

OBSERVATIONS

ON

A LETTER

FROM

EARL CORNWALLIS

TO

THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE  
EAST INDIA COMPANY;

*Published in the London Gazette of Feb. 1, 1792.*

*"Emeritus"*

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LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRETT, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE,  
PICCADILLY.

1792.

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA  
AT LOS ANGELES

QUESTIONS

IN LETTER

FRANK CONWAY

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA COMPANY

LONDON

UNION OF CALIFORNIA

AT LOS ANGELES

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## OBSERVATIONS, &c.

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**N**OTWITHSTANDING repeated experience of detriment to commanding officers from their imprudence of writing long official letters, the following will exhibit another conspicuous proof of that excessive weakness. Circumspect magistrates seldom record, at the time, the reasons upon which they found their decrees, because many decisions have been acknowledged perfectly correct, while the principles they were deduced from appeared erroneous. Would that military magistrates, too, for the honour of the profession, had followed their wise example ! It was during the two last wars this influenza became epidemical. Too many evidences of it, naval as well as military, are extant. The inconsiderate-affected details transmitted from Germany, America, and both the Indies, during those periods, replete with technical phrases, and martinet expressions, unintelligible to English readers, will not, no more than their

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authours,

authours, be suddenly forgotten. A puerile presumption of scholastic ability, to be esteemed men of the cabinet as well as the field, favoured of both Minervas, induced this infatuation, productive of no better purpose than to excite *sardonic* smiles, or provoke to indignation. Soldiers conceited of their literary qualifications are styled in the French armies, "*—s de la plume.*" Cicero was called in derision *The learned Consul*. "Perish me," exclaimed old Admiral Cornish, "if ever I go on service again with a classical general, to forego a Manilla ransom for the Latin declamations of a Jesuitical archbishop!" Modern commanders, though not quite competent to the Cæsarean "*Vidi Vici,*" or to emulate the energetic precision of the celebrated *George Walton*, possess discernment enough, surely, to distinguish, on every occasion, whether of victory or defeat, the preference of compendious simplicity and perspicuity in their narratives, to the mawkish, drawling dissertations, superfluous as impertinent, "*Quia nunc non erat his locus,*" did not vanity, in this case, supersede or fascinate their judgment.

judgment. The almost impossibility, likewise, of describing operations of war in terms adequate to the perception of even the most intelligent and comprehensive mind, would deter, one might imagine, experienced officers, men of the world, as well as the camp, from such unseasonable essays. Whenever a pedantic military gazette issues from Whitehall, you may, in general, infer something wrong, some misrepresentation, or some misconduct. A scrap bescrewled, in pencil, upon an aid-de-camp's back, or a drum head, in the Lacedæmonian style and spirit, is the sure harbinger of propitious and honourable fortune.

Not less injudiciously have administration, in the present instance, lavished their premature commendations on such *apocryphal Jeremiahs*. So profuse, indeed, have been these *periodical overtures*, as nearly to exhaust the language of panegyric; of all subjects confessedly (in the example before us particularly) the most sterile and insipid. Let Bedanore and Mangalore sur-

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render;



render ; let Myfore and its metropolis become overspread, like the rest of the East and West Indian Colonies, with Caledonian emigrants ; what strain of encomium from the nasal sesquialteral trill of Soprano P— ; what “IÖ triumph” eulogy, from the corvinal guttural twang of thoroughbass D——, can be resounded more rapturous and exulting, than the applausive Pœans they have already recitativèd and chorussed.

Well said Mr. Fox, “Untimely praises should be suspended, lest they provoke discussion.” Happily they *have* provoked it, to the perfect detection of ministerial artifice, in attempting to make “*Their wart an Offa ; their mole-hill a huge Olympus !*” in deifying, even with eagle apotheosis, their fabulous hero, “*Præsens divus habebitur,*” in order to render it profanation to scrutinize his consecrated actions. Be their purpose, however, what it may ; whether, as usual, to delude the people, to prevent, by a variety of embarrassments and perplexed disquisitions, the Ithuriel eye, the focus of observation, from concentrating

concentrating on their darkest deeds either of negotiation or finance ; or to incense this English Alexander and his captains, (or more properly the *Scotch Alexander*, who is the real emperor) to challenge satisfaction, on their return from the *patriotic band*, for not distinguishing, what it is impracticable to discriminate in parliamentary debates, the agent from the action : a combination which the ministry itself cemented, and determined to render indissoluble, by their most *conglutinous* congratulations : Be their projects, I say, malevolent and formidable as themselves, they will not avail to discourage an unconfiding yet undaunted opposition, from pronouncing what strictures they deem suitable to every gradation of misconduct.

Nor will their rhetorical flourishes, on the integrity and disinterestedness of their demigod,

“ Cujus, in senatu, recinet jocosa

“ Nomen imago.”

Which are nothing, in fact, to the argument,

ment, save his failures from animadversion. Already dignified, adorned, and enriched with every distinction and advancement, illustrious or lucrative, that fortune can communicate; in degree an Earl, in honour a knight of St. George; in place a privy counsellor; in rank a general; in station and emolument a colonel; constable of the tower, and governor of India (independent of his family inheritance) What motive, for goodness sake, what inducement can the most insatiable spirit thus abundantly gratified, possess to venality or improbity? Nor, in truth, is his heart tarnished or depraved by such ignominious stains. He is, in the truest English sense, an honest, upright, worthy, honourable gentleman; and in the Roman sense, like Lepidus, "*A tried and valiant soldier.*" Be this his unfulfilled praise—his genuine desert.—To expatiate on his civil administration, his political career, or his martial exploits, is, in the ironical sense of the Dramatist, to be "A d—d good-natured friend "indeed!" Admitting, however, in the utmost latitude, the transcendent excellence  
of



of his civil and military qualifications ; what genius can exert or extend its powers, when manifestly subservient to the domineering influence of a perpetual dictator ? Neither ideas, opinions, judgment, or actions, suggested and inculcated by another, can be ascribed to a man himself, or be accounted the effect of his own intelligence. In the ascendant only he moves—he speaks—he breathes, and has his being.

“ And in some taste is Lepidus but so :

“ It is a creature taught by R—— to fight,

“ To wind—to stop—to run directly on.

“ He must be taught, and trained, and bid go forth,

“ His corporal motion governed by Scotch spirit.”

Although, in discussion of the following Letter, as much only of the several clauses is inserted from the original (to avoid prolixity and repetition) as was immediately requisite for observation ; yet will there be found, I trust, no passage in this selection either perverted, mistated, misconstrued, or misapplied ; not intentionally so, I can presume to pronounce with the certitude of perfect conviction.

LETTER.

# LETTER.

No. 1. **T**HE strong fortresses of Durwar and Copaul had long been invested and besieged by the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and with so little prospect of success, that it had been more than once under the consideration of the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad, whether they should not convert those sieges into blockades.

The news of the fall of Bangalore, which seemed to have been unexpected by the garrisons of those places, so effectually intimidated them, that, although in no shape reduced to extremity, or even distress, they agreed to surrender.

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2. After having taken out of that place (viz. Bangalore) *heavy guns and supplies of military stores*, and provisions to the utmost extent that could be transported.

After having received intimation that General Abercromby, with a battering train, which, in addition to my own, I was in hopes would be sufficient for the accomplishment of  
our

No. 1. **H**ERE appears a first instance of the imbecility of our allies ; of their little utility to us, indeed, every intelligent and experienced officer, here, as well as abroad, long ago pronounced their conviction. It was from the success of the English arms that the two fortresses surrendered. “ America was conquered in Germany,” Durwar and Copaul at Bangalore. Instead of uniting with us, they wisely enriched themselves, seized the stores of the captured places, and obtained complete possession of the enemy’s extensive and valuable territories, lying between the Krishna and Tum-buddra.

