp. 83—87.)

Marcus Aurelius.

History affords many examples of noble lives, whose morality has been based on Conscience alone—lives that have conformed to virtue as ‘the highest reason,’ and as possible under all circumstances. Ancient history has no finer moral figure than the Stoic Emperor, Marcus Aurelius; “one of these consoling and hope-inspiring marks which stand for ever to remind our weak and easily discouraged race how high human goodness and perseverance have once been carried, and may be carried again:” in whose

His
tions.’

‘Meditations,’ or jottings in a common place-book, we have, as it has been said, “a kind of common creed of wise men,” and “the moral back-bone of all universal

religions": and in whose beautiful character and natural virtues we see his own ethical system illustrated. Bearing in mind its defective agnosticism, its ignorance of any true scheme of the universe, and the absence of any definite belief in an unseen spiritual world, where virtue struggled after here may be attained and eternally enjoyed—its want, therefore, of adequate motive—we may study it with great advantage, as commending itself by its clearness and certainty to every educated mind, since its morality is based, not on any difficult form of belief, but on Conscience alone.

Peculiarly susceptible to good influences, it was from his mother, he tells us, that he
 His teachers, first "learned to abstain not only from doing evil but even from thinking it"; and from his tutor Rusticus, a Stoic philosopher, that he was taught to look not at words but things; and from the discourses of Epictetus, the slave, that he learned "how to live a free man, superior to all earthly conditions, moved solely from within, his own master, daunted by nothing, allured by nothing:" while from his adopted father, and predecessor, Antoninus Pius, a man of singular simplicity and self-control, his general character was greatly moulded and stimulated. Thus trained, he was able, as Emperor, to govern with true sagacity and magnanimity, since he says he "found nothing better in life than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude."

No one can study his 'Meditations' without being brought to love goodness, and to see that virtue is its own reward: that every man should be as good as possible; and that he cannot be called good till he produces good actions as naturally as a tree brings forth fruit. Here are a few of his
 His wise say- wise sayings that lose nothing by repetition: "When thou hast assumed these

names—good, modest, true, rational, equal-minded, magnanimous,—take care that thou dost not change these names ; and, if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them.” “Thou hast not leisure to read. But thou hast leisure to check arrogance; thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people.” “As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has caught the game, a bee when it has made its honey, so a man when he has done a good act does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another act as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.” “What more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it, just as if the eye demanded recompense for seeing or the feet for walking”? “All things soon pass away and become a mere tale And what is even an eternal fame? A mere nothing. What then is that for which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one thing, thoughts just and acts social and words which never lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all that happens.” Believing that all things form one whole, and, though he knows not how, are well and wisely governed, each part is to find its good in ministering to the good of the whole, and in manifesting perfect resignation. “The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all when it becomes an abscess or tumour on the universe. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature In the next place the soul does violence to itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with the intention of injuring him.”

Add to this Stoical resignation and belief in the unity of things, that hope for the individual and the race, which has been

His defect.

born in later times through the teachings of a higher than Aurelius, and you may touch his beautiful marble system into life.*

CHAPTER III.

Theory of Prudence.

"A glorious thing is prudence,
And they are useful friends,
Who are chary of beginnings,
Until they've seen the ends :
But give us now and then the man,
That we may crown him king,
Whose Justice scorns the consequence
That he may do this thing."

"At this point it becomes necessary to discriminate *Prudential* judgment from *Moral* judgment.

OBJECTS OF PRUDENTIAL JUDGMENT.

(1). "While the objects of *Moral* preference are the *springs of action within us*, the objects of *prudential* preference are the *effects of action upon us*. Shall we smart for what we do? or shall we gain by it? Shall we suffer less, shall we profit more, by *this* course or by *that*? These are the questions, and the only ones, that are asked in the counsels of prudence. Happiness, security, content, are there the grand ends in view. It is *sentient* good that attracts the eye, and directs the will.

(2). "Thus prudence is an affair of *foresight*; moral judgment of *insight*. The one appreciates what *will be*; the other what immediately *is*. Hence the two do not stand in the same relation to *experience*. We cannot tell, till we have tried, whither our propensities will lead us; but in *self-knowledge*, the inner eye is ever open from the first: though it remains open only to those who sacredly use and guard it. Unfaithfulness inevitably impairs and corrupts the native insight; and then the substitute to which men turn is always their foresight. To the very nature of moral dis-

* For an interesting description of Marcus Aurelius and his 'Meditations,' see an article in the *Madras Christian College Magazine*, by Dr. Marcus Dodds—February, 1888.

cernment it is essential that it be spontaneous, and not a product of experience. Conscience is given; prudence is found."

The eye of conscience is open from the first, and passes its moral judgment at a glance; Abuse of Con- no research or experience is required. science.

But infidelity to conscience and to personal conviction, a disregard of the higher calls of duty, or a yielding to evil dispositions—envy, malice, selfishness, prejudice—injures, and may destroy, the inner sight. Only if the eye is single, is there a true and undivided vision; it beholds what is right, because it rightly beholds. The eye that is evil has a false and divided vision; it beholds what is false, because it falsely beholds. Here, not the blind, but the blinded fall; for the inner light is not only obscured, but it misleads. Nor can any one fix a direct and clear-sighted gaze towards truth, who is casting side-glances all the while on prudential prospects; asking, whether gain or loss will follow. Conscience needs to be kept "quick as the apple of an eye;" sensitive to sin and shame, and strictly true. Though it is Polonius who preaches, yet we must applaud the sentiment:—

"This above all—to *thine own self be true*,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou can'st not then be false to any man."

(3). "Further, it is the law of prudence to gratify the tendencies in the order of their eagerness, and live chiefly in the indulgence of the ruling passion, whatever that may be. Prudence is self-surrender to the *strongest* impulse; Duty is self-surrender to the *highest*,"

(4). "When we yield to any vehement impulse, certain corrective consequences follow, either in the compunction of our own mind, or in the indignation of our fellow-men; and this is because the spring of our action is not, in our own estimation, or in theirs, *the highest*, whose authority we might have been

expected to obey. Such sentiments are expressive of a moral

A moral nature
universal.

nature, familiar with the notions of right and wrong; and we see that the scale of excellence is identical and constant for all men. No one objects to the recognition of a common moral law; and the comparison of ethical ideas is as practicable to us as the comparison of scientific ideas. Such a fact attests that Conscience, like Intellect, is the common property of humanity; the basis of our union, not of our divergencies: whereas the *relative force* of any particular passion is strictly an incident of individuality. Thus whoever lives in harmony with *universal order*, permitting the impulses that stir him to hold the rank which the voice of humanity assigns them, follows the *Moral* rule; while he who lives in deflection from the universal order, and takes up with his own propensities, follows the *Prudential* rule.

(5) "In this way we see that the will, whenever it goes astray, follows the direction of *individual* tendency and wish:

Self, the essence
of sin, so that *self* is the centre and essence of all sin; and the surrender of self—letting the

union with God. Divine order pass through us and take possession of us—is the simple condition of This implied *identification* between the inner

Morality and
Religion. consciousness of a sacred order among our springs of action, and the real, eternal, objective Will of God, construes very faithfully the sense of *authority* attaching to the

revelations of our moral nature: they are *in* us, but not *of* us; not ours, but God's. In this feature of the conscience we find the *point of vital connection between morals and religion*; where the rule and method given for the life of man is felt to be a communion established with the life of God."

Moral feeling consists in recognising our obligation in relation to a law which we call good; and all are conscious that they can and ought to obey this law; that they are at once bound by it, and capable of breaking it, in which fact lies our responsibility.

Remorse *Remorse and indignation* are the spontaneous and universal manifestations of this feeling. The anguish of mind caused by the violation of the moral law, cannot be confounded with the regret or sadness resulting from a misfortune or a

failure. The two feelings are utterly unlike. The drama is based on the idea of moral responsibility; and it is pathetic only in the degree in which it describes the conflict between passion and duty. Poetry, in its loftiest tones, ever vindicates the majesty of the inward law of purity and love, and has expressed

Culpability. the *sense of culpability* with terrible force. Æschylus said that "blood

shed by a murderer freezes on the ground; that all the waters of ocean cannot cleanse the bloodstained hand." And Shakespeare, in well-

Shakespeare on known lines, makes Richard III. Conscience. exclaim: (Act V., Scene 3.)

"O coward Conscience, how thou dost afflict me!
 'The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight.
 Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.
 What do I fear? myself? there's none else by.
 My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
 And every tongue brings in a several tale,
 And every tale condemns me for a villain.
 Perjury, perjury in the high'st degree;
 Murder, stern murder, in the dir'st degree,
 All several sins, all used in each degree,
 Throng to the bar, crying all—'Guilty! guilty!'"

Indignation, again, is a sort of remorse that we feel for *others*. Why do we feel this

Indignation. when crime is successful; and which

reaches its height when crime is at its height? And when the criminal is captured, in every trial of the kind, the question of moral responsibility is raised, and punishment is proportional to the criminal intention.

Why, when a man has committed a great crime, and is put on trial for his life, does he

Trial of a criminal. become an object of such profound interest? the court crowded with

listeners—the cross-examination, the summing-up, the verdict of the jury, the sentence of the judge, all waited for with trembling eagerness. Because it is a moral

question, and there is some adequate sense of man's real place in the universe, of his responsibility and future destiny. Or again, why the admiration when we see one man risking his life to save another? Why does such heroic action always excite enthusiasm?

Admiration of
self-sacrifice.

It is "the triumph of conscience"; which we thus see to be 'identical and constant' for all men. We thus become sensible of a 'universal order'; and he who lives in harmony with it, is the *moral* man. And just as the belief in our personal identity, in the midst of a ceaseless flow of sensations, and lapses of consciousness, pre-supposes a timeless and eternal Consciousness, which is the very Life of our life; so in all our moral judgments, whether they concern our own conduct or that of others, there is pre-supposed a faith in an all Holy Being, revealed in us, and yet above us; from whose Law we derive our law, and in loyal observance to which we realise a communion with God Himself. Just as God manifests Himself as Will in the physical universe, so He manifests Himself as *Moral* Will in the guidance of human purpose, and in the judgment we pass on human sin: ever taking care that all revolts against this moral authority shall have in them the seeds of their own decay, while all faithful and self-denying reverence has its force continually increased.

Moral judgments
pre-suppose a Holy
Being.

Nature of Moral Authority.

(1). "In speaking of the relation among the separate elements of action, as they appear in the eye of conscience, we have frequently adverted to the *Authority* which we acknowledge in the higher or the lower. What then is the nature of that authority which the suggestions of honour, for instance, have over us against the whispers of perfidy? and where is its seat?

(2). "Is the authority in any sense simply *subjective*; wielded *by myself over myself*; and directing its messages exclusively to me; saying only, 'This is *better for you*; whether for others also, I do not mean to tell you?' In no sense is the authority a mere 'subjective' affair. The feeling is, as we have seen, a constant characteristic of human nature. How can that be a mere self-assertion of my own will, to which my own will is the first to bend in homage, if not to move in obedience? The power to create law is adequate to alter it. We cannot alter law; and the sense of authority which we put up for ourselves, we could assuredly put down for ourselves. Yet, as we are well aware, we can pretend to no such prerogative with respect to the claims of the moral consciousness; try as we may, we cannot turn lower into higher. The authority which reveals itself within us reports itself, not only as undervived from our will, but as independent of our idiosyncracies altogether. It affords a rational ground of expectation from others. By one and the same operation, it imposes on us a *duty*, and invests us with a *right*: and it takes two to establish an *obligation*. If I am justified in assuming in my neighbours an apprehension like my own of the equality of two vertical triangles, can any reason be given why I may not in like manner assume that they feel with me the respective 'authority' of honour and perfidy? The supposition of 'subjective' morals is no less absurd than that of 'subjective' mathematics.

(3). "If the sense of authority means anything, it means the discernment of something *higher than we*, having claims on our *self*; therefore no mere part of it. And the predicate 'higher than I' takes us a step beyond: for what am I? A *person*: 'higher' than whom no 'thing' assuredly—no mere phenomenon—can be; but only *another Person*, greater and higher and of deeper insight. Here then we encounter an 'objective' authority, whose excellence and sanctity have their seat in eternal reality, whose revelation to one mind is valid for all: and *moral consciousness passes to religious apprehension*. The intuitions of the human conscience are thus partial manifestations in life, of the Divine perfection; and man becomes 'a law unto himself,' by 'self-communication of the infinite Spirit to the soul.'"

The *authority of conscience* is not found in the nature of the faculty itself, but altogether in the character of the truth which it discovers. The faculty is a power of sight, such as makes a perception of self-evident truth possible to man. To the truth itself belongs absolute right of command. In thus discovering to us Moral Law for the guidance of our actions, conscience has

authority over all other springs of activity within us. All these forces of our nature are dependent upon intelligence for direction, while intelligence is dependent on its possession of Moral Law. That which discovers Moral Law has thus the teaching authority which belongs to the Law itself. This Law, as absolute truth, admits of no contradiction. Dispositions, affections, and desires, which are out of harmony with conscience, are out of harmony with our nature; that is, are unnatural, and can have no place in healthy moral development.

The high honour of establishing the supremacy of conscience belongs to Butler:—*Sermons* I. II. III. and *Dissertation on the nature of Virtue*. (See Calderwood's *Hand-book of Moral Philosophy*, pp. 77—83.)

‘*Why may I not do as I like*’?

(4). “We must not forget that authority takes in not only the Moral but also the Prudential system, and that we look with positive disapproval on rashness and recklessness, as not simply foolish or hurtful, but as *wrong*, even when no interests are visibly affected except the offender's own. We feel that no man has a right to trifle with his own well-being. Why is this? If we were living in a merely sentient world, it would not be so; but since we find that there is a higher law and a Divine rule; that over and above the force of Nature, there is now the free righteousness of God; that, added to the idea of human power over the more pleasurable, there is the idea of human *obligation to the more excellent*;

we cannot now treat, as given to us out and out, what is only *lent* to us as a *trust*; we cannot set up ourselves in insolent defiance to Divine order. The whole temper expressed by the question, 'Why may I not do as I like?' is the sure symptom of the absence of the *reverential and conscientious* spirit; and must be condemned as a potential immorality. With such a temper, when any trying problem arises, the requisite clearness and heroism will not be there.

"When a man perseveres in simply living as he likes, the prudential order becomes supreme; the autocracy of inclination is complete; and what is the effect? The characteristic *human* element is gone; the *man* has disappeared; and in his place there stands either *brute* or *devil*, according as blind sense or computing intellect predominates."

The path of ruin !

"Alas, how early may we set out on that—as soon as we become conscious agents at all. Ruin of body. Ruin of *body*. What thoughtless squandering of vital powers ! What dwelling of the mind on subjects, the very thought of which in early years are poison to the life. What sowing in boyish greediness, in self-indulgence, in recklessness, of the seeds of future suffering, degradation, dissolution.

Ruin of mind. And ruin of *mind*. That goes often with ruin of body. We are fearfully and wonderfully made, and none can injure any part of the delicate organisation without risk of touching something more vital still. Every act and thought of sin, every over-indulgence of appetite, every over-tasking of energy, tells surely on mind as well as body. And not only by this re-action of body on mind may we be ruining our minds. No faculty lives and grows unless it is *used*, and used as it was *meant* to be used. Indolence, conceit, and wilfulness, foolish and profitless reading, squandering of imagination on unwholesome excitements, cowardly avoiding of difficulties, dishonest short-cuts to knowledge: these are the things that lay waste our powers, make education a

semblance instead of a reality, kill, instead of fostering, sacred gifts and faculties. Ruin, once more, of *heart and life*. Here it is where sins against the powers either of body or mind come home in the end ; and here belong sins against the more sacred gifts and sensibilities—against affection, honour, conscience.”*

The Higher Harmony.

(5). “ On the other hand, if, on every occasion of controversy between stronger desire and higher authority, the former is freely sacrificed, by a patient gymnastic of fidelity, the moral scale absorbs the prudential, and a perfect harmony ensues ; giving the true conception of the angelic mind—the saint’s rest—the ultimate reconciliation between our personality and God’s. The probationary conflict disappears, and the moral emotions of approbation and disapprobation are replaced by admiration, love, and worship—towards which the ethical feelings ever aspire, and in which they ultimately merge.”

“ Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
 These three alone lead life to sovereign power ;
 Yet not for power (power of herself
 Would come uncall’d for.) but to *live by law*,
 Acting the law we live by, without fear ;
 And, because right is right, to follow right
 Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.”

CHAPTER IV.

SPRINGS OF ACTION CLASSIFIED.

Psychological Order.

“ If a man is moral because he pronounces some *other* *imperative* to be of higher worth than a competitor ; then, in order to give any account of the moralities, we must be able to collect this series of decisions into a system, and find ourselves in possession of a table of moral obligation, graduated ac-

Graduated scale
 of excellence.

* Wellington College Sermons, by E. C. Wickham, M A (Macmillan and Co)

According to the inner excellence of our several tendencies. Either this is possible, or ethics are impossible.

"We begin by distinguishing between two sets of impelling principles, which we may call the PRIMARY and SECONDARY springs of action. The PRIMARY consist of the *unreflecting* instincts, and have *no end in view*; but impel us to action in a way analogous to that of the lower animals. The Secondary are only the primary over again, but *transformed by self-knowledge and experience*, when they become sought *for their own sakes*.

1. PRIMARY : HOW DISTINGUISHED.

"The Primary springs of action are divided into four classes : (1) Propensions ; (2) Passions ; (3) Affections ; (4) Sentiments.

(1). *Propensions : viz. Organic Appetites (Food and Sex) ; and Animal Activity.*

Organic life.	These forces are necessary for the very maintenance and continuance of the physical life; the first being related to the <i>organic</i> life, and the
Animal life.	second to the <i>animal</i> life; the last expressing the enjoyment attending the use of all our powers.

(2). *Passions : Antipathy ; Fear ; Anger.*

"The *Passions* express what we suffer at the hands of objects that would disturb or injure us, and are thus *repulsions*. They are the self-protective provisions of our nature, without however involving self-reflection. Towards an object of natural aversion immediately before us, we feel *antipathy*; towards that which has just hurt us, we experience *anger*; towards that which menaces us with evil, we look with *fear*. All these are instinctive feelings, and go before any experimental knowledge of the harmful or disagreeable. The sight of a wild animal with brilliant eyes, will strike into a child a terror it has never been taught: and anger displays itself towards all sources of

injury, animate or inanimate; while it is clearly the business of all reflective knowledge of evil, to subdue it.

N.B.—The principles hitherto enumerated have no necessary reference to *persons*, nor involve more than a relation to *things*—living things it may be, but nothing more. Now, however, we cross the line, and come into a world of *personalities*.

We now rise to persons.

(3). *Affections : Parental ; Social ; Compassionate.*

“As the *Affections* single out *personal beings* like ourselves as their objects, they operate as *attractions* and not as *repulsions*. They are three in order. Parental. The first is the *Parental*; the conditions of which are, that the beings on whom the affection is directed, be, independently of us, the *image of our essence*; and, dependently upon us, the *continuation of our existence*: the father being more affected by the idea of the first, and the mother of the second.

“The second affection is the *Social*; directed not only to our *like*, but to our *equals*, in the sense of respondent though different natures. The third is *Compassion*; that *fellow-feeling* which springs forth at the spectacle of suffering, and bewails another's pain as if it were our own: thus showing that ‘pain and sorrow’ have a distinct place within the plan of human life. What meaning could Pity have in a world where suffering was not meant to be? That our constitution is furnished with this medicine of ill, indicates a system constructed on a theory of sorrow—as a natural element of discipline; and affords the clearest evidence of other ends than happiness, of ends that calculate on its loss, and replace it with blessings of a higher tone.

Social.

Compassion.

Pity implies suffering.

(4). *Sentiments : Wonder ; Admiration ; Reverence.*

“The last set of Primary principles includes the *Sentiments*; which pass out by aspiration to *ideal* relations higher than ourselves, whether recognized as personal or not. Wonder. *Wonder* is the primitive intellectual impulse, especially lively in childhood: it asks for causality, and is directed upon the hidden and unknown. Admiration. *Admiration* is the sense of ideal beauty, whether it exists in forms or colours, in thought or

speech, in action or character, in music or art : it is homage given to what is present to the mind. *Reverence* looks up to transcendent *Goodness*, or transcendent *Life*. No man can venerate himself, or anything below himself. The upward look of *Reverence* is revealed through the attraction of *objective* character above us. Secret shame and nobler hope for ourselves flow down upon us from the greatness and sanctity of our spiritual superiors. But above and beyond these, *Reverence* goes forth in faith upon invisible objects, and discerns a better and higher before which it humbles itself. The religious sense, to the great mass of mankind, anticipates the moral ; and when the conscience comes to be unfolded, God is already recognised as there. And if there be indeed a Divine person that lives in our humanity, and coalesces with all its good, this is only natural.

“ These three sentiments are thus, respectively, the springs of Knowledge, of Art—including in that the phenomena of life and character—and of Religion.

II. SECONDARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF PRIMARY PRINCIPLES : HOW DISTINGUISHED.

“ The Secondary principles are but the *self-conscious counterpart* of the Primary principles. The Primary principles are essentially *disinterested* in their action, simply impelling us hither and thither, without choice and reckoning of ours.

“ But, since each of them, in the attainment of its end, yields us a distinct kind of satisfaction, they may themselves become *ends*, and be indulged *for the sake* of the experiences which they bring.

Primary principles become ends in themselves.

(1). *Secondary Propensions : Love of Pleasure, Power, and Money.*

“ When the Appetites pass into the self-conscious state, we have the *Love of Pleasure* ; and when they assume the scale of excess, *Food* becomes Gluttony or Drunkenness, and *Sex* becomes Lust or Licentiousness. This is not their right and wholesome condition, as is seen

Love of Pleasure.

Gluttony,
Drunkenness,
Lust

by the fact that they draw to themselves terms of censure.

Animal activity, again, becomes transformed into the *Love of Power*—whether physical or intellectual: and these two principles combined—the love of pleasure and the love of power—develop into the *Love of Money*; which at length becomes an end in itself.

(2). *Secondary Passions : Malice ; Vindictiveness ; Suspiciousness.*

“The Passions, growing self-conscious, produce well-marked and familiar forms of disposition. As the original impulses—Antipathy, Fear, Anger—are anything but delightful, it appears strange that a taste for indulging them should be possible at all; yet nothing is more certain than that a man may contract a sort of relish for them. The fondness for

Taste for indulging the passions.

Antipathy or *pleasure in hating*, we call, as a feeling, *Ill-will* or *Malice*, and in its expression, *Censoriousness*, the cherishing of Resentment, *Vindictiveness*; of Fear, *Suspiciousness* or *Mistrust*. A *censorious* man will actually get up antipathy as a congenial excitement. He picks up scandals *con amore*; and tells you confidently the weaknesses he has found out in your friend. Half the gossips of the world consist of such traffickers in ill-will; and the great majority of slanders are born of the malice of prejudice.

“Similarly, a *vindictive* man will look out for occasions of *resentment*, for real or imaginary injuries. He is never long without a quarrel, and a resolve to pay off somebody for taking an unfair advantage: or he watches with keen satisfaction the retribution which, without agency of his, events may seem to bring upon his foe. Again, a *suspicious*

A vindictive man.

A *suspicious* man. A *suspicious* man *invents fears* for himself in the mere exercise of his temper. He lives as if every last post had brought him a threatening letter. If he catches a cold he must make his will. He will not have a new suit of clothes, lest they should be made by a tailor with scarlet fever in the house. His chief intellectual excitement is in constructing hypotheses of mistrust. he finds the historians liars. and moralist insincere. Like the Eastern prince, secured

by tasters against the poison that may lurk in each dish or cup, he pledges all his faculties to the baffling of stratagems; resolving *never to be beaten*. In each of these cases we see the abuse of the primary passions, which should be left alone and forgotten as sentinels at posts of danger, instead of our fancying that they can never do enough for us.

(3). *Secondary Affections: Sentimentality.*

“When the Affections become self-conscious, and are indulged *for the sake* of the experiences they bring, the *sentimental* state of mind is produced. Affections indulged in their own sake. If, instead of spontaneous *family* affection, the members simply excite a sympathetic interest; if, instead of *social* affection, there is the mere love of society; and instead of *compassion*, there grows up a taste for indulging Pity; we have a transition from natural health to sentimental disease. The objects themselves are desired *for the sake* of the feelings they excite; and instead of being carried out of ourselves, we are shut more closely in.

(4). *Secondary Sentiments: Self-culture; Pleasures of Taste; Concern for Religion rather than for God.*

“The sentiment of *Wonder*, which, in its Primary form, is directed towards the unknown, and seeks for knowledge, loses its disinterestedness in the secondary stage; the knowledge is absorbed as nutriment to intellect, instead of the intellect following in the trail of knowledge; and the natural impulse is replaced by the secondary desire of *self-culture*. The thirst for truth is exchanged for the craving for accomplishment—a far inferior inspiration, than which the scholar’s life has no more beguiling seduction. *Admiration*, at the secondary stage, becomes the *love of Art*, or *devotion to the pleasures of Taste*. Its tendency is to lose the simple emotions awakened by Beauty, through deliberately *seeking* them. So with the change from the primary to the secondary stage in the sentiment of *Reverence*. A *taste* may be formed for gratifying even the feelings of Reverence. When a mere ‘interest in religion’ takes the place of the Love of God; when comparison and criticism of creeds, or a gauging of our own spiritual feelings, become dominant, Reverence is detected looking in the glass.”

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Self-reverence. of creeds, or a gauging of our own spiritual feelings, become dominant, Reverence is detected looking in the glass.”

CHAPTER V.

SPRINGS OF ACTION CLASSIFIED.

Moral Order.

“Of all the springs of action in our list, one set alone requires to be cast out at the outset as absolutely evil, and incapable of ever entering upon a graduated scale of worth. These are the Secondary Passions—inadmissible. *Passions*—expressing themselves in Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, and Suspiciousness,—and are mere diabolical corruptions of the passions.

(1). *Appetites, Secondary and Primary. Animal Activity.*

“Proceeding now to consider the series in an ascending order of worth, the *Love of Ease* and *Sensual Pleasure* comes lowest; for it is surely meaner to eat for the *palate's sake* than to appease the simple hunger. The function of the Primary instincts is to maintain human life, personal and social, in the most complete and balanced vigour; and that vigour is sapped mainly by *indulgence*; not merely in revolting degrees, but in measures sanctioned by general habit, though too well understood by every wise physician, and inwardly recognised by the shame of many a private conscience. Indulgence consists in anticipating and exceeding instinctive wants. We must beware of fancying that we *want*, because we *like*.

“The propensity to *Active energy* stands as much above the appetites as the functions of the animal life are above those of the organic; and when, in its secondary transformation, it passes under intellectual direction, and becomes the *Love of Power*, it rises in the scale, and is of course much higher than the *Love of Money*.

(2). *Love of Gain, relatively to the Primary Passions. (Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.)*

“How shall we measure the *Love of Gain* against *Antipathy* or *Hatred*? Should a man, *e.g.*, who has an intense horror of blood, swallow his natural disgust—his instinctive aversion—and accept a good butcher's business, for the sake

of the gain it will bring? Certainly not: it would be mean to surrender such a feeling to *money*.

“*Fear*, again, in the absence of any higher call, should be acted upon. We condemn the ship-captain, who, through love of ease, imperils many lives. We turn away in disgust from panic-stricken men and women, who, in a plague-tainted city, seek to drive away terror by drunken carouse and ribald song; whereas we revere those who, in the same scene, surmount personal dread by devotion to the sick.

“So with *Resentment*. Suppose a youth about equally passionate under provocation and greedy of money. Would the cure or concealment of anger be too dearly bought by the possession of five rupees every time he managed to restrain it? Assuredly, because the inner improvement would not have been real. Whenever resentment is *bought off* by mere interest; whenever a man with just anger in his heart remains placid only because he *cannot afford* to let his indignation appear, we cannot help despising such self-control as sordid.

(3). *Secondary Affections, relatively to the Primary Passions.*

“Now let a new order of impulses come upon the scene, viz., the *Secondary Affections*, and place themselves for estimate face to face with these same *Primary Passions*. These secondary affections, you remember, resolved themselves into mere *Sentimental* pleasures: and these also will be found to be lower than the Passions. Suppose a case in which opportunity is offered for social and sympathetic pleasures, saddled with the condition that some *hated* object is also to be present. On a lower stage, it is the generous dog invited to a canine dinner, with the intimation that a fox would be at the head of the table, and a cat at the bottom. Would you respect him more for accepting the jollity or declining the jar? If he were yours, you would think better of his honesty, if he sent a dignified refusal. Here, it is plain, the *antipathy* must rule: and to disregard it, is to lose the sterling sincerity of affection.

“The same superior right must be assigned to legitimate *Fear*. In the storm or in the pestilence, the dictates of Fear

are authoritative against all suggestions of social pleasure-seeking. Not only is it a guilty and degrading thing to drown the terrors of a crisis in ghastly festivities; but even a compassionate clinging to the bed-side of the wounded, in a siege which demands active self-sacrifice from all in the dread emergency, may well become a selfish distortion of duty.

“Just as little can these Secondary Affections assert any claim against well-grounded *Resentment*. When we have been *wronged*, we feel Resentment can-
cels sympathetic
relations
resentment, which cancels sympathetic relations towards the author of the wrong, and puts an end to the possibility of their sincere enjoyment. It is a natural defence of Right among men; which, however, becomes so unwelcome to easy-tempered and sociable natures, that any guilt incurred is often overlooked. This mere *masking* of a grave moral disturbance—where a wrong has been distinctly intended—is an offence against reason and right: though we are of course to *limit the time* of our resentment, which is the provision of nature for a crisis or a mood of injury, and nurse it not for ever.

(4). *Place of both the Secondary Affections and the Primary Passions relatively to the Love of Power.*

“What is the difference between what we have called the causal energy—the *Love of Power*—and the *Passions*? Creativeness in the one; laziness in the other. In the Passions, the will lies asleep till some foe approaches; and if there were no evil, they would do no good: but the causal energy anticipates and prevents the evils for which the others wait; and prevention is better than cure. Moreover, it is impossible to exercise the gift of ruling other wills without living largely in their life, knowing their conflicts, and having the touch of their enthusiasms; so that the causal energy is essentially sympathetic with good. In this view, it is not wholly without reason that *Ambition* has been called ‘a splendid passion’ and ‘the last infirmity of noble minds.’ Those whose capacity and energy mark them out as natural ‘kings of men,’ yearn to conquer difficulties and confusion, and to elicit the resources of other minds by touch-

ing their springs of sympathy. At the same time, this spring

Abuse of Love
of Power.

of action is liable to abuse and corruption : and then we see the rule of the worse over the better ; the enthronement of the genuine tyrant on the ruins of trampled rights and reason. And, foremost among the evils of its abuse, is the grossly selfish conception of it among the lower minds—such as the first Napoleon—who cannot resist its fascinations. But against such instances we must set those in which it has been compatible with self-sacrifice ; and Aristides, Socrates, and a host of gifted men, were too high not to know their power, and deeply care for it, yet held it humbly ; and were only stimulated by it to profounder prayer for light, and more absolute consecration to the supreme ends of life. Let it be further

Love of Liberty.

considered that the *Love of Liberty*, which has enriched history with its most thrilling episodes, is essentially the *Love of Power*. It is a resistance of the power *that is* in the name of the power *that ought to be* ; the claim of competent intelligence and manly character to direct its own steps, and groan no more under the yoke and lash of an effete control. We must then assign to this incentive a position higher than the passions. The man and the nation that can hold their resentful feelings under control of their sense of power, are less to be condemned than those who bring them under no rational restraint.

(5). *Love of Culture, relatively to the Love of Power.*

“ The next step of ascent brings us to the *Secondary Sentiments*, which may be classed together, as the *Love of Culture*—a zealous care for the higher types of human thought and feeling. This spring of action aims at the perfecting of the reason, the imagination, and the moral affections—the increase of knowledge, the refinement and sincerity of art, the purification of religion. It secures, therefore, a genuine liberality

Culture above
Power.

of mind ; and since a man should rather *teach* his fellow-men than *rule* them, the Love of Culture is higher than the Love of Power.

(6). *Primary Affections, relatively to Wonder and Admiration.*

“ There now remain to be placed only the *Primary Affections* and the *Primary Sentiments*. We love
Persons above things. *persons* more than *things* ; and, indeed, in order to love things (as distinguished from

merely *liking* them), have to personify them and fancy them returning our look. Personality is essential to affection: and since personality is beyond doubt the culminating fact of the

The Affections
above the Senti-
ments.

world, the affection which culminates with it must be supreme among the springs of action; and must have a higher authority than the sentiments, except that the third of them—Reverence—converts itself, as we contemplate it, into affection of the most perfect kind. The student or the artist, who, in the pursuit of knowledge, or the exercise of imagination, should let his children starve in body or mind, or should lavish all his resources on his library or pictures, and have no succour for distress and misery, would be universally condemned.

“As for Wonder and Admiration, there seems no reason for assigning a superior authority to either impulse. The former starts the question, ‘Whence comes it, and whither goes it?’ the latter, ‘What does it say to me?’ ‘What is it like?’ The first is more intellectually fruitful; the second approaches much more nearly to affection, and deepens affection.

(7). *Primary Affections* inter se.

“We pass on to the *Affections*. With regard to *Parental* love; it is (a) voluntarily assumed, and to evade its claims is to convict ourselves: (b) its obligations are inalienable: the common misery which I pass by, some other may relieve; but the little child has but one father and one mother: (c) its instinctive force is limited in time—in the lower animals to the period of dependence. Hence, in its presence, mere

Parental feeling
above Social.

Attachment to a friend—the *social* feeling—must yield, and take the lower place. A mother who is nursing her infant must refuse to undertake the charge of a friend prostrated by scarlet-fever. A father has no right to ransom his friend, who has been captured by brigands, at some enormous price, if he thereby injures his children. Simple friendship, too, must yield to urgent *Pity*.

Pity above
Friendship.

If I am helping my friend in some important undertaking, and an accident happen in the street, I must go to the sufferer and quit my friend. Of the three affections, then, *Attachment*, or the social feeling, is the least imperative.

" In adjusting the relations between the other two—Parental Love and Compassion—it may be said that we can, to a great extent, choose for ourselves the moments for giving effect to the first, while the moment to exercise the latter is an *opportunity given*: and taking into account the *keenness* in compassion, its *universal scope*, and its *duration* through the whole of our life, we pronounce its superior authority to the provisional instinct of Parental Love; though the latter, during its season, must sometimes be the more imperative.

Compassion
above Parental
love.

(8). *Supreme Place of Reverence.*

" It remains only to vindicate the supreme place of *Reverence towards goodness*—the apex and crown of human character—which, when adequately interpreted, proves to be identical with devotion to God. This posture of mind cares for right actions, not simply as good phenomena, but chiefly as the ex-

pression of *right affection*, as functions of pure, faithful, self-devoted, lofty character. And in thus passing from the fruits to the lovely or stately nature that bore them, the feeling of approbation which looks complacently *down*, becomes a homage which looks reverently *up*; and is thus transferred from the level of ethical satisfaction to the plane of personal affection and aspiration. And till this change takes place there is hardly any *sacred* element in the ideas of right.

" Yet, though we revere human character and disposition, the imperfections of venerated men, the mingling in them of littleness and greatness, make us do so with reserve; and in the very moments of purest homage, they extort from us the sigh for a *perfect spirit*, where our trust and love may be for ever safe. This final revelation is the issue of the full develop-

ment of conscience: and we see the difference between the simply moral approbation and the feeling of Reverence. The latter cannot express itself without resorting to language

more than ethical, and plainly crossing the boundary into the field of religion. It lives in the presence of souls that are holy, of dispositions that are heavenly, of tempers that are saintly, of love that is divine, and will not bear to have these objects of its thought flattened and disfigured by being labelled as simply *Right* or even *Virtuous*. It insists on in-

It longs for a
perfect spirit.

It leads to Reli-
gion.

vesting them with a light of *sacredness*: and in virtue of this sentiment, the stern 'You must,' is transformed into the harmony of a perfected will.

"Reverence is thus, not simply a sense of right, but the supreme form of the *love of right*, which can reach its development in all dimensions only among beings that go wrong—that is in a world of sin: for except upon a scene of inward conflict, the phenomena of *Conscience*—temptation, will, duty, rightness—do not come to the birth. But it belongs to the last and highest stage of our earthly existence, and is intent upon the perfected aim and final blessedness of our moral nature, in its assimilation to God. The conception of such a

culmination of character, the homage of heart towards it, still more the faith in its reality as the living spirit of the universe

and soul of our souls, is unparalleled and supreme as a motive. In the personal conscience, it is satisfied only when the internal feeling is right, and keeps us abashed and vigilant till temptation retreats. In the selection of our human guides and models, it determines our homage to the summit-levels of character, where the panorama of excellence is entire. For want of this help many a susceptible mind is carried captive

by partial admirations mistaken for complete: but no one whose perceptions have been trained by the great masters of

spiritual harmony can ever be satisfied by erratic tentatives. The wild enthusiasms of a generation that has lost its guide, and gropes in the dark for some hand to lead it; that tries all competitors for worship—now science, now art, now order, now progress, arbitrary equality or an equally arbitrary hierarchy, force of intellect or force of dynamite; nay, that sinks so low as to bend the knee to the passing *Zeitgeist* (spirit of the age), while turning the back to the consensus of all ages; sufficiently show the helplessness of minds where Reverence is set afloat without a compass and with the eternal stars shut out."

CHAPTER VI.

How to estimate Mixed Incentives.

"In cases where we have acted from *mixed* motives, some acting from approvable, others selfish and unworthy, mixed motives. such as *Vanity, Love of Praise, Love of Fame (or Glory)*, we are by no means unconscious of the spoiling combination, and cannot accept the word of mistaken praise without secret shame.

“ When self-esteem is isolated, it is *Pride*, which finds adequate satisfaction in sitting before the glass in pleased admiration. More often, the social affection is warm, which makes the self-admirer dependent on the sympathy of his fellows; and then the first question will be, ‘Do they echo his self-laudation?’ or, horrible thought, do they ‘write him down an ass’? This type of self-esteem is *vanity*; which craves for *immediate* praise. When the resolve is, not to *enjoy* the public praise, but to *earn* it, even though it may never fall upon his ear, the variety becomes the *Love of Fame*.

“ It is in *academic life* where appeals to the love of Praise are most systematically invoked: the whole apparatus of prizes, certificates, degrees, and honours, deriving its leverage from this principle. Allowing for the stimulus that thus wakens lazy faculties and industry, it should be remembered that this incentive achieves nothing except what *ought to be accomplished* by a higher, *viz.*, by the native wonder and quest for light, whence all knowledge springs: and were the minds of the teacher and the taught in the best state, their relations to each other would need no other power than this. In every one, therefore, with whom the competition lies between the love of praise and the love of ease, the former is entitled to the victory. In every one with whom the competition lies between the love of praise and the hunger for knowledge, it is an impertinence in the former to intrude upon the paramount rights of the latter. In modern education, the extravagant trust reposed upon the system of examinations and rewards implies a cynical disregard of the natural craving of reason for enlargement and lucidity of thought; and mischievously forces to the front motives intellectually cramping and morally inferior.

Virtual reduction of all study to a graduated drill, and of what is called ‘successful’ teaching to a forecast of examination questions by the sum of the chances divided by the names of the examiners, might well excite the indignation of such a master of mental training as the late Professor De Morgan, who well knew from the personal memory of his youth, and the long experience of his class-room, how stifling is such a method to all freshness and originality of thought; how superfluous is its competitive stimulus to

the better class of minds, and how likely, with the rest, to bring their education to a dead stop with their professional degree.

“As in academic life, the *Love of Praise*, so in political, the *Love of Fame*, seems always the poor substitute of something which ought rather to be there. Instead of referring problems to the individual conviction and conscience, the rule is to satisfy some body of opinion other than your own—either to thirst for momentary praise or to court historic fame. While the latter is higher than the former, it is better still to forget both in simple truth of conviction, and faithful service to the State and to mankind.

“And if we follow the play of these motives into the mixed affairs of life, we find them responsible for Cowardice in many a ruinous temptation. Rather than temptation. forfeit the favour of companions or superiors, how many a lie is told ! To escape the jeers and scorn of associates, how often is the false pretence assumed, or the guilty compliance made ! To keep the good-will of light-minded associates, in what cowardly silence is the unpure innuendo or the hinted calumny allowed to pass ! ”

Veracity.

“The last moral quality which needs to be adjusted to our scale is *Veracity*. In itself, it is not a *spring of action* ; though a love of it may, like the love of justice,—that *Fairness* of mind which estimates character and conduct according to their moral worth,—find a place in the system of moral dynamics. Veracity is, primarily, a restraint or limit imposed upon speech. The

Speech implies veracity. primary impulses to speech carry with them of necessity the postulate of veracity, viz , that what is affirmed is thought, and what overflows as emotion is felt. Veracity is thus *strictly natural*. While it is freely admitted that the *social* union itself rests

Not created by society. on natural trust, and falls to pieces on its failure, yet, long before we have any idea of society and its conditions and needs, we hate to be cheated, and despise the liar whose victims we are. So that beyond our obligation to do each other no mischief, unvaracity touches other relations, not so much within, as beyond our life. Whoever commits a breach of veracity belies two things : primarily, *his own beliefs and feelings* ; but also, *the belief and feelings which are authorised by reality*, as

Agreement between thoughts and things. accordant with the nature of things and the course of the world. That is to say, besides the agreement between thoughts and words, there is an agreement between thoughts and things; so that the man who utters a falsehood tampers with the order of facts which God has made true. This is the element which is felt to be involved in every lie, and which makes it, not only a human delinquency, 'the abandonment, or, as it were, annihilation of the dignity of man', as Kant said; but an *impiety*—a bold affront against the seat of all truth. 'Thou hast not lied unto men only, but unto God,' holds good of every lie; and it is the secret consciousness of this which mingles a certain *religious* shrinking with the shame and repugnance of all purposed falsehood. Veracity, therefore, wields the authority, not of social affection only, but of *Reverence* also: supported by the kindred sentiments that draw us to all intellectual light and spiritual beauty. It is a homage paid to a perfection that has rightful hold of the universe, and is the inward reality of all appearance. In its explicit form, this image of Moral Right no longer represents itself as a collective conscience of mankind, or as an abstract law and order, but *lives* in the will and personality of God.

"With regard to the question whether there are any extreme cases that justify the practice of deception, where nothing else will save life; while the theoretic reasons may seem convincing, yet when we place ourselves at one of the crises demanding a deliberate lie, an unutterable repugnance returns upon us, and makes the theory seem shameful. It is perhaps possible, in such cases, for there to be a discrepancy between an uncertain understanding and the immediate insight of the conscience."

Table of Springs of Action.

"It may be useful to collect the results of our survey of the springs of action into a tabular form. The following list presents the series in the *ascending order of worth*.—

(For illustrative examples of Veracity and Fidelity, see Chapter IX.)

Lowest.

- 1. Secondary Passions :—Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions :—Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.
3. Primary Organic Propensions :—Appetites.
4. Primary Animal Propension :—Spontaneous Activity (unselective)
5. Love of Gain (reflective derivative from Appetite.)
6. Secondary Affections (Sentimental indulgence of Sympathetic feelings).
7. Primary Passions :—Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.
8. Causal Energy :—Love of Power or Ambition ; Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments :—Love of Culture
10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration
11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social ; with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence."

Highest.

We thus see that each of us has within him, by the constitution of his nature, a great variety of "springs of action"—impelling motives ; and that when any two of these wake up in us at the same moment, one urging us to do this, and the other urging us to do that, we immediately become conscious that the one is *worthier* than the other, having an intrinsic *claim* over us, and a *right* to be preferred. We also see that it is possible to classify these springs of action—appetites, passions, affections, sentiments—and to arrange them in a scale of felt worth, from the secondary Passions—Censoriousness, Vindictiveness and Suspiciousness—at the bottom, up to the Primary Affection of Compassion, the highest in the scale but one, and

Reverence at the very top. And we are conscious that, even when a lower impulse appeals to us more intensely than a higher, we not only *ought* to obey the higher, but *can* do so, if we *will*. In this liberty of choice, and in this consciousness of higher worth, consists our great distinction from the lower animals ; and because we have the power of resisting a stronger impulse, and following a higher, we have the capacity for making *Character*.

How character
is made.

CHAPTER VII.

The Resulting Rule.

“ Oh, righteous doom, that they who make
Pleasure their only end,
Ordering the whole life for its sake,
Miss that whereto they tend.
While they who bid stern Duty lead,
Content to follow they,
Of Duty only taking heed,
Find pleasure by the way.”

“ We are now prepared for an exact definition of Right and Wrong; which will assume this form: *Every action is RIGHT, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher : Every action is WRONG, which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower.* Thus, the act attributed to Regulus, in returning back to death at Carthage, was

right, because the reverence for veracity whence it sprang is a higher principle than any competing fear or personal affection which might have suggested a different course. (For the story of Regulus, see Chapter IX.) Again, the act of the manufacturers of adulterated or falsely-labelled goods is wrong, because done in compliance with an inferior incentive, the love of gain, against the protest of superiors, good faith and reverence for truth.

“ A man, *e.g.*, who is trustee for a minor, swindles his ward out of a lakh of rupees. Our rule therefore presents the case thus : the principle of action admitted, *i.e.*, the motive, is the *love of money* ; the principle of action excluded is the

Illustrations.
A swindler.

sense of justice and good faith : of the two, the former stands lower in the scale : therefore the act is wrong. Again, a man sacrifices a fortune of a lakh of rupees to pay his

Paying a debt. father's debts. Motive, *sense of justice* : principle of action rejected, *love of riches and their enjoyment* : the former being higher than the other, the act is virtuous. But

The second case modified. case : let the son who pays his father's debts, have a lively sense of the *applause* which his act will win, and reckon on it with eager

relish. What is the effect of this modification ? The motive—the sense of justice—is partially the same ; but being qualified by the accession of the *love of praise*, a lower motive, can have no effect but to *deteriorate* the act. But if an act is right which is performed with intention of consequences predominantly *pleasurable*, (according to Bentham,) the son's action would now appear to be *better* than before, because the new pleasure thrown in helps to swell the favourable side of the account !

“ The assertion that *Pleasure* is the supreme end of human as of all sentient life, is not borne out by facts. Since the human organism consists of stirring instincts seeking satisfaction, man acts *before* he enjoys ; without know-

ledge of what is in store for him. The *end* on which he at first seizes as the thing that suits him, is the *outward object* ; and is not the pleasure which the thing will give him, for that is a secret from him still. Further, whatever this appendix might be, there would still be a distinct satisfaction in the mere fact of the instinct reaching its end ; but this pleasantness is *consequent* upon the previous instinct, and

Pleasure a sequence, not a cause. not its *cause* ; making its entrance into our thought, not at the beginning, but at the completion of action. Aristotle put an extinguisher upon the whole principle of the ‘pleasure theory’ of morals when he said : ‘ It is not true of every virtue that the exercise of it is attended with pleasure ; except, indeed, the pleasure of attaining its end ’

“ Equally impossible is it to identify the greatest happiness of self with the greatest happiness of all concerned ; to show that it is always prudent to be virtuous ; to make the motive of self-love, however rationally worked, suffice for building up a virtuous character. There is no internal agreement between self-interest and benevolence. Can self-love become identical with self-sacrifice ? A man, *e.g.*, accepts the

Is it always prudent to be virtuous ?

Illustration dungeon or the scaffold rather than betray
 a friend or consent to the ruin of the State
 He secures for others the happiness which he renounces for
 himself. And this is one whose reason tells him that his *own*
 pleasure is for him the sole good so that he is betrayed by
 his disinterested passion into direct contradiction of his own
 reason. Another man, in similar circumstances, declined the
 sacrifice, and lived in opulence and office through another
 generation. What metrical standard can demonstrate that
 the felicity of one supreme moment of self-immolation trans-
 cends in amount thirty years of unbroken health, of social
 favour, and satisfied affections? The most impartial estimator
 of happiness cannot convict such a man of imprudence. It
 is utterly impossible to prove that the one was not the *victim*
 of his affections, and the other the *gainer* by his self-
 care. It is only the gradations of the scale of *worth*
 that can ever establish the reality of such a sacrifice. Self-
 seeking has necessarily a blighting effect
 upon the inward movements of the moral
 Self-seeking life. Who was ever known to make himself
 blights the life. a martyr to truth, in order to *taste the pleasures* of heroism?
 or a philanthropist in order to *add to his enjoyment*?

“ But, it is said, *society* may work upon the moral sentiments,
 and get a maximum of useful actions out of
 Society and the the individual agent, by means of praise
 moral sentiments. and blame. Coercion is to be employed. But
 we know by experience that it is not praise that by its force
 elicits the virtues, but the unforced virtues that elicit praise.
 Under the mere discipline of hope and fear from others, there
 will be no emergence from self-seeking into self-devotion to
 duty, or self-sacrifice to love; but an inevitable descent into
 lower depths of selfish isolation. Again, a man, say, is quite
 convinced that it will serve him better to tell a lie than to
 speak the truth; to indulge a safe passion than to resist it?
 What is to check What is to check such a man when ‘the
 a man? many’ are out of the way, and he has *his*
 opportunity without fear’ The result is
 abundantly seen in these lawless and wicked times that have
 followed when all Government and social restraints have been
 withdrawn or destroyed in a country. It may be true that in
 ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the greatest attainable
 pleasure to others may be the best way to his own; but if in
 the hundredth his pleasantest path diverges from theirs, how
 can he be dissuaded from taking it? And a cham that is
 weak at one point is no good at all. The inroads of exception

to ethical rules may thus become very numerous. When was it ever known that men, ruled by their own Selfish men greatest pleasure, unfurled the flag of an never heroes ideal morality, and led the way to heroic attacks upon the strong-holds of wrong? In ordinary trade and business, the rules of integrity are by no means the measure of private advantage; and the whole history of statecraft shows how difficult it is for strict veracity and honour to cope with the unprincipled arts of the wily diplomatist; who quickly seizes the crisis when a courageous lie may turn the balance and secure the triumph of a nation's policy. If the end of life is to make the most of its pleasures and minimise its pains, there is no room for the devotee of compassion, whose heart is irresistibly drawn to the haunts of sin and misery, and takes on it the burden of countless woes besides its own, and bleeds for every wound it cannot heal. (For illustrative examples, see Chapter VIII.)

"It cannot be denied that the sense of *Right* has earned its separate name, by appearing to those who have it as essentially different from the desire of pleasure or from coercive fear. There must have been a time, in the evolutions of the past, when the *consciousness of right* first emerged, and took its place in the life, as something new; just as there was a new departure when *feeling* first came upon the scene. Some crisis of conflict and necessary choice between two instincts arose—e.g., between the agent's own hunger and the saving of his more endangered wife or child. Suppose him, under such conditions, visited by a feeling, not of mere vehement liking, but of a superior *Right*, of *authority that demands* the self-neglect: is he to welcome it as *an insight*, and follow the rule of evolution that each new element constitutes a *discovery*; or is he to arrest the evolution, and remain at the stage short of the idea of *Duty*? He cannot do the latter: and so we are introduced to the consciousness of *Freewill* and the dawn of the *Moral* idea. Not till a necessary causation is replaced by a free, and for the spontaneous is substituted the voluntary, can human conduct earn the name of *moral* at all. The sense of *Right* is thus entitled to a separate name, as being something altogether different from pleasure or fear. Why pretend, against all fact, that it is identical with self-interest; and so be driven to the unsatisfactory task of *explaining away* the highest characteristics of our nature; of plucking off the mask of

Divine authority from duty, and of human freedom from responsibility, of cancelling obligation? Better far to trust the veracity of nature; and accept the independent reality of the moral relations it discloses. The idea of a *higher* is as much entitled to be believed, as that of an outer; the *right* as the true: and both are distinct from the *pleasant*."

It has been already observed that language is a faithful and abiding record of our natural feelings.

Words imply ideas. Language is the great confessional of the human heart: and so long as we have a certain class of *words* embedded in human speech, the *ideas* they express cannot be destroyed. The word '*good*' was framed originally,

'Good' & 'useful.' Max Müller tells us, to signify acts which were *not* useful; nay, which might be detrimental to the agent, but which nevertheless require our approval. Their *usefulness* depends on the means which we employ: their *goodness* on the objects which we have in view. We may call useful what is selfish; we can never call what is selfish, good. In the same way, the sense of '*Right*' differs from '*pleasure*,' '*happiness*,' '*expediency*,' in its very essence; as much as '*hearing*' does from '*seeing*,' or '*feeling*' from '*intellect*.' '*I ought*' never means '*it is pleasantest for me*,' or for thee, or for all of us.

Illustrative Examples.

Was it *pleasantest* for Horatius Cocles, when he stood alone and undefended on the old bridge across the Tiber, with the Tuscan army before and the surging flood behind? Was it *pleasantest* for Florence Nightingale, to be exposed to the cold and hardships of a Crimean win-

ter, in her ministrations to the sick and suffering in the hospitals of Scutari? Was it Dr. Kane. *pleasantest* for Dr. Edward Kane, an American naval surgeon, who, in 1853, volunteered to command a polar expedition in search of the Franklin vessels, and who, in order to rescue four companions who had gone in search of provisions, set forth with nine other brave men across the ice, in deadly cold 78° below the freezing point, and after succeeding in their search, but enduring indescribable sufferings, returned frost-bitten, famished, and delirious to their ship?

Was it *pleasantest* for Thomas Fowell Buxton, whose name will ever be associated with that of William Wilberforce in freeing England from the detested slave-trade, when, on one occasion in his private life, he faced a fearful peril for the sake of others, and at the risk of all the horrors of hydrophobia and an awful death, struggled successfully with a large mad dog, under the inspiration of one self-forgetting thought, that "if ever there was an occasion that justified a risk of life, this was it?" Writing to his wife afterwards, he said: "What a terrible business it was. What I did, I did from a conviction that it was *my duty*, and I never can think that an over-cautious care of self in circumstances where your risk may preserve *others*, is so great a virtue as you seem to think it. I do believe, if I had shrunk from the danger, and others had suffered in consequence, I should have felt more pain than I should have done had I received a bite." Why was he thus obliged to run this risk for others? Simply because his sublime thought for them, and a high sense of being in duty bound to serve them, ruled his noble life. On any other calculation, his action was sublime folly. An estimate

Why is self-sacrifice obligatory?

of the sense of 'pleasures' can never explain or justify such a course: and apart from this sense of Duty, no reason can be given why a man is ever bound to sacrifice himself for others. In every literature, nobility is pictured as disinterested; and it is absence of self-interest, and pure unselfishness, that make the essential difference between a low character and a really noble one.

" Love seeketh not itself to please,
Nor for itself hath any care;
But for another gives its ease.
And builds a heaven in hell's despair "

Conscience is essentially the faculty that commands us to set Duty before pleasure; and this fact is the foundation of all true ethics.

Example is more forcible than precept; and the next two chapters will be devoted to some further studies of heroism and lofty conduct.

CHAPTER VIII.

Illustrative Types of Heroic Deeds and Lofty Character.

" Some there are,
By their good works exalted, lofty minds
And meditative, authors of delight
And happiness, which to the end of time
Will live, and spread, and kindle."—*Wordsworth*.

[*Royal Natures*.—"In every rank of life we meet occasionally the kings and queens of humanity. We feel that whatever faults might find entry into their hearts, the low rabble of vices would knock for entrance in vain. Such mean visitors as envy, craft, malice, spite, jealousy, would be spurned with contempt. God allows us to meet sometimes with these noble natures, that, admiring them, we may try to rise to their level."

Many persons there are who are conscious of inferior motives in their conduct, but it is merely impulse on a low level ; for a level may be of any elevation. The words ' lower ' and ' higher , ' ' lower nature ' and ' higher nature , ' are in such cases meaningless. There is no moral strife and struggle, no conflict between the

Low natures. higher and the lower, no remorseful feeling when the superior has been sacrificed to the inferior, and no sense of nobility when a moral battle has been won. Such natures fall far below the level of true manhood.

Again, history is full of acts, often characterised by great daring, but prompted by the most diverse motives, from the lowest in the scale to the highest and noblest of which human nature is susceptible.

Military con- Great military conquerors, such as
querors. Julius Cæsar, Alexander the Great, and Napoleon Bonaparte, created for a time splendid empires ; but because their ruling passion was the aggrandisement of self, their creations quickly perished. The Emperor Maximilian dis-

Maximilian. played himself to the citizens of Ulm upon the topmost pinnacle of their cathedral spire ; it was an act of daring, but vain and worthless. The march

Pizarro. of Pizarro to the conquest of Peru was beset with obstacles and perils, and the triumph was a courageous surmounting of tremendous difficulties ; but the hardihood and bravado were prompted by greediness for gain and fame. Many a deed that has been called glorious thus becomes despicable through selfishness and vanity.

Far otherwise are those sublime acts of self-devotion and self-forgetfulness, which spring from a deep sense of Duty, and fixed resolution to fulfil it at any cost ; such chivalrous honour, fortitude, self-sacrifice and devotion, as are depicted in the Indian epics,

the Rámáyana and the Mahá-bhárata ; these are
 “Golden Deeds.” “the truly golden and priceless deeds
 that are the jewels of history, the
 salt of life.” Such fidelity to duty—the watchword
 alike of Nelson and of Wellington—kept the Roman
 sentinel at his post at the gate of
 The Roman Pompeii, when the blinding dust and
 sentinel. liquid lava from Vesuvius swept
 everything before them ; and his bones, breastplate,
 and helmet yet remain, to witness to his unflinch-
 ing firmness. It kept Leonidas and his 300 Spartan
 warriors at the Pass of Thermopylæ,
 Leonidas and the 300. till their heroic bravery was over-
 powered, and they were cut down, one
 by one, in their desperate resolve to do their best to
 save their country from the invasion of the Persians.

There are many well-known instances in which the
 gallant devotion of one man has saved a whole
 band. Recall, again, the old Roman
 Horatius Co- story of Horatius Cocles, who, with
 cles. his two brave companions, defended
 the one wooden bridge across the Tiber, against the
 Tuscan army, while the rest of the citizens, with
 “hatchet, bar, and crow,” were smiting the planks
 behind them, till the supports of the bridge had been
 destroyed. At the last moment, his two companions
 darted back, and the bridge fell with a mighty crash,
 while

“Alone stood brave Horatius,
 But constant still in mind,
 Thrice thirty thousand foes before,
 And the broad flood behind.”

His heroic work accomplished, one eye put out by a
 dart, and otherwise severely wounded, he jumped into
 the foaming stream.

Nearly two centuries after, the Plebeian Consul, Decius, with that earnest religious faith which gave the old Romans their marvellous resolution, in order to save the Roman legions from the Latins, called to the chief priest, in the midst of the fight, to consecrate him as a sacrifice to the gods, dashed on horseback into the thickest ranks of the enemy, and met his devoted death. Later on, his high-spirited son, Decius, the son of a second Decius, followed his father to a like sacrificial death, in behalf of his country, thereby securing victory for the Romans over the furious Gauls.

Nor was this patriotism confined to Rome. Years after, when these Gauls were defending their native lands against Julius Cæsar, one young chieftain of the tribe of the Averni, named Vercingetorix, after having done his best to throw off the Roman yoke, was driven with his men into their fortified camp at Alesia; and after a gallant resistance, and all hope was gone, he offered himself to become a victim for their safety, remained in captivity for six long years, and was at last slain, in order to grace a Roman triumph, on the Capitoline hill.

As the old Roman bridge was held by Horatius, so in like manner, was Stamford bridge, across the river Ouse, defended in the 11th century, by one brave Northman, who, meeting his foes one by one, after the last battle, kept back the whole pursuing English army, thus allowing numbers of his countrymen to reach their ships in safety; till he himself was slain by a cowardly spear-thrust from an enemy under the bridge.

So also, the knightly Robert Bruce, in 1306, perilled himself to secure the retreat of his friends, when pursued by the

Lord of Lorn, by placing himself in a narrow path near the head of the Tay, and keeping back the wild Highlanders with his single arm.

And, to cite another similar instance of brave self-devotion for the sake of others: one night during the Seven Years' War between Prussia and Austria, a young

officer of the Auvergne regiment,
 the *Chevalier d'Assas*, was sent out from the army of the French allies in Germany to reconnoitre, when, alone in a wood, he was suddenly surrounded by a number of the enemy who were advancing to surprise the French, and with their bayonets pricking his breast, was told that if he made the slightest noise he would be a dead man. Shouting aloud, "Here, Auvergne! Here are the enemy"! he fell dead to the ground before the shout reached his men; but his cry aroused his comrades, and his willing sacrifice saved the whole army.

And splendid, too, was the self-devotion of "the *Helsman of Lake Eric*," who, on board the burning steamer, "held fast by the wheel in the very jaws of the flame, so as to guide the vessel into harbour, and save the many lives within her, at the cost of his own fearful agony, while slowly scorched by the flames."*

"Great deeds can never be undone:
 Their splendour yet must fill our sky
 Like stars, outlasting even the sun."

It was his love of knightly deeds, which knew no distinction of time, or place, or people, that has made Sir Francis Doyle's poetry so beloved by Englishmen. He took his lyre to sing the deeds of those who never in the darkest hour despaired or faltered, who never

* See "A Book of Golden Deeds," for several of these stories, (Macmillan and Co.).

feared to face death at the call of duty—splendid feats of arms or of single unassuming valour: of the heroic deaths of the soldier Charles Gordon, and the girl Alice Ayres; of Melville and Coghill, who in 1879 saved the colours from the desperate wreck of Isandlwana, but would not save themselves; of whom Lord Stratford de Redcliffe wrote:

“Ye crown the list of glorious acts which form our country’s boast,
Ye rescued from the brink of shame what soldier’s prize the most,
And reached *by duty’s path* a life beyond the lives ye lost:”

of the “Eleven men of England,” who died through mistaking a signal amid the sands of Upper Scinde, and were found by Sir Charles Napier with the “Red Thread of Honour” bound round each bleaching wrist: Mehrah Khan, and of Mehrab Khan, who vowed

“To perish, to the last, the lord
Of all that man can call his own,”

and fell beneath the English bayonets at the door of his zenana.

Noble portraits adorn his “Hall of Heroes”—“the fathers of our ancient race,” who never bartered their fidelity or played the coward, but,

“—Gainst the rush of peril, showed
Fresh courage as the foe drew nigher,
And fused men’s thoughts, until they glowed
Like one great breath of living fire.”

The feature of character common to all such deeds of heroism is *Courage*—a virtue that is tested by the power of a man to stand alone. Just as the word *virtue* signifies, generically, manly strength, (the Latin *virtus* being derived from *vir* a man, because virtue is the most manly ornament, and the corresponding Greek term *arete* (ἀρετή)

coming from *Arēs*, ("Ares) Mars—both conveying the idea of manly strength and energy), so the Latin *virtus*, and Greek *andreia* (*ἀνδρεία*—*ἀνὴρ*, a man,) signify, specifically, courage, manly spirit, and fortitude. True courage, whether physical or moral, is manliness; no vulgar or brutal force, but "the firm resolve of virtue and of reason." Physical courage, though no doubt a constitutional endowment, may be cultivated by judicious training. It is that unflinching steadiness of nerve, which, rising into a sentiment, renders a man superior to a sense of personal danger; as seen so strikingly in the brave Gordon of Kartoum.

Exhibited in a leader, courage has a wonderfully inspiring power on others. It is said
 Captain Sir Wm. Peel. of Captain Sir Wm. Peel, of the Royal Navy, that, during all the bombardment at Sebastopol, it was his invariable practice to walk about behind his battery on the natural plateau of the ground, where he had little or no protection from the enemy's fire. This he did from no swagger, but to *set an example to his men of cool contempt for danger*. "I can see him now," says Lord Wolseley, "with his telescope under his arm, in quarter-deck fashion, halting from time to time to watch the effect of his battery upon the enemy's works, or to direct the attention of his men in charge of guns to some particular spot or object in the Redan or Malakoff. He was thus always in view; his men could always see him; and as they were down in the trench before him, and so in comparative safety, all felt that his eye was upon them, and that if he, in the exposed position, made so light of his great danger, *they could not presume to wince* in the shelter which the battery afforded them."

It was the knowledge that Wellington was with the army, that raised the natural courage of the British soldier to the heroic pitch. The same confidence in, and love for, Garibaldi, inspired his followers and their deeds: and it is this training of men in habits of common obedience and mutual trust, till the sympathy amongst them moves them all as one man, that constitutes true *discipline*, where, as it has been said, the knowledge of the trust which each places in the other, makes the desire to vindicate that trust one of the most imperious of the emotions.

It is true that conspicuous courage comes sometimes of that passion of self-regard which goes to form what is called a "child of destiny." Alexander the Great had this courage; and so had Napoleon Bonaparte: they thought of themselves as in some sense greater than the world in which they played a part. But there are much nobler sources of this kind of valour. True courage is allied to gentleness, generosity, and forbearance; it is never overbearing, cruel, and unforgiving. It is said of Sir John Franklin that "he was a man who never turned his back upon a danger, yet of that tenderness that he would not brush away a musquito." And a story is told of a French officer, in the cavalry engagement of El Bodon in Spain, who had raised his sword to strike Sir Felton Harvey, but perceiving his antagonist had only one arm, he instantly stopped, brought down his sword in the usual salute, and rode past. That was the display of a truly fine and gentle trait of character.

The sight or sense of *suffering, wrong, and misery*, will call forth deeds of heroic tenderness, and sometimes

turn a coward into a man of the serenest courage.

Moral courage. Such moral courage is a virtue of the

highest cast, and renders a man, in a benevolent undertaking, or in the pursuit or defence of right, superior, not only to privation and danger, but to the fear of reproach, opposition, or contempt. For even those who may be distinguished for physical courage, never flinching in the face of danger, may be deficient in moral courage; unable to contend valiantly for the right, and to face opposition; afraid of their companions, easily seduced to evil, shrinking before a laugh or a sneer. That is not true manliness. If you are to say of any one what Mark Antony said of Brutus :—

“ The elements were
So mixed in him that nature might stand up
And say to all the world—this was a man ;”

you must put the idea of *moral fearlessness and rectitude*, and *hatred of wrong* into your conception of manly vigour. Is it manly to have the temper of wax, shaped by every passing circumstance; to be cowed by the prospect of some self-denying service; to be borne aside by a breath of opposition; to be whirled away by a sudden gust of temptation, or to let boon companions carry you along? Not of such stuff are true heroes, reformers, benefactors made.

