

THE
MYSORE REVERSION,

“AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE”:

BY

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“Government is a practical thing, made for the happiness of mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity.”—BURKE.

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PREFACE.

I THINK that any one who candidly and carefully peruses the following pages, will find that they are not open to certain plausible and obvious objections—that they are not written to represent a mere isolated grievance—that no claim is set forth here of despotic power for an Indian Rajah, on “divine right” principles, and at the expense of an industrious population, contented and prosperous under British management. It will be seen that I do not ask for the toleration of old abuses in the face of accomplished facts and altered circumstances, or insist upon an over-scrupulous devotion to letter and precedent in favour of a Prince, without regard to the spirit of engagements, without protecting the interests of the people.

This book is not written merely to propose the reconsideration of this case of Mysore, but to suggest a reconsideration of all the relations of the Imperial Power to the minor States of India; to show how, in Mysore, we neglected our earliest duties of instruction and guidance—how, grasping at patronage, we have

hitherto thrown away the opportunity of establishing a limited monarchy as a model and exemplar—and how, by abolishing that Principality, we should, in all probability, throw away the opportunity for ever, and retard, or finally obstruct, the progress of Indian reform, and the relief of our scattered military strength.

I shall endeavour to prove, that although the expected Mysore Reversion is not by any means “an Exceptional Case,” in the sense of the official document which I quote, it is so far exceptional that the appropriation of this State would be exceptionally unjust, injurious, imprudent, and unprofitable.

And while I argue that statements disparaging a Prince’s personal conduct or mental qualifications—unless asserting crime or idiocy—are as irrelevant to a question of his sovereignty and his regal position in India, as they would be in Europe, I shall show that this Prince’s derelictions have been much exaggerated, and that their origin in British neglect has been completely overlooked; that his conduct was never so blameable, and that his abilities are not so deficient, as to warrant his permanent exclusion from power, or to offer the slightest excuse or pretext for extinguishing the tributary State.

But I have not written the following pages as an apologist or an advocate for the Rajah of Mysore. I do not plead for the Rajah’s personal advantage and dignity, I plead for the advantage and elevation of his people, and of the people of India, and for the general good of the British Empire.

For Lord Canning's public character I have the profoundest respect ; no one can estimate more highly than I do the great services he rendered to the Empire by the matchless courage, the sagacity, self-control, and self-contained steadfastness of purpose which he so signally manifested throughout the perils and horrors of 1857 and 1858. In the pacification of Oude, and the maintenance, modified by law, of its ancient baronial institutions, the extension of similar privileges to the great landholders of other Provinces, and in the restorative operations on the Punjaub settlement, I recognise the statesman of large heart and broad intellect. But Lord Canning lived and died a public man ; his acts are public property, and so long as they entail important consequences on the nation, they form a legitimate subject for comment and discussion, until, in the course of time, they become matters for history.

With great reluctance and regret, therefore, but without hesitation or reserve, I shall have to call attention to that part in the treatment of this exceptional case of Mysore, in which Lord Canning, misled by its superficial temptations, appears to me to have deviated from the direct path of justice and good faith, to have raised unfounded claims by the novel process of an eternal right of conquest, and a latent Supreme Sovereignty, and to have launched our Government upon an aggressive course, which cannot be justified or defended, but from which it is difficult to recede.

The truth is that Lord Canning, in his treatment of the Mysore case, was not pursuing a policy of

his own choosing, but dealing with the practical results of his predecessors' policy, results which were decidedly good, so far as they went, and the permanence of which seemed to him, and was declared by his professional advisers—erroneously as I maintain—to depend on a strict persistence in the administrative sequestration of the Mysore Principality. That his mind was not clear or composed on this subject is, I think, manifest, not only from his declaring it was “an exceptional case,” but from the slight aberrations of logic and of temper into which he was betrayed in his correspondence both with the Rajah and with the Secretary of State. But on these points my readers will be able to judge for themselves.

I will yield to no one in the admiration I feel for those eminent men in the Indian Services, whose achievements in days of war and convulsion, and whose earnest labours in the time of peaceful organisation, have conferred so many blessings upon India. Let the fullest meed of honour and gratitude be awarded to our great Indian administrators—but let them be confined to their own sphere. The field of Indian administration is the very worst training-ground for Indian government. I do not say that it is absolutely impossible for a Collector or a Resident to rise above the small successes of his official career to broad views of Imperial policy; but I certainly think it is highly improbable. The exceptions, though brilliant, have been very few. I think, moreover, that in the present day, the work and associations of an Indian administra-

tor are even less likely to inspire him with enlarged and tolerant principles, and more likely to fill his mind with narrow technicalities and contemptuous prejudices, than they were forty or fifty years ago. Native States were then substantive Powers in India; native Princes and Ministers were looked upon as worthy opponents or coadjutors.

I must confess to considerable distrust and dread of a purely professional Government,—composed of members of a close official guild,—untempered by a well-defined Imperial policy, unmitigated by the presence of a British statesman as Viceroy, unwatched by Parliament, unmindful of popular feelings. The professional ruler must magnify his office; to him it always appears an incontrovertible position, that “whate’er is best administered is best,”—an opinion which is probably entertained by a great many people in Great Britain, with reference to India, but which seems to me to be opposed to the first principles of modern politics, and to be fraught with infinite mischief. However strong, however well administered, the Government of India may be, it is not, and never will be so strong, and so well administered, as to be able to trust to physical force and organised establishments, and to dispense with moral superiority.

But, it may be said, there are certain facts that cannot be denied—they speak for themselves; the results of British administration are beneficial, the revenue and trade of India are increasing, the people are contented and prosperous. No one can assert more strongly than

I do that British rule has conferred and is conferring the greatest benefits upon India. I object to the progress of annexation and uniformity, because it neutralises and debases those benefits, and endangers the stability of our reforming operations. I admit that in most provinces of India the people are in a thriving and improving condition. But that the population in general, or the reflecting and influential classes in particular, are politically contented, indifferent or apathetic, I must distinctly deny.

It does not follow as a matter of course, that a period of material prosperity is always a period of political tranquillity. Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked.

Nor does it follow as a matter of course, that a period of material prosperity is to last for ever. Because we dare not predict disaster, do not you presumptuously prophesy smooth things. Twenty years, thirty years, fill up a small space in history, form but a brief term in the life of a nation. Can we not look forward so far? We may have goods laid up in store for many years; we may eat, drink, and be merry, but the day may come—a day of reckoning for our stewardship—when a soul shall be required of us; and it may then be found that there is no soul in our Indian Empire, but that it is possessed of a devil.

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THE MYSORE REVERSION,
AN "EXCEPTIONAL CASE."

CHAPTER I.

THE REVIVAL OF ANNEXATION.

"We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company, are by Us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained; and We look for the like observance on their part.

"We desire no extension of Our present territorial possessions; and, while we will permit no aggression upon Our dominions or Our rights to be attempted with impunity, We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as Our own; and we desire that they, as well as Our subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government."

—PROCLAMATION BY THE QUEEN IN COUNCIL TO THE PRINCES, CHIEFS, AND PEOPLE OF INDIA, 1st November, 1858.

FOUR years ago, about the time when Lord Canning's important despatch of the 30th April, 1860, on the right of Adoption by native Princes, was published, it did really seem as if the era of annexation in India was closed. The unequivocal and weighty assurances of Her Majesty's Proclamation were hailed as the Magna Charta of the minor States. And even those unconverted and unrepentant officials—some of them men of great merit and ability, such as the late General Sir Mark Cubbon—who deplored that solemn and public statement of principles, declared that its pledges must be scrupulously respected, that its Royal origin forbade all tampering with its terms, and that it constituted an absolute bar to any further territorial acquisitions, except by open war.

During the perilous crisis of 1857, the most serviceable and timely aid in men and money was furnished by every class of native rulers, by independent allies, by protected tributaries,

and by feudatory chieftains ; but the value of this material aid was far exceeded by the moral effect of their firm and loyal adherence. Lord Canning then learned to admit—to make use of his own words—that “ the safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well affected to us. Setting aside,” he continues, “ the well-known services rendered by Scindia, and subsequently by the Maharajahs of Rewa, Chirkaree, and others, over the wide tract of Central India, where our authority is most broken in upon by Native States, I venture to say that there is no man who remembers the condition of Upper India in 1857 and 1858, and who is not thankful that in the centre of the large and compact British province of Rohilcund there remained the solitary little State of Rampoor, still administered by its own Mahomedan Prince, and that on the borders of the Punjaub and of the districts above Delhi, the Chief of Puttiala and his kinsmen still retained their hereditary authority unimpaired. In the time of which I speak, these patches of Native Government served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave.”*

The natural result of this conspicuous and practical refutation of all Lord Dalhousie’s doctrines as to the impotence, hostility, and uselessness to the Empire of the Native States, was a salutary reaction in their favour. Cessions in full sovereignty, not only of confiscated estates but of British territory, which two years before would have been looked on as an impossible contingency, were made to several Native Princes as rewards for their inestimable aid. Two successive Secretaries of State, Lord Stanley and Sir Charles Wood, evinced the most liberal intentions towards our dependent allies and tributaries ; both of them insisted on the restoration of Dhar, contrary to the advice of the “ experienced political officer,” Colonel Durand, who had unfortunately been allowed by Lord Canning to lead him astray on this point, and who, as Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, still contrives to resist the restoration ; and both of them, in reviewing some of the worst political cases, took some imperfect steps towards restitution and compensation.

* Despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 43A, dated Simla, the 30th April, 1860, paragraph 34. Appendix A.

Sir Charles Wood, in his reply of the 26th of July, 1860, cordially agrees with Lord Canning's despatch from which I have just quoted, and says:—"In the sentiments expressed in your Excellency's letter of the 30th of April I entirely concur. It is not by the extension of our Empire that its permanence is to be secured, but by the character of British rule in the territories already committed to our care, and by practically demonstrating that we are as willing to respect the rights of others as we are capable of maintaining our own."

I shall have to show that if the declared intentions of the present Calcutta authorities with regard to Mysore are allowed to be realised, it will be a practical demonstration that we are *not* willing to respect the rights of others, that we are resolved to treat with contempt the rights of the Rajah of Mysore, the rights of our Ally the Nizam, the feelings and interests of the people of Mysore, and of the Princes and people of all India.

In short, the grand and terrible events of 1857 did rouse the nation, the statesmen of Great Britain, the rulers of India, to something like enthusiasm, and under its influence—and in spite of the irresistible exasperation of the hour—many noble principles were avowed, some of which were embodied in the Royal Proclamation, and in other official documents. But the excitement soon died away, upon the restoration of order. When none but financial difficulties remained, and when even these were surmounted, the season of self-complacent apathy set in once more. And now, in this time of our wealth, security and pride, there is a manifest tendency to depreciate our obligations to the native Princes, and to renew pretensions which, it may be said, have never been abandoned except by way of grace and favour.

Almost every statesman of eminence, of all parties and in both Houses of Parliament, sought for occasions during the Sessions of 1857 and 1858, to condemn emphatically the policy of annexation; one and all concurred in attributing the rebellion in a great measure to the bad spirit which that policy had created. Even so late as the 4th of August last, Lord Stanley made use of the following words in a speech before the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce:—"This he might say, they had never had an abler Governor-General, or an administration at

Calcutta more thoroughly peaceable in its intentions, or with a more fixed determination not to carry on that policy of annexation of which so much was heard fifteen years ago."

But it will be my painful task to show that the present Governor General and the present administration at Calcutta are actually engaged in carrying on that same policy of annexation, that they are carrying it on by the discarded and discredited process of ignoring an adoption, that was so cruelly exercised in Lord Dalhousie's time, and that this process now menaces the most friendly, the most tractable, the most orderly, and to us the most profitable native State that still exists in India.

Lord Canning recommended his measures in 1860, for securing to every Chief above the rank of a Jaghiredar the right of adopting a successor, according to the Hindoo law, because, said he, it will "show at once, and for ever, that we are not lying in wait for opportunities of absorbing territory, and that we do deliberately desire to keep alive a feudal aristocracy where one still exists."* "And," he added, in that same despatch, "should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best main-stays will be found in these native States. But to make them so, we must treat their Chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity, teaching them that, in spite of all suspicions to the contrary, their independence is safe, that we are not waiting for plausible opportunities to convert their country into British territory, and convincing them that they have nothing to gain by helping to displace us in favour of any new rulers from within or from without."

But I shall prove that we are now "lying in wait" for "a plausible opportunity" to absorb territory to which we have no manner of claim or title whatever; that when Lord Canning penned those lines he was, with strange inconsistency and instability of purpose, himself "lying in wait" for that same territory, and was preparing a lurking-place for himself or his successor by an inexplicit reservation in that very despatch;

* Paragraph 26. Appendix A.

that, through his ill-advised contrivance, the British Government is now visibly "lying in wait" until the death of the Rajah of Mysore, who has passed the age of three score years and ten, to pounce upon that Principality without a shadow of right or justice.

Among the distinguished officers who, under the Governor General's instructions, negotiated the Treaties of 1799 with the representatives of the Rajah of Mysore and the Nizam, there was one great man, then known as Colonel Arthur Wellesley, who foresaw that a measure of resumption might be planned at some future period, and warned his brother, Lord Mornington, in the following emphatic terms, to provide against the possibility of such a breach of faith:—

"Colonel Kirkpatrick will have written to you yesterday respecting the 6th Article of the Subsidiary Treaty. We all agreed that that ought to be modified in some manner. As it now stands, it will give ground for the belief *that we give the Rajah the country at the present moment with the intention of taking it away again when it will suit our convenience.* Supposing that the candid and generous policy of the present Government should weaken that belief as far as it regards them, it must be allowed that the conduct of the British Government in India has not at all times been such as to induce the natives to believe that at some time or other improper advantage will not be taken of that Article. They know as well as we do that there may be a change of government immediately, and that there certainly will be one in the course of a few years, and the person then appointed Governor General may not have such enlarged systems of policy as those by which we are regulated at the present moment. This induces me to believe, that they will object strongly to that Article, and I don't think that it will be very creditable to us to insist upon it."*

The Governor General did insist upon that Article; an improper advantage was taken of that Article; in the course of years the candid and generous policy of Government did become weakened; and in the present day the intention is too

* Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, vol. i, p. 244. This letter was written before the Treaty was concluded; and the Article which is here called "the 6th" can only be Article iv. The discrepancy may be due to a subsequent alteration of the draft, or perhaps to some clerical or typographical confusion between "iv" and "vi".

clearly manifested of taking away the country of Mysore, because it is supposed to suit our convenience.

The ultimate disposal of the Mysore territories at the demise of the reigning Rajah, will probably, and may very reasonably be made to depend upon the answers that are finally given to the following three questions:—

1. HAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ANY RIGHT TO ANNEX THOSE TERRITORIES?

2. WOULD THE ANNEXATION BE BENEFICIAL TO THE PEOPLE OF MYSORE?

3. WOULD THE ANNEXATION BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE?

I presume that our Government would at present answer these questions in the affirmative. I shall endeavour to show that all three questions ought to be met with an absolute negative. I hope to produce a conviction so decided of the injustice, impolicy, and imprudence of the meditated annexation, as may lead to some decided action in the Cabinet or in Parliament, and may once more place the Home authorities in distinct antagonism to that policy of bad faith and disguised rapacity by which, during the last twenty years, the officials of Calcutta have destroyed the fair fame of Great Britain in the East, and undermined the foundations of our Indian Empire.

CHAPTER II.

MYSORE FROM 1799 TO 1856.

ABOUT four centuries ago two brothers of that tribe of Yedava Rajpoots, to which Krishna, the deified hero of Dwarka in Guzerat, is said to have belonged, left the great Hindoo capital of Beejanuggur, and travelled South in search of adventures. One of them is said to have married, under very romantic circumstances, the daughter of a wealthy landholder in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, whose Canarese title of Wadiyar, or Lord, adopted by his son-in-law, when he succeeded to the estate, became the hereditary distinction of their descendants. Such is the origin of the Rajahs of Mysore, according to the annals of their court poets and genealogists.

For many years the Wadiyars extended their possessions by subduing the neighbouring chieftains; they assumed the title of Rajah, but paid tribute and homage to Beejanuggur. But from the subversion of that last great Hindoo State, in 1564, by the four Mahomedan Kings of Dowlutabad, Beejapoor, Golconda, and Beder, the Mysore Rajahs may be considered as independent Princes. One of them commenced to coin money in his own name in the year 1654; and another, during the reign of the Mogul Emperor Aurungzeb, claimed and established the right of sitting on an ivory throne. The Mysore State, though sometimes reduced to ceremonial homage, and to the payment of ransom or tribute, always maintained its autonomy against the successive pretensions of the Mahomedan Kings of Beejapoor, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam; and enlarged its boundaries during the political convulsions attending the fall of the Mogul Empire, which altered the whole political aspect of the Deccan.

On the death of the Rajah Chick Deo Raj in 1731, his successor, a minor, became a mere puppet in the hands of the

Dalway, or hereditary Minister, a veritable *Maire du Palais*. A succession of military and financial exigencies, with which no one else was capable of dealing, at length threw all the power of the State into the hands of the celebrated Hyder Ali, who had commenced his career as a simple trooper. Hyder Ali always kept up the form of annually presenting the captive Rajah, as their Sovereign, to the assembled people at the Dusserah festival, while he took the place himself of Commander-in-chief and Minister; but after the first few years of his son's reign this custom was discontinued by Tippoo, who himself assumed all the style and emblems of royalty, to which his father had never pretended.

Counting from the final ruin of Hyder's patron and rival, the Hindoo minister, Nunjeraj, in 1761, to the death of Tippoo Sultan in the storm of his great stronghold, in 1799, the Mussulman ascendancy in Mysore only lasted for thirty-eight years.

Lord Wellesley's first plan after Seringapatam was taken, was that of recognising one of Tippoo's sons; but he was deterred from this settlement chiefly by considerations of British interests, and a dread of French influence, and partly, also, by a regard for the "antiquity" of the Hindoo royal family's "legitimate title." He writes to Dundas, the 7th of June, 1799:—"It would certainly have been desirable that the power should have been placed in the hands of one of Tippoo's sons; but the hereditary and intimate connection established between Tippoo and the French, the probability that the French may be enabled to maintain themselves in Egypt, and the perpetual interest which Tippoo's family must feel to undermine and subvert a system which had so much reduced their patrimony and power, precluded the possibility of restoring any branch of the family of the late Sultan to the throne, without exposing us to the constant hazard of internal commotion, and even of foreign war."*

Sound policy thus forbidding the maintenance of the House of Tippoo, the Governor General naturally turned to the representative of the royal family of Mysore, whose rights had been usurped by Hyder Ali. "Between the British Govern-

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 36.

ment and this family," writes Lord Wellesley to the Court of Directors on the 3rd of August, 1799, "an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortunes." Lord Wellesley here alludes to the negotiations carried on in 1782 with the agents of Sham Raj, father of the present Rajah, which resulted in a Treaty of alliance, ratified by the Government of Madras on the 27th of November in that year; in consequence of which the Hindoo Prince's flag was hoisted on the walls of Caroor, when that fort was taken, on the 2nd of April, 1783, by Colonel Lang. The conspiracy of the Rajah's adherents in Mysore, which led to these negotiations, was, however, discovered and crushed by Tippoo; and in 1783 the Honourable Company made peace with the Sultan, and in the next year concluded a Treaty with him.* "They had formed," continues Lord Wellesley, "no connection with your enemies. Their elevation would be the spontaneous act of your generosity, and from your support alone could they ever hope to be maintained upon the throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultan, or against any other claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy all the friends of the usurping family, and consequently be adverse to the French, or to any other State connected with that family in its hereditary hatred of the British Government."

"In addition to these motives of policy, moral considerations and sentiments of generosity and humanity, favoured the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. Their high birth, the antiquity of their legitimate title, and their long and unmerited sufferings, rendered them peculiar objects of compassion and respect; nor could it be doubted that their government would be both more acceptable and more indulgent than that of the Mahomedan usurpers, to the mass of the inhabitants of the country, composed almost entirely of Hindoos."†

And his instructions to the Commissioners appointed by him for the settlement of Mysore affairs were to the same effect:—

"The restoration of the representative of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of ter-

* *Historical Sketches of Southern India and Mysore*, by Colonel Mark Wilks, 1817, vol. ii, p. 488-500.

† Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 81-82.

ritory between the Allies, in which the interests of the Mah-rattas should be conciliated, appearing to me, under all the circumstances of the case, to be the most advisable basis on which any new settlement of the country can be vested, I have resolved to frame without delay a plan founded on these principles.”*

I have already quoted a passage in which Lord Wellesley describes the recognition of the Hindoo Prince as “an act of spontaneous generosity.” This was the fundamental principle upon which that great statesman, most justly and judiciously, based the whole transaction as between the allied powers and the Mysore family:—

“From the justice and success of the late war with Tippoo Sultan,” he writes to the Court of Directors, “the Company and the Nizam derived an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms. The right of conquest entitled the Company and the Nizam to retain the whole territory in their own hands; the cession of it to any other party might be a consideration of policy or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground of justice or right.”

“A lineal descendant of the ancient House of the Rajahs of Mysore still remained at Seringapatam; but whatever might be the hopes of his family from the moderation and humanity of the conquerors, this young Prince could assert no right to any share of the conquered territory.”†

The investiture of the Rajah with the character of a Sovereign was deliberately treated by Lord Wellesley, not as the restoration of an old Government and dynasty, but as the creation of a new one. It appears from his letter of the 7th of June, 1799, that according to the original draft of the Treaty the whole of the conquered territories were to be considered as the Rajah's dominions, and the provinces to be retained by the Allies were to be accepted by them as if they were ceded by the Hindoo Sovereign. To this process the Governor General objected. “I think,” said he, “the whole transaction would be more conveniently thrown into a different form from that which you have given to it. I do not see any necessity for ceding the whole country, in the first instance, to the Rajah of

* Wellesley's Despatches vol. ii, p. 19.

† Ibid., vol. ii, p. 72.

Mysore, and accepting again as a cession under his authority such districts as must be retained by the Allies. I think it will be more convenient, and less liable to future embarrassment, to rest the whole settlement upon the basis of our right of conquest, and thus to render our cession the source of the Rajah's dominion. For this purpose the proceeding should commence with a Treaty between the Nizam and the Company."*

But while Lord Wellesley thus upheld, on behalf of the Allies, their right of disposing of all the conquered territories, and did dispose of them in such a manner, and in such recorded terms, as should be a perpetual acknowledgment of the Rajah's obligations, and a perpetual bar to the revival of any pretensions to the sovereignty of the districts allotted to the Company and the Nizam, he intimated no design of depressing the restored Prince into an insignificant and insecure position. On the contrary, he was avowedly desirous to welcome the Sovereign of Mysore as a distinct and additional power in India, pledged to the reciprocal recognition and defence of our titles and possessions, for he instructs the Commissioners that "the Rajah, after his accession, may be made a party to the general guarantee."†

The infant Rajah's elevation was opposed at the time by several of Lord Wellesley's advisers, and by none more than by Sir Thomas Munro, who held that we should divide between ourselves and our sole Ally, the Nizam, the whole of the conquered districts. But all objections were overruled; a separate government for Mysore was constituted; Poorniah, the able Brahmin who had been Tippoo's chief officer of finance, was appointed Prime Minister, and for eleven years managed the country with great skill and success, so far as relates to the augmentation and collection of the revenue.

Poorniah was a clever financial officer, and would have been invaluable as a Sheristadar, or manager, to one of the by-gone type of "crack" Collectors who, in the first twenty years of this century, gained an ephemeral reputation by putting on the screw in certain districts of the Madras Presidency and the North West Provinces. He had practised his art in a

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 26.

† Ibid.

severe school. During the last seven years of Tippoo's reign, when the Sultan obstinately insisted on keeping up enormous military establishments on a revenue reduced by Lord Cornwallis's Partition to one half of its former amount, Poorniah was driven to exercise his greatest dexterity in squeezing the unfortunate population. And until the end of the year 1804 the demands of the Honourable Company on the Government of Mysore, under Article III. of the Treaty, for its contribution "towards the increased expenses" of the war with the Mahrattas, seem to have precluded any mitigation of the public burdens. During Poorniah's administration the pressure was never relaxed. No imputation seems ever to have been cast upon his personal integrity, and when, in the year 1811, he was compelled to resign his authority, he left a sum of hard cash in the Treasury exceeding two millions sterling. This fund was not, however, entirely due to savings from the public income, but was swelled by the gradual sale of vast stores of sandal-wood—the special produce of Mysore and monopolised by the Government—and of other superfluous stock and materials which had been heaped up in every department during the reign of Tippoo. The people did not prosper under Poorniah's rule, and little or nothing was done by him in the way of public improvement. Sir Mark Cubbon, in his Report to Government, as Commissioner of Mysore in 1854, alludes to the accumulated treasure "which the dubious policy of Poorniah had wrung from the people."

After the departure of Sir John Malcolm, the first Resident at Mysore, in 1804, Poorniah was left to pursue his own plans, in possession of undivided authority, undisturbed and uninstructed by the Government of Madras, or their representative the Resident. The young Rajah was left to the enlightened tuition of his mother, his grandmother, and the other ladies of the harem.

It has unfortunately never formed a feature in our scheme of foreign policy in India—what is called at Calcutta our system of political agency—to raise the character of the feudatory and tributary Princes by early education and guidance; but there has rather been a too manifest tendency "to give them rope enough to hang themselves"—to let them, in youth and in age,

go to the bad their own way; and then to step in and make a clean sweep of everything. We seem never to have perceived that any intermediate course was open to us between utter neglect and wholesale supersession. The patient instruction of native Princes and statesmen, the tolerant reform of local institutions, present too narrow a field of power and patronage to be attractive to our eastern officials. This systematic negligence, in its most culpable form, characterised the dealings of the Madras Government with the pupil State committed to their charge by Lord Wellesley's arrangements.

From 1799 till 1832, with a very brief interval, the British Resident at the Court of Mysore was in direct communication only with the Madras authorities, from whom he received his instructions; while the Madras Government reported its proceedings to the Supreme Government in Bengal. The plan never seems to have worked well. The authority was wrongly placed, the responsibility was too much divided. The Duke of Wellington—then General Wellesley—in a letter to Major Shawe, dated the 14th of January, 1804, gives us the strong opinion on this subject of a very shrewd observer of men and manners who had had the best and latest opportunities of forming a judgment, and affords us another instance of his remarkable foresight as to the course of Mysore affairs.

“In respect to Mysore,” says he, “I recommend that a gentleman from the Bengal Civil Service shall be Malcolm's successor there. The Government of that country should be placed under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor-General in Council. The Governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah than they have with the Souba of the Deccan” (the Nizam) “or the Peishwa. The consequence of the continuance of the present system will be that the Rajah's Government will be destroyed by corruption, or, if they should not be corrupt, by calumny.* I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil, or who has strength of character or talents to defend the Government” (meaning clearly the Mysore Government) “against the second. In my

* Only those who know some of the secrets of the “political” system in India, will appreciate the full force and significance of this prediction.

opinion the only remedy is to take the Rajah under the wing of the Governor General; and this can be done effectually only by appointing as Resident a gentleman of the Bengal Civil Service, and by directing him to correspond only with the Governor General.”*

This advice was acted on for a short period; but soon after the departure of Sir John Malcolm's successor, Colonel Mark Wilks, the Resident was replaced in direct subordination to the Government of Madras, and, under their instructions, continued down to the year 1832, to carry out that policy of masterly indifference to Mysore affairs—so long as the Subsidy was paid—that was best calculated, whether it was so intended or not, to lead to the Rajah's ruin, and to augment the power and patronage of the Governor of Madras. And at Calcutta the salutary principles of control relied upon by Lord Wellesley seem to have been completely forgotten.

The most striking and critical instance of this cruel neglect—that to which all the subsequent disorders must be attributed—occurred in December 1811, when, after an unavailing struggle against the intrigues of the Palace party, Poorniah was finally deprived of power, and the Rajah, now sixteen years old, proclaimed his own majority and took the government into his own hands.

Lord Dalhousie, in a Minute dated the 16th of January, 1856, from which I shall have to quote at greater length further on, says that the Rajah's “rule was scandalously and hopelessly bad, though he commenced it under every advantage.” But what is the fact? Where ought the responsibility for the misrule of Mysore really to fall? The British Government, entitled by Article XIV of the Subsidiary Treaty to impose its authoritative advice in any matters connected with “his Highness's interests, the economy of his finances, and the happiness of his people”—authorised also by Article IV of the same Treaty, “to introduce such regulations and ordinances as might be deemed expedient for the better ordering of any branch or department of the Mysore Government”†—looked on with apparent unconcern while the Regency of its own institution was pulled to the ground; demanded no securities, imposed no

* Wellington Despatches, vol. ii, p. 666.

† Appendix B.

authoritative advice, introduced no ordinances, but allowed a boy of sixteen to declare himself of age, and to seize upon absolute power. Yet Lord Dalhousie says that the Rajah commenced his rule "under every advantage!"

From the first year of the young Rajah's personal rule, the condition of Mysore gradually and steadily deteriorated; occasional remonstrances were addressed to the native Court by the Resident and by the Government of Madras, but no efficient means were applied to improve the administration. In the year 1825, Sir Thomas Munro, then Governor of Madras, visited Mysore, and warned the Rajah in terms which are described as follows in a Minute which the Governor wrote immediately after the interview:—"I concluded by saying that the disorder of the Rajah's affairs had reached such a height as would justify the Government in acting upon the Fourth Article of the Treaty; but that as a direct interference in the administration, or the assumption for a time of part of the Mysore territory, could not be undertaken without lessening the dignity of his Highness, and shaking his authority in such a manner that it would be impracticable ever to reestablish it, I was unwilling to adopt such a course until the last extremity, and wished to give him an opportunity of restoring order himself. But if reform were not immediately begun, direct interference would be unavoidable."

The plan of persistently abstaining from active remedies, until the disease became inflammatory and dangerous, although maintained by so eminent an authority as Sir Thomas Munro, will, I think, be pronounced erroneous, even on his own showing, without appealing to its actual effects. Surely it would not have "lessened the dignity of his Highness," or "shaken his authority," if certain "ordinances," dictated by the Governor of Madras under the powers conferred on him by Articles IV and XIV of the Treaty, had been issued by the Rajah in his own name and as his own act, and if the due execution of those ordinances had been referred to the Resident's close supervision, and secured by the appointment of a trustworthy Minister. But no such step was taken; no ordinances or regulations were imposed upon the Rajah; no specific plan of reform was laid down; the Governor of Madras took his leave, and the Rajah

was once more left to his own devices. The result was what might have been confidently predicted. Those who flattered and fleeced the young Prince considered the Governor's inaction to have conferred upon them a fresh lease and a new license. Matters went on from bad to worse.

On the death of Sir Thomas Munro in 1827, the conduct of Madras affairs fell for some years into the hands of certain Madras Civilians of what may be called the transition school, intermediate between the corruption of 1800 and the purity of 1864. Since the days of Paul Benfield—"whose offal," as Burke said, "should have fed the region kites"—the salaries of civil appointments had been immensely raised. Jobbery had succeeded to bribery. It was perfectly notorious that the officials who ruled the Madras Secretariat about the year 1830, already looked upon Mysore as given over to them as a prey. A Madras Civilian, a near relative of the Governor's, was nominated *in petto* to be either British Commissioner of Mysore or Resident with full powers, assisted by a native Devan of his own choosing, as might be found most convenient when the time came. The Rajah was not to be disturbed or frightened any more until he had sufficiently committed himself. The Resident was not to insist on the redress of grievances, or to encourage complaints, until some fearful oppression, some impending disaster, or the stoppage of the Subsidy, should afford a good pretext for putting the Rajah on the shelf. Vague rumours of the expectant and passive hostility of the Madras Government spread over the Principality, and unquestionably contributed to excite the subsequent rebellion; for it is recorded in the Report of Lord William Bentinck's Special Committee on the insurrection, that a belief was universally prevalent among the ryots of Mysore that their opposition to the Rajah's authority was viewed with complacency by the Honourable Company's Government!*

The crisis rapidly advanced after Sir Thomas Munro's abortive visit. The vast hoards of Poorniah's administration had entirely disappeared in the first fifteen years of the Rajah's accession to power. Funds were at last required to sustain the

* Report of the Special Committee, dated the 12th of December, 1833, paragraph 199, and other places.

extravagant scale of expenditure that had become habitual; the usual course was taken; the land assessment and other taxes were raised in those districts where they had hitherto been most moderate; the ryots were harassed and oppressed by the new exactions, and in the year 1830 the North-Western province of Nuggur was in open rebellion, and the disturbances spread to other parts of the country. British troops promptly quelled the revolt; but Sir Thomas Munro, who had died at his post as Governor of Madras three years before, had left on record his firm convictions that no good could come of the administration of a Prince, against whose original elevation he had protested. The strongly expressed opinion of such a man, whose memory had been recently honoured with an official canonisation, and whose views now appeared as fulfilled predictions, was irresistible, when used by his successor to support his own proposal of superseding the Rajah's authority. Accordingly, Lord William Bentinck, who had become Governor-General of India in 1828, acting on the exaggerated representations of the Madras Government, despatched to the Rajah an intimation, couched in terms of great severity, that, under the provisions of the Treaty of 1799, the British Government had determined to take into its own hands the management of Mysore. The letter was delivered by the British Resident. His Highness surrendered his authority without any altercation or resistance, and two Commissioners appointed by the Madras Government were at once put in charge of all the departments of the State; a Resident continuing, as before, to maintain at the Rajah's Court the semblance of diplomatic relations between the two sovereign powers.

That the eventual restoration of the country was intended from the first by Lord William Bentinck, appears clearly, both from his letter to the Rajah, in which he terms the assumption of the government, "the course which the wisdom of the Marquis Wellesley established for a *crisis* like the present;" and also from the instructions given by him to the Governor of Madras, that under the two Commissioners whom he originally appointed, "the agency should be exclusively native: indeed that the existing native institutions should be carefully maintained." And the Governor-General seems very soon to have

perceived how little had hitherto been done on our side to instruct and guide the young ruler, and to avert the disorder in his affairs, for early in 1832 he took the step that had been so strongly urged by Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1804, relieved the Madras Government from further interference in the administration of Mysore, and placed it under the direct superintendence of the Governor General in Council. Lord William Bentinck also appointed a Special Committee (consisting of four eminent Madras officials) to inquire generally into the state of Mysore.

It is difficult to imagine any sufficient cause for the severe measures against the Rajah adopted by the Supreme Government. The mere fact of a local insurrection having broken out, does not seem to justify the immediate degradation of the Sovereign, nor does the mere fact of British troops having been employed to quell that insurrection. We were bound to employ that military force, which was amply subsidised by the Rajah, for the maintenance of his rule, and for the suppression of public disorder. Such an employment of our troops was clearly contemplated when the Treaty was concluded, and could not be considered as an extraordinary service or special favour.* A petty revolt was no surprising or unheard-of phenomenon in any part of India.

The summary substitution of direct British management was a somewhat harsh and hasty remedy for any administrative abuses or oppression, when the Treaty gave us the power of dictating and enforcing the acceptance of such "ordinances" as might have removed all cause of offence.

But it must also be remarked that, according to the strict letter of the Treaty (Article IV), neither objections on our part to the Rajah's domestic policy, nor the occurrence of a revolt in his dominions, afforded sufficient grounds for even

* Article x of the Subsidiary Treaty provides that "in case it shall become necessary, for enforcing and maintaining the authority of his Highness in the territories now subjected to his power, that the regular troops of the English East India Company Bahadoor should be employed, it is stipulated and agreed, that upon formal application being made for the service of the said troops, they shall be employed in such manner as to the said Company shall seem fit."—Appendix B.

his temporary supersession, unless the payment of our Subsidy were endangered. Reasonable anxiety for the instalments of the annual tribute, was the only cause laid down that could sanction our interference, whether by imposing ordinances, or by the open attachment of districts.

And it must be further remarked that, according to the strict letter of the Treaty (Article IV), when it should be thought necessary to have recourse to this extreme measure, we had no right to attach the whole of Mysore, but only "such part or parts" as should be required to render the funds of the State "efficient and available either in time of peace or war."*

Nor did these difficulties long escape the observation of Lord William Bentinck. In a despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 14th of April, 1834, he writes as follows:—

"By the adoption of the arrangement which I advocate, certain doubts will be removed which I cannot help entertaining, both as to the legality and the justice, according to a strict interpretation, of the course that has been pursued. The Treaty warrants an assumption of the country with a view to secure the payment of our Subsidy. The assumption was actually made on account of the Rajah's misgovernment. The Subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy. Again the Treaty authorises us to assume such

* The whole Article stands as follows: "And whereas it is indispensably necessary that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the fund destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the third Article of the present Treaty, it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor-General in Council shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor-General in Council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right, either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the Government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Bahadoor, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maharajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, as shall appear to him, the said Governor-General in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available, either in time of peace or war."—Appendix B.

part or parts of the country as may be necessary to render the funds which we claim efficient and available. The whole has been assumed, although a part would unquestionably have sufficed for the purpose specified in the Treaty; and with regard to the justice of the case, I cannot but think that it would have been more fair towards the Rajah had a more distinct and positive warning been given him that the decided measure since adopted, would be put in force, if misgovernment should be found to prevail."

The arrangements which Lord William Bentinck advocated in this despatch were, that the three districts of Nuggur, Chitteldroog, and Bangalore—yielding an annual revenue equal to the permanent claims of our Government for the Subsidy, pensions, and the pay of 4000 Irregular Horse, which the Mysore State was bound by treaty to maintain—should be ceded to the Honourable Company, and that the remaining three districts of Mysore, Ashtagram, and Munjeerabad, should be restored to the Rajah's direct rule.

The truth is, that by this time Lord William Bentinck had begun to perceive, that the unqualified denunciations which had induced him to shelve the Rajah, were by no means corroborated by the detailed information laid before him by the Special Committee of Inquiry. He felt that he had been deceived and misled. He acknowledged his error, and he regretted it to the last hour of his life. It is well known that after his return to England, he repeatedly declared that the supersession of the Rajah of Mysore was the only incident in his Indian administration that he looked back upon with sorrow. In the early part of 1834 Lord William visited Mysore, received the Report from the hands of the Special Committee, and had more than one interview with the Rajah. His Highness implored the Governor General to have pity on his fallen condition, and especially challenged the closest research into his own private conduct, and into the personal share he had taken in the executive duties of the Principality.

The following extracts are taken from the Report of the Special Committee, which is dated the 12th of December, 1833 :—

"We do not, however, think that the decline of the revenue since the time of Porneah has been caused entirely by misgovernment.

It appears to us to be partly attributable to causes which were beyond the control of the Rajah's Government. We allude to the general fall which has taken place in the price of agricultural produce, and also to changes which have occurred peculiarly affecting the State of Mysore.

“The administration of Poorneah, though it was conducted with energy and vigour, and filled the coffers of the State with treasure, does not appear to us to have been attended with an augmentation of the wealth of the people, but, indeed, with an opposite result; and we will add, that we doubt whether, even if that Minister had continued to conduct the affairs of the country, the revenue could have been maintained many years longer at the height to which it had been raised.

“It is worthy of remark that in some of the complaints of the people, of the grievances they have been subjected to under the Rajah's Government, the period of Poorneah's administration is included in the general censure, without distinction from that of the Rajah's personal rule. One of the witnesses stated that the great body of the ryots were in easy circumstances when Poorneah's rule commenced, but half of them were ruined when it closed.”

That the effect produced upon the Governor General's mind by his own local investigation, as well as by the Report of the Special Committee, was not altogether unfavourable to the Rajah, is manifest, not only from his having immediately addressed, from Mysore, that despatch to the Secret Committee, already quoted, in which he recommends the Rajah's restoration to a more limited sphere of power, but more clearly and explicitly, from the following expressions occurring in that same despatch :—

“It is admitted by every one who has had an opportunity of observing the character of the Rajah, that he is in the highest degree intelligent and sensible. His disposition is described to be the reverse of tyrannical or cruel, and I can have little doubt, from the manner in which he has conducted himself in his present adverse circumstances, that he would not neglect to bring his good qualities into active operation, and to show that he had not failed to benefit by the lessons of experience. But lest this hope should be disappointed, the means ought undoubtedly to be retained in our own hands of guarding against the evil consequences of his misgovernment. The personal character of the Rajah has, I confess, materially weighed with me in recommending the measure above alluded to. I believe he

will make a good ruler in future, and I am certain that, whatever may have been his past errors, he has never forgotten his obligations and his duties to the Company's Government."

In March, 1835, Lord William Bentinck left India, and Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe succeeded provisionally to the office of Governor General, which he held for a year. Shortly after his accession to the Government, he addressed a letter to the Rajah of Mysore, dated the 6th of April, 1835, in reply to one received from his Highness, in which the following passage occurs:—

"My Friend, you appear to be disappointed because the expectation held out to you by his Lordship, that the resolution relative to the affairs of Mysore would reach this country from England by the close of the past year, has not been fulfilled; but you will readily admit that the realisation of this expectation depended upon circumstances wholly beyond his Lordship's control. I sincerely hope, however, that your mind will not be kept much longer in a state of suspense, and that the decision of the Home Authorities may be conformable with your inclination."

Lord Metcalfe decidedly favoured the reestablishment of the Hindoo Sovereign's authority; and his deliberately recorded opinion is extant that the supersession of the Rajah of Mysore was a "harsh and unprovoked" measure.*

At last the reply to Lord William Bentinck's despatch of the 14th of April, 1834, arrived from England. The Court of Directors, in their letter, No. 45 of the 25th of September, 1835, distinctly declare their intention of retaining the charge of Mysore only for the specific and temporary purpose of establishing "a fair assessment upon the ryots, with security against further exaction, and a satisfactory system for the administration of justice." They object entirely to tarnish the prospective reinstatement of a Prince who "had ever been," as they observe, "the attached friend of the British Government," by even that limited project of partition recommended by Lord William Bentinck. They object to the division of a State, the separate integrity of which was guaranteed by the Treaty with the Nizam. The doctrines of annexation were not yet in vogue.

* This can be verified, if necessary, though I am not at present in possession of a copy of the actual paper in which that term is used.

After alluding, in severe terms, to the profuse and unbridled extravagance which had been the main cause of the Rajah's difficulties and of the people's distress, the Directors go on to say:—

“We would not willingly, after having assumed the powers of government, place the inhabitants of any portion of the territory, however small, under the absolute dominion of such a ruler, until we had established a system which would afford security against the vices of his character, till we had secured protection to the people against extortion, and afforded them the means for a legal redress for their injuries; and if this desirable end can be attained, the same reasons which served to recommend the restoration to the Rajah of a portion of the country, will, in our opinion recommend the restoration of the whole.”

And in giving their general suggestions as to the form and principles of the government to be constructed for Mysore, they say:—

“We are desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the native usages, and not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency when the country shall be restored to the Rajah.”

It now became necessary to inform the Rajah that he was not to expect the immediate restoration of any part of his country; and, accordingly, on the 28th March, 1836, the new Governor General, Lord Auckland, addressed a letter to his Highness, in which he thus alludes to the instructions that had been issued by the Court of Directors:—

“I hasten to announce to you that the propositions of Lord William Bentinck, of which you were informed by his Lordship's letter of the 14th May, 1834, have received the most attentive consideration from the authorities in England, who have now directed me to communicate to you their decision in regard to them.

“The Honourable the Court of Directors have signified their commands that the administration of your Highness's territories shall remain on its present footing until the arrangements for their good government shall have been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance.”

In reporting the delivery of the Governor-General's letter to his Highness, the Resident at Mysore, in a despatch dated the 5th May 1836, observed:—

“With regard to Lord William Bentinck’s propositions, which have now been negatived by the Court, the Rajah declared that he never would have assented to them, had he not been told that, if he did not, he would never get back any portion of his country. He, however, never expected the Court of Directors, if they gave him any part, to limit it to a third of the dominions, which we had conferred gratuitously upon him as a child: he expected his past conduct would, on a consideration of the whole of it, have dictated a more generous decision. In short, he thought it not improbable that orders would have been issued for the removal of the Commission altogether, the appointment of an efficient Dewan, who would manage the country in concert with his Highness and in his name, but under the superintendence of the British Resident.”

“With reference to that portion of his Lordship’s letter which states that the administration in Mysore is to remain on its present footing until the arrangements for its good government shall have been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance, his Highness asked who was to be the judge of when this period had arrived? Were the reports of the officers employed in the Commission to be the guide to the Government,—of those whose employment would be lost by the re-transfer of the country? And he concluded this subject by asking how many years I thought it likely would be deemed by Government as sufficient to afford just ground for confidence that salutary rules and safeguards had been matured and confirmed by practice, and when I thought it likely he might look to receiving back the management of his country.”

These proceedings were duly reported to the Court of Directors on the 31st of October 1836, but in their reply, No. 20, dated the 20th of September 1837, the Court gave no further instructions on the subject of the restoration of the territory. But that it still continued to be the intention of the Home Government, to retain the direct management only as a temporary measure, is apparent from a despatch of the Court of Directors, No. 20, dated the 30th of October 1839, in which they review the course taken for organising the administration of Mysore, and observe with reference to certain orders directing the abolition of corporal punishment:—

“We think it unfortunate that a country like Mysore, which has so recently come under our management; which we had it in view ultimately to restore to a native Government, and for that reason avoided any innovations inconsistent with the maxims and practices of the

best native Governments, should have been made the subject of an experiment so embarrassing."

When the Commission for the Government of the Territories of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore, was established in 1832, Lord William Bentinck determined that the machinery of the administration should be that of a native agency, and that "the existing native institutions should be carefully maintained." Two joint Commissioners were originally appointed, but they did not work together harmoniously; and on the 5th of June 1834, Lieutenant-Colonel Cubbon, (afterwards General Sir Mark Cubbon, K.C.B.) was appointed sole Commissioner, with very large discretionary powers. And while the entire fabric of native institutions was for many years preserved in outline, the original plan of governing by "an exclusively native agency," was very soon abandoned as impracticable, and English officers were introduced into all the higher appointments. And though General Cubbon, with all his great abilities, was not in any respect a man of broad and liberal mind, was of the stiffest school with regard to distinctions of race and social rank, and was no friend to educated natives, it must not be overlooked that in the earlier stage of his operations there was an influence at work, which rendered the exclusive employment of native agency, especially of the old incumbents, almost impossible,—the opposing influence of the Rajah and his adherents throughout the country. Every innovation appeared to them to be a new turn of the screw, securing the English occupation, and making the restoration of the Rajah's authority more difficult and more unlikely. And, as we have just seen, the Court of Directors in London had themselves started the same class of objections. But the Rajah had an auxiliary more near at hand in the person of the Resident, Major (afterwards Major-General) Stokes, who, in his despatches to Government, gave a general support to all his Highness's demands. Between the Commissioner, one of Sir Thomas Munro's disciples, and the Resident, a friend and pupil of Lord Metcalfe, there was a complete antagonism of opinions and feelings. Their long continued official disputes were terminated in favour of General Cubbon in 1843, when Lord Ellenborough was Governor General, by the post of Resident being abolished. This

was at first felt by the Rajah as a great blow, but he learned to acquiesce in its expediency. On the removal of the concurrent authority from his Court, the Rajah was brought into closer relations and more frequent communication with the Commissioner, and they soon came to understand each other better. The great advantages arising from General Cubbon's excellent administration, began to manifest themselves about this time, in the increased revenue and trade of the country. In December 1847, the General finally reported to Government that the differences between himself and the Rajah were at an end ; and henceforth they continued to be on the most friendly terms.

The Rajah again brought forward his claim to the restoration of the country in a *khureeta*, or royal letter, to the Governor General, Lord Hardinge, dated the 15th of February 1844, in which, referring to certain measures that were in preparation for the payment of his debts, he said :—

“When, in consequence of the mismanagement of treacherous hirelings, and the influence of their evil counsels, the resources of my country were found inadequate to defray its expenses ; when those financial embarrassments gave rise to many internal disquiets, the British Government, to whom I was previously indebted for the restoration of my throne and Kingdom, could not remain indifferent spectators of this state of things : they interposed, not to wrest the country from my hands, but to heal it of its disorders, and return it to me in a healthy state. But as its principal disease, from which, as a common source, all its other evils engendered, was its involved condition, I saw the accomplishment of two distinct objects, namely, its restoration to a prosperous state, and when thus restored, the approximation of the prospect to myself of once more ruling my own country, that hereditary patrimony bequeathed to me by my Sires, the Sovereigns of the soil, and the perpetuation of which has been guaranteed for me by the Honourable Company, but of which I have been deprived for the long space of twelve years, in consequence of my misplaced confidence in unworthy hirelings. Hence, my Lord, this desire on my part for the speedy liquidation of the public debts of my country.”

In another letter, dated the 10th of April 1844, his Highness thus pleads his cause :—

“I am now in the fifty-first year of my age ; I have been relieved

from the government of my own country for the last twelve years for my misplaced confidence in unworthy servants; these twelve years have been to me a season of the severest trials and afflictions; in this school of adversity I have acquired lessons of true wisdom, which remain legibly inscribed upon my heart by the fearful finger of experience; and thus initiated and instructed, I am anxious of approaching your Lordship as the Governor General of India, and by consequence my Patron and Protector, seeking, through your Lordship, the restoration to me of the government of my own country, of which I have been temporarily relieved."