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2. The army which then marched from Bangalore, was the most formidable and the best provided European and native force that ever acted together since the English establishment in India. Had they moved early from Bangalore, their heavy cannon might have proved of service. Battering guns and large quantities of ammunition indicate a siege of some strong hold, and

our object, was at the head of the Pondicherrum Ghaut, and in readiness to cooperate with me, I moved on the 3d of May from the neighbourhood of Bangalore, with a respectable and *sufficient* corps of artillery, the Nizam's horse, His Majesty's 19th regiment of dragoons, &c. &c.

[ See No. 13 ]

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3. Receiving information of my movement, he (viz. Tippoo) marched by one of the most direct roads, to his capital.

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4. I knew that he (viz. Tippoo) had long before given orders to burn the villages, and to destroy the provisions and forage on all the roads by which we could march to Seringapatam.

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5. As there is no place of strength near the capital on the north side of the river, in which I could lodge the *heavy artillery and stores* in security for a few days, with a moderate garrison, I was in hopes that I might be able to cross that river (viz. the Caver) with



sieges are works of time, and of fair weather, and not of a day and precarious seasons.

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3. [ See No. 9, 12, and 26. ]

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4. An additional motive for not committing the event of so momentous an enterprise to the contracted period of a few remaining weeks of the dry season.

[ See No. 29. ]

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5. To join General Abercromby before an engagement with the enemy, or the siege of his capital, was a measure the most judicious imaginable, and apparently practicable ; but then the *heavy cannon* and *cumbrous stores* must, for a time, have been left

with the whole army, and to effect a junction with General Abercromby before I should find it necessary to approach near to the ultimate object of the movement.

6. By a most unaccountable *supineness* and *want of exertion* on the part of the Nizam's cavalry, which neither my *requisitions* nor orders could overcome, we suffered some loss, both in baggage and followers, on the march.

[ See No. 31. ]

The

behind at Bangalore. General Abercromby, it is asserted, had already a battering train with him, sufficient, probably, to begin the siege. If not for weighty ordnance, the Caveri is well known to be fordable, like all other large Indian rivers, about the summer solstice, for light field-pieces, in almost every part. Once united, the two armies became irresistible, for one alone proved nearly so; and how easy would it then have been (supposing the rains suspended) to have reinforced the battering train from Bangalore? The Monsoon once set in, all thoughts of opening trenches must, of course, have been relinquished, and the army would thus have been happily exonerated, on its return, from its insuperable encumbrance.

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6. These qualified, complaisant terms of "*want of exertion*," and "*inactivity*," but in plain English, *cowardice*, of the Nizam's cavalry, were neither unaccountable nor could be unexpected, because the supineness of Indian (not Persian, Mogul, or Tartar) cavalry, serving as mercenaries, when not counteracted

The inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a distance, frequently occasioned a scarcity in the camp.

[See No. 17.]



counteracted by expectation of plunder, or defence of their own dwellings and immediate possessions, has been reprobated for ages.

Pretty auxiliaries these, indeed, to whom a commander in chief (exquisitely conscious, at times, of the indispensable necessity of implicit submission and subordination to the very existence of an army, and who makes the Company's troops perfectly sensible of them) is constrained to condescend to requisitions and entreaties, to prevail on them to discharge their duty. Disobedient troops can be considered only as banditti—as no better than voracious locusts—“*Fru- ges consumere nati;*” and, by their continual defeats, disheartening their fellow-soldiers.

There is still a worse consequence resulting from such dastardly confederates, by their affording European commanders the convenience of imputing the cause of every blunder and miscarriage, to their notorious poltroonery. The battle of Fontenoy was lost,

7. The Caveri is never, I believe, lower than it was during the greatest part of last May.—[See No. 21.]

From its bed being rocky, and difficult beyond what I have ever seen for so great a tract in any other river, it appeared *nearly*, if not utterly impracticable to pass our heaviest guns over at any ford that could be discovered below Seringapatam.

The ford near the village of Kannambady, about eight or nine miles above Seringapatam, over which it was positively asserted that Hyder Ali had frequently passed twelve pounders, and sometimes heavier guns.

8. In the event of my being able to cut off the greatest part of his army.

9. Tippoo

lost, say the Germans and the English, by the ill-behaviour of the Dutch; and the like has been vented by every European commander in India, from Lawrence to Lepidus.

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7. These passages, modified with the term *nearly*, seem to admit the practicability of crossing over at least the light artillery, which requires a track no wider than three or four yards to proceed with ease. They agree, also, with the concurrent opinions of gentlemen who have traversed the Caveri near those parts. Thus the heavy cannon is evinced to have been the sole obstacle to the army's passing this river. During the long vacation at Bangalore, a ford over the Caveri might surely have been traced somewhere or other, by the offer of handsome rewards, either to the peasants, or to our own native soldiers.

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8. How far this ability became effectual, will be seen hereafter.—[See No. 24.]

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9. Though

9. Tippoo, with his whole army, had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his right covered by the Caveri, and his left extended along the front of a high mountain, with a deep swampy ravine; the passage of which was defended by batteries, running along the whole of his front.

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10. We had suffered greatly during the preceding week, by rains uncommonly frequent and heavy so early in the season.

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11. With the expectation that a complete victory might not only relieve many of our temporary distresses, but tend to bring the war to a very speedy conclusion.

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12. Tippoo, notwithstanding that we were advancing by a route, for which he was not prepared, did not decline to risk the event of a battle in a new position.

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Their infantry, on this occasion, shewed a much better countenance than usual,  
which



9. Though Tippoo is frequently stigmatized, by his European adversaries, as a barbarian, no semblance of barbarism appears in this disposition of his forces, to cover his capital.

[See No. 3---12 and 26.]

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10. [See No. 15, and 20.]

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11. These acknowledged temporary distresses, preceding, it seems, any decisive action with the enemy, manifests the imprudence of dragging heavy cannon and stores into the field at that critical season of the year.

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12. Promptitude, and reciprocal confidence like this, exhibits the magnanimity of a gallant, as well as generous soldier; a virtue, though not absolutely incompatible with tyranny, yet usually accompanied by qualities more benevolent and humane. That he should prove peculiarly rigorous ✓

which perhaps, may principally be attributed to Tippoo's own presence, and exertions amongst them.

[See No. 3, 9, and 26.]

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13. But even if I had thought the heavy guns that I had brought with me *sufficient* for the siege.

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14. The soil, of all the parts of the Myfore country that I have seen, is in general dry, and by nature unfruitful; and sustenance, either for men or animals, can only be raised upon it, by a most persevering industry in its inhabitants.

[See No. 27.]

15. The

to the English, may be accounted for, though not justified, considering their professed, their long, and their inveterate enmity to himself and family.

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13. Ignorant of the geography of the whole scene of action, as is evident from several passages in this narrative; totally unacquainted with the fords of the Caveri; and uncertain, therefore, of joining General Abercromby; the commander in chief brings heavy guns with him at a precarious season, for no other purpose, it should seem, than to be declared *insufficient* for the occasion, on their arrival at the destined spot; although they had previously been pronounced sufficient. [See No. 2.]

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14. It was experienced to be so on the march, from the Carnatic to Bangalore; and not, therefore, to have been further invaded till the rains had produced and left verdure on the soil, and other green forage.

15. The

15. The premature setting in of the monsoon, near a month before the usual period. [See No. 10, and 20.

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16. The road for the heavy guns was to be made the whole way by our own pioneers. I was forced to halt one day after the first march, by the draught cattle having been completely exhausted in accomplishing it.

Considerable detachments of troops were ordered to attend and assist the heavy guns on the second day's march; but the bullocks were so extremely reduced, that, even with the aid of the soldiers at the dragropes, their progress was so tedious, that the body of the army was upwards of twelve hours in marching as many miles.

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17. The effects of several circumstances from which we had already suffered many inconveniences, pressed upon us particularly



15. The seasons in that country are divided into three, the temperate, the hot, and the wet. But no seasons in any country, or under any climate, are ever accelerated or retarded one entire third of their whole extent.

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16. Every difficulty, incidental to this enterprize, seems to have arisen from the impediments created by the heavy cannon, notwithstanding the prodigious number of cattle appropriated for their draught.

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17. "Still harping, quoth Polonius, on  
"my daughter." Again the Nizam's refractory cavalry, represented a little heretofore

larly hard at this juncture ; and none more than the conduct of the Nizam's cavalry, who were now, if possible, more *inactive* and more *inattentive* to my *requisitions* than ever.

They had, regardless of my remonstrances since the commencement of our march from Bangalore, hardly ever sent a detachment beyond the picquets of our infantry, and had persevered in exhausting the small stock of forage and provisions.

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18. I could not leave Tippoo at liberty to employ his whole force against General Abercromby ; and therefore resolved to remain in my position near *the ford*, which held the main body of the enemy's army in check at Seringapatam, until I should have reason to believe that General Abercromby was out of all danger of being interrupted in his retreat, by Tippoo's marching in person, or considerably reinforcing the corps which I knew he had detached against him, but which alone was not of  
sufficient

tofore as obstructive by action as by inaction. If contumaciously disobedient to *requisitions* (a new term for orders, and the first army, probably, wherein *remonstrances* were substituted for commands) Why retain them after such flagrant instances of misbehaviour? [See No. 6.]

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18. Several material facts are here presented to us.

Neither Tippoo's whole force, nor himself in person, nor a very considerable reinforcement of his troops, nor any corps, sufficient essentially to obstruct General Abercromby's retreat, marched against that General; for if they had, our grand army would, in consequence, have moved to his support. And he must, probably, have been advised of the insufficiency of Tippoo's detach-

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ment

✓ sufficient strength to make me apprehend  
that it could give General Abercromby any  
material molestation.

[See No. 20.]



ment to molest him, by the same express which conveyed the instructions to him to retire. For had the enemy's detachments against him been considerable, the instructions would rather have directed to take some strong post, and not to retire.

How then is the precipitation of that retreat to be accounted for? An army, superiour to any that ever before encountered Hyder Ali or Tippoo (except during this campaign) was then encamped at Periapatam, yet made no resistance to a detachment incapable of molesting it. No person, indeed, can yet account for it; because, strange as it may seem, not one official document, relative to the conduct of that retreat, has yet been produced.

It appears also, that our principal army kept near a *ford*, in order to cross, and assist General Abercromby, provided the Sultan had employed a large force against him. Now, had the river proved *unfordable* it would have been useless for our army to have remained there any longer.

19. In the mean time I gave directions to burst eleven heavy guns; eight eighteen, and three twenty-four pounders; to bury or destroy the military stores that could not be carried with us.

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20. Having remained long enough to give ample time to General Abercromby to fall back from Periapatam, I moved from my encampment near the ford on the morning of the 26th.

As not only our heavy guns were now destroyed, but General Abercromby's corps had actually descended the Ghauts.

21. And

19. How preferable it had been to have left those heavy guns and stores behind, is here again apparent. Previous to the army's arrival near Seringapatam, when the showery weather, so much complained of, indicated the little use that could then be made of them, they might have been destroyed or buried to good effect, for the sake of facilitating the passage of the Caveri. A junction with General Abercromby, the first consideration, became then of easy attainment.

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20. This clause determines, also, one ford at least. The battle was fought on the 15th or 16th of May; the rains, says the narrative, set in during the preceding week, (See No. 10 and 15) that is, let us suppose about the 9th. A ford was subsisting (notwithstanding the rains which swell the waters) on the 26th. [See No. 18]

If ample time were given for General Abercromby to retreat, before the grand army moved from the ford, some account of that retreat must surely have reached the  
commander

21 And to make every other necessary preparation for resuming our operations against the enemy's capital, as soon as the rivers should subside. [ See No. 7. ]

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22. Unless Tippoo, in the mean time, should agree to make such concessions as the confederates might *reasonably* think they have a right to *exact* from him.

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23. I was



crowded together, under the batteries upon the island, in a manner that, from the disorder usually attendant on flight, exposed them to slaughter from every shot.

[See No. 8.]

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25. In contradistinction to *our* ; the Governor-general seeming to regard himself, on all important occasions, as the King's rather than a Company's servant.

All our governments in the East ; the majority of those, I believe, in the West Indies ; as well as those in Europe and in America, are possessed by military persons ; a conjunction of offices incompatible in the East, because, for their military conduct, they are not responsible within the jurisdiction of their own governments ; and very little so elsewhere, if we may judge from the proceedings of a pending impeachment.

26. A little

26. It would be in vain to suppose, that we should remain long undisturbed by an enemy so able and active as Tippoo.

[See No. 3, 9, and 12.]

27. There is at present a favourable opportunity that it (viz. the war) will be terminated with valuable acquisitions to the Company, and to the other members of the confederacy.

Impelled, however, as I was, by the consideration of the state of your finances—

And

26. A little further on, this monarch is represented as perfidious, barbarous, insatiably ambitious, "*Myforum postremus*" in short, and an object of terrour to all his neighbours: a character irreconcilable in moral possibility to his acknowledged gallant spirit, and his repute as a legislator, statesman, cultivator, and protector of his country. It is happy for him that verbal abuse (of which he has received rather more than his due share) that the war of words produces no corporeal hurt; nor do hard words, be it remembered, atone for insult.

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27. The war having commenced on the basis of a partition treaty, [See the celebrated letter to the Nizam, laid before the House of Commons] it is in fact a predatory war, and now confessedly protracted for the purpose of *compensation*, even whilst the allies are rendering their debts every day more incapable of repaying them.

And of their right (viz. of the allies) to expect some *compensation* for their losses and expences.

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28. In attempting to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, the information that I had received of the political affairs of Europe



No acquisitions, however, in the smallest degree valuable, can ever be derived to the East India Company from territorial possession. The revenue of one-third of the dominion of Mysore would not, in twenty years, defray the expence incurred by the present war, were it to terminate this campaign. By extending their domain, there is a wider and remoter frontier to defend, with a certain charge of additional troops. Nor would the income of the included province, or district, ever pay for the collection of it, if barren and unproductive as represented.—[See No. 14.]—Similar prospects of future opulence in India, and of that country soon becoming a pecuniary resource to this, have not unfrequently been presented to us by the grand Comptroller; with what degree of probability, the past management, and actual debts of the Company will pretty well ascertain.

28. Admitting that war had been actually declared with Spain or Russia, how could it have affected the salutary delay

Europe operated, also, strongly to induce me to make an effort.

29. And by that means entirely break his power, before the setting-in of the periodical rains—

Without having been attended with any material addition to the expence, which we must necessarily have incurred, if the army had, during the same period, remained in a state of inactivity.

I shall certainly, therefore, not relax in the *smallest degree*, in forwarding the necessary preparations to enable me, as soon as the season will permit, to *resume* the most vigorous prosecution of offensive operations.

30. The

of the siege of Seringapatam till the close of the rains? In that distant quarter there could be little danger from either Spanish or Russian armaments at any period; and the Company could not then, even by the capture of Seringapatam, have become rich enough to aid England in the contest.

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29. The commander in chief was given credit, by every veteran, for the prudence of remaining at Bangalore during the rains; because it appeared too great a risk—too rash a procedure, to reduce the attack of Seringapatam to so nice and minute a portion of time.—[See No. 4.] It would not have stood the public in half the expence of men and money to have placed the army in quarters of refreshment during the rains, that was incurred by the prodigious ravage and havock of the Monsoon. Tippoo himself is said to have lost above thirty thousand horses. What then must have been our loss of draft and carriage cattle? Fifty thousand will scarcely, I suppose, replace them; for if General Medows, with eighteen thousand





land troops, had seventy thousand cattle, twenty-six thousand men must have occasion for one hundred thousand at least. Then the renewal of camp equipage, of magazines, and of stores, must be enormous. At all events it may be deemed a fortunate circumstance, instead of a disappointment to be regretted, that the sudden rains did prevent our army from undertaking the siege. Soldiers can sustain an excess of heat or cold, but no troops can endure the rigour of wet, or even damp weather, or the duty of trenches in a swampy soil, at the confluence of rivers.

If vigorous operations are to be *resumed*, they must, of course, cost as much at least as the original ones did, but most likely considerably more, on account of the present distance of the army from Fort St. George, and other deposits of provision and stores in the Carnatic.

Had the proper season for action been attended, the heavy expence of one more campaign at least would have been saved,  
far

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30. The failure has reflected no disgrace on the British arms.

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31. At the time we suffered the greatest inconvenience from the *inactivity* of the Nizam's cavalry, and I expressed my dissatisfaction, in the strongest terms, at the behaviour of the chiefs, I was perfectly sensible, that even *their presence contributed to awe the enemy*, and was otherwise of value, as being a proof of the strong connection of the confederacy.

32. I must

far more chargeable than quarters of refreshment, a consideration that seems to have been entirely forgotten.

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30. By no means on the bravery and spirit of the officers and soldiery, native as well as British.

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31. Prior to this it is observed, that “ We suffered some loss, both in baggage  
“ and followers, on the march towards  
“ Seringapatam, from only a small number of the enemy’s irregular horse, by a  
“ most unaccountable *supineness* and *want* of  
“ *exertion* on the part of the Nizam’s cavalry.”—[See No. 6.] In another place the Nizam’s troops are called “ A numerous and powerful body of horse.” Now after so many proofs of their pusillanimity, how could the enemy stand in awe of them? Five hundred of the best might probably have been selected from them, to some advantage for the service, whose presence would have been equally as good a proof of the alliance: the rest ought surely to have been dismissed.

32. There

32. I must, in justice to the officers and foldiers, both of the King's and Company's troops, who compose this army, give my public testimony, that during the course of a campaign, which from a concurrence of circumstances, has been singularly arduous, they have manifested patience under fatigue and scarcity, gallantry in action, and a general spirit of zeal for the honour and interests of their country, which, in my opinion, has never been exceeded.

32. There has scarcely been an action in India, wherein the Company's officers have not received this kind of indiscriminate praise from his Majesty's generals ; public thanks for their services have been conferred on them, also, at the end of every war. With what sincerity, or what advantage, they are now commended, will be seen hereafter. No one in India has ever been able to learn to what good purpose they were thus distinguished heretofore, as they never yet experienced other return for their services than continual supercession.

“ *Periere labores, pereat et eorum ingrata merces.*”

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
As official dispatches from military commanders are not formed from authenticated registers, wherein daily proceedings are recorded, as on the open journals kept in ships of war, to be always referred or appealed to, when expedient, as testimonials of the transactions themselves ; but are fabricated, revised, amended, and corrected



at their own pleasure, from materials of their own selection, disposed at their own leisure, and usually some time subsequent to the occurrence of the several events: the public, by their representatives, as well as by individuals who pay for them, are clearly entitled, for their own instruction, as well as the general satisfaction, to examine such productions, to analyze their composition, to compare the parts, and to animadvert on the several representations exhibited in them; for by these means alone, can they be enabled to distinguish real from visionary objects; and to refrain or bestow their applause with a rational appropriation and discernment.

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