The well-known story of generous self-sacrifice displayed on the battle-field of Zutphen, Sir Philip Sidney has immortalised the name of Sir Philip Sidney. “ I see the scene before me,” says a writer of the present day, * “ as if on a glowing canvass. The clouds droop heavily over the blood-red plain, where, among the dead and dying, lies the wounded hero, scarce heeding the press of the distant battle, or the panic of the scattering foe. His

* “Records of Noble Lives,” p. 114, by W. H. Davenport Adams. (T Nelson and Sons, London)

eyes are dim with the death-mist ; his brow grows damp with agony ; the lips parch, and the faltering tongue can scarcely murmur its earnest prayer for ' water.' But already his want has been anticipated, and the welcome draught sparkles refreshingly before him. Now see how yonder dying soldier raises his writhing limbs from the hard earth, and turns towards the cup the keenest, eagerest, and most wistful eyes ! As Sir Philip catches their glance of mute, imploring agony, he puts aside the wished-for draught. ' Take it,' he faintly says, ' to yonder soldier ; he has more need of it than I.' "

It has been moral courage that has sustained the preachers of righteousness in all ages and lands,

in the face of the fiercest resistance ; that upheld Wilberforce in his protracted efforts to put down the abominations of the slave-trade ; that nerved Cardinal Borromeo, in 1576, at Milan, and Bishop Belzunce, in 1721, at Mar-

seilles, to brave the perils of those plague-stricken cities, to stand fearless and unwearied in the midst of the deadly sickness, to watch over the people in their sufferings, visit the hospitals, and console the dying ; that kept

George Monk, Duke of Albemarle, the king-maker of the 17th century, steadfast and unshaken at his post of duty, during the terrible pestilence that swept over London in 1665, when every hour marked the tolling of the death-

bell : that sustained John Howard, in the same manner reckless of infection and pestilence, in his pilgrimage to hundreds of prisons, that he might alleviate the miseries of his fellow-men who were confined there : that fortified

Elizabeth Fry on a like errand of benevolence ; and that led Florence

Florence Night-
ingale.

Nightingale and other English ladies,
in the depth of a Crimean winter, in
the hospitals at Scutari, freely to
devote their health and strength to the holy work of
softening the suffering of war ; whose loving step and
gentle hand spared many a sick man's life, and dis-
missed others peacefully to their rest.

“ Lo, in that house of misery,
A lady with a lamp I see
Pass through the glimmering gloom,
And flit from room to room.

And slow, as in a dream of bliss,
The speechless sufferer turns to kiss
Her shadow as it falls
Upon the darkening walls.

As if a door in heaven should be
Opened, and then closed suddenly,
The vision came and went ;
The light shone and was spent.
On England's annals, through the long
Hereafter of her speech and song,
That light its rays shall cast
From portals of the past.

A lady with a lamp shall stand,
In the great history of the land,
A noble type of good,
Heroic, womanhood.”—*Longfellow*.

The same spirit inspired those deeds of chivalry
for which the Indian Mutiny was so conspicuous ; it
impelled Neill to march on Cawnpore,
Neill and Have- and Havelock on Lucknow, urging on
lock. officers and men alike in the hope of
rescuing the women and children in their peril ; it
enabled Sir Colin Campbell to rescue
Sir Colin Camp- the blocked up band at Lucknow, and
bell. to conduct his long and helpless train
across the perilous bridge at night, never relin-
quishing his charge till they safely reached Cawnpore amid
the desperate assault of the enemy.

Courageous resolution and unselfish daring have been nowhere more illustrious than amid the horrors of shipwreck. On board ships of war and other vessels, at such times, there have been splendid instances of unshrinking obedience to the voice of duty, and acts of noble self-forgetfulness. From admirals and captains down to cadet and cabin-boy, brave hearts have manifested a willing self-sacrifice for others; the strong giving place to the weak in moments of rescue, and facing certain death rather than endanger women and children.

In 1852, the *Birkenhead*, a war-transport, with a large company of men, women, and children, on board, struck on a reef of sunken rocks off the African coast, in the dead of night, and became a hopeless wreck. The word was passed to *save the women and children*; and the helpless creatures were passed silently into the boats. Then the commander thoughtlessly called out, "All those that can swim, jump overboard, and make for the boats." But one of the officers of the troops said, "No! if you do that, the boats with the women must be swamped;" and the brave men stood still. "There was not a murmur nor a cry amongst them, until the vessel made her final plunge. Down went the ship, and down went the heroic band;" and few of them were saved.

The sympathy and bravery of dwellers on shore have at such times given a chivalrous response to the sufferers on the sea: and there are few nobler pictures than that of the crippled but cultured Anna Gurney, a lady of good family, who, on the Norfolk coast, procured a life-boat and apparatus for rescuing the ship-wrecked, and in dark nights, amid the howling storm, and in infirmity and pain, used to be wheeled down to the shore in her

chair, to inspire the crew of the life-boat, and to afford aid to the half-drowned sailors when they were brought ashore.

And the well-known story of the stout-hearted
 Grace Darling. Grace Darling, likewise proves that there are heroic women as well as heroic men. She was the daughter of the keeper of one of the light-houses on the Fern Islands, and on a boisterous morning in September, 1838, went off in a boat with her reluctant father, over a tremendous sea, to rescue the survivors of the *Forfarshire*, a large steamer that had been wrecked on the rocks. While her father was on the vessel, the noble girl "rowed off and on among the breakers, dexterously guiding her little boat;" and rescued one by one nine survivors, whom she conveyed to the light-house, and lodged and nursed till relief could come from the mainland. Well did her gallant conduct win an enthusiastic recognition throughout the country.

The true metal of all such "golden deeds" is self-devotion : and a high sense of Duty, which never even deemed it possible to act otherwise, together with a deep compassion, have been the constraining motives. An old Greek proverb says, "To be good is *difficult*." Duty implies self-sacrifice, and can never come out of selfishness, however sublimated : and apart from this sense of duty, in respect to country, kindred, religion, and one's highest convictions, no reason can be given why men or women are ever bound to sacrifice themselves. What calls forth our deepest admiration, whether on the battle field or on the sea, in pestilential cities, in hospitals of suffering, or in any other scenes of life, is "the spirit that *gives itself for others*, the temper that for the sake of religion, of country, of duty, of kindred, nay, of pity even to a stranger,"

will dare all things, risk all things, endure all things, meet death in one moment, or wear life away in slow, persevering tendance and suffering."

It must not be supposed, however, that goodness and greatness such as this are confined to the summit levels of character. A noble life open to all.

Every one has the power of shaping his own life, of forming his own character and opinions: and not only one's own prosperity and happiness, but the progress and glory of his country, depend upon the faithful use he makes of the powers that God has given him. Do not suppose that a soldier serves his country any more than other good citizens. Militarism and patriotism are by no means interchangeable terms. Even military heroes may be like Mazzini and Garibaldi, who won freedom for Italy, not with swords and bayonets, but with the moral sentiment of justice and humanity. To each one of us it is given to lead a "noble life." Whatever your position, you have the raw material out of which men are made, and are capable of being moulded into the noblest types of manhood: always remembering that it is not so much the head as the heart that determines a man's excellence. Genius is a curse unless regulated by sound moral principle; and he that can control his appetites and rein in his passions, and be strictly upright and humane, is nobler far than Cæsar or Napoleon.

"I ask not of his lineage,
I ask not of his name,
If manliness be in his heart,
He noble birth may claim.
The palace or the hovel,
Where first his life began.
I seek not of—but answer this:
'Is he an honest man'?"

To make ourselves men in the truest and most comprehensive sense—to attain to perfect True manhood. manhood—is that on which every one of us should determine. We are not intended to be

the slaves, but the masters of circumstances ; and the work of self-formation cannot be transferred to others. Only do the best you can, and you will have no occasion to ask any one to do for you what a stupid idler once

asked an old Bishop of Lincoln to do
 A Bishop of Lincoln. for him, viz., to make a great man of

him. "Brother," replied the Bishop, "if your plough is broken, I'll pay for the mending of it, or if your ox should die, I'll buy you another ; but I cannot make a great man of you ; a ploughman I found you, and, I fear, a ploughman I must leave you." Opposition and impediments will be sure to

stand in the way of all ; but that resolute encountering of difficulties, which we call courageous effort, will only brace the aspiring mind to rise in the scale of honour and usefulness.

"Should you see, afar off, that worth winning,
 Set out on the journey with trust,
 And never heed if your path, at beginning,
 Should be among brambles and dust ;
 Though it is but by footsteps ye do it,
 And hardships may hinder and stay,
 Keep a heart, and be sure you'll get through it,
For where there's a will there's a way."

Biography is full of splendid successes because fixity of purpose and tenacity of will have been the inspiration of manly actions. He who resolves upon doing a thing, will often secure its achievement by that very resolution ; while the vacillating man, who is always weighing the possibilities of defeat against the chances of victory, is doomed to failure. There was

one of the old Scandinavian deities
 A 'god with a hammer.' that was very true to the Norseman character ; it was a god with a ham-

mer ; and there was the crest of a pick-axe with the motto, "Either I will find a way or make one." And one of those old Teutons is recorded to have said in a

famous speech, "I believe neither in idols nor demons, I put my sole trust in my own strength of body and soul." Energy of will, resolute decision, is the central power of character in a man—it is the man himself : and this has been the ruling characteristic of those whose names are imperishable on the page of history. Sir Thomas
 Energy of will
 Sir Thomas
 Fowell Buxton. Fowell Buxton, who carried on the work of Wilberforce in the British Parliament, and who was himself a splendid example of a resolute, energetic man, once said : "The longer I live, the more I am convinced that the great difference between men, between the feeble and the strong, the great and the insignificant, is *energy—invincible determination*—a purpose once fixed, and then death or victory. That quality will do anything that can be done in this world, and no talents, no circumstances, no opportunities, will make a two-legged creature a man without it."

A few hours before he fought the battle of Meeanee, Sir Charles Napier wrote : "It is my
 Sir Charles
 Napier. first battle as a commander : it may be my last. At sixty, that makes little difference ; but my feelings are, it shall be *do or die*." And he won the victory. That is the spirit in which every stern difficulty—be it the accomplishment of a task, the discharge of a sacred duty, or the mastering of an evil passion—must be faced, we must *do or die*.

Resolution and persevering industry, rather than
 great genius, point the high-road to
 Genius defined. success. Genius indeed has been defined as the power of making efforts, or as patience : John Foster, author of "Decision of Character," held it to be "the power of lighting one's own fire." And certain it is that in cases like Demosthenes and Sir Isaac Newton, and with a host of other worthies, it has been

untiring application and indomitable perseverance—a wise and faithful use of time, turning every moment to account, and making the most of all their powers—that won the day, and gave them immortality. Did you ever read the following advertisement? “Lost, yesterday, somewhere between sunrise and sunset, two golden hours, each secured by sixty diamond minutes: no reward is offered, for they are gone for ever.”

Use of time.

Demosthenes, in particular, has set a noble example of the triumph of steady persistence over what seemed insuperable difficulties. That great orator had at first a weak voice, a thick way of speaking, and such short breath that he had to stop between his sentences. His first attempts were hissed, and he had to retire confounded. Assured, however, by a friend that his natural defects might be overcome, he *resolved* to overcome them. “By the use of small pebbles, he corrected his pronunciation; by climbing the steep hills, he strengthened his lungs; by delivering his orations at the sea-side he increased the power of his voice;” and he lived to thrill the warriors of Greece as no other voice has done.

Demosthenes.

From the modern world many noble examples might be selected of resolute, persevering, manly will, crowned by moral intrepidity. George Stephenson was born in a lowly dwelling consisting of one apartment; and his parents brought up a family of six children on 12s. a week. At one time we see him a farmer’s boy on 2d. a day; at another, an engine-fireman; now mending his neighbour’s clocks and watches at night; then extensive locomotive manufacturer at Newark, and spending fifteen years in working out improvements in the steam-engine; and later on, a

George Stephenson.

railway contractor, and a great colliery and ironwork-proprietor. "Well do I remember," he says, "the beginning of my career as an engineer, and the great perseverance that was required for me to get on. Not having served an apprenticeship, I had made up my mind to go to America, considering that no one would trust me to act as an engineer. However, I was trusted in some small matters, and succeeded in giving satisfaction. Greater trusts were reposed in me, in which I also succeeded. Soon after, I commenced making the locomotive engine : and the results of my perseverance you have this day witnessed : and further, let me say that I've dined with princes, peers, and commoners, with persons of all classes, from the humblest to the highest." Here was a man, at one time weeping over overwhelming difficulties ; and then, rising out of them, finding himself a benefactor of the world !

John Kitto was a still more striking illustration of the fact that most precious jewels are sometimes found in dust-heaps. The son of a drunkard, he began life in a poor garret, feeble and deformed. At eleven years of age, he was apprenticed to a barber. At twelve, he was engaged in repairing a house, when his foot slipped from a ladder, and he fell thirty-five feet on to a stone pavement, and was taken up as dead. From that moment he never heard a sound ; his sense of hearing was completely extinguished. At fifteen, he began to draw, and hawked his pictures at Plymouth fair ; but soon found himself a parish pauper in the work-house ; where he became a skilful shoe-maker. Then he turned to writing essays that showed great talent ; and he was taken out of the work-house under distinguished patronage. Later on, he became a tutor, and travelled to the East. Returning home, he prosecuted his

literary labours, till he was paid £250 a year for his famous "Pictorial Bible," full of oriental illustrations, and £1,000 as editor of the "Biblical Cyclopædia:" and the pauper shoe-maker was known as John Kitto, D.D., F.S.A. It was his mission to prove that no condition in life need be hopeless; and that, penniless and untrained, a man, with unflagging industry, and high integrity, may battle manfully with his fate, and take a place among the ripest scholars of the age. The course of such an one is an incentive to all.

The life of Hugh Miller, again, the Cromarty mason, as told by himself in "My Schools and Schoolmasters," is the history of a noble and independent character, formed in the lowliest lot, by the aid of self-help and self-respect. First learning his letters by studying the sign-boards of his native town of Cromarty, he had a school-training after a sort; but gleaned his best pickings of knowledge from boys and men, workmen and fishermen, and above all from the old boulders strewed along the Frith. With a big hammer, he went about chipping the stones, thus early collecting geological specimens. Always keeping his eyes open, and his brains active behind them, he found in the pale-red clay of the quarry, above, and in the deep-red stone below, with the curious embedded fossils, ample matter for reflection. From being a quarryman he became a geologist, also a theologian, and an accomplished speaker and writer; and as the fruit of long years of patient observation and research, we have his "Testimony of the Rocks," and "Old Red Sandstone." He would not, however, have been what he was but for his moral energy and high integrity. It was this that enabled him, at one of those important turning-points in life that determine future character, to strike away from the rock of intemperance, on which youth and manhood have been so often wrecked.

“Real glory

Springs from the silent conquest of ourselves”;

and in order to wrestle successfully with any vicious habit, it is necessary to take our stand on a high moral elevation. In the stern contests of the will, everything depends on right direction and motives.

High principle.

It is this reference to character that discloses the evil of such moral diseases as gambling, and the love of gain. Because

Gambling.

they demoralise and materialise a man's nature, and weaken the mind through enervating excitement, they are wrong, and should be resisted. You cannot prove by logic that gambling is worse than that weak and senseless squandering of money which is so common in other ways ; but an enlightened conscience and a high sense of right are unerring guides. If our aim in life be rightly directed, the forces of our nature will be properly controlled. “Directed towards the enjoyment of the senses, the strong will may be a demon, and the intellect merely its debased slave ; but directed towards good, the strong will is a king, and the intellect is then the minister of man's highest well-being.” Call conscience by what name

Conscience rules the world.

we may, it is *moral* force that rules the world. They are the true kings of men, who reveal “those two virtues of a lordly race—perseverance in purpose, and a spirit of conduct which never fails.”

To quote a passage from the concluding chapter of Mr. Smile's “Self-Help” :—“Though a man have comparatively little culture, slender abilities, and but small wealth, yet, if *his character be of sterling worth*, he will always command an influence, whether it be in the workshop, the counting-house, the mart or the Senate. Canning wisely wrote in 1801,

Canning.

‘My road must be *through character* to power ; I will try no other course ; and I am san-

guine enough to believe that this course, though not perhaps the quickest, is the surest.' You may admire man of intellect ; but something more is necessary before you will trust them. Hence

Lord John Russell.

Lord John Russell once observed, in a sentence full of truth, 'It is the nature of party in England to *ask the assistance* of men of genius, but to *follow the guidance* of men of character.' This was strikingly illustrated in the

Francis Horner.

career of the late Francis Horner—a man of whom Sydney Smith said that the Ten Commandments were stamped upon his countenance. 'The valuable and peculiar light,' says Lord Cockburn, 'in which his history is calculated to inspire every right-minded youth, is this. He died at the age of 38 ; possessed of greater public influence than any other private man ; and admired, beloved, trusted, and deplored by all, except the heartless and the base. No greater homage was ever paid in Parliament to any deceased member. Now let every young man ask—how was this attained ? By rank ? He was the son of an Edinburgh merchant. By wealth ? Neither he, nor any of his relatives, ever had a superfluous sixpence. By office ? He held but one, and only for a few years, of no influence, and with very little pay. By talents ? His were not splendid, and he had no genius. Cautious and slow, his only ambition was to be right. By eloquence ? He spoke in calm, good taste, without any of the oratory that either terrifies or seduces. By any fascination of manner ? His was only correct and agreeable. By what then was it ? Merely by sense, industry, good principles, and a good heart,—qualities which no well-constituted mind need ever despair of attaining. It was

Force of his character.

the *force of his character* that raised him ; and this character not impressed upon him by nature, but formed, out

of no peculiarly fine elements, *by himself*. There were many in the House of Commons of far greater ability and eloquence. But no one surpassed him in the combination of an adequate portion of these *with moral worth*. Horner was born to show what moderate powers, unaided by anything whatever except culture and goodness, may achieve, even when these powers are displayed amidst the competition and jealousy of public life."

Who does not admire these 'royal natures'? Those who have thus left behind them the record of a noble life, have bequeathed to posterity an enduring good. The high models of biography are the finest educators of character; for noble natures lift us up; increase our self-reliance, and elevate our aims in life. They afford a looking-glass for the mind; presenting outwardly what may be our own career.

"Ever their phantoms rise before us,
Our loftier brothers, but one in blood;
By bed and table they lord it o'er us,
With looks of beauty and words of good."

"So may inferior eyes,
That borrow their behaviours from the great,
Grow great by their example, and put on
The dauntless spirit of resolution."

Just as one cannot gaze upon a noble picture without wishing one were a great painter, or listen to some soul-lifting musical composition without wishing one were a great musician; so one cannot study the biography of the wise and good and great, without deriving therefrom a constant inspiration. "Who can read of Hampden without a desire to stand like him in the fore-rank of patriotism? Who can study the career of Algernon Sidney without longing to exhibit the same unflinching devotion to liberty?"

Study of biography.

Hampden.

Algernon Sidney.

Who can trace, step by step, the difficult life-experiences of William Penn, the illustrious founder of Pennsylvania, without feeling how beautiful is the love of truth,—the tolerant temper which preaches and practises charity—the mild forbearance which giveth not blow for blow? Or who can read of the chivalrous exploits and gallant generosity of the French Bayard, whose valour saved the disgrace of the whole French army at the battle of Spurs; or of Robert Blake, the bravest of England's seakings, whose untiring energy and unconquerable resolution sustained a life which was one unflinching act of obedience to the sublime law of Duty—duty to his God, his fellows, and his country:—

“*Duty* his star; he lived for *Duty's* sake;
Truest of England's children—Robert Blake”!

who can study the lives and actions of heroes such as these, and of others to whom reference has been given, without cherishing noble thoughts and aspirations, and desiring to be a Bayard, a Blake, a Penn, a Sidney, and a Hampden, in his own circle? Emerson has remarked, that “the pictures which fill the imagination in reading the actions of Pericles, Zenophon, Columbus, Bayard, Sidney, Hampden, should teach us how needlessly mean our life is, that we, by the depth of our living, may deck it with more than regal or national splendour, and act on principles that shall interest man and nature in the length of our days.”

Engrave on your heart the rule of conduct followed by Lord Erskine, a high-minded and independent man—a rule that has

* “Records of Noble Lives.” (T. Nelson and Sons, London). Here will also be found biographies of Sir Philip Sidney, Francis Bacon, Robert Blake, George Monk, and William Penn.

guided the conduct of every good and noble life. "It was a first command and counsel of my earliest youth," he said, "*always to do what my conscience told me to be a duty, and to leave the consequence to God.*"

CHAPTER IX.

Examples of Veracity and Fidelity.

"Speak not a word which false thy own heart knows,
Self-kindled fire within the false one's spirit glows."—*The Kurral.*

["It will be acknowledged even by those that practise it not, that clear and round dealing is the honour of man's nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it."—*Lord Bacon.*]

Truth has been defined as the "summit of being," and the soul of rectitude in human affairs. Integrity in word and deed is the backbone of character. When our words correspond to our inmost thoughts

Veracity. and opinions, there is veracity: when

men say what they think, they are veracious men. But opinions may not be true; there may be no correspondence between *them* and eternal fact. If a man, through carelessness, slander another, believing the slander to be true, he may not have violated veracity; but his careless error excludes him from the rank of clear truthfulness. In

Truthfulness.

the same way, a man may bold, believe, and defend vigorously certain views, whether social or religious; but if he has only taken them up indolently, and second-hand, he cannot be called a man of truth. To be *true*, our convictions must have affinity with fact: it is our duty therefore to give our minds and consciences no rest till this agreement is ascertained.

But truthfulness is much more comprehensive than this, and must cover the whole of life.

Truth in life. Uprightness of character cannot be claimed, till there is transparent truthfulness in action as well as in words. Not only must there be a correspondence between convictions and realities in the abstract; there must be agreement between true convictions and individual life. The life, *i.e.*, outward conduct and practices, must not give the lie to thought and feeling. You cannot separate *thinking* rightly from *acting* rightly. To speculate on truth, and not to do it, is to be unreal and false. Truth always presents itself in the form of a duty; and he alone is the true man who *does* the truth; who is prepared at any moment to act from principle, and to risk the consequences. An hypocritical or double life is a false life; and a false life is an acted lie. A man must really be what he seems to be; and he must seem to be what he really is.

Thinking and acting.

A truly upright character will be strictly truthful and straightforward in *all* its actions; will carry out honesty of intention and honesty of dealing in all things; in small matters—where the allegiance of the soul is often tested most—as well as great. He will be like the mason with whom Hugh Miller served his apprenticeship, and who “*put his conscience into every stone that he laid.*” Whether he be student, mechanic, manufacturer, merchant, official, or statesman, he will pride himself upon the genuineness, thoroughness, and solidity of his work. Mean short-cuts, unscrupulous scamping and adulteration, crooked policy, are not consistent with self-respect, but ensure self-degradation. Conscience must dominate over the

A conscientious mason.

whole life and character, or a man will be always liable to fall before temptation, and be the victim of self-reproach. Many a man who would never perjure himself in a court of justice, is daily guilty of small insincerities. In deeds as well as in words :

“ A lie which is half a truth is ever the blackest of lies ;

A lie which is all a lie may be met and fought with out-right :

But a lie which is part a truth is a harder matter to fight.”

We should speak and act “ *the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.*”

It matters not whether the dishonest act be successful or not, discovered or concealed, the meanness is the same ; though the man that stoops to it is not the same as he was before. Whether in secret or under the gaze of a thousand eyes, the truthful man acts

rightly. The boy who, when asked
The upright boy. why he did not pocket some pears, for nobody was there to see, replied, “ yes, there was : I was there to see myself ; and I don’t intend ever to see myself do a dishonest thing ” ; was governed by a true principle : and with such high self-respect, would be sure to succeed in life. And far better than material success, and without which wealth and prosperity are nothing, he would carry through life that which is a man’s best possession—a satisfied conscience. “ The man cozened not me, but his own

conscience,” said Bishop Latimer of
Bishop Latimer. a cutler who made him pay two-pence for a knife not worth a penny. “ It is heaven upon earth,” said Francis Bacon, “ to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in Providence, and *turn upon the poles of truth.*”

Speaking of the general probity of Englishmen, which he held to be a principal cause of their success,

Baron Dupin on
Englishmen.

Baron Dupin observed: "We may succeed for a time by fraud, by surprise, by violence; but we can succeed permanently only by means directly opposite. It is not alone the courage, the intelligence, the activity, of the merchant and manufacturer, which maintain the superiority of their productions and the character of their country; it is far more their wisdom, their economy, and, above all, their probity." There is nothing more honourable to human nature than the trust reposed by one person in another—the result of uprightness of conduct; a trust often confided in persons whom we have never seen—the finest act of homage, it has been said, which men can render to one another.

Sir Robert Peel, who may be taken as a type of a high-minded and successful English statesman, owed his great influence

Sir Robert Peel. mainly to his love of truthfulness. Speaking in the House of Lords a few days after his death, the Duke of Wellington said: "All must feel the high and honourable character of the late statesman. In all the course of my acquaintance with him, I never knew a man in whose truth and justice I had greater confidence. I never knew an instance in which he did not show the strongest attachment to truth; and I never saw in the whole course of my life the smallest reason for suspecting that he stated anything which he did not firmly believe to be the fact."

Wellington himself, too, the greatest English general, was, like the equally great Washington, inflexibly true and honourable,

Wellington. a profound hater of falsehood in every form. Napoleon's aim was "Glory"; but Wellington's watchword, like Nelson's, was "Duty." He was in the habit of saying, that, if there was one thing on which an

English officer prided himself more than another, excepting his courage, it was his truthfulness. "When English officers," he remarked, "have given their parole of honour not to escape, be sure they will not break it. Believe me—*trust to their word*; the word of an English officer is a surer guarantee than the vigilance of sentinels."

But such fidelity is, happily, not confined to any country or to any age. Noble are the instances recorded in ancient history of the fulfilment of a promise even in the face of death; and of perfect trust in a faithful friend.

The thrilling story of Damon and Pythias is well known. Pythias was a Pythagorean, who came under the suspicious anger of Dionysius, the powerful tyrant of Syracuse. He was sentenced to death; but having friends and lands in Greece, he besought the tyrant to allow him to go there and settle his affairs, promising that he would return within an appointed time, to meet his doom. Dionysius, who trusted no one, laughed at his simplicity: but Pythias had a friend, Damon, who came forward in his behalf, and offered to become his surety, engaging to suffer death in his stead, if Pythias did not return according to his promise. Then the tyrant, out of curiosity to know the issue of such conduct, let him go. The appointed time drew near; and Pythias did not come. But Damon was sure of his friend's fidelity and honour; and such was his splendid faith, that he affirmed it must be the winds and waves that kept him; and if so, he should rejoice to die, to save his friend. The last hour arrived and Damon was preparing to die, when Pythias appeared, calm and resolute, ready to undergo his sentence, and rejoicing that he had come in time. Such

heroic and mutual constancy was too much for even the brutal tyrant, who still had a spark of manly admiration for a noble deed : and he reversed the sentence ; and went so far as to ask to be admitted to the secrecy of such a friendship.

Even more touching is the story of the old Roman
 Consul Regulus, who was sent with an
 army to fight the Carthagenians on
 the coast of Africa, and who, after a terrible defeat,
 was kept a close prisoner for two years, “pining and
 sickening in his loneliness.” At length the Roman
 arms secured such a decisive victory, that the
 Carthagenians resolved to sue for peace ; and knowing
 that Regulus would ensure a hearing at Rome, they
 resolved to send him with their envoys, having first
 made him swear that he would come back if the em-
 bassy proved unsuccessful. Arriving at the city
 gate, “worn and dejected,” he refused to enter,
 maintaining that he was no longer a Roman citizen,
 but a barbarian’s slave. Resisting the entreaties of
 wife and sons, and of the Roman Senate, the latter
 came out to the Campagna, when Regulus, with
 splendid self-forgetfulness, pleaded against himself,
 urged them to continue the war, and to allow of no
 exchange of prisoners. It was useless reminding
 him that his oath was wrested from him ; and that
 he was therefore not bound to return. His noble
 reply was :—“I am not ignorant that death and the
 extremest tortures are preparing for me ; but what
 are these to the shame of an infamous action, or the
 wounds of a guilty mind ? Slave as I am to Carthage,
 I have still the spirit of a Roman. I have sworn to
 return. It is my duty to go ; let the gods take care
 of the rest.” Nothing could prevail upon him to
 break his word, or to save himself at the risk of his
 country’s weal : and so the old man turned back to

the chains and death that he knew were awaiting him. Who can withhold admiration and reverence from such lofty fidelity and self-devotion?

Another instance of the sacredness of a plighted word, we have in Alonso de Guzman, surnamed "The Good," the high-minded Lionese knight who undertook the defence of the city of Tarifa, one of the gates of Spain, after it had been captured by king Sancho, in the 13th century. His eldest son was in the service of Don Juan, who undertook to recover Tarifa for the king of Morocco: and on arriving at the gates, Don Juan declared that, unless the city were yielded at once, Guzman should behold the death of his son. The boy was held out, weeping, before his father's eyes. The parental struggle was severe; but rather than yield the city, and break his faith to the king, he sacrificed his son. The king, after embracing the man who had been true to his word at such a cost, exclaimed:—"Here learn, ye knights, what are exploits of virtue. Behold your model."

Heroic acts of fidelity such as these are not confined to men. The story is told of the Athenian woman—"the lioness without a tongue"—who, when put to the torture that she might disclose the secrets of those who conspired against the tyranny of the Pisistratids, "actually bit off her tongue that she might be unable to betray the trust placed in her."

Neither is such a spirit shown by only men and women. In the battle of Aboukir Bay, many brave hearts perished, adding to the glory of the British navy; but "the noblest thing that perished there was one young faithful heart." At night, one of the French ships

took fire; and Nelson, with true British generosity, gave orders that the English boats should be put off to the burning ship, which they had been attacking, so as to save as many lives as possible. The French officers gladly accepted the offer of safety, and called to the captain's son, "the little favourite of the ship," to come with them. But he had received a sacred trust which he dared not violate. His father had told him not to move from a spot where he had stationed him; and the child said he "must obey his father." That father's voice, they said, would never call to him again, for he lay mortally wounded upon the deck; but the boy was resolute. The boat was therefore put off; and in the lurid light of the flames, the devoted son was seen on the deck, fastening the unconscious form of his father to "one of the spars of the shivered masts:" and soon after, when the ship exploded, and its burning fragments fell far and wide, "for one moment the boat's crew had a sight of a helpless figure bound to a spar, and guided by a little childish swimmer, who must have gone overboard with his precious freight just before the explosion."

Fidelity is not a virtue that flourishes only in the West. We know how in the Indian epic, the *Rámayána*, *Ráma*, the noble minded, filial, fraternal, and tenderly devoted to his wife *Sítá*, is represented as resolving to sacrifice himself rather than allow his father, *Daśaratha*, king of *Ayodhyá*, to break his pledged word to the mother of his brother *Bharata*. He persists in his resolution, notwithstanding the entreaties of his own mother, *Kauśalyá*, the taunts of his brother *Lakshmana*, and his anxiety for the safety of his wife, who determines to accompany him in his exile. And when his father dies, and his brother *Bharata* visits him,

and urges him to return and accept the government, and when all the citizens entreat him too, Rama replies : "There is nothing greater than truth ; and truth should be esteemed the most sacred of all things. Devoted by promise to my father's commands, I will neither, through covetousness nor forgetfulness, nor blind ignorance, break down the barrier of truth." (II. cix. 17.)

And you will remember the story of Hariśchandra, king of Oude, who reigned in
 Hariśchandra. great splendour.* He had a wife renowned for beauty and gentleness, and also an infant son. In the court of Indra, king of the gods, Vaśishtá, who had been his guru, boasted one day of the virtues of his royal disciple. Thereupon Viśvámitra, a rishi distinguished for his malicious, envious temper, declared that Hariśchandra was addicted to falsehood. A furious dispute arose between the rival gurus, which ended in an agreement that Vishwámitra should tempt and try king Hariśchandra in every possible way, to induce him to break his word. If he failed, he was to give half his divine powers to Vaśishtá. Hereupon Vishwámitra proceeds to the earth to carry on the work of temptation ; while king Hariśchandra is warned by a dream of the coming trials ; and his wife, hearing the dream, comforts him and exhorts him to hold fast his integrity.

Vishwámitra begins operations by obtaining from Hariśchandra the promise of an immense sum of gold for the performance of a sacrifice. He then lays waste the fertile fields of Oudh, so as to reduce the king to abject poverty, and when the treasury is utterly empty, comes to him for the promised money, offer-

* The following outline is from a paper on "South Indian Vernacular Literature," by Rev G. U. Pope, D.D., in *The Indian Magazine*, September, 1888.

ing to forego the payment if the king will only repudiate the debt. Hariśchandra will not tell a lie, and gives up his kingdom to the relentless creditor. The debt, however, is yet far from paid. The unhappy king, with his wife and child and a faithful minister, goes forth, in charge of a heartless bailiff, set over him by his fiendish persecutor ; and they come to Kási. There he sells his wife, his child, and finally himself, and so pays the debt. Thus, his word is unbroken. But he is fallen from his high estate, and is the slave of the Vettiyán, the public executioner and burner of the dead for the city of Kási.

His poor queen is the slave of a cruel Bráhmaṇ, who, with his wife, makes the poor lady a wretched drudge. Meanwhile, the child is bitten by a serpent in the jungle, whither it has wandered, and dies. The tidings are brought to the mother, who obtains with difficulty permission after dusk to go to the jungle to seek the corpse to take it to the burning-ground. In darkness and in unutterable anguish of soul she seeks for the body, finds it, and takes it to the burning-ground, where her husband, the fallen king, is in attendance as the Vettiyán's drudge. They recognise one another. It is an awful hour ! She asks for the performance of the sad rites ; but he cannot forego his master's fee, and will not break his compact. So the poor wife goes away through the city to try to obtain the few small coins necessary for the burning of the body of her little son. While roaming about in the dark she is seized by the royal guards as a demoness, who has occasioned the sudden death of the infant son of the king of Kási. She is summarily condemned to be beheaded, and is hurried off to the burning-ground for execution. It is Hariśchandra's duty, which, as he has told himself, he is bound to execute, to shed the blood of his cherished wife. The swollen, distorted body of his little son lies

at his feet, his wife bows her head to the stroke, and his cruel master urges him to do his duty.

He can escape from all by a word : let him deny the debt ! He wavers not ; but the trial is complete, and, when he uplifts the sword, it falls on her neck a garland of fragrant flowers. All the deities of Indra's heaven appear, and shower praises and blessings on the hero, who would not break his word ; and he, with wife and child restored to life, returns to Oudh to reign long and happily.

By the side of these heroic deeds of unfaltering fidelity and untarnished honour, how despicable does all base conduct and untruthful speech appear. *Rectitude* is but another name for virtue : and to say that a man is strictly upright in his character, is to say of him the highest thing.

When Themistocles privately told Aristides the Just. Aristides, the great Athenian who so distinguished himself at Marathon, that he intended to burn the Persian fleet, and thus make Athens the mistress of the sea, that noble, upright man revolted from the base design, and informed the Athenians that, while nothing could be more advantageous to their country, nothing could be more unjust. The people responded to this sentiment, rejected the proposal of the general, and bestowed upon Aristides the surname of Just.

“ Who is the honest man ?

He that doth still and strongly good pursue,
To God, his neighbour, and himself most true ;

When neither force nor fawning can
Unpin, or wrench, from giving all their due.”

It is the Tamil Kural that says :—“ The gain and loss of life are not mere accident ; just mind inflexible is sages' ornament.”

The first lesson of the highest type of life is this : “ *Be true* ”—and the second, this : “ *Be true* ”—and the third, this : “ *Be true* .”

PART II.

RELIGION.

“ Educate men without Religion, and you make them but clever devils.”
Duke of Wellington.

CHAPTER I.

1. *What is Religion ?*

“ By ‘ Religion ’ we understand belief in an Ever-living God, that is, of a Divine Mind and Will ruling the universe, and holding moral relations with mankind.” God is man’s highest thought; and the character of this highest thought will determine the moral quality of a religion. As the deity is, so will the religion be. “ A bad god can never have a good religion.”* The whole order of thought and the entire life are shaped by the nature of a man’s highest conception. Supposing ‘ Force ’ be conceived as the highest idea, then necessary laws rule the universe ; each new life is but a new link in a forged chain of necessity ; there is no freedom ; hence no responsibility ; hence no such thing as Duty and Morality. But if you have as your highest thought an ever-living, righteous, loving Being, then the entire order of things must be intended to conform to Him ; and since a moral order cannot be built up by a necessity that destroys morality, religion can only be realised *through man*, as a free and rational agent.

Religion defined. God, man’s highest thought.

‘ Force.’

‘ Being.’

Religion realised through man.

See *Religion in History*, chapter I, by Principal A. M. Fairbairn, in connection with this section. (Hodder and Stoughton, London.)

Man's nature must thus be open to God's Spirit ; and God speaks through man, in order that His own Divine purposes may be fulfilled. This is the object of religion ; that God's holiness, goodness, love, may everywhere prevail ; that men's thoughts and actions may be governed by their idea of God ; that if God hates sin, and every form of wrong, man may hate them too ; that if God is compassionate and loving, eager to save men from evil and sorrow, so man is to minister to suffering, and seek to root out evil from the earth.

Belief in God is thus the source of the highest inspiration ; putting strength into the heart ; giving us power to fight on and always in the cause of right ; to persevere through evil report and good report, through success and failure, to the end. Faith in a Divine order, just and good, administered by a wise and loving Will, guiding all things well, inspires the soul with courage, and gives powerful support, in the midst of all the evil in the world, to constancy and patience. When we feel our own weakness, and yet strive to stand by what is true and right, courage comes from knowing that God cares for us ; that all the great powers of the universe are working with us ; that evil and error are transient, and truth and good eternal ; that God is on the side of all things just, honest, pure, and noble. Everything great, generous, and brave, comes from keeping in sight this heavenly ideal of truth and righteousness ; this "supreme glory and beauty which descends from God into all hearts that trust Him."

Atheism. Atheism, on the other hand, sees no beauty or perfection in the universal system of things, and nothing better to be expected in the future ; it limits moral facts to the small

human scale of personal experience ; thus dwarfing their importance, and quenching any enthusiasm of virtue. The denial of God, and, as a consequent, of the spirituality of the soul, uproots all reasonable motives for being generous, just, and honest. If I can enrich myself, and escape the Penal Code, why should I not do so ? Why should I abstain from wrong-doing, or sacrifice myself for others, if an opposite course brings profit to myself, and if there is no hereafter ? The moral affections receive no justification from atheism ; but the elevating influence of religion consists in the consciousness that in God we have an infinite and eternal sympathy with them. The power and function of religion is thus to promote goodness, to elevate man : and the onward movement of the race has, in every age, been effected by persons who have been made good by their religious ideas.

Religion is a universal phenomenon of humanity. Religion univer- Wherever you find man, you find reli- sal. gion, in some form or another. It has been affirmed that no tribe or nation has yet been met with, destitute of a belief in beings higher than themselves. If such *could* be found among the lowest and most savage people—men who have no religious ideas at all—it would simply show that absence of religion means to be sunk in the lowest depths of barbarism. Man is only *man* in so far as he is religious.

Religion and Apart from religion, there is no society, no civilisa- culture. tion ; and man's nature has always been at its best, and culture has been at its highest, when the religious idea has been purest and strongest. The vast literature of India and of China grew up under the influence of religious ideas ; and this literature was more or less noble according to the purity of those ideas. So with the Jews ; they were great in literature, because

of the greatness of their religious ideas. So with the Greeks ; both their literature and their art were religious. The influence of religious training on the excitement of speculative genius is strikingly seen in works of philosophy. The chief writers of the Immanent school were deeply religious. Descartes was a scholar of the Jesuits ; Genlins, a convert to the Protestantism of the Low Countries ; Malebranche, a priest of the Oratory ; Spinoza, a pupil of the Rabbis.

Religion and patriotism. And the highest order of national and patriotic life, where the spirit of self-sacrifice has ruled, has ever co-existed with strong religious ideas.

“ Religion is at once a mode of thought and a mode of feeling : ” and the religious affections, “ rich in elements of wonder, admiration, reverence, culminate in worship. ” When the apprehension of truth and the enthusiasm of devotion, which constitute the religious mind, are reached “ by reflection on the order of the physical and moral world, ” it is called Natural Religion. ‘ *Natural Religion* ; ’ by which is usually understood, ‘ *what may be known of the invisible God through the things which He has made, even His everlasting power and divinity* : ’ so that Nature becomes ‘ a temple filled with God. ’

2. *Why Ethics before Religion.*

By treating Ethics, as we have done, before Religion, it is implied that moral rules do not depend upon prior religious belief ; but rather that the consciousness of Duty is itself a condition of religion. If we live in affinity with God at all, our being must touch His at every point ; but if we were only sensitive beings, we should be His creatures without knowing it ; if no more than intel-

Sense of Duty underlies Religion.

lectual beings, we should know Him without loving Him : it is only as *moral* beings, as *subjects* that know nature, as agents that withstand and conquer it instead of being disposed by it, as *above* it, as a cause, and not *of* it, in the chain of its effects : it is only when we become conscious of possessing free choice and selective power, that " God and man emerge into thought as something *more* than nature ;" and such relations as trust, affection, sympathy, alienation, spring into existence ; and righteousness and duty become sacred terms.

If we conceive for a moment of Religion without Ethics, we have merely the knowledge of an intellectual power at the head of the universe,—a Divine omnipotence ; to whose purposes it would doubtless be our wisdom to conform ; but we should be conscious of no *quilt* if we acted otherwise. Unless there is planted within our nature a *moral ground* to which Divine Law can appeal, there can be no consciousness of Right and Duty ; obedience can have no *character* ; " and the human world is susceptible of government only as a menagerie."

But, if we start with Ethics without any religious conception of the universe, we yet meet, at a very early stage, with the idea of Duty, and the working of Conscience ; and these form the condition on which the lessons of the religious instructor depend for their efficacy. The first of all revelations to man is his own soul, in its inmost make and constitution : and a second revelation is only possible as it comes through the first. " The law of right is inwoven with the very tissue of our nature : " responsible life begins with childhood, and " conscience may act as human, before it is discovered to be divine."

Ethics thus have a practical existence before any explicit religious belief is entertained:

Ethics must rise into Religion. but this is necessarily an incomplete development. For 'ought' implies commandment, "speaking in the imperative"; so that here "is revealed, not simply the thought of one Moral Law in God and man, mind, but *the relation between the two*; both, the seat of the *same conscious moral order*: the one, its infinite Archetype, the other, the *finite image*, made susceptible of appeal and of response." Before Ethics are thus followed out to their natural issue, and freed into Religion, we are face to face with a mystery: there is a subjective vision of an 'ideal' perfection, but no reality. But as soon as the other side of the relation is apprehended, the ideal becomes real; the character of Duty becomes transformed. When the moral consciousness is felt to be, in very truth, "*a communion between the Divine and the human mind*," an infinite object of personal affection comes into view; man becomes a worshipper; and the life of Duty is converted into the life of Love. The whole moral world undergoes a change. The rule of right, the requirements of perfection, are now seen to be "wherever the universal Spirit is:" "*and the law of righteousness, inherent in His essence, is put forth by His Will, for the assimilation of dependent spirits to His own.*"

Religion, as its name indicates, is the bond which unites man to God. Morals are thus connected, as we have already seen, (Introduction), with God, or the universal Spirit, on the one hand, and with man, on the other. There is an eternal and universal Consciousness, pervading the universe, and living in the human consciousness, as the ground and cause of our life; and there is a kindred Moral Law in both. What is poeti-

cally said of the life of the universe, we may say of the intellectual consciousness which pervades it:—

“The eternal fire that feeds each vital frame,
Collected and diffused, is still the same.”

The universe and all its laws have their source in an infinite and perfect Reason; hence Morals must be rooted in this Reason too. The Moral Law, which is revealed by conscience, in order that the will may obey it, has its seat in the Divine Being; and it becomes manifested in the world of men, in order that

the Divine purpose may be fulfilled;
Union with God. which is no other than the establishment of a complete communion between the Divine and the human mind.

Natural law and Moral law are both revelations of the Divine Reason: the ideas of the Divine mind pass into the world, and become the intuitive lights of reason and conscience for all free natures; guiding us, on one line, to the true reading of the universe; on the other, to the communion and sympathy of God. Hence it is that all men have the same fundamental ideas, which form the common ground both of intellectual intercourse and of moral co-operation. The principles of morality, being thus principles

Morality grounded in eternal truth of reason, are grounded in eternal truth, and have therefore a basis that never can be shaken. If Morals are based only on experience—on an agreement among a number of men—there is no guarantee for permanence. Extinguish faith in the Eternal, in whom reside the great ideas of Truth and Right and Goodness, and you unman conscience and destroy the highest life. “The sapping of the life of religion is the death of morality.”

CHAPTER II.

Theism.

"These are thy glorious works, Parent of good,
 Almighty ! thine this universal frame,
 Thus wondrous fair : thyself how wondrous then,
 Unspeakable ! who sitt'st above these heavens
 To us invisible, or dimly seen
 In these thy lowest works ; yet these declare
 Thy goodness beyond thought, and power divine."—*Milton.*

"The spacious firmament on high,
 With all the blue ethereal sky,
 And spangled heavens—a shining frame—
 Their great Original proclaim
 The unwearied sun, from day to day,
 Doth his Creator's power display,
 And publishes to every land
 The work of an Almighty hand

Soon as the evening shades prevail,
 The moon takes up the wondrous tale,
 And, nightly, to the listening earth,
 Repeats the story of her birth .
 Whilst all the stars that round her burn,
 And all the planets in their turn,
 Confirm the tidings as they roll,
 And spread the truth from pole to pole.

What though, in solemn silence, all
 Move round this dark terrestrial ball ;
 What though no real voice nor sound,
 Amidst their radiant orbs be found ;
 In reason's ear they all rejoice,
 And utter forth a glorious voice ;
 For ever singing as they shine,
 The hand that made us is *Divine*."—*Addison.*

The beauties of Nature which God gives us are a permanent possession. Every time we see a sunrise or a sunset; a magnificent heaped-up mass of clouds, from which the lightning will presently flash and heaven's artillery roar; the mountain with its forests, glaciers, and snowy peaks piercing the clouds, and the deep blue sky overhead; the ocean with its immeasurable smile, rolling on the beach; the dome of night; the moonlight on the lake or among the trees; the brook rippling

over the stones ; the changing foliage of autumn, and the many-tinted flowers : every time we see these, our souls are fed with food, and of them we never tire. We tire of our earthly possessions—of houses, places, faces—but of Nature we never tire ; and because there is eternal Truth behind, Nature never betrays the heart that loves her. When the devout mind looks through Nature up to the supreme Mind that contains this Truth we have one side of ‘ Natural Religion,’ or Theism.

“ All religion resolves itself into a conscious relation, on our part, to a higher than we ; and, on the part of the rational universe at large, to a higher than all, *i. e.*, to a Mind supreme above the whole family of minds. The conditions of such

God and nature. supremacy are twofold : (1) *Dynamical*, consisting in the command of all methods needful for the accomplishment of contemplated ends : (2)

God and man. *Moral*, consisting in the ascendancy of the highest ends. In treating of the former, we have to do chiefly with the relation of God to *Nature* ; in treating of the latter, we deal with His relation to *Man*.”

1. *God as Cause.*

The two great sources of religious belief are the principle of causality, and the sense of moral obligation.

Causality. The idea of causality cannot be attained by simply registering what we

observe : it can only arise out of something objective in the relation between cause and effect ; and springs from the activity of the Ego. “ The true starting point and the true terminus of all philosophy, is in the fact of *Perception*,” which discovers the dualism of *self*, and an *other than self*. Self-consciousness is born the

Causal will. moment my spontaneous activity is disputed by something outside myself.

“ If I know myself at all, it is in *trying* ‘ with all my might ’ to do something to heave away a retarding resistance—such as shutting a door against a furious wind : and when thus withstood, and resolved to persist rather than desist, I am conscious of exercising a causal will ; and we here reach the

relation of cause and effect. The encounter sets us face to face with causality other than our own—cause within and cause without ; and not till we put forth and direct our own causality

Will in the uni-
verse. have we revelation of the causality of the world " The world to which we are introduced is thus "*another self*, just as causal as we, *instinct with hidden will*." "We

thus arrive at the inmost meaning of the word *cause*. The impelling force which invaded my organism, but which I resisted, has now to serve me, and is at the disposal of my *will* ; and in virtue of this, *I am the cause* of what it will do " Amid certain possibilities, my will selects the direction in which a portion of the force shall proceed. "Cause, therefore, means that which can settle an alternative, viz., *a choosing and disposing will* : " and we are to conceive of all changes around us as *willed* by a power immanent in nature. "All which happens in nature has one kind of cause, and that cause a will like ours : and the universe of originated things is the product of a Supreme Mind that *thinks it out* : which carries us to the first truth of religion."

2. *Explicit Will.*

There are three marks or characteristics of Will or Intention, as distinguished from automatic action :

(a) *Selection* from among many contingencies, leading us to look for some *end* which is the object of preference :

(b) *Combination*, or the converging of independent lines of action upon an *end* beyond themselves :

(c) *Gradation* through the whole, or the subordination of minor ends to major.

Gradation. But these three marks which characterise intention in man, are by no means limited to human beings. They are abundantly manifest throughout the unconscious, organic world.

"If they are apparent in the structure of a cottage, are they absent from the hut of the beaver and the nest of the wasp? Does the granary of the former provide for the future any better than the store-house of the squirrel?"

Unconscious artists. Is there more skill in a pair of spectacles than in a pair of eyes? in the hunter's snare than in the spider's web? in the lover's serenade than in the nightingale's song? in the oars of a boat, than in the fin of a fish? That these combinations have reference to an end which has to be gained, it is impossible to deny. Yet the originality is not with them, as it is with us. Intelligence is not present as conscious reflection, but *works through them*, and directs them to their being's end. If you put these wonderful artists off their beat, and set them the plainest new problem, they can make nothing of it, and turn out utter simpletons."

When the butterfly deposits her eggs on *the very*
 Butterfly's eggs. *leaf of all the forest* which will best
 nurture the grubs that are to be, and
 perishes after bequeathing the world that legacy, does
 not the act irresistibly suggest an *end* or *aim* in view
 —an idea which by these means is to be realised by-
 and-by? It is not supposed that the 'aim' or 'idea' is
 a conscious one on the part of the insect herself; but
 it must be *some one's*. A *future* can only cause a *pre-*
sent in the sense that the conception of that future, as
 something to be aimed at, is present already in a con-
 trolling mind. We have thus afforded the strongest
 evidence of *design or purpose in Nature*. Organic life
 is a great whole, formed and constituted on a definite
 plan, all the parts of which are so arranged and com-
 bined as to realise a preconceived end.

The adaptation of organs, in a thousand cases, is
 arranged *with a view to the future*.
 Adaptation of organs. The difference of the sexes can only be
 explained in view of the provision for
 the preservation of the species. In embryonic life, the
 organs of the senses, which are only to come into use
 in the future, are elaborately prepared beforehand,

and are adapted by anticipation to the sphere of their exercise. So with the phenomena of lactation, with the organs of nutrition, sight, sound, respiration, circulation, we see the wonderful adaptation of structure to function, and of organ to environment, which is inconceivable except on the theory of an intelligent design.

The cause of the living organism is thus its end ; for every thing connected with it is so disposed as to realise

that end. Just as a building *exists* Architect's plan. *first in the mind and plan of the architect*, in view of which the various materials are collected and combined in a way they would never have done if left to themselves ; so the idea of every organised being is first formed in the Supreme Mind, and all its parts are then prepared and adapted for the realisation of the end in view. The animal exists virtually in the cell ; the oak in the acorn. This

passage from the virtual to the actual
From virtual to actual. is the law of every being, which thus realises the final cause of its existence.

This end was contained in the initial thought from which all proceeded ; and such a design requires as its efficient cause, a perfect, living thought, which we call God.

CHAPTER III.

Design in Nature.

Argument from Final Causes (Teleology).

[“The one Eternal Thought beaming through the features of the world.”]

By ‘final cause’ is meant that which is the direct end or motive for an action. The
Final cause. final cause of the eye is to produce vision : the final cause of the universe is the end which the Creator had in view in framing it. The

word 'teleology' has always been associated with the name of Anaxagoras. He was perhaps the first who spoke of the beauty and order in the universe being due to a designing mind. Socrates also saw that whatever manifested design was a product of thought and not of chance.

"If Will supplies whatever meaning there is in the word causality, and must itself be taken to include intention, we are led, by an *a priori* necessity, to look upon the universe no less than upon the person of a fellow-man, as pervaded by intellectual power; and must assume *purpose* to be everywhere.

"Can we find then prevailing in the field of organic nature the three marks of intention before enumerated?"

Selection.

1. "Are there indications of *Selection*? Do we find in Nature, among several possibles, steadily one? The first principle of the reigning hypothesis of the world is the extensive openness of all living forms to slight 'accidental' variations. The method by which the claims of the countless multitude of possibilities on the field of nature are sifted, Mr. Darwin himself designates as '*Selection*,' '*Natural Selection*,' i.e., the attainment or increase of some property giving an advantage in the struggle of life. Let us then consult some of these phenomena of Selection.

(a) "The *anterior limbs of vertebrate animals* exhibit in the skeletons a fundamental unity of plan and of relation to the whole; yet the changes that might be rung upon them by extension or contraction of size, by altered proportions of their members, by re-adjustment of weight, by modifying their muscular apparatus, are endless in excess of all the actual types. What, then, has limited the number which have found admission? The revision of the structure has undeniable reference to the medium in which the creature is to live; reducing it to the pectoral fin of the fish and the paddle of the seal; or extending it into the wing of the bird; and, in land animals, terminating it with the hoof or toe for pro-

gression, the claw for battle, the hand for prehensile arts. Why are the modifications of form thus accurately relative to the conditions of life? It cannot be pretended that the medium itself can mould the organs committed to it into congenial shape; so that we must seek the determining power in the organism itself. Its operation may be conceived according to the modern doctrine of '*Epigenesis*,' or growth of the embryo by accretion (rather than by expansion); and by piecemeal additions of part after part the whole is at last built up; the moulding idea distributing itself into successive acts of construction. The result being the same, whether the growth be by accretion or expansion, and delivering one creature to the land, another to the water, another to the air, the problem, 'whence the selective causality?' remains unaffected.

(b) "The modifications in the organs of sense have obvious reference to the conditions on which their Organs of sense. function is to be exercised, yet cannot have been the result of these conditions. Animals that live in the water have only the internal ear, while the Ear land mammals are furnished with an external concha; in hunting quadrupeds, the ear being turned *forward* for pursuit, in those which have to escape them by flight, *backwards*. Moreover, the auditory organ is in accurate relation with the vocal apparatus whose effects it has to measure. It is simplest and least developed in creatures which, being without lungs, produce no *voice*, but only *sound*, and that from other parts of the body than the mouth. In birds, the ear is very large in proportion to the rest of the head; and, in correspondence with its completeness and delicacy, is the perfection of their vocal mechanism.

"It is the same with the differences in the organ of sight. Common to all, is the fundamental provision—a nerve responding to the one appeal of light alone, and dead to every other. Who can point out an efficient cause, in a nature indifferent to function, that shall discriminatingly weave *two* nerves, one conducting undulations of light, the other those of sound? and shall further keep their reports apart in chambers of heterogeneous impression? Who can give us a reason, drawn from molecular matter and motion, why the dissimilar affections *never* waver or interchange? We see, too, how the leading modifications in the organ answer to the shifting demands of animal life. The insect, whose rapid flight no moveable eye could guard with adequate vigilance, is furnished with a stationary com-

pound organ. Fish, always in the water, and needing no washing, dispense with eyelids, and, as their medium has a refraction about the same as that of the eyeball, the cornea is flat, while the crystalline lens is nearly spherical. In those that live in the deep, dark seas, and in prowling animals by night, the eyes are large, to gather all the accessible rays; whereas, if the animal's size gives it some security, and vision is needed chiefly for near or stationary food, as with the hippopotamus and the elephant, the eyes are small. Again, for carnivorous animals that live by chase, the eyes are in front; and for herbivorous tribes that live by defensive precautions, they are on the two sides.

c) "The *modifications of structure*, in respect of its specific gravity, and the comparative solidity of its parts, also bear upon them the mark of selection, with distinct reference to the varying conditions of life, on the land, under water, in the air. Fish and the cetacea (whales, &c.) are nearest in specific gravity to the element in which they live, and so have practically, least weight to move; while they have nearly the whole of their muscular strength at disposal for horizontal progression. When we set foot upon terra firma, *weight* enters into the problem. Since all parts of the body now tend to fall, a system of support is required that everything higher may be kept in position by that which is immediately below. For the compacted vertebræ column, the extremities must be turned into props, while still used as instruments of locomotion. To insure the utmost strength of support, the legs of a quadruped should be short, and to relieve the muscles of the weight of the body when at rest, they should all be vertical columns, like the elephant's; to insure the utmost speed of movement they must be long, and to give the muscles propelling power, the hinder ones need extending into a longer line.

"In the air, again, the bird comes to be a complete study of economy in weight and intensity in muscular power. Perfect provision is made for lightening the body; among other contrivances, the cylindrical bones being hollow, and filled not with marrow but with air, which, indeed, permeates the whole body: while there is need of a most powerful apparatus to counterbalance its gravitation, and give it its free passport through the air. In order to meet the changing conditions of the atmosphere, the wing must be set at an angle variable at will; must present

a closed surface underneath for the downward stroke, and open on the upper side; it must have an area duly proportioned to the weight of the body, and must admit of being folded and put by when its work is done.

“These few facts sufficiently indicate the presence of *Selection* in nature, that is, the limitation of erratic possibilities to definitely chosen lines; and the problem is, how *one idea* can obtain control over a *plurality of conditions*.

Combination.

2. “We pass now to the next objective mark of intention, viz., *Combination*, and here we have to follow the traces of many independent series of operations, and find the terminus of them all in one functional result. This kind of combined action is seen in Cuvier’s celebrated law of ‘Correlation of Organs,’ and in Darwin’s ‘Correlation of Growth.’

Operations and functions.

In flesh-eating animals.

Thus, if the intestines of an animal are organised for the digestion of flesh only, its jaws must be so constructed as to devour live prey; its claws for seizing and tearing it; its teeth for cutting and dividing it; its organs of motion for pursuing it; and its organs of sense for discovering it at a distance. The form of the tooth thus regulates the form of the condyle, of the scapula, and of the claws, in the same manner as the equation of a curve regulates all its properties; so that by commencing with any one of these bones, an expert may reconstruct the whole animal.

Again, if you set aside the end in view, what reasonable account can be given of the preparation. In view of birth. visible throughout the animal world, for new creatures about to enter it? Or, is it by calculation of its own, or by inspiration of prescient nature, that the bird knows when to build its nest, and the salmon when to ascend the rivers?

“And this combination becomes more impressive, when it takes place in the complete absence of one of the related elements. It is in the atmosphere that the ear is to have its history: yet not there, under the thrill of aerial tones, but in a silent chamber, are the parts of its labyrinth put together. It is in the light that the eye is to learn its lesson and have its life: yet not there, amid etherial undulations, but in the dark, is that most marvellous and mobile of optical instruments built up. A microscope invented in a city of the blind

would hardly surprise us more ; it is a correct vaticination of the laws of refraction in a realm that has never heard of

Pre-established light. Is it possible for imagination to conceive of a clearer case of pre-established harmony. harmony between elements that have no acquaintance with each other, and that can be made ready for their future relation only by a mind that embraces them both ?

“ Yet from this inference a method of escape is sought by that universal solvent, the doctrine of evolution. We must remember, it is said, that How explained by evolution. the eye is a mere inheritance, and we must go back to the beginning of its organic history, and think of a mass of protoplasm or some primordial jelly as lying exposed to the sunshine and the air, till it is tickled by them into two feelings that then betake themselves to different centres ; and these incipient organs afterwards elaborate themselves into eye and ear. But, in order that all this should take place, there is need of a pre-established concord between the medium and the material : your protoplasm must be constituted so and so—in this way to answer to the light—in that way to the vibrating air. Thus the organs are already provided there, in the latent state, which shall advance to meet the approaches of the two new media : and we have really nothing more than has always been familiar to us in each single birth.

“ A still higher type of combination presents itself when the adaptation subsists between one living being and another. The Lactation. instinctive art of sucking in the offspring of the mammalia finds the conditions of its use in the mother that is made ready to give the needed nourishment. Some kinds of plants are dependent upon insects for their fertilisation. The orchids of Madagascar would be barren but for the Fertilisation of plants. services of a certain moth. Thus we see a deeply-implanted sympathy between the vegetable and the animal world : and it is from a single source that all life brings its creations forth.

“ As two provinces of nature thus unite for one end, so do two successive portions of time which are Time⁹ instincts out of sight of each other : as when the of animals. female ant bites or shuffles off her wings as soon as she is about to deposit her eggs, and confine her attention to the establishment of the future colony : or when the

young of insects creep out of their eggs or cocoons into life precisely when the buds of the trees are opening. More complex forms of combination for a given end

Social instincts of animals.

are presented in the social instincts of animals: as in the bee-hive, where the distribution of functions is so exact, that each constituent member of the community seems to be a mere organ of the collective life. Such intelligent relations must owe their adjustment to some thought, evidently absent from the creatures themselves, embracing and pre-conceiving the whole.

“Not less surprising is the organising instinct which enables shoals of turtles, *e.g.*, to regularly swim from the bay of Honduras to the Cayman islands near Jamaica—a favourable spot for laying their eggs—as if they were accomplished geographers.

Migrating turtles. And migrating birds sweep over immense tracts of air, amounting to several thousands of miles, with a punctuality so sure that the Persian calendar is reckoned by them: and they recover not only the same country, but the same village and the same nest. By what magnetic needle within them they trace their unerring path, by what secret chronometry they hit upon the date of passage, is inexplicable except as part of the *intellectual* combinations of the world.

Gradation.

3. “The third and last mark of *intentional* action is *Gradation* by arrangement; by which a given end is attained through a *train* of independent means, each making provision for the next. Throughout nature our attention is so handed on to the next step of the climax, that the only difficulty is to arrest ourselves at a place of pause. *Life* is the first of such stages at which every theory is obliged to

stop and take breath. We here understand what the elements are for, on which organisms feed; and in the structure and history of plants, we recognise an internal subordination among its parts, all tending to the maturation of their seed; and which is constructed on the assumption that it has an interest in the continued existence of its kind. To the formation of the ovule within the flower, whence new plants shall spring, every detail in the structure leads up.

“A higher landing place is found when we touch the stage of *consciousness*. The *raison d'être* of plants is their subservience to the maintenance

Consciousness.

of sentient creatures: without them, no animal could live.

Life lives on life. They comprise the great chemical laboratory in which carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are wrought into such principles as can be turned to account by the animal frame; only that, unlike our chemist's apparatus and processes, their experiments are all silent, their alembics all sweet, their products the grace and beauty of the world, and their very refuse a glow of autumn glory. *That mere life* should thus be used up in the service of *conscious existence* strikes us at once as a legitimate adjustment of means to ends; and we feel at first some repugnance to the further subsistence of one animal upon another. Since, however, organisms must pass away and be successive, the economy which turns their disappearance to account and appropriates death to the renovation of life, can offend only an unreasoning feeling.

Economy in nature.

Moreover, it is the inferior life that supports the superior; and it is in the chase or in conflict that man learns his first arts, and wins his place at the head of all terrestrial races. If, at each step of the series, the life produced were *merely an end*, only so much of it need be born as might remain in permanence; but, serving also as a *means* to other life, it is provided in large excess of this measure; and the members are kept down by the exigencies of the next stage. Thus the different groups of natural history are closely related to each other as components of one system of sentient existence: and through all we trace the continuous pattern of a comprehensive thought.

Human life. "*Human life*, again, is a third platform, which carries a separate and ulterior end, served and realised through all that goes before. And not only is man the crown of a system of conscious life, but he contains within himself a graduated hierarchy of functions—appetites, passions, affections, sentiments—all under the disposing eye of conscience. And the plan of his nature does not stop there;

Society and Church.

but throws him upon the reciprocal relations of *Society*; and not till we come to the *State* and the *Church*, do we reach the highest organism of human life. Many chiefs of philosophy—such as Plato, Lessing, and Comte—have in different forms, treated the 'education of the

Education of the race.

human race' as the end of ends, reserved for the future by the workings of the past: and if it is to this that all really tends, then,

glancing back from this altitude, we see how all pervading is the feature of *Gradation* in the causality of nature.

“ Slight and rapid as this survey has been, it suffices to attest the presence, throughout the range of natural history, of all the characteristics of intellectual purpose; and to place ‘Force’ under the direction of intending Thought. In the work of man, we know that intentionality is connected with the three features — Selection, Combination, (gradation; since they are nothing less than direct effects of intentionality as cause, operating in the very seats of our own consciousness: and when we compare the work of man and that of nature, we find them to resemble each other in the possession of these three features; and so, by induction rather than by analogy, we infer that intention, which is true of the former, is *likely to be true* of the latter.”

Thought directs Force.

Further Examples of Design in Nature.

Construction of Cell.—Among the instincts of construction, one of the most remarkable is that of *bees*.

Bees and mathematics. “ It is a very curious problem of mathematics to determine at what precise angle the three planes which compose the bottom of a cell ought to meet, to afford the greatest economy or the least possible expense of materials and work. This problem belongs to the transcendental part of mathematics, and is one of those called problems of *maxima* and *minima*. It has been solved by some mathematicians, particularly by the able Mac-laurin, by the infinitesimal calculus, and this solution is to be found in the *Transactions* of the Royal Society of London. This scientist has fixed precisely the required angle; and he found, after the most exact measurement of which the subject admitted, that it is the very angle at which the three planes of the bottom of the cell in reality meet.

“ Shall we ask here *who taught* the bee the properties of solids, and to resolve problems of *maxima* and *minima*? We need not say that *bees* know none of

these things. They work most geometrically without any knowledge of geometry ; somewhat like a child, who, by turning the handle of a barrel-organ, makes good music without any knowledge of music." (*Works of Reid*, by Hamilton, II. p. 546.) A Swiss geometrician has tried to show that this calculation was not exact, and that the geometry of the bees was imperfect. Lord Brougham resumed the problem, and has shown that the bees ' were right.'

Construction of Nests.—"One of the most remarkable nests is that of the *sayo*, a little Indian bird near akin to the English bullfinch. Its form is nearly that of a bottle, and it is suspended on branches so flexible, that apes, serpents, and even squirrels cannot approach it ; but to render it more inaccessible to its numerous enemies, the bird places the entrance to it *underneath*, so that it can only itself enter it flying. Inside there are found two chambers, one of which serves the female to hatch her eggs ; the other is occupied by the male, who, while his companion fulfils her maternal duties, cheers her with his songs." (Milne Edwards, p. 240. Cited by Paul Janet, in *Final Causes*, p. 88.)

Villa Architecture.—Actual pleasure-gardens are found among birds. "The cleverest of these hedge-makers, these Lenôtres of ornithology, is the *speckled chlamgdere*, which much resembles the English partridge. The couple proceed with order in constructing their grove. It is usually in a bare locality they place it, for the sake of the sun and light. Their first care is to make a causeway of rounded pebbles, nearly equal in size. When the size and thickness of this appear to them sufficient, they commence by planting there a little avenue of branches. They are seen bringing from the fields, with this view, small shoots of trees about the

Birds' pleasure-gardens.

same size, which they thrust firmly by the thick end into the interstices of the pebbles. These birds arrange the branches in two parallel rows, making them all converge towards each other, so as to represent a hedge in miniature. This improvised plantation is almost a metre in length, and its size is such that the two birds can play or walk abreast under the protection of its shade.

"The grove once finished, the loving couple begin to think of embellishing it. For this end they wander all round the country, and steal every shining object they meet with, in order to ornament its entrance. Shells with shining mother-of-pearl are above all the object of their desire. If these collection-makers find in their country pretty birds' feathers, they gather them and hang them instead of flowers on the faded branches of their dwellings. It is even certain that in their neighbourhood every bright-coloured object with which the soil is artificially strewed, is immediately removed by them. Gould, who discovered these groves, and brought one to the British Museum, states that if a traveller loses his watch, knife, or seal, they are found in the nearest promenade of *chamgderes* of that district." (Pouchet, *l'Univers*, p. 153. Cited by Jauet, in *Final Causes*, p.p. 89-90.)

Plants as time-pieces.—"Each flower, bird, and insect has its appointed *time* in the shifting panorama of beauty and music that stretches through the year. They perform their parts as regularly as actors in a play, all keep well their places, and appear only when the piece expects them. This accuracy extends even to days and hours. The naturalist Thoreau said that if he were placed in the fields after a Rip Van Winkle sleep of unknown length, he could tell the *exact day of the year* by the flowers around him. Other close

observers of nature have claimed the same. Before mechanical clocks were common, it was an ordinary habit to read the time of day in the flowers.

“Every blossom has its precise hour for unfolding its petals and for shutting them. Although the light and temperature affect these movements, there is always a strong effort made by the plant to keep its allotted time*. Day flowers imprisoned in darkness still follow their usual out-door habits. Most flowers open at sunrise and close at sunset, but there is no hour of the twenty-four when some blossoms do not awaken, and there is none when some do not begin to sleep. This motion is generally gradual, but morning flowers open rapidly, and afternoon flowers close very rapidly.

“The daisy, or ‘day’s eye,’ spreads its lids to the earliest rays of the sun, usually, about five o’clock, and goes to bed just before sunset. The morning glory does all its blooming between six and nine o’clock, in the morning, and never opens a second time; the life of each flower being limited to a single morning. Dandelions awake between six and seven o’clock, and are put to sleep some time before evening when the heat is excessive. The yellow goat’s beard, so common in the meadows, ends its day at noon, and is therefore familiarly called ‘go-to-bed-at-noon.’ The pink little pimpernel blossom is known as ‘the shepherd’s clock,’ from its custom of closing exactly at two in the afternoon.

“The old fashioned ‘four-o’clock’ either was falsely named or has lost its reckoning, as it does not appear until about six o’clock. Of all the plants which fold together their flowers and hang their heads at sundown for the night’s rest, perhaps the most noticeable

* It should be borne in mind that there must necessarily be some variations in the times of opening and closing, when the plants concerned are out of their native habitat: as *e.g.*, when English plants are cultivated in this country.

are the asters, which invariably hide their faces at six o'clock. Many leaves do the same. The clover trefoils and the wood sorrel (*oxalis*) close between six and seven P.M., and stretch out from six to seven A.M. The action is very marked in all pod-bearing plants, as the *acacia* and locust, and especially the sensitive plant, which all double up, or rather double down, with the closing day. In a country walk toward sunset you may see the drowsy leaves and blossoms nodding one after another in slumber, and setting a fine example of early dreams.

"*Heliotropes*, sunflowers, marigold, and all compound and yellow flowers, turn toward the sun throughout the whole day, following his course, so as to face the east in the morning, south at noon, and west in the evening. The direction in which they point therefore shows the time.

"Many kinds of plants bloom only at night, and toll the hours of darkness with their silent bells of beauty, ringing perfume instead of sound during their period. Often their fragrance is extraordinary, as if to offset the disadvantage which their colours suffer at night. The evening *primrose* does not show its loveliness until about seven P.M. The night-blooming catchfly modestly nestles out of sight on the ground through the day, but at seven o'clock, as if at the touch of a fairy, the little blossoms sparkle thickly among the grass. The night-blooming *cereus* begins to open at seven o'clock, and is locked fast again at two A.M. The great water-lily *Victoria Regia* is nocturnal, like some other water-lilies. Linnæus, the father of modern botany, constructed a flower clock which would tell the hours.

"Is it possible that all this time-keeping, involving a knowledge of astronomy, the times and motions of celestial bodies, the progress of the seasons, the times

of sowing, planting, growing, blooming, and ripening, are the result of blind chance, or unreasoning 'Law,' or simple unintelligent force? Who can believe it? only the fool, who hath said in his heart there is no God.'" -*The Armoury*.

"A pleasant writer tells of a Texas gentleman who became convinced of the existence of
The Texas Star. God in the following manner. One day he was walking in the woods, reading the writings of Plato. He came to the place where that great writer uses the phrase, 'God geometrizes.' He thought to himself, 'if I could only see plan and order in God's works, I could be a believer.' Just then he saw a little 'Texas star' at his feet. He picked it up, and thoughtlessly began to count its petals, finding there were *five*. Counting the stamens, and the divisions at the base of the flower, he found five of each respectively. He then set about multiplying these three fives to see how many chances there were of a flower being brought into existence without the aid of mind, and having in it these *three fives*: the chances against it were one hundred and twenty-five to one. He thought that was very strange. He examined another flower, and found it to be the same. He multiplied one hundred and twenty-five by itself to see how many chances there were against there being *two* flowers, each having these exact relations of numbers; he found that the chances against it were fifteen-thousand six hundred and twenty-five to one. But all around him were multitudes of these little flowers. They had been growing and blooming for years. He thought this showed the order of intelligence, and that the mind that ordained it was God. And so he shut up his book, picked up the little flower, kissed it and exclaimed: 'Bloom on little flower! Sing on little birds! You have a God, and I have a God. The God that made these little flowers made me.'" -*Ibid*.

It is because 'Force' in Nature is under the direction of intending Thought—of a controlling Mind—that science is possible.

How science is possible. Theism may be defined as 'the rationality of the universe'; and science as the discovery of the laws of the universe. The universe is everywhere governed by law—the law of gravitation, mathematical laws, chemical laws, and other special laws involved in the different sciences. Science is able to discover law, by observation and demonstration; so that the laws of Nature are also the laws of thought. It is reason that enables men to be scientific; and there could be no science if the laws of Nature were not related to the laws of thought. If there is not a Mind embodied in Nature, if there is no reason for the making of the world in its present form rather than in any other, how could there be any understanding of law—any formulated science? If the universe were a mere concourse of irrational atoms at the mercy of a blind chance, science would be impossible.

Laws of nature laws of thought.

But the kingdom of Nature being a vast order, where nothing comes by accident or caprice, where there is no violation or interruption of the order, it must be governed by an almighty and perfect Reason; a Reason that must be antecedent to the creation which manifests it: and so science is a possible and an ennobling pursuit. Nature reflects the light of mind as clearly as she reflects the relations of number and of force. The very phrase 'Natural Selection'—one of the primary data of modern science—implies 'mental purpose': the word 'natural' suggests *matter* and the physical forces; the word 'selection' suggests *mind* and its powers of choice. An engineer, such as Professor Fleeming

Order implies Reason.

'Natural Selection.'

Jenkin, whose criticisms Darwin says in his "Life and Letters," by his son, he felt to be the most valuable ever made on his views, has constant experience of the relations between matter and mind. "It is his calling to subordinate the physical forces to the special purposes of mechanical construction: it is his daily business to study the invariabilities of force, and to yoke them to the service of design." In the universe, on a larger scale, we see Force everywhere linked to Thought: and we rise from purpose to a designing Mind.

CHAPTER IV.

Implicit Attributes of God as Cause.

"In the foregoing sections there has been set forth the first psychological source of Theism, the recognition of a living Will as Cause of the phenomena of the world. We have now to examine what this position enables us to say respecting the Being whom it reports to us as an ascertained object of thought. Our reasoning on this single line, *i.e.*, in the physical sphere, reaches no more than 'His *natural* attributes'; and simply prepares the intellectual outline for the moral features which define themselves from another source.

(a). To identify Causality with God is to ascribe to Him *all Power*; for the terms are interchangeable. All causality being volitional and selective, the line of realised action is only one out of a plurality of possibilities, and the cosmos which has come into being is but a sample of an unknown number that might have been.

(b). "Here, however, arises the question whether we can be certain that such Power is all predicable of *the same Will*. Is there anything to forbid its distribution among a plurality? and to posit Polytheism? The intuitive principle which leads us to read a causal Power behind phenomena makes that power

the external counterpart of our own: and Nature is but the mirror of the mind. Now of the personal consciousness it is

Unity of human consciousness. the essence to retain its *unity* through all experiences: and every time the observer discerns a living energy in Nature, he thinks after the pattern of himself, and cannot help investing it with a like identity: so that there is thus a native provision for Monotheism. Further, the logical rule, that no more causes

Economy in causes. are to be admitted than are needful for the effect, forbids us to wander beyond the all-sufficing single Divine Will. Again, the physical unity of Nature herself bespeaks the oneness of the Cause. A network of universal media

Unity of Nature. weaves the contents of space into one system; and a running thread of progressive history is equally manifest in Nature, and blends its successive acts in time into one drama. In truth, the very idea of a world or universe, as a whole, is rigorously impossible, except on the assumption of a substantive unity incompatible with diverse origins and independent directions. How are we to conceive of one state of things working out another, unless they be organically united in the same whole? Nothing short of two or more universes would be needed, to bring within the possibility of thought more than one Divine Will as the source of all. These reasons surely authorise us to reckon *Unity*, as well as universal Power, among the predicates of God.

(c). "It is hardly necessary to specify *Intellect* as predicable of God. Who can deny that the creative genius of Nature even transcends its intending skill? What sublimer architecture than the dome of the midnight sky? What richer picture-gallery than the sunset effects, even on the same landscape through a single year? What more pathetic drama than the story of human life, for ever enacted on the stage of ten thousand homes? Of these indeed, or their equivalents in Nature,

Art copies Nature. all our Art is but a copy: the prototypes of all intellectual relations are in the universe around; and how can they be Thoughts in their reflection, unless they be so in their

incidence? Both Science and Art among men we measure by one test, viz., their *Truth*; and what is this, but their accurate reproduction of the methods and aspects of Nature? With what consistency can we do homage to the decipherer of Law, and see no wisdom in its Institution? and crown with bays the brow of a Dante or a Shakspeare for reading to us the poem

of the world, yet have no reverence for the Author of its harmonies? There is, no doubt, a difference between our conceptions of human intellect and of Divine: and the Divine thought, instead of *learning*, goes *before* the objects that are known,—invents their constitution, determines their relations in time and place, and reads their history throughout, ere they have begun to be.

(d) “Further, in what terms can we speak of the *extent* and the *duration* of the Divine nature? All our conclusions are at present to be drawn from the phenomena of the world. We certainly cannot affirm the cosmos to be infinite; and as a conclusion must not go beyond its premises, we cannot infer from it as an effect the infinitude of God as its cause; we can only speak of the Divine perfections as indefinitely great. But *space** we *can* affirm to be infinite, so that *one* of the two pre-requisites of phenomena is in possession of the predicate which we are investigating; and as it is impossible to maintain a disparity of scope between the Cause and the condition of all things, we infer the infinitude of God from an unlimited scene of existence. By a similar method, we may justify the assertion of the *eternity* of God. If there was ever a time in which as yet the universal Cause was not, it has *come into being*, and is itself only a *phenomenon or effect*; which is a simple contradiction. Its *self-existence*, its *being other than phenomenon*, is its essential feature as a causal explanation of phenomena; it cannot therefore have a nativity, and must always have been *a parte ante*.

“To sum up then the results which are yielded by the principle of Causality; there is One universal Cause, the infinite and eternal seat of all power, an omniscient Mind, ordering all things for ends selected with perfect wisdom. Further advance we cannot securely make upon this line of thought; and were we only *intellectual* free agents, devoted wholly to the study of external nature, and looking through it to its transcendent source, here our religious apprehensions would stop; or rather, hence they would develop themselves into forms consonant with their origin. It would be interesting to seek, in the history of mankind, for actual reli-

* Dr. Martineau posits ‘Space’ as the one condition co-existing with the First Cause.

gions constituted on this type, and exhibit their overgrowth in one direction, their atrophy in another. But this fascinating bye-path would withdraw us too far from our main track; and we must enter at once upon its next stage, which introduces us to a new and independent source of religious truth."

We can have no absolute or exhaustive knowledge of anything: but of the Absolute itself we can know

that it is, and also, in some measure,
 How the Absolute is known. *what it is.* It cannot be known by the

imagination; for the imagination can only picture what is limited by space and time. It cannot be known by *reasoning*, or be defined; though all inductive processes of reasoning require the Absolute as their condition. It *can be known* as the

correlative of the finite; and must be assumed, to account for the finite uni-
 The correlative of the finite. *verse.* It therefore holds some *rela-*

tions to it. These relations must be *real*; else our knowledge is a fiction. Relations do not involve limitation: this is the same as saying that there can be no likeness where there is a difference. We assume the Absolute, in order that thought and science may be possible. He must be known, in order that man may know anything besides.

The universe is a *thought* as well as a *thing*. It reveals *thought* as well as *force*. These
 The universe a single thought. *thoughts* include the *whole* universe;

so that the universe is controlled by a *single* Mind. Gravitation is a thought as well as a force; and it prevails everywhere; and the universe, so far as it is affected by gravitation, is a single thought. But a thought implies a *thinker*—a thinking agent; and if the universe is a single thought, it was thought by *one* thinking Agent, who is Self-existent.

CHAPTER V.

God as Perfection.

[“Man is *ὁ ἀνα ἀθρόων*, he who looks upwards; and certain it is that what makes man man, is that he alone can turn his face to heaven.”
 “*Cor humanum inquietum est, donec requiescat in Deo.*” The human heart is restless until it rests in God.]

“We have already seen that, in the case of *volitional* experience, we have given to us an *objective causality*. And we are now to see that, in the case of *moral* experience, we have given us an *objective authority*; both alike being objects of immediate knowledge, on the same footing of certainty as the apprehension of the external material world. The belief in finite objects around us can boast of no logical advantage over the belief in the infinite and righteous Cause of all.

1. *Right, as universally valid.*

“The fundamental form which the Moral Intuition assumes has been already expounded in the chapters on Morals. Whenever two incompatible springs of action simultaneously urge us, there is an attendant consciousness of superior excellence in one of them; an excellence in the scale of *right*, which, in carrying our assent, commands our obedience; and which can only be disregarded at the cost of a mysterious and haunting *disloyalty*, giving rise to a sense of guilt. Hence we have a moral language which can be translated into no other: the superior terms in the scale do not court us by their charms and graces, but claim us by their *authority*; tell us that we *ought* to follow them; that they are *binding* on us; that they are offered to our option by a higher than we; and that in neglecting them we *sin*. These ideas are intelligible to all men; they flow into every language, and give it half its force and fire; they are the preamble of all Law and the pervading essence of the higher religions. In proportion as the springs of action have strength within us according to

The Moral Intuition.

Moral ideas in every language:

and in the higher religions.

their worth, we are at peace with ourselves, and conscious of a secret harmony. And by the same rule we judge others by the same ideas. it is that we estimate each other; pouring indignation on the man whom no call of compassion can snatch from his selfish ease; watching with enthusiasm the hero from whose lips no terror can extract a betrayal or a lie; looking up with reverence to the saintly mind in which all discords cease, and the higher affectionate reign without dispute.

"Now what means this scale of relative excellence which gives an order of rank to our impulses, and frames them into a hierarchy? Why cannot they change places, or take turn and turn about? What is the nature of the right? One step in the determination of this question can be taken without challenge. The moral order is not arbitrary. We only give forth what we find. In other words, the Moral Law (for such is the 'Canon of principles' taken as a whole,) is imposed by an authority foreign to our personality, and is open, not to be canvassed, but only to be obeyed or disobeyed."

2. *Right, as the Divine in the Human.*

"What then is the 'foreign authority' which imposes the Moral Law? In the act of Perception, we are immediately introduced to an *other than ourselves that gives us what we feel*: in the act of Conscience, we are immediately introduced to a *Higher than ourselves that gives us what we feel*: the externality in the one case, the authority in the other, the causality in both, are known upon exactly the same terms, and carry the same guarantee of their validity. Nothing more is needed for this moral revelation than the same fundamental faith on which all our physical knowledge rests. The dualism of perception, which sets ourselves in the face of an objective world, and the dualism of Conscience which sets us in the face of an objective higher mind, are perfectly analogous in their grounds. The superiors among our inward springs of action lay claim to our will with an authority that is above us: and it is the specific sense of *Duty* that constitutes a dual relation, lifting us to Him to whom the allegiance is due. In

other words, the Moral Law first reaches its integral meaning, when seen as impersonated in a Perfect Mind, which communicates it to us and lends its power over our affections sufficient to draw us into Divine communion.

The Moral Law
impersonated.

How else could it transcend our whole personality as it does, and haunt us with tones from beyond and above? If our humanity were at the summit, and, in passing further, we emerged into blank silence, how could these subduing voices flow thence upon the heart? They attest a speaking nature there, that bids us feel as it feels and become the organ of its thought; a nature that, appealing to us from a superhuman height, cannot be less than a conscious will, but simply a personal and holy Mind; and that, reporting to us a Law which holds for all thinking and voluntary beings, is universal and supreme. Here at last and here alone does the objective authority of what the inward conscience tells find its explanation and its home; and hither it is that we are brought, in proportion as our self-knowledge is deep, and our moral ideal is lofty and complete."

This interpretation of conscience fully accords with some of our deepest moral experiences.

"For our true moral life and education, we are dependent on the presence of some nature higher than our own; without which the mere subjective feeling of relative worth among the springs of action would rarely pass from knowledge into power. If your whole past could be laid open, where would you find its moments of purest consecration, of fresh insight into duty, and willing love to follow it? Not when you were criticising a creed or constructing a philosophy; but when first there stood near you some transparent nature, nobler, simpler, purer, than yourself, that fixed your eye and compelled you to look up. To some less happy in their living friendships, the new birth may have come from some image of ideal excellence in the pages of biography or fiction: but in both cases the same principle holds; that the inward suggestions of conscience first go forth to conquer, when they come to us in their objective power; that the faith of conscience hovers with us, meaningless and incomplete, till it rests upon a realized Righteousness.

"It is here perhaps that the main difference lies between the will ethically obeying, and the heart spiritually surrender-

ed,—between morality and religion. Morality applies itself successively to several points of duty: religion, fairly awakened, seizes all at once. Morality, intent on one obligation, is apt to be betrayed upon another: religion, *demanding harmony above everything*, achieves the whole more easily than a part, and takes the discords out of opposites. Morality proceeds from action towards the soul: religion issues with the soul into action.

“Consider then what is implied in this fact of moral dynamics—that, unless acted upon by a higher nature, we never rise. The law applies, not to our particular selves alone, not merely along the ascending steps of moral and mental elevation, but just as much, nay even with intenser force, at the summit levels where the culminating saints and heroes stand. Are they cut off by their position from all dependence? On the contrary, of all dependence, theirs is the deepest and the most clinging; of all faces, theirs the most habitually upturned; and the less they encounter any *higher visible* righteousness, the more flows in upon them from an *invisible Highest* of all. And thus, through the hierarchy of moral ranks, we are led up to a supreme objective Perfection, without which these grandest and loveliest of natures could never be. From the indefinite experience of a better and a better, with yet a possibility of a better still, we rise into the assurance of an infinite Perfection.

“But are the indications of an objective Divine Holiness communing with our nature confined to men of superlative nobleness? And below this height, is it only man that acts on man through the force of admiration? Not so. Many of those far down on the scale of goodness, pass by the intermediary aids, and fly at once to the supremely holy. The principle is still the same: they find in their religion the living and realised ideal. If to them it were a *mere* ideal, if it were *not* living, *not* real, do you think it would snatch them from their low level, and plant them in the air of a higher life? No, nothing is so sickly, so paralytic as ‘Moral Ideals,’ that are nothing else; their whole power is in abeyance till they present themselves in a living personal being, who secures the righteousness of the

Difference between Morality and Religion.

The highest natures also dependent:

on infinite Perfection.

Ideas must be realized in personality.

universe and seeks the sanctification of each heart. The whole difference between morality and religion hangs upon this conviction of an Eternal Holiness in correspondence with the individual conscience: and Conscience reveals the living God, because it finds neither content to its aspirations nor victory in its strife, till it touches His infinitude and goes forth from His embrace.

“Nor is it only in its forward pressure and ideal aims that the conscience leads us to Him. In its retrospect also, nay, in its very failures, it brings us to His presence; no longer,

Conscience also
reveals a Moral
Judge.

it is true, under the inspiring aspect of Infinite Perfection, but in the solemn character of our Moral Governor and Judge. To good or ill desert we assign *reward or retribution*: whence then are these to come? If

we have incurred displeasure, we have thereby invested some one with the right to direct penalty upon us, viz., the recipient of the wrong. Did we wrong only our equals and our superiors who could bring us to account, the Moral Law might (in this relation) have seemed to us complete within the limits of human life, and have carried us to nothing that is divine. But if, betrayed by some passion, we insult or wrong the weak, who have the right to strike but are bound hand and foot before us; here there is at once the keenest demand and the utmost miscarriage of justice. The demerit being a hideous

God the Avenger
of the weak.

reality, the correlative penal power can be no empty fiction; and the very consciousness of justice unsatisfied gives rise to the faith that Righteousness has yet to complete

itself in the unseen, where silent watch is kept over the rights of them that have none to help them. The dependants whom we dare to injure have power, by their dumb looks, to call up for themselves an Almighty Protector, and reveal to us an Eternal Equity.

“That the divine secret of life, its relation to One infinitely Holy, is really wrapped up in these moral experiences, is confirmed by the marvellous effect of a bold and penetrating appeal to them. Stories of religious conversion may be ridiculous to the cynic and mistrusted by the

Religious con-
version.

philosopher; they are however indubitably true, not only of an Augustine and a Loyola, but of rude masses of unawakened men, suddenly lifted out of disordered dreams into the clear light of heavenly reality and the enthusiasm of a devoted will. And how are these wonders wrought? If, with faith intense

enough, you will assume the 'sense of sin,' and speak to its agony of shame, you will not only find a conscience there, but fling it down at the feet of a God never seen before; a conscience that finds itself estranged from an ever living Righteousness that searches all hearts. This is exactly what we should expect, if our nature were framed for responsive communion with an Infinite Perfection; but wholly unintelligible if the conscience were strictly limited to social uses.

"Finally, what is the alternative, if there be no objective Divine authority of which the moral law is the expression? The sense of responsibility is a mere illusion: we have but to settle terms with our neighbours, and all is well. Purity within, faithfulness when alone, harmony and depth in the secret affections, if we mar them, it is our own affair, and there is none to reproach us or put us to shame. The measure also which the natural conscience takes of wrong acts and dispositions must be discarded: and when it shivers in the returning shadow of old sins, plunges into self-inflicted penances, and makes spontaneous confession at last of an unsuspected crime; these superfluities of anguish must be flung away in contempt as mere superstitions. Yet surely they are among the most pathetic and solemn of human experiences, precisely because they are the outburst of a truth, and the self-vindication of a moral law.

"We rest therefore in the conclusion that, both in the aspirations of conscience which lift us upwards, and in its recoil of horror that arrests our fall, we are under the action of an infinite objective Perfection, that would win us to sympathy with itself."

We have already seen, in the chapters on Morals, that the sense of *Duty* is the consciousness that we owe something, and that, not to ourselves, but to another. This consciousness of '*ought*' could never be created by 'society' or 'public opinion,' though these might create a '*must*.' To 'break a man in,' and compel him to turn this way or that, is not the same as a conviction of conscience, nor can it make a man disinterested. Our sense of moral obligation is a wholly different feeling from our love of

Society may create 'must,' but not 'ought.'

praise and fear of blame ; these are not *the same* as conscience, and often pull exactly the opposite way. The '*right*' to command us, which we instinctively acknowledge, is outside and above ourselves ; and just as the act of perception brings us face to face with an outward world, so the exercise of

Conscience reveals a Righteous Person.

conscience lifts us to a Righteous Person, to whom the allegiance is due.

It is a perfect and holy Mind—the fountain source of Moral Law—that exerts this wonderful power over us.

And this conclusion is most rational, and in perfect accord with the constitution of our nature. " Every change has its cause, every quality its substance, every being its end." These are the principles of

Reason requires an Absolute.

reason. Our reason must itself find a cause adequate to itself, and to the entire universe. It must find the

explanation of itself in something beyond it ; and this '*something*' must, from the nature of things, be perfect and absolute. Thought cannot stop at anything lower ; any limited being or limited perfection placed at the origin of things, would be absurd and illogical. This very idea of perfection, which we are compelled to entertain, is itself one of the great proofs of God. The *idea* of perfect good is in

We have the *idea* of perfection.

us ; and yet there is no perfect good to be found in anything or in any one we see. We are imperfect, and yet

have the idea of perfection. Finite, frail, and faulty, we can yet conceive the highest good. The idea is in us, and yet comes from without. If we were shut up in ourselves ; if our human nature were the topmost level, we should be incapable of conceiving anything better than ourselves. Thus the Perfect must be something above us, and not the product of our own con-

ceptions. Since the finite cannot contain the infinite, the fact that we can conceive it, argues
 This implies *that it is*. Thus we are brought to
 God. understand that we come from a higher principle than ourselves, or beings like ourselves. The Perfect must exist before the imperfect ; the type before the copy. The imperfect implies the Perfect ; the less pre-supposes the greater. If an imperfect wisdom like ours, with its defects and errors, can exist, much more must we believe that the Perfect Wisdom exists, and that ours is ' but a spark from it.' God is the Supreme Good, the Moral Perfection ; whose bright image is dimly reflected in man's thought and heart and conscience, making him, in very deed, God's son.

This ' looking up ' to another and a higher than ourselves, is true to our best experiences. The best educators of our
 The power of lofty character. moral and spiritual nature are pure and lofty characters. Truth and moral beauty are powerless till embodied in a person, who at once commands our reverence and our love. Ideas must be realised, and character must live before us, if we are to be quickened to enthusiasm. " Unless acted upon by a higher nature, we never rise." " If you would *lift* me," says Emerson, " you must be *above* me." And what about the higher natures to which *we* look up ? Whence do the great saints and moral heroes of our race draw *their* inspiration ? There are no companions above them : no higher forms that they can see : and yet, the higher they are, the more reverently do they still
 The highest characters still look up. look up. What is the explanation ? That from a better, and a ~~better~~ still, we rise perforce to a Best, to an ' infinite Perfection.' Conscience reveals God, because it finds no contentment till it reaches His moral infinitude ; the heart is for ever restless till it rests in Him.

Conscience also reveals God in the aspect of a Moral Governor. Our nature is intended for communion with this perfect and holy Being ; hence the ‘sense of sin’ and estrangement from an ever living righteousness, of which we are conscious, when we have done wrong, and feel we have incurred displeasure, and are covered with shame, and tortured by remorse. This is the homage paid by conscience to perfect Holiness. And when we insult the weak, who cannot strike us, though they have the right, where are they to get justice and redress ? This carries us, necessarily, into the unseen ; and to an Almighty Protector, who rules in equity, and will recompense to every man according to his works.

These human experiences cannot be ignored : they are deep and strong just because they answer to truth. But if there be no Moral Law and no Divine Authority from which it proceeds, then human responsibility is a fiction ; the reproaches and confessions of conscience are superfluous ; and there is nothing to hinder secret unfaithfulness or impurity. We are our own masters, and what is to prevent us doing as we like ?

CHAPTER VI.

1. *Implicitly Attributes of God, as apprehended by Conscience.*

“The form which Theism assumes when developed from this source, widely differs from that which is given by the principle of Causality. There, the Divine agency was seen, in the cosmos, in natural law : here, it is seen, in the human soul, in the moral law. We must gather up, therefore, the results of this new insight, and attach to the thought of God the additional predicates by which it is now enriched.”

What Con-
science tells us
God is.

1. God stands related to us as "*our Highest*;" and in the attributes we ascribe to Him, when interpreted by conscience, we have only to call up before us the elements of ideal perfection. If our nature be the reflection, or the effect, of His will, this must be so. God must be identical with the highest in man.

(a) Since the *Affections* are among the highest of our springs of action, sending us forth in loving service for others, we must ascribe to God "Benevolence towards sentient beings" With us, "often has the uplifted arm of anger dropped reluctantly before the beseeching look of misery, or, in striking the blow, crushed the heart that wields it with insufferable shame." The self-seeking mind is out of harmony with nature. "From this constitution of our humanity, is there nothing to be learned of its Author? Are we made to approve and reverence what He regards with aversion or indifference? Is Pity implanted in us by the Pitiless? In giving us compassion is He not, *ipso facto*, compassionate, providing countless channels through which remedial blessings flow?"

(b) But the social affections are "not the final crown of excellence." This is something higher still. He has Justice. As we watch the drama of life, we pass moral judgments on the persons acting around us: "we admire what is in itself admirable, we reprobate what is culpable; and we expect the echoes of our own feeling from all living voices, and seem to hear its reverberations in the very nature of things. Hence the conscience of mankind refuses to believe in the ultimate impunity of guilt, and looks upon the flying criminal as only taking a circuit to his doom. Unless therefore we are made upon one pattern, and the scene of things upon another, the universe is a common-wealth of minds morally governed; and we must recognise in the Infinite Disposer *Justice towards moral beings, i. e., a treatment of them according to character.*"

(c) We can go a step further, and attribute to God "*Amity towards like minds.*" "When a life takes the form of the holiest ideal, and duty becomes love, we yield it our reverence, and draw towards it in spiritual kinship: and so, while conscience, in its struggles, repre-

He has Friend-
ship for kindred
minds.

sents what God is for and what He is against; no less, in its heavenly calm, does it bespeak the living unison of His spirit with our own. Sanctity of character is, in itself, harmony with God: and how should related spirits, intent on whatever things are pure and good, live in presence of each other—the one the bestower, the other the recipient of a sacred trust—and *exchange no thought*, and give no sign of the love which subsists between them ”

2. But the All-perfect stands in “ *one relation to all of us* : ” and “ the moment the two truths are apprehended—of the spiritual unity of our nature, and of the All-righteous, as its Source and Head—the idea inevitably follows of our united human life as constituting a *kingdom of God*—one realm of Divine Law, harmoniously working towards a human perfection, analagous to that of a higher world.”

An harmonious
kingdom.

Prayer.

If God and man are ‘related spirits,’ each seeking what is pure and good, a loving exchange of thoughts must subsist between them. This is *Prayer*; and prayer is thus the truest and highest realisation of religion. Not until the relation between God and the soul has been truly

Prayer, the highest
form of religion.

formed, and the soul goes forth towards God in reverent love, is religion real. For “ to give it reality, it must find that which it seeks : ” and prayer unites the soul to God, and draws down from its Source, the higher spiritual life. No higher end of the universe can be conceived than this—the union of the created and the uncreated, the human and the Divine.

It unites man
and God.

Prayer is not the utterance of sacred words only when the lips are silent, the heart and life may pray.

"Prayer is the soul's sincere desire,
 Uttered or unexpressed ;
 The motion of a hidden fire,
 That trembles in the breast.
 Prayer is the burden of a sigh ;
 The falling of a tear ;
 The upward glancing of an eye,
 When none but God is near."

Of the lives of all the great religious heroes, prayer has ever formed a foremost part, and been the secret of their spiritual power. But it is not limited to such.

Prayer is universal. Everywhere and in all ages, man has cried out to one above him, for pity and deliverance, and, in some sort, prays.

A *praying* being has thus, by some means, been evolved ; and it is a true law of evolution that all progress is effected through some natural *correspondence* between

A praying being
 has been evolved.

things and their environment. That is to say, if certain instincts, powers, or faculties, are developed, there must exist something to correspond to these. Every organism, and the faculty or function of every organism, has its corresponding object or element external to itself. Birds are evolved in an atmosphere where wings can work: fishes in an element where fins can paddle. For a spiritual and praying being like

There must then
 be a spiritual en-
 vironment.

man to be evolved, there must be a spiritual environment where prayer can be exercised. If man is conscious of dependence on a higher Power, there must be forces that excite and draw out this sense of need and dependence.

In our social world, we see that prayers are offered and answered. The child utters a cry of distress ; and the father's heart is moved by the cry. It is a law of nature for requests to be made and answered, as between

man and man ; and since man's religious instincts stretch out beyond the present state, towards a God and an unseen world, these also must exist as realities. If every other and lower appetite of human nature finds its satisfaction in correspondence with an outward

All instincts
must be satisfied.

object, it cannot be that the highest, the religious instinct, which expresses itself in prayer, is the one unsatisfied instinct ; " the one hunger of man for which there has been provided no food ; the one thirst for which there has been supplied no water." There is a shelter, a resting-place, for everything in nature ; can it be that nowhere in the universe the *spirit of man* finds its native home ?

A Universal Kingdom.

If man's nature is both morally and spiritually one and the same, and if God is the one Source and Head,

The idea of
humanity.

a *united human life* must be not only possible, but the sure goal of human development. The Divine Law is one and the same ; it must eventually rule, therefore, over *one realm, one kingdom*. Men are at present divided

National differ-
ences.

into nations ; and nations, again, are divided by race, language, and religion, and into a number of separate cliques

and sects. But the common idea of *humanity* is destined to overcome these separating and disintegrating forces : and this idea can only grow out of a true conception of man's nature, and out of the " one relation to all of us " in which the Universal Spirit stands. This Spirit is the Divine Father of all ; and since the image of His moral Perfection is reflected in the mind and conscience of man, man is indeed His son. But this relation makes men brothers : the unity of man means

Brotherhood.

fraternity : and this brotherhood is to be realised, in a perfect society—far

higher and more glorious than Plato's dream—in the one “kingdom of God” on earth.

2. *Unity of God as Cause and God as Perfection.*

“We have now sought an origin for primary religious ideas on two sides of our nature, the intellectual and the moral; and found an infinite Will, first in the principle of Causality, then in the intuitions of Conscience. The

The two lines of thought

Intellectual.

Intelligence, power, self-

Moral.

Two corresponding classes of religious

worships which have been suggested by the spectacle of the cosmos, missing the high moral idealism to which nations may rise when they seek God in the experiences of humanity and along the course of history.

“Each of these two directions brings us to the presence of an Eternal Being: and since (a) we our-

Man, a unity of the natural and spiritual.

only manifesting

clamorous instincts of our nature; since (b) our instinctive

External nature works on us:

extent, administers the retribution and enforces the discipline

and administers judgment.

Because of these intimate relations, we perceive identify the

Therefore the Causal and the Holy God are One.

springing from ourselves unite, in our own persons, a subjection to both the outward physical order and the inward moral law; being ourselves a unity of the natural and the spiritual, and

character as the judicial Will regulates the springs of action are themselves waked up

by the external world, and all the problems of conscience are set by its conditions:

since (c) external nature, to a considerable extent, administers the retribution and enforces the discipline of the moral laws—the ruined health of the

intemperate being a literal judgment of physical nature—the natural and the moral systems thus playing into each other's hands:

we perceive identify the Causal with the Holy God; what we find true of the Creator, we affirm of the Righteous Judge; and what we say of the Holiest, we apply to the Architect of worlds.”

CHAPTER VII.

The Future Life.

"Glorious warrior, glory of orator, glory of song,
 Paid with a voice flying by, to be lost on an endless sea,
 Glory of virtue to fight, to struggle, to right the wrong,
 Nay, but she aim'd not at glory, no lover of glory she ;
 Give her *the glory of going on, and still to be.*"

"The hope of immortality makes heroes of cowards."

What is a future life? "It is not the idea of passing into 'Eternity,' but that of entering upon more intimate Divine relations, that consecrates the faith in a future life. The question of a Life to come centres in the interpretation of Death, as affecting the individual. To find its true significance, we must examine it in three points of view: physiological, metaphysical, and moral": noting, first of all, that the great mass of mankind have always believed, in some fashion, in the immortality of the soul; and that in all old superstitions, the germ of this truth, as of many other truths, is involved. In a land like India, where succession to property is regulated by the title one has to offer oblations to the spirits of departed ancestors, it seems superfluous to insist on the life after death: but there are no doubt many in modern India who believe that science has exploded the fallacy.

1. What has the *physiologist* to say of Death? All that he can affirm is that the *signs and evidences* of consciousness vanish in death; but physical science cannot prove that the conscious soul does *not* continue after death. Its fundamental conception lies in the relation of *function* to *organ*. But is 'thinking' a function of the brain? The function is found in certain molecular motions and changes; but these motions in the tissues of the brain are no more *thought*, than it is my pen that thinks when I write on paper. The greatest scientists have told us, (Spencer and Tyndall), that 'a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion'; and that 'the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness, is unthinkable.' If the connection then between brain and thought is neither causal nor necessary, how shall we affirm that consciousness is extinguished with the extinction of the organism?

But the physical law of 'the conservation of energy' affords positive evidence of the survival of the soul. Death means nothing more than 'the transformation of energy;' the resolution of organic compounds into inorganic combinations. Can we find in these those 'states of consciousness'—the thoughts, affections, and volitions—which formed part of the living man? If not, according to the law of conservation, they still continue; for it is impossible to suppose that unconscious life will continue to flow on, while conscious self-existence with its infinite capacity of development will become extinct. Are spiritual qualities the only energy not to be conserved?

Again, the principle of 'correlation,' or mutual relation, between faculty and range of life, points in the same direction. Do not the sentiment of wonder, the sense of beauty, compassion, sympathy, love, rise to a sublimer height than their earthly uses will permit, and indicate a life of larger dimensions than the present? From a survey of the instincts, perceptions, and affections of an animal, we are able to determine, approximately, the scope and character of its life: and if we deny the enduring persistence of the spiritual element in man, we rob the whole process of evolution of its meaning.

2. After the physiologist has withdrawn, the metaphysician steps forth, and asks, 'What it is that survives the perishing organism.' The soul is the self, the seat of personal identity, the permanent centre of all our acts and experiences, which remains unchanged amid the physical changes of the body; undisturbed by the sufferings of the body; and often retaining its full vigour at the near approach of death itself. Does not this indicate that the soul, the self, may continue to live after the body has disappeared? If this personal subject of thought and will has been set up by the Supreme Mind, and lives in its embrace, akin to God and yet *other* than Himself, what is there in the nature of death to dissolve this relation?

Personality is unquestionably the highest fact in the universe; and from the personal to the impersonal is a distinct descent: and if death has power over it, to destroy it, then "it can undo the utmost which the Divine Will has wrought!"

To say that the relation between the human soul and the Divine has *begun* in time, and therefore it must cease, is to run counter to Newton's first law of motion, which declares that a particle once set in motion in empty space will continue to move for ever, unless some external force supervenes. Gravitation, once given to the material of the universe, must be conceived to be eternal: and "why may not the communicated Divine nature endure as long as the uncommunicated Source on which it lives?"

Or to say that the Infinite cannot admit any finite by its side, but must embrace it and *merge* it, is to think of mere extension, and to "*confound the infinite with the total.*" A great mind does not exist at the expense of lesser intelligences, "and Newton who weighed the planets could live under the same roof with the house-keeper that prepared his porridge." Moreover, the very relation supposed to be impossible, *now* exists: we are conscious of ourselves, and conscious of God; "and if the wonder has not been too great to arise, what harder conditions forbid it to abide, beyond death?"

3. But the real evidence of a Future Life does not appear until we turn to the *Moral* aspects. In the present world, the Divine ends in the creation of human nature and life, are obviously only *partially attained*; indicating that the present term of years is "but a fragment and a prelude." In the reach of the human mind, in the scale of its powers, is there not indefinite growth and promise? Are its achievements in any sense commensurate with its endowments? What a vast difference between the intelligence of man and that of other creatures! Their outlook is very limited: they have no conception of time and space: but man can look up and down the vista of the ages: and "there are no astronomers among the lower animals." "If you found a plough-boy taking lessons in navigation, and pouring over maps of New Zealand and Fiji, you would guess that he was about to take to the sea, and become a colonist at last; and if we have but to till our own earth for a season, what can be the fascination of sailing through the skies? Is it not that we have vaster relations than with our immediate surroundings;" and that there is an amazing contrast between

the limitation of our position here and the boundless range of our intellectual desires ?

Further, " what is it that arrests the attempts of the student of Nature or the servant of Art ?" Not the consciousness of the failure of his powers, but " only that he has a short loan of time and tools:" had he *these*, he feels that he

could conquer what he has to leave unfinished. " I do not know," says Dr. Martineau, " that there is anything in nature (unless indeed it be the reputed blotting-out of suns in the stellar heavens,) which can be compared in

Extinction of great minds. wastefulness with the extinction of great minds: their gathered resources, their matured skill, their luminous insight, their unfailing tact, are not like instincts that can be handed down; they are absolutely personal and inalienable; grand conditions of future power, unavailable for the race, and perfect for an *ulterior growth of the individual*. If that growth is *not to be*, the most brilliant genius bursts and vanishes as a firework in the night."

Still more cogent is the argument when transferred from the intellect to the *affections* which adorn humanity. Are there such boundless capacities of love without a world where it shall be fully satisfied ? Time and distance cannot

break the charm and power of reciprocal affection: and if our mutual loves " are computed only for this *cisalpine province* in which our lot is cast, why do we so follow with our looks the travellers that leave us by the ascending tracks, and, instead of losing them in the everlasting snows of the great mountain-chain of Death that bounds our external view, trace them into the *transalpine valleys* under fairer skies, and never cease to converse with them, the visible with the invisible ?" Are these great powers of knowing and of loving, which often

These look for perfection.

only begin to unfold themselves when the death-frost seems to nip them, never to reach perfection in a more genial clime ? If there be no future for man, his life is but the prologue to a drama that never will be acted: and our faith in the unity and completeness of nature is an idle dream.

It is not, however, till we present our question to the *Moral* Verdict of the moral consciousness: answer. " Liberty to go right—liberty to go wrong—can it be a mere haphazard gift, as if from some curiosity to see what will

turn up? And when the experiment is over, are the actors dismissed, the curtain dropped, and the theatre closed? Such an issue would contradict the very essence of moral freedom, which surely loses all significance if no difference is to be made between those who use it well and those who misuse it. We are not upon our trial here, unless there is a future that depends upon ourselves. The alternatives of a trust have a sequel in the alternatives of a reckoning. So that, wherever Conscience is, there we stand only in the fore-court of existence; and a Moral world cannot be final, unless it be everlasting."

The underlying sentiment of justice within us clearly demands another life, where the faithful but the troubled here, shall find reward and rest, and where the miscreants that go unpunished here, shall get their dues. For Justice demands a future. it cannot be affirmed that the present inward experiences of the good and the bad conform with the relative worth of their character. Do the most excellent have the amplest recognition, and the guiltiest, the most to bear? The best saints are those who are most dissatisfied with themselves; Inward award not adequate. while the hardened criminal suffers least from inward pangs. Thus Conscience does not adequately administer its own law; and "if Death gives final discharge alike to the sinner and the saint, we are warranted in saying that Conscience has told more lies than it has ever called to their account."

Neither are there adequate provisions in the organism of the external world for making us feel the difference between right and wrong ways of living. If the self-indulgent and vicious External award not adequate. man is willing to incur the *penalties* due to his unfaithfulness, do they settle his account, and can he thus escape? Such an attempt only plunges him in deeper guilt, which calls for stricter retribution. Or, "is there no such thing as *prudent* profligacy," that contrives by art and vigilance to dodge the avenger's grasp?

Further, it cannot be said that 'exact retribution' is found in the favour and disfavour of mankind. Award of associates not adequate. The average standard of moral purity, probity, and disinterestedness, may be applied to the ordinary level; but it does not meet cases of "abnormal meanness and exceptional heroism." "And suppose that, in the exercise of its best power, it visits

aim for some lapse by a loss of social caste; the sentence can be stifled, just like self-reproach, and got rid of by simply stepping down to the next level, where among other associates he may win his reputation upon easier terms. It is *class-opinion* alone that holds the seat of effective judgment over men." Or, finally, shall we look to history, to pronounce the verdict? Can we be safe there from the critic's deforming or idealising hand? And "what have the mass of mankind to do with the verdicts of history?"

Award of history not adequate.

"From this survey of the great lines of human experience, two inferences seem to force themselves upon us: (1) That *everywhere*—in our conscience, in our physical nature, in the sentiments of associated men—there are indelible marks of a morally constituted world, moving towards righteous ends: (2) That *nowhere*, within us or out of us, do we find the fulfilment of this idea, but only baffled tentatives. This is what we should expect to see, from the first station of an unfinished system; and it irresistibly suggests a justifying and perfect sequel."

Everywhere a moral order.

Nowhere a fulfilment.

And since God is, we may rest assured that what *ought* to be, *will* be, in the largest and fullest sense. We live in a moral universe, so that the good can afford to wait. God is just. If what ought to be, will be, then every wrong will meet its recompense; and they who here obey the inner voice, will not wait in vain. "We desire virtue, not as the reward of virtue, but as its continuance." Virtue will not be defrauded. To her shall be given "the glory of going on."

What ought to be, will be.

Virtue will 'go on.'