About this time the Rajah's importunate applications, and the rumours of their probable success, created such a strong interest, and excited so restless a spirit throughout Mysore, that it was officially suggested to the Supreme Government to remove his Highness from his own country, and place him in the Fort of Vellore, in a position little removed from that of a state-prisoner. This cruel proposition was totally disapproved by Lord Hardinge; but before it had been negatived at Calcutta it had reached the Rajah's ears, and in an indignant letter to the Governor General, dated the 9th of May 1844, referring to the Treaty of 1799, and protesting against his removal from Mysore, he writes as follows:—

"From these provisions your Lordship will perceive that the British Government reserved to itself the right, under certain circumstances, to bring under the direct management of the servants of the Company Bahadoor, 'part or parts' of my country, &c.; but nothing is said about the power to remove me from the country. At the time of the assumption, my Lord, I did not solicit the trial of any mitigated measures of reform, but I readily consented to the extreme one of the assumption of my country; nor did I, my Lord, claim the privilege of ceding only 'part or parts' of it, but I as readily yielded the whole. Thus, my Lord, have I conducted myself with grateful submission to the British Government, impressed by a lively sense of the obligations conferred by them in the original restoration to me of my country, in the full belief that, in the words of my Treaty, the British Government will act towards me and my heirs, even 'as long as the sun and moon shall endure,' as my Guardian and Patron; and in the most anxious hope that they will, after making the necessary arrangements for my future prosperity, return my country to me, whole and entire, as I had committed it to their care."

A formal application for the restoration of his territory was

addressed by the Rajah to the Governor General, Lord Hardinge, on the 7th of September 1844. On the 7th of June 1845, the Maharajah wrote to complain that no reply had been made to his last letter, and after defending his character from misrepresentations, he observed :—

“I can call on those who now best know me to say whether at this moment I am not, as to mental and physical vigour, as capable of governing my country as any man of fifty years of age in India. I am not aware that it has been attempted to show that any other reason exists sufficient to render null the Honourable Company’s Treaty with me, or to justify the withholding from me now the government of my country.”

“I believe I could make it plain that the assumption of the government of my country by Lord William Bentinck, was a measure both unnecessary and uncalled for by the exigencies of the time, not to speak of its being unjustified by the Treaty existing between the Honourable Company and myself. Disturbances there were in some districts of the country, but do not disturbances occur in portions of the Company’s country without any blame being imputed to the governing authority? I had contracted debts, it is true; but what were they in proportion to the revenue of my country? And have not the best and most upright Governments in the world debts?”

In another part of this letter the Rajah admits his early extravagance and the mismanagement of public affairs, but asks if this is any reason that he should be “disinherited for ever.”

“I appeal,” he says, “to the Treaty existing between the Government and myself, that Treaty which I have never violated in the slightest particular or degree, and which I am sure your Excellency will consider the Government bound in honour to abide by. I have received repeated assurances from Governors General that the British Government will do me justice. I ask no more, but, as human life is limited, I earnestly entreat that justice may be deferred no longer. It is more than nine years since Lord Auckland gave me a hope that, a short time longer being then necessary to perfect the measures in progress for the better ordering of my country, it would be returned to me; but more than nine years have passed away, and, so far as I am acquainted, no steps have been taken to fulfil this promise.”

“It may, and I daresay will be said that neither the debt of the country nor what are considered my own private debts, are yet paid, and therefore I should not yet think of asking for the government of the country to be restored to me. Your Excellency will not consider

that man a bankrupt, or that country in a bad state, whose debt is not much more than one-third of his or its income for a year,—not to mention that there are funds accumulated in the Treasury nearly enough to clear it; and as to the latter, my private funds are much more than sufficient to pay them off. And I could easily prove what your Excellency will, I doubt not, readily believe, that were the government in my hands during the last thirteen years, under any salutary regulations the Governor General might have thought fit to impose, and which I was bound by the Treaty to regard, all debts of every description would have long ere this been paid, considering only the difference, perhaps necessary, between the expenses of European and native administration.”

No reply was sent to the Rajah's letter; but Lord Hardinge, who, it is understood, had begun, after a careful examination of the case, to entertain grave misgivings as to our right of retaining the administrative charge of the country, called upon the Commissioner of Mysore for a return of the exact amount of the Mysore public debt; and, on the required information being furnished, all these proceedings were reported to the Court of Directors in a despatch, No. 22, dated the 6th of August, 1846, the purport of which was to express a doubt whether we ought to keep possession of the Rajah's dominions after our pecuniary claims were satisfied, and when there was no longer any cause for anxiety as to the regular payment of the Subsidy.*

We have seen, then, that from 1834 to 1847 the Rajah never ceased to claim his restoration; that three Governors General—Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe, and Lord Hardinge—admitted that his abrupt supersession was inconsiderate, unduly severe, and of doubtful legality; that neither the Supreme Government nor the Home Authorities ever rejected or contested his claim, but only postponed their assent to a more convenient season, placing before him the prospect of reinstatement as soon as an orderly administration for the country had been effectually established. And I may add, that in no despatch of the Home Government, or of the Government of India, during that period, was any intention of permanently retaining the management of Mysore ever ex-

* I have not seen this despatch, but I am assured that its effect is as above stated.

pressed or implied. But new views of policy were now beginning to prevail; the Mysore Commission, under the able direction of General Cubbon, had effected great improvements in the twelve years between 1834 and 1846; the authorities, both at Calcutta and in London, began to be enamoured of their own achievements; and the lust of patronage also lured them on to tighten their grasp on Mysore. The appointments in the Mysore Commission were among those most coveted by young officers in the Army, and the idea of not merely being unable to provide for the candidates already on the Governor General's list, but of having to turn adrift, or remand to regimental duty all those gentlemen actually in the enjoyment of those lucrative offices, must have been most unpleasant when pressed upon the consideration of the Council and the Secretariat by the Rajah's repeated claims for his restoration. Nor could the Commissioner and his Assistants be expected to under-estimate the value of their own labours, or to advocate their own abolition. The Rajah himself very naturally foresaw this obstacle when, as we have seen, he asked the Resident, in 1836, "who was to be the judge" of the period when the "good government" of Mysore "should have been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance? Were the reports of the officers employed in the Commission to be the guide to the Government—the reports of those whose employment would be lost by the re-transfer of the country?"*

The views, therefore, of Lord Hardinge, expressed in the despatch No. 22 of the 6th August, 1846, not being in accordance with those that were generally accepted both in Calcutta and in London, were by no means well received at the India House. In their reply to it, No. 15, dated the 14th of July, 1847, after ten months' consideration, the Directors observe:—

"The Rajah addressed a letter to the Governor General in June, 1845, claiming to be reinstated in the government. In November following the Rajah was informed that the reply to his letter was delayed in consequence of the necessity of ascertaining the exact amount of the debt due to the British Government. We think this a most insufficient cause of delay; first, because the most exact information on this point ought to have been at once accessible; and,

* Ante, p. 24.

secondly, because such an intimation would naturally tend to make the Rajah believe that the only or the chief obstacle to this reinstatement was the non-liquidation of the debt. The real hindrance, however, is the hazard which would be incurred to the prosperity and good government which the country now enjoys, by replacing it under a ruler known by experience to be thoroughly incompetent."

Unfavourable as is the tenor of this despatch, it is remarkable as containing no positive denial of the Rajah's rights, no absolute refusal to consider some plan for his restoration to power under adequate securities. His alleged incompetence is only spoken of as "an obstacle" and "a hindrance," not as a final and insurmountable objection to his reinstatement. And the whole question is left open by the concluding sentence:—"We have not been apprised whether any definite answer has yet been made to the Rajah's application." No instructions for a definite answer are given. No definite answer, no answer at all, was in fact made to the Rajah's appeal.

This despatch of the 14th July 1847 may be considered as marking the turning-point in the Rajah's fortunes, after which the tide set in against him: it contains the first decided indication of a simple reluctance to part with the management of so rich and thriving a province, and to break up the administrative system of our own construction, under which the country had so signally prospered. The reluctance was natural, defensible, justifiable; but the real difficulty, however disguised, was the patronage. There was not sufficient sympathy with the Rajah's claims and with native interests, to induce the British authorities, at home and in India, to seek for some intermediate plan, by which the Prince's power might for the future be limited by law, and by which an efficient native agency might be gradually trained to replace their English instructors. It has been, throughout, the official theory that the Rajah's restoration must necessarily involve the total and immediate withdrawal of European agency—a theory manifestly erroneous, for ample power is conferred upon the British Government by the Treaty, to introduce "regulations and ordinances," and to offer authoritative advice on all subjects "connected with his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both States." But this theory was at first, I have no doubt,

sincerely held; an incongruity was conceived to exist in any plan for associating, even as a temporary expedient, a native Sovereign and English administrators in the government of a Principality; and the idea of a native ruler's power being limited in any direction by a Code or a Constitution, never seems to have presented itself—not even up to this day. The Rajah himself has alluded to “salutary regulations” that might have been imposed upon him, and which he was “bound by the Treaty to regard,”* but the complete exclusion of the Sovereign and of all natives from power, the monopoly of all official honours and emoluments in the hands of Englishmen, are the only conditions on which our assistance has been afforded.

Somewhat perplexed by the problem of reconciling the separate and native government of Mysore under the Rajah's sovereignty—as designed by the Treaties of 1799—with an effectual guarantee for the continuance of good order and economy, somewhat averse to relinquish a valuable field of patronage, and yet more than half persuaded of there being no longer any valid pretext for maintaining the sequestration, the Government subsided into the passive policy of letting well alone, and of gaining time by harping on the Rajah's incapacity—a plausible but most untenable plea. The plea of the Prince's personal incompetence—used with such cruel effect in the cases of Mysore and Dhar, and now threatening the Rajpoot State of Oodeypoor—does in effect strike at the root of hereditary monarchy; and when advanced by the British Government in India amounts to a confession of its own incompetence as an Imperial and Paramount power. That system for the government of a Principality or of a Province, which depends for its success upon the personal abilities and moral character of one man, is not one that British statesmen in the nineteenth century could be expected to approve or to uphold, in a case where they were authorised to express disapproval or to suggest modifications. And why such a system was allowed by us to exist for one day in Mysore, why a boy of sixteen, supported by his minions and flatterers, was permitted by us to displace an experienced and faithful Regent, to pos-

* Ante, p. 29.

sess himself of absolute power, and then to retain it uncontrolled for twenty years, is a political mystery that has never been explained. It is hard to understand how it was that the British Government, holding by the Treaty the right of imposing those salutary regulations and ordinances, which the Rajah himself invoked, never seems to have thought of introducing the first essentials of a limited monarchy, such as a Code, a Civil List, and a Council of State.

What Prince in the world is endowed with sufficient talents, or with sufficient self-denial, to be safely trusted with uncontrolled and absolute power? It seems a waste of time to dwell, even for a moment, on so elementary a principle of modern politics. Is King Victor Emanuel supposed to have the requisite capacity to administer justice in Italy, and to dispose of its finances, according to his own notions and predilections, unchecked by Law, unassisted by constitutional advisers? Was the youthful King George selected to rule over Greece on account of his extraordinary administrative abilities? Yet because the Rajah of Mysore, an absolute ruler at the age of sixteen, by permission of his British Guardian, failed to make a good use of the power which never ought to have been thrown into his hands, that negligent and incompetent Guardian turns round upon him, stigmatises his rule as "scandalously and hopelessly bad," denounces him as "thoroughly incompetent," and permanently suspends his authority.

And after fifteen years of government by an able and zealous Commissioner, who, in common with his Assistants, is remunerated by a liberal but fixed salary, who is controlled by regulations, and is responsible for every official act, and for every item of expenditure, to the Governor General in Council—when Mysore has prospered, as might have been expected under this well-regulated scheme of administration—a most unfair and unreasonable comparison between the two periods of native and British rule, is accepted as a full and complete apology for the proscription of the Sovereign, and, as we shall shortly see, for the abolition of the sovereignty.

We may surely assume that the Rajah never was really incompetent for the legitimate duties of a constitutional Sovereign, when we find that Lord William Bentinck, after a care-

ful inquiry, pronounced him to be "in the highest degree intelligent and sensible," described his disposition as "the reverse of tyrannical or cruel," and expressed his belief that he would "make a good ruler in future." And from 1832 to 1847 nothing whatever had occurred that could have told to the disadvantage or discredit of that Prince, who "had ever been," as the Directors themselves observe,* the attached friend of the British Government." The facts had not altered; the merits of the case had not been affected; but the times had changed. Fifteen millions sterling had been sunk in the Affghan war; the conquest of Scinde had entailed a heavy burden on the finances; the Sutlej campaign had cost money; an annual deficit had for many years appeared in the accounts. Distant expeditions and the advance of our external frontiers were deprecated; but the short-sighted policy of internal acquisitions began to be entertained both at Calcutta and at home. The favourite plan for restoring the financial equilibrium was that of gradually extinguishing all those native States that were in the midst of or contiguous to our territories—those States which were said to consume so large a portion of the revenues of India, while we bore all the expenses of its protection. Mysore, the valuable field of patronage, now began to be regarded, though in a vague and furtive fashion, as Mysore the rich reversion. The Rajah had no son, and in 1847 he was in his fifty-fifth year.

In February 1848 Lord Hardinge was succeeded by Lord Dalhousie. In a letter dated the 8th of August 1848 the Rajah once more addressed the Governor General on the subject of the restoration of his territory:

"General Cubbon," he said, "in his letter to me of the 5th December 1845, informed me that the delay on the part of your Excellency in replying to my *khureeta* of the 7th June 1845, was occasioned by the absence of some information relative to the state of the debts which your Excellency had deemed it necessary to call for. I trust your Lordship has received this information, and that it has been satisfactory. Your Lordship will have heard from Mr. Grant that all my private or the Soucar debts have been settled; and in regard to the sum due by the State to the Honourable Company, should there

* Ante, p. 22.

be any deficiency in the funds accumulated in the Commissioner's Treasury to liquidate it, I will make it up, as I mentioned to your Excellency in my *khureeta* of the 7th September 1844, from my private funds. I trust also that your Lordship will have had from the Commissioner such a favourable report of the country, after fifteen years, as will satisfy your Lordship of the efficacy of the arrangements made; and that there can be, in your Lordship's mind, no reason to apprehend failure of the military funds provided for by the 3rd Article of the Treaty; and that, consequently, the time has come when I have a right to expect the fulfilment of the intimation given me in the 5th paragraph of Lord Auckland's letter of the 28th March, 1836, communicating the sentiments of the high authorities in England as to the period at which I might expect the government of my territories would be restored to myself."

No orders were passed by Lord Dalhousie on this letter, and no reply was made to it. A copy of it was sent to the Court of Directors with the despatch, No. 27 of the 1st of July 1848, but their answer, No. 6, dated the 14th of February 1849, contained no allusion whatever to the Rajah's requisitions. Less than a month before the date of the last mentioned communication, their despatch (No. 4, dated the 24th January 1849), approving and confirming the annexation of Sattara, had been transmitted to Calcutta.* The reign of terror for Hindoo Princes had commenced. Nagpore and Jhansi were annexed in 1854. The smaller Principalities of Jaloun, Ungool, Jeitpore in Bundelcund, Bughat, Sumbhulpore, Boodawul and Chota Oodeypoor were also absorbed during Lord Dalhousie's tenure of office.† In 1853 the Nizam was coerced into assigning to our "exclusive management" some of his finest provinces, producing about a fourth of his revenue. In January 1856 the appropriation of Oude had been finally sanctioned, and the orders for deposing the King had been issued, and were in process of execution.‡ On the 19th of December 1855 Lord Dalhousie recorded a Minute denying to Prince Azeem

* Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 8.

† His Lordship also proposed, on various occasions, the annexation of the Rajpoot State of Kerowlee, of Kolapore (whose Rajah now represents the family of Sivajee, the founder of the Mahratta power), and of Adyghur; but these were all disapproved by the Home Government.

‡ Oude Papers, 1856, p. 241.

Jah, the heir and representative of our faithful Allies in war and peace, the Nawabs of the Carnatic, that hereditary dignity and revenue which had been expressly secured to the Wallajah family by the Treaty concluded in 1801 with the Prince's own father, the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah. What were Lord Dalhousie's reflections on Mysore, in the full tide of this career of annexation, may be easily conceived.

In one of his Minutes, dated the 16th January 1856, reviewing General Cubbon's Administration Report for the preceding official year, occurs the following passage:—

“The Rajah of Mysore is now sixty-two years of age. He is the only Rajah who, for twenty generations past, as he himself informed me, has lived to the age of sixty years. It is probable, therefore, that his life will not be much further prolonged. He has no legitimate son or grandson, nor any lawful male heir whatever. He has adopted no child, and has never designed to adopt an heir. On the contrary, General Cubbon informed me that, when sometimes pressed by those about him to adopt, the Rajah has been used to reply, ‘No, I have no male child of my own. I will not adopt. I will be the last Rajah of Mysore.’

“The Treaty under which Lord Wellesley raised the Rajah, while yet a child, to the musnud, and the Treaty which was subsequently concluded with himself, were both silent as to heirs and successors. No mention is made of them; the Treaty is exclusively a personal one.

“The inexpediency of continuing this territory, by an act of gratuitous liberality, to any other native Prince, when the present Rajah shall have died, has been already conclusively shown by the conduct of his Highness himself, whose rule, though he commenced it under every advantage, was so scandalously and hopelessly bad, that power has long since been taken from him by the British Government.

“I trust, therefore, that when the decease of the present Rajah shall come to pass, without son or grandson, or legitimate male heir of any description, the Territory of Mysore, which will then have lapsed to the British Government, will be resumed, and that the good work, which has been so well begun, will be completed.”

We have now arrived at a new stage in our downward progress. For the first time a Governor General has now placed on official record, although in a secret department, a statement of his desire and design to incorporate Mysore with the British dominions, on the death of the reigning Rajah. Henceforth the

question of reinstating the Rajah, treated with silent contempt in the Minute just quoted, sinks into a secondary place. Henceforth a suspicion cannot be avoided, that the true obstacle to restoration is not the Rajah's incompetence, not the impossibility of securing good government, but an aversion to relax our grasp, to relinquish the visible advantage afforded by long continued administrative possession.

But though Lord Dalhousie avows himself to be prepared to rely, if necessary, upon the newly invented weapon, which he had just used with cruel effect in the Carnatic spoliation—to deny that the sovereignty of Mysore was hereditary, to declare the Treaty of 1799 “a personal treaty,” made only for one life, and renewable merely at the good pleasure of the British Government, as a matter of grace and favour—he very plainly indicates a hope that this engine of destruction may after all not be required, that the conveyance may be quietly effected, without notice, dispute or scandal; that the Rajah, who had now outlived by three years the supposed family limit of sixty, may soon disappear from the scene, leaving no heir by birth or adoption, no possible claimant of the throne, to draw from us a premature or public disclosure of our expansive pretensions. And it is very remarkable how, in his eagerness to lay this flattering unction to his soul, Lord Dalhousie snatches at the veriest trifle, some petulant expressions attributed to the Rajah, and parades them as a proof of that Prince's acquiescence in the prospective extinction of his dynasty. The Rajah, we are assured, has “never designed to adopt an heir.” There can be no question of this, because, when pressed by those about him, he has been used to reply, “I will not adopt. I will be the last Rajah of Mysore.” General Cubbon himself was never present when the Rajah made use of these expressions, and when he repeated this interesting piece of Court gossip—probably after dinner—to the Governor General, can scarcely have anticipated that it would be treasured up so carefully, and turned to such a purpose. There can scarcely be a better specimen of the enormous assumptions, the transparent fallacies, which, in the privacy of a compliant Council, Lord Dalhousie was permitted to pass off as arguments, than is shown in this short extract from his Minute on Mysore. A Treaty of “per-

petual friendship and alliance," the obligations of which are to last "as long as the sun and moon shall endure,"* is pronounced to be "exclusively a personal one," good only for the Rajah's life, and providing for no heir or successor. The solemn formalities of a Treaty become mere idle words when they uphold the native sovereignty; the recorded intentions, the written proposals of his predecessors are silently overlooked—I suppose because they are informal and not legally binding—but the tittle-tattle of a Residency Moonshee, when it implies that the Rajah is resigned and even reconciled to the extinction of his family, is hailed as holy writ.

There can be, to my mind, no more evident mark of conscientious moral weakness, than that exhibited by our authorities at home and in India, with strange uniformity, at every stage of the numerous acquisitive transactions between 1848 and 1856, in always grasping with manifest exultation at anything said or done, or omitted to be said or done, by the injured parties, that could be twisted into even the remotest resemblance of an admission or acquiescence on their part.

And even if we accept as accurate the reported version of the Rajah's exclamations, to what do they amount? He had watched with dismay the recent destruction of so many friendly Principalities; he had ascertained during his own interviews with Lord Dalhousie, that there was no hope of redress for himself, and he said in the bitterness of his heart, "I shall be the last Rajah of Mysore,"—not "I will," for the nice distinction between "shall" and "will," peculiar to the Teutonic languages, was unknown in his own vernacular; and most certainly, as I shall show, the Rajah could not and did not *willingly* abandon the hope of perpetuating his dynasty,—but "I now see clearly," was his obvious meaning, "that I am doomed by the present policy of the Calcutta Government to be the last Rajah of Mysore. I will not, like the Rajahs of Sattara and Jhansi, adopt a son to be an outcast, a beggar, a pretender threatened with the gibbet or the jail, or at the best a pensioner for life. I shall be the last Rajah of Mysore."

But although it may be true that expressions such as these, indicating an aversion to adopt a son whose right of succession

* Appendix B.

would be assuredly rejected, may, during the darkest hours of the Dalhousie reign, have sometimes escaped the Rajah, the assertion that he had "never designed to adopt an heir," is not only unsupported, but is positively contradicted by facts. In his letter to Lord Hardinge of the 15th of February 1844, already quoted,* he speaks of his Principality as "that hereditary patrimony bequeathed to me by my Sires, the Sovereigns of the soil, and the perpetuation of which has been guaranteed to me by the Honourable Company." In another letter, dated the 9th of May 1844, from which some extracts have also been given,† he declares his belief "that, in the words of my Treaty, the British Government will act towards me *and my heirs*, even 'as long as the sun and moon shall endure,' as my Guardian and Patron." At this time the Rajah was upwards of fifty years of age, and had no son. And in his letter of the 8th of August 1848, to Lord Dalhousie himself, he had confirmed these letters and renewed their claims. And at a later period, when appealing to Lord Canning against the proposed retransfer of Mysore to the supervision of the Madras Government, he says:—"Moreover, my Lord, I have grave fears that such a measure as this, if introduced, would possibly interfere with the claims that I *and my heirs* have for the restoration of the Government of my country." This letter, of which I shall have to say more hereafter, is dated the 15th of March 1860, when the Rajah was sixty-five years old. On these two occasions he can scarcely be supposed to have written in these terms, without relying on his right of adopting an heir. This at least is certain, that from 1832 to 1844, when he claimed the perpetuation of his sovereignty, and declared the rights of his heirs; and from 1844 to 1860, when he again protested against any infringement of their rights, the Rajah never, in any official document, or at any official interview, allowed any opportunity to pass away of asserting the hereditary nature of his dignity, he never expressed any doubt on the subject, and no doubt on the subject was ever expressed to him.

And it is worthy of remark that Lord Dalhousie's aspirations for the completion of the good work of assimilating Mysore, do not seem to have called forth any response or approval from

* Ante, p. 26.

† Ante, p. 27.

any other member of the Government. Indeed, during the consultations on the disposal of Oude, Sir John Peter Grant, then a Member of Council, and a firm upholder of British paramount prerogatives, in a paper dated August the 7th, 1855, made use of the following distinction :—“ The case of Mysore differs from the supposed case of Oude, inasmuch as our management of that province is professedly temporary, and on account of the Sovereign of Mysore.”*

General Cubbon was certainly not prepared for the absorption of this native State, for he wrote in the following terms in a private letter to a friend on the 23rd of June 1859 :—

“ I have received a tremendous wig lately from Bengal on the subject of duties, and shall have to point out more than one mistake on their part, besides insinuating that they have no right under the Treaty to reduce the revenues of a foreign State, and that they will have to make a corresponding reduction in the Subsidy. In truth they, or I should rather say Mr. Beadon, have forgotten that the orders from England are imperative that the administration of Mysore should be so conducted that the country may be restored to a native Government at the shortest notice; and in consequence we are at this moment obliged to oppose many parts of procedure which a native Government could not administer.”

Lord Canning himself, so late as the year 1860, in referring to the affairs of Mysore in the General Report on the Administration of India for the preceding official year,† treats the maintenance of the separate jurisdiction and distinct establishments of Mysore, as a matter of conscientious obligation.

“ It has also been necessary,” he says, “ so to conduct the administration as to fulfil *conscientiously* the instructions laid down for guidance in a letter from the Home authorities, under date the 25th September 1835, and which states as follows :—‘ We are desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the native usages, and not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency, when the country shall be restored to the Rajah.’ ”

* Oude Papers, 1856, p. 213.

† Published.

CHAPTER III.

1856 TO 1862.

As we approach more closely to that crisis in the fortunes of the Mysore State, which immediately preceded and produced the actual position of its affairs, the question of restoring a native government during the reigning Prince's life-time, sinks into insignificance before the imminent prospect of the whole framework of the native State itself being swept away at the reigning Prince's demise, and of Mysore being incorporated in the Madras Presidency. Before finally quitting this earlier aspect of the case, I wish, therefore, briefly to recapitulate and present in a small compass, the views which I have formed on the Rajah's personal claim to restoration.

I think, then, that the first attachment of the country by Lord William Bentinck was not justified either by the terms of the Treaty, or by any special urgency of outraged humanity, or of danger to the tranquillity of our own adjacent provinces. These points appear to me to be proved by Lord William's own admissions that while the Treaty only warranted an assumption with a view to secure our Subsidy, "the Subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy;" that whereas the Treaty only warranted the assumption of such "part or parts" as should be sufficient to secure the payment of our demands, we actually assumed charge of the whole country.

The rebellion in Mysore was of a trifling nature, and was very easily suppressed; similar disturbances have occurred at various times in the neighbouring British districts of Canara and the Southern Mahratta country, without any serious charges of oppression or negligence being brought against the officers who were responsible for the good order of those territories. The fact is that the inhabitants of the Southern Mahratta Provinces and of Canara, with whom the rebels of the Mysore

district of Nuggur are closely allied by blood and manners, are a peculiarly turbulent and warlike race; and, as the Rajah reminds the Governor General, Lord Elgin, in a letter written in April 1862, a really formidable rebellion which broke out in those British provinces in 1844, was not suppressed until an army of at least 10,000 men had been employed for several months,—an army including several European regiments, with the aid of a battering train, and including also the Irregular Cavalry of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore. So that if we compare the recent history of the contiguous British districts with that of Mysore, we find the incident of a revolt to be identical, and the obligation of suppressing revolt to be reciprocal. Lord William Bentinck also acknowledged that the Rajah's disposition was neither tyrannical nor cruel, and that no imputation of inhumanity could be made against him. And the Special Committee of Inquiry came to the conclusion that as to many of the grievances under which the people of Mysore had suffered, the period of Poorniah's administration must be included in their censure, without distinction from that of the Rajah's personal rule.

Then as to the broad general case of the misgovernment of Mysore, I have maintained, and, I think, proved that the Honourable Company was primarily and mainly blameable for it. If Mysore was badly governed in the past, it was our own fault; and if Mysore were in the future to be badly governed under the restored rule of its Sovereign, the faithful ally and attached feudatory of the British Crown, it would be equally our own fault. Ample securities can be obtained, under the provisions of the existing Treaty, for the due administration of justice, and for the economical management of the finances. I can see no valid objection, therefore, under that head to the Rajah's immediate restoration.

The Treaty undoubtedly leaves the execution of the two corrective Articles, IV and V, both as to commencement and as to duration, to the discretion of the British Government. But this discretion, being of necessity so placed in the hands of that one of the two contracting parties which alone possesses the power of enforcing the provisions of the Treaty, the heaviest moral obligation is imposed upon it to be cautious as

to the commencement of such an execution, and to make its duration as brief as possible—to treat the weaker party with good faith and generous consideration, so long as he conducts himself with loyalty and deference towards his powerful Ally and Patron. This the Rajah of Mysore has always done, and he has never been accused of doing otherwise. But we were *not* cautious in commencing the execution; having previously neglected to train the Rajah and to organise his administration, we overlooked, when it fell into disorder, the milder plan of introducing regulations and ordinances, and at once rushed to the extreme process—that “harsh and unprovoked measure,” as Lord Metcalfe called it, of setting the Prince entirely aside, and putting the management exclusively in the hands of English officers. And we have certainly not, in any way or at any time, tried to shorten the duration of our interference. I cannot but come to the conclusion that the Subsidiary Treaty has been infringed by the stronger party, both in letter and spirit, and that the weaker party is entitled to a signal and complete reparation.

Throughout the terrible events of 1857 and 1858 the people of Mysore remained tranquil. Elements of mischief existed in abundance in various quarters; emissaries of rebellion traversed the country in every direction; but peace was never disturbed, and the Rajah’s troops were actually detached into the adjoining British provinces to assist in preventing insurrection. Without detracting from the great merits of Sir Mark Cubbon, whose name and influence had the greatest weight throughout Mysore with all classes, from the Prince to the peasant, and whose vigilance and tact were remarkable throughout the time of danger, his own official statements to Government may be adduced to prove how efficacious were the example and exertions of the Rajah in securing to us the fidelity of his people. In a despatch, dated the 2nd of June, 1860, the Commissioner of Mysore wrote in the following terms to the Governor General, Lord Canning:—

“To no one was the Government more indebted for the preservation of tranquillity than to his Highness the Rajah, who displayed the most steadfast loyalty throughout the crisis, discountenancing everything in the shape of disaffection, and taking every opportunity

to proclaim his perfect confidence in the stability of the English rule. When the small party of Europeans arrived at Mysore, he made manifest his satisfaction by giving them a feast. He offered one of his Palaces for their accommodation, and as a stronghold for the security of the treasure; and even gave up his own personal establishment of elephants, etc., to assist the 74th Highlanders in its forced march from the Neilgherries to Bellary, for the protection of the Ceded Districts, a proceeding which, although of no great magnitude in itself, produced great moral effects throughout the country. In fact, there was nothing in his power which he did not do to manifest his fidelity to the British Government, and to discourage the unfriendly."

The Viceroy acknowledged the Rajah's valuable and faithful services in the following letter of thanks.

"To his Highness the Maharajah of Mysore.

"Fort William, the 28th June 1860.

"MAHARAJAH,

"I have lately received from the Commissioner of Mysore a despatch, in which the assistance received by that officer from your Highness, in preserving peace and encouraging loyalty in the districts under his charge during the recent troubles in India, is prominently brought to notice.

"I was well aware that, from the very beginning of those troubles, the fidelity and attachment to the British Government, which have long marked your Highness's acts, had been conspicuous upon every opportunity.

"Your Highness's wise confidence in the power of England, and your open manifestation of it, the consideration and kindness which you showed to British subjects, and the ready and useful assistance which you rendered to the Queen's troops, have been mentioned by the Commissioner in terms of the highest praise.

"I beg your Highness to accept the expression of my warm thanks for these fresh proofs of the spirit by which your Highness is animated in your relations with the Government of India.

"I shall have much pleasure in making them known to her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

"It is satisfactory to me to know that, throughout the time of which I have spoken, your Highness has had the advantage of the support and counsel of so tried and distinguished an Officer of the Crown, and one so devoted to the welfare of your Highness's State, as Sir Mark Cubbon.

"I have, &c.,

"CANNING."

But even while these amenities were passing between Mysore and Calcutta, the Rajah was in the agonies of a fresh wound, one that touched him to the quick, that seemed to destroy all hope of recovery from his long political syncope, and to threaten him with the infliction of political death in the face of all India, before his natural term of life had closed.

Ever since 1832 the management of Mysore had been under the direct superintendence of the Governor-General of India, and was not liable to be interfered with by the subordinate and nearer Presidency of Madras. The Rajah had some pride in this arrangement, not, perhaps, unmingled with the feeling that the transfer had originally been made with some intention of rebuking the Madras Government for its neglect, and of thus casting upon it to a certain extent the blame of the misgovernment of his country. He also knew that his supersession had been instigated by the Madras officials, that gentlemen belonging to that Presidency enjoyed most of the lucrative offices dependent on his continued supersession; and he believed that his prospects of restoration would be much more favourable, while he was in direct communication with the higher and more distant authority, than if he were left in the grasp of the more contiguous and more interested minor Government.

In a despatch to the Governor General in Council, dated the 26th of January 1860, the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood, quite unexpectedly desired that the Mysore Commission should be placed under the immediate superintendence of the Government of Madras, to which Sir Charles Trevelyan had been recently appointed. The grounds for this sudden change are thus stated in the despatch:—

“The arguments which in 1832 were advanced by the Governor General of India, in favour of the transfer of the controlling authority over the Mysore Commission to the hands of the Governor General of India in Council, were of a temporary and accidental, rather than of a general character, and do not appear to be applicable to the present circumstances of the Mysore administration. On the other hand the territory over which political and administrative control is exercised by the Government of India, has been so extended, and the current business of your office has so increased since 1832, as to

afford full and ample employment for the Foreign Department of your Government. It appears to me, therefore, that it is advisable, partly with the view of relieving your Government, and partly with the object of placing the superintendence of Mysore and Coorg under the Government, which, from its position, can most conveniently exercise it, to revert to the arrangement which was originally made, on our first assumption of the administration of Mysore, viz., that the superintendence should be exercised by the Government of Madras."

But the geographical position of the Mysore Principality, which naturally suggests the Madras Government as the centre of direction in the event of Mysore becoming a British province, was the very circumstance that made the proposed transfer most alarming and offensive to the Rajah and all well-wishers of his sovereignty. It seemed to them to denote the beginning of the end, to be the preliminary measure of annexation. The Rajah prepared a firm but respectful remonstrance to be forwarded to the Governor General, wrote to Sir Mark Cubbon declaring that "nothing would ever exact from him acquiescence in this measure," and implored the Commissioner not to leave him in the midst of these new difficulties. "I could ill afford," wrote the Rajah, "to lose your much valued friendship and counsel at any time, but just at present it is a positive calamity both to myself and to my country." For immediately on receiving information of the intended change, Sir Mark Cubbon had sent in the resignation of his office in the following letter to Government.

From the Commissioner for the Government of the Territories of His Highness the Rajah of Mysore, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

"Nundydroog, 5th March, 1860.

"SIR,

"Having received private but authentic information that orders have issued from the Office of the Secretary of State for India, that the control of Mysore shall be withdrawn from the Government of India, notwithstanding the declaration contained in the despatch from the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated the 31st May 1838, No. 34,* I have the honour to request you will be so good as to tender to the Honourable the President in Council the resignation

* I do not know what this declaration is, but I believe it would throw some light on the early history of this question.

of my appointment as Commissioner, and to add to it my respectful solicitation to be relieved as soon as his Honour may find it convenient.

“ I shall have the satisfaction of making over charge to my successor of the territories of Mysore and Coorg, in a state to all appearance (I say to all appearance, for I do not presume to be able to see below the surface,) of perfect tranquillity, and not dissatisfied with the present form of administration, and with a current revenue exceeding that of any former year in Mysore, that is to say, not less than 93 lakhs of rupees.

“ I have the honour to be, etc.,

“ M. CUBBON, Commissioner.”

The motives and feelings by which General Cubbon was actuated in taking this step, may be gathered from the following extracts from two of his private letters, both dated the 8th of March, 1860.

“ I have just had a little talk with —— (a native) ‘ and find that the late order is regarded as a great breach of public faith, as the first step towards the final extinction of the State of Mysore and its incorporation with Madras, and consequently tending to produce the most fatal of all results, the destruction of all confidence in the sincerity of the Queen’s Proclamation. Viewed in this light it is a most serious affair, and in the present suspicious temper of the native mind, it is certain to give rise to the most unfavourable interpretation, and be made a party question of by our enemies, who will represent it as another proof of our intention to degrade the natives.’

“ The Rajah’s *khureeta* is most forcibly put ; and whatever impression it may make on the Government of India or the India Board, it is almost certain to cause a sensation if read in the House of Commons. As for the adoption, they dare not refuse it. I had no idea it would have been so generally believed that this step was preparatory to the extinction of the Raj, but such appears to have been the impression that has got abroad, and which is openly avowed in the petitions that are coming to me.”

The following is the *khureeta* or letter from the Rajah to Lord Canning, to which General Cubbon alludes.

“ Mysore Palace, 15th March 1860.

“ MY LORD,

“ Having been informed that the Mysore country has been or is about to be transferred from Bengal to the Madras Presidency, I beg leave most respectfully to address your Lordship upon

this subject, and to entreat that the reasons which induce me to protest against this measure will meet with your Lordship's consideration.

" 2. The transfer of the management of my country from the Supreme to a subordinate Government, without any reference to me, as if I had no longer any interest in the matter, or any rights to uphold, fills my mind with apprehension and alarm.

" 3. Consider, my Lord, I beseech of you, the degradation to which I should be subjected, by such a measure, in the eyes of all natives, and especially those of my own subjects. Pardon the boldness of my language, my Lord, but my conscience tells me that I am entitled to protection from your Lordship, in consideration of the loyalty exhibited by myself and my subjects during the recent sad disturbances, which permitted of two thousand of my Silladar Horse being sent to aid in the suppression of the Rebellion. I claim it, moreover, my Lord, in virtue of her Majesty's Proclamation.

" 4. I cannot, my Lord, see how my interests, or those of my country, are to be bettered by this transfer. Perfect tranquillity reigned in my country at a time when a word of mine, or disaffection on the part of my people, would have thrown Southern India into a blaze; but my conduct, and that of my people during that dreadful period, exhibits the complete success of the administration as at present carried out.

" 5. Moreover, my Lord, I have grave fears that such a measure as this, if introduced, would possibly interfere with the claims that I and my heirs have for the restoration of the Government of my country, as it is evident that the contemplated change is with the view of introducing alterations in the form of Government, which would render it difficult for me or my successor to conduct the administration hereafter with a native agency; and the recent conduct of the present Governor of Madras adds cogency to my fears on this point.

" 6. I do not, moreover, my Lord, hesitate to state (and, from my position, I claim a right to be a judge in such matters, seeing how much I am interested in this question) that the condition of Mysore at this moment would contrast favourably with any other province on this side of India. The revenue has increased, and is increasing; and that, too, without pressing on any class, or giving rise to murmur or complaint. There is comparatively little crime; and, what there is, is effectually met by a system, which, for efficiency and cheapness, is not surpassed by any in the country. That the judicial system founded upon that most cherished by natives of all their institutions, the Punchayet,* operates with the utmost success, and I specially deprecate any innovation in the native system of judicial administra-

* Trial by a jury of five members.

tion at present in force ; the most sacred rights and privileges of the people are respected, and the utmost confidence exists in the minds of all that such will continue so long as the present system lasts.

“ 7. I now beg to bring to your Lordship’s recollection, that Mysore was under the control of the Supreme Government for many years and prospered. It was afterwards transferred to Madras, and the result does not afford proof of the advantage of the transfer, for the insurrection arose, and the country was assumed while under the control of that Presidency.

“ 8. In conclusion, my Lord, I beg to remark, that it would require very strong reasons to justify the risk of making the change now proposed ; and I most respectfully, at the same time most emphatically, deny that any such reasons exist.

“ 9. And now, my Lord, I have stated my case, and, fully relying on your Lordship’s well-known sense of justice, I confidently leave the issue in your Lordship’s hands. I am an oldman, and have suffered much ; and you, my Lord, will, I feel assured, save me from this crowning indignity.

“ With the assurance of my unaltered respect and esteem for your Lordship, I beg leave to subscribe myself,

“ Your Lordship’s most faithful Friend and humble Servant,

“ MYSORE KRISTNARAJ WADIYAR.”

It will be observed that the Rajah here lays claim to the restoration of his country, on behalf of himself and *his heirs*, and deprecates rash innovations, not only on his own account, but on account of *his successor*. No trace is to be found of that indifference to the interests of the family, of that determination to be the last Rajah of Mysore, upon which Lord Dalhousie relied in 1856. He alludes to the rights of his heirs in 1860 just as he did in 1844.*

Lord Canning supported the Rajah’s application in the following letter to the Secretary of State, informed the Rajah and Sir Mark Cubbon that for the present the proposed change would not be carried out, a reference having been made to London ; and requested the Commissioner in the meantime to suspend the tender of his resignation.

“ Foreign Department (Camp Hoshiarpore),

“ No. 35, 30th March, 1860.

“ SIR,

“ I had the honour to receive, on the 8th instant, your des-

* Ante, p. 27.

patch of the 26th January, directing me, at my earliest convenience, to place the Mysore Commission under the immediate superintendence of the Governor of Madras in Council. I thereupon called, by telegraph, for the papers showing the circumstances in which, in 1832, the Mysore Commission was placed on its present footing. Before the papers reached me, I received a telegraphic message from the Rajah of Mysore. The letter to myself, which his Highness announces, as well as a letter from his Highness to the Commissioner, Sir Mark Cubbon, reached me yesterday. Copies of these letters I enclose.

“I have received, too, a letter from Sir Mark Cubbon, tendering his resignation, on account of the change prescribed in the superintendence of his charge.

“Whether, if the opportunity had been allowed to me of being the channel of the communication to his Highness, I could in any degree have anticipated his remonstrances, and lessened the feelings of mortification and indignity which he has expressed, I cannot say. Perhaps it might have been so, although certainly I do not pretend that I could have made the change palatable to him.

“But the question now to be considered is, how the appeal of the Rajah is to be dealt with, and I feel it to be impossible, in the face of such an appeal coming from so venerable and loyal a Prince, and couched in terms so dignified, but so respectful, to persist in the immediate execution of your orders without submitting the case for your reconsideration.

“Although no allusion is made in your despatch to the Sovereign of Mysore, it appears to me that that Prince possesses a very strong claim to have his wishes and feelings considered by us, and that we shall do that which is both ungenerous and impolitic, if we set these aside.

“I am, therefore, not surprised that the Rajah of Mysore should speak of the declared measure as being a degradation of himself in the eyes of all natives, especially in those of his own subjects, and an indignity.

“It is unnecessary for me to say, that the Rajah’s allusions to the loyalty of himself and his people, and to the example and aid thereby given to the native subjects of the Crown in Southern India, are quite just. Mysore was traversed in all directions during 1857 and 1858 by Mahratta and Brahmin emissaries, but the people of that country remained tranquil.

“Also, the Rajah is well entitled to point (as he does point with pride) to the actual condition of his dominions. The system of admi-

nistration which has prevailed there is in many ways capable of amelioration, but it has been repeatedly acknowledged to deserve the character given to it by the Court of Directors in 1838 of a 'beneficial and improving system'; and I cannot think that the nearness of supervision, or any other convenience which would result from a transfer of the superintendence of that system to Madras, is worth purchasing at the cost of offending and alienating the Sovereign of the country; especially when, by a little patience, the desired end will, in all human probability, be attained without any such consequences.

"As bearing on the price which we shall pay for forcing this measure upon Mysore, I invite your attention to the following facts.

"The Rajah of Mysore is an old man, past sixty, and of a family notoriously shortlived. He has no son, and has adopted no heir. It has been supposed that he will bequeath his Kingdom to the British Government. I say 'supposed,' because there is no formal or official evidence of his purpose; but I know for certain that such was his intention, because early in 1858, and whilst Upper India was still in full rebellion, the Rajah seized an opportunity of conveying to myself, through an entirely private channel, not only the strongest protestations of his loyalty, gratitude and devotion to the Government, but a distinct and earnest declaration, more than once repeated, of his wish that everything that he possessed should at his death pass into its hands.

"I beg you to compare this declaration with the passage in his letter now enclosed, in which the Rajah expresses grave fears that the measure announced from England will interfere with the claims which he and his heirs have for the restoration of the Government of his country.

"It may be very little desirable that more provinces should be added to those which are already under the absolute rule of the Queen in India; but the case of Mysore, lying in the midst of the Madras Presidency, and already bound to us in a way which is not convenient or satisfactory, is quite exceptional; and the bequest of that country in full sovereignty to the Crown, by the free will of the ruler, and in a spirit of loyal attachment to the British power, is a consummation which, in the interests of all concerned, no one would wish to see defeated.

"It will be the first measure towards Mysore by the direct Government of the Queen, and it may probably be the last to be taken during the present Rajah's lifetime. Surely it is to be desired that it should

not be such as to draw from the Rajah an emphatic protest and refusal of consent, in which he will carry with him, reasonably or unreasonably, the sympathy of his fellow Princes.

"I have, &c.,

"CANNING."

The first point that demands notice in this very remarkable despatch, and which must be carefully held in remembrance, is that Lord Canning very properly describes the Rajah as "the Sovereign of Mysore." In a subsequent letter of great importance addressed to the Rajah, he carefully avoids giving him that title, and claims the sovereignty for the British Government. The people of Mysore are also said in this despatch to be "his own subjects."

The next noticeable point is the admission that "the Rajah is entitled to point (as he does point with pride) to the actual condition of his dominions." In that subsequent letter to the Rajah himself, which I shall shortly have to produce, he is expressly debarred from the merit of having given any support to Sir Mark Cubbon, whose enlightened services he had eulogised, and is taunted with the counteraction offered by himself and his partisans to the improvements introduced by that officer. That counteraction, chiefly due, as explained in the last Chapter, to the rivalry of the Resident and the Commissioner, had been reduced to nothing on the Resident's departure, and had ceased entirely since 1847. For thirteen years the most perfect harmony had subsisted between the Rajah and General Cubbon. The General himself, in the same despatch, dated the 2nd of June, 1860, from which I have already quoted his testimony to the Rajah's loyal services during the rebellion, acknowledges "the cordiality observed by him for a good many years towards the existing administration."

In the despatch to the Secretary of State, which we have just read, no complimentary words are omitted, no consideration is to be withheld, no offence is to be offered to the dignity of "the Sovereign of Mysore," that "venerable and loyal Prince"—apparently because he is supposed to be going like a lamb to the slaughter. In the subsequent letter to the Rajah himself, which we have yet to see, he is a "hereditary prisoner," his ancestors were "vassal chiefs," his rank and possessions are

not hereditary, the sovereignty of Mysore is claimed for the British Government, and every form of studied disparagement and reproach is aimed at this unfortunate Prince—apparently because he will not go like a lamb to the slaughter, because the hope of his quietly submitting to be extinguished has been dispelled.

The main interest and pith of the despatch now under consideration are concentrated in two paragraphs, which I shall here quote separately for more easy reference :—

“The Rajah of Mysore is an old man, past sixty, and of a family notoriously shortlived. He has no son, and has adopted no heir. It has been supposed that he will bequeath his Kingdom to the British Government. I say ‘supposed,’ because there is no formal or official evidence of his purpose; but I know for certain that such was his intention, because early in 1858, and whilst Upper India was still in full rebellion, the Rajah seized an opportunity of conveying to myself through an entirely private channel, not only the strongest protestations of his loyalty, gratitude and devotion to the Government, but a distinct and earnest declaration, more than once repeated, of his wish that everything he possessed should, at his death, pass into its hands.”

And then :—

“I beg you to compare this declaration with the passage in his letter now enclosed, in which the Rajah expresses grave fears that the measure announced from England will interfere with the claims which he and his heirs have for the restoration of the Government of his country.”

And certainly if the supposed declaration and the actual claim, be compared, they will be found to be directly contradictory. The only wonder is that this utter incompatibility of the colloquial concession with the written claim before his eyes,—a claim consistent with all the Rajah’s authentic declarations before or since,—did not suggest to Lord Canning that there must have been some strange misunderstanding in 1858, some mistake in reporting the Rajah’s private conversation, some wrong interpretation of his words, some mis-translation of his Oriental compliments to that *entirely private channel* through which his supposed “wish” was conveyed to the Governor-General. It appears as if Lord Canning was so eager to believe, and so anxious to persuade himself, that the Rajah had ex-

pressed this unaccountable "wish,"—at variance with the whole tenour of his life—that, although he knew this private report must require some formal document to corroborate it, he never took the least notice of it in his communications with the Rajah, never acknowledged it, or returned thanks for it, or requested any explanation on the subject, as if he feared that a touch would burst the bubble. If the Rajah's alleged message appeared to the Governor General to be of any public importance, it was surely his duty to make some further inquiry about it. Instead of that, the very incident which we noticed in Lord Dalhousie's Minute of the 16th January, 1856, so typical of the moral weakness and legal nullity of these acquisitive apologetics,* is exactly reproduced. No question is asked, no confirmation is required of the vague expressions informally translated and informally reported. After having been treasured up for two years, the Rajah's deferential protestations are brought forward by Lord Canning,—as a rumour of his desponding soliloquy was by Lord Dalhousie,—to prove his Highness's indifference to the rights of his family and the future existence of his State, at the very time that he was contending for them.

The despatch then proceeds thus :—

"It may be very little desirable that more provinces should be added to those which are already under the absolute rule of the Queen in India; but the case of Mysore, lying in the midst of the Madras Presidency, and already bound to us in a way which is not convenient or satisfactory, is quite exceptional; and the bequest of that country in full sovereignty to the Crown, by the free will of the ruler, and in a spirit of loyal attachment to the British power, is a consummation which, in the interest of all concerned, no one would wish to see defeated."

For my part I do most positively declare, that if the Rajah had any such intention, which he certainly has not, I should wish to see it defeated. I believe that we cannot afford to lose Mysore as a dependent native State, and that we cannot afford to take it as an additional British province. I can see nothing inconvenient or unsatisfactory in the way Mysore is bound to us, except that obstacle to its full development as a reformed

* Ante, p. 36-38.

native State, offered by the needless and unjust suspension of its legitimate Sovereign.

Mysore is indeed "an exceptional case." It stands as the last barrier against a policy of despair and defiance. It ought to be made our model native State. With it would disappear the last hope of order and regularity being introduced by our influence into the administration of the larger Principalities. No general scheme of policy, no political future would remain possible for the British Empire in India, but that of a series of annexations and a progressive augmentation of the European forces. If the native States cannot be reformed, they are doomed to be gradually annexed. But if Mysore be annexed, if, in defiance of her Majesty's Proclamation, the rapacious system is be reopened, our promises and counsels will never be believed or trusted, and any suggestion of reform, or offer of administrative assistance, will spread consternation and rouse opposition throughout every native State.

Lord Canning, as it seems to me, betrays an uneasy consciousness that the deliberate appropriation of Mysore which he even then meditated, was quite indefensible, by his extreme anxiety that the Rajah should not be startled or provoked into an assertion of his rights; by that unpleasant allusion to the short lives of the Mysore family; and by his strongly expressed desire for a free will bequest "in full sovereignty." He plainly enough declares a hope that the Rajah may be allowed to die quietly without having adopted a son, but states no doubt whatever as to his right to adopt a son if he chooses.

The free will bequest of the country in full sovereignty was never offered, and will never be effected; the Rajah, as he has always intended, will soon adopt a son. On these points, I am informed, there can be no doubt. The loyal attachment which Lord Canning acknowledged, will be confirmed throughout Mysore by the restoration of the Rajah or his successor, but will not long survive the destruction of the dynasty.

Whatever objections may be made to this despatch on general grounds, it was effectual in removing the particular and immediate grievance of which the Rajah complained; and in the following letter the Governor General informed his Highness of the favourable result of his remonstrance:—

To his Highness the Maharajah of Mysore.

“Fort William, the 28th June, 1860.

“MAHARAJAH,

“I have the satisfaction to inform your Highness that the expression of the feelings with which your Highness regarded the proposed transfer of the superintendence of the Mysore Commission to the Government of Madras, received, so soon as it was known to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, the immediate and respectful consideration of the Queen’s Government.

“I am informed by the Secretary of State, that, in making this transfer, it was intended that the policy which has guided the administration of the Mysore territory should remain the same, and that its superintendence should continue to be subject to the general authority and control of the Governor General in Council, but that now, as being more agreeable to your Highness’s feelings, it has been determined by Her Majesty’s Government that the orders directing the transfer should be cancelled.

“It gratifies me to think that this intimation will be agreeable to your Highness.

“I have, etc.,

“CANNING.”

Matters were thus restored to their former footing, and Sir Mark Cubbon consented to remain at his post. But in the following February he was attacked with very serious illness, and was compelled to resign. He died at Suez, on his way to England, in April 1861, at an advanced age, having passed the whole of the present century in India.

So far, let me remind my readers, the amenities prevail. Not a disagreeable word has passed between Calcutta and Mysore. And I must also recall the fact that the Rajah’s letter to Lord Dalhousie of the 8th of August 1848, still remained unanswered at the end of 1860. The Rajah’s repeated application to be reinstated in the Government of his country, had never yet been directly refused. The last communication on the subject which his Highness had received, was the letter from General Cubbon of the 5th of December 1845, informing him, by the Governor General’s orders, that the delay on Lord Hardinge’s part in replying to the Rajah’s letter of the preceding 7th of June, was caused by a pending inquiry into the state of the Mysore debt.

But the crisis was now at hand. Besides one copy sent by

his Lordship for General Cubbon's information, several copies of Lord Canning's despatch had reached Mysore and Madras, and the Rajah was not long kept in ignorance of its contents. While it appeared to promise him relief from his immediate cause of alarm, it did so on grounds that were still more alarming. He was represented as a life tenant, and as a life tenant by choice—as the last in entail, quite willing to make a bequest of his Kingdom, from his own “free will” and “loyal attachment,” to the British Government. And notwithstanding his frequent previous assertions of his “hereditary patrimony,” of the rights of his heirs and successors, his latest allusion to the claims of himself and his heirs to the restoration of the country, was spoken of in Lord Canning's despatch as if it were something quite new and unexpected. Somewhat encouraged therefore by the favourable answer given to his request, and the courteous terms in which it was conveyed, the Rajah saw that he must take the first opportunity of once more distinctly setting forth his unrevoked pretensions, and of urging their consideration on the Government of India. An opportunity seemed to present itself when General Cubbon's illness compelled him to resign the office of Commissioner. It was while Sir Mark Cubbon was preparing for his departure, that the Rajah addressed the following letter to Lord Canning:—

“Mysore Palace, 23rd February, 1861.

“MY LORD,

“I have to crave your indulgent attention to, and serious consideration of, a subject of the highest importance, which I shall, as briefly as is compatible with the magnitude of the interests involved, now proceed to lay before your Lordship. In the year 1799, the all-powerful English nation conquered the armies of Tippoo, stormed the fortress of Seringapatam, and slew the usurper, and then that great statesman, Lord Wellesley, founded a noble and disinterested policy, which added immensely to the fame of the British Government, and did more to establish its influence and consolidate its power than many great victories. The Governor General waived all right of conquest, rescued me, then an infant, the rightful heir to the throne of Mysore, and the descendant of a long line of Kings, from captivity, and restored me to the musnud of my ancestors. By an Article in the Treaty between the British and myself, it was provided, that, if at any time the affairs of my country fell into confusion, the British Govern-

ment should have the power of assuming the management of the country until order was restored; and in 1831, Lord William Bentinck, then Governor General, intimated to me that this provision of the Treaty was to be enforced, and it was enforced without being resisted in any way by me. I will not pause to argue whether the step taken was an absolutely necessary one. The character of Lord William Bentinck was a guarantee that he considered it so; but his views must have been subsequently greatly modified, for he proposed in the year 1834, two and a half years after the assumption of my country, that three-fourths of it should be restored to my control, on the condition that I assented to the temporary alienation of the remaining portion, as a guarantee for the payment of my Subsidy to the British Government.* I had previously been gratified by his Lordship's assurance that the assumption of the administration of my country by the Government had not been caused by the personal omissions of the Sovereign. In the year 1836, Lord Auckland received a despatch from the Court of Directors, in which their opinion was declared, to the effect that, instead of adopting the views of Lord William Bentinck, they considered it a better course to let the sole management of the country remain as it was, until such salutary rules and safeguards should be matured, as would place the affairs of Mysore on a safe and secure basis. In a despatch from the Court of Directors, republished by your Lordship in your last Administration Report of India, it is ordered, with reference to Mysore, 'that they are desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the native usages, and not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency *when the country shall be restored to the Rajah.*' After a personal inspection, Lord Dalhousie, on his return to Calcutta, pronounced his decision, that the affairs of Mysore were all that could be desired. My Lord, I never hesitate to assert that the enviable state of Mysore is to be attributed to the enlightened services of Sir Mark Cubbon, whose acknowledgments of my support have received your Lordship's recognition. During twenty-six years he has carried on the administration of the affairs of my Kingdom, and has indisputably shown that whatever requirements there may be in other countries for introducing changes, Sir Mark Cubbon has established that Mysore needs none of them, for its native system of government has produced results that bear comparison with any that can be exhibited in any part of India, whether its material prosperity, the happiness of its people, or any

* This is a singular mistake of the Rajah's. Lord William Bentinck proposed a permanent cession, not a temporary alienation. Could the Rajah have misunderstood it at the time?

other test be applied. But, my Lord, as you know, Sir Mark Cubbon leaves his office, and there is no successor who can occupy his place. He departs with the fervent prayers of the Sovereign and his subjects, that blessings may be showered on him.

“The universal desire of my people, and justice to my own character, require that I should now solicit the restoration of my sovereign rights, of which I was deprived, as has already been stated, as a temporary measure; in proof of which, should proof be required in a matter so notorious, I beg to refer your Lordship to Lord William Bentinck’s despatch to the Court of Directors, the Court’s answer to Lord Auckland, also the Court’s despatch, an extract from which I have quoted above. What I ask, my Lord, is not much; the country is acknowledged to be mine; all I ask, then, before I die, is that I may be restored to the position I formerly held, that the stigma which now attaches to my name may be removed, and that I may appear once more before my own subjects and the Princes and people of India as the Sovereign of Mysore in fact as well as in word.

“I ask for my country, not with the intention of making any great changes in the nature of its administration, for Sir Mark Cubbon has shown where the safe road to further improvement alone lies; and I purpose by the selection of experienced persons to conduct the Government, to prove that this State will continue to prosper under a superintended native administration, and be as heretofore loyal to Her Majesty and to her successors, be the consequences what they may to myself and my heirs. I have now only to request your Lordship to submit this letter to Her Majesty’s Government, and to solicit your support of my claim; and this, from the proofs I have already received of your Lordship’s generous nature, and from the noble sentiments expressed in your Lordship’s letter to the Secretary of State for India, on the question of the rights of native Princes, I feel assured I shall receive. And here I hope I may be pardoned if I express my individual opinion, as one of the Sovereigns of India, on your Lordship’s just and wise treatment of the native Princes of this great country, in strengthening their hands, elevating their position, and consolidating their possessions. A day will come, my Lord, possibly not in my time, for I am now an old man, but probably at no remote period, when these Princes and Chiefs, bound to your Government by the double tie of gratitude and self-interest, will present a bulwark which neither the wave of foreign invasion nor the tide of internal disaffection can throw down; and then the wisdom and justice of your Lordship’s policy, a policy which no Governor General before your Lordship had the courage to avow, will become manifest to the

world. In conclusion, I beg you to remember, my Lord, that I have never committed the smallest offence towards the British Government. I have ever been true and loyal; the avowed object for which the Government of my country was temporarily assumed has long since been accomplished, and there is no justifiable pretext for its further retention. Support, then, my prayer, my Lord; render me justice, and make the few remaining days of a Sovereign who has drunk so deeply of the bitter cup of affliction as I have done, happy, and you will add another jewel to that immortal crown which your Lordship has earned by your generous advocacy and support of the rights of the Princes of India."

The solemn appeal here recorded remained unanswered and unnoticed for thirteen months.

CHAPTER IV.

1862 AND 1863.

THE letter dated the 11th of March, 1862, which I am now about to lay before my readers, with a few brief comments of my own annexed to some of the paragraphs,* did not, of course, come into the hands of the Rajah of Mysore until several days after Lord Canning's departure; for his Lordship left Calcutta for England on the 12th of March, the very day after that on which this letter must have been signed, and, I suppose, despatched. In all probability, therefore, this was Lord Canning's last public act of any importance.

*“ To his Highness the Maharajah Kishen Raj Wadiyar Bahadoor,
“ Mysore.*

“ MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

1. “ I have received your Highness's Khureetas of the 14th August and 21st October, urging, with reference to your own advanced age and my approaching return to England, that a speedy answer should be given to your Highness's Khureeta of the 23rd February, 1861.

2. “ It is your Highness's request that the last mentioned Khureeta may be submitted to Her Majesty's Government, and that it may be accompanied by my support of the claim therein advanced—that claim being, that the management of the country of Mysore should be now restored to your Highness.

3. “ This demand, based upon arguments which will hereafter be noticed, is one which it is as little my inclination as my duty, to treat lightly, or to set aside without the most patient and impartial consideration; and I regret the disappointment which may be caused to your Highness, when I now inform you of my inability to support your claim, or to admit the grounds on which it is founded, and which I regard as mistaken and untenable.

* I have affixed numbers to the paragraphs, which was not done in the original. I have also italicised certain passages.

4. "My regret is the greater because it was my pleasing duty, in a letter of the 28th June, 1860, to express to your Highness my cordial thanks for your steadfast loyalty, prominently noticed by the late Sir Mark Cubbon in his letter of the 2nd June, 1860, and subsequently to make known to Her Majesty's Government the spirit by which your Highness had been animated, and of which you had given substantial proofs during the troubles of 1857. Your Highness, in your Khureeta of the 23rd February, 1861, after a candid avowal that the present enviable state of Mysore is attributable to the enlightened services of Sir Mark Cubbon, has referred to a supposed recognition by me, not only of the loyalty displayed by your Highness at the time of which Sir Mark Cubbon wrote, but also of *support given* by your Highness to that officer during his long and able administration. Had Sir Mark Cubbon ever acknowledged such support, your Highness must feel sure that nothing would have been more agreeable to me than to have had it in my power, on such good grounds, to attribute to your Highness a share in the credit due for the successful administration of Mysore. Under such circumstances there would most certainly have been no hesitation on my part in freely according to your Highness the merit which you appear to claim in your Khureeta of the 23d February, 1861. But I cannot conceal from your Highness that throughout the correspondence between Sir Mark Cubbon and this Government, extending as it does over many years, I have failed to find any such acknowledgment. Sir Mark Cubbon has left on record opinions of an entirely contrary character. He has stated that any improvements which had taken place had been effected *in spite of the counteraction he had met with on the part of your Highness and your partisans*, and that the conduct of your Highness, during your suspension from power, would afford no security that the crisis which had induced your suspension would not recur in the event of your restoration.

PARAGRAPH 4.

As to the counteraction of the Rajah and his "partisans," (including the British Resident,) a sufficient answer to this imputation has been given already. (*Ante*, pp. 25, 26.) Suffice it once more to observe, that all such counteraction had ceased for nearly fifteen years.

General Cubbon undoubtedly was opposed to the Rajah being restored to absolute power. And so am I.

5. "Your Highness observes that the Marquis of Wellesley rescued you when an infant from captivity,—this is true; but the Marquis Wellesley, when he released you from a *hereditary prison*, and placed you on the Throne of Mysore, *far from waiving any right of conquest*,

asserted and maintained that right in all its integrity and in a three-fold manner. In the first place, after the fall of Seringapatam, and the death of Tippoo Sultan, the Territory thus conquered was made the subject of a Partition Treaty, in which your Highness was not otherwise a party concerned than as the notified future recipient of the liberality of the British Government. *The contracting parties were the Governor General and the Nizam.* The details of the Partition of the Territory were prescribed by Lord Wellesley, *the conquest having been effected by British arms.* This was Lord Wellesley's first and chief assertion of the right of conquest, and in it your Highness had no share whatever as a principal."

6. "In the next place, *ancillary to the Partition Treaty of Mysore,* was the grant, on certain conditions, of that portion of the territories conquered from Tippoo Sultan, which the Governor General thought proper to assign to your Highness. The instrument was styled the Subsidiary Treaty; *its subordinate relation to the Partition Treaty* being thereby indicated. The cession of territory in favour of your Highness, which comprised districts annexed by Hyder Ali, over which your ancestors had never ruled, *was based distinctly upon the British Government's right of conquest.* In one of the communications from your Highness, mention is made of that hereditary patrimony 'be-

PARAGRAPH 5.

The Mussulman domination, which during the twenty-two years of Hyder Ali's rule never impugned the sovereignty of the old House, endured for no more than thirty-eight years, hardly long enough for the Rajah's legitimate rights to have been forgotten or annihilated. *We* had not lost sight of them, for sixteen years before his release we had made a Treaty with his father, and had hoisted the Mysore Rajah's colours on a fort taken from Tippoo. (*Ante*, p. 9.) Lord Wellesley, while unquestionably maintaining the rights of conquest,—not of British arms alone, but of the Company and the Nizam—still respected and relied upon the antiquity and legitimate title of the Hindoo family. And this is recorded in the Partition Treaty and in all the contemporary documents, as one principal reason for the Rajah's elevation.

PARAGRAPH 6.

The Subsidiary Treaty, by which the Rajah was placed in possession of the P^rincipality of Mysore, was undoubtedly "ancillary" and "subordinate" to the Partition Treaty, and remains so, for the latter Treaty still subsists. But the cession in favour of his Highness is *not* "based distinctly upon the British Government's right of conquest." The Preamble of the Treaty proves that it is based upon certain stipulations between the Honourable East India Company and his Highness the Nizam, for establishing "a

queathed to me by my sires, the Sovereigns of the Soil.' But when the grant was made by Lord Wellesley in favour of your Highness, you did not inherit any patrimony in the soil, and you could not claim a single village, for the independence of your Highness's ancestors, after the destruction of the Kingdom of Bijeynuggur, to which they had long been vassal chiefs, was short-lived, and they had entirely lost by the sword, what they had gained by the sword. *Therefore, your Highness's title to authority in Mysore rests solely upon the cession made to you by the British Government;* and both in the Subsidiary Treaty, and in the despatches explanatory of the principles on which it was framed, Lord Wellesley was careful to assert that the only basis of your dominion was *the British right of conquest*, and the power of his Government to make the cession on conditions. This was Lord Wellesley's second assertion, and *maintenance of the right of conquest.*

7. "Lastly, the fourth and fifth Articles of the Subsidiary Treaty show that *far from waiving the rights derived from conquest*, Lord Wellesley, in a very signal manner, *kept those rights alive* in the conditions which he attached to the cession. By the fifth Article, a wide discretionary power is retained to the Governor-General to assume, whether your Highness consent or not, the management of the Territories, and to provide for the effectual protection of the country and the welfare of the people. Nor was the latitude of this discretion unintentional. In a despatch which accompanied the draft Treaty of Seringapatam, Lord Wellesley informed the Commissioners that the provisions of Article 5 were absolutely necessary for the purpose of precluding the embarrassments which had arisen

separate Government in Mysore," under his Highness Mysoor Kishen Raj Wadiyar Bahadoor, who in the Partition Treaty is described as "a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore."

Some districts over which the Rajah's "ancestors had never ruled," were ceded to him; and some districts which had formed part of his hereditary possessions were included in the Company's share.

The Rajah's ancestors were certainly "vassal chiefs" at one time, and gained their independence and their sovereignty "by the sword," but that was a long time ago.

But these points are of little consequence, for if we simply add the name of the other Ally and contracting party, the Nizam,—never omitted by Lord Wellesley, but always overlooked by Lord Canning,—it is perfectly true that "the only basis of the Rajah's dominion," after 1799, was the right of conquest of the Allies, and their power to make the cession. And what better basis, what better title could he have?

in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, and that, in his opinion, it was a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprise your Highness, from the first hour of your accession, of the nature of your dependence, than to leave any channel open for future ambiguity and discussion. His Lordship proceeded to state that this was a point which he held to be so essential to the very existence of the new arrangement, that if it should appear objectionable, 'on grounds of which he was not then aware,' he saw no alternative but that of dividing the whole territory between the Allies: in other words, of totally excluding your Highness from the proposed liberality of the British Government, if there were any demur on the part of those acting for your Highness to accept the grant on the conditions attached to it. Nor was he less precise, when reporting his arrangements to the Court of Directors and to the Ministers of the Crown."

8. "Throughout these despatches there is *no waiving of the rights of conquest, and of the Supreme Sovereignty which it conferred upon the British Government.* On the contrary, there is repeated assertion in the strongest and clearest language, that in the arrangements made, it was had in view that the title of your Highness to the territory entrusted to you, should have no other basis than the right and power of the British Government to assign it, and that the grant of dominion over that territory was to be in entire subordination to the *Sovereignty* of the British Government, and was conditional on the country being governed in accordance with the wishes of the

PARAGRAPH 7.

The fourth and fifth Articles of the Subsidiary Treaty show that the Allies having, by their right of conquest, ceded Mysore to a descendant of the ancient Rajahs, the British Government could only secure to itself the power of interference in the government by a special agreement to that effect in the Treaty. The Rajah's right of sovereignty depends upon the Treaty, and the British right of guidance depends upon the Treaty, and not upon "keeping the rights of conquest alive,"—a rhetorical flourish which I shall show to be quite out of place.

PARAGRAPH 8.

Here we have a perfectly new term introduced, a term quite unheard of from 1799 to 1862—"the Supreme Sovereignty" of the British Government over Mysore. This is a term to which the Rajah would certainly not object, —though I believe Imperial Supremacy would be more accurate, —if it were used without prejudice to his rights as Sovereign of Mysore. Since 1799 the Rajah has stood towards the British Government in the position of a subordinate, dependent Prince, a position by no means incompatible

British Government, for the good of the people, and in a manner that should leave no reason to apprehend failure in bearing such share of the burthen of military expenditure in peace or in war, as the Governor General defined for the one, and left open to discretion in the other state of affairs. There is then no doubt whatever as to the intentions of the Marquis Wellesley, when making the grant in favour of your Highness. He has recorded them in the different stages of the arrangement; first, prior to its completion; next, in the terms and conditions themselves of the Treaty; and, lastly, when announcing to the British Government that the spontaneous act, by which conditional dominion was conferred on your Highness, was secured from being hereafter made a ground for assumptions such as those which I regret to see in your Highness's Khureeta."

right of conquest; a conqueror may cede a territory by right of conquest; two conquerors may divide a territory by right of conquest; but one victorious power, or two Allies, having ceded a territory by right of conquest, cannot retain the right of conquest after the cession.

The right of conquest empowered the Company and the Nizam to make a partition and settlement of the territories held by Tip-poo. Whatever was conferred upon the British Government, whatever was conferred upon the Nizam, whatever was conferred upon the Rajah, are all clearly defined in the Partition and Subsidiary Treaties. Under these two Treaties the Rajah holds his sovereignty; under the latter of those Treaties the British Government holds its annual Subsidy, its neglected prerogative of authoritative supervision, and its abused prerogative of temporary management; but no Supreme Sovereignty is conferred upon the British Government by either of the Treaties. But, as I said before, the term, although new and unprecedented, might stand, if it were used with good faith, and with

that of Sovereign over his own dominions. But the term is clearly introduced here, in order to insinuate that he is not, and never was a Sovereign at all, but a sort of probationary Satrap or Hospodar, tolerated during good behaviour, but removable at will.

And this Supreme Sovereignty is said to be conferred upon the British Government by "the right of conquest;" and it is again asserted that the Rajah's title had "no other basis than the right and power of the British Government to assign it;" to which I must again reply that the right of conquest, as proclaimed by Lord Wellesley, belonged to the Company and the Nizam, and that the Rajah's territories were not assigned to him as a grant by Lord Wellesley, or by the British Government, but by the Allies.

But setting aside the Nizam, for the moment, and supposing the Company to be the sole conqueror, what is, even then, the meaning of maintaining the right of conquest after the conclusion of treaties? Is no good and valid title given—is no sovereignty conferred by a British cession? A conqueror may hold a territory by

out prejudice to the Rajah's rights. But it is not so used in this despatch.

9. "But the Khureeta, passing from assumptions without foundation, proceeds on the strength of them to make an appeal for justice, complains of the further retention, without justifiable pretext, of your country, after the avowed object for which its government had been temporarily assumed, had long since been accomplished; and claims the restoration of sovereign rights, the suspension of which, it is asserted, was always stated to be a temporary measure. Your Highness thus challenges the justice and the good faith of the British Government. Thereby your Highness compels me to point out to you, that the British Government did not interpose to enforce the remedy provided in the Subsidiary Treaty, until the obligations which attached to the cession had been for *twenty years flagrantly and habitually violated*, in spite of repeated warnings and remonstrances by the British Government and its agents; nor until the country had been driven into rebellion by mis-government of the very worst description, and when, but for that interference, most of the provinces of Mysore would have effectually shaken off your Highness's authority."

PARAGRAPH 9.

The mis-government of Mysore during twenty years is, as I have shown, the fault of the British Government, which allowed a boy of sixteen to assume absolute power, and neglected to employ the efficient means provided by the Treaty for the regulation and control of the native administration.

But it is a cruel abuse of language to call the mis-government of Mysore "a flagrant and habitual violation of the Treaty." It was never intended by the Treaty to bind down the Rajah to a course of immaculate administration, under the penalty of immediate and perpetual suspension, and the ultimate extinction of the State in the event of failure. He was bound to accept any "regulations and ordinances" imposed by the Company; but none were imposed. He never refused to carry out any specific plan of reform; no such plan was ever laid before him. The controlling action of the British Resident and of the Madras Government was confined to desultory rebukes, and remonstrances in cases of individual grievance.

10. "It was under these circumstances that the British Government, sensible of the responsibility which the *rights of conquest*, and of *sovereignty* imposed upon it, acted upon the provisions of the Treaty; and having made ample provision for your Highness' comfort and dignity, *cancelled the authority it had conferred*, and re-entered on the possession and the administration of the My-

sore territory, in order to retrieve its public resources, and to rescue the country from anarchy and ruin. When thus reluctantly forced to supersede your Highness's authority, no expectation, direct or indirect, was held out that that authority would be restored in your Highness's life-time, *under its former conditions*. The Government of India carefully held itself free to act as future circumstances might show to be the best; and it abstained from all pledge to Prince or people, that an administration which had so signally failed, would ever be re-established."

PARAGRAPH 10.

In this paragraph it is now in substance asserted that though the British Government acted in 1832 "upon the provisions of the Treaty," it did not act by virtue of the Treaty, but by virtue of "the rights of conquest and of sovereignty."

The British Government is said to have "cancelled the authority it had conferred;" but no such cancellation was provided for by the Treaty, or was ever pronounced or proposed. The British Government simply assumed the management of Mysore on behalf of the Sovereign, and in his name. Nothing was cancelled; no permanent change was declared or intended at that time.

The British Government is also said to have "re-entered on the possession and administration of the Mysore territory," which is erroneous, for it never was previously in possession of the territory, and has never, up to this day, assumed possession of it. After the fall of Seringapatam, the whole country ruled by Tippoo was in the military occupation of the allied conquerors, the Company and the Nizam, who ceded Mysore to the present Rajah, and placed him in possession of it by the public ceremony of enthronement.

It is said that the Rajah was never led to expect that his authority would be restored, "under its former conditions." The Rajah has never asked to be replaced at the head of affairs under the former conditions of uncontrolled and lawless power. On the contrary, he has invited the imposition of regulations and ordinances.

11. "Your Highness has adverted to certain proposals made by Lord William Bentinck, subject to the approval of the British Government. As the latter withheld its concurrence, the proposals of the Governor General fell to the ground. In the course of the correspondence, the Court of Directors used language which was consistent with a purpose, at some future period, *and under conditions left undefined*, to restore a native Government, but *not specifically that of your Highness*.

PARAGRAPH 11.

The writer of the despatch says that the Court of Directors spoke of restoring a native Government to Mysore, "under conditions left undefined," and "not specifically that of his Highness." It appears to me that when the Court of Directors in 1835 desired that the administration should "remain

The expressions of the Court of Directors were simply in the way of caution, to prevent anything being done which could interfere with the future free action of the British Government, as to the form of administration to be organised for Mysore. There was nothing in them which approached to a pledge to restore your Highness' share in the administration, even if administration by a British Commission should fail. That which the Treaty promised, the British Government scrupulously performed; and your Highness is now enjoying the personal provision which was secured to you in the event of that government resuming the administration of Mysore. *This provision is a personal right, not an heritable one. It is not claimable as a right, even by a natural-born heir*, however liberally the Government might, of its own grace, be disposed to deal with a claim from such a quarter; and as your Highness failed to fulfil the obligations of the authority which had been ceded to you, it is the only right which remains to you; and your title to that right is exactly the same as was your title to the authority which you forfeited through misrule. That is, it rests upon favour shown to your Highness by the British Government, in its mode of dealing with other rights which it had acquired by conquest."

on its present footing until the arrangements for good government shall have been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance,"* they quite sufficiently defined the conditions under which the native government was to be restored; and if those conditions have not yet been attained, the Government of India is at fault. But this native government, we are told, was "not specifically that of his Highness." Yet, as we have seen, the Court of Directors objected to "a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency when the country shall be restored to *the Rajah*."† This mention of the Rajah is surely quite as specific as his Highness himself could desire.

The sting of the whole letter lies in the latter part of this paragraph, which proves too clearly that it is not merely the retention of the management that is sought to be justified, but the eventual extinction of the native State. The Rajah's personal share of the revenue is declared to be "the only right which remains" to him, and this is "a personal right, not a heritable one." The only reason that is given for declaring the sovereignty not to be hereditary, is that he has "forfeited" his "title" "through misrule," and that he has "failed to fulfil the obligations of the authority which was ceded" to him,—penalties which are unexplained and unjustified either by the fact of the Rajah's rule, or by the particular provisions of the Treaty, or by the general principles of international law.

* Ante, p. 23.

† Ante, p. 40.

12. "The good faith of that Government towards your Highness is inviolate. Its justice can as little be called in question. After *patiently permitting for twenty years an administration which culminated in insurrection*, and rendered necessary the interven-

PARAGRAPH 12.

tion of British troops to suppress anarchy, the British Government was imperatively called upon to vindicate its own character for justice, and not to permit its name or its power to be identified with misrule. It had a duty to fulfil towards the people of Mysore, and for thirty years, under the able and honest administration of British Officers, that duty has been efficiently performed. Solvency has been restored, and order is now maintained in Mysore. So far the immediate purpose of the resumption has been obtained. But when your Highness proceeds to state that the native system of government has produced these results, and that you will provide an administration for the future as good as that which you would supersede, your Highness seems to forget the material fact that the paramount authority of British Officers is the safeguard, and the very essence of the good which is manifest in the present administration. Your Highness *fails to offer any security upon a point not*

I trust that the good faith and justice of the British Government towards the Rajah of Mysore, *may* remain inviolate. Certainly they are not to be placed beyond all hope of preservation by a single ill-advised despatch.

It had a duty to fulfil towards the people of Mysore, and for thirty years, under the able and honest administration of British Officers, that duty has been efficiently performed. Solvency has been restored, and order is now maintained in Mysore. So far the immediate purpose of the resumption has been obtained. But when your Highness proceeds to state that the native system of government has produced these results, and that you will provide an administration for the future as good as that which you would supersede, your Highness seems to forget the material fact that the paramount authority of British Officers is the safeguard, and the very essence of the good which is manifest in the present administration. Your Highness *fails to offer any security upon a point not*

That the Government of India "patiently permitted" the maladministration of Mysore for twenty years, which Lord Canning strangely enough seems to consider a proof of graceful forbearance, is, as I have already shown, an example of inexcusable neglect of duty,—neglect of a duty not the less sacred because it was voluntarily undertaken. And this neglect of duty might be much more deservedly, and much more appropriately stigmatised as a breach of solemn obligations, than the untutored and misguided extravagance of the young Prince's career.

There is, and always was, an ample security for the good government of Mysore,—including, if thought necessary, the employment of any required number of English officers,—in the proper application of Articles IV and V of the Treaty, authorising the imposition of regulations and ordinances.

inferior in importance to the restoration of order and solvency, namely, the future maintenance of good government in Mysore. This was one of the avowed purposes of the resumption of authority by the British Government; and I say frankly to your Highness that it is my conviction, founded on experience of the past, that if the authority of the British Officers was removed, or even hampered, the peace and prosperity of Mysore would be at an end. The justice of the British

Government might indeed be open to question, if, without the fullest security that the measure would not be synonymous with a return to oppression and misrule, the province of Mysore was replaced under its former Head."

13. "The obligations of the British Government to the people of Mysore, are as sacred as its self-imposed obligations to your Highness, which alone form your Highness's title to any rights under the Subsidiary Treaty. When in that Treaty the British Government reserved to itself the re-assumption at its own discretion of the dominions entrusted under conditions to your Highness, it thereby acknowledged the obligation by which conquest had been accompanied, and admitted its responsibility for the enduring welfare of the people over whom it had become Sovereign. And whilst the British Government has been careful to satisfy the right which it originally conceded to your Highness, and certainly not the less careful because the concession was made spontaneously, and without its being in your Highness's power to offer any consideration of the smallest political value as an equivalent, it is equally alive to its obligations to the people of Mysore, and to the responsibility for their prosperity and welfare, of which it cannot divest itself. It has been and will continue to be scrupulously just to both parties."

political theory and expectations of 1799, and to the opinions of such men as the Duke of Wellington, Sir John Malcolm and Sir Mark Cubbon, as to the practical results from 1799 down to 1860.

PARAGRAPH 13.

The British Government did not "reserve to itself the re-assumption at its own discretion of the dominions entrusted under conditions" to his Highness. The Treaty simply empowered the Honourable Company to assume management of such a portion of the Rajah's territories as might be sufficient to supply funds for the Subsidy, "whenever" and "so long" as there should be "reason to apprehend" a failure in the funds so destined. This is very far from amounting to the "re-assumption" of dominions held merely as a trust by the Rajah.

When the writer of the despatch states that the Rajah's sovereignty in Mysore was a "concession made spontaneously" by the British Government, the statement is inaccurate, for the concession was made in consequence of stipulations between the British Government and the Nizam, recorded in the Partition Treaty.

When he states that it was not in the Rajah's power "to offer any consideration of the smallest political value," the statement is in direct contradiction of the opinions of Lord Wellesley, as to the

14. "Your Highness has pressed upon my consideration your advanced age, and your desire that the stigma which attaches to your name might be removed by a restoration to the position you formerly

held. These are pleas to which in themselves I desire to show respect, and all practicable indulgence, but accompanied as they have been by pretensions based upon erroneous assumptions, and leading as they have led to an imputation upon the fair dealing of the British Government, it has been incumbent on me to correct the errors into which your Highness has fallen; and to put upon record, that in my opinion your Highness was very ill-advised, when upon the grounds of assumed ancestral and hereditary rights which have no existence, and of admissions and promises which never were made, you permitted yourself to forget the generosity of the British Government, in order to call in question its good faith and justice.

“I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and I beg to subscribe myself,

“Your Highness’s sincere Friend,

“CANNING.”

“*Fort William, 11th March, 1862.*”

It has been supposed, and even confidently asserted, that this letter was not of Lord Canning’s composition; that he sanctioned and signed it at the last moment, when enfeebled by illness, and glad to dispose in any way of an irritating and perplexing subject that had long pressed for settlement, and which he felt ought not to be handed over to Lord Elgin, after a year’s delay, in an undetermined state. It may be so, but I see no sufficient internal evidence in the letter to separate the authorship from the responsibility, which cannot be shared or divided. Although the whole tenour and spirit of this letter is inconsistent with the general scope and object of the Adoption despatch of the 30th of April 1860, it must be remembered that its germ is contained in those words of that very despatch, and of the subsequent circular to the Princes of India, confining its benefits to those “who now govern their own territories:” although it is quite inconsistent with Lord Canning’s latest utterances as to the policy of maintaining native States, and the imprudence of increasing the area of our direct possessions, it is quite consistent with his declaration that the case of Mysore was quite exceptional, and his confident exultation over the forthcoming bequest of the Principality, in “free will and full sovereignty,” and “in a spirit of loyal attachment,” by its venerable Sovereign. The signal discomfiture of this confident anticipation,

embittered by the fruitless and unfortunate reference to a private source of information which was quite inadmissible and never ought to have been cited, may have infused, almost unconsciously to the writer, that otherwise unaccountable acrimony which pervades the whole letter.

Within a month from its receipt the Rajah sent the following rejoinder to the newly arrived Governor General, Lord Elgin, as an appeal to the Home Government against Lord Canning's decision :—

*“ To the Right Honourable the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, K.T.
and G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor General.*

“ Mysore Palace, April 1862.

“ My Lord,

1. “ I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Lord Canning's letter of the 11th ult., informing me that he was unable to support my prayer for the restoration of the government of my Kingdom, and leaving me to gather that he had not complied with my request to forward it to the Home Authorities.

2. “ I can hardly expect you, my Lord at this early stage of your government, to enter upon a review of, perhaps, the latest measure of your predecessor, and I shall therefore not be disappointed should your Lordship hesitate to make inquiries into the merits of my claim. In fact, it is my desire that this letter should be regarded as an appeal to the Home Authorities from the decision of Earl Canning, and I therefore beg that a copy of it may be forwarded to the Secretary of State with the least practicable delay. It would however be most grateful to my feelings, should my case be fortunate enough to gain your Lordship's powerful support. I now proceed to discuss the communication under reply.

3. “ In the letter of Earl Canning particular pains are taken to prove that the British Government, after the death of Tippoo Sultan, never waived its right of conquest, but asserted and maintained it in all its integrity, and in a threefold manner. I am not aware that this proposition was ever denied by any one, and most certainly it was never disputed by me, and may therefore, as far as I am concerned, be at once conceded in all its entirety. But what follows? Do not these rights expire with their first exercise, and, a Treaty once signed by the Conqueror, is not the *status quo ante* that Treaty merely a matter of history? The rights of conquest are swallowed up in its self-imposed obligations.

4. “ It is to be observed, however, that the conquest was not

effected by the British alone, and that in the diplomatic correspondence of the time, this fact is always scrupulously set forward. A strong contingent from Hyderabad, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, formed part of the invading force, and participated in the prize-money shared among the captors of Seringapatam. The Nizam of the Deccan treated as an equal power with the Governor General, in the arrangements which resulted in the partition of Tippoo Sultan's territories; and his assent, to all outward appearance, was as necessary as that of Lord Mornington to the Treaty, by which the Peishwah and myself were admitted to a share of the conquered districts. Lord Canning may be right in saying that I "was not otherwise a party concerned than as the notified future recipient of the liberality of the British Government," still I take it to be manifest that, but for the pledge to make me this recipient, the Treaty would not have been concluded as it now stands; and the fact is admitted by Lord Mornington (in a passage quoted by Lord Canning himself) when he states that, if the Treaty broke down, he "saw no alternative but that of dividing the whole territory between the Allies." It was at one time also intended that I should have been something more than a mere recipient, for I see from Lord Mornington's letter, of the 5th June 1799, that, by the Treaty as originally drafted, the *whole of the conquered territory* was to have been made over to me in the first instance, the Allies afterwards accepting, as a cession under my authority, such districts as were to be retained by them. I submit this to be a conclusive proof that the British shared with others in the rights of conquest.

5. "Lord Canning urges that the erection of the Kingdom of Mysore in my favour was a purely spontaneous act, and that it "was not in my power to offer any consideration of the smallest political value as an equivalent." This is perfectly true as regards myself personally, but surely it will not be denied that the device of constructing a quasi-independent Kingdom in Mysore was attended with the most important political advantages to the British Power, as distinguished from that of the Allies. Lord Wellesley reiterates the fact again and again. He states that any other arrangement would have "aggrandised the Nizam's power beyond all bounds of discretion." and "afforded strong grounds of jealousy to the Mahrattas," and have been "an augmentation of their resources and means of mischief;" while at the same time it was the expedient best calculated to "secure to the Company a less invidious, and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commercial advantage and military strength, than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory or power," (*Wellesley's*

Despatches, vol. ii, p. 74). The Duke of Wellington, too, repeatedly asserts that the Kingdom of Mysore "had afforded the most substantial assistance to Great Britain in all her difficulties," (*Supplementary Despatches*, vol. iv, p. 555), and that to this assistance he was in a great measure indebted for his early military successes. I believe that the above will be clearly ascertained from the original letters of Sir Arthur Wellesley, which were formerly in the Mysore Residency, but which, I hear, have been carried to England by the late Governor General.

6. "Lord Canning truly states that the territory ceded to me in 1799 comprised districts over which my ancestors had never ruled, but he omits to add that their Kingdom, though differing in its limits, was hardly less extensive than that which the Allies assigned to their descendant (*Insurrection Report*, par. 6). Compensation was given in the North for districts restored in the South. The new limits were fixed for military reasons, and the boundary was moved northwards in order that the British might hold the keys of the Ghauts (*General Memorandum of Sir M. Cubbon*, and *Wilks' History*, passim). So paramount indeed was this object considered, that, as increased knowledge led the features of the mountains to be better understood, the boundaries were some time afterwards greatly modified by a subsequent special Treaty, not alluded to by Lord Canning, in which certain Talooks in the north of Chitteldroog were given in exchange for strong positions about Wynaud (*First Supplementary Treaty*, 29th December 1803). Is it too much to say that the anxiety displayed in those days to make the Mysore Territory powerless against the British, is a proof that they regarded the distinct position of my country as a permanent fact ?

7. "My family also, even in its reduced position, was of more importance than the late Governor General seems to have supposed. The political advantage attending the possession of their persons was recognised by Hyder Ali himself, who, besides being a ruthless conqueror, was a quick and far-sighted statesman, and so highly did he estimate their influence, that when the direct line had failed for want of a natural-born heir, he selected a new head to the family by a formal and interesting ceremonial. (*Wilks' History of Mysore*, vol. ii, p. 163.) Lord Wellesley likewise makes frequent allusion to the 'justice' of my claims, and speaks of the 'high birth' of my family, and the 'antiquity of their legitimate title.'

8. "The good success of the administration of the Regent Poorniah is constantly quoted as a contrast to the bad success of my own : and, if the amount of revenue collected is taken as the sole test, it must be

admitted that the comparison is greatly in favour of the former. It has, however, been distinctly asserted, both by Lord William Bentinck's Commissioners and by Sir Mark Cubbon, (*General Memorandum on Mysore*) that the exactions of that Minister were calculated to exhaust the real energies of the State, and that collections were swelled to a fictitious amount by the vast stores of sandal wood, &c., which had accumulated during the reign of Tippoo. Besides this, a very large military force, particularly strong in European regiments, was maintained in those days, by which the price of grain was kept up, and great sums of money drawn from Madras, and put into circulation. (*Report on Insurrection*, par. 186.)

9. "Sir Arthur Wellesley, whom nothing seems to have escaped, was struck with the consequences which must ensue when this great military expenditure ceased, and points out that money could come from no other source into a country which was completely land-locked and 'shut out from intercourse with either coast.' (*Supplementary Despatches*, vol. iii, p. 164, 165.) He apprehends the worst consequences to Lord Wellesley's arrangements when this should take place, and as he apprehended so it fell out; for although I was able to keep clear of the 'Madras sharks,' (*Supplementary Despatches*, vol. ii, p. 574) the collections, and with them the Subsidy, fell into arrears, and the government of the country was assumed by the British. The true secret of correcting the unfortunate geographical position of Mysore has since been discovered to consist in the construction of bridges and roads; but it was to afford me advice of this sort that a Resident was attached to my Court, and I can confidently assert that no such advice was ever given. Nor, if roads had been made in Mysore, would they have been of much use, for years elapsed after the assumption before they began to be constructed in the Madras Presidency. (*Writings of Sir Arthur Cotton*, *passim*.)

10. "As my collections have been contrasted with those of Poorniah, before me, so also have they been compared with those of the British Commission after me. The financial success of Sir M. Cubbon's administration has doubtless been very great, but it has been principally caused by the augmentation of the land revenue, which in a country where the Battoya system prevails (under which the produce is equally divided between the Government and the cultivator), is dependent on the price of grain, which has increased to an incredible extent, entirely, as I believe, owing to the means of communication, which was an idea in advance of the age in which the government was in my hands. A statement of prices in 1832 and in 1862, more particularly in the Nuggar division, would astonish political economists.

11. "I think I have thus been successful in showing that other causes than mis-government were at work upon the revenue; and, even if mis-government were proved to have existed, I hope I shall not be misunderstood when I say that the researches of the Torture Commission, and other government inquiries in the neighbouring territory, will have established the fact that in India gross mis-government may long be carried on without the knowledge, or in spite of the exertions of the responsible authorities.

12. "Lord Canning has laid great stress on the fact that my people broke out in rebellion, and that they had to be quelled by British troops. But is there anything extraordinary in the fact that soldiers were called upon to restore the internal tranquillity of a territory, in which they had been living at free quarters for three and thirty years? And has insurrection, if insurrection it may be called, been unheard of elsewhere? On the contrary, may it not be described as the chronic state of India; may it not be compared with the cholera, as an epidemic from which the best governed States, as well as the best ordered constitutions, are never safe? In the present instance, it arose in the Nuggar division, to which I had no hereditary claims, and where I may be supposed to have had no personal influence. The people of one portion of Nuggar are of the same race as the people of Canara, and the inhabitants of the other are closely allied with the inhabitants of the Southern Mahratta country. It is a curious fact that both these territories have been more than once in open rebellion, of a most serious character, subsequent to the assumption of my government; and the flame lighted in Canara was not extinguished without the extraneous aid of European regiments from the Bombay Presidency, and of Irregular Horse from this very Mysore. All three districts, moreover, were alike conquered from Tippoo, in 1799, and it is fair to assume that disturbances arose in them from similar causes. A fact must be added, which is no assertion of mine, but is found recorded in the report of Lord William Bentinck's Commissioners, that the belief was universally prevalent among the Mysore ryots, that their opposition to the Serkar was viewed with complacency by the Company's Government at Madras. (*Insurrection Report*, par. 199, and other places.)

13. "I now feel that I am treading upon delicate ground, but my character and conduct have been attacked with such extraordinary asperity by Lord Canning, that it is necessary for my own vindication, to follow his example, by waiving delicacy in this instance, if in no other. I have stated above, on the best authority, what was the belief of my people; and I have equally indisputable authority, in the

shape of the evidence of a gentleman, happily still living in England, for the fact that he has frequently heard Lord William Bentinck say, in his retirement, that he bitterly regretted the step he had taken with regard to Mysore, into which he had been led by what he subsequently found to be false and distorted representations. Lord Canning will be the last man to dispute the authority which has said that, however undesirable it might be to add more provinces to the British dominions, yet that the case of Mysore, lying in the very heart of the Madras Territory, was *quite exceptional*. It was certainly thought to be so thirty years ago, and that this was likely to be the case was clearly foreseen by the great Duke of Wellington, who, on the 14th January, 1804, recorded, 'The Government of Mysore should be placed under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor General in Council. The Governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah, than they have with the Soubah of the Deccan or the Peishwah. The consequence of the continuance of the existing system will be that the Rajah's Government will be destroyed by corruption, or if they should not be corrupt, by calumny.' It is, further, matter of the utmost notoriety, that Sir Mark Cubbon resigned rather than serve under the Madras Government, and that he considered that even his administration had been weakened by the last mentioned evil influence.

14. "The conviction that he had been deceived had probably begun to work on Lord William Bentinck's mind, when he made his proposition that three of the Fouzdaris of Mysore should again be made over to me in sovereignty, and that the remainder, or so much as may satisfy the claims of the Company, should be transferred to the British Government. This proposal, it must be borne in mind, emanated from the very Governor-General whose hasty action deprived me of my Kingdom; and his words most unmistakeably are susceptible of no other meaning than that he had abandoned the idea of my being unfit to exercise sovereign powers, and that the claim of his Government was now limited to the requirement of a material guarantee for the payment of the Subsidy. The Court of Directors demurred to this arrangement, not as I understand on personal grounds, but because they objected to any division of a Kingdom, the integrity of which was guaranteed by the parties to the Partition Treaty. This I only know from hearsay, for no copy of the despatch was communicated to me, but its truth is confirmed by the fact, that in the year after Lord William's letter, the Supreme Government received orders 'not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency *when the country shall be restored to the Rajah.*'

For this extract I am indebted to Lord Canning himself, who quotes it in his Administration Report in 1860, with an introduction as to the necessity of '*fulfilling it conscientiously*;' and I must therefore own to considerable surprise when I found that his Lordship had made Lord William's proposal tell against me rather than in my favour; and that his conscientious interpretation of the words 'restored to the Rajah,' was merely that it was 'language consistent with a purpose at some future period, and under conditions left undefined,' to restore a native Government of some sort!

15. "Lord William Bentinck was succeeded by Sir Charles Metcalfe, the ablest Indian statesman of his generation, and pre-eminently qualified to form a judgment on any point connected with the conduct of a native Prince. It was Sir Charles Metcalfe's deliberately recorded opinion that the assumption of my Government was '*harsh and unprovoked*.'

16. "Lord Canning has reproached me, on the authority of Sir Mark Cubbon, with the opposition his administration had met with from myself and my partisans. I am of course unacquainted with the contents of that officer's reports (indeed throughout this vindication I labour under the disadvantage of most imperfect information of what has been alleged against me), but I think I can venture to say that they must be of very old date, for I have always understood that for many years past the Commissioner had cherished a very different opinion. These unfavourable statements were most probably made during, or immediately after, the time when, though deprived of the government, a British Resident still continued attached to my Court. My relations with this gentleman (Major-General Stokes) extended over several years, and as he is happily still alive, I fearlessly appeal to him, as to whether he can recal a single instance, in which, in his opinion, I acted contrary to the interests of the Government which he represented. I must protest, of course, against being held responsible for all unauthorised use of my name; and it will readily be admitted that no situation can possibly be conceived more likely to produce such uses, more especially as it was patent to all, that between the Commissioner and the Resident there was an utter want of sympathy and harmony. Both were honest and high-minded gentlemen, but their opinions, on many of the most important points that came before them, were opposite and antagonistic. The one was a friend and disciple of Lord Metcalfe, and held views, which up to the date of the receipt of this letter, I supposed to be identified with the name of Lord Canning. The other had been brought forward by Sir Thomas Munro, and was the strenuous and unflinching advocate of

the measures which afterwards found their crowning exponent in the administration of Lord Dalhousie. He was a wise man, and a good man, but both his wisdom and his goodness had taken their bent from the school in which he had been brought up. He honestly and firmly believed that until the last rag of power was stripped from the native Princes, and the whole map became coloured red, there was neither safety nor prosperity for India.

17. "I have before stated the opinion of Sir Charles Metcalfe as to the assumption of my country, and I think it quite probable that Colonel Stokes was imbued with the same feeling. At any rate, he and Colonel Cubbon never worked in harmony. The battle between them was for a long time fought through the medium of despatches to the Supreme Government, until at last, in the time of Lord Ellenborough, the Resident fell before the Commissioner, and the post of the former was abolished. I do not pretend to possess feelings above those common to mankind, and I freely own that my sympathies were deeply engaged with Colonel Stokes. It is to this period that I am inclined to refer the hostile opinions of Sir Mark Cubbon, and I can think of no one else likely to be indicated as a 'partisan' except the high officer deputed to my Court by the British Government to advise and guide me in all my actions.

18. "Lord Canning appears now to be of opinion that, up to 1857, I was disaffected and ill-disposed; and that it was only the great crash of the mutiny, which had so contrary an effect on many others, that led me to become loyal to the British Government, and to withdraw my opposition to the administration of Sir Mark Cubbon. But it is notorious in Mysore that that officer had long been of quite the contrary opinion, and I am greatly misinformed if Lord Canning has not indirectly borne testimony to the same fact by placing on record that I was *justified in referring with pride* to the present state of my country. His Lordship besides, on the 28th June, 1860, wrote to myself that 'the fidelity and attachment to the British Government, which have long marked your Highness's acts, had been conspicuous upon every opportunity.'

19. "Lord Canning has attached a reading to Articles IV and V of the Subsidiary Treaty which I must own struck me with surprise. I have before shown that when the words 'the Rajah' occurred in a despatch from the Court of Directors they were interpreted to mean nothing more than a native Government of some sort. When, however, they occur in the Treaty, they are narrowed down to their most restricted literal meaning, and are held not to extend even to my son, if I had one. I will not ask what was the meaning attached to these

Articles by the representatives of the Nizam, whose opposition Lord Wellesley deprecated, but I will ask what Lord Wellesley thought of them himself, and most fortunately I find the question fully and nobly answered in a letter to that statesman from his illustrious brother the future Duke of Wellington (dated 14th June, 1799, *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. i, p. 244). The Treaty was at the time in an incomplete state, and the Article mentioned as No. VI can only be IV and V of the perfected document; but even supposing it to refer to the present Article VI, the spirit indicated would be in no way affected. "Colonel Kirkpatrick will have written to you yesterday regarding the sixth Article of the Subsidiary Treaty. We all agreed that that ought to be modified in some manner. As it now stands, it will give grounds for the belief that we give the Rajah the country at the present moment, with the intention of taking it away again when it will suit our convenience. Supposing that the candid and generous policy of the present Government should weaken that belief so far as it regards them, it must be allowed that the conduct of the British Government in India has not at all times been such as to induce the natives to believe that at some time or other improper advantage will not be taken of that Article. They know as well as we do that there may be a change of government immediately, and that there certainly will be one in the course of a few years; and the person then appointed Governor-General may not have such enlarged systems of policy as those by which we are regulated at the present moment. This induces me to believe that they will object strongly to that Article, and I don't think it will be very creditable to us to insist upon it."

20. "The above speaks for itself; but according to the reading of Lord Canning, a Governor-General, such as the Duke of Wellington sees in prospect, had only to form the opinion that the short-coming provided against had been discovered, and, however restricted and temporary in its nature that particular short-coming might be, the Subsidiary Treaty became dormant; unless, indeed, the same, or another Governor-General, *during my life-time*, had decided that the crisis had passed away, and that the Treaty had become null and void, and the country lapsed absolutely, and with it all the rights of my heirs, should my death occur before that decision was arrived at (*Earl Canning's Letter*, par. 11). Yet Lord William Bentinck in 1834 had recorded that the Company had not assumed the management of the Mysore Government on its own account, but that it was still managed entirely on my behalf. He also decided that the Treaty was in no way cancelled, but still remained in full force (*Lord William Bentinck's*

Minute, 14th April, 1834). Let the noble ideas expressed by the Duke of Wellington decide the question between these two Viceroy.

21. "In order further to expose the weakness of Lord Canning's interpretation, it is only necessary to push it to the extreme, and to suppose that I had died the day after the Treaty was concluded! I submit it is impossible to conceive that the other Ally in conquest, who evidently scanned the provisions with a jealous eye, would have consented to an arrangement which hung on so slight a thread as the life of a child. This appears to me conclusive as to this point, even if the spirit which guided the framers of the Treaty had not been so unmistakably described by the most illustrious hand that aided in it.

22. "Lord Canning seems to suppose that I expected the Government to be handed over to me without the provision of any security that the country would continue to be well governed. But quite the contrary is the fact. A vast interval separates 1862 from 1832. Not a single individual survives who was about me at the earlier period. A new breed of public servants has grown up, who are skilled in the ways and imbued with the principles of Europeans. In the gentlemen of the Commission too, I should have been provided with a body of officers brought up at the feet of Sir Mark Cubbon, and acquainted with the general views which guided his long administration. Had my country been restored to me, it was never for one instant my intention to make any change in the present system, which was to remain, as it is now, a native administration, superintended and controlled in its every branch by Englishmen. In the event of any important change being thought necessary by myself and my advisers, it would not have been carried into effect without full discussion with the British Resident, who, I concluded, would have been nominated to my Court.

23. "I may here mention that, after watching from the vantage ground of my isolated position, the working of the Mysore Commission, I had come to the conclusion that it was defective in two points, and generally most admirable in every other. 1st.—The Judicial system appeared more cumbrous and slow than was necessary; and I had fixed my eyes upon a gentleman, qualified beyond all others, not only to reform it, but to render it a model for imitation elsewhere. 2nd.—The Public Works Department, in my opinion, and that of every person with whom I have conversed, is based on an altogether mistaken system. It would have been one of my first measures to have proposed to restore to the revenue authorities the power and responsibility which experience shows should never have been severed from their office.

24. "Lord Canning speaks of the high consideration which he entertains for me, but he did not answer my application until after a twelve-month of torturing delay, and almost contemptuous neglect, and his reply at last was couched in language of studied coldness and bitterness. It would appear, too, that he considers that the fact of my making this application had altered my position among Indian Sovereigns, for he addresses his answer to the Maharajah *residing at Mysore*, instead of (as has been the custom for sixty-three years) to the 'Maharajah of Mysore'; and he has gazetted his Private Secretary as 'Commissioner of Mysore,' in succession to Sir Mark Cubbon, who, for twenty-seven years, never styled himself, or was styled by others, anything but 'Commissioner for the *Government of the Territories of the Rajah of Mysore*,' and I, in my turn, addressed him as 'Commissioner for the *Government of my Territories*.' These changes are quite in accordance with the spirit of the letter.

25. "Finally, I am almost ashamed of having to defend myself against the charge of having 'permitted myself to forget the generosity of the British Government, in order to call in question its good faith and justice.' On the contrary, I venture to believe that I am now in reality defending that Government against one of its own honoured servants. It is not I who have drawn from a Treaty a doctrine, which the greatest of Englishmen has declared it would not be creditable to be thought to insist upon. It is from the same great man's words I have shown that both the crisis which arose, and the advantage that would be taken of it had been foreseen as almost inevitable, and beyond the power of the local Government to prevent. It is a body of British Commissioners whose words I have appealed to as absolving me from the principal gravamen of misgovernment (*Insurrection Report*, par. 201, and other places). It is the same body who have pointed out that when the Madras Government prohibited their Resident from listening to the complaints of the Ryots, it was virtually departing from the salutary principles of control relied upon by Lord Wellesley (*Insurrection Report*, par. 21-202). It is the same body who have more than hinted their regret that before the 'extreme and degrading' measure of resumption was adopted, there had been no attempt to reform by 'authoritative interference.' It was Lord William Bentinck himself who repented of what he had done, and made a generous effort to remedy it. It was Lord Metcalfe, the statesman who governed, gloriously for England, its three most important dependencies, that declared the assumption of my Kingdom to be 'harsh and unprovoked.' It is Lord Canning himself who has described the fidelity and attachment to the British Crown which

have long marked my acts, and been conspicuous upon every opportunity; and it is the same Lord Canning who leads the way to make waste paper of his own Proclamations. Lastly, it is from the lips of the Queen of England and of India herself that, within the last week, I have received the proud and grateful assurance that as I am the oldest, so am I the staunchest of Her Allies! With these and other gracious words still sounding in my ears, I can well afford to forget the harsh and contumelious language of the late Viceroy, and rely with patient confidence on that British truth and justice which he has so unjustly accused me of calling in question."

For nearly a year and a half the Rajah heard nothing officially on the subject of this appeal; though rumours, supposed to be authentic, more than once reached India, of great differences of opinion and animated discussions in the Indian Council as to the Hindoo Sovereign's rights, as to the duty of the British Government towards him and towards the people of Mysore, and as to the general policy of restoration. And at one period the Rajah was positively assured—and the assurance was not, I believe, founded on error—that the Secretary of State had consented to reinstate his Highness at the head of the Mysore Government on certain conditions, and that a draft despatch to that effect had been actually prepared, and was under consideration at the India Office. All his hopes, however, were damped for the present at the conversation with the Commissioner of Mysore described in the following Memorandum—

"At an interview which Mr. Bowring had with the Rajah of Mysore on the 14th September 1863, the following conversation took place:—

Mr. Bowring.

"A private letter has been received by me from Lord Elgin, the Viceroy, stating that a despatch from the Home Government contains an unfavourable decision with regard to your Highness's appeal for the restoration of the government of your country. His Lordship has desired me to inform him of the whole of your Highness's desires, and to report to him my own sentiments regarding the promotion and advancement of your Highness's dignity and comfort.

The Maharajah.

"The British Government considering me as the sole and rightful owner of this Kingdom—a Kingdom which from antiquity belonged to my ancestors—established me on the throne.

“You must be aware that I myself ruled this country for a space of twenty-two years with absolute power. I now firmly assert that I now am what I have been through life, a humble Ally, a staunch friend and well-wisher to the British Government. Moreover you must consider that I am the very person who was proclaimed by the Treaty of 1799 to be the rightful heir. I am no one else, but the same man, who is by the blessing of God still alive, and whose privileges and titles have from time to time been fully acknowledged and upheld by the British Government. It would undoubtedly be as well consistent with the principles of justice, as it would be gratifying to myself and to all my subjects, should the British Government, honouring the solemn provisions of the Treaty of 1799, restore me in my old age to the government of my country, which was declared to be assumed only for a certain time. But I have noted down on this paper all my sentiments, and I particularly desire you to read it; or I shall be glad to have it translated, if you will give me the services of one of your Assistants for a few minutes.

“*Mr. Bowring.*

“As your Highness’s case has been finally settled by the Secretary of State, there could be no advantage in my hearing anything more regarding the restoration of the government; but if there be any suggestion for the improvement of your Highness’s dignity and comfort, your Highness can express yourself verbally with perfect freedom.

“*The Maharajah.*

“It is my wish that the British Government should make it known by proclamation throughout my Kingdom that the country has been restored to me. Hereafter I wish that the Commissioner of Mysore may be designated the Resident and Minister at my Court,—the government being still administered by him, but in my name, and with my voice in all matters of importance. The balance now in the Treasury should be made over to me, and the yearly revenue also, after deducting the necessary expenses of the public establishments.* The power of Adoption must be admitted to rest with me. It is my

* This, I must confess, is rather an alarming demand; but all alarm and anxiety on the subject ought to have been dispelled long ago, and could be dispelled before the Rajah’s restoration, by “a regulation or ordinance”—to be issued as a law by the Sovereign—establishing a public Treasury and a Civil List or Privy Purse, with distinct accounts, forms and vouchers for disbursement, and under responsible officers. The organisation and control of such institutions are of course difficult at first, but not impossible; and

earnest desire that the native State of Mysore should continue from generation to generation. If these requests are complied with it will raise me in the estimation of my brethren, the Princes of India, it would be a source of gratification to me, and fill my people with contentment.

“ *Mr. Bowring.*

“Is it your Highness’s wish to adopt a son to succeed to all your Highness’s possessions ?

“ *The Maharajah.*

“It is not only my wish to make such an adoption, but I repeat it, it is my determination to adopt a son, in conformity with the Hindoo law and the long established usages of my ancestors, to be the representative of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore.

“ *Mr. Bowring.*

“What is the name of the youth whom your Highness intends to adopt,—to what line of descent does he belong, to the *Moogoor* or to the *Calola* line ?

“ *The Maharajah.*

“The youth does not belong to either of the branches you mention. His name cannot be announced at present, nor until the proper time arrives; but it is my express desire that you should communicate what I have said on this point to the Governor General.”

And shortly after this, the lamented and sudden death of Lord Elgin having occurred, it fell to Sir William Denison, who as senior Governor had taken provisional charge of the Viceregal office, to communicate officially to his Highness the views taken by the Home Government on the question of his reinstatement. This was done in the following letter.

“ *To his Highness Maharajah Kishen Raj Wadiyar Bahadoor,
of Mysore &c. &c. &c.*

“MY HONOURED AND VALUED FRIEND,

“It is my duty to inform your Highness that your appeal against the decision of the Government of India which was conveyed to you in

after a time—after a succession and a minority, for instance—they would work by themselves.

During General Cubbon’s administration a surplus, amounting to upwards of a million sterling, had accumulated, *in specie*, in the Mysore Treasury; part of which, I understand, has been invested in the Indian Funds during the present year.

Lord Canning's Khareeta dated the 11th March 1862, was duly forwarded to the Secretary of State in Council, and that the commands of Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the administration of the Mysore Territories, have now been received.

"Her Majesty's Government, in arriving at their decision, have been influenced by an anxious desire to do justice to all those who would be affected by it, and have felt that every consideration is due to your Highness on account of your age and your loyalty to the British Government. At the same time Her Majesty's Government, after weighing fully and carefully all the arguments adduced by your Highness, have decided that your title to the territories of Mysore rests solely upon the exercise by the British Government, in your favour, of an undoubted right of conquest; that the Subsidiary Treaty of the 8th July 1799 contains no conditions under which the administration of your Highness's possessions, if once assumed by the British Government, was to be restored to you; that while the orders from time to time issued by the Government of India and the Home Government, indicate a wish that no steps should be taken or expressions used which would interfere with the free exercise of their discretion in any future circumstances which might arise, the expression of these sentiments constitutes no obligation on the part of the British Government to reinstate your Highness and gives your Highness no right to such restoration.

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the assumption of the administration of your Highness's Territories in 1831, was in accordance with the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty; that your Highness cannot, as of right, now claim its restoration; and that the reinstatement of your Highness in the administration of the country is incompatible with the true interests of the people of Mysore.

"I am therefore commanded by Her Majesty's Government to inform your Highness, that Her Majesty's Government have determined not to interfere with the decision which was communicated to your Highness by Earl Canning and confirmed by Lord Elgin, and that the administration of Mysore shall continue to be conducted as at present by the British officers.

"I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself,

"Your Highness's sincere friend,

"W. DENISON.

"Fort William, the 31st December 1863."

There is nothing contained in this letter that will be new to my readers, nothing that demands any lengthened comment.

In terms more guarded and courteous than those used in Lord Canning's letter, the Rajah's title to the territories of Mysore is said to "rest solely upon the exercise by the British Government, in his favour, of an undoubted right of conquest." To this, after again observing that the conquest and the cession were made not by the British Government solely, but by the British Government and its Ally the Nizam, I can only once more append the question,—What better title could the Rajah possibly have? The Rajah certainly desires no better title than the cession of 1799, and has never repudiated his obligations to the British Government, although he alludes with very natural pride to the antiquity of that legitimate title which Lord Wellesley himself professed to respect, and which is recorded in the Partition Treaty of Seringapatam.

The Rajah's claim to reinstatement is explicitly and decidedly rejected in this despatch—for the first time be it observed since 1832—on the ground that the Subsidiary Treaty "contains no conditions under which the administration of his Highness's possessions, if once assumed by the British Government, was to be restored to him." There are indeed no particular conditions mentioned, no peculiar formality or process is laid down in the Treaty by which the restoration is to be accompanied; but at the same time it certainly does not appear to contemplate the perpetual retention of the government in our hands, since all the provisions of the Articles authorising British management, are expressly stated to be applicable only "*so long* as any part or parts of his Highness's territories shall remain under" our "exclusive authority and control."

In Article V of the Subsidiary Treaty it is expressly provided, that "whenever and so long" as any part of Mysore remains in our hands, we are to "render to his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed." This stipulation is now, and has been always, fulfilled by the British Commissioner. The accounts are regularly furnished to the Rajah up to this day.

In short, I am clearly of opinion that all the public debts having been long ago paid off, and the accounts closed; and what are called the Rajah's private debts being much less in amount than the accumulated surplus funds: and the Subsidy,

which Lord William Bentinck admitted had "never been in jeopardy," having for many years been paid in monthly instalments according to the terms of the Treaty; there is now no reason to doubt that the funds of the State are "efficient and available in time of peace or war;" and, consequently, that no cause remains, under the strict terms of the Treaty, for any longer retaining the Rajah's dominions under the "exclusive authority and control" of the British Government.

But extending the power of our Government under the Treaty to the utmost limit, granting, as I do, that having once assumed the management, and having retained it for thirty years, we are morally bound not to relinquish it until we have obtained the best security for "the welfare of the people," one of the objects mentioned in Article V, I say that there is no impossibility, no such difficulty of obtaining a full security, as could justify us in turning the temporary interference contemplated by the Treaty into a permanent sequestration. If our Government declares that it can devise no substantial reforms for Mysore as a native State; that it knows not how to impose such "ordinances and regulations" as would form a constitutional protection to the people; that it can prescribe no remedy for the defects of this, or any other native State, except extinction; then I say that it is not proclaiming the incapacity of native Princes, but its own incompetence as an Imperial Government.

But the "right of conquest" seems to be advanced somewhat inconsequentially in this letter, as if to suggest continuity and consistency with Lord Canning's epistle, without adopting his exaggerated doctrine that the right of conquest in Mysore is perpetual,—surviving the cessions, superseding the Treaties, precluding hereditary succession in the Rajah's family, and conferring sovereignty over the country and people not upon the restored Prince, but upon one of the victorious Allies who restored him. These extraordinary views are silently dropped in Sir William Denison's letter, and, I may add, in the despatch from the Home Government on which it is founded. Nothing is said about the Rajah's dignity not being "hereditary"; and it may still therefore be hoped that the Secretary

of State and the Indian Council have not as yet come to any adverse decision on that point.

The future maintenance of this allied and tributary State, of that "separate Government" in Mysore for which the Partition Treaty stipulates, and of the rights of the Rajah's family, or his adopted heir, now depend entirely upon the wisdom of the Home Government. If the professional rulers at Calcutta are allowed to have their own way in these matters, they will soon make short work of them.

CHAPTER V.

TREATY RIGHTS OF THE NIZAM.

THE threatened absorption of Mysore, on the demise of the present aged Rajah, is calculated to disgust and alarm all the Princes of India, as the first infraction of the general pledge in favour of native sovereignties, the promise to respect existing Treaties, and to abstain from territorial extension, contained in Her Majesty's Proclamation of 1858, and confirmed by Lord Canning's latest public measures; but it is more particularly calculated to disgust and alarm the Nizam, because it would constitute a direct and most contemptuous violation of our engagements with him, and would involve a direct menace against some of his most valued possessions, which, like the Mysore country, are at present confided, under Treaty, to our exclusive management.

In the conquest of Tippoo Sultan's dominions, and in the establishment or revival of the Hindoo State of Mysore, the Honourable Company did not act alone, but in concert with the Nizam. The Nizam had an army of 20,000 men in the field—including 6,000 Cavalry, the arm in which we were most deficient—who received their full share of the prize-money after the storm of Seringapatam. The two Allies agreed to a certain division and settlement of the conquered territories; and under the Partition Treaty of Seringapatam, portions equal in revenue, and conveniently situated with reference to their respective frontiers, were "retained in sovereignty" by the Company and the Nizam,* while the central districts, forming a compact Principality, were allotted to the Rajah of Mysore. Three Schedules attached to this Treaty specify minutely the limits and subdivisions of this triple distribution. Lord Wellesley, however, reserved to the Company, "as a just indemnification

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 77.

for their superior share in the expenses and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore.”* The Rajah was to be placed in a tributary and dependent position to the British Government, in return for its military protection, and as security for the regular payment of a fixed military Subsidy, and of additional contributions in time of war.†

In the last words of the Preamble to the Partition Treaty of Mysore, it is declared that all its Articles, “by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure, and its conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties.”‡

One of those conditions is thus stated in Article IV of the Treaty:—

“*A separate Government* shall be established in Mysore; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed that the Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Bahadoor, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described.”

And in Article V “the contracting parties mutually and severally agree that the districts specified in Schedule C, hereunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah, and shall form *the separate Government* of Mysore, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.”§

The only subsequent condition of this Treaty, referring to the Rajah of Mysore, is contained in Article IX:—

“It being expedient, for the effectual establishment of Maharajah Mysore Kishna Rajah in the Government of Mysore, that his Highness should be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, it is stipulated and agreed that the whole of the said force shall be furnished by the English East India Company Bahadoor, according to the terms of a separate Treaty, to be immediately concluded between the said East India Company and his Highness the Maharajah.”||

And as if to mark by a conspicuous ceremony the concerted action and equal participation of the two Allies in restoring the ancient Hindoo sovereignty, the infant Prince was carried to

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 77.

† Ibid., p. 85.

‡ Appendix B.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid.

the ivory throne of his ancestors, and publicly installed, by the officers of the highest rank belonging to both Governments. The circumstance is thus described by the Mysore Commissioners in their Report to the Governor General, dated the 30th of June 1799:—

“The ceremony of placing the Rajah on the Musnud was performed by Lieut.-General Harris, as senior member of the Commission, and by Meer Allum, each of them taking a hand of his Highness on the occasion.”*

And Lord Wellesley himself records the same incident in his despatch to the Court of Directors of the 3rd of August:—

“On the 30th June” (1799) “the Rajah of Mysore was formally placed on the Musnud by the Commissioners, assisted by Meer Allum.”†

Meer Abool Cassim, better known by his abbreviated title of Meer Allum, was the Dewan or Prime Minister of Hyderabad, who had been present with the Nizam’s army throughout the campaign and siege of Seringapatam, and who, as his master’s Plenipotentiary, concluded and signed the Partition Treaty of 1799.‡

“I found in Meer Allum, the Commander,” wrote Sir John Malcolm, who acted as Military Commissioner with the Nizam’s troops, “a man whose heart and soul were in the cause; and the advance of this force was so rapid, that it was obliged to halt some days for the advance of the Grand Army.”§

No step in the negotiations and settlement had been taken without the knowledge and consent of Meer Allum. Lord Wellesley, in the despatch appointing the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, and giving the outline of the arrangements he wished to be adopted, concludes with this injunction:—“The contents of this despatch must not be communicated to any person who may not have taken the oath of

* Wellesley’s Despatches, vol. ii, p. 736.

† Ibid., p. 85.

‡ The present Prime Minister of Hyderabad, the Nawab Salar Jung, is great grandson to Meer Allum; his paternal grandfather, Mooneer-ool-Moolk, having married Meer Allum’s only daughter. This lady’s son, Meer Mahomed Ali, was the Nawab Salar Jung’s father.

§ Kaye’s Life of Malcolm, vol. i, p. 84.

secrecy prescribed in the Commission, excepting Meer Allum.”*

And in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated the 3rd of August 1799, he observes :—

“On the 5th of June I had furnished the Commissioners with the first draft of a Treaty between the Company and his Highness the Nizam, for the partition of Mysore, and having received the fullest communication of their sentiments, and of those of Meer Allum, on the subject, I made such alterations as appeared to be advisable.”†

One very distinguished and highly trusted officer who was employed in the settlement of Mysore, Major Munro—afterwards General Sir Thomas Munro and Governor of Madras—gave a very decided opinion, as in the following extract, that the conquered territories ought to be equally divided, and that the installation of the infant Rajah would be both impolitic, and unfair to our Ally :—

“In making this partition, we have only to consult our own advantage and that of the Nizam.

“As I am convinced that the Mahrattas will not dare to give any interruption to the partition of the Mysore dominions between the Company and the Nizam, I do not know a single argument against it, unless it may be thought that it would make the Nizam too powerful; but this is an objection without much foundation.

“We may assert that the Nizam’s army has not contributed so much as the Company’s to the conquest of Mysore; but he has done all that he could; his troops have done more than was expected; and had they done less, still every principle of good faith demands that both parties should share alike; but if we only divide with him a part of the territories of the late Sultan, and set up a pageant over the rest to pay a British garrison in Seringapatam, and subsidise a large body of our troops, he must see and feel that we have infringed upon our engagements with him.”‡

And he writes as follows in a familiar letter to his father :—

“You will see in the papers how the Partition Treaty has been made. I believe that it has not met with general approbation here. Had I had anything to do in it, I would certainly have had no Rajah of Mysore, in the person of a child, dragged forth from oblivion, to

* Wellesley’s Despatches, vol. ii, p. 23.

† Ibid., p. 84.

‡ Gleig’s Life of Sir T. Munro, vol. ii, p. 231, 234.

be placed on a throne on which his ancestors for three generations had not sat more than half a century. I would have divided the country equally with the Nizam, and endeavoured to prevail on him to increase his Subsidy, and take a greater body of our troops; but whether he consented or not, I would still have thought myself bound by treaty to give him his fair half of the country.”*

The principle of the original offensive and defensive alliance between the Company and the Nizam, was that of “an equal division of conquered territory,” as stated in Article VI of the Treaty of 1790; † and although Lord Wellesley ruled that this engagement was not permanently obligatory, and that according to the letter of the new Treaty of 1798, the Nizam could not demand a share in the territorial acquisitions beyond his relative proportion in the expenses and exertions of the campaign, ‡ yet the principle of equal division was in fact adopted as the basis of the new arrangements. Indeed, so clearly was the spirit of the long standing engagements between the Allies in favour of the Nizam’s claim, that the same plan of equal partition was laid down in a Treaty concluded the very year after these transactions. In the third “separate and secret” Article of the Treaty of 1800, it is agreed as follows:—

“If, contrary to the spirit and object of this defensive Treaty, war should hereafter appear unavoidable, (which God avert!) the contracting parties will proceed to adjust the rule of partition of all such advantages and acquisitions as may eventually result from the success of their united arms. It is declared that in the event of war, and of a consequent partition of conquests between the contracting parties, His Highness the Nawab Asoph Jah shall be entitled to participate equally with the other contracting parties, in the division of every territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms.”§

And the same course was pursued in the Treaties of 1804 and 1822, after the first and second Mahratta wars. || By the Treaty of 1822 the Nizam not only gained an exemption from debts which he owed the dethroned Peishwa, amounting to

* Gleig’s Life of Sir T. Munro, vol. i, p. 222.

† Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 133.

‡ Wellesley’s Despatches, vol. ii, p. 77.

§ Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 151. || Ibid., pp. 157-159.

about sixty millions of rupees (six millions sterling), but cessions of territory which give him at least eighteen lakhs (£180,000) of additional revenue. On both occasions the Nizam received rather more than his fair share of the territories conquered by the allied forces.

The provinces at present forming the Principality of Mysore were thus ceded to the Rajah, not by the East India Company alone, but,—as stated in Article V of the Partition Treaty,—by the two allied and conquering powers, the East India Company and the Nizam. If therefore, by “right of conquest,” the British Government has any reversionary claim upon those provinces, the reversionary claim of the Nizam must be equally strong.

The following extracts from the contemporary despatches will prove that Lord Wellesley fully admitted the equal right and interest of the Nizam, in the disposal and settlement of the provinces conquered from Tippoo :—

“It is almost superfluous to state to you that the whole Kingdom of Mysore, having fallen to the arms of *the Company and the Nizam*, is at present to be considered as a part of their dominions by right of conquest.”*

“From the justice and success of the late war with Tippoo Sultan, *the Company and the Nizam* derived an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms. The right of conquest entitled *the Company and the Nizam* to retain the whole territory in their own hands; the cession of it to any other party, might be a consideration of policy or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground of justice or right.”†

“To have divided the whole territory *equally between the Company and the Nizam*, while it would have afforded strong grounds for jealousy to the Mahrattas, would have aggrandised the Nizam’s power beyond the bounds of discretion.”‡

“The Rajah of Mysore will therefore be restored to the throne, and maintained on it *under the protection of the Company, the Nizam*, and I trust also of the Mahrattas, who certainly all have a concurrent and common interest in the exclusion of Tippoo’s family.”§

And writing to the Commissioners who were engaged in negotiating the Subsidiary Treaty with the relatives of the

* Wellesley’s Despatches, vol. ii, p. 13.

† Ibid., p. 72.

‡ Ibid., p. 36.

§ Ibid., p. 38.

infant Rajah, on the absolute necessity of one particular Article being maintained without any alteration from the original draft, he says :—

“This is a point I hold to be so essential to the very existence of the new arrangement, that if it should appear objectionable, (on grounds of which I am not aware), I see no alternative but that of dividing the whole territory between the Allies.”*

It surely might be supposed, when a Principality had thus been constructed or reconstituted out of territories conquered by two Allies, and in consequence of the stipulations of a Treaty between them, that this settlement ought not to be disturbed, that this Principality ought not to be summarily appropriated by one of those two Allies, without the other's consent having been asked, without any previous consultation having taken place, without any explanation or notice having been given. The impropriety and irregularity of such a proceeding do not seem to be lessened in the present instance, when we recall to mind that for ten years before and for twenty-three years after that settlement, those two powers had continued to act upon that principle of equal partition which was the basis of their original alliance; that Lord Wellesley himself declares that the only alternative to the Hindoo restoration, would have been to divide the conquered country with our Ally; and that he anticipates the maintenance of the Mysore State under the protection of the Company and of the Nizam. And this reliance on the Nizam's concurrent protection, which I have quoted, is not stated in a document intended to persuade or flatter that Court, but in a private despatch addressed to Dundas (Lord Melville), then President of the Board of Control, where no empty compliment to the Nizam could possibly find a place, and where, on such a point, Lord Wellesley would be sure to express himself frankly.

By the Treaties of Vienna and Paris in 1815, the city and territory of Cracow, Poland and the Ionian Islands, were established as separate States,—the first as “a free, independent and neutral State,” under the protectorate of the three partitioning powers; Poland as a constitutional Kingdom under the Romanoff dynasty, but not incorporated in the Russian Empire;

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 49.

the Ionian Islands as an independent Republic, protected and administered, but not possessed, by the British Sovereign.* The absorption of Cracow by Austria in 1846, and the several encroachments by Russia on the constitution and separate existence of Poland, have from time to time formed subjects of remonstrance and protest by Great Britain and France. And if Great Britain had at any time pretended, by virtue of her long occupation, to convert her protectorate of all, or any one of the Seven Islands into full sovereignty, and had attempted to perform any such act of sovereignty as ceding any part of the Ionian State to any other power,—to Turkey, for example,—without the consent of Austria, Russia and France, they would certainly have protested against a proceeding so unwarrantable, and would probably have resisted it to the utmost.

Mysore was established as a separate State by the Partition Treaty of 1799; and if its incorporation into the British Empire were contemplated, the Nizam, as joint-conqueror, joint-restorer, and joint-protector, would have at least as strong grounds of complaint against Great Britain, as ever Great Britain and France had against Russia or Austria, in the cases of Cracow and Poland, or as the co-signatories of the Treaties of Vienna and Paris, would have had against Great Britain in the supposed case of the annexation or cession of the Ionian Islands.

Three great objects were settled by the Partition Treaty between the East India Company and the Nizam:—(1) the allotment of certain portions of the conquered country in full sovereignty to the Allies; (2) the establishment of a separate Government in Mysore under a descendant of the ancient Hindoo dynasty; (3) a suitable provision for Tippoo Sultan's family.

Besides those out-lying provinces of Tippoo's Empire which were acquired by the British Government as its share of the conquest, one small piece of territory within the frontiers of Mysore Proper was specially transferred to its keeping by the contracting parties, "for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, and for the general security." By Article III of the

* Acte du Congrès de Vienne du 9 Juin, 1815, Art. 6, 9, 10; and Convention de Paris, 5 Novembre, 1815;—Martens' Recueil, etc.

Partition Treaty, "it is stipulated and agreed that the Fortress of Seringapatam, and the island on which it is situated, shall become part of the dominions of the said Company, in full right and sovereignty for ever."*

This Article constitutes the sole and sufficient title of Great Britain to the possession of this celebrated stronghold. Without the express consent, thus given, of the Nizam, our Ally and partner in the conquest and its advantages, Seringapatam would have become part of the separate State under the Rajah of Mysore. Without the Nizam's consent, no other place or district within the limits of that separate State could have then become British territory, or can ever become British territory, by any legal title, "as long as the sun and moon endure."

The emphatic and special grant of the "sovereignty" in the little river island of Seringapatam to the Company by this Article, proves that the claim to sovereignty over the whole of Mysore by right of conquest, advanced in Lord Canning's letter to the Rajah, is quite unfounded.

And it is worthy of remark that by a Supplemental Article to the Partition Treaty, it is agreed, "with a view to the prevention of future altercations," that so far as the third great object of that Treaty,—a suitable provision for Tippoo's family,—extended, "the contracting parties shall not be accountable to each other on this head."† The least important of the three objects, an object merely of personal interest, being thus by a separate Article specially exempted from future inquiry and expostulation, and left to the discretion and good pleasure of the contracting parties, it is quite clear that the more important and fundamental objects of the Treaty were *not* by any means to be exempted from future inquiry and expostulation, and were *not* left to the discretion and good pleasure of either party, but that on these heads both parties would "be accountable to each other," "as long as the sun and moon should endure."

I have thus shown that not only would the Nizam have a good cause of protest against the appropriation of Mysore by the British Government for its own aggrandisement, as an unauthorised reversal of the settlement of 1799, as a measure

* Appendix B.

† Ditto.

opposed to the traditional policy of his House, but that even in the case of a genuine and unavoidable "lapse," by the extinction of the reigning family, his claim to a partition would be irresistible. If, on the contrary, the "lapse," pronounced or predetermined, were not genuine, but, as I contend, factitious and unfounded, the protest and remonstrance of the Court of Hyderabad would be still more formidable and embarrassing.

If, in reply to the Nizam's objections, the Government of India were to appeal, as they could hardly avoid doing, to the only plausible extenuation,—to the thirty years of British management, to the prosperity and contentment of the people during that period, and the duty of securing the permanence of the reformed institutions of Mysore,—the Nizam might well inquire, with very reasonable solicitude, how many years of British management would suffice to extinguish the sovereignty of his family in the two Provinces of Berar.

Just as the Nizam concurred with the Honourable Company in 1799 in recognising the young Rajah as the Sovereign of Mysore, so had the Nizam concurred with the Honourable Company in 1768 in recognising the Nawab Mahomed Ali Wallajah, previously his own feudatory, as the Sovereign of the Carnatic. And just as the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah, the acknowledged Sovereign of the Carnatic, by the Treaty of 1801, entrusted to the Company "the civil and military administration" of his territorial possessions, so did the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1853 assign Berar and other provinces to "the exclusive management" of the British Government.* In neither case was there any cession, or any relinquishment of sovereignty. After two hard diplomatic struggles, one in 1853, the other throughout 1859 and 1860, the Nizam still retains the sovereignty of those provinces, and has avoided assigning their management in "perpetuity" to the British Government.

Lord Dalhousie was very anxious, when the Treaty of 1853 was being negotiated, either to obtain a cession of certain Provinces, or else their assignment "*permanently*" or "*in perpetuity*;" but the Nizam's objections to all these forms were insurmountable, and the term ultimately adopted was, that the

* Parliamentary Papers, Nizam's Debts, 1854, p. 144.

Provinces were to be "assigned to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being."* Lord Dalhousie himself thus summed up the result of the discussion in the first paragraph of his Minute of the 30th of May, 1853:—

"His Highness did not receive with favour the proposal of the Government of India to cancel the principal sum of debt due by his Highness, as an inducement for the cession of certain portions of his Highness's territory, for the payment of the Contingent Force. He showed himself, from first to last, absolutely and inflexibly resolved to refuse all cession of territory *in perpetuity*, and he expressed the utmost reluctance even to assign districts to our management, the sovereignty remaining with himself. To this latter measure, however, he at last consented."

And in paragraph 6:—

"From the foregoing summary of the several Articles, it will be seen that the Treaty signed by the Nizam differs from the draft suggested by the Governor General in Council in two particulars. 1st. The Nizam *does not cede* the districts specified, *in perpetuity*, though he *assigns* them to the British Government. 2nd. The Government of India on its part does not surrender the principal sum of fifty lakhs of rupees which it was prepared to give up."

And again in paragraph 9:—

"Doubtless the Treaty would have been more complete, and still more advantageous to the British Government, if the territories, now *merely assigned*, had been *ceded* absolutely, and *in perpetuity*."†

* Draft Treaty, Article vi, p. 140, and Ratified Treaty, Article vi, p. 144; Parliamentary Papers, Nizam's Debts, 1854. See also *ibid.*, par. 41, p. 110, p. 118 to 120, and p. 133.

† Parliamentary Papers, Nizam's Debts, 1854, pp. 150, 151. Lord Dalhousie could not, however, allow the Nizam to enjoy unmolested this little diplomatic success. The first encroachment consisted in quietly inserting in the official Gazette of Calcutta the appointment of certain officers to posts in what were called "The Ceded Provinces of Hyderabad". Of course this ingenious device may have been the invention, not of the Governor General himself, but of some *very* clever Secretary; but it accords very closely with the subsequent trespass, undoubtedly Lord Dalhousie's own. Much to the surprise, however, of the official mind at Calcutta, this unwarrantable term immediately attracted attention at Hyderabad, and induced Salar Jung, the Nizam's Minister, to enter a decided protest against its use. This remonstrance could not be resisted with decency, and the term was altered to "The Assigned Provinces". In spite of this rebuke, in the

By Article IV of the Supplemental Treaty with the present Nizam,—concluded on the 7th of December 1860, “in order,” as stated in the Preamble, “to mark the high esteem in which his Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen”,—“his Highness agrees to forego all demand for an account of the receipts and expenditure of the Assigned Districts for the past, present or future”: but the British Government promises to “pay to his Highness any surplus that may hereafter accrue”, after defraying all charges and expenses, “the amount of such expenses being entirely at the discretion of the British Government”. By Article V the Viceroy restores to the Nizam the two Assigned Provinces of Nuldroog and the Raichore Doab, retaining “in trust”, under Article VI, only the two Berar districts.*

We received the Carnatic from the Nawab, as we received Berar from the Nizam, as *a trust* on certain conditions, and not as an absolute possession. And at the present day we ought to hold the Carnatic, as we still profess to hold Berar, as a trust,† and on no other terms. But instead of doing so, since the demise of the Nawab of the Carnatic in 1855, we have refused—on the preposterous plea that the Treaty of 1801 was only “personal”, or for one life, and that the two subsequent successions were merely by “grace and favour”—to recognise the lawful heir and successor, Prince Azeem Jah,

face of the Nizam’s repeated and recorded rejection of the term “*in perpetuity*”, Lord Dalhousie, in his farewell Minute of the 28th of February, 1856, writes as follows:—“By a Treaty concluded in 1853, his Highness the Nizam has assigned *in perpetual government* to the Honourable East India Company, the Province of Berar and other districts of his State.” And he then proceeds to calculate the revenue of these Assigned Districts as an addition “to the annual income of the Indian Empire.” (!) Parliamentary Paper, Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 1856, pars. 18, 19, and note.

* *The Nizam*, by H. G. Briggs, 1861, vol. i, p. 317. I believe this last Treaty has not yet been published in any Parliamentary Paper.

† This very term is used by Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras, in the Proclamation of 31st July 1801:—“His Lordship, in accepting the *sacred trust transferred to the Company by the present engagements*, invites the people of the Carnatic to a ready and cheerful obedience to the authority of the Company.”—*Carnatic Papers*, 1861, p. 105. The same term is used in the Nizam’s Treaty of 1860.

a son of the Nawab with whom the Treaty of 1801 was concluded.*

The Nizam, having been already sufficiently alarmed and affronted by the Carnatic spoliation, now sees the annexation of Mysore impending; a transaction so hostile to his rights and dignity, so manifestly injurious to his interests, so directly threatening his own possessions, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to evade or resent his demand for explanations. If, after managing Mysore in the Rajah's name, and rendering annual accounts, for thirty years, we claim the sovereignty of his dominions, and decline to recognise his heir; if after fifty years of uninterrupted "*civil and military administration*",† and after two successions, we were entitled—without form, apology, or public notice—to confiscate the Carnatic, and to refuse the stipulated share of the revenues to the Nawab—after how many years of "*exclusive management*",‡ and after how many successions, shall we be entitled to appropriate the Nizam's two provinces of Berar, and to refuse any longer to "make over the surplus revenues"‡ to the Sovereign of Hyderabad? How these questions can ever be answered, how any distinction can ever be drawn between the cases, so as to reassure the Nizam's Government, appears to me to be quite an insoluble problem. To meet expostulations from that quarter with a contemptuous reprimand, to refuse explanations, to decline discussion, and to threaten coercion, would be a much easier task, and one much more congenial and familiar to the powers that be—at Calcutta.

* For a full account, see *The Empire in India*, Letter III, p. 47.

† The words used in the Treaty of 1801 with the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowla, Collection of Treaties, 1812, p. 467.

‡ Terms used in the Treaty of 1853 with the Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla (Volume of Treaties, 1856, p. 70), and in the Treaty of 1860 with the Nizam Afzool-ood-Dowla.

CHAPTER VI.

RIGHTS OF THE RAJAH AND HIS HEIRS.

I HAVE heard that in a certain voluminous work—age and author unknown—descriptive of Northern Europe, there is one Chapter with this remarkable heading,

“ON THE SNAKES IN NORWAY.”

The whole Chapter however only consists of these words:—

“There are no snakes in Norway.”

A singular parallel to this negative specification is to be found in the Administrative Report of the Government of India for 1860 on Mysore. In the general Table of Contents, in company with JUDICIAL, REVENUE, and PUBLIC WORKS, there is a special department for

“MARINE,”

And a Section with the same heading is duly placed in its proper order; but contains only the following information:—

“MARINE.

“Mysore is without any sea-board or navigable rivers.”

If the present Chapter were to be written, in this peculiarly exhaustive style, by any one imbued with the doctrine and spirit of Lord Canning's letter, it would be very brief, and might stand thus:—

RIGHTS OF THE RAJAH AND HIS HEIRS.

The Rajah has no rights, and his heirs cannot be recognised. Or if we expand our summary a little, and adopt the very words of that extraordinary communication, it might run as follows:—

The Rajah of Mysore enjoys the personal provision—an

ample provision for his comfort and dignity—made for him when the British Government, as Conqueror and Sovereign, cancelled the authority it had conferred, and reentered upon the possession of the Mysore territories. This provision is a personal right, not heritable even by a natural-born heir; and his title to that right rests upon favour shown to his Highness by the British Government.*

A personal right, resting upon grace and favour, seems to me to be little better than no right at all. But I trust I have given sufficient reason in the last two Chapters for not accepting the conclusions of Lord Canning's letter, and for disapproving entirely of its spirit. I believe that the Rajah and his heirs for ever, have the right of sovereignty in Mysore, under the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam, and that this right is secured and guaranteed to them by the Partition Treaty of Mysore, between the Nizam and the British Government.

In his determination not to allow the coveted reversion of Mysore to escape, Lord Canning was driven at last to threaten the annihilation of the Rajah's dynasty with a very cruel weapon—the weapon used by Lord Dalhousie in the Carnatic spoliation, and displayed in his Minute on Mysore†—to deny that the sovereignty of Mysore was hereditary even to direct lineal descendants, to declare the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 “a personal Treaty,” made only for one life, and renewable merely at the good pleasure of the British Government, as a matter of grace and favour. The intention of using this plea is evident in that passage of the letter to the Rajah, in which Lord Canning tells him that his personal provision “is not a heritable right, and would not be claimable even by a natural-born heir.” I shall show that this reserved plea of a personal or life Treaty, is utterly untenable and groundless.

The Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 with the Rajah of Mysore is declared in the Preamble to be “a Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance,” concluded in consequence of what was “stipulated in the Treaty of the 22nd of June 1799” (the Partition Treaty) “between the Honourable East India Company and the Nawab Nizam-ood-Dowla;”—“for effecting a settlement of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultan,”—and “in

* Ante, p. 67-9.

† Ante, p. 36.

order to carry the said stipulations into effect;”* and the Preamble closes with the asseveration that it “shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure.”†

Two preliminary points of great importance come out very clearly in the terms of this Preamble. Firstly, although the Nizam is not a party to the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah, his equal action and interest in establishing the separate State of Mysore, are fully admitted; the Subsidiary Treaty is concluded in order to carry out the stipulations of the Partition Treaty with the Nizam. Secondly, as the Treaty is stated to be “perpetual,” and to be of binding force on both parties “as long as the sun and moon shall endure,” it is not a personal but a real Treaty; and therefore, although the usual words, “his heirs and successors,” are not appended to the Rajah’s name, hereditary succession is effectually maintained.

The Treaty declares itself to be perpetual, and to be made for important public objects; it is therefore a real and not a personal Treaty.‡ The Rajah of Mysore was certainly recognised and instituted, by the terms of this Treaty, as the reigning Sovereign of Mysore, and an Ally of the British Government. The dignity of a reigning Sovereign is essentially hereditary in India, as in Europe. If the Rajah had been a person arbitrarily selected for this dignity by the East India Company alone, of its own good pleasure, as a reward for his services, or in consideration of his eminent personal qualifications, this Treaty collated with the Partition Treaty, would still have transmitted

* Appendix B.

† Appendix B.

‡ “Treaties, properly so called, are either personal or real. They are personal, when their continuation in force depends on the person of the Sovereign (or his family), with whom they have been contracted. They are real, when their duration depends on the State, independently of the person who contracts. All Treaties made for a time specified, or for ever, are also real.” *Law of Nations*, translated from G. F. von Martens, London, 1803, p. 54. “Treaties,” says Vattel (book II, chap. xii, § 187), “that are perpetual, and those made for a determinate time, are real; since their duration does not depend on the lives of the contracting parties.” And Grotius points out that it is not necessary that the words “heirs and successors” “should be introduced in order to make the Treaty real.” *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. ii, c. 15.

the sovereignty to his heirs. But it was not so: the Rajah's position is much stronger; he was selected by the two Allies, the East India Company and the Nizam, disposing of territories conquered by their united arms, to be the Sovereign of "a separate Government;" and he was expressly so selected as the "descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore," as the representative of a royal family whose hereditary succession had been preserved for upwards of three centuries, and which had only been excluded from power, during the military usurpation of Hyder and Tippoo, for the comparatively short space of thirty-eight years. Lord William Bentinck, in his severe letter of 1832, informing the Rajah that he was about to assume the management of Mysore, thus describes what took place after the fall of Seringapatam:—"Your Highness is well aware of the generosity displayed by the conquerors upon that occasion. Instead of availing themselves of the right of conquest, and of annexing the territories of Mysore to those of the Honourable Company and of the Nizam, the sovereignty was restored to the family of the ancient Rajahs of the country, who had taken no part in the contest, and your Highness was placed on the musnud." And all the conditions of the Partition Treaty, providing for this restoration, and making the detailed allotment and cession of the provinces "to form the separate Government of Mysore," are also said to be binding upon "the heirs and successors of the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure."

The Partition Treaty, as I have stated in the last Chapter, divided the dominions ruled by Tippoo Sultan into three parts, and the Schedules attached to that Treaty define the respective acquisitions of the Honourable Company and the Nizam, and the limits of the Rajah's dominions. No Schedule is attached to the Subsidiary Treaty; the frontiers and extent of the Mysore State are not in any way indicated therein, except as "the territories specified in Schedule C, annexed to the said" (Partition) "Treaty." Thus, without a reference to the Partition Treaty with the Nizam, the representatives of the Rajah would never have known what districts were comprised in the Mysore country. And, therefore, although the Rajah was not a party to the Partition Treaty, nor the Nizam to the Subsidiary

Treaty, it is manifest that the one cannot be read without the other; that the two are inseparably bound up together; that the Rajah of Mysore is entitled to point equally to both Treaties in support of his sovereign rights.

All the conditions which were imposed upon the Rajah of Mysore by the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, slightly modified by the additional Articles of 1807, may be concisely stated as follows:—He was to receive a military force furnished by the East India Company, for the defence and security of his dominions, and to pay the annual sum of seven lakhs of star pagodas (£245,000) as a Subsidy* (Article II); he was to maintain at all times fit for service, and ready to serve with the Company's army, a body of 4,000 effective Horse (Additional Article I); to hold no communication or correspondence with any foreign State (Article VI.); to admit no European into his service, or into his territories, without the consent of the Company (Article VII): to make a suitable provision for certain officers of rank in the service of Tippoo Sultan (Article XI): and lastly, Article XIV contains a declaration on behalf of the Rajah that he will "pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both States." (Appendix B.)

It is with reference to this last Article only that the Rajah has been charged—most unfairly and absurdly in my opinion—with an infraction of the Treaty, or in the words of Lord Canning's epistle, with its "flagrant and habitual violation." Every stipulation of that Treaty providing an equivalent in money and military aid for general protection, has always been fulfilled to the letter, and the British Government has thereby profited largely. The Rajah has never been accused of hostile

* In addition to this, the Rajah, by a subsequent arrangement, pays £5,000 per annum, as *rent* for the river island of Seringapatam, held in sovereignty by the British Government, making £250,000 per annum in all.

or sinister intrigues against the dominant power, either within or without his own territories. His Highness's hearty allegiance to British supremacy, his loyal demeanour, his beneficial influence and useful services during the crisis of rebellion, have been the recent subject of grateful acknowledgments by the Viceroy, the Secretary of State, and—it is understood—by the Queen herself. The slightest dereliction within this sphere of duty, might well be charged as an infraction of the Treaty. But the obligations of Article XIV must be placed in quite another category. In the first place, they do not relate to any promised advantages or service that could be improperly withheld from the British Government, and which the Rajah might be called upon, under penalty, to make good. They relate to "the mutual welfare of both States" in a general way, but more particularly to "the advancement of his Highness's interests, and the happiness of his people,"—in short, to the welfare of the State of Mysore. This Article was meant to promote the good order and stability of the separate Government of Mysore, and was never intended to prove a trap, or to furnish a pretext for its destruction. The obligations are mutual, the dominant power undertaking to offer good advice, the dependent Prince promising to pay the utmost attention to it. But the British Government could not possibly have the right of complaining that its advice was not followed, unless the Rajah displayed the most open and defiant contumacy, because, under Article IV of the Treaty, it held the corrective remedy for the inattention or disobedience of the Mysore State in its own hands: it had the power of imposing regulations and ordinances, "for the effectual protection of the country, and the welfare of the people."* The British Government having confined its controlling action to vague and loose reproof, and to the remonstrances of the Resident in particular cases; having neglected to make its advice efficacious by establishing general principles and substantive law; having neglected to make its advice authoritative by the imposition of ordinances, or even by the firm presentation of specific measures of reform, is completely debarred from accusing the Rajah of an infraction of the Treaty. As well might the Rajah of Mysore accuse the

* Appendix B.

British Government of infringing the Treaty, in not having pressed its good advice upon him at the proper time, and in the most effectual form.

The Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 is what is called by writers on public law "a Treaty of unequal alliance." Grotius says that in a Treaty of unequal alliance, "where the terms of the compact give a permanent precedence to one of the parties,"—"where the greater share of power goes to the stronger,"—"the King" (or State) "preserves his sovereignty." And "in unequal alliances the words *command* and *obedience* are sometimes used with reference to transactions between the superior and the inferior; but this does not refute what I have said." "The payment of money to the superior, as a consideration for protection, does not destroy sovereignty."* And Wheaton says:—"Treaties of unequal alliance, guarantee, mediation and protection, may have the effect of limiting and qualifying the sovereignty according to the stipulations of the Treaties."†

The sovereignty of the Rajah of Mysore is, therefore, undoubtedly limited and qualified by the stipulations of the Subsidiary Treaty, under which the power of making war, and of communicating with other States is resigned, and an authoritative right of counsel is conceded to the British Government; but it is limited by nothing beyond those stipulations, and no provision is made in that Treaty for the suppression, under any circumstances, of the Rajah's sovereignty, or of that separate government of Mysore constituted by the Partition Treaty with the Nizam.

That Lord Canning did really meditate the suppression of the Mysore State was first placed beyond a doubt, to my mind, by the fact that he tacitly, but very effectually, excepted the Rajah from the benefit of the *amende honorable* to Hindoo Sovereigns, which was based on that Adoption despatch of the 30th April 1860, approved in Sir Charles Wood's reply of the 26th July of the same year, to which I have so often referred.‡ When all the other Rajahs of India received the assurance in a circular letter from the Governor General, that Her Majesty

* De Jure Belli et Pacis, Dr. Whewell's edition, 1853, lib. I, c. ii, pp. 152, 153, 157, 160.

† Elements of International Law, Boston, 1855, p. 45. ‡ Appendix A.

desired the dignity of their houses to be perpetuated, and would for the future recognise the right of succession by adoption, no copy of this letter was sent to the Rajah of Mysore; and this letter, representing Her Majesty's intentions to be confined to "the several Princes and Chiefs *who now govern their own territories*," was expressly worded so as to exclude the case of the Rajah of Mysore, and his case alone, by this captious and accidental distinction.*

The Rajah of Mysore, though still acknowledged to be the Sovereign of that country, has not governed his own territories for the last thirty-two years.

The administration of Mysore was undertaken by us in 1832, and has been carried on ever since in the Rajah's name, by virtue of Articles IV and V of the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, which gave the British Government the right to assume the management of such parts of the Rajah's dominions as might be sufficient to furnish a full security against any apprehended failure in the payment of our Subsidy. There is nothing in the nature of those or any other provisions of the Treaty, or in the actual continuance of our administrative intervention, that can really affect the Hindoo law of inheritance, or weaken the rights of an adopted son. But according to the Rajah's interpretation of the Treaty, this administrative intervention ought long ago to have ceased. If, therefore, the Rajah had resumed his active functions, either by the favour and good will of our

* The following is a translation of one of these letters :—

	L. S.	
"To	"H.H. RAJAH RAVI VURMAH,	"OF COCHIN.
	etc., etc., etc.,	

"After compliments.—Her Majesty being desirous that the Governments of the several Princes and Chiefs of India *who now govern their own territories* should be perpetuated, and that the representation and dignity of their Houses should be continued; I hereby, in fulfilment of this desire, convey to you the assurance that on failure of natural heirs, the adoption by yourself and future rulers of your State of a successor, according to Hindoo Law and to the custom of your race, will be recognised and confirmed.

"Be assured that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made to you, so long as your House is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the conditions of the Treaties, grants, or engagements which record its obligations to the British Government.

"CANNING."

Government, or, as he contends he should have done, by right, when the improvement of the revenue had removed all fear of his solvency—if indeed any such fear ever existed—he would then, according to the terms of Lord Canning's circular, have become entitled to adopt a successor. And thus, upon the disputed construction of Article IV, would come to depend not only that temporary question of the Rajah's personal rule, to which alone the Article was meant to refer, but also the vital question, unimagined by those who framed the Treaty, of the extinction or perpetuation of this ancient Hindoo sovereignty.

But it must also be noticed here that Lord Canning, having on the 30th of March 1860,* told the Secretary of State that the Rajah was willing to bequeath his Kingdom to the British Government, and having referred to the fact that his Highness had not adopted an heir, as a satisfactory point in the situation, could hardly be expected on the 30th of April—just one month later—to write to the Secretary of State, proposing to encourage the Rajah to adopt, and to follow that up by inviting that Prince himself to take the very step which, in Lord Canning's opinion, was so strongly to be deprecated. This particular inconsistency was not committed. The boon, or at least the invitation, was to be confined to those Princes "who now govern their own territories."

It is very remarkable that neither Lord Canning, in his despatch to the Secretary of State of the 30th of March 1860, nor Lord Dalhousie, in his Minute of the 14th of January 1856,† directly denies or impugns the Rajah's right of adoption. Indeed, from their both noticing as a gratifying circumstance that he had not adopted a son, one would rather be justified in assuming that they could not deny his right to adopt—in Sir Mark Cubbon's words:—"As for the adoption, they dare not refuse it."‡

But from the significant exception in the Adoption despatch and circular letter to Princes, I am afraid that Lord Canning, if he failed to obtain the free-will bequest, if the Rajah and his family were obstinate, was prepared to revert to that pretended Imperial prerogative of refusing to recognise an adoption, which he had himself condemned and discarded.

* Ante, p. 51.

† Ante, p. 36.

‡ Ante, p. 47.

The Adoption despatch itself distinctly acknowledges that the imaginary precedents for ignoring adoptions cannot be found, do not in fact exist. "We have not shown," he says in paragraph 17 of that despatch, "so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from the Paramount Power.*" Yet he did, in the same breath, covertly refuse his assent to such an adoption by the Sovereign Prince of Mysore, by arbitrarily confining the advantages of this very despatch to those Princes "who now govern their own territories." Mysore must indeed be an "exceptional case," when we see that its temptations could lead a statesman of clear head and high principle into this maze of inconsistencies.

I regret that a copy of the circular letter to the Princes of India, promising to recognise adopted successors, was not sent to the Rajah of Mysore; but I cannot allow that his rights, or the rights of his family, are in the least diminished by that omission. I must entirely repudiate the notion that the Rajah of Mysore, or any other Hindoo Sovereign, ever had, or has now, any need of the Viceroy's permission, in any form, as the preliminary or as the ratification of a fully effective adoption. The Rajah, in common with all other Hindoo Princes, and in common with all other Hindoos, possesses the legal right of adopting a son, who can by no principle of law, by no precedent older than Lord Dalhousie's series of iniquities, be excluded from inheritance and succession. An adoption, affording, as it does, the only channel by which the nearest collateral or cognate can succeed, in default of a lineal male descendant, cannot reasonably be considered either as a privilege or as an unusual process, but is an essential and indispensable incident of the Hindoo law of inheritance.†

I am not so well acquainted with the actual condition of the Rajah's family, as to be able to judge whether any member of it is entitled to make any claim to the throne by consanguinity to

* Appendix A.

† I have recently argued the general question of Adoption so fully, that I do not consider it necessary to go over the same ground here, but must refer to *The Empire in India*, Letters on "The Right of Adoption", p. 127, and "Sattara", p. 154.

the reigning Prince, or by virtue of descent from a common ancestor. I do not know whether the Rajah's grandsons, in the male or female line, are absolutely illegitimate, so as to be ineligible for succession, with or without the ceremony of an adoption. There are precedents in some native States for the succession of an illegitimate line, on failure of the superior House. On the particular pretensions of any branch or individual, I am not prepared to pronounce, or even to offer an opinion, not being sufficiently informed either as to the Rajah's kindred, or as to local and family customs and precedents. But on the general question, I see no ground whatever for doubt or cavil. The Rajah's act of adoption would convey to any person legally eligible an indefeasible title to the sovereignty of Mysore. In the event of his Highness's demise without having adopted a son, the right and duty of adoption would devolve upon his senior widow. To the many authorities on this point, quoted by me in a recent publication,* I may add the testimony of Sir John Malcolm:—

“The first in rank among the Princesses of a Hindu Ruler or Chief who has no issue, becomes on his death a personage of great consequence in the State, from her acknowledged right of adoption, and the claims upon the power and property of her husband, which this choice confers. It is generally conceived a duty to choose from the least objectionable among the near relations of the deceased; but the obligation is not imperative, and the consequences of the exercise of this right too often produce family feuds and disputed successions.”†

The “ruling sanction” of the Paramount Power, however amplified and abused during Lord Dalhousie's sway, properly extends only to the prevention of these family feuds, to the ultimate decision in disputed successions, and no farther.

In short, if the justice and good policy of maintaining this Principality are recognised, there can be no difficulty in fixing upon the heir. If on the other hand annexation is decreed, it may as well be done boldly, on the plea that the Raj is not heritable even to a natural-born heir; for it is impossible to show that any Paramount Power in India has ever possessed any more right to refuse succession to an adopted son than to a lineal male descendant.

* *The Empire in India*, p. 140-144.

† Malcolm's *Central India*, vol. i, p. 484.

CHAPTER VII.

IMPERIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

FOR many years past very confused and erroneous notions have extensively prevailed, as to certain supposed rights or strong claims of Great Britain to a position of Imperial or Paramount supremacy over all the native Sovereigns of India. I do not think that any such claim was ever advanced, in any official document or in any historical work, before the complete subjugation of the Mahratta Princes, and the general pacification of India, by the Marquis of Hastings in the year 1819; and no such general claim can be found, expressed or implied, in the Treaties of that critical period. It would be immaterial, even if it were possible, to trace the exact date, or the particular authority, from which this claim originated; but we find it asserted and enforced, in its fullest development, with ruinous results to several native dynasties, and with the effect of a general menace to all, during Lord Dalhousie's eight years' tenure of the Viceroyalty, from 1848 to 1856.

As the British dominions were extended and consolidated, and British domination became more and more an indisputable fact, a gradual approach seems to have been made to the demand of Imperial prerogatives, while the limits of those prerogatives were at every step progressively expanded.

These assumed prerogatives have been strained in two directions, and with two purposes: in the direction of Feudal Suzerainty, with the alleged purpose of consolidating our Empire; in the direction of Administrative Dictatorship, with the alleged purpose of protecting the people. Both these purposes are good; both these pretensions are based on truth and reason; but they have unfortunately been pushed far beyond their legitimate scope, until their ordinary statement,

official and literary, has become false in letter and spirit ; until their origin has become obscure, and their future inscrutable ; until the native Princes and their subjects have learned to dread every allusion to these prerogatives as the prelude of insidious aggression.

To regulate the successions in minor principalities is a natural attribute of Imperial authority ; and although the East India Company, which, like the Nawabs and Rajahs, had been a vassal of Delhi, never could or did pretend to occupy the throne of Timour, the duty of deciding in cases of doubtful or disputed succession has devolved upon Great Britain, as a moral result of her immense material strength, and of her pre-eminent interest in the preservation of the general peace and good order of India. This duty was not assumed by our Government without many misgivings and much hesitation. It was declined on two remarkable occasions by Lord William Bentinck,* and the manifest disorder and discredit arising from the over-scrupulous non-interference of that nobleman's administration had probably the greatest effect in determining his successors to adopt a bolder policy. But we did not know where to stop. The moral duty of pacification, imposed upon Great Britain by her overwhelming power in India, and by the general tenour of her engagements with the native States, naturally extended to all cases of disputed inheritance ; while over a large class of petty Princes she had acquired, by conquest, treaty or patronage, an unquestioned supremacy and the privilege of investiture. But the duty of investing feudatories, of superintending and controlling successions in Hindoo royal families, was by degrees exaggerated into the right to *divest* feudatories, and to abolish royal families, by refusing to recognise adoptions. The adoption of an heir, which among the Hindoos is not only a religious and social obligation, but is an ordinary, essential and incessantly recurring incident of their law of inheritance,—without which, on the failure of lineal descendants in the male line, even the nearest collateral cannot claim by virtue of his consanguinity,—was declared to be an extraordinary and special boon, to be granted or withheld at the choice of the dominant power. This

* *The Empire in India*, p. 213-217.

new doctrine, resting on no historical or legal foundation, was first applied in 1841, in Lord Auckland's time, to bar a succession to the petty State of Colaba, over which "the entire supremacy," and "right of investiture," were expressly reserved by Treaty to the British Government; and in 1848 it was employed for the extinction of the Sattara family, although its head had always been treated by us with great form and ceremonial as a royal personage, with whom, "his heirs and successors," "in perpetual sovereignty," we were connected by a Treaty of "friendship and alliance." On this critical occasion the new destructive heresies, fortified by an audacious assertion of utterly imaginary precedents,* were exalted into political maxims, formally ratified and confirmed by the conclusion of the Court of Directors, that "a dependent principality cannot pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the Paramount Power; that we are under no pledge, direct or constructive, to give such consent; and that the general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it."† In accordance with this judgment, and as natural consequences of the approved annexation of Sattara, the extinction of the important State of Nagpore, and the small Principality of Jhansi, followed in the year 1854.

And thus, with the purpose in view of consolidating the Empire, one of the chief prerogatives of Imperial Suzerainty, which might have been exercised with the cheerful and unanimous acquiescence of the Princes and people of India, was perverted and prostituted to the lust of territory.

Our first encroachment, in the case of Colaba,—far from being a proper and opportune assertion of Imperial rank and functions, as some have argued,—was an absolute abdication of that federal rank, and a repudiation of those functions of protection and control, which alone could entitle the *de facto* Paramount Power to be recognised and obeyed as the Imperial sovereignty of India. By this new policy our Government denied its origin and history, contradicted all its precedents, renounced the beneficent duties of *Empire*, and assumed the offensive and defiant position of an all-absorbing acquisitive *Kingdom*. No *de facto* Paramount Power, no *de jure*

* *The Empire in India*, p. 165-168. † Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 8.

Imperial or Federal Head in Asia or in Europe since the world began, has ever continued for any lengthened period to retain its commanding influence by common and peaceable consent, when it has ceased to respect and protect the integrity of the possessions, and the privileges and the dignity of the minor constituent States. The British Government has lost at once power, influence and reputation, by its territorial acquisitions of the last twenty years.

But in those days the doctrine had become universally accepted at Calcutta, that the native Princes were disqualified for any good purpose, useless as allies, impotent as enemies, and yet capable of being very troublesome, and that our only true policy was, in Lord Dalhousie's own words, that of "getting rid of those petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never be a source of strength."* Mr. George Campbell wrote as follows in 1852, alluding to the case of Sattara :—

"One right of Lord Paramount we have unequivocally established, that of succeeding to the estates of Princes who die without legitimate heirs; yet that right has not always been exercised. In former times, when it was the policy of the Government to maintain and even to create subsidiary States, heirs were generally found or created; but latterly, better understanding our position, we have been more inclined to insist on our rights. It is indeed only in this way that we can hope gradually to extinguish the native States, which consume so large a portion of the revenues of the country, and so prevent us from lightening the burdens and improving the condition of the mass of the people."†

The rights of Princes, represented by certain musty old parchments called Treaties, were allowed to weigh as nothing against the "real good" of their contented subjects, "whose best interests, we sincerely believe," says Lord Dalhousie,

* Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 83.

† Campbell's *Modern India*, 1852, p. 169. This plausible and smartly written book represents very fairly the ordinary views of Indian affairs held by the Bengal Civil Service, of which Mr. Campbell, now a Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, is a very able and distinguished member. The book contained a great mass of information, was favourably received, and much read; and it was published just in the nick of time, as if to serve as an exponent and defence of Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation.

“ will be promoted by the uniform application of our system of government.”*

This alleged desideratum—“ the uniform application of our system of government”—appears to me to be the extreme abuse and perversion of what I have called the second assumed prerogative of Imperial power, Administrative Dictatorship. Based, like the claim to regulate successions, on truth and reason, on the dominant power and dominant interests of Great Britain throughout the continent of India, it has been pushed, beyond all bounds, to a climax of exaggeration and falsehood. Confined to a fair supervision of public affairs in the secondary States, to the reproof and correction of scandalous misrule, to the inculcation of sound general principles, and the deprecation of barbarous prejudices, the reforming action of the *de facto* Paramount Power has effected great and beneficial changes in their laws and customs, and in the prevalent tone, temper and opinions, both of rulers and subjects; † and would have been capable of indefinite extension, without infringing any engagement, without exciting any dissension or mistrust. Every step gained in this way is a substantial and permanent advance in the course of civilisation and progress. But when, according to recent practice, the defects of native institutions are not only denounced, but deplored as being quite

* Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 83.

† I allude particularly to the prohibition of Suttee; the resolutions against female infanticide among the Rajpoots, and the combined plan for relaxing the restrictions on marriage connexions and the enormous expense attending them, which were the chief incentives to that horrible crime; the suppression of Thuggee, and consequent disappearance of the superstitions which tended to its concealment and toleration; the cessation of torture, cruel punishments, and the arbitrary infliction of death, and imprisonment without trial; the abolition or mitigation of transit duties, and other impediments to trade; and in more complete protection to the accumulation of wealth and its transmission by inheritance. Some of these reforms are as yet but partially secure; and it is above all to be regretted that our Government should have struck the heaviest blow possible against that last mentioned—the inviolability of property—by its recent inroads upon the jewel-rooms and wardrobes of mediatised royal families. Native Princes and Ministers were already but too prone to similar high-handed acts, on due provocation; and needed no such example of confiscation in cold blood. See *The Empire in India*, p. 15, and 220-250.

incurable by native and natural means, and the introduction of English officers into every place of authority is prescribed as the only panacea, there is an end of harmonious co-operation ; advice appears as an insult and a menace, and the very idea of reform becomes detestable. During the last twenty years, while the prerogative of regulating successions has been vitiated by the lust of territory, the prerogative of correcting abuses has been vitiated by the lust of patronage ; the one assumed prerogative has been employed to prove, explain and strengthen the other, and the two together have been made the pretext and justification for destroying Principalities and extinguishing dynasties, for abolishing native nobility and proscribing native talent.

A reconstructive policy for the Indian Empire can never grow out of a series of illicit assumptions and silent encroachments ; any apparent gain that can be traced to no other source than that, must always be illusory and precarious ; there is nothing to show for it ; it is matter neither of record nor of repute. A solid and permanent Imperial fabric can only be built on explicit, acknowledged and recorded declarations, preceded by general confidence, followed by general consent. Our relations with the native States have been reduced, legally and morally, to a stagnating Chaos of confusion and contradiction. Is it possible to evoke a Cosmos out of this Chaos ? I think it is possible.

Up to this time, the British Government has done nothing to deserve the general confidence, or to secure the general consent. The two great Imperial prerogatives which naturally devolved upon our Government, and which, if fairly exercised, would have been gladly conceded by all, have been turned into weapons of offence and destruction, until the only chance of honour and security for a native Prince appears to lie in denying those prerogatives to the utmost limits of subordination, and in evading their operation by every practicable device. Our counsels and our assistance are seen to be fatal, not only to the independence, but to the very existence of the most friendly and submissive Principalities. In one most conspicuous and important instance—that of Mysore—we have effectually reformed the administration of the country, but

have signalised our management by the complete and permanent exclusion of the Rajah from all voice and share in the government, and by giving all places of high trust and emolument to English officers; and an intention is now very plainly shown of making our administrative possession at once the opportunity and the pretext of absorbing the State and abolishing the sovereignty. If this contemplated breach of trust and violation of Treaties—as I think I have shown it to be—be allowed to proceed to the final extremity, what reliance can thereafter be placed in our moderation and good faith?

In order that we may be able to undertake the reform of the native States, in order that the native States should accept our instruction and guidance, it is necessary not only that our moral influence should be restored to its former height, but that it should rise to a revolutionary strength. Three great political operations appear to me to be required to produce this full effect:—(1) a Golden Bull, or declaration of paramount authority over all the Princes of India, explaining the Imperial principles, and the reciprocal rights and duties of the secondary Powers; (2) a demonstration of good will and liberal intentions towards native Princes in general, which should precede or accompany, and thus illustrate the Golden Bull; (3) the exhibition—as an example, model and encouragement—of one or more native States, reformed under British tutelage, and then re-established in their former dimensions, or aggrandised by the Paramount power, as active members of the Federation.

These measures would be intelligible and acceptable to all, would involve no embarrassing confessions, would not openly break the continuity or consistency of our political action, but would vindicate, to a certain extent, the severities of the past, while removing all menace from the future.

One very plausible objection might be brought against the fundamental notion of an Imperial manifesto or Golden Bull: it might be denounced as being after all an arbitrary usurpation of prerogatives and functions not lawfully appertaining to the British Government, as being, in wholesale and with the widest extension possible, just one of those high-handed acts of state against which, in detailed and particular instances, I have myself protested. But this is a complete misconception of my views.

I have not protested, and do not protest against arbitrary acts of state in general, any more than I protest against war, conquest, revolution or rebellion in general. An act of state, however arbitrary and rigorous, may or may not be justifiable, just as in the case of war, conquest, revolution or rebellion. I have protested against certain transactions in which the British Government has violated solemn treaties, while professing by sophistical arguments to respect their provisions, has repudiated treaties in full force as if they were waste paper, has claimed Imperial prerogatives, which not only it had never acquired, but which never existed in any age or country, and has not employed those assumed prerogatives for the protection, instruction or reform of friendly and orderly native States, but for their confiscation and destruction.* And in those cases to which I refer, the British Government did not pretend to act under any sense of revolutionary or belligerent necessity, did not admit that its action was abnormal or extraordinary, but asserted its legality; appealed, without a shadow of right, to "the universal and immemorial custom of India," and invoked a visionary series of precedents, which were said, without a vestige of proof, to have come down from "the Imperial House of Delhi," and the other "Governments which preceded us."† These are not legitimate acts of state, these are not acts of war, these are not conquests,—they do not present themselves as such,—they are simply appropriations on false pretences. They do not command the respect, assent or approval of any native party or of any native interest, either in our long settled possessions or in the newly acquired provinces, or in the allied Principalities that are still preserved. They are utterly unintelligible to the native mind, except when viewed as despotic equivocations, as disingenuous pretexts for predetermined violence. Such transactions as these can give no valid title, can destroy no adverse right; they do not even produce terror and submission, but simply exasperate, and generate permanent conspiracies.

Open undisguised conquest is an intelligible process; and

* *The Empire in India*, Letters on the Carnatic, Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi, and *passim*.

† Ditto, p. 165, 166.

the title to possessions so gained is not, within certain limitations, impugned even by modern international law, while, according to the popular conceptions of the East, the right of conquest is a sufficient plea before God and man. The lapse of time, general acquiescence and content, may confirm a conquering power in dominions that were originally acquired by an unprovoked aggression. Nor is it necessary that a conquest should be consecrated with blood: overwhelming force may produce all the effect of conquest without a sword being drawn. But there must be a visible process, and an open avowal.

It is not then against high-handed acts of state that I protest, but against the underhand and undeclared proceedings of a secret Executive. I do not protest against conquest in hot blood, but against the cold-blooded denial of rights, without even the form of a proclamation, in contempt both of a lawful and unoffending claimant, and of an unwilling and bewildered people.

A war, a conquest, a revolution, a rebellion, an act of state, may be justifiable, when international discussion or municipal law affords no prospect of redress or remedy. There must be a beginning to every political constitution, and to every constitutional change. The most Pragmatic of Pragmatic Sanctions becomes good public law, if it is founded on truth and justice; if it supplies a great political want, if the promulgating Power is manifestly competent to enforce its provisions, and if a great majority of the secondary Powers, and the people of the Empire, accept it with joy and gratitude. All these conditions could, I believe, be fulfilled in Queen Victoria's Imperial manifesto; and therefore I think that all objections to its issue on grounds of international law or public faith, can be fully refuted.

From the following passage in the Adoption despatch of the 30th of April 1860, Lord Canning would seem to have been partially conscious that a clear definition of Imperial pretensions was required under the altered circumstances of British rule:—

“The last vestiges of the Royal House of Delhi, from which, for our own convenience, we had long been content to accept a vicarious authority, have been swept away. The last pretender to the repre-

sensation of the Peishwah has disappeared. The Crown of England stands forth the unquestioned Ruler and Paramount Power in all India, and is, for the first time, brought face to face with its feudatories. There is a reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt, but eagerly acknowledged by the Chiefs."

But this despatch, confined to the subject of succession in certain States, is addressed, not to the Princes and people of India, but to the Secretary of State. It contains no sufficient avowal of principles, even within its limited scope, and was followed up by no precise and public declaration of Imperial supremacy.

We have hitherto failed to appreciate the sources of power that lie hidden in the peculiar civilisation and social life of India. We have hitherto neglected to guide, to mould or to encourage the political sentiments of the natives, which are thoroughly monarchical and conservative, but have left them to brood over the memories and glories of bygone days and fallen dynasties. It is our fault that both Princes and people have learned to gaze for the centre of their national existence, interests and honour, anywhere but towards the British Throne. In order to authenticate a thorough change in the legal relations between the British Government and the minor States of India, to make the transition harmonious, and to place the Imperial constitution on a secure basis, the evident stamp of Royal Personality, a distinct assertion of the Royal will, should characterise each document, and dignify each transaction. Were attempts to be made to institute a general reform of the native States merely by the ordinary official means, by a greater stringency of local interference, the movement would be opposed and hampered in every direction by the terms of existing Treaties, by the irresistible mistrust which our past dealings have generated, and even by our own recorded practice and precedents. Without the avowed assumption of Imperial supremacy, inaugurated and exemplified by Royal acts of restoration and re-assurance, our reforming propensities will merely provoke native Princes to antagonism, and us to annexation.

For until an Imperial Constitution for India is solemnly

proclaimed and acknowledged, the British claim to paramount authority over the more important States will rest upon nothing but a silent usurpation, unjustified, unrecognised and undeserved.

When in consequence of Napoleon's conquests, and his alliances with the minor Princes of Germany, the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved in 1805, and the Emperor Francis assumed the hereditary title of Austria, the Electoral and Feudal Principalities were transformed into independent and sovereign States, and were ultimately so recognised by the Treaties of Vienna, and the Acts constituting the German Confederation.

The practical dissolution of the Mogul Empire, and the reduction of its political elements, some into British provinces and British dependencies, others into protected, allied and independent States—begun by the Mahratta Confederacy, and perfected by British victories—was definitively registered and recorded in our long series of treaties with the Princes of India of every degree. We maintained—as the supposed medium of political influence—an outward ceremonial and verbal deference towards the Great Mogul, down to a later period than even any of our native Allies;* but when in all our negotiations we had entirely ignored and set aside his Imperial pretensions, and dealt on terms of equality and alliance with the Princes who, from his point of view, were undutiful vassals, it was clear that the throne of Delhi had fallen, and that the ancient constitution of the Empire had fallen with it.

The British Government, in the face of its own Treaties, can make out no more valid claim to supremacy over the more considerable Princes of India, than the Emperor of Austria

* The Nawab of Oude, hereditary Vizier of the Empire, openly renounced his ancient allegiance to the throne of Delhi in 1819, by assuming the title and insignia of King, and coining money in his own name. This was undoubtedly done with the consent and approval of the British Government; but, as Sir John Malcolm observes, "no alteration was made in the relations subsisting between the Company's Government and the Imperial family." And the Honourable Company continued for some years longer "to coin money in the name of the Emperor of Delhi, and to style itself, upon the face of that coin, the servant of a monarch who owed his daily subsistence to its bounty." Malcolm's *Political History of India*, vol. i, p. 536, 540.

could make out to supremacy over the Princes of Germany, since the conclusion of the Treaties of Vienna. Indeed the House of Hapsburg has still the vantage ground of ancient hereditary right,* and the perpetual Presidency of the Diet under the Acts of Vienna; while that shadowy succession to the Mogul Emperor, which has been sometimes attributed to the East India Company, rests upon no basis either of inheritance or of testament, of ancient forms or of modern compact.

The British claim to Imperial supremacy in India, bears, indeed, less resemblance to the traditional and dormant pretensions of Austria, than to that intrusive and indefinite demand of the "hegemony" of Northern Germany, advanced by the statesmen and partisans of Prussia, promoted on several recent occasions by direct military intervention in the affairs of Baden, Hesse Cassel, and other States, and firmly maintained in Schleswig Holstein against the authority of the Diet.

Now the Prussian pretensions to the hegemony of Northern Germany, like the British claim to supremacy in India, are founded on much more solid grounds than mere material force; both are the offspring of a real political necessity; but both are at present devoid of positive definition and limitation, and of legal sanction. Both powers are fettered by their engagements, which cannot, with justice or prudence, be silently ignored or persistently disregarded; and those engagements, unless by the mutual consent of Princes, can only be effectually modified by some new development of force,—by war, or revolution, by a National Convention, or a Golden Bull.

The true relative position of the British Government in India towards those Sovereigns, who, by the terms of their treaties, are unrestricted in their internal policy and procedure, is that of a "great Power" towards its weaker neighbours, on a continent where no second great Power exists,—no Austria, not even a Bavaria,—to divide or balance its dominant influence.

It is true that some of the Indian Princes, with whom treaties were made, or their ancestors, had been tributaries, feudatories or provincial Governors under the Great Mogul, the Rajah of Sattara or the Peishwa: some of them had no

* Hereditary by the prescription of four centuries, although the form was elective.

better original title than that of a rebellious vassal or contumacious Lieutenant; but then the East India Company—in whose name, and not in that of the British Sovereign, all the treaties were concluded—entered upon the field of negotiation with no more secure footing, with no more valid pretensions.

The English Authorities avowed themselves to be vassals of the King of Delhi, tenants and tributaries of the Nizam and the Nawab of Arcot, and entered into various complicated relations of joint management, partnership and assignment, with Chieftains of inferior rank. At successive political conjunctures these embarrassing engagements were, for the most part, shaken off or commuted; the ambiguous tenures were simplified or converted into cessions; but whatever new rights of sovereignty and independence may have been gained by the East India Company, must have been equally conceded to those confederates and to those defeated adversaries with whom treaties were concluded.

The British Government having made treaties of “perpetual friendship and alliance,” in which the reciprocal position of both parties is strictly defined; having received cessions of territory from these Princes as the consideration for military defence; and having thus generally, and with more or less precision, recognised them as the absolute masters of their dominions and subjects, has acquired no right to term them or treat them suddenly as feudatories, or to assume over them the prerogatives and function of a dictatorial Suzerain.

That right, those functions and prerogatives, may be acquired, but not without an open assertion and justification, not without fair limitations and compensations; and this acquisition will never be advanced by a contempt for existing treaties, or by destroying Mysore, a reformed Principality, the work of our own hands, before the face of those whom we wish to subject to a similar process, but only by measures of persuasion and encouragement, and by the offer of reciprocal advantages.

By very simple and equitable means, as I believe, the Nizam, and other Princes who are equally with him, left, under the terms of their treaties with the East India Company, in the possession of absolute local power, and of every prerogative of monarchy, might be induced not only formally to acknowledge

the Queen as their Imperial Suzerain, but to adopt, under Her Majesty's guidance and example, constitutional government, judicial reform, and a sound financial system.

The Nizam of the Deccan, who rules over ten millions of subjects, had asserted and secured his independence of Delhi for upwards of forty years before our first Treaty with him in 1766.* The English have never known the Nizam, have never had any dealings or any communications with him except as an independent Sovereign. Lord Dalhousie himself, while aiming to deprive the Nizam of a large portion of his dominions,† observed that he was "an independent Prince,"‡ and that "the British Government was bound by the solemn obligations of a Treaty to abstain from all interference in his Highness's internal affairs," and "had guaranteed to him the exercise over his own subjects of his own sole and absolute authority."§ The obligations referred to are contained in Article XV of the Treaty of 1800 :—

"The Honourable Company's Government, on their part, hereby declare that they have no manner of concern with any of his Highness's children, relations, subjects or servants, with respect to whom his Highness is absolute."||

And in another part of the same Minute Lord Dalhousie says :—

"Were it not for the existence of the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces, our relations with the State of Hyderabad would be merely those which usually are found between two independent Powers, and the position of the Resident at Hyderabad would correspond in all respects with that of any accredited Minister of a foreign State."¶

It is expressly stipulated in Article VIII of the Treaty of 1804 with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindia of Gwalior, confirmed by the subsequent engagements of 1805, 1817 and 1844, that "the Honourable East India Company's Government have no manner of concern with any of the Maharajah's rela-

* Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, 1826, vol. i, p. 478; Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 116.

† Papers relating to the Nizam, 1854, p. 107. See also the *English in India*, p. 79.

‡ Papers relating to the Nizam, p. 39.

§ Ditto, p. 38, 39.

|| Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 149.

¶ Papers relating to the Nizam, 1854, p. 37.

tions, dependents, chiefs or servants, with respect to whom the Maharajah is absolute ; and it is further agreed, that no officer of the Honourable Company shall ever interfere in the internal affairs of the Maharajah's Government."*

The British Government obtained, under Article IX of the Treaty of 1817 with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindia, freedom from those restrictions of the former Treaty which prevented alliances being formed with the States of Oodeypoor, Joudpore and Kota, which had hitherto paid tribute to Scindia ; but a condition is added, " that nothing in this Article shall be constructed to give the British Government a right to interfere with States or Chiefs in Malwa or Guzerat, clearly and indisputably dependent on or tributary to the Maharajah ; and it is agreed that his Highness's authority over those States or Chiefs shall continue on the same footing as it has been heretofore."† The suzerainty of Scindia over certain petty States is hereby clearly recognised ; but no suzerainty or right of superintendence over the State of Gwalior is claimed for the British Government in this or any other Treaty.

In Article X of the Treaty concluded in 1818 with Maharajah Mulhar Rao Holkar of Indore, " the British Government declares that it has no manner of concern with any of the Maharajah's children, relations, dependents, subjects or servants, with respect to whom the Maharajah is absolute."‡

And " the English Government engages," in Article XVI of the same Treaty, " that it will never permit the Peishwa, nor any of his heirs or descendants, to claim or exercise any sovereign rights or power whatever over the Maharajah Mulhar Rao Holkar, his heirs and descendants."§

The dissolution of the Mahratta Confederacy, and the cessation of the Peishwa's authority, are thus admitted by both parties : complete independence is guaranteed to the Rajah of Indore, but none of the Peishwa's prerogatives are transferred to the East India Company.

By Article III of the Treaty of 1803 the British Government agreed, " never to interfere in the concerns of the Maharajah of Bhurtpore's country, nor to exact any tribute

* Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 357.

† Ibid., p. 365.

‡ Ibid., p. 410.

§ Ibid., p. 411.

from him.”* And after the outbreak of hostilities, the unsuccessful siege of Bhurtpore, and the submission of the Rajah in 1805, this condition was repeated in Article V of the new Treaty:—“The Honourable Company, in consideration of the friendship now established, will not interfere in the possession of this country, nor demand any tribute on account of it.”†

There is a similar provision in Article III of the Treaty of 1803 with the Maha Rao Rajah of Alwur, that “the Honourable Company shall not interfere with the country of the Maha Rao Rajah, nor shall demand any tribute from him.”‡

The Rana of Dholepore, a small Principality with about one hundred thousand inhabitants, is the only Indian Sovereign who retains the full power of declaring war and peace, and of establishing diplomatic relations with all the potentates of the world. Article IV of the Treaty of 1806 provides that this State “will remain exempt from all orders of the Adawlut, and other demands of the Honourable Company, and the Maharajah Rana hereby agrees to take upon himself the responsibility of adjusting all disputes which may arise, either external or internal, and no responsibility for assistance or protection remains with the Honourable Company.”§

“The Honourable East India Company engages,” by Article II of the Treaty of 1833, “never to interfere with the hereditary or other possessions of the Nawab of Bhawalpoor.” And Article III declares that “as regards the internal administration of his Government, and the exercise of his sovereign rights over his subjects, the Nawab shall be entirely independent, as heretofore.”||

Many other States of Rajpootana and Central India,—of which the more important are Oodeypoor, Jeypoor, Jodhpoor, Kota, and Bhopaul,—are bound by their treaties “to act in subordinate co-operation¶ with the British Government, and to acknowledge its supremacy; but the British Government, on its part, agrees that the Princes, their heirs and successors,

* Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 471.

† Ibid., p. 473.

‡ Ibid., p. 468.

§ Ibid., p. 384.

|| Ibid., p. 502.

¶ A reference to the original negotiations, and to the position of this engagement among the terms of the Treaty, will prove that it invariably applied to military and diplomatic “coöperation” only.

“ shall remain absolute rulers of their dominions, and that the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced.”*

The Principalities of this numerous class, acknowledging their subordination and the supremacy of the one Great Power of India, are true feudatories of the British Crown. But the very fact of their acknowledged subordination—of British supremacy over them being expressly admitted in their treaties,—contributes to prove that the Principalities of that more important and less numerous class, such as the Nizam, Scindia, and Holkar, in whose contemporaneous treaties subordination is not promised, and British supremacy is not admitted, are not feudatories, but independent States.

These States are certainly not the less independent, in all that relates to internal legislation and administration, because they have renounced the right of making war, and of contracting foreign alliances, except with our consent and in concert with us. The State of Saxe Coburg, with a very trifling revenue, and a population of 150,000, has parted with none of its internal independence in consequence of the military convention by which its troops are incorporated with the Prussian army. Belgium and Switzerland are perfectly independent, in spite of that perpetual neutrality to which they have pledged themselves.

There are thus two classes of native States, those which are independent sovereignties, connected with the dominant Power by treaties of friendship and alliance only; and those which are confessedly dependent and feudatories of the British Crown. All those of the former, and many of the latter class, are left, by the terms of their engagements with the East India Company, in possession of absolute and uncontrolled power over their own subjects and revenues. They have renounced for themselves all the prerogatives of external action, and we, on our part, have repudiated all pretensions to interfere with their internal affairs.

But it may be objected that it is useless at this late period to claim perfect administrative freedom for the petty States of India; that the practice of many years sanctions our supervision; that, in the interests of humanity, and for the good

* Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 420, 426, 430, 435, 441.

of trade, we have constantly interfered with beneficial effect in their internal concerns, that we still do so, and that we must continue to do so. It is true that we have frequently interfered with our advice and remonstrances, for the protection of individuals, for the improvement of public communications, and for the removal of objectionable imposts,—such as transit duties—which had been found burdensome on commerce, or injurious to some of our own sources of revenue; and when our suggestions have been steadily pressed upon a native Court, regardless of evasion and delay, they have at last produced the desired result: but, however sound in principle and advantageous in practice such changes may be, they are hardly calculated to work a permanent reform in the local system, or to create an impression of our disinterested intentions. They generally appear to the native Prince as proposals that he should incur additional expenses, abandon some profitable tax or monopoly, or even prohibit some produce, trade or manufacture within his dominions—such as salt or opium—for the benefit of his gigantic friend. These proposals are recommended by no prospect of gain to the Prince himself, are not even demanded by his own people, and are dreaded more especially as pretexts and precedents for further encroachments and for continued dictation.

The truth is, that except by an intrusive regard for the protection and advancement of individuals,—which in its best aspect resembles jobbery and favouritism, and in its worst, approaches the confines of corruption—and an intermittent mediation in favour of those peculiarly British objects to which I have alluded, our Residents and Political Agents have seldom brought their influence to bear either upon the general form of administration, or upon any particular measures of the Princes to whom they are accredited. Our own Government has never enjoined or encouraged such interference, nor would it be easy in most cases to interfere with effect. Those very clauses of treaties which I have just cited stand in the way of such schemes of reformation; and even if not firmly insisted on by a Prince or Minister of some talent and resolution, (as has often been done,) they would not fail to supply the means of obstruction and delay. A Resident has neither resources at his dis-

posal for enforcing his suggestions on a friendly native Court, so long as the country is peaceable and orderly, nor has he always any adequate sources of information to assure him whether his suggestions are actually adopted, or whether their adoption is really practicable. Unless during a minority, when a struggle for power has induced an appeal or an intrigue for British support, or during some crisis of political danger and disorder—not always of provincial origin—it is seldom that any pretext or opportunity has been afforded for directly assuming or controlling the management of one of those Principalities which are entitled to internal independence.

What the votaries of annexation considered the most splendid opportunity possible, not merely for interference but for acquiring territory, was offered to Lord Ellenborough in 1843, by the open contumacy and formidable warlike preparations of Scindia's Government. But having been compelled to invade Gwalior, to fight two pitched battles, and to occupy the capital, Lord Ellenborough replaced the Rajah on the throne; imposed very moderate conditions of peace; and though he secured, by the new Treaty, a certain control over the Regency during the reigning Prince's minority, no steps were taken to subvert the native administration or the established usages of the State. This equitable and considerate settlement had a most reassuring effect throughout India—soon, however, to be effaced by Lord Dalhousie—and secured to us a most faithful and serviceable ally at Gwalior, whose loyal and gallant conduct in 1857, went very far to prove how much a native Prince's influence could contribute to the stability of our Empire.

In this instance the Resident's supervision was imposed as a consequence of the recent hostilities, by virtue of a special Article in the Treaty of peace, and only for the minority of the Rajah then reigning;* so that, as the former Treaties were

* Article VIII. "Inasmuch as it is expedient to provide for the due administration of the government during the minority of his Highness the Maharajah, which shall be considered to terminate when his Highness shall have attained the full age of eighteen years, that is, on the 19th January, 1853, it is further agreed that during such minority the persons entrusted with the administration of the government shall act upon the advice of the British Resident in all matters whereon such advice shall be offered.

expressly confirmed in the new one, the general principle of the autonomy of Gwalior was not attacked or questioned.

There are certain remarkable cases, besides those of the Carnatic and Mysore, in which the British Government has obtained full powers of administration over the whole or part of a native Prince's dominions; but the result has seldom been of such a nature as to reconcile native Princes in general to this plan of assigning their territories to our care. And I do not see how they ever can be reconciled to our tuition and guidance, except by a propitious termination to the management of Mysore, and of the two other States,—Dhar* and Oodeypoor—now held under our direct control.

The very prevalent impression that our Government has constantly directed the administration of our Indian Allies, in the cause of reform and progress, has, in fact, arisen from rumours of our dealings with that class of Principalities, which by the terms of their treaties are expressly subject to British superintendence, and bound to follow our advice whenever it is offered. But, in truth, our relations with these States have hitherto been chiefly remarkable for neglect, uncertainty, and contradictions, for utter failure in local and timely results, and for ultimate consequences so disastrous to the States and dynasties themselves, as to render the idea of British counsels and management most ominous and alarming to all who have as yet contrived to preserve their independence. I am not aware of a single instance, within the last thirty years, in which our right of temporary management appears to have been exercised with really disinterested motives, at once to reform the institutions of a native State and to strengthen the throne of an allied and friendly Prince. We have not used our practical supremacy to persuade and improve, but always to coerce or destroy. A notion seems gradually to have become established that we were on every occasion reduced to an absolute choice between the complete abandonment and the total abolition of a

no change shall be made in the persons entrusted with the administration without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the express authority of the Governor General." *Volume of Treaties*, 1853, p. 373.

* For a full explanation of this extraordinary case, see *Dhar Not Restored*, by John Dickinson, F.R.A.S., etc. King, Parliament Street. 1864.

native State. This is very clearly stated in a Minute by Mr. Dorin, who was a member of the Supreme Council when the annexation of Nagpore was carried out:—

“If it were possible to withdraw British influence entirely from any native State, so as to leave its Government to stand or fall on its own merits, there might be reason for trying the experiment of self-government; but in the position in which the British Government, as paramount in India, stands to Nagpore, this isolation is not practicable. Between the two extremes of entire neutrality or entire possession, I see no justifiable cause of interference for the Government of India.”*

Mr. Dorin could write in these terms, and the Governor General in Council could endorse them with approval; and the Bhonsla dynasty was extinguished, and the Nagpore territories were annexed, mainly on the plea of incorrigible misrule: although it was quite manifest that the real and ultimate blame of the alleged misrule must rest with the Government of India, since the Treaty of 1829 conferred upon it full power to dictate, through the Resident, such administrative measures as it pleased, and in case of extreme disorder to assume the entire management of the Nagpore country for so long a period as it might deem necessary.†

No such necessity ever did arise. The State of Nagpore was certainly so far well governed, that our active and open interference was never once required, during twenty-five years of purely native administration, to check oppression, to keep the peace, or to restore order. That this Principality was not very badly managed, may be fairly inferred from the following

* Papers relating to the Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 38.

† “It shall be competent to the British Government, through its local representative, to offer advice to the Maharajah, his heirs and successors, on all important matters, whether relating to the internal administration of the Nagpore territory or to external concerns; and his Highness shall be bound to act in conformity thereto. If, which God forbid, gross and systematic oppression, anarchy, and misrule, should hereafter at any time prevail, in neglect of repeated advice and remonstrance, the British Government reserves to itself the right of reappointing its own officers to the management of such district or districts of the Nagpore territory, in his Highness’s name, and for so long a period as it may deem necessary, the surplus receipts in such case, after defraying charges, to be paid into the Rajah’s treasury.” *Volume of Treaties*, 1853, p. 404.

words, in which Lord Hardinge, warning the King of Oude in 1847 of the inevitable consequences of his continued misrule, holds up the case of Nagpore before him at once as an example and an encouragement:—

“The Nagpore State, after having been restored to order by a British administration of the land revenue, is now carried on under native management, with due regard to the rights of the Prince and the contentment of the people.”*

The true cause of such defects as really existed in the Government of Nagpore, may be easily divined from the following remarks by Mr. Mansel, an officer of great distinction and long experience, and the last Resident at Nagpore, in a despatch to the Government of India, dated the 14th December, 1853:—

“This oscillation of interference, and of principles by which the people of a country are to be guided, is a most serious evil. The Chief who to-day is subject to the control of a strict Resident, is amused by his flatterers with the prospect of a successor of a wholly different character. The advice of to-day is disarmed of half its force if it can be expected to be followed by a different course of policy on the morrow; and when the season of indifference and ease has produced its natural effects of misgovernment and debt, the reaction must needs be violent and doubly distasteful to an arbitrary Prince, on the appointment of an officer impelled by duty to enforce a general reform. It has frequently been a subject of astonishment to me that so much difficulty should exist in forcing a Mahratta Chief to follow out the views of the Resident, as I have found at Nagpore with this Rajah. But after long thought upon this subject, I am convinced that the main cause of the difficulty lies in the system of filling up diplomatic appointments. It seems to be quite a chance if the system of the officer who precedes, and of the officer who follows, agrees. The Rajah and his Ministers speculate upon this difference of action or opinion. Honesty is lukewarm and roguery is fearless, as there is no certainty or no permanence in the policy to be enforced.”†

Mr. Mansel speaks of the oscillation of the *Resident's* policy and system, in a style that clearly indicates that our Government had no system or policy whatever of its own, and fur-

* Oude Papers, 1858, p. 63, 64.

† Papers relating to the Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 17

nished its diplomatic agents with no definite instructions as to their control over the local administration.

The last Rajah of Nagpore and his Ministers were always submissive and well affected to British supremacy; during his reign upwards of two millions sterling were paid to our Government as tribute, and his troops marched four times across the frontier to the assistance of his powerful Ally. On his death, however, in December, 1853—though his grand-nephew, Janojee Bhonsla, was well known to be his intended successor and was adopted by the widow†—the Bhonsla family was declared to be extinct, and the Nagpore country annexed to the British dominions. And thus disappeared from the political scene one of the few native States that were really well affected and accustomed to our principles, amenable to our guidance, and capable of indefinite improvement.

By Article VII of the Treaty of 1837, the King of Oude promised “to take into his immediate and earnest consideration, in concert with the British Resident, the best means of remedying the existing defects in the police, and in the judicial and revenue administration of his dominions,” and the following arrangements were made :—

“If his Majesty should neglect to attend to the advice and counsel of the British Government or its local representative, and if (which God forbid) gross and systematic oppression, anarchy and misrule should hereafter at any time prevail within the Oude dominions, such as seriously to endanger the public tranquillity, the British Government reserves to itself the right of appointing its own officers to the management of whatsoever portions of the Oude territory in which such misrule may have occurred, for so long a period as it may deem necessary.”

And in Article VIII :—

“It is further agreed that in case the Governor General should be compelled to resort to the exercise of the authority vested in him by the preceding Article, he will endeavour, as far as possible, to maintain, with such improvements as they may admit of, the native institutions and forms of administration within the assumed territories, so as to facilitate their restoration to the Sovereign of Oude when the proper period for such restoration shall arrive.”*

* *The Empire in India*, p. 174-201.

† Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 93-94.

But besides this very explicit provision for the restoration of the Oude territories to native rule when an improved system should have been established, there was also a stipulation in Article VII, that during the time of British management, "the surplus receipts, after defraying all charges, should be paid into the King's Treasury, and a true and faithful account rendered to his Majesty of the receipts and expenditure of the territories so assumed."*

By the cession of nearly two-thirds of his possessions, made in the Treaty of 1801, the Nawab Saadut Ali Khan, crushed by arbitrary exactions, purchased exemption from all further pecuniary demands, and "paid such a price for it as no other native ruler ever did," as General Low, when negotiating the Treaty of 1837, wrote to the Government of India.† But the Treaty of 1801 gave us no right of interference, except as friendly advisers, and, to use Lord Dalhousie's own words, "peremptorily and insurmountably barred the employment of British officers" in the administration.‡ The Treaty of 1837 was concluded with the express object of supplementing these defects, and of giving us the positive right to interfere effectually and to assume the management of the country, in case of "gross and systematic oppression and misrule."

When, however, the assumption of the Government of Oude began to be a practical and urgent question in 1854, it was perceived by the Governor-General and his advisers that these two Articles (VII and VIII) in the Treaty of 1837, providing for the ultimate restoration of native rule, and for the intermediate payment of all surplus receipts to the native Sovereign, would deprive the British management of that permanent and profitable character which, under Lord Dalhousie's acquisitive maxims, was now invariably contemplated, when any disorder in the affairs or break in the direct lineal succession of a native Principality, appeared to afford an opening for our "paramount" claims. Therefore Lord Dalhousie proposed that this Treaty, although duly ratified by both the contracting parties, and officially published as a valid engagement, should

* Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 93.

† Oude Papers, 1858, p. 19.

‡ Oude Papers, 1856, p. 182. See also the Proclamation, p. 256.

be declared null and void, in consequence of a *secret letter* from the Court of Directors in 1838.*

In Nagpore we had a right to interfere; no occasion for interference arose, yet we seized upon the first plausible, though false pretext—the death of the Rajah without male issue—to destroy the native State, and we justified our proceedings by alleging defects and corruption in its internal affairs, that could only have arisen from the neglect, connivance, or incompetency of our own accredited agents.

In Oude we had a right to interfere; the very best justification for our interference arose, but we rejected alike the right and the justification, and violently extinguished, instead of reforming, another friendly native State.

In Mysore we had a right to interfere. A fair occasion for such interference presented itself. A rebellion broke out in one of the provinces, and the management of Mysore was assumed in 1832 by the Governor-General Lord William Bentinck, avowedly for a temporary purpose,—to introduce order into the finances and a regular system for the good government of the State. But according to the spirit of the Treaty, and the declared intentions of Lord William Bentinck, of several of his successors and of the Court of Directors, order and regularity having been established in every department, and ample guarantees existing for their continuance, no cause remains for any longer retaining the Rajah's dominions under the exclusive authority and control of the British Government. On various pretences, however, the restoration of the Rajah to his proper position has been postponed and evaded; until now, in his old age, this unfortunate Prince finds, from the manner in which his last urgent appeal is treated, not only that he is to remain degraded in his forced retirement, but that a private decree has been registered for the annexation of his country and the extinction of his family at his death. Long and uninterrupted possession has produced the usual effect. The fancied power and the real patronage derived from the sequestration, are too precious to be relinquished; the contemplated sacrifice is too much for the virtue of the Calcutta Foreign Office.

And yet, beyond the miserable patronage, nothing whatever

* Appendix C.

is to be gained from this unjust confiscation, either for the Empire or for the people of Mysore. The State now pays a much larger sum as tribute applicable to Imperial purposes than could ever be shown as a surplus under our immediate rule; besides being bound to furnish a body of four thousand Irregular Horse, most useful troops, whenever required for our service.*

And thus another friendly and influential native State is threatened with destruction, the native State of all others that is certain to afford us invaluable material and moral support, and to relieve us of all risk and responsibility over a large area in any time of political or military danger, and which, in ordinary days of peace and tranquillity, pays handsomely for our general protection. As a British Province, filled with bitter regrets and reminiscences, where no one would be responsible and no one would have anything to lose, Mysore could never be denuded of troops, it could never be relied on, and might at any time become a centre of hostility, or the scene of anarchy and confusion.

The flourishing existence of Mysore as a separate though dependent Principality, must always be creditable and profitable to Great Britain, and might be held up to the other Sovereigns of India as an example of our beneficent influence, as an encouragement for them to submit to our tuition and guidance. As an annexed Province it would constitute a flagrant instance of British duplicity; it would prove to the native Princes and statesmen that all their suspicions of advice from Calcutta were well founded; that the first suggestion of reform must be resisted as a malignant encroachment, and that the control or management of their administration by English officers would be merely the first step towards the extinction of the dynasty, the absorption of the State, and the proscription of all native talent.

The acquisitive proceedings of the last twenty years have made native Princes and Ministers averse to our laws and institutions, and have served to render our principles of government more conspicuously offensive to the higher classes even in our own Provinces, as the cause and badge of their degra-

* Volume of Treaties, 1812, p. 455.

dition and ruin. But if British good faith and the majesty of the British Throne were vindicated by gracious acts of restoration and restitution, royally decreed and royally performed; if the era of annexation were manifestly closed for ever, and a proposal of innovations were seen not to be an insidious encroachment, but the preliminary step to territorial aggrandisement and admission to the security and dignity of a place in the Imperial Federation—reform would appear in a much more favourable light.

Peaceful reforms can never flourish or take permanent root in an atmosphere of distrust and hatred. The alienation of the Princes, the nobility, and all the conservative classes and interests, will never tend to the conciliation and improvement of the mass of the population. If, in spite of its own professions and promises, our Government is to be quietly allowed to recommence the career of annexation, under the pretence of reforming native institutions, by first assuming or accepting a trust and then playing the part of a fraudulent trustee—if Mysore is to be annexed because it is at present so well administered, and the Nizam's dominions because they are still so badly governed, and Dhar and Oodeypoor to be held under attachment because the Rajahs are said to be incompetent, and perhaps some other petty State because the Prince is too clever and ambitious—we shall soon discover that an army of even 100,000 British soldiers will be insufficient to prevent a second great rebellion, in which we might find most of the native Princes ranged against us, instead of their co-operating with us, as they did in 1857. If the new system of *management* is permitted to succeed and to spread, such a hostile coalition of native Princes could hardly be considered either morally unjustifiable or politically imprudent. Extinction being the inevitable fate of our best friends, our worst enemies could anticipate no more dreadful doom for themselves, in the event of their bold attempt failing.

In 1858-9 there were 112,000 British soldiers employed in India. A special return, showing the casualties among our troops during the three years 1857-8-9, would present a fearful picture. But the rebellion was nothing to what it would have been if a coalition of native Sovereigns had been in the field

against us, or even if one of the more important Princes—Scindia, Holkar, the Nizam, or one of the leading Rajpoot Rajahs—had entered heart and soul into the movement, instead of assisting us as most of them did, and discountenancing the rebellion as they all did.

Undoubtedly, better sanitary appliances, and less intemperance, have lowered the percentage of deaths in our tropical stations in time of peace; and greater attention to the soldier's requirements will make a still more marked improvement; but little or nothing can be done, I fear, to lower the mortality in time of war, which, as is well known, arises from fatigue, exposure to the sun and rain, and camp epidemics, and depends to a very slight extent upon the deaths in action.

The following extract—very ordinary in its purport—from the military intelligence of the *Times*, October 25th, 1864, will give some idea of the human expenditure in Eastern service:—

“New colours for the 31st Regiment have arrived at Aldershott, and will shortly be presented. The Regiment has seen much service in India, the Crimea, and in China. In 1860 it left India for China over 1,100 strong, and received during its stay in that country a draft of 102 men. It embarked from the latter place for England only 642 strong, having experienced a total loss of 588 of all ranks, or nearly one-half of its strength, in the space of three years and a half.”

This is a loss of 15 per cent. per annum. In all probability not fifty of these men were killed or died of wounds. It is thus, that on an average of ten or twenty years, the percentage of deaths in India appears so high, although during the last two or three years of quiet garrison duty a favourable return may be made.

And if the disaffection of the people, and the area of our military occupation and civil responsibility, are to spread and widen progressively by this new process of annexation, we shall soon find that the demand for European troops will far exceed the present enormous establishment of 75,000 men. Nearly 10,000 men are required *yearly*—even though not a shot should be fired—to keep up the force in India. An incalculably larger number would be wanted in one year of war or rebellion. Recruiting is becoming more difficult every day.

The standard height of the infantry has just been lowered by an inch. Our army grows more expensive as the condition and prospects of the soldier require and receive more attention. Emigration, steadily operating on Great Britain, has, within twenty years, drained away an entire generation of able-bodied men from Ireland, once the most fruitful source to fill the ranks of the army, and the exodus has scarcely slackened yet. The day may come when we shall want some of those 75,000 men from India, and wish for them in vain. It may then be no comfort or consolation whatever to know that this large force is paid for from the Indian revenues. We may want British soldiers in Europe at any price; and the absence in India of 75,000 men of the age, class, habits, and temperament of which soldiers are made, must lead to the offer of larger inducements to the limited number of that class that remain in the country. If a better class is to be attracted, the same costly expedients must be resorted to.

In the midst of a general war, when the national honour, great interests, and great principles were at stake, we should of course make efforts that would astonish the world. We might, for a time, find it difficult to raise our armies to the numerical strength we required, but in a crisis of great importance and difficulty we should certainly do it, because we are a nation of thirty millions, and because we can afford to pay whatever may be found absolutely necessary to attract recruits and to keep veterans in the ranks. We have the population to furnish the men,* and we have the wealth to supply the cost, and for a limited time and a definite object the prospect of a great war charge and a highly-paid army is not as alarming to our old-fashioned statesmen as the younger school of Liberals might desire. When the crisis is passed, it will be said, the army may be diminished. But in India there is no crisis to be passed; it is a permanent occupation with 80,000 men that is contemplated.

When it has become necessary to raise the pay and perquisites of the troops required for European service, the same advantages will at once be extended to those in India and the Colo-

* The last returns, however, show that the population of Great Britain is now nearly stationary, increasing only at the rate of about 80,000 per annum, and the rate of increase perceptibly diminishing.

nies. And no emoluments or privileges granted to our army can ever be retracted. It appears, therefore, to me that the entertainment of a permanent force in India of 80,000 men, and a permanent force of 40,000 men at home solely to relieve and recruit this great army of occupation, is likely to prove a rapidly progressive strain on our military resources. And when we perceive how the numerical demand upon a population which is at once prosperous and drained by emigration, and the natural aversion to a long tropical service, are combining to hasten the period when the pay and pensions of the entire army must be enhanced, I think the formidable menace to the finances both of Great Britain and India, can scarcely escape observation, and ought not to be treated with levity by any section of British politicians.

If we can devise no plan for ruling India except that of retaining and extending our direct possessions; if we can offer our good offices to India only on condition of taking all the good offices in the country for our sons and nephews, then two great objects must be abandoned by English statesmen—the one (with which I have myself but little sympathy) that of maintaining what is called our just influence in Europe by the display of an imposing force at home, as desired by the two old established parties—the other, that of reducing our armaments so as to minimise taxation and expenditure—the cherished aim of our social and financial reformers. These two great objects, if the first be kept within bounds, are by no means irreconcilable with each other; for by judiciously organising the Militia, a reserve of veterans, and the newly-acquired defensive arm, our noble Volunteers, nearly all the regular troops in Great Britain might be made disposable for foreign service; but both objects are utterly incompatible with the reluctant subjection of India. I do not hesitate to say that so long as the present repulsive, contemptuous and hopeless plan for governing India continues, neither of these two great objects can ever be fully attained. Should a general war break out in Europe, a desperate war of principles, when Great Britain ought to strike an effectual blow for the good cause, or even an aggressive coalition against us—no troops could be safely withdrawn from the East, our vulnerable point. Nor could

our force in the East be easily sustained or relieved: while in a time of general tranquillity, the Indian depôts and relieving reserves at home—useful as they may be for defence—could neither be reduced nor made available for the contingency of active operations:

It appears to me to be a manifest and incontrovertible fact that it is only by organising an Imperial Federation, by trusting, reforming, and strengthening the native States, that the actual and prospective strain on our own military resources can be relieved, and those of India made available for Imperial objects. Wherever there is a native State, there is a competent and visible authority, responsible for the peace and good order of a certain area, and of a certain population. Even now we could, on an emergency, march all our troops out of Mysore, or out of the Nizam's dominions, with much more confidence, and with much less anxiety, than out of any part of our immediate possessions.

Lord Dalhousie was enabled to keep up the temporary and superficial appearance of not having entailed a heavy burden both on India and on the Imperial resources, solely by not calling for a proper and reasonable augmentation of European troops to occupy his territorial acquisitions. Had he demanded, as he should have done, the reinforcement of 15,000 British soldiers required for the Punjaub, Nagpore, and Oude, the expense would have opened all eyes to the ruinous nature of his policy.*

“Lord Dalhousie,” said a writer in the *Saturday Review*, by no means an advocate for annexation,† “can scarcely have been mistaken in the inference that the pressure of a fixed charge would be lightened by an extension of the area of taxation.” The inference is quite correct; but where is the “fixed charge”? The conclusion follows closely enough from the premisses, but I deny the major. Lord Dalhousie undoubtedly *thought* there was a fixed charge; he thought that he could occupy the Punjaub, Nagpore, Oude, and Scinde, enlarged by confis-

* He did ask for two or three battalions, but did not insist upon the reinforcement as a precaution that was urgently and imperatively required; and this very moderate request leaves my statement intact.

† *Saturday Review*, February 26th, 1859.

cating the greater part of Ali Morad's possessions, with the same force of 40,000 Europeans that had sufficed before those acquisitions were made. He seems even to have thought that in certain cases the acquisition of territory enabled him to diminish the number of occupying troops. Thus, he writes in a Minute dated the 5th of February, 1856, paragraph 27:—

“Scinde would be perfectly safe with one European corps, now that Meer Ali Morad has been deprived of even the semblance of power, while the Punjaub has become a British Province.”*

Unquestionably Scinde might well be considered more secure—though I doubt if it was ever in danger from the Seikhs—after the Punjaub had become a British possession, garrisoned by an army of 60,000 men, including 12,000 Europeans, besides an Irregular Force of 15,000 men, at an expense of £2,100,000 per annum, equal to the entire revenue of the Province!† The cost of this additional security may appear rather heavy, but the whole charge of the Regular troops was laid on the Bengal Presidency, which was well able to bear it; and Scinde, I may admit, reaped a part of the benefit. But that Scinde was more safe, more able to dispense with European Regiments after Meer Ali Morad had been deprived of his richest districts than it was before, I cannot admit at all. Surely Lord Dalhousie did not mean that he had been accustomed to regard Meer Ali Morad, whom we had set up as Râis of Khyrpoor, in despite and at the expense of his brethren, as a Prince likely to commit some aggression or to engage in some conspiracy against us! Ali Morad was not the man to be a popular leader: wherever his character and his antecedents were known in Scinde and in other parts of India, I believe he was generally disliked and despised. But still, such as he was, he would obviously have had a much greater inclination for mischief, and, I believe, quite equal power for mischief, when injured and disaffected by a partial confiscation, than when enjoying, undisturbed by us, his ill-gotten wealth and dominions.

But this was always Lord Dalhousie's argument, brought forward in every case of annexation, that by destroying the native Princes and disbanding their armies, all the hostile and

* Parliamentary Papers, East India, Additional Troops, 1858, p. 16.

† First Punjaub Report, p. 95.

dangerous elements in the country were dissipated, and none but external enemies would remain,—the truth of which may be estimated by comparing the work cut out for us in Oude and Jhansi, recently annexed, and in our older provinces of Rohilcund and Bahar, by discontented pretenders and adventurers, like the Nana, Khan Bahadoor Khan, Kooar Sing, and Tantia Topce, with the moral and material assistance we received from native Princes and Chieftains of every class, during the rebellion of 1857. The very reverse of Lord Dalhousie's theory is true: no Sovereign in India is so foolish as to think of committing any aggression against us; we require literally *no* troops for the special duty of watching the little armies of native States; every native Prince is a conservative agent, who knows himself to be bound over under heavy penalties to keep the peace; and whenever we extinguish a Principality, we not only let loose all the swash-bucklers and fanatics who have hitherto been harmlessly employed and amused within its precincts, but we rouse the spirit which makes the men of that class powerful and popular.

The idea that the great use of our army is to protect the frontiers, and that our "settled" provinces may almost be left to take care of themselves, pervades all the writings of the acquisitive school. Thus Mr. George Campbell, perhaps the most able advocate of consolidation, wrote in 1852:—

"The army heretofore employed in guarding our frontiers has only been moved forward—and, in fact, instead of being increased in numbers or expense, has rather been diminished since the conclusion of the war."*

The force in Hindoostan was indeed diminished; important stations were denuded to garrison the Punjab; and the consequence was that in 1857 the great strategic points and centres of political influence, the cities of Delhi and Agra, and Bareilly, the chief town of Rohilcund, with the surrounding districts, at once fell into the hands of the mutineers and rebels, and were not recovered until after several months of marching and fighting. And again:—

"It is perfectly clear that our older territory must require fewer troops than it did in 1835-6, now that the frontier is advanced many

* G. Campbell's *Modern India*, 1852, p. 430.

hundred miles, (!) that the Gwalior army is transformed into a British force, and that the country has in every way become more settled.”*

A great part of the Gwalior army *was* transformed into a British force, and although restrained and delayed for some time by the Maharajah Scindia, took the field against us in 1857, and gave a great deal of trouble; while that part of the Gwalior army which did *not* become a British force, but remained in the native Prince's service, *though equally ill-disposed*, was perfectly inactive and innocuous throughout the rebellion.

It must also be remarked that at the outbreak of the mutinies in 1857, the native army was not only unnecessarily large and expensive,—the lust of patronage having swelled the local Contingents, providing good places for English officers, without diminishing the Staff or the number of the Regular Regiments,—but it was dangerously large. Every one who has observed the habits and sentiments of the Indian soldiery can testify to the accuracy of Lord Ellenborough's opinion:—

“It was impossible for me not to see the respect which our own soldiers entertained for native Princes. I felt satisfied that I never stood so strong with our own army as when I was surrounded by native Princes. They like to see respect shown to their native Princes.”†

Recruited, in the various arms of the service, from all the most warlike tribes of India, animated with recent and traditional achievements, and yet alienated by the exclusion of their race from even the lowest military command and distinction; stationed, frequently for years, within the limits of the allied States, the Sepoys took the deepest interest in the fate of the native Princes; and they were peculiarly exposed to be personally taunted in places of public resort, with being accomplices in the destruction of all the historical dignities and ancient institutions, which every native with a spark of honour and national pride, was bound to admire, to love, and to respect. The same temper, the same passions exist now-a-days. Sir Mark Cubbon, a very shrewd and practised observer of native

* G. Campbell's *Modern India*, 1852, p. 431.

† Evidence before the Select Committee of the Lords on Indian Territories, June 18th, 1852,—Question 2305.

character and feelings, wrote as follows in a private letter to a friend, dated the 22nd of May, 1859:—

“There never was such a mistake as to suppose that the hostile spirit has been extinguished or cowed by the suppression of the mutiny, and that we can safely do now what would have been dangerous in former times.”

It is as true now as it was in 1857, that every extinction of a friendly Principality at once adds to our immediate responsibilities, burdens our military strength, and lowers our moral dignity before the people of India. Not only does that grasping and greedy policy cause an ever increasing demand for European troops, but it prevents us from having a trustworthy native army,—it deteriorates and demoralises the best native soldiers in the service. Maintain the allied States in willing allegiance, and the native army may be safely recruited from the most warlike races in India to any strength required, trusted with the most efficient arms, and (a great part of them) employed, for occasional and emergent service, in almost any part of the world. But turn those States into British Provinces, and then, besides British troops being required for their occupation, the necessity for cautiously raising and arming native Regiments, and for balancing their numbers by a certain proportion of European soldiers, will be indefinitely enhanced.

It is strange to see how Lord Canning, led away by the particular temptation of Mysore, could yet express himself with such force and decision on the general question of extending our territorial limits. He writes to the Secretary of State, in paragraph 33 of the Adoption despatch of the 30th April 1860, to the following effect:—

“We shall not become stronger so long as we continue adding to our territory without adding to our European force; and the additions to that force which we already require, are probably as large as England can conveniently furnish, and they will certainly cost as much as India can conveniently pay.”

CHAPTER VIII.

BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.

BUT presuming that I have successfully established my two points,—firstly, that on grounds of legal right, and according to the terms of Treaties, the State of Mysore ought to be preserved as a separate Government, and not incorporated in our immediate possessions,—and, secondly, that its distinct preservation is the most prudent and advantageous policy for the British Empire,—there is still a class of objections to a course of mere abstract justice, that has considerable weight both in India and at home, that deserves our notice, and even demands our respect.

It is asked whether the British Government having *de facto*, if not *de jure*, attained to the position of Imperial Suzerain of all India, is to exercise its immense power for the benefit of the Princes and nobles, or for the benefit of the people at large ; whether a native administration can possibly be as good as ours ; and whether we are not bound—even at some risk and sacrifice—to take every fair opportunity of extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests will be thereby promoted. “The obligations of the British Government to the people of Mysore,” said Lord Canning, in his memorable letter to the Rajah, “are as sacred as its self-imposed obligations to your Highness.”*

Many people would point to the Rajah’s misrule of Mysore, or to the acts of oppression and cruelty that were perpetrated in Oodeypoor,† and ask whether it is advisable that the native Princes of India should be everywhere released from British control. I do not wish to emancipate the Princes from British control. I complain—more especially in this particular case

* Ante, p. 71.

† *The Empire in India*, p. 393.

of Mysore—that control has never been properly or steadily applied, that we have always neglected general principles and meddled in obscure particulars: and that after finding our intermittent and desultory dabbling in details to be utterly unproductive of substantial reform, we have pressed that false and fruitless method to its extreme, by deposing all the local dignitaries, sweeping all the patriarchal institutions into the dust-bin, and distributing English officers over the country in every place of honour and emolument.

Thus in Mysore, as in our own possessions, although we have indeed introduced order and regularity into every department, we have done little or nothing to initiate or instruct the rank and wealth of the country—the old governing classes, or the new class of educated natives,—in the practical working of the reformed administration.

We have stopped the independent development of the Hindoo races, by taking the management of every detail of their affairs upon ourselves, and condemning their best men to an insignificant and humiliating position, or to a discontented inactivity. All the progressive energy and ambition of India is forcibly turned by our exclusive policy into the direction either of fanaticism, or of conspiracy,—or of both combined. We have carried the system of class-government to the greatest extreme, retaining the entire and distinct series of superior offices—all access being denied to natives,—in the hands, not only of a class, but of foreigners,—not only of foreigners, but to a great extent of inefficient and unqualified foreigners.

Of course I would not be understood to make any comparison, either as to moral end and aim, or as to beneficial results, between our Government and that of Tippoo Sultan in Mysore; and yet we seem to have fallen into the very error attributed by Sir John Malcolm to that bigoted Mahomedan Prince, with the same effect of a positive deterioration in the character of our native coadjutors. In a Report to the Governor General on the state of Tippoo's dominions, Malcolm comments on the Sultan's want of success in the administration of Mysore, as compared with what had been done by his father, Hyder Ali, and says that "it may be ascribed to his chiefly employing Mussulman Asofs and Amildars, which Hyder seldom did. The

Hindoos still do the business, *but are more venal from having less responsibility.*"*

While the founders of our Indian Empire were maintaining and strengthening a precarious position, controlling and conciliating allies, and contending with powerful enemies, the English in India continued to place a high value on the good will and good opinion of the natives. While they were evoking peace and order out of a chaos of conflicting interests, they learned at every step to appreciate the value of native tact in negotiation, and of native skill and experience in the settlement of districts. And, as in all times of real difficulty, the work was done by a few men: our most celebrated tasks of pacification and organisation, were effected by one or two able and experienced English officers in each province, by means of some special native agency. No doubt on many occasions, at a very early period in the process of conversion, the ignorance and prejudices of the local authorities whom our officers found in the districts, induced some of that passive obstruction and counteraction, of which General Cubbon, as we have seen, had reason to complain in Mysore, and necessitated for a time the employment of European Assistants, who could understand what was required of them, and could be trusted to obey orders. But there was no wish to bring the natives back to their old places, or to train up a new generation to succeed to them. Every appointment gained for the dominant race was permanently appropriated, if it was worth having.

As our supremacy became every day more surely established and acknowledged, the immediate obvious necessity for reliance on native agency rapidly diminished, and the stream of patronage, swelled by private interest, by national and professional pride, and by official pedantry, has filled the country with English gentlemen to be provided for, with apparent functions to be performed, and with ever increasing claims for promotion or pensions. The mass of English idlers and nonentities in the civil and military services certainly do not add to the physical strength of the British Empire in India, while they detract from its moral strength, lower the native ideal standard of English ability and dignity, and introduce those constant

* Wellesley's Despatches, vol. i, p. 655.

provocations of levity, insolence, and contempt, which are so dangerous to our power, and derogatory to our national reputation. The same great vice pervades the whole organisation; an unnatural and degrading rule of exclusion is manifest in all our establishments; appointments for Englishmen are multiplied; and young Englishmen without any peculiar qualifications are placed even in minor positions, the duties of which could be fulfilled in a much more efficient manner by natives, with the great advantage of their improvement in knowledge, in self-respect, and in attachment to British institutions.

Just in proportion as our direct possessions have been extended by annexation, competent English officers have been more thinly scattered over the country. The Civil Service has been largely supplemented by the Army. Even that source has frequently seemed to be exhausted; and promotions of Englishmen from the "uncovenanted" ranks have been occasionally made to appointments that had been previously reserved for commissioned and covenanted servants; but all natives were, and are still, consigned to an inferior range; they are destined to remain Deputy Collectors and Deputy Magistrates for ever, subordinate and inferior to the youngest newly-arrived covenanted Assistant or military officer, and incapable of attaining to any post where distinction may be won by original and independent action.

It is the greatest mistake to suppose that our elaborate arrangements have put an end to corruption in high places. What with the confusion of tongues, and the want of a public opinion, it is generally impossible to prove or to disprove particular cases; but with well-informed and experienced persons there is no doubt as to its prevalence. The corruption is still in high places, although among a different set of persons from those who would have been the recipients under native rule. The class of officials that is really tainted with corrupt and fraudulent malpractices, is chiefly to be found among the *Amla*, the wretchedly paid ministerial officers of the Courts and of the Collectors' offices, those who too often can retard or expedite business, and bar access to their superiors, at their will; and who, in the worst instances, absolutely pull the wires of an indolent or incapable principal, who shields them from view, and

relieves them from responsibility. Our English hierarchy, with all its symmetrical procedure, with all its apparatus of checks and balances, is too often the whited sepulchre of administration, beautiful on the outside, but within which are dead men's bones and all uncleanness. The receipt of presents and bribes is winked at, almost recognised as a legitimate source of emolument, by immemorial Oriental custom: and the system of our Government has proved no remedy for corruption, but has merely aggravated its infamy and secrecy, and has reduced both givers and takers of bribes to a state of permanent distrust and chronic desperation. Under native rule this abomination assumes a milder and more regular form; is pervaded by a mingled notion of ceremonial observance and compensation for inadequate emolument, and is mitigated in practice by partial publicity, and by certain traditional limits of equity and compassion. And thus it does not involve so much perfidy and injustice, nor produce so much malignity and false accusation in an unreformed native State, as it does in our own provinces. Nor is this custom of conciliatory gifts to men in power, necessarily accompanied by extortion or by the perversion of justice. This is explained with great lucidity in the following passage from a Minute written by Lord Macaulay when he was a member of the Supreme Council of India:—

“A court may be corrupt, and yet it may do much good; indeed, there is scarcely any court so corrupt as not to do much more justice than injustice; for there is no reason to believe that the party who is in the right will be less able to fee the judge than the party who is in the wrong; and, *cæteris paribus*, the worst judge will, from selfish motives, decide rightly rather than wrongly. Thus we see that in many countries and through many ages, society is held together, order is preserved, property is accumulated, though the courts constantly receive bribes, and occasionally pervert judgment.”*

The great defect in the administration of native States is, that they, for the most part, have no regular code of law or courts of justice at all; the great landholders and the collectors of revenue exercising judicial functions in person and by self-appointed deputies, each within his own jurisdiction, in a

* Arnold's *Public Life of Lord Macaulay*, p. 233.

rude so-called patriarchal fashion, which our Government has unfortunately followed in the Non-regulation Provinces,* to the extent of confounding judicial, executive, and revenue functions in the hands of every official.

An English public servant in India is perfectly secure and comfortable so long as he preserves amicable relations with his official superiors. By keeping up his monthly returns, annual reports, and English correspondence, and keeping down the arrears of current business with the aid of clever native subordinates, a smooth appearance can be easily maintained before the higher authorities. However incapable and indolent, however dependent on his underlings he may be, so long as he is popularly reported to have a good name at head-quarters, no native will undertake the Quixotic task of denouncing him or his adherents. All open scandal may be avoided, and with a little good luck and prudence, he may safely and successfully float and rise far above the highest point attainable by the ablest and most deserving native. How he stands with the people of his district, how they speak among themselves of his public conduct or private character, is a matter of very little moment, and can neither injure his prospects nor affect his social position.

On the other hand, a native Judge or Prefect is sure to find his own level; he would be fully subjected, in all the intercourse of life, to the public opinion of his town or district; and if he became justly obnoxious to the community, not only might he be visited with those legitimate social penalties from which the European in a similar position is perfectly exempt, but there would be none of that despair of being heard, and dread of the consequences of such audacity, which too often prevents a complaint being made against an English Civilian, and there would be no compunction, on the part of Government, as to his removal, reduction, or dismissal.

And while it is notorious that in our own Provinces corrupt practices are very seldom detected or punished, except in petty and trifling cases, the highest offenders in native States are exposed to summary and exemplary correction, if popular indignation is roused to the pitch of clamour by their extortion, or

* Scinde, the Punjaub, Oude, and Nagpore.

if by any other means the scandal is forced upon the Prince's attention. No doubt the inquisition would be conducted without any regular arraignment, and with a complete disregard of the rules of evidence; even if no specific charge could be proved, the possession of unaccountably large private funds would probably be held to criminate the accused sufficiently to warrant his degradation and the forfeiture of his goods. Unquestionably this check is intermittent and capricious in its performance; but, maintained and set in motion by public opinion—of which the Prince himself is susceptible—it does constitute a check more effective, as every native will tell us, than any that has been devised by the British Government.

We are not, in short, justified in concluding either that official oppression and corruption reign unbridled and unpunished in the normal and unreformed native Principality, or that these evils are expunged, or even materially lessened, on the introduction of British rule. Matters are neither so bad in native States, nor so good in the British dominions, as is commonly represented.

The English Government has attempted by merely penal measures, to obtain the irreconcilable advantages of the cheapness of Oriental, and the purity of European, administration. Very insufficient pay, and but little confidence and encouragement have been hitherto afforded to native officials. Not only are they badly paid, but no amount of ability and faithful service can secure their advancement to places of consideration and profit for which they may be well qualified. It is not reasonable to expect honour and loyalty to spring up and flourish as the return for neglect, contempt, and humiliation. Hopeless exclusion and proscription will not produce a reformation, but something very different.

It has been argued, from the results of the attempt in Mysore, that native agency, except in subordinate places, is a failure under our legal and orderly system, and that all the superior officers of every department in provinces under our control must be European. Now, so far as the experiment was a failure, I believe that the failure was inevitable, that the experiment of native administration in the higher ranks under British supervision, was never fairly tried, has never been

allowed a fair chance of success there or elsewhere. In Mysore we tried at first to work our civilised machinery, requiring punctuality, patience, and assiduous attention, and presupposing the equality of all before the law, with the instruments we found to our hand, with the old set of prejudiced and uneducated native officials. We tried to keep a complex and delicate engine at work with unskilled and unwilling labour. We did not try very long. No opportunity was lost of getting rid of the Foujdars, the higher officials whom we found in charge of districts, and as they were removed their places were taken by English Superintendents. No attempt seems ever to have been made to obtain natives of English education, judicial training and established character, for such offices. No one ever thought of strengthening the local administration by bringing a single well educated and trained native judge or collector from Calcutta, Bombay, or Madras. No one ever thought of turning to such men for assistance. No one thought of finding an appointment for any one who was not an English gentleman, a "covenanted" Civilian, or an officer in the Army.

I deny that it is impossible or even difficult, now-a-days, to find a certain number of native gentlemen morally and mentally competent to execute the duties of the highest posts in the civil government of India, in conformity with our own principles and practice. There are literally *no* grounds—and I challenge contradiction on this point—for casting the slightest general aspersion on the honour and probity of the higher class of our native public servants, either in the Judicial or Revenue Departments—the Sudder Ameen and Deputy Collectors. They are, for the most part, fairly, though not handsomely, paid; and notwithstanding their subordinate functions, undefined rank, and circumscribed prospects, their credit for efficiency and integrity stands deservedly high, both with the Government and the people.

Now let us inquire what has been done for this deserving class in Mysore, where Lord William Bentinck, in assuming the charge, desired that "the agency should be exclusively native; indeed, that the existing native institutions should be carefully maintained."* Here, at least, in this reformed native

* Ante, p. 17.

State, we might expect to find that during our thirty years' management, a body of native gentlemen had been educated and trained to the public service, and would be capable of undertaking many, if not nearly all of the important posts throughout the country,—the power of supervision and control, and the highest executive authority being vested in the hands of three or four British officers. But no! ever since 1832 the natives have been steadily losing, and English gentlemen have been continually gaining ground in the field of civil employment. There has been a constantly recurring tendency to a more elaborate organisation of departmental establishments, sometimes with good reason, but always with the same result,—more appointments for European officers. Not a single native has ever been promoted to the charge of a district, although, in spite of the small encouragement offered to educated men, there are many fully competent for such duties.

The details of the Mysore Educational Department, as given in Mr. Bowering's Administration Report for 1862-3, afford a good epitome of the scope and effect of the Educational operations of Government throughout India,—a fair example of that shallow, showy, and fussy misdirection of the public resources, which we call civilisation and progress, and for which we claim so much credit.

The population of Mysore is nearly four millions. The number of scholars in the schools maintained or aided by the local Government during the official year, was 2317. Of these it is said that 1450 are learning the English language, and 722 are educated up to the University entrance standard—evidently belonging to an urban class whose parents are well able to pay for their education, most of whom would do so if the Government would leave them alone, but who certainly have no claim whatever to an education for their children—the school-fees being quite nominal—at the expense of the agricultural population.

But out of these 2317 scholars, we find that 434, or about one-fifth, are of English or East Indian parentage, and that the schools they attend receive fully one-fourth of the public money expended as grants in aid. The people of this description may perhaps be able to muster, at the very

most—exclusive of the military, who have their own schools—two thousand out of the four million inhabitants of Mysore, and they are all located in the town and cantonment of Bangalore. By no means a poor class, as compared with others, utterly insignificant in numbers, and consisting chiefly of British military pensioners and their descendants, they are yet allowed to swallow up one quarter of the funds allotted for the encouragement of Education.

The total expenditure of the Mysore Educational Department for the year 1862-3 was, in round numbers, £5,000. Of this, £2,000 went in the salaries of the Director and Inspectors; and of the remainder, two-thirds, or £2,000 more, were devoted to schools at the official capital, Bangalore—population under 100,000—leaving just one-fifth, £1,000, for the schools of the 3,900,000 provincials.*

Doubtless the highly respectable gentleman who perhaps receives a better income as Director of Public Instruction than he could earn in his legitimate sphere of an independent schoolmaster, does his work most conscientiously, and sends in a most satisfactory annual Report of his labours, with the prettiest tabulated statements; but with the doubtful exception of himself and his inspecting colleagues, I do not believe that any man, woman, or child in Mysore, derives any real benefit from this absurd misapplication of the public funds—certainly no one who has the slightest claim to assistance from the State. I believe that if the Government of Mysore—and my remarks are intended to apply equally to the Government of India—were to give up meddling with the details of education, and were to confine its action to providing the machinery, either by Universities or by boards of examiners, for ascertaining and declaring the qualifications of candidates for the public service, and for granting degrees and certificates of proficiency in Law and Medicine, it would undertake quite as much as any Government legitimately and fairly can, and would promote education much more effectually than by sustaining or assisting any number of schools. I believe that Government schools and stipendiary instruction attract the wrong sort of students,

* Administration Report of Mysore for 1862-3, paragraphs 111 to 118; and Appendix D.

and obstruct the efforts of the right sort of teachers. If proper inducements were held out to persons of recognised position and ample fortune to give their children a good English education—if a fair field to all qualified natives were opened by Government—the greatest possible encouragement would be given both to schoolmasters and scholars.*

I would exclude no person from employment, or from competition for employment, on account of his caste or connections in India, any more than I would in England; but I believe that those who can qualify themselves without any extraneous aid, will in general be found to be better qualified, both morally and intellectually, than those who have been raised above their ordinary sphere by charity schooling, public or private, by Government scholarships or other factitious means, or who have sought for education merely as a stock in trade. Men of decided genius, and even of extraordinary talent, may be left to work their way upwards; most certainly the Government has no special faculty for drawing them from their obscurity in their early youth.

In my humble opinion, the connection between the Government and education in India, hampers the progress of reform by rendering education unpopular and unfashionable, and by discouraging natural enterprise and individual self-reliance.†

It must not be supposed that I attach any very great importance to this particular topic; that I consider a very grievous injury to be inflicted on Mysore by this annual prodigality of five thousand pounds, that I burn with indignation against so very harmless a hobby as Government education.‡ The reason of my expatiating so far on this question is, that this fallacious system of public instruction is one of those “inestimable blessings of British rule”, that would most certainly

* What deters men of rank in India from entering the British service, or bringing up their children with that object, is that, whether in Civil or military employ, a native has been hitherto compelled to commence life in a position little, if at all, raised above that of a menial servant.

† Appendix E.

‡ Very harmless, at least, so long as no religious teaching is allowed in any Government school, and no grant is given to any proselytising establishment. Any deviation from this rule I hold to be iniquitous and of a dangerous tendency.

be declared to be imperilled by the restoration of the Rajah's Government.

An altered distribution of the territorial divisions of Mysore and a comprehensive revision of establishments, mainly after the pattern of the Punjaub, was recommended by the present Commissioner, Mr. Bowring, in June, and sanctioned by the Government of India in September, 1862; and the complete inauguration of the new arrangements is announced in the Administration Report of Mysore for the official year 1862-3. The general effect of the revised organisation may be briefly summed up as follows:—the number of appointments in the Executive and Judicial Departments, filled by English gentlemen, is raised from twenty-one to twenty-seven, their aggregate salaries from £28,000 to £40,000, and the average annual salary—from the Commissioner's £5,000 down to the junior Assistant's £500—is increased from £1,300 to £1,500.* The good work which had been so well begun in Lord Dalhousie's time is still carried on!

But the higher native officials participate very moderately, if at all, in the benefits of this revision of establishments. Some of the changes are not as fully explained as could be wished; but, on the whole, it appears to me that this body of public servants gains a little in position and prospects—though even that is doubtful—but loses decidedly in the number of superior appointments open to the class, and in the aggregate of its emoluments.†

This latest inroad upon the constitution of Mysore—though introduced merely as a revision of establishments, and evidently considered as a mere matter of routine—strikes me as being a very remarkable disclosure, after a thirty years' probation, of the utter inability or unwillingness of our authorities in India, according to the maxims which prevail at Calcutta, to carry out the reform of a native State with the express object, loyally avowed and loyally fulfilled, of replacing the administration in native hands.

If the present administration of Mysore is of such a nature that it cannot be maintained without a full complement of

* Administration Report of Mysore, 1862-3, paragraph 181.

† Appendix E.

English officers, and without the constant support of British troops, then I say it is not an administration that is really suited to the country or to the people. It may last for a time, it may be compatible with a high state of social order and material prosperity, it may have been a necessary stage in the production of that state of order and prosperity, but on the face of it such an administration is temporary and provisional, and it ceases to be a reforming or progressive agent when its temporary nature is forgotten, when the class interests and national arrogance of alien rulers, suggest that it should be perfected and perpetuated.

I know well to what inflammatory misrepresentations I expose myself at the hands of that large portion of the Press of India impersonating the British official and commercial interests of the hour. I may be accused of abandoning the authority and dignity of Great Britain, of libelling my own countrymen, of flattering the natives, pandering to their envy, hatred, and jealousy, and even apologising for their worst and most notorious vices of corruption, cruelty, and sloth. I am not very mindful of attacks from that quarter; and I am not very apprehensive of being misunderstood in England; but I may perhaps take this opportunity of anticipating certain objections.

I maintain, then, that by the policy which I recommend, British authority would be greatly strengthened. In that diplomatic reconstruction of the Empire in India, which I believe is now urgently required, I would not resign an atom of Imperial power; I would more openly assert it. I would cause it to be more distinctly acknowledged, and more generally understood and respected—I would give up no means of influence, I would strengthen those that exist already, and I would acquire more. Our influence—political, moral, and social—is at present quite as strong in the native States of Mysore or Hyderabad, as it is in our own districts of Bellary, Kurnool, or Cuddapah, which fell to the Nizam's share in the partition of Tippoo's dominions, and were eventually ceded to us in 1800, to provide for the expense of our subsidiary troops. Indeed on the proverbial grounds of *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, I believe that the reputation and authority of the British

Government and nation stand much higher in the more remote native States, than in those under direct control, or in our own immediate possessions, where familiarity with our institutions and manners has dispelled awe and blunted admiration.

And I totally and emphatically deny that by anything I have said in this Chapter, or in any part of this book, I have depreciated the achievements, or cried down the just fame of those eminent public servants, who during the last half century, have raised the stately structure of our Indian Empire, and have adorned it with so many enduring trophies of humane and peaceful progress. The great names of the past generation, and the greatest who yet survive—such men as Mountstuart Elphinstone, Malcolm, Metcalfe, St. George Tucker, General Briggs, and Sir George Clerk—are all on my side. And though many of the new school are, I fear, at present opposed to that policy by which alone, as I believe, the Indian Empire can be long preserved by Great Britain as a beneficial and honourable charge, I am neither hopeless of seeing them converted, nor blind to their great merits. I do not presume to disparage a Lawrence, a Temple, or an Edwardes; I feel myself unworthy and unqualified to express the admiration that I feel for their unrivalled labours. The mistake against which I contend is that of assuming, as the indiscriminate eulogists of “the services” and the system sometimes appear to do, that every English official who supplants a native in a recently annexed Province, or excludes one in a settled district, is necessarily a Lawrence, a Temple, or an Edwardes.

What I desire, and venture humbly to recommend, is that we should endeavour to gain the confidence of the Princes and their advisers, that we should aim at the instruction and not at the destruction of native administrators, and that whenever and wherever the local abuses are so rooted and inveterate, the local magnates so ignorant and depraved, that the only possible cure consists in radical extirpation and removal—and this may have been the case in Mysore—we should never lose sight of what ought to be the chief end and object of our most rigorous measures, the installation, one by one, as soon as may safely be, of trained native statesmen and magistrates in the place of their British teachers and precursors. This plan may seem to

the bureaucratic mind to savour too much of a self-denying ordinance, and to endanger the official fabric; but I am convinced that the happiness and permanent civilisation of a people will be more advanced by the development of their capacity for self-government, than by a stereotyped system—be it ever so symmetrical and ever so benevolent—of foreign and exclusive nepotism.

Where an immense population is subjected to an alien race, and especially where the natives and the conquerors are of different religions and colours, there must exist some amount of repugnance and heartburning; and nothing but the most scrupulous respect for ancient rights, and a generous recognition of native talents and qualifications on the part of the dominant race, can overcome the natural repugnance to a foreign yoke, and secure permanent or even long-continued submission and peace.

In the cause of progress not less than in the cause of peace, I plead for the maintenance of native States, and for the elevation of native statesmen and administrators.

Even if there were the greatest reason to dread that a large proportion of native officials, when installed in the higher posts after an apprenticeship in our schools, would prove intriguers, tyrants, and corruptionists—I should still say that it would be better to leave the Hindoo to stagger and struggle through the bogs and thickets of bribery and oppression, than to keep him for ever cramped and constrained in the strait-waistcoat of foreign management. Having once placed him in the right way, we need not abandon him to his fate; we may still give him a helping hand in his difficulties.

There will always be work enough in India for our Lawrences and Temples, but a great part of the work that has now fallen—through patronage, official pedantry, and national arrogance—into the hands of Brown, Jones, and Robinson, ought to be transferred cautiously and gradually to the hands of educated and trained natives, by whom it could be executed in a style and with actual results more genuine, more finished, and more popularly acceptable than can ever be expected under existing arrangements. And the proportion of higher appointments, the positive share in the Government of India, that may

be safely entrusted to natives—in the Principalities as well as in British Provinces—is an increasing proportion, and the demand for its concession will every day become more irresistible.

It is in the reform of the native States, and in that direction alone, as I believe, that the regeneration of India, including our own immediate possessions, can be pursued. But nothing but iteration, reiteration and importunity in the cause of a far-sighted Imperial policy, can counteract and finally destroy—in the minds either of the English public, or of influential natives—the mischievous effects of ten years' unrestrained acquisitiveness, and of constant appeals to the pride and prejudices of race, and British interests, and “the true interests” of the natives, and Christian duties, and European destinies, and all that horrible mixture of cant and cupidity by which the annexation policy was vindicated, which is now being cautiously revived in certain quarters, and which may be expected to increase and multiply during the period of political success and material prosperity, which we may hope lies before us.

And if the most sanguine expectations of material prosperity should be realised; if by sheer dint of a long peace and administrative skill, the resources and revenues of our Government should continue to increase, and British capital continue to be more largely invested in works of productive utility, and railway communications become perfected throughout India; our provocations and our obligations to interfere with the administration of native States will become more frequent. I wish to make our interference more easy and more efficient. I am by no means of opinion that our power should be timidly exerted in controlling and superintending the government of native States. I should rather complain that it has not been used sufficiently, and not in the most effectual and acceptable manner and direction. We have aimed more at extending our boundaries than our laws and customs, more at enlarging our patronage than our moral influence.

It is the complete separation of judicial and executive functions, the promulgation of a Code, and the limitation of the Prince's power over the public revenue,—all of which have been established in Travancore,—that tend to transform an

Asiatic despotism into a constitutional monarchy. And this good work could have been, and still can be, as well done in Mysore, as it has been in the less important State of Travancore, under the auspices of the Madras Government, and with the hearty approval of the present enlightened Rajah.

Undoubtedly much remains to be done in Travancore ; many reforms are crude and imperfect ; others, like many of our own, are but showy and superficial ; some gross abuses, protected by ancient usage and religious prejudice, are still untouched : but, on the whole, this Principality is decidedly more advanced than any one of those in direct subordination to the Calcutta Foreign Office, and the condition of the people, and their feelings towards the Government, may be favourably compared with the state of affairs in the adjoining districts of the Madras Presidency.

Yet Travancore was at one time in a much worse plight than Mysore was in 1832. In the year 1808 the Subsidy due to the Honourable Company had fallen into a long arrear ; the Rajah, under the influence of an ambitious Dewan, defied the injunctions of the Madras Government to reduce the number of his troops, and for several months resisted in the field the military measures that were adopted for his coercion. When the Travancore army was dispersed, the Dewan committed suicide, and the Rajah was reduced to terms of submission. The expenses of the war and other penalties imposed upon the State, the incapacity of the new Dewan, and the infirmities and imbecility of the Rajah, impeded a recovery from the disorders consequent on the recent insurrection. The Subsidy again fell into arrears, a spirit of disaffection became manifest throughout the country ; and in 1809, under Article V of the Treaty of 1805,* (identical with Article IV of the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore,) the management of Travancore was assumed by the British Government. For five years full authority was exercised by Colonel John Munro, the Resident, as Dewan or Prime Minister ; and under his judicious control the public debts were liquidated, the revenue largely augmented, and yet, by the abolition of petty cesses, the burden of taxation was much lightened. In 1814, on the accession of a young

* Collection of Treaties, 1812, p. 283.

Rajah, the management of the State was restored to a native Dewan, extricated from its embarrassments, and in a condition of great prosperity. But this was under the old school of Anglo-Indian statesmanship,—eighteen years before Mysore was attached, thirty years at least before the policy of annexation was expounded. And Travancore was never made a field for patronage, and was not occupied and over-run with establishments during our management, as Mysore has been.*

Travancore pays an ample Subsidy to the Government of Madras; and yet both Prince and people would cheerfully acknowledge how much it owes to British protection and guidance. But they certainly do not see, and I cannot see, that any benefit would accrue to them by its becoming a province of Madras. I cannot see that the annexation of Travancore in 1809 would have been advantageous to the British Empire. And I cannot see that any benefit or advantage would be conferred, either upon the people of Mysore or upon the Imperial Government, by the annexation of that Principality. On the contrary, for manifold reasons, already stated, I believe the change would be injurious to all classes, and, sooner or later, most damaging and burdensome to us; while the restoration of native rule—which might be brought about by a very gradual process,—would greatly redound to the honour and dignity of Great Britain, would immensely augment our moral influence, and our means of extending reform; and might almost immediately be turned to account as a relief to our military expenditure.

The question of the relative advantages to the people, and to the Imperial power, of provincial uniformity, administered by Englishmen, and of the greatest possible development of native rule,—both in subordinate States and in British territories,—is not settled by proving—if it could be proved,—that all the English gentlemen employed in the public service in India, are certain to be more talented and better educated and more high-principled, than any native gentlemen that are available for the same duties—that a British Governor or Commissioner must necessarily be a more wise and a more able ruler than a Hindoo Prince.

* Appendix F.

Whether we are marching on in these British Islands towards an Intellectual Aristocracy may be a disputed question; but I think it will hardly be a disputed question that we have hitherto marched on very slowly in that direction, and that a political fabric of that nature is obviously not suited to the actual opinions and tastes, the habits and interests, of any but an imperceptible minority of the nation. India I believe to be still less prepared, and still less inclined, to welcome the advent of such a visionary constitution of society.

Yet what the professional rulers have been striving, and still strive, to force upon the whole of India—granting all their assumptions, accepting their largest self-assertions,—is nothing but an Intellectual Aristocracy of foreigners, of unsympathising, unsociable, transitory foreigners. And some of them expect the natives of India to be content with their national degradation, and even to be grateful for its extension and completion.

We can appreciate in Europe the value of a hereditary Monarchy, and a hereditary Peerage, without wishing to subject either Prince or Peer to a competitive examination,—but in India the alleged incapacity of a Sovereign or Chieftain is made the pretext, not for limiting his power, but for abolishing it altogether, and for degrading the family to stipendiary insignificance. We can give due weight at home to the claims of wealth and rank; but in India, far from admitting the great proprietors to participate in the management even of communal or civic affairs—instead of enlisting them on our side,—we have done everything to injure the property and the prospects of the class, to outrage their keenest susceptibilities, and to reduce them to a social position even lower than that of our secondary officials. Even if I admitted in full the arrogant pretensions of professional administrators, I should not believe in the efficacy of an ideal system of Government and of society, which I can only describe by the compound term of “Chinese Socialism”—a system under which there are to be great establishments, but no great estates; no privileges, except official privileges; no prescriptive rights, except those of the ‘covenanted Services’; no subordination, except official subordination, to which Princes must daily bow down; no dignity,

except official dignity; no access to even the lowest share in public life, except through a competitive examination. The ideal of Indian officials has never been brought to perfection: the greatest servants of Government in India, and the Home Authorities, have, from time to time, opposed its full realisation; but the inevitable tendency of our system has been just what I have described. This has been, and continues to be, the tendency of our operations in Mysore; and the consummation would be much facilitated by the disappearance of the Rajah and his Court.

I can place no hope or reliance upon such a system, either as a Conservative power or as a reforming agent, when once the point of good order and a working administration has been gained. Perhaps we are entitled to a full acquittance for the past; perhaps we could not have instituted order and progress without territorial possession, without exclusive control. But if repression and proscription are maintained too long, and pushed too far, I believe that the system will be found—not only in Mysore, but all over India,—to be ephemeral and explosive.

It is an extraordinary thing that any English statesman should be found to speak of the supposed deficiencies of an Indian Sovereign, as if, according to the best theory of government extant, the Prince was bound to be the ablest and most active administrator in his dominions.

There have been native Princes who completely answered to that description; we might find some now, if we cared to look for them; but, if a sound and practical system of government were fairly established in each important State, I doubt whether the all-accomplished, all-inquiring, all-seeing Prince would be the most favourable specimen of the fraternity. I do not expect or wish a native Prince to be the best possible financier, legislator and judge in the country. On the contrary, I think that Oriental Sovereigns must be taught to do less, rather than to do more, than they attempt or assume to do, under the maxims and canons of ancient state-craft.

I want a Hindoo Prince, such as the Rajah of Mysore, not to be an accomplished administrator, not to be a profound statesman, but to be the living symbol of authority and order,

the visible and avowed representative of allegiance and obedience to Her Majesty's Imperial Crown, an indispensable connecting link and medium of communication between the Teacher and the Pupil.

There cannot be a greater mistake than to set up that invidious comparison which is so often made, between a British Commissioner and a Hindoo Prince. No one but a professed Republican would think of setting up such a comparison between a European Sovereign and an eminent Statesman. Their attributes and functions are quite distinct. With a native Prince on the throne, and in the full possession of every befitting prerogative, all the influence of a British Commissioner may be maintained in the person of a Resident, exercising with more or less stringency, according to time and circumstances, the right of authoritative counsel. But no British Commissioner or Governor can, on the extinction of a native Sovereignty, fill the Prince's place, exert the same influence, or wield the same moral authority. A certain moral force is destroyed, and physical force must supply the loss. The most energetic Commissioner would not undertake to govern Mysore without the constant support of British troops. More especially at any period of great national excitement—during an actual or impending invasion, or extensive rebellion—a British Commissioner, though burdened with full responsibility, would be absolutely powerless unless backed by European soldiers. A British Resident in a native State of similar area, with less responsibility, would have more power and more influence; for he could bring all his representative authority and all his personal talents, to bear with full force upon the Sovereign, his Ministers and nobles, upon the most intelligent, the most deeply interested, and most influential personages in the country, upon six or eight persons who have the most to lose, and who know that they can be individually identified, and made to answer for their conduct. But no British Commissioner could bring his own influence, his own powers of persuasion, to bear upon four millions or ten millions of people without a recognised leader, or led by a deposed Prince, or a desperate pretender.

At such a time,—when a British Commissioner, without ade-

quate military support, would be a laughing-stock, a victim, or a fugitive—a Hindoo Prince, such as the Rajah of Mysore, unaided by our troops, with or without the countenance and advice of a Resident, in the face of much local opposition, might, by lifting up his finger, preserve the peace, not merely in his own dominions, but over a large area of adjacent British territory; and would, to say the least, neutralise or impede a considerable part of the hostile resources, which, if unrestrained, would be arrayed against us. Such has ever been and, I believe, always will be, the general effect of an allied native State, as a conservative power in the Empire.

And in peaceful times, the beneficial effects of an allied native State, as a reforming agent throughout the Empire, ought, in my opinion, to be equally conspicuous. A British Resident, properly instructed, can bring all his representative and personal influence to bear upon the Sovereign and his Ministers, upon six or eight persons with whom he is in close communication, and who are connected by innumerable ties with all the great interests and centres of thought of the country. When these are gained the battle is won; but until they are gained, the British Instructor cannot hope to make a very deep or permanent impression upon the millions of an Indian Principality.

So long as the Princes, and all those to whom the people look up as their national and social leaders and celebrities, regard our political system with distrust and disaffection, so long will every reform, every material improvement, even in our longest settled Provinces, rest upon a precarious foundation, so long will our Government continue to be not an organism in India, but a mechanism; not rooted in the soil, not vitally connected with the population, but loosely attached to localities, running smoothly in the presence and by the authority of English officers, liable to sudden and total disarrangement when military force is withdrawn. I believe that India under the existing course and practice of our rule is very much over-administered, and that if a great crisis and time of trial were to come upon us, while we still adhere to Calcutta principles, she would be found not to be governed at all.

It is a fact—very deplorable, perhaps, but not the less true—that men, even in a very advanced stage of civilisation, are not guided entirely by reason, but to a great extent by their affections and their imagination. Men, also, in some strange countries, are known to have a certain regard to their own interests and their own worldly enjoyments, and even to such intangible considerations as a love of excitement, loyalty to a Prince, national pride and personal vanity. Of course these untutored feelings may be considered to be very unphilosophical, but still it cannot surely be advisable to overlook the fact of their existence. Perhaps a judicious Ruler might detect their hidden meanings, divine their tendency, and turn their forces to some good purpose. Up to the present day we have ventured, as it seems to me, to navigate the vessel of the State in India too much by the compass and the dead reckoning, without allowing for the force of the wind and the current, without observing the clouds by day or the stars by night. We have trusted too much to rule and plumb-line, without paying attention to those invisible and imponderable elements which are as potent in social and political action, as the physical imponderables are in physical dynamics.

Man cannot live on bread alone; and even with an ample supply of bread, man cannot be made happy by administrative tidiness, or by the perfect punctuality of returns and reports. The most striking effect of Sir Mark Cubbon's improved management in the eyes of the agricultural population, is the vast increase in the revenue, which has risen from what may be roughly stated as an average of £600,000 under the Rajah's rule, to its present annual amount of £1,000,000. This great augmentation has been chiefly produced by the gradual commutation of the *Battoya* land-assessment, or equal division of crops between the tenant and the Sovereign, into a money payment, which has been steadily carried on for upwards of thirty years, concurrently with a constant rise in the prices of all agricultural produce. The vexatious imposts, upwards of sixty in number, abolished by General Cubbon, were not very heavy in their aggregate amount, were levied chiefly from special classes and professions, and their remission was not felt as a boon to the bulk of the population—to the occupants and

cultivators of the soil. I have no doubt myself that the people are much better able to pay the present land-assessment than they were to pay the nominally smaller amount demanded thirty years ago ; owing to higher prices, and access to markets by good roads, the relative burden of taxation has, I believe, been lightened. But we must not be surprised or indignant if the farmers,—proverbially *laudatores temporis acti*,—are not nearly as grateful as they ought to be for the abolition of transit duties and petty cesses, while they are fully alive to the fact that they are paying a much higher land-tax than they did under native rule,—that they no longer share a bad crop with the Sircar, but have to find cash on the day of reckoning, whatever the past season may have been. In short, they do not feel at all satisfied that they get more “*panem*” under the Commissioner’s, than they did under the Rajah’s auspices ; while they know for a certainty that on the extinction of the Raj, their loved “*circenses*” would for ever disappear.

Is it surprising that the natives should perversely prefer a Rajah to a Commissioner ? A considerable share of the public revenue is allotted to the Rajah,* which doubtless stirs the spleen and rouses the cupidity of our Financial Department ; but this large income is all expended in Mysore ; the Rajah’s patriarchal bounty supports thousands who would find no place at our board ; and the splendour of his genial hospitality, public ceremonies and processions, is a constant source of pride, entertainment and excitement, to all ranks and classes. All this must cease on annexation ; all encouragement to native art and learning ceases ; the manufacture of many fabrics and articles of luxury falls off ; all public pomp, state, and general amusement disappear ; the sting and vivifying charm of life is gone ; everything is doomed to settle down to a dead, dull, and uniform level.† The stately dinner-parties and gay balls, in which English officials and their families take delight, may be highly civilised and intellectual recreations, worthy of general

* About £140,000 per annum. His successor might probably be persuaded to manage with a smaller Civil List.

† On this aspect of the case, see a curious article, “Christmas in Bombay”, from a native newspaper, the *Hindu Prakāsh*, which will be found in Appendix G.

respect and admiration ; but these festivities can hardly be expected to rouse much popular interest, for they take place in private houses, and natives, even of the highest rank, are very seldom invited to them. The diversions of the British hierarchy being of this exclusive nature, the current rumours of their ordinary expenditure can scarcely call forth any warmer sentiment than that of cold esteem. No doubt it is very proper that the Commissioner and his Assistants should remit half of their salaries to Europe, for the education of their children, and as a provision for their own retirement ; but this respectable economy, even when contrasted with the Rajah's barbaric profusion, is not calculated to raise a moral enthusiasm throughout Mysore in favour of the permanent installation of a British bureaucracy, and the permanent exclusion of a native Sovereign.

I know nothing of my own personal knowledge of the Rajah of Mysore ; I have never seen him. I have no reason to suppose his Highness to be a profound statesman, or a man of extraordinary talents. But from all that I have been able to learn, I should suppose him to be admirably adapted for our Imperial purposes, both as a conservative power and as a visible agent for accepting and assimilating reforms. He is described by those who know him well, as a Prince of more than average acuteness of intellect, active for his years, and capable of taking a shrewd and lively share in a discussion on public affairs, master of three languages spoken in his dominions, Canarese, Mahratta, and Hindustanee ; sufficiently acquainted with English to appreciate and control a correspondence,* and to understand a good deal of a conversation, though unable or unwilling to take part in it.† He has never shut his eyes to the

* In 1844, when the Government expressed some doubt on this point, and wished his Highness to correspond in Canarese, he gave assurances as to his entire knowledge and approval of his own English despatches.

† In my own experience I have known several instances of native Princes and nobles, both Hindoo and Mussulman, who, though fairly proficient in English, had an insurmountable objection to converse in that language. There seemed to me to be a prejudice against its use, as a *clerklike* accomplishment. This aversion, however, is not shared, or has been overcome, by the Rajah of Travancore and his brother, Prince Rama Vurma, both of whom are excellent English scholars ; the latter, indeed, has published,

errors of his youth ; he has not been unmindful of the benefits conferred upon the country by General Cubbon's long administration. Hope deferred may have made his heart sick, but it has never turned him from the firm attachment to British supremacy and reliance on British protection, which was the first lesson of his childhood, and has been the guiding principle of his public life. At his advanced age, and with his severe experience, I cannot conceive a better instrument in our hands than the present Rajah would be. His disposition is acknowledged to be humane and beneficent ; and, apart from the general respect for his lineage and station, the popular love and regard for the Rajah's person and dignity are said to be very remarkable throughout Mysore, and to have been much heightened of late years, in the midst of conflicting rumours as to the restoration of his authority, and with the ever approaching prospect of losing him altogether.* With the government of a hundred and fifty millions on our hands, with eighty thousand British soldiers locked up in India, we are as little able to afford, we ought to be as unwilling, to lose the Rajah as are the people of Mysore. But if we lose him by annexation, we shall lose many other native Princes, and millions of native hearts, by alienation. If we regain him, or even his successor, by restoration, we shall redouble our moral influence, we shall redouble our reforming capacity, we shall be able to take the first steps for relieving our military strength.

Far from desiring to see "the uniform application of our system of government" extended to every State and province, I believe that by such means the harmonious establishment of sound principles of morals and politics would be rendered impossible, that our reforms would not be really accepted and naturalised in India, but would dege-

under the modest *nom de plume* of "A Hindoo", several remarkable letters and pamphlets on political and religious topics.

* An interesting letter will be found in Appendix H, written by one who had ample means of forming a judgment, which will give a very fair idea of the feelings with which the threatened extinction of the Mysore dynasty is viewed, not only by the natives, but by some of our most experienced and devoted officers.

nerate, even to a greater extent than now, into a superficial and deceptive crust, concealing from us the volcanic elements that boil beneath it, and gather strength from the external pressure. I would rather look forward to a multiplicity of political and municipal centres, giving rise to a free and noble emulation, to a more active production of wealth, and to a more permanent type of civilisation. I believe that in a Federation of reformed native States, owning allegiance to the Imperial Crown, accepting such general rules of law and judicial procedure, and such principles of financial administration, as may suffice to make each Prince a constitutional Sovereign,—and only in such a Federation,—Conservatism and Progress may be reconciled and secured. There would be found the legitimate and benevolent application of the old Roman maxim of government, “*Divide et impera.*”

I object to an extreme centralisation, even in administering our immediate possessions. I think that a larger discretion in devising local improvements, and in promptly carrying them out by the expenditure of local revenues,—after providing for certain Imperial disbursements and contributions,—ought to be allowed to the Viceroy, to the Provincial Governors, and by them, under analogous conditions, to their Prefects, and to Municipal Councils, both in towns and districts. But objecting, as I do, to a centralised dictation of administrative and personal details, either in the control of dependent States, or in the general control, by Her Majesty’s Government of all proceedings in India, I would yet maintain most firmly the right of supervision and ultimate decree in the hands of the Home Authorities, so as to ensure a constant and steady application of British principles, from the purest and least prejudiced source, to the government of the Indian Empire, so as to save the people of that Empire from the curse of professional rule, and the people of Great Britain from the consequences of that curse.

The Home Government might, I think, with much advantage to the public service, place more confidence in the Viceroy and the Provincial Lieutenants, and charge them with a greater responsibility. The Secretary of State might relinquish—in practice, if not in theory—his power of previous sanction,

retaining the power of criticism, correction and prohibition, as it is now exercised in Legislative matters. I have no fear that the dignity and authority of the Viceroy's office would be lowered by the rare occurrence of his orders being modified or reversed. No Minister of the Crown could be unmindful of the deep responsibility under which such a step must be taken ; and I assume that on both sides a proper understanding is to be kept up, and that good temper and all forms of courtesy are to prevail.

I think the occasional decisive intervention and peremptory explicit orders of the Secretary of State, in matters involving some broad general principle—especially in matters where great difference of opinion has existed in India—have frequently produced a most beneficial effect, and will continue to do so. I believe that a more willing obedience and submission would be paid to the Imperial Government, if it were certain that an appeal to London against some “act of State,” or departmental oppression was not a mockery ; if every native Prince, and every native official were fully convinced that the Royal Government was a living reality. The consultations in London, withdrawn from contact with the strange indigenous race, unaffected by local and temporary interests and antipathies, are much more likely to be carried on with a cool and deliberate impartiality, to be characterised by a fair and generous spirit, and to lead to an impartial conclusion, than those which take place at Calcutta or Bombay. Even a Governor-General of high rank and dignified antecedents—even Councillors of mature years, appointed by virtue of a distinguished career at home—must, to a certain extent, succumb to local influences.

The Jamaica planters could never have been induced to legislate for the emancipation of their slaves, even though the same amount of compensation for that purpose had been voted to them by the British Parliament. Not a single native would have been appointed to a seat in the High Courts or in the Legislative Council of India, had the initiative of those conciliatory measures been left to the local authorities.

The cry that has been from time to time raised in Calcutta, that “India must be governed in India,” has never been raised from a wish to infuse a more liberal spirit into Anglo-

Indian institutions; but either to assert and maintain the vested rights and privileges of the "covenanted" hierarchy, or to augment, concentrate, and strengthen the influence of the English commercial class over the Legislative and Executive of India. This cry has never been raised on behalf of the legitimate operations of capital—not for any broad principle, not for any national interest, British or native, not for the great or small landholders, not for the toiling millions, but for the hundreds of temporary settlers with no permanent stake in the country, encumbered by no public duties, and restrained by no public opinion. With very few exceptions, European capitalists are only to be found in the Presidency cities; the "up-country" settlers are either their servants or their debtors. These so-called Bengal settlers and planters, the most noisy of whom are *not* settlers or planters, but *manufacturers* of indigo, their employers and creditors, and others interested in their operations, exasperated at the rejection in London of the coercive Contract Law, which after a long and laborious agitation they had carried through the Legislative Council at Calcutta, exasperated also at the effectual modification in London of the Rules for the Sale of Waste Land, drawn out in the interest of their class, and too hastily published by Lord Canning—have never ceased to pursue with their querulous and impotent abuse the present Secretary of State, and to denounce all attempts to govern India, as they complain he has done, directly and in detail from a Council Chamber in London. There may sometimes be a doubt and a difference of opinion in drawing the line between matters of detail and matters of principle; but with ordinary prudence and moderation, there ought to be no practical difficulty. The particular cases complained of appear to me to have involved great and fundamental principles; an impartial and deliberate revision in London was most urgently required, and with the exception of the European planting interest of which I have spoken—a party small in numbers, but strong in speech and means of influence—the results were most satisfactory to the public at large.

In another case, which led to a collision between the Viceregal Government and the Home Authorities, and to a considerable ferment for a time among the official and

commercial classes in Calcutta—the grant of an increased or more settled provision to Tippoo Sultan's family—the Secretary of State acted in consequence of an appeal to Her Majesty's Government; and although it was an isolated case, and the wrong redressed had not roused much general attention or sympathy, the decision was hailed throughout India as an auspicious omen, as the sign of a better era commencing.

But it must be acknowledged, in accordance with established precedents, that unless under the obligation of an appeal in regular form, and in an affair beyond the cognisance of municipal law, the Home Authorities ought not to interfere with the proceedings of the Viceregal Government, or to issue direct orders in personal questions, or in matters of individual grievance. For example, the Secretary of State might properly lay down the general principle that henceforward natives were to be eligible or to be admitted in larger proportion to a certain class of appointments; and with that object in view, Her Majesty's Government might open the door by a special order, or, if legal obstacles existed, by an Act of Parliament; but it would not be advisable or right that the Secretary of State should officially propose or forbid any particular appointment or promotion. If the general instructions should produce very scanty or very slow results, the proper remedy would be found, not by tampering with the Executive power and patronage of the Indian Government, but by the installation, either at the ordinary period or immediately—as demanded by circumstances—of a Viceroy whose opinions were in accordance with those of the Ministry.

The same broad distinction between the principles and the details of Government ought to be maintained by the Imperial Power of India, in controlling and instructing a subordinate or protected State, when it has passed, or has never undergone, the probationary stage of direct tutelage or management by a Commission of English officers. For example, the British Government might very properly exert all its influence to induce or constrain a native Prince to promulgate a Code, or to limit by a law his own Privy Purse. Great judgment, tact, and patience might be required to render these reforms acceptable; and in certain quarters, where our right of interference was

least clear, and our means of control least efficient and available, it might be expedient to offer some highly coveted privileges and material advantages, such as cessions of territory, on the condition of constitutional government. In ceding territory no real power would be abandoned; on the contrary, on giving up administration we should retain a stronger hold on government; in many instances the occasion might be taken for expressly assuming Imperial supremacy; and the loss of direct possession would be a decided gain so far as it enabled us to reduce our establishments, and to consolidate our military strength.*

But however much the process for converting the disorderly and careless despotism of native States into the government of Law and Order, may be varied—under diverse circumstances and eventualities—the general object, I maintain, is legitimate, and quite within the limits of just Imperial action. We should aim at the imposition of principles, not of persons—at the inculcation of permanent Law, not at the dictation of particular judgments. Thus I can conceive every possible gradation of moral pressure, from gentle persuasion to imminent coercion—according to the urgency of the case—being justifiably employed by the British Government, to induce or compel a native Sovereign to institute a Code and a sound financial system, and even to introduce a certain *class* of persons—as educated Collectors and trained Judges—into the administration of his country. The last-mentioned innovation would be the most delicate of all, and by an injudicious' excess or precipitancy might approach very near to the forbidden confines; but if the questions of Law and procedure were first settled, and then the want of competent initiation were demonstrated—if great care were taken to recommend persons likely to be agreeable to the Prince and to command respect among the people, if the smallest possible number were brought in, and obviously as a trained *class* to serve under the local Government, not as personal hangers-on of the Resident, or professed adherents of the Imperial Power—the difficulty might be easily overcome. The strangers would be employed in the administration, not

* *The Empire in India*, p. 393-406.

obtruded into the Government. So far, with temper and discretion, the boundaries of a just Imperial supremacy would not be transgressed.

But while I should be prepared, in an extreme case, to resort to the most decided measures to induce or compel a native Prince to reform his Government, I should be very slow to exercise any moral pressure whatever, merely to induce or compel him to dismiss a Minister, or to accept one of our nomination. That would be quite a different style of interference, that would be the widest departure from what ought to be the Imperial rule—to suggest or impose great principles, but not to dictate in personal details. From the most aggravated form of this oppressive supervision, where a Minister known to be obnoxious and offensive is brought face to face with the Prince to overrule his wishes and to direct his movements, no result can be reasonably expected but the utter degradation and despair of the Sovereign, and the complete demoralisation of all his establishments, even if it did not operate as a provocative to intrigue and contumacy, the preliminary stages to deposition or annexation.

Yet this fruitless task of meddling with individual claims and particular grievances, of pitting the protégé of the Residency against the favourite of the Court, of interfering in details and disregarding substantive reform, has hitherto characterised our system of Political Agency in India—with this additional defect, as pointed out by Mr. Mansel,* that from our Government having had no definite policy of directing or remodelling native States, having given no consistent instructions to its diplomatic Agents, and demanded from them no precise course of action, a period of irritating importunity would often be followed by a season of indifference and repose, so that no lasting impression was ever made. In its best aspect, under the guidance of an energetic and conscientious Resident, the existing system of Political Agency merely plucks at the leaves instead of attacking the root; while in that worst aspect which it has occasionally assumed, the noxious tree flourishes and brings forth its corrupt fruit in security and abundance.

* Ante, p. 136.

Such has been the conduct of the Calcutta Foreign Office—such is the practice of the professional rulers of India. They are satisfied if the Resident's Diaries are regularly transmitted and contain no startling disclosures. They have devised no plan for improving a dependent State, except that of destruction. They are prepared to take that course with the Mysore State, and they most assuredly will do so, if they are not checked by the Government of Great Britain. The Rajah of Mysore is in his seventy-first year, and it will be too late to interfere, too late to remonstrate, when he is no more—when the Calcutta professionals have committed the British Government beyond retreat by a proclamation, by openly rejecting the Rajah's heir, by intimidating the Nizam into silence, perhaps by some "just and necessary" measures of coercion and correction.

It will then be too late to reconsider either the justice or the policy of grasping at the Mysore Reversion. The question must be decided in England, and must be decided without delay.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

THE ADOPTION DESPATCH.

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

Foreign Department,
Simla, 30th April 1860 (No. 43A).

SIR,

In accordance with the intention expressed in my Despatch No. 16, of the 6th of December last, I desire to bring to the notice of Her Majesty's Government the general subject of adoption as affecting the succession to the Native States and Principalities of India.

2. I have, in the course of my recent march to Upper India, been forcibly struck by the want of some clear and well understood rule of practice in our dealings with the Princes and Chiefs upon this subject.

It is not that the measures taken under the orders of the late Court of Directors, in dealing with doubtful or lapsed succession, have not in many instances been liberal and even generous, and certainly there is not, at the present moment, an indisposition on the part of the Native States to doubt the general good-will towards them of the Paramount Power. But there appears to be a haze of doubt and mistrust in the mind of each Chief as to the policy which the Government will apply to his own State in the event of his leaving no natural heir to his throne, and each seems to feel, not without reason, that in such case the ultimate fate of his country is uncertain.

3. It is to this alone that I can attribute the extraordinary satisfaction with which my assurance to Scindia that the Government would see with pleasure his adoption of a successor if lineal heirs should fail, and that it was the desire of the Paramount Power that his

House should be perpetuated and flourish, was accepted by those attached to his Court, to the extent that at Gwalior the news was received with rejoicings very like that which would have marked the birth of an heir. For there is not a State in India which has had stronger or more practical proofs of the wish of the British Government that its integrity should be maintained than Gwalior, from the time when, in 1826-27, the then Maharajah was, in his last illness, perseveringly pressed by Lord Amherst to adopt an heir, and was assured that nothing could be further from the wish and intention of the Government than to exercise then or thereafter any intervention in the internal administration of his country or to pretend to control the succession to his State, down to 1843, when the present Maharajah, then a child, was placed upon his throne and confirmed in the possession of it by Lord Ellenborough in person.

4. To the same cause I ascribe the manifest pleasure of the Maharajah of Rewah, when a like assurance was given to him. He said to me that his family had been in Rewah for eleven hundred years, and that my words had dispelled an ill-wind that had long been blowing upon him. A son had lately been born to him, but if any Prince might reasonably expect his adoption of a successor to be respected, without a special promise to that effect, it would be one who is bound to us by treaty, and who can show an unusually long and uninterrupted descent from an ancient Rajpoot stock, which for centuries has steadily held its own against all intrusion, whether by Mahomedans, Mahrattas and Pindaries, as is the case with the Maharajah of Rewah.

5. I could adduce other instances, such as those of the Maharajah of Cashmere, the Maharajah of Puttiala, and the Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej country, in which the value attached to the announcement, and the eagerness to have it solemnly recorded, were strongly marked.

6. I believe that the chief cause of this feeling is the vagueness that has prevailed in our policy respecting adoptions. That policy has not only been incoherent, but even when an adoption has been admitted there has often been long discussion in India, and references to the Home Government, before a final decision has been taken, thereby giving rise to doubts of our real desire to admit it.

7. But it is not only through what has passed between the Government of India and Native Courts that our hesitation and uncertainty have been made manifest to the latter. Within the last ten or twelve years the discussions between the Government of India and the Home Government, and the keen conflict of opinion between individuals of experience and of the highest authority in India and in England, upon

this question of adoption have been laid bare to all who have chosen to examine them. Since 1849, the official correspondence on not less than sixteen or seventeen cases of doubtful succession and of adoption have been printed by orders of Parliament. In these papers there is every variety of opinion as to the claims of Native States on the one hand, and as to the duty, rights, and policy of the British Government on the other.

And it must not be supposed that because these documents are published in blue books and in English they are beyond the knowledge of Native Courts. They are, on the contrary, sought for and studied by those whose dearest prospects they so closely affect. It is not many months since I was informed, by the Governor General's Agent in Central India, that a native Court had received from England the parliamentary papers on Dhar before they had reached my own hand.

Papers relative to the Rajah of Sattara, printed by order of the House of Commons, March 1st, 1849.

Papers respecting the succession by adoption of Sovereign Princes in India, printed by order of the House of Commons, February 15th, 1850.

Papers on the annexation of Jhansie, printed by order of the House of Commons, July 27th, 1855.

Papers on the annexation of Kerowlee, printed by order of the House of Commons, August 3rd, 1855.

9. There is disagreement even on the first fundamental point of all,—our own duty.

See Minute of Lord Dalhousie on Sattara, August 30th, 1848, paras. 25 to 30, and on Kerowlee, August 30th, 1852, para. 7.

Minute of Mr. Lewis on Kerowlee, September 2nd, 1852.

Minute of Mr. Willoughby on Sattara, May 14th, 1848.

we should take these opportunities of consolidating our territories and of getting rid of petty intervening Principalities.

See Minute of Sir J. Littler on Sattara, September 5th, 1848.

Dissent of Mr. Shepherd on Sattara, January 6th, 1849.

Dissent of Mr. Tucker on Sattara, January 3rd, 1849.

8. A brief examination of the papers named in the margin will show how irreconcilably at variance with each other are the views which the highest authorities have taken of a subject which lies at the very root of the future existence of Native States.

In one place, it is urged that we are bound not to neglect right-ful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue by refusing to permit adoption in independent States, where there has been a total failure of all heirs; and that

In another place, and by other authority, it is contended that the absorption of small independent Principalities, which happen to be surrounded by our own territories, will not always augment

our power, but will be a source of weakness to ourselves, without being a benefit to the people.

10. Neither is there agreement on the subject of our own rights. On this head there arise, as might be expected, many complications from differences of origin, of race, and of tradition amongst the various Native States. Some are designated "independent," as having maintained their existence under successive paramount dynasties, and having suffered comparatively little interference in their internal affairs from any. Such are the Rajpootana States, some of the Bundelcund States, and others. Some are called "dependent," as having been created or re-established by the Moguls, or the Peishwa, or ourselves, and as having been invested, in some instances, with authority short of sovereign authority. Such were Sattara, Jhansi, Jaloun. Then there are disputed points arising out of race and usages; whether, in a Rajpoot State, the widow of a Rajah may adopt a son without having received her husband's permission. To what extent, in a Rajpoot State, the voice of the principal officers of the State is necessary to the recognition of the succession. Whether, in a Bundeela State, the Chief may adopt a stranger, to the exclusion of collaterals. Whether, in Hindoo States generally, the senior widow of a Chief is allowed to adopt unreservedly, or is limited to a choice within certain degrees of affinity. These are points of nicety which, probably, it would be impossible to rule absolutely and with satisfaction to all, but, putting aside for the present all small complications, remain broad and important questions of right on our part, upon which the very highest of our officers are at issue.

See Minute of Lord Dalhousie on Sattara, paras, 8, 9, and 30.

Minute of Mr. Willoughby on Sattara, para. 10.

to the Principality, or to sovereign rights, until the adoption has received the sanction of the Sovereign Power; and that this sanction may be withheld even from independent States.

See Minute of Lord Metcalfe, October 20th, 1837.

Minute of Lord Auckland on Oorcha, January 2nd, 1842, para. 4.

to the exclusion of collateral heirs, and that the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular

and not in violation of Hindoo law; and further, that even in the case of a fief or dependency, a

11. In one paper, it is maintained to be beyond doubt that a Prince's adoption of any individual does not constitute the latter heir

Elsewhere, it is confidently laid down that Hindoo Sovereign Princes, on failure of heirs male of the body, have a right to adopt and not in violation of Hindoo law; and further, that even in the case of a fief or dependency, a

legal adoption cannot be barred by the Government or Lord Paramount.

12. It is impossible that the minds of native rulers and of their people should not be disquieted so long as such a question as this, bearing as it does upon every class of State, independent and dependent, is allowed to remain in doubt; for the doubt has been only partially resolved by the decisions of the Court of Directors on the cases at issue. The Court "were fully satisfied that by the general

See Despatch from the Court of law and custom of India a dependent Principality, like that of Sattara, cannot pass to an adopted

heir without the consent of the Paramount Power." But this decision extends only to dependent Principalities, and not even to these unreservedly, for all dependent Principalities are not like that of Sattara, which was created, or resuscitated, by the British Government upon conditions framed by that Government, and of which that Government might, perhaps, be assumed to be the rightful interpreter.

See Despatch from the Court of Directors to the Government of India on Kerowlee, January 26th, 1853.

In another place, the Court of Directors draw a marked distinction between the case of Sattara, a State of recent origin and of our own creation, and that of Kerowlee, an old Rajpoot State, which had existed long anterior to our rule in India. But there is no admission that, even in such a case as that of Kerowlee, we are bound to recognise an adoption. It is rather implied that the question is one of expediency, and that, even in that case, there might have been grounds for taking the opportunity to substitute our own Government for that of a native ruler.

13. Another point upon which strong difference of opinion will be found in the papers referred to, and which has a most important bearing upon the claims of many Native States, is the meaning of the words "heirs and successors" in the several treaties and grants in which we find them used.

The instances in which the Government of India has bound itself by engagements or concessions to a Chief and his "heirs and successors," or to his heirs for ever, without explanation of what is to constitute the right of succession or inheritance, are very numerous. The question arises whether the expression is to be interpreted according to our own sense, which would limit it to heirs and successors by blood, or to be extended to heirs and successors by adoption, when the adoption has taken place in accordance with Hindoo law and with the custom of the other party to the engagement.

14. This question has never, so far as I know, received an authoritative answer; perhaps the decision of the Court of Directors on the case of Hattara may be regarded as having determined it against the admission of an adopted heir and successor where a dependent Chiefship is concerned; but this is not clear, for other considerations were mixed up in that case.

It is a question which is sure to recur. There are several of the Hill States, the possession of which was confirmed to their respective Chiefs by special grants after the Ghoorka War of 1814, and in dealing with which a decision upon it may any day be called for, owing to the terms in which the grants are couched.

15. Whilst there has been so much doubt as to the duty and rights of our Government in India, there has not been less as to its policy.

16. Probably that view of our policy which would prescribe the retention in our hands of the power to disallow adoption, and thereby to secure to ourselves an accession of territory, could not be expressed in terms more moderate or less calculated to alarm Native States than those used by Lord Auckland, when, in reference to the Colaba succession, he declared that we ought to "persevere in the one clear and direct course of abandoning no just or honourable accession of territory or revenue, while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously respected."

But this declaration contains nothing reassuring or clear to those who will be most affected by it. It has been shown that the opinions of the very highest authorities in India and in England, of those in fact with whom alone the decision of such matters rested, have differed widely as to what accessions of territory would be just, and as to what claims of right do exist, and do deserve our respect.

17. Nor does it appear possible to lay down these points with certainty by any declaration, however detailed and elaborate.

We profess, indeed, to be guided by the Hindoo law, and by the practice of those who have preceded us as rulers in India; but as to what that practice has been we are not agreed amongst ourselves. If, indeed, we never referred to it but for the purpose of avoiding carefully all new encroachments upon the liberties of Native States, and with the determination that our authority in questions of succession should be exercised with at least as much forbearance as was shown by the Mahomedans and the Mahrattas, a little uncertainty would be immaterial. We would easily make sure of erring only on the right side. But it has even been appealed to in support of a pretension to withhold our assent to adoption, even in the case of in-

dependent States, thereby making the State a lapse to the British Government; and yet we have not shown, so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from the Paramount Power.

18. I venture to think that no such instance can be adduced, and that the practice which has prevailed is truly described by Sir Henry Lawrence, where he says:—"The confirmation of the Suzerain is necessary in all cases. He is the

See letter from Sir H. Lawrence on Kerowlee, November 17, 1853.

arbitrator of all contested adoptions; he can set aside one or

other for informality, irregularity, or for misconduct; but it does not appear, by the rules or practices of any of the sovereignties, or by our own practice with the Istumrardars of Ajmere, that the Paramount State can refuse confirmation to one or other claimant, and confiscate the estate, however small."

I am aware that Sir H. Lawrence, who, when this was written, was the Agent of the Governor General in Rajpootana, speaks only of that part of India; but although the strong brotherhood of the Rajpoot States, their geographical position, and other circumstances caused their relations with the Emperors of Delhi to be more clearly defined, and less subject to capricious change than those with other feudatory States, I believe that there is no example of any Hindoo State, whether in Rajpootana or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power, by reason of that Power withholding its assent to an adoption.

19. It has been argued that the right to grant sanction implies the right to withhold it. This, however sound logically, is neither sound nor safe practically. The

See Minutes of Mr. Reid and Lord Falkland on Sattara, April 25th and July 28th. 1848. histories of feudal Governments furnish abundant examples of long-established privileges habitually renewed as acts of grace from the Paramount Powers, but which those powers have never thought of refusing for purposes of their own, or upon their own judgment alone.

20. Then as regards our other rule of guidance, the Hindoo law,

See letter of Sir George Clerk on the Chiefship of Bughaut, November 10th, 1842.

it has been said, by one who is well competent to speak on the subject, that "it is hunting after

a shadow to search for laws of inheritance to Chiefships in India so fixed as the Government desires to obtain.

* * * * *

"The Hindoo law, which is comprehensive regarding rights to private property, does not provide distinctly for Chiefships. It is not

fair, therefore, to desire a claimant to support his pretensions by adducing fixed laws." And in the same letter it is observed, in reference to certain views of the right of succession amongst the Hill Chiefs, "that it is the inconsistency, caprice, and mutability of our opinions regarding all great principles that is the bane of our supremacy in India." I fear that as regards the matter now under consideration, this is too true.

21. And now I would beg Her Majesty's Government to consider whether the time has not come when we may, with advantage to all, adopt and announce some rule in regard to succession in Native States, more distinct than that which we have been seeking to derive from the sources above mentioned; not by setting aside the Hindoo law wherever that avails, and not by diminishing in the least degree the consideration which the feudatory States have experienced at the hands of former ruling dynasties, but, on the contrary, by increasing this consideration, and at the same time making our future practice plain and certain.

22. A time so opportune for the step can never occur again. The last vestiges of the Royal House of Delhi, from which, for our own convenience, we had long been content to accept a vicarious authority, have been swept away. The last pretender to the representation of the Peishwah has disappeared. The Crown of England stands forth the unquestioned ruler and Paramount Power in all India, and is, for the first time, brought face to face with its feudatories. There is a reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt but eagerly acknowledged by the Chiefs. A great convulsion has been followed by such a manifestation of our strength as India had never seen, and if this, in its turn, be followed by an act of general and substantial grace to the native Chiefs, over and above the special rewards which have already been given to those whose services deserve them, the measure will be seasonable and appreciated.

23. Such an act of grace, and in my humble opinion, of sound policy, would be an assurance to every Chief, above the rank of Jagheerदार, who now governs his own territory, no matter how small it may be, or where it may be situated, or whence his authority over it may, in the first instance, have been derived, that the Paramount Power desires to see his Government perpetuated, and that, on failure of natural heirs, his adoption of a successor, according to Hindoo law (if he be a Hindoo) and to the customs of his race, will be recognised, and that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made to him, so long as his House is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the

conditions of the Treaties or Grants which record its obligations to the British Government.

24. The effect to be expected from this measure may be shortly described.

25. To the old Principalities of Rajpootana it would be of no direct importance. There adoptions have been hitherto generally respected by all Ruling Powers, and if any class of Chiefs feel secure that we shall not question their claims to adopt successors, it is probably the Princes of Rajpootana.

To the great Houses of Scindia, Holkar, Rewah, Puttialla, and to other smaller ones to whom the promise has already been made, it would be no new concession.

But to all other Chiefs, to the Guicowar and others in Western India, to those in Central India, in Bundelcund, and in the Hill States, it would be a most welcome assurance.

26. It would reassure them upon a matter on which they are especially sensitive, the continuance of the representation and dignity of their families.

It would remove a distinction already adverted to, which has been drawn between independent and dependent States, founded (though I venture to think not quite correctly founded) upon Lord Metcalfe's Minute of October 28th, 1837, and would do away with the difference of treatment between the independent Chiefs, and the Chief of a State like Jaloun and Jhansie, who, although he and his forefathers may have exercised for more than a century the full functions of government, is not considered entitled to adopt a successor, because the Peishwah had recognised his ancestor only as a Soubadar.

It would show at once, and for ever, that we are not lying in wait for opportunities of absorbing territory, and that we do deliberately desire to keep alive a feudal aristocracy where one still exists. It would establish this more conclusively, and bring it home to many more minds, than the promises and declarations recently made in Durbar to the powerful Chiefs to whom we were under special obligations.

27. I have proposed that the assurance should be given to every Chief who now governs his own territory, and who holds a position higher than that of a Jagheerदार.

This will mark a line which will be generally clear and intelligible, and it will accord with the one main distinction drawn by Lord Metcalfe between Chiefs who are, and Chiefs who are not, entitled to adopt.

Nevertheless, I think that some exceptions in favour of Jagheer-

dars should be made. A Jagheer is usually an assignment of land or revenue, in consideration of services, and not hereditary, or hereditary only for a generation or two. But, as Lord Metcalfe observes, there are in Bundelcund Chiefs whom it is difficult to place in either of the classes which he describes; and it is clear that he alludes to some who are there called Jagheerdars.

See De Cruze's Political Relations, p. 39, *et seq.* In their case the word means much more than in other parts of India. Their territories and the administration thereof have been granted to them and to their successors in perpetuity, so long as certain obligations are observed, and the concession of the privilege of adoption to the most influential among them would have a beneficial effect, not only in that disjointed Province, which, whatever may be our desire and however stringently we might enforce lapses, we could not hope to consolidate under our own administration for many generations to come, but throughout India.* In these last mentioned cases it would be expedient to require Nuzzerana whenever adoption took effect. From a fourth to a third of a year's revenue would, I think, be a fitting amount.

28. The case of the Mahomedan Chiefs remains to be considered.

Adoption in the full sense in which it is exercised by Hindoo Chiefs they cannot claim. But adoption of one collateral in preference to another of closer affinity, has been allowed to them where lineal heirs have failed; and it seems that it is also in accordance with Mahomedan law and usage that the Sovereign should select from among his sons the one whom he may desire to succeed to him. The King of Delhi exercised this right shortly before his rebellion.

* These Jagheerdars resemble those of whom Sir John Malcolm wrote as follows:—

“Adoptions which are universally recognised as legal among Hindoos are not a strict right (any more than direct heirs) where grants of land are for service. * * *

“But we have received the submission of the Jagheerdars, confirmed their estates, honoured them, and have continued to do so, by treating them as Princes; but while a few have been permitted to adopt, others are denied the privilege; and while we declare their direct heirs are entitled to succeed, we lie in wait (I can call it nothing else) to seize their fine estates on failure of heirs, throwing them and their adherents and the country into a state of doubt and distraction. These families should either never have been placed in possession of these countries, or never have been removed from them.”—*Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm*, Nov. 14th, 1829.

To the Mahomedan Chiefs, then, the assurance to be given would be that the Paramount Power desires to see their Governments per-

petuated, and that any succession to them which may be legitimate according to Mahomedan law will be upheld.

29. I recommend that in every case, Mahomedan or Hindoo, the assurance should be conveyed to each Chief individually, and not by a general notification addressed to all. This would be necessary, in order to avoid future claims from petty Jagheerdars or others whom it is not intended to include in this measure.

30. The proposed measure will not debar the Government of India from stepping in to set right such serious abuses in a Native Government as may threaten any part of the country with anarchy or disturbance, nor from assuming temporary charge of a Native State when there shall be sufficient reason to do so. This has long been our practice. We have repeatedly exercised the power with the assent and sometimes at the desire of the chief authority in the State, and it is one which, used with good judgment and moderation, it is very desirable that we should retain. It will, indeed, when once the proposed assurance shall have been given, be more easy than heretofore to exercise it without provoking jealousy of any designs upon the independence of the State.

31. Neither will the assurance, if worded as proposed, diminish our right to visit a State with the heaviest penalties, even to confiscation, in the event of its disloyalty or flagrant breach of engagement.

Upon this point, I beg to refer to the following passages in papers by Sir George Clerk :—

See Minute on Sattara, April 12th, 1848, para. 26.

“ We should look for escheats not from such a source as the doubtful meaning of the stipulation of an agreement, but from the incorrigible misconduct of allies when thrown back, as they should be, on the responsibilities of the Sovereign rights relinquished to them, rendering punishment in such cases signal and salutary, by abstaining from half measures, such as largely pensioning or managing for the delinquent, or substituting his child, wife, or minister.”

And again,—

See Letter on Chiefship of Bughat, November 10th, 1842.

“ The proper punishment for the Paramount State to inflict for gross mismanagement and oppression, such as prevails to a considerable extent in these

Hills, would be sequestration of the Chieftaincies; but this would not be fair until we had revived their interest in their ancestral territories, by manifesting the same respect for their rights, founded on a possession of many centuries, as is entertained by the people in general. Could we inspire them with confidence in our general disinterestedness, our severity, when called for, would be rightly and beneficially understood; and for the most part, that confidence would correct the motives to neglectful or tyrannical conduct requiring punishment."

I consider these views to be sound, not only in the cases to which they refer, but in those of Native States generally; and I would apply them generally, with this single limitation—that the penalty of sequestration or confiscation should be used only when the misconduct or oppression is such as to be not only heinous in itself, but of a nature to constitute indisputably a breach of loyalty or of recorded engagement to the Paramount Power.

32. It is certain that objection to the proposed measure will be taken on the ground that it will cut off future opportunities of accession of territory, and that it is our duty not to forego these.

I regard this not as an objection, but as a recommendation; and I cannot take that view of our duty.

33. Notwithstanding the greater purity and enlightenment of our administration, its higher tone, and its surer promise of future benefit to the people, as compared with any Native Government, I still think that we have before us a higher and more pressing duty than that of extending our direct rule, and that our first care should be to strengthen that rule within its present limits, and to secure for our general supremacy the contented acquiescence and respect of all who are subjected to it.

Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards Native States.

We shall not become stronger so long as we continue adding to our territory without adding to our European force; and the additions to that force which we already require are probably as large as England can conveniently furnish, and they will certainly cost as much as India can conveniently pay.

As to Civil Government, our English officers are too few for the work which they have on their hands, and our financial means are not yet equal to the demands upon us. Accession of territory will not make it easier to discharge our already existing duties in the ad-

ministration of justice, the prosecution of public works, and in many other ways.

34. The safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well affected to us. Setting aside the well known services rendered by Scindia, and, subsequently, by the Maharajahs of Rewah, Chirkaree, and others, over the wide tract of Central India, where our authority is most broken in upon by Native States, I venture to say that there is no man who remembers the condition of Upper India in 1857 and 1858, and who is not thankful that in the centre of the large and compact British province of Rohilkund there remained the solitary little State of Rampoor, still administered by its own Mahomedan Prince, and that on the borders of the Punjab and of the districts above Delhi, the Chief of Puttiala and his kinsmen still retained their hereditary authority unimpaired.

In the time of which I speak, these patches of Native Government served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave. And in quiet times they have their uses. Restless men, who will accept no profession but arms, crafty intriguers bred up in Native Courts, and others who would chafe at our stricter and more formal rule, live there contentedly; and should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in these Native States. But, to make them so, we must treat their Chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity, teaching them that, in spite of all suspicions to the contrary, their independence is safe, that we are not waiting for plausible opportunities to convert their country into British territory, and convincing them that they have nothing to gain by helping to displace us in favour of any new rulers, from within or from without.

35. It was long ago said by Sir John Malcolm, that if we made all India into Zillahs, it was not in the nature of things that our Empire should last fifty years; but that if we could keep up a number of Native States, without political power, but as royal instruments, we should exist in India as long as our naval superiority in Europe was maintained.

Of the substantial truth of this opinion I have no doubt, and recent events have made it more deserving of our attention than ever.

I have, etc.

CANNING.

(B).

PARTITION TREATY OF MYSORE, 1799.

*Treaty for strengthening the Alliance and Friendship subsisting between the English East-India Company Behauder, his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the Paishwah, Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, and for effecting a Settlement of the Dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun.**

Whereas the deceased Tippoo Sultaun, unprovoked by any act of aggression on the part of the Allies, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and admitted a French force into his army, for the purpose of commencing war against the Honourable English Company Behauder, and its Allies, Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder; and the said Tippoo Sultaun having attempted to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security made by the Honourable English Company and its Allies, for their defence and protection against the joint designs of the said Sultaun and of the French, the allied armies of the Honourable English Company Behauder and of his Highness Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder proceeded to hostilities, in vindication of their rights, and for the preservation of their respective dominions from the perils of foreign invasion, and from the ravages of a cruel and relentless enemy.

And whereas it has pleased Almighty God to prosper the just cause of the said Allies, the Honourable English Company Behauder and his Highness Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, with a continual course of victory and success, and finally to crown their arms by the reduction of the capital of Mysore, the fall of Tippoo Sultaun, the utter extinction of his power, and the unconditional submission of his people; and whereas the said Allies, being disposed to exercise the rights of conquest with the same moderation and forbearance which they have observed from the commencement to the conclusion of the late successful war, have resolved to use the power which it has pleased Almighty God to place in their hands, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war, and of establishing permanent security and genuine tranquillity for themselves and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions; wherefore a Treaty, for the adjustment of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun between the English East-India

* The Paishwah refused to accede to this Treaty.

Company Behauder and his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, is now concluded by Lieutenant General George Harris, Commander in Chief of the Forces of his Britannic Majesty and of the English East-India Company Behauder in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K.P., Governor General for all Affairs, civil and military, of the British Nation in India; and by the Nabob Meer Allum Behauder, on the part and in the name of his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, according to the under-mentioned Articles, which, by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties, as long as the sun and moon shall endure, and of which the conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties.

1. It being reasonable and just, that the Allies by this Treaty should accomplish the original objects of the war (*viz.* a due indemnification for the expenses incurred in their own defence, and effectual security for their respective possessions against the future designs of their enemies), it is stipulated and agreed, that the districts specified in the Schedule A, hereunto annexed, together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tippoo Suldaun to any part of the possessions of the English East-India Company Behauder, of its Allies or tributaries, situated between the Ghauts on either coast, and all forts situated near to and commanding the said passes, shall be subjected to the authority, and be for ever incorporated with the dominions of the English East-India Company Behauder, the said Company Behauder engaging to provide effectually out of the revenues of the said districts, for the suitable maintenance of the whole of the families of the late Hyder Ali Khan and of the late Tippoo Suldaun, and to apply to this purpose, with the reservation hereinafter stated, an annual sum of not less than two lacs of Star Pagodas, making the Company's share as follows :

Estimated value of districts enumerated in the Schedule A, according to the statement of Tippoo Suldaun in 1792	- - - - -	Canterai Pagodas	7,77,170
Deduct, provision for the families of Hyder Ali Khan and of Tippoo Suldaun, two lacs of Star Pagodas, in Can- terai Pagodas	- - - - -	- - - - -	2,40,000
Remains to the East India Company	- - - - -	- - - - -	<u>5,37,170</u>

II. For the same reason stated in the preceding Articles, the district specified in Schedule B, annexed hereunto, shall be subjected to the authority, and for ever united to the dominions of the Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, the said Nabob having engaged to provide liberally, from the revenues of the said districts, for the support of Meer Kummer-ud-Dien Khan Behauder, and of his family and relations, and to grant him for this purpose a personal Jaghire in the districts of Gurrumcondah equal to the annual sum of 2,10,000 rupees, or of 70,000 Canterai Pagodas, over and above and exclusive of a Jaghire, which the said Nabob has also agreed to assign to the said Meer Kummer-ud-Dien Khan, for the pay and maintenance of a proportionate number of troops to be employed in the service of his said Highness, making the share of his Highness as follows :

Estimated value of the territory specified in Schedule B, according to the statement of Tippoo Suldaun in 1792 - - - - Canterai Pagodas	6,07,332
Deduct, personal Jaghire to Meer Kummer-ud-Dien Khan, 2,10,000 rupees, or - - - - -	70,000
	<hr/>
Remains to the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder - - - - -	5,37,332
	<hr/>

III. It being farther expedient for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, and for the general security, on the foundations now established by the contracting parties, that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subjected to the said Company Behauder, it is stipulated and agreed that the said fortress, and the island on which it is situated (including the small tract of land, or island, lying to the westward of the main island, and bounded on the west by a Nullah, called the Mysore Nullah, which falls into the Cauvery near Chenagal Ghaut) shall become part of the dominions of the said Company, in full right and sovereignty for ever.

IV. A separate Government shall be established in Mysore ; and for this purpose, it is stipulated and agreed, that the Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

V. The contracting powers mutually and severally agree, that the districts specified in Schedule C, hereunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah, and shall form the separate Government of Mysore, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

VI. The English East India Company Behauder shall be at liberty to make such deductions, from time to time, from the sums allotted by the first Article of the present Treaty, for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultaun, as may be proper, in consequence of the decease of any member of the said families; and in the event of any hostile attempt, on the part of the said family, or of any member of it, against the authority of the contracting parties, or against the peace of their respective dominions, or the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, then the said English East India Company Behauder shall be at liberty to limit or suspend entirely the payment of the whole, or any part of the stipend hereinbefore stipulated to be applied to the maintenance and support of the said families.

VII. His Highness the Paishwa Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder shall be invited to accede to the present Treaty; and although the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any part of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties (namely, the English East India Company Behauder and his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder), yet for the maintenance of the relations of friendship and alliance between the said Paishwa Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, the English East India Company Behauder, his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Behauder, it is stipulated and agreed that certain districts, specified in Schedule D, hereunto annexed, shall be reserved for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, in full right and sovereignty, in the same manner as if he had been a contracting party to this Treaty; provided, however, that the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder shall accede to the present Treaty, in its full extent, within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties, and provided also that he shall give satisfaction to the English East India Company Behauder, and to his Highness Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, with regard to certain points now depending between him, the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, and the said Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said Paishwah, on the part of the English East India Company Behauder, by the Governor General or the British Resident at the Court of Poonah.

VIII. If, contrary to the amicable expectation of the contracting

parties, the said Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder shall refuse to accede to this Treaty, or to give satisfaction upon the points to which the Seventh Article refers, then the right to, and sovereignty of, the several districts herein before reserved for eventual cession to the Paishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, shall rest jointly in the said English East-India Company Behauder and the said Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, who will either exchange them with the Rajah of Mysore for other districts of equal value, more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange and settle respecting them, as they shall judge proper.

ix. It being expedient, for the effectual establishment of Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah in the Government of Mysore, that his Highness should be assisted with a suitable Subsidiary Force, it is stipulated and agreed, that the whole of the said Force shall be furnished by the English East-India Company Behauder, according to the terms of a separate Treaty, to be immediately concluded between the said English East-India Company Behauder and his Highness the Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder.

x. This Treaty, consisting of ten articles, being settled and concluded this day, the 22d of June, 1799 (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurram, 1214 Anno Higeræ) by Lieutenant General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor General aforesaid; and by Meer Allum Behauder, on the part and in the name of his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder; the said Lieutenant General Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, have delivered to Meer Allum Behauder one copy of the same, signed and sealed by themselves; and Meer Allum Behauder has delivered to Lieutenant General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, another copy of the same, sealed by himself; and Lieutenant General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, and Meer Allum Behauder, severally and mutually engage, that the said Treaty shall be respectively ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General, under his seal and signature, within eight days from the date hereof, and by his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah

Asoph Jah Behauder, within twenty-five days from the date hereof.
Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam,
on the 13th day of July, Anno Domini 1799.

(Signed) J. A. KIRKPATRICK, *Resident.*

Schedule A (*The Company's Share*).

* * * *

Schedule B (*The Nizam's Share*).

* * * *

Schedule C (*Districts ceded to Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah
Oodiaver Behauder.*

* * * *

SEPARATE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY WITH THE NIZAM.

*Separate Articles appertaining to the Treaty of Mysore, concluded on
the 22nd of June, 1799 (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurram,
Anno Hegiræ 1214) between the Honourable English East India
Company Behauder, and the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah
Behauder.*

I. With a view to the prevention of future altercations, it is agreed between his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder and the Honourable English East India Company Behauder, that to whatever amount the stipends appropriated to the maintenance of the sons, relations, and dependants of the late Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Suldaun, or the personal Jaghire of Meer Kummer-ud-Deen Khan, shall hereafter be diminished, in consequence of any one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Mysore, the contracting parties shall not be accountable to each other on this head.

II. And it is further agreed between the contracting parties, that in the event provided for by the Eighth Article of the Treaty of Mysore, two-thirds of the share reserved for Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder shall fall to his Highness the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the remaining third to the Honourable English East India Company Behauder.

Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam,
on the 13th day of July, Anno Domini 1799.

(Signed.) J. A. KIRKPATRICK,
Resident.

SUBSIDIARY TREATY WITH THE RAJAH OF MYSORE, 1799.

A Treaty of perpetual Friendship and Alliance, concluded on the one part by his Excellency Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander in Chief of the Forces of his Britannic Majesty and of the English East India Company Behauder in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on behalf and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K.P., Governor General for all Affairs, civil and military, of the British Nation in India, by virtue of full powers vested in them for this purpose by the said Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor General; and on the other Part by Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, Rajah of Mysore.

Whereas it is stipulated, in the Treaty concluded on the 22nd of June, 1799, between the Honourable English East India Company Behauder, and the Nabob Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company Behauder, his Highness Nizam-ud-Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the Peshwa, Row Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, and for effecting a settlement of the territories of the late Tippoo Suldaun, that a separate Government shall be established in Mysore, and that his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder shall possess certain territories, specified in Schedule C, annexed to the said Treaty, and that, for the effectual establishment of the Government of Mysore, his Highness shall be assisted with a suitable Subsidiary Force, to be furnished by the English East India Company Behauder; wherefore, in order to carry the said stipulations into effect, and to increase and strengthen the friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company and the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, this Treaty is concluded by Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander in Chief of the Forces of his Britannic Majesty and of the said English East-India Company Behauder in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor General aforesaid, and by his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kishna Rajah Oodiaver

Behauder, which shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

i. The friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties shall be considered as the friends and enemies of both.

ii. The Honourable East-India Company Behauder agrees to maintain, and his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder agrees to receive, a military force, for the defence and security of his Highness's dominions; in consideration of which protection, his Highness engages to pay the annual sum of seven lacks of Star Pagodas to the said East-India Company, the said sum to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments, commencing from the 1st of July, Anno Domini 1799. And his Highness further agrees, that the disposal of the said sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops to be maintained by it, shall be entirely left to the Company.

iii. If it shall be necessary for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or of either of them, that hostilities shall be undertaken, or preparations made for commencing hostilities against any State or Power, his said Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, agrees to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense incurred by the augmentation of the military force, and the unavoidable charges of war, such a sum as shall appear to the Governor General in Council of Fort William, on an attentive consideration of the means of his said Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of his said Highness.

iv. And whereas it is indispensably necessary, that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses described in the Third Article of the present Treaty, it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor General in Council of Fort William in Bengal shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor General in Council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right, either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the Government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Behauder, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, as shall appear to him,

the said Governor General in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available either in time of peace or war.

v. And it is hereby further agreed, that whenever the said Governor General in Council shall signify to the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the Fourth Article, his said Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder shall immediately issue orders to his Aumils, or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, according to the tenor of the Fourth Article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and control of the English Company Behauder. And in case his Highness shall not issue such orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor General in Council shall be at liberty to issue orders, by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenue of the said territories, as he shall judge most expedient for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country and the welfare of the people. Provided always, that whenever, and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed, and shall remain under the exclusive authority and control of the said East India Company, the Governor General in Council shall render to his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed; provided also, that in no case whatever shall his Highness's actual receipts or annual income, arising out of his territorial revenue, be less than the sum of one lac of Star Pagodas, together with one-fifth of the net revenue of the whole of the territories ceded to him by the Fifth Article of the Treaty of Mysore; which sum of one lac of Star Pagodas, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said net revenue, the East India Company engages, at all times and in every possible case, to secure and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

vi. His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder engages, that he will be guided by a sincere and cordial attention to the relations of peace and amity, now established between the English Company Behauder and their Allies, and that he will carefully abstain from any interference in the affairs of any State in alliance with the said English Company Behauder, or of any State whatever. And for securing the object of this stipulation, it is further stipulated and agreed, that no communication or correspondence with any foreign State whatever, shall be holden by his said Highness

without the previous knowledge and sanction of the said English Company Behauder.

VII. His Highness stipulates and agrees, that he will not admit any European foreigners into his service, without the concurrence of the English Company Behauder; and that he will apprehend and deliver up to the Company's Government all Europeans, of whatever description, who shall be found within the territories of his said Highness, without regular passports from the Company's Government, it being his Highness's determined resolution not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigners to remain within the territories now subjected to his authority, unless by consent of the said Company.

VIII. Whereas the complete protection of his Highness's said territories requires that various fortresses and strong places, situated within the territories of his Highness, should be garrisoned and commanded, as well in time of peace as of war, by British troops and officers, his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder engages, that the said English Company Behauder shall at all times be at liberty to garrison, in whatever manner they may judge proper, all such fortresses and strong places, within his said Highness's territories, as it shall appear advisable to them to take charge of.

IX. And whereas, in consequence of the system of defence which it may be expedient to adopt, for the security of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, it may be necessary that certain forts and strong places, within his Highness's territories, should be dismantled or destroyed, and that other forts and strong places should be strengthened and repaired, it is stipulated and agreed, that the English East-India Company Behauder shall be the sole judges of the necessity of any such alterations in the said fortresses; and it is further agreed, that such expences as may be incurred on this account, shall be borne and defrayed, in equal proportions, by the contracting parties.

X. In case it shall become necessary, for enforcing and maintaining the authority and government of his Highness in the territories now subjected to his power, that the regular troops of the English East-India Company Behauder should be employed, it is stipulated and agreed, that upon formal application being made for the service of the said troops, they shall be employed in such manner as to the said Company shall seem fit; but it is expressly understood by the contracting parties, that this stipulation shall not subject the troops of the English East-India Company Behauder to be employed in the ordinary transactions of revenue.

XI. It being expedient for the restoration and permanent establish-

ment of tranquillity in the territories now subjected to the authority of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, that suitable provision should be made for certain officers of rank in the service of the late Tippoo Suldaun, his said Highness agrees to enter into the immediate discussion of this point, and to fix the amount of the funds (as soon as the necessary information can be obtained) to be granted for this purpose, in a separate Article, to be hereafter added to this Treaty.

XII. Lest the garrison of Seringapatam should, at any time, be subject to inconvenience from the high price of provisions and other necessaries, his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder agrees, that such quantities of provisions, and other necessaries, as may be required for the use and consumption of the troops composing the said garrison, shall be allowed to enter the place, from all and every part of his dominions, free of any duty, tax, or impediment whatever.

XIII. The contracting parties hereby agree to take into their early consideration the best means of establishing such a commercial intercourse between their respective dominions, as shall be mutually beneficial to the subjects of both Governments, and to conclude a Commercial Treaty for this purpose, with as little delay as possible.

XIV. His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder hereby promises to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both States.

XV. Whereas it may hereafter appear, that some of the districts declared by the Treaty of Mysore to belong respectively to the English Company Behauder and to his Highness are inconveniently situated, with a view to the proper connection of their respective lines of frontier, it is hereby stipulated between the contracting parties, that in all such cases they will proceed to such an adjustment, by means of exchanges or otherwise, as shall be best suited to the occasion.

XVI. This Treaty, consisting of sixteen Articles, being this day, the 8th of July, Anno Domini 1799 (corresponding to the 3rd of Suffur, Anno Hegiræ 1214, and to the 7th of the month Assar, of 1721st year of the Saliwahan era) settled and concluded at the fort of Nazzerbagh, near Seringapatam, by his Excellency, Lieutenant-General

George Harris, Commander in Chief of the Forces of his Britannic Majesty, and of the Honourable English East India Company Behauder, in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, with the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, the aforesaid gentlemen have delivered to the said Maha Rajah one copy of the same, in English and Persian, sealed and signed by them, and his Highness the Maha Rajah has delivered to the gentlemen aforesaid another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his seal, and signed by Luchuma, widow of the late Kistna Rajah, and sealed and signed by Purnia, Dewan to the Maha Rajah Kistna Rajah Oodiaver. And the aforesaid gentlemen have engaged to procure and to deliver to the said Maha Rajah, without delay, a copy of the same, under the seal and signature of the Right Honourable the Governor General, on the receipt of which by the said Maha Rajah, the present Treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable the English East India Company and on the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, and the copy of it now delivered to the said Maha Rajah shall be returned.

Witnessed (Signed) EDWARD GOLDING, <i>Assistant Secretary.</i>	(Seal of the Maha Rajah) and the (Ranee's Signature.) (Seal and Signature of Purniah.)
A true Copy, (Signed)	G. BUCHAN, <i>Sub-Secretary.</i>

**ARTICLES EXPLANATORY OF THE THIRD ARTICLE OF THE
TREATY OF MYSORE, CONCLUDED IN 1799.**

*Additional Articles for modifying and defining the Provisions of the
Third Article of the Treaty of Mysore, settled and concluded between
the English East India Company Behauder and Maha Rajah Mysore
Kishen Rajah Oodiaver Behauder, Rajah of Mysore.*

Whereas it is stipulated by the Third Article of the Treaty of Mysore, that in the event of hostilities, or of preparations for hostilities, against any State or Power, Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Behauder shall contribute towards the discharge of the increased expenses thereby incurred, a sum to be eventually determined by the

Governor General in Council of Fort William ; and whereas it has appeared expedient to the contracting parties, that the provisions of the said Article should now be rendered specific, and that the said indefinite contributions in war should be commuted, for the fixed maintenance of a certain body of Horse in peace and war, wherefore these additional Articles, for modifying and defining the provisions of the Third Article of the said Treaty, are now concluded, on the one part, by Major Mark Wilks, in the name and on behalf of the Honourable Sir George Hilario Barlow, Baronet, Governor General for all affairs, civil and military, of the British Nation in India by virtue of full powers vested in him for the purpose by the said Sir George Hilario Barlow, Baronet, Governor General, and on the other part, by Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiavur Behauder, Rajah of Mysore, in his own behalf.

I. It is agreed and stipulated, that his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiavur shall be relieved from the pecuniary contribution to which he was liable, by the provisions of the Third Article of the Treaty of Mysore : in consideration whereof, his Highness engages to maintain, at all times, fit for service and subject to muster, a body of (4,000) four thousand effective Horse, of which number about (500) five hundred shall be Bargeer, and the rest Sil-ladar Horse.

II. Such portion of the said body of (4,000) four thousand Horse as, in the opinion of the British Government, shall not be necessary for the internal protection of the country of Mysore, shall be, at all times, ready to accompany and serve with the Honourable Company's army, and while employed beyond the territory of Mysore, the extra expenses of their maintenance, or batta, at the rate of (4) four Star Pagodas per month for each effective man and horse, after the expiration of one month from the date of their crossing the frontier, shall be regularly paid by the Honourable Company. The extra expense of any casual service beyond the frontier, not exceeding in duration the period of one month, shall be borne by the Government of Mysore.

III. If it should, at any time, be found expedient to augment the Cavalry of Mysore beyond the number of (4,000) four thousand, on intimation to that effect from the British Government, his Highness the Rajah shall use his utmost endeavours for that purpose ; but the whole expense of such augmentation, and of the maintenance of the additional numbers, at the rate of (8) Star Pagodas for each effective man and horse, while within the territory of Mysore, and of an additional sum, or batta, at the rate of (4) four Star Pagodas a month,

after the expiration of one month from the period of their passing the frontier of Mysore, as described in the Second Article, shall be defrayed by the Honourable Company.

iv. Whereas, in conformity to the wish of the Governor General, a body of (4,000) four thousand Horse and upwards has been provisionally maintained by his Highness the Rajah, from the period of the conclusion of war in the Deccan until this time, it is hereby declared, that his Highness has fully and faithfully performed the obligations of the Third Article of the Treaty of Mysore until this day, and is hereby absolved from all retrospective claims on that account.

These four additional Articles, which, like the original Treaty of Mysore, shall be binding on the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure, having been settled and concluded on the 29th day of January, Anno Domini 1807, corresponding to the 19th of Zilcaad, Anno Hegiræ 1221, and to the 21st day of the month of Poosh, of the year 1728 of the Shaliwahan æra, at Mysore, by Major Mark Wilks with the Maha Rajah Kistna Rajah Oodiavur Behauder, Major Wilks has accordingly delivered one copy of the same, in Persian and English, signed and sealed by him, to his Highness the Maha Rajah, who has likewise delivered to Major Wilks another copy, in Persian and English, bearing his Highness's seal and signature, and signed by Lutchuma, widow of the late Kistna Rajah, and sealed and signed by Poornia, Dewan to his Highness Maha Rajah Oodiavur Behauder; and Major Wilks has engaged to procure and deliver to the said Maha Rajah, without delay, a copy of the same, under the seal and signature of the Honourable the Governor General, on the receipt of which by the Maha Rajah the present additional Articles shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable East-India Company and on the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiavur Behauder, and the copy now delivered to the said Maha Rajah shall be returned.

A true Copy,

(Signed)

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

Secretary to Government.

(Collection of Treaties, 1812, p. 441-459, and 302-304.)

(C.)

OUDE TREATY OF 1837.

(Page 139.)

Lord Dalhousie's plea for annexing Oude, instead of assuming its management under the Treaty of 1837, was that the Treaty had been "cancelled" by the Home Authorities. The fact is, that the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors simply disapproved of the increased burden of providing a Contingent Force, imposed upon Oude by the new Treaty, and desired that the King should be "exonerated from these obligations," to which his assent had been most reluctantly given. But the Secret Committee added—"Although we thus convey to you our directions for the abrogation of the Treaty, we leave it discretionary with your Lordship to adapt your measures to the state of circumstances as may be found to exist when you receive this letter;" and they recommended that the communication to the King should be made, "as an act of grace from your Lordship in Council, rather than as the consequence of the receipt of a public and unconditional instruction from England." (Oude Papers, 1858, p. 37-38.) The Governor General, Lord Auckland, with the advice of his Councillors, General Morrison and Mr. Robertson, decided on merely signifying to the King of Oude that he was relieved from the military expenses imposed by the Treaty of 1837; and they came to this decision on the express grounds of the difficulty under the Treaty of 1801 "of enforcing its conditions," of the "solemn, recorded and effectual warning contained" in the new Treaty of 1837, and of the power obtained by it to "assume the administration as a remedy for gross misrule." (Minutes by Lord Auckland, Colonel Morrison, and Mr. Robertson: Oude Papers, 1858, p. 38, 43, 59.) And the last words of Lord Auckland's Minute of the 2nd of May, 1839, the last that he penned before addressing the King of Oude on the subject in obedience to the Court of Directors' instructions, consists of an expression of his entire agreement in the opinion of his colleague Mr. Robertson, that "if the independence of Oude endure much longer, it will be mainly in consequence of this very provision,"—for the assumption of the administration in case of misrule. (Oude Papers, 1858, p. 59.) It is clear, therefore, that the Government of India in 1839, did not consider or intend the new Treaty to be annulled, but simply, as they told the King, that the Articles imposing a pecuniary charge upon him were to be cancelled.

But Lord Dalhousie, in laying the train for the meditated annexation of Oude, said that "pledges upon the non-ratification of the Treaty were given to Parliament."* I know not to what Lord Dalhousie can allude, except to the conversation that took place in the House of Lords on the 6th of August, 1838, in the course of which "Lord Ellenborough said that to assert that there was no Treaty in existence because it had not been ratified at home, was not a correct representation of the fact. The Treaty was ratified by the Governor General, and certainly might be acted on."

"The Marquis of Lansdowne said that he had now distinctly to state that not only did his noble friend at the head of the Government of India, immediately on being informed of this Treaty, express his disapprobation of the manner in which the promise had been drawn from the Sovereign of Oude, but he also caused it to be intimated in the most explicit manner to that Prince, that he was in no degree bound by the promise to sign such a Treaty, and entirely relieved from any stipulations or conditions it imposed."—(Hansard, 3rd series, vol. xlv, p. 1006.)

Whether Lord Lansdowne's statement constitutes a "pledge" or not, matters very little; for it is founded on an error. The noble Lord at the head of the Government of India, Lord Auckland, did indeed express some slight disapprobation of the "superfluous" promise,† but he did *not* disapprove of the Treaty; he framed its conditions himself, and highly approved of them; and he persistently argued with the Court of Directors for the maintenance of every item. And, as I have already stated, the King was *not* told "in the most explicit manner," or in any manner, that he was "entirely relieved from its conditions," but merely that he was relieved from the additional Subsidy for troops.

Lord Ellenborough was, of course, perfectly correct in his view of the situation. The Treaty concluded in 1837 was not, and could not be cancelled by a "secret letter" in 1838.

The Treaty of 1837 was officially published in a volume of Treaties, by authority of the Court of Directors in 1845, and reprinted as a Return to Parliament in 1853.

I regret very much to observe that Mr. Kaye, in the first volume of his excellent *History of the Sepoy War*—containing an admirably written sketch of the public character and administration of Lord Dalhousie—puts forth, once more, the official version of these transactions, and calls the Treaty of 1837 "an abortion," (page 127). He

* Oude Papers, 1858, p. 65.

† Ditto, p. 3, 7, 9, 23.

also mentions that the following Return was made to Parliament under the signature of the Secretary to the Board of Control.

“There has been no Treaty concluded with the present King of Oude which has been ratified by the Court of Directors, with the approbation of the Commissioners for the affairs of India.”

(Signed)

R. GORDON.

“India Board, July 3, 1838.”

It must have been on the strength of this document, fortified by some overstated verbal information, that the Marquis of Lansdowne made the erroneous statement that I have quoted from Hansard. The literal purport of the Return is true, so far as it goes; but it by no means amounts to a declaration that the Treaty, which it does not name, is null and void; nor, had it contained such a declaration, could it have had the effect of annulling the Treaty, any more than the “secret letter” of the Court of Directors, or the “pledge” given by Lord Lansdowne, neither of which was communicated to the King of Oude. On the contrary, the King was expressly informed in Lord Auckland’s letter of the 8th of July, 1839, that the Court of Directors, in consideration of the “embarrassments which might be occasioned to the State of Oude by the annual payment of sixteen lakhs of rupees to the support of the military force,” had empowered the Governor General “to relieve the State of Oude from all that is onerous in the conditions respecting this force.” (Oude Papers, 1358, p. 60.)

This notification, that the King was relieved by the Court of Directors from *some* of the conditions, is equivalent to a confirmation by the Court of Directors, of the remaining conditions, had any such confirmation been required. But immemorial custom, and innumerable precedents, and the terms of this particular Treaty, do not give a hint or show a trace of the necessity for such confirmation. The Governor General had at least the powers of a Plenipotentiary, if not of a Sovereign. What might have been the effect of a timely and open rejection of the Treaty by the Court of Directors I am not called upon to discuss; but this at least is, I think, clear, that a Treaty concluded with every formality between the Governor General of India and the Sovereign of Oude—signed, and sealed, and ratified, and copies exchanged—could not be cancelled by the Home Authorities without the knowledge and consent of the Sovereign of Oude; without, in fact, a fresh negotiation with that express object. The Governor General had full power to conclude Treaties, and the final exchange of ratified copies made the Treaty binding upon both parties.

And, in fact, in a long Memorandum of advice and remonstrance addressed by Lord Hardinge to the King of Oude in 1847, his Lordship distinctly threatens to enforce the stipulations of the Treaty of 1837. (Oude Papers, 1858, p. 62.)

Sir Henry Lawrence, writing in the *Calcutta Review* in 1845, describes the conclusion of the Treaty of 1837, observes that the Court of Directors "very properly disapproved" of the measure by which the King was to have been saddled with the expense of an Auxiliary Force, and that, in reliance on his Majesty's good intentions, "Government overlooked the glaring mismanagement still existing in parts of Oude, and did not act on the permission given by the new Treaty." (Volume of Essays, 1859, p. 334.) And he adds subsequently:—"No one can deny that we are now authorised by Treaty to assume the management." (p. 339.)

And Mr. Kaye himself mentions that General Sir William Sleeman, who was for several years Resident at Lucknow, alluded, in two letters written in 1853 and 1854, to the "ample authority conferred by the Treaty of 1837." (*Sepoy War*, vol. i. p. 129.)

No one in India, at Lucknow, or at Calcutta, ever doubted the validity and binding force of this Treaty, until Lord Dalhousie found that it stood in the way of his scheme of appropriating all the revenues of Oude.

(D.)

GOVERNMENT EDUCATION.

(Page 159.)

The following extracts from an article in the *Bombay Times of India* of the 13th of August 1864, so exactly convey my views on the general question, that I cannot refrain from bringing them forward to my aid:—

"The annual charge for 'Education' on the revenues of India has come to be a very heavy one. In the Budget Estimate for the current year, it stands at £561,175. * * * * It is a charge, moreover, which has doubled itself since 1861-62, and which bids fair to annually, and considerably, increase in amount. * * * * According to the latest returns at hand, there are attending Government schools, or schools under Government inspection, in the Punjab, 59,990 pupils;

in Bengal, 71,699 pupils; in the Central Provinces, 21,353 pupils; in the North-Western Provinces, about 110,000 pupils; in the Bombay Presidency, about 50,000 pupils; and in the Madras Presidency, about 30,000 pupils; or a total for all India of 343,042 pupils receiving instruction either at Government schools or Government aided schools. Now, comparing this total number of pupils with the total estimated expenditure of the Education Department for the current year, as given above, it will be seen that each pupil costs the state between £1 and £2 per annum, the precise cost being much nearer the latter than the former sum. Now, the population of India is supposed to be 180,000,000, and if we assume that 120,000,000 are directly under British rule, and that one soul out of every six of that number, should be receiving instruction, we have exactly 20,000,000 of pupils for the Government Education Department to instruct, when it shall have become fully expanded. We make no allowance for private schools, for it has hitherto happened that private schools, dependent as they are on mere school fees, have been unable to compete with the Government institutions, and that all classes of pupils, the rich as well as the poor, have, naturally enough, preferred the semi-gratuitous education afforded them at the latter. Assuming, then, that within ten or fifteen years, at furthest, the Government Educational operations will have become fully developed, and that the youth of the country will be receiving instruction at Government schools, the question presents itself, How is the money for this immense system of instruction to be provided? Putting increase of population aside altogether, and estimating the number of pupils at even ten millions for all India, the gross annual charge for their education, at present rates, would be between fifteen and twenty millions sterling, or about twice the present great military expenditure. But, as the operations widen, the cost per pupil will decrease! It should be so, though no such effect is as yet manifesting itself; but making every such allowance, and calculating that the charge per head will have fallen to one-fourth of what it is at present, the expense to the people of India, for the estimated number of pupils would, nevertheless, not be less than between four and five millions sterling per annum. An annual charge of this heavy kind the country would not, and should not, continue to bear. Yet it is inevitable, if the present system be persisted in. If the Education Department continues to be fed with the public money on the same scale as at present, ten years hence it will be a greater burden on the tax-payers than a treble income-tax would be just now. But if we look closer into the present expenditure, we shall find that it is mainly devoted, not to the enlightenment of the 'people,' but to the

superior education of classes who should have required no pecuniary aid at all, and the corresponding classes to which in Europe, never dream of obtaining or seeking for any State educational aid whatever. If the truth were made apparent, it would become but too clear that up to the present, the educational operations of the Government of India have touched neither the highest, nor the lower and most numerous grades of the population. The Government Colleges and schools have been mainly attended by pupils whose parents would have provided an English education for them, had there been no Government Education Department at all. It is the children of traders and native officials, or of parties ambitious that their sons shall become officials or pleaders, who constitute the great bulk of the pupils at the Government schools. And it is because the institutions seem as if wholly intended for such classes, that the Rajahs, Jaghirdars, and other Chiefs, will not send their children to them; while, on the other hand, the high schooling fees charged, effectually prevent the poorer natives from sending theirs. A result is that the entire educational expenditure is practically devoted to cheapening the cost of "schooling" to a class who would provide good schools for themselves were there no Government education whatever. There is a well grounded belief that a sufficient number of good private schools for the instruction of the children of respectable natives of the middle class, would now be in existence, and flourishing, but for a consciousness of the hopelessness of their competing with institutions supported by Government funds, and the certificates of whose masters and professors are, to the pupil, a kind of diploma of eligibility for State employment.

The average cost of each pupil to Government does not at present exceed £2 per annum; but if from the aggregate number of pupils be excluded those of the merely "aided" schools, the cost per head becomes something actually astounding to contemplate. Some of the Government Colleges have comparatively few pupils, yet have a most costly educational staff. But putting the Colleges out of the account, the cost per pupil at the mere schools is startling. We have before us a General Statement of the Progress of Education in the Punjaub, during 1862-63, and therein we find that, excluding "General establishment and charges," and all charges for "buildings," the expense of instructing 1,969 boys at 22 Zillah schools was Rs.87,258, or Rs.44-5-0 per pupil per annum!"

(E.)

NATIVE PROMOTIONS.

(Page 161.)

The Commissioner of Mysore, in his Administration Report for 1862-3, after describing the new appointments and increased salaries for English officers under the revised arrangements, tells us that a corresponding amelioration has also been made in the position of the native officials :—

“The new and honourable post of Native Assistant has been created. The number of superior appointments opened to natives has been increased from thirteen to fifteen, and the average salary raised from Rs. 342 to Rs. 440 per mensem.” (Par. 182.)

If an acceptance of this statement were to be the termination of our inquiry, the result would be that while the body of English officials was augmented by six, and their annual receipts by £12,000, the body of superior native officials would be augmented by two, their receipts by £2,500, and their average salary raised just to the level of that allotted to the junior European Assistant. And although the Report dignifies the new offices with the title of “superior appointments,” they are still placed in an inferior category, out of the line of ordinary promotion, and subordinate to that allotted to the youngest English officers.

But this statement requires a little closer examination. Although the Commissioner, who admits (par. 179) the propriety of a “due advertence to the claims of the native officials,” declares that “the number of superior appointments opened to natives, has been *increased* from thirteen to fifteen,” it is somewhat remarkable that the details given in that very paragraph would lead us to suppose that the number had been *decreased* from nineteen to fifteen. We are told that “of the principal native officers affected by the new arrangements,” there were selected for the post of Native Assistant, “two Judges of the Hoozoor Adawlut (the Court being abolished), three Head Sheristadars of the former Divisions, and eight Moonsiffs.” And then it is added that “six individuals who were found ineligible for the new class of appointments, were permitted to retire on suitable pensions.” These pensioners seem to make up a list of nineteen “principal native officers,” who are now succeeded by fifteen Native Assistants.

I cannot offer an explanation of the apparent discrepancy, with any degree of certainty, for want of the requisite particulars; but, from

the context of the Report, I believe it to arise from four of the pensioners, whose former offices were abolished and who were not considered qualified for the new posts, having been Head Sheristadars of the old Divisions. The other two pensioners had been Moonsiffs (Judges), only eight out of ten of that class having been made Assistants under the new organisation. Now while the writer of the Report includes the Head Sheristadars among the "principal native officers," of the old list, he does not choose to classify them as "superior officials." And though I think that the distinction is over-strained and calculated to mislead, it is not entirely without meaning or pretext. The Sheristadar of a Division, though occupying a post of great indirect influence and power, was merely a ministerial officer, exercising no judicial functions, entrusted with no ostensible authority, while the Native Assistant is a Magistrate, Judge and Collector, whose orders in every department, though subject to appeal, are valid and decisive. But as the Head Sheristadar's salary ranged from £300 to £480 per annum, the distinction seems to be almost without a difference, and the substantial gain in "superior" appointments to the class of native officials, sinks—if I am not very much mistaken—into a clear loss.

(F.)

PUBLIC WORKS AND POLICE.

(Page 167.)

Lord Dalhousie, contrary to Sir Mark Cubbon's opinions and wishes, insisted on a Public Works' Department being cut out for Mysore, on the model of that which he had then lately framed for our own provinces, and which has long been a reproach to our Government, and a jest among all intelligent natives, on account of the large number of highly salaried English officers permanently maintained—out of all proportion to the work executed—the very indifferent style in which much of that work is executed; and the gross peculation which pervades the Department, in spite of all the complicated safeguards of sanctioned estimates and audited accounts. Previously to this unwelcome innovation, Sir Mark Cubbon had, through the agency of one Engineer officer, the Superintendents of Districts, their local subordinates, and native contractors, provided a much more complete system of roads throughout Mysore, than existed in any British pro-

vince of the same extent; and always kept the irrigation works of the country in good order, at a very much smaller outlay for construction and repairs, than could have been shown in similar instances by our own elaborate accounts. The formation and maintenance of roads, tanks, and channels, and other simple engineering operations, upon which the public revenue and the profits of agriculture so greatly depend, have been from time immemorial familiar to Hindoo experts. A very little supervision would enable these men to carry out all the ordinary work of a district, and to execute almost all the plans of our scientific Engineers. They are quite competent to render all the necessary returns and accounts, and if properly remunerated would be as trustworthy as most people. The native architects and engineers, worthy of culture and instruction at our hands, are dying out in our older possessions, and their craft, from disuse, is becoming forgotten; but some of them, and many of a similar standing, are employed on the Public Works, and being, as in other departments, badly paid and not burdened with responsibility, have not, as a class, the highest character for purity, are popularly supposed to accumulate small fortunes in a wonderfully short time; and these scandals are often most unfairly brought forward as examples of what must be expected whenever natives are employed.

On the other hand, the English Engineers of districts, who by mere position, relieve their subordinates of responsibility, and unwittingly screen them from observation, are almost entirely occupied in clerical duties, upon the accuracy and regularity of which, their official reputation depends. Although invested in theory, with the executive charge of all the works within their range, the close application to accounts and correspondence imposed upon them, frequently keeps them tied to the desk for months together, so that they may never, or very seldom, have seen the works they are nominally constructing.

Since the newly modelled Public Works Department of Mysore commenced to act, its operations have chiefly consisted in opening and extending communications, and maintaining those already formed, in the repairs and improvement of old native works of irrigation, and in ordinary building. When plans and estimates have once been prepared and sanctioned, the cases are very few and far between in which much scientific engineering is required in completing the works. The services of English gentlemen, so-called Executive Engineers, are quite thrown away on road-making and repairing tanks, and are absurdly over-paid with salaries of £1000 a year. No practical man, undertaking the work on contract, would think of employing

such expensive agency. The whole structure and system of this Department, in Mysore and throughout India, is unsound; and it affords another instance of the truth of what Sir Thomas Munro said:—

“Expensive establishments, when once sanctioned, are not easily put down. There is never any difficulty in finding plausible reasons to keep up a lucrative office.”*

If the roads and tanks were re-transferred to the care of the district revenue authorities, who, with the landholders, are directly concerned and interested, and have the greatest facilities at command for prompt and constant attention to their efficiency; if a sufficient number of properly paid native Engineers were stationed over the country; the English engineering Staff might be reduced to one Superintendent with a Secretary or Assistant. The official records might not be so voluminous; there would be of necessity a certain relaxation of red tape; but by a judicious organisation, by encouraging contractors, by placing a little confidence and granting a little discretion in the right quarter, a more efficient supervision of work might be instituted, expenses greatly diminished, and speculation certainly not increased.

But then many good appointments for English gentlemen would have to be abolished.

We have already extended to the Mysore State “the inestimable blessings” of the British Public Works and Educational Departments. Mr. Bowring, the Commissioner, in the Administration Report for 1862-3 (paragraph 54), refers to “a complete and systematic re-organisation of the Police,” as the next step that is to be taken. If “the good work” is to be carried on by extending the new British Police Department to Mysore, there will be an opening for eight or ten more English officers, with salaries from £2500 to £600 per annum.

The new system of Police, which has now been introduced into all the districts of the three Presidencies, is the latest and worst example of that fatal tendency to excessive organisation and extreme centralisation, which has of late years characterised the Government of India. Official pedantry and the lust of patronage have both been at work here. The general results of the new establishment,—were a public and impartial inquiry instituted,—would assuredly be summed up as follows:—vast expense, copious scribbling, general unpopularity, marked inefficiency both as a detective and a protective force. Heaps of “able” reports, and “elaborate” correspondence on controversial and personal matters, are annually produced for the edification of Government, by three or four gentlemen enjoying splendid emoluments, the Director

* Gleig’s Life of Sir T. Munro, vol. ii, p. 453.

General, and the Inspectors General of the several minor Governments. The Police Superintendents of Districts,—military officers with salaries of from £600 to £800 per annum,—are chiefly tied down to clerical duties, examining and transmitting diaries and tabular statements.

Of course the stiff regularity of the new establishment was quite incompatible and irreconcilable with the patriarchal structure of local and village Police. The two could not exist side by side. The old inexpensive system, which was susceptible of great improvement at very small cost, has lost all its own authority and influence, even where it has not been formally abolished, and cannot impart its local and traditional knowledge to the new-comers. The new Police, armed and drilled and dressed, are, in their most useful aspect, only an army of Sepoys under another name, and are actually employed on certain duties from which the native troops have been relieved. But their arms, their drill, their dress, and the escort duties which they are made to perform, simply lower their efficiency as policemen. And their pay being quite inadequate, corrupt and oppressive practices are, it is said, very generally employed to secure some additional contributions from the community among whom they are quartered. The Department, taken as a whole, is an opprobrium to British rule.

(G.)

(Page 173.)

“CHRISTMAS IN BOMBAY.”

(*From the Hindu Prakash, December 23th, 1863.*)

“The inherent vice of all foreign rule never appears so disadvantageously, as in times like the present, specially devoted to relaxation and pleasure. The ruling race has such an awful consciousness of its own superhuman elevation, and the habits of an exclusive and single life are so studiously cherished, that they never can unbend themselves nor relax the gravity of their wrinkled front, and smiling self-pleased, enjoy themselves to their heart’s content. In fact, besides the hereditary element of sour melancholy which has permanently quartered itself on British character since the days of their Puritan psalm-singing fathers, their peculiar position in this country as a race of merchant rulers has served to give a sad prominence to

this most unwelcome trait in their character. British rule in India has most amply vindicated the justice of Napoleon's severe diatribe against their character as a European nation. In its whole aspect, it is so formal and rigid in the smallest as well as the most Imperial concerns, the one guiding principle is the expectation of money's worth for money paid. There is order, there is neatness, there is economy, there is every possible convenience and accommodation, but with all this, British rule has the appearance more of a shop, than of a splendid imperial mansion worthy of the love of millions, who might come there to honour the Sovereign Queen who sits over them enshrined in majesty. In seasons of jollity as in seasons of business, this same hateful thought of a selfish nature intrudes and spoils the cheer. It is Christmas now, and one would expect merriment and the noisy turbulence of harmless joy to bustle through our streets. But our streets look even more sombre and sadly desolate than when they are alive with the hum of business. Each man sits in his own petty self and mopes the time away; and this is our relaxation. The native population of the town, having nothing to stimulate them into the active habits of enjoying merry cheer out of doors, dissipate their means in worse than idleness.

Under native Sovereigns such times seldom would have come unattended by their train of popular attractions and enjoyments. Our temples would have blazed all night one mass of flame, and thousands would have poured there to hear some popular and favourite bard, reciting to them the pleasant stories of old days. There would have been popular masques and public theatres open to every comer. The whole public would have been freely asked to partake of their Sovereign's hospitality, and milk and sugar, in unnumbered rounds, would have infused cheer and freshness into the joyous throng. The advent of day would have brought with it other and more martial shows. The whole city would have been invited to the Prince's Palace, and there the Sovereign would have held a magnificent Durbar in honour of the new year that was dawning on their life and fortune. The Durbar over, there would have been horse races, and foot races, there would have been fencing with the sword or the stick, there would have been bull fights and buffalo fights, there would have been wrestling and a thousand marvellous feats of agility or force. Then the whole population would have poured out in the train of their Sovereign out of the city, and having rent the air with their merriment, and tired all their capacity for enjoyment, they would have returned home and gone to rest. These are the things which forge so strong the chain of love between King and people; and in their

absence the most regulated Government fails to inspire any other feeling than that of thankless content. We are sure London and Paris are not so subdued in their Christmas merriment as this city is with a Christian population of above five thousand. The people, in order to be elevated from their dreary selves, want some such machinery of popular shows and festivities, where they may catch and impart pleasure all around. The Government sadly misunderstands this popular craving for merriment and relaxation. People often feel surprised at being told that the British Government is a standing object of suspicion to its subjects, and seldom inspires any feeling of love and attachment in their bosoms. The cause, as we have mentioned it, is obvious enough. It treats its subjects like severe masters, and is paid in return for this severe formality, by perpetual suspicion of its motives even when engaged in the most philanthropic projects for their welfare. Bombay life is very tiresome."

(H.)

LETTER FROM A FRIEND.

(Page 175.)

April 10th, 1863.

Dear _____

In the *Edinburgh Review*, just published, there is an article headed "India under Lord Canning," which, but for the position which the putative author holds with reference to the Government, would scarcely be deserving of notice. As it is, however, I suppose it must be viewed in some measure as an expression of the sentiments of the Government, though it is hard to believe that they would be so unscrupulous, so devoid of all honour, as to support the monstrous doctrines put forward by the writer of the article in question. Most of our Governors General have sought for and set forth some other and more specious plea than that of mere expediency, for plundering weak Princes; but the reviewer boldly avows that expediency should be our guide, and some of his remarks make it quite clear that the Rajah of Mysore is to be the next victim. Yet he is not disloyal or disaffected. The Commissioner, the Governor General, and the Secretary of State have testified to the contrary. He must therefore be sacrificed on some other plea; and I know of none, after twenty years

personal experience of the Prince and his country, except that the territory is rich, the climate good, the position eligible—and we want it. Add to this, that we are strong, the Rajah weak—and what more could possibly be required to satisfy the most delicate Whig conscience? It is the old story of Naboth's vineyard once more repeated—only rather more flagrant, for we don't propose to give anything in return to anybody.

It will be curious to see how, when the extinction of the Mysore State has been accomplished, the claim of the Nizam to a share of the plunder will be met. Should we, in reference to that code of honour which is said to be observed among thieves, give half of the "sick" Hindoo's possessions to the Mussulman, the latter, entertaining probably more chivalrous sentiments than at present seem to inspire us, and feeling acutely the recent shameful attempt to rob him of a part of his own country, might restore his share to the Rajah or his heir, and read us a lesson of which we seem to be sadly in want.

It is melancholy to think that in spite of all our asseverations, wrung from us in the hour of our peril, all our protestations of honesty and good faith, we should still be bent on robbing our neighbours. It has been recently avowed in the most shameless manner by a person holding high office in India, that it is our intention to deprive the Nizam, at some future period, of the territory which we seized, but were compelled to relinquish a short time ago. Meanwhile, Mysore, already in our insatiable grasp, is to be annexed, and one of the oldest Royal Houses in India obliterated. It cannot be pretended that the Rajah has committed any great crime. He is loyal, humane, generous, intelligent, hospitable; and his dignified courtesy to all classes of Europeans, strikes all who approach him. The people of the country, whose interests the author of the paper in the *Review* guards with such jealous care, look on the Rajah with the most kindly feelings, and speak of him with the deepest respect.

The whole of the Mysore country is covered with noble works, executed entirely by the present Rajah and his ancestors. The Mussulman Princes did nothing but plunder. We have done nothing but restore some of the works that had fallen into disrepair, make a fine road for our own convenience to the Hills, build Rest Houses for European gentlemen, from which Natives of all classes are carefully excluded, and construct in each station the usual Jail and Church! The Rajah's family, on the other hand, has, in the Ashtagram Division alone, constructed magnificent dams across the principal rivers, which throw water into upwards of six hundred miles of canals, excavated.

at a cost and with an amount of skill that throw our petty works into the shade.

At every town and almost every village there is a Chuttrum where all native travellers are housed and fed for the day, established and endowed by the Rajah. And when, in 1856, we were threatened with famine, the Rajah for months fed thousands daily, who but for his bounty might have perished. It makes one's blood boil to think that a man who has done so much good should be so shamefully maligned. His great crime, alas ! is possessing a country that we covet ; and that, I have learned to understand, is an unpardonable offence.

The observation that the Princes of India with one or two exceptions, are politically ciphers, is as ungenerous as it is untrue. Had those who only remained passive in 1857, declared against us, India would have been lost, at any rate for a time. But the danger has blown over, and we, as usual, forget what we have passed through. And yet we have had some warnings that ought not to have been forgotten.

Look at the fearful catastrophes which followed our unwarrantable invasion of Affghanistan. Then retribution followed swiftly, and *one* at any rate of the instigators of that wickedness paid for it with his head. The blood, however, of the unhappy victims of this iniquitous campaign was scarcely dry, before we seized Scinde,—a country whose rulers had behaved in the most friendly manner towards us, and who could, had they been so minded, have prevented a single man of the Candahar force from ever reaching India. They helped us in every possible way, in our time of need, and they met their reward. The instant our hands were free, we conquered Scinde, plundered Hyderabad and imprisoned the Ameers. I have always looked with horror on the conquest of Scinde. I think it is perhaps the most wicked act of spoliation we have ever perpetrated ; but still it is ludicrous to observe how the Whig reviewer and advocate for wholesale spoliation, carps at the single Tory acquisition of Scinde. But Whig and Tory are, I fear, alike in this accursed lust of territory ; and it seems destined that robbery shall follow robbery, till India is again deluged with the blood of innocent women and children. I shared in the Affghan campaign, and escaped the fate that overwhelmed so many brave fellows. I have experienced the kindness and hospitalities of the Ameers of Scinde, and have seen them dethroned, and their country taken from them. I have seen the Carnatic, Tanjore, Nagpore, and a host of other Principalities fall before our unhallowed greed ; and the only instance which I can remember when we were justified in seizing the country of a Native Prince was that of Kur-

nool. I have seen the terrible year 1857 pass away, and I believe that I shall live to see something similar occur again, for I do not believe that we can be permitted to continue in such a career of wholesale reckless robbery unchecked.

Before concluding these remarks, I would draw your attention to the cry that is now got up, and which the author of the paper in the Review puts forth, about the necessity for guarding *the interests of the people*. What that may mean exactly, I don't profess to know; but we have the author's own word for it that so little sensible were the people of Oude of our tender concern for their interests, that the cultivating classes were as hostile to us during the Mutiny, as any other class of the people. As regards Mysore, you and I know from intimate personal acquaintance with the people, that however much they may fear, they neither love nor respect us, and they would joyfully see our rule changed to-morrow for that of the old Rajah. I could say much more, but you know as well as I do, how wicked and desperate is the game our rulers seem bent on playing.

Believe me, ever yours, &c., &c.

THE END.