

*W. M. Marsh Esq,
with Mr Dalrymple's comments.
1807.*

A
REPLY
TO THE
STRICTURES
OF THE
EDINBURGH REVIEW,
&c. &c.

G. SIDNEY, Printer,
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A
REPLY
TO THE
STRICTURES
OF THE
EDINBURGH REVIEW,
ON THE
FOREIGN POLICY
OF
MARQUIS WELLESLEY'S
ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA ;
COMPRISING
AN EXAMINATION
OF THE LATE
TRANSACTIONS IN THE CARNATIC.

By LAWRENCE DUNDAS CAMPBELL, Esq.

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R E P L Y

TO THE

STRICTURES

OF THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW, &c.

IN proportion to the degree of reputation, which any writer has acquired, his opinions ought to be cautiously weighed, and attentively examined. It is natural to the pride of literary talents to sport with the favours of the public; and, unless the judgment of a popular author be much stronger than his pride, he will be prone to indulge in all the caprices of his imagination, and to exert his

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influence in the dissemination of speculative notions in literature, or in politics, which may be adapted to the exercise of philosophical ingenuity, or to the purposes of political contention; without any regard to the accuracy of the facts, or to the justness of the principles on which these notions are founded; and mindful only of those striking expressions, and of that imposing sophistry, by which the generality of his readers will be readily captivated and misled. To the anonymous writers of literary periodical Journals which have attained celebrity, this observation will, in many instances, be found to apply; and the Edinburgh Review has recently exhibited some eminent illustrations of its truth.

The first number of this critical Journal attracted the notice, and obtained the approbation of all men of judgment and taste, by the severe justice of its criticisms, and by

the real talents and learning which it displayed. But the writers of this work, having thus at once acquired a high reputation as critics, were no longer content to confine the exertions of their abilities to their own proper province. Public praise produced in their minds its usual intoxicating effects; and the more sober judgment and discretion of these gentlemen yielded to the desire of rendering their publication a convenient vehicle for the display of their powers in elaborate disquisition, and for the promulgation of their views in philosophy, and in politics. Hence the review of some new theories in metaphysics, furnished occasions for gratifying their readers with very full expositions of their own metaphysical speculations. Hence the celebrated work of Segur, on the politics of European Courts, during a particular period of time, served to introduce a prolix dissertation of their own, on the general principles of the law of nations, and

on the progressive advancement of that science in modern times, whilst the work itself is laconically described and dismissed in a few sentences. And, hence these discursive critics, in exposing the plagiarisms of an illiterate scribbler, who has published a book on India, ingeniously discovered—“ a “ *most favourable occasion*” to speculate at great length on the state of the British possessions in that country, to insinuate their disapprobation of the system of policy, by which those possessions have lately been governed, and to recommend the propagation of the established religion of the Church of England amongst the Hindús, “ *under the power and influence of Govern- ment,*” as the best means of conciliating their affections,—and the introduction of English colonists amongst them, to share in the property and cultivation of their native soil, as a sure way to teach them to admire,

and in time to imitate, the superior justice, and moral feeling of the English nation. *

* This last dissertation must have been perused with mingled sentiments of aversion and regret, by every reader of the Edinburgh Review, who is conversant with the peculiar system of manners, and the internal polity of our Indian fellow-subjects; and who, in the first two numbers of that work, had seen oriental publications reviewed by a writer, thoroughly acquainted with those manners and that polity, as well as deeply versed in the languages, literature, and history of Asia. An unfortunate absence from his country, for a long time deprived the public of the lucubrations of this learned and judicious writer; but he has now resumed his labours in the Edinburgh Review: and no man, I am persuaded, deprecates more strongly than he does, those speculations on the state of India, in which his critical colleague was pleased to indulge. If, indeed, I could have entertained any doubt as to his sentiments on this point, his review of Mr. Colebrook's book on the *Husbandry and Internal Commerce of Bengal* would have removed it. The reader will find that interesting piece of criticism in the 19th number of the Edinburgh Review, which has just been published: and it particularly claims his attentive consideration, both

In the spirit of this most just, generous, and enlightened policy, the writer of this last article, has, in the 18th number of his Journal, again introduced the discussion of Indian affairs, in a manner still more strikingly felicitous than that which he had before adopted. A republication of *Mr. Orme's Historical Fragments of the Moghul Empire*, during a part of the reign of Aurungzebe, together with a posthumous tract on the origin of the English trade at Surat and Baroach, presented to the ingenious mind of the Reviewer another "*most favourable occasion,*" not only for urging his favourite scheme for meliorating the condition of the natives of India, by converting them from their religion,* and from the sound principles it contains, and from the striking contrast it exhibits, to the chimerical speculations to which I have adverted.

* "The exertions of the established church, *supported by the power and influence of government,* would be able

by dispossessing them of their property;* but also for making a direct attack, both on the general policy of Lord Wellesley's administration in its foreign relations, and on the particular measure of the assumption of the Carnatic. Yet a writer of less acuteness might have discovered, that the infor-

“ to make a *rapid progress* in the *conversion* and consequent moral improvement of the Hindus.”

Edinburgh Review, Vol. IV. p. 318.

* “ The most effectual way to *preserve* England and India together, for the *greatest length of time*, and for their *mutual advantage*, is, to permit the COLONIZATION OF THAT COUNTRY.”

Edinb. Review, Vol. IV. p. 305.

No competent judge, locally acquainted with India, will hesitate to say, that to “ *permit the colonization of that country*” would be, *in effect*, to dispossess the natives of their property in the soil;—of that property which, by the wisdom, justice, and sound policy of the British parliament, is secured to them in perpetuity.

mation contained in Mr. Orme's book was little calculated to recommend that scheme ; and a writer, less skilled in the stratagems of literary warfare, would have thought the publication of a book,* containing the reasons and arguments for the adoption of that policy, afforded at least as "*favourable*," and quite as *fair*, an "occasion" for commenting upon it, as the review of a few fragments of Indian history, during the reign of Aurungzebe, or even of the events of the Company's factories at Surat and Baroach, during the first years of their establishment.

But, though a review of the publication alluded to would have been as *fair*, it

* See notes relative to the peace concluded between the British government and the Mahratta chieftains, and to the various questions arising out of the terms of the pacification.

would not have been so *convenient* a mode of attack on Lord Wellesley's administration, as the one which has been adopted. In reviewing that publication, he must have noticed those details, into which he declares "*he cannot enter*;" and of the facts of which, though adapted, as he says, to enforce and elucidate his arguments, he studiously forbears to avail himself. This magnanimous forbearance leads him chiefly to convey his animadversions in those loose convenient generalities, which at once free his genius from the minute restrictions of truth, and best persuade that large proportion of his readers, who have either no time, or no capacity for enquiry and who, therefore, readily rely on his judgment, and adopt his opinions.

He informs us himself, that the bulk of his readers "*consider India as something very large, very curious, and very dis-*

trnt;" and hence proceeds his anxiety to give them a distinct idea of its present state, by acquainting them, "that the system of " foreign policy pursued by the British go- " vernment bears, in *its broad out-line*, no " *slight similarity* to the plan of universal " ascendancy acted upon by the *celebrated* " *oppressor Aurungzebe*." Here again he declares " *he cannot enter into minute de-* " *tails*;" and the bulk of his readers are therefore left to conclude, that, in addition to India being " *very large, very curious, and* " *very distant*," the British government there resembles that of Aurungzebe, the *Great Moghul*! of whose name, at least, they may before have heard, and which, perhaps, contributed to give them that notion of India being so " *curious*," which he has so happily corrected.

Yet, however highly he may estimate this additional information respecting India with which he has supplied his readers, a

few “of *the minute details*” to which, out of pure kindness towards our Indian Government, he declined even to advert, least “*it should seem invidious,*” would have convinced those readers, that, between the policy of our Government, and the system of Aurungzebe, there is not any *one* point of resemblance, either in their principles, or in their objects; and, that in their “*broad out-line*” no other sort of similarity is discoverable, but that the scene of their operation was laid in the same country, and was nearly of the same geographical extent.

The external policy of Aurungzebe was not, as the reviewer asserts—“a system of “ascendancy—” that is, of predominating influence, throughout the states of Hindústan,—but a fixed plan of universal, absolute, and unconditional subjugation. Ambition, avarice, and an assumed fanaticism were its ruling principles: the attainment of an undivided despotic dominion over

the whole extent of the Indian continent, the acquisition of personal riches, and the conversion of the Hindus to the Mohammedan faith, were its chief objects. If the writer had no access to the original sources of information on this subject, even the very book under his review, though defective, furnishes sufficient evidence of the truth and accuracy of this general description of Aurungzebe's system of policy.

“ Aurungzebe” says Mr. Orme, “ held
 “ his government under his father, and even
 “ at that time his capacious mind had *deter-*
 “ *mined to annex all the unconquered*
 “ *countries of the peninsula to his em-*
 “ *pire.*” *

Again. “ The year 1669 opened with a
 “ new war, conducted by Aurungzebe in

* Orme's Historical Fragments of the Moghul Empire, 8vo. edition, 1782, p. 4.

“ person, which leads us to recal an im-
 “ portant measure of his government.”
 * * * * *—“ In order to palliate to his Mo-
 “ hammedan subjects the crimes by which
 “ he had become their sovereign, he *deter-*
 “ *mined to enforce the conversion of the*
 “ *Hindus throughout the empire*, by the
 “ severest penalties, and even threatened
 “ the sword.—A few petty Rajahs were
 “ lured by better appointments to conver-
 “ sion; but *the people clung to their pa-*
 “ *godas*; and some preachers were put to
 “ death, which increased the spirit of mar-
 “ tyrdom. An old woman led a multitude
 “ in arms, whom Aurungzebe defeated in
 “ person. The religious vexation conti-
 “ nued. *Labour left the field, and industry*
 “ *the loom*; until the decrease of the re-
 “ venues drew representations from the
 “ governors of the provinces; which in-
 “ duced Aurungzebe to substitute a capita-
 “ tion tax, as the balance of the account

“ between the two religions. It was laid
 “ with heavy disproportion on the *lower*
 “ *orders of the Hindûs, which compose the*
 “ *multitude*; insomuch, that the produce
 “ would have amounted to half the ancient
 “ revenue; *few, nevertheless, bartered their*
 “ *faith for the exemption, and thousands*
 “ *perished under the oppression.*” * To an
 independent Hindû prince it was proposed,
 as an alternative to the capitation tax, “ that
 “ he should *no longer strike coin with his*
 “ *own name, but with Aurungzebe’s*; that
 “ the *Hindû temples* should be *demolished,*
 “ or *converted into Mohammedan mosques*;
 “ that *justice* should be *administered ac-*
 “ *cording to the Koran*;—but, that if these
 “ terms were refused, *his whole people*
 “ should be subject to the general capita-
 “ tion of the Hindûs.” †

* Historical Fragments, p. 100.

† Ibid p. 104.

Other authorities, which much more fully develop the merciless policy of Aurungzebe, might be cited in confirmation of the truth of these extracts; but the general accuracy of Mr. Orme, as far as his information goes, is unquestionable; and the reader, however unacquainted with Indian history, will therefore be able to judge, whether the policy here described, bears, as the Reviewer alleges, “*no little similarity* to the system “ of the British Government;” the main purpose of which system, even the Reviewer himself states to be “ the attainment of an “ *ascendant influence*” amongst the princes of Hindūstan, by “ *diplomatic dexterity*,” and by “ *pacific victories*.”

It must, however, in fairness be acknowledged, that the Reviewer totally disapproves of the British Government having an “ *ascendancy*” amongst the states of Hindūstan; and he strongly condemns that

“ *dexterous diplomacy*” by which it was obtained. “ Such policy, he conceives, *could* “ *by no chance be right*, whilst *many plans* “ might have been adopted that would “ only have incurred *some risk of being* “ *wrong.*” Of the nature of those plans he gives no sort of intimation; but from the general observations with which he concludes his strictures, it is perfectly plain, that, whatever plans of policy may be floating in his fancy, they are all founded on principles congenial to those of his grand scheme for the *colonization of India, and the conversion of the Hindûs.*

Impressed, as he appears to be, with the notion, that our Indian empire can never be safe, nor its native subjects prosperous and happy, until that scheme shall have been established, it is quite natural in him to deny, that a system of policy, which rests on principles diametrically opposite to his

own, can by any possibility be right. He who thinks it wise and just to supplant the natives in the cultivation of their own soil, and in the exercise of their ancient religion, can, of course, see *nothing right* in a system, which, through the commanding influence of a paramount protecting power, secures to them the undisturbed possession of that soil, and the free enjoyment of that religion; both from the rapacious, turbulent domination of Asiatic usurpers, and the interested, or misguided schemes of European reformers. But plain men will be apt to consider, that the system which protects the property, laws, customs, and religion of the natives, is, at least, as well adapted “to inspire them with the will to befriend us,”*

* Edinburgh Review, No. 18, p. 408. “The best policy is to provide ourselves with friends against the hour of alarm.”—*** To “*inspire many with the will to befriend us*,” is an infinitely more promising specu-

as that which seeks to deprive them of these sacred inheritances. Even those princes, for whom much of the sympathy of the Reviewer is excited; but whom he, nevertheless, informs us, “have been distinguished by a policy *little better than barbarous*; whose concerns of war and peace have been managed by *victorious assassins, consummate traitors, and experienced robbers*; by *diplomatists, less skilful at making, than at breaking treaties*; and by *generals, whose daggers were more formidable than their swords* ;”*

“lution, as to an unvitiated taste, it is a much more agreeable task; than to *take from all* the power of doing us harm!”—or, he might have added, *than to deprive all of the sources which constitute their strength and happiness.*

* Edinburgh Review, No. 18, p. 396—The Reviewer gives this general character of the princes who reigned in Hindustan, during the time of the wars in the Carnatic;—that is, those wars which, with some intervals

—even those princes, valuable as their friendship may be in his estimation, are not very likely to be “*inspired with the will to befriend us,*” at the sight of English colonists cultivating the neighbouring provinces, and of English clergymen, endeavouring to subvert their immemorial worship. Nor would such a sight be very happily calculated to subduc, in the tributaries of the British Government, that “*little occasional petulance and fretfulness under their leading-strings,*” * or (as a less in-

of peace, lasted from 1744 to 1783. At the period when the British Government in India adopted that line of policy in its foreign relations, which he severely condemns, for a “*want of tenderness and indulgence,*” several of those princes were alive; and he may rest satisfied, that their immediate descendants who now reign in Hindustan, if they do not possess all the power, do at least inherit, unimpaired, those eminent qualities of their fathers, which he has so faithfully pourtrayed.

* Edinburgh Review, Number 18, p. 404.

dulgent and more accurate observer of their conduct would call it) that unceasing animosity, and systematic treachery under their engagements, which the Reviewer conceives “ *may well be forgiven them.*”

It must indeed be confessed, that he is at much greater pains to censure the system of policy which has been pursued by the late Governor-general of India, than to shew the wisdom, justice, and practicability of his own speculations: and as it is his censure, rather than his speculations, which it is the purpose of this Reply to refute, the arguments which he has advanced against the policy in question, may be thought intitled to a more particular consideration.

The Reviewer has himself correctly stated the question at issue to be—“ Whether this “ system of policy is likely, either while it “ is undergoing the process of establish-

“ment, or after it has been established, to
 “diffuse *general* satisfaction, and, conse-
 “quently, to *strengthen* the *authority* and
 “*influence* of the British nation in Hin-
 “dustan?”

Now, in order to determine, previously to actual experiment, whether any plan of state policy be calculated to secure its proposed end, it is essential to consider the characters and circumstances of the respective parties on whom it is designed to operate. The adaptation of a system of practical policy to those characters and circumstances, is the only true criterion by which it can be judged. It is therefore necessary, in this discussion, to advert to the relative circumstances in which the states of India, and the British Government in that country are respectively placed; to the general character and policy of Indian princes; to the principles and views by

which their conduct to each other is regulated; and to the genius, habits, and interests of the people over whom they rule.

The general description, however, which the Reviewer has himself given of most of these subjects, principally by way of concession in the argument, supercedes the necessity of any lengthened account, and leaves to me only the humbler task of correcting, amplifying, or explaining, particular points.

“ It never can”—says he—“ be denied,
 “ that, relatively to the states allied with us
 “ in the East, our Indian Governments have
 “ long stood in a situation of *considerable*
 “ *difficulty*. In fact, our system of alliances
 “ in that quarter has, for a course of years,
 “ subjected *all parties* to those *incon-*
 “ *veniences* and *embarrassments* which are

“ the usual companions of an unequal
 “ union. Of that system it was the ruling
 “ principle, though a principle very vari-
 “ ously modified, that the native *Sovereigns*
 “ included in it should, in their *foreign re-*
 “ *lations*, be at once *under the control of*
 “ *British protection*, and yet remain ab-
 “ solute masters of their own subjects.
 “ Thus, secure of supreme power at home,
 “ but yet *held in a state of political vas-*
 “ *salage*, they felt almost all the vanity,
 “ with scarcely any thing of the pride, of
 “ independence. They *became indolent,*
 “ *luxurious, inattentive* to their *regal* duties,
 “ —and—PERHAPS TYRANNICAL!!! When-
 “ ever they *were permitted* to retain a
 “ military force of their own, (*a permission*
 “ *not always granted*) their armies were
 “ *ill paid* and *mutinous*; and, being clearly
 “ unnecessary to states safe *under British*
 “ *protection*, soon *became inefficient* also,
 “ except in *alarming their own leaders*, and

“ *extorting the revenues from their own*
 “ *countrymen.* Even the British troops,
 “ subsidized by those princes, were some-
 “ times *left in arrear*; an *inconvenience*
 “ which was *severely felt during war.* Our
 “ Governors were eye-witnesses of these
 “ *disorders,* and found it *painful to pro-*
 “ *secute the system,* in which they had
 “ *obviously originated,* while they could
 “ scarcely abandon it, without some sacrifice
 “ of power and consequence. They filled
 “ the dispatches they addressed to their
 “ employers in England, with *complaints*
 “ of the *complicated miseries resulting from*
 “ *a divided government,* and took steps,
 “ more or less justifiable, *to establish more*
 “ *firmly the authority of the British Coun-*
 “ *cils over those of their allies.* Some em-
 “ ployed the method of persuasion; others
 “ mixed persuasion with implied threats;
 “ and, indeed, it required some *patience to*
 “ maintain an *uniform tone of conciliation,*

“ in pressing measures of *evident expe-*
 “ *diency* on those, who were as hard to per-
 “ suade, as they were easy to compel. Un-
 “ der these circumstances, it was really *dif-*
 “ *ficult to act*; for, not merely the passions
 “ of the bad, but even the *feelings of the*
 “ *good* experienced a strong temptation to
 “ commit occasional irregularities in the
 “ exercise of power; and many things were
 “ done, which the *acutest casuist would be*
 “ *obliged to pronounce completely ambi-*
 “ *guous.*”

This description exhibits a pretty accurate
 account of the relations which subsisted
 between the British Government in India,
 and its Tributary Allies, before, and at the
 commencement of, Lord Wellesley's admi-
 nistration. Those allies were, in truth,
 always *entirely dependant* on the British
 Government. Some of them *owed* their
 political existence to British arms; and none

of them could *maintain* that existence a *single month* without British protection. All the treaties which have been concluded between them and the Company attest their *complete dependance*; and may be considered as the charters of their “*political vassalage.*” By those treaties they are considered as the chief magistrates of their respective states, in all their *internal concerns*; but it is expressly stipulated, that in all their *external relations* they should be entirely subject to the British Government; that a British minister should reside in their capital, for the purpose of directing those relations, and of controlling their conduct; and that a British military force should be constantly stationed within the respective states, for their protection; for which protection certain sums of money should be paid, with strict punctuality, to the British Government, to defray the whole expenses of the troops so stationed. In time of war,

they were bound to maintain such augmentation of those several forces, as the British Government *should judge fit*; and likewise to furnish certain proportions of their own troops, together with all those supplies of provision, with which it is necessary for an army to take the field.

The Reviewer states, that the British troops, by whom those allies were thus protected, and for whose whole expenses they had thus expressly stipulated to provide, were “*sometimes*” left in arrears: but it is irrefragably proved, by the concurrent testimony of *all* our Indian Governors, and of *all* the Company’s Servants, who have either written, or who have given evidence on this subject, * from the origin of those al-

* Consult the voluminous official papers on Indian affairs, which have been printed by order of the House of Commons, in 1774, during the proceedings relative to the

liances until the present day, that none of the stipulations of the subsidiary treaties were ever strictly fulfilled on the part of the native chiefs; that the tribute for the payment of the British troops was, during war, constantly in very considerable arrear; and that, on many trying occasions, when imminent dangers menaced the British dominions, those tributaries not only withheld the supplies which they were bound to furnish, but even frustrated the exertions of the British Government to procure them.

It appears, from the same incontrovertible testimony, that this failure in the payment of the stipulated tributes arose principally from the continual defalcations in the land-

trial of Mr. Hastings, and more recently, between the year 1799 and the close of the last Parliament. These last, which contain a vast body of evidence on this point, the reader may conveniently refer to in the volumes of the Asiatic Register.

rents, or revenues, * of the respective states, which the pernicious management, and the wasteful oppression of their domestic governments had produced ; but in some measure also, particularly in the Mohammedan states, to the jealous and hostile spirit which the tributary chiefs secretly cherished for all Europeans, and consequently for the English supremacy.

These causes, superadded to the evils inherent in a divided government, at length reduced the tributary states of our Indian empire to a condition so ruinous, that instead of being bulwarks of its security, according to the original purpose of the system of alliance, they were frequent sources of the most imminent dangers. A radical change of system, therefore, became essen-

* In India, a given per centage on the amount of land-rents constitutes the revenue of the state.

tial, not only to the well-being of the people of those states, and to the political existence of their native rulers, but also to the safety of the British empire in Hindûstan.

If then a change in our system of alliance with those vassal states was necessary from the single consideration of its inherent defects, and of the multiplied evils which had sprung from them, that necessity will appear much stronger, and still more urgent, when we look at the political situation of the independent sovereignties of Hindûstan, during the early part of Lord Wellesley's administration; at the prevailing principles and objects of their policy; at the improved state of their military strength and resources, under the direction of French officers, notoriously in the interest of the government of France, and therefore hostile to the English; and, above all, at the known views of that government respecting India, com-

bined with the system of intrigue, through which those views were sought to be promoted.

The Mohammedan state of Mysore had long been the most formidable enemy of the English nation in Hindûstan; and though its power had been considerably reduced at the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792, yet that reduction served only to imbitter the rancour, and stimulate the revenge of its sovereign, Tippoo Sultaun, against the British government. Aware of the hostile sentiments thus cherished by that prince, the Company's executive officers in India nevertheless endeavoured, by every practicable means, to conciliate his confidence, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit: whilst he, on the other hand, unremittingly, and strenuously, employed every artifice of intrigue, and exerted all the influence of a fanatical zeal, to unite all the Mohammedan

Sovereigns of Asia* in one general confederacy, for the purpose “ of expelling the British nation from India.”† In order to strengthen this confederacy, and to secure the most efficient means for the attainment of its object, he ardently solicited the active alliance, and military co-operation of France; and with this view, in April 1797, he actually transmitted letters to the Executive Directory at Paris, ‡ by a French officer

* See the instructions given by Tippoo Sultaun to the ambassadors, whom he deputed on a *special mission* to Zemaun Shah, king of Cabul, together with the secret correspondence between him and that prince.

Asiatic Ann. Regist. Vol. I. Chron. p. 196.

† Tippoo’s letter to the representatives of the people in the Isle of France.

Ibid. supra, State Papers, p. 215.

‡ *Vide* Tippoo’s letters to the Executive Directory; and the Articles of Engagement and Alliance which he pro-

in his own service; and deputed two ambassadors to the Mauritius. Those ambassadors were received by the governor of that island with every demonstration of friendly attachment; they obtained from him the strongest assurances of a perfect concurrence in the object of their mission; and a proclamation was accordingly issued, recommending a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo Sultaun.*

posed to France, for the express purpose of commencing a war of extermination against the English in India.

Ibid. supra. State Papers, pages 96, 97.

* See a copy of the proclamation issued by the Governor-general of the Isles of France and *La Re-Union*.

Asiatic Regist. State Papers, p. 237-8.

See also a letter from the same governor, to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 7th March, 1798.

Ibid. State Papers, p. 225, 6, 7.

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This negotiation between Tippoo Sultaun, and the French government, was discovered by Lord Wellesley soon after his arrival in India; and that discovery led to the developement of the other parts of that prince's scheme, for the destruction of the British power in the East.

The secret formation of this hostile project against a nation with whom he was at the same time maintaining, under the obligations of a treaty of peace, all the ostensible relations of amity and concord, to whose unexampled moderation, in the height of victory, he then owed his independence and power,* and against whose conduct, in peace, he had not even the *pretext* of a

* See the public dispatches of Marquis Cornwallis, giving an account of the operations of the campaign of 1792, in Mysore, and of the termination of the contest, by the peace of Seringapatam. *Printed by order of the House of Commons, in 1793.*

grievance to allege, affords the clearest demonstration, that the established maxim of Tippoo Sultaan's foreign policy was, to regard peace only as a means of providing more effectually for the successful prosecution of war, and to consider the primary object, and ultimate end of war, to be, if not always the total annihilation of the enemy, at least, the entire plunder and devastation of his country.

This general principle of policy, which was carried to its utmost height by the ambitious fanaticism and implacable resentment of Tippoo, prevails more or less in the councils of every Asiatic prince throughout the vast extent of the Moghul conquests; and, though it was moderated by the other Mohammedan governments of Hindûstan in proportion to their weakness, yet, fortified by the pious precept of the koran, "*that the highest merit in the sight of God, is to*

war against infidels," and actuated by the restless, turbulent, and profligate spirit by which they are uniformly characterized, it has rendered them the scourge of that devoted country.

Hence, the fervid exhortations of Tippoo to join his standard, in a *holy war against the English infidels*, were received by those governments with a correspondent feeling; and though the sensation which that feeling produced amongst the Mohammedan tributaries of the British empire in Hindustan was artfully dissembled at the time, yet subsequent events brought to light abundant evidence of its existence.* The same caution, however, was not observed by Vizier Ally, who had, in the beginning of 1798, been removed from the government of Oude, by Lord Teignmouth, on grounds both of

* See Asiatic Register, vol. 1, and 4, *State Papers*.

justice and expediency.* The antipathy which that youth manifested towards the English government during the short period of time in which he exercised the authority of Nabob of Oude, was naturally inflamed to the highest degree of exasperation after his dismissal from that dignity. These circumstances, together with the impetuous, revengeful, and sanguinary disposition he displayed in his massacre of Mr. Cherry, and the other English gentlemen at Benares, †

* See the minute of the Governor-general of Bengal, of the 13th of January, 1798, in which the reasons for displacing Vizier Ally are fully unfolded and explained; and from which the reader, unacquainted with Indian politics, will be able to form a very perfect notion of the nature of the relations between the British government and the tributary state of Oude.

Asiatic Register, vol. 1. State Papers.

† See an account of this massacre.

Asiatic Register, vol. Chronicle, p. 75.

at once procured him some adherents from amongst the mutinous soldiery of Oude, and recommended him to the anxious notice of Tippoo, as the fittest instrument for advancing his project in northern Hindûstan.

The malignant zeal of this infatuated youth against the English, was, indeed, fully commensurate to Tippoo's utmost wishes, and had, in fact, anticipated his views. Having eluded the pursuit of the British troops, after the massacre at Benares, he took refuge in the forests and mountains of Bhotwâl,* where he was joined by one or two refractory Zemindars, and several disaffected Mussulmans with their followers, amounting in all to about nine thousand men. With this numerous retinue, contemptible to be sure as soldiers, but formi-

* Bhotwâl is a small Hindû principality, situated between the province of Oude and the kingdom of Nypâl.

dable as a band of ruffians, made desperate by rebellion, thirst of revenge, and the prospect of plunder, Vizier Ally descended into the plains of Goorakpoor, which form the eastern frontier of Oude. In this position he kept the whole province in a state of continual agitation and alarm; whilst, at the same moment, Zemaun Shah, king of Cabul, had actually commenced his march, with a large army, in order to carry into execution his long-menaced design of wresting the Nabob's dominions from the authority of the English.

Zemaun Shah was sovereign of a powerful Mohammedan state, situated principally on the west side of the river Indus, but comprising the provinces of Lahore and Cashmier, which form the north-west frontier of Hindûstan, and which are from 300 to 400 miles' distance from Oude. This state was founded in 1740, by Ahmed Shah

Duranee, a warrior of great renown throughout Asia, who left to his successor Zemaun Shah, not only a numerous and well-disciplined army, but also the fame which that army had acquired under his command, in his several invasions of Hindûstan, and more particularly in his celebrated victory over the Mahrattas at Paniput. Along with these inheritances, Zemaun Shah possessed something of the enterprizing spirit, and all the ambition of his ancestor. The design of subjugating the state of Oude, and of extinguishing the Nabob's family, had *long* formed the *main object* of that prince's policy; and his inveterate hostility to the English power in Hindûstan had been *publicly* and *repeatedly* announced to all the nations of Asia.

He therefore embraced the propositions submitted to him by Tippoo with all the enthusiasm and alacrity which, in a mind

governed by such principles and views, so extensive a scheme of conquest and plunder may be supposed to inspire; and Tippoo, elated with the cordial union of so powerful an ally, exerted all his powers of dissimulation, and employed every stratagem of policy, which his subtle mind could devise, to conciliate the friendship, or at least to secure the neutrality of Scindiah, the Mahratta Prince, whose jealousy would naturally be excited by the march of Zemaun Shah into Hindûstan. Having succeeded in obtaining a promise of neutrality from Scindiah, he besought him to use his influence in the councils of the Peishwa (the supreme constituted authority of the Mahratta empire) to detach that prince from his alliance with the British government.

The triple alliance formed by Lord Cornwallis in 1790, between the British government, the Peishwa, and the Nizam of the

Deccan, had long been an object of the utmost jealousy, and a source of the greatest uneasiness to Tippoo. It was the main purpose of that alliance to preserve a balance against the power of Tippoo in the Deccan, and, through the supposed influence of the Peishwa over the other Mahratta Chieftains, as their acknowledged superior, to form a barrier against the designs of Zemaun Shah, in northern Hindûstan; and, though it proved of little productive efficiency during the Mysore war of 1791-2, it nevertheless operated, in the early part of the subsequent peace, as some impediment to the prosecution of Tippoo's project for the subversion of the British empire in India.

In 1795, the bond of reciprocal alliance between those three powers was dissolved by the Mahrattas, who, regardless of the existing treaty, and without any just cause, or any attempt to settle their pretended

grievance by previous explanation, suddenly commenced a war of aggression against the Nizam, according to the accustomed policy of Asiatic states. But, as the British government took no part whatever in that war, both those powers separately retained an ostensible alliance with the English.

As soon, therefore, as Tippoo had obtained the promised co-operation of Zemaun Shah, and the French, and the neutrality of Scindiah, he directed his machinations to effect the complete separation of the Nizam and the Peishwa from the British government, and even to prevent all friendly intercourse between them.

The state both of the Nizam's government, and of the Mahratta empire, was extremely favourable to the operation of those machinations. The councils of the Nizam were controlled by a party of

French officers whom he had retained in his service, to whom he had given the command of 14,000 of his best troops, who had openly displayed the standard of France in the vicinity of his capital, and who maintained a secret correspondence with Tippoo ; whilst, on the other hand, the existence of this prince's government was menaced by the known intentions, and occasional aggressions of Scindiah ; who, by the decisive sway which he had gained in the councils of the Peishwa, could at any time make that prince the instrument of his ambitious views on the dominions of the Nizam, without appearing himself to be any farther concerned in those views, than what belonged to his political situation as a feudatory of the Mahratta empire, bound to obey the commands of his superior.

The Mahratta empire had for some years been distracted by internal dissensions

partly arising from the peculiar nature of its anomalous constitution, but principally from the conflicting interests of its feudatory chieftains. The great object of contention amongst those chieftains, and the main spring of their policy, was the attainment of a paramount and exclusive influence in the councils of the Peishwa; and, at the period of time under review, that influence had been completely acquired by Scindiah, the most formidable potentate in Northern Hindûstan. That prince maintained this pre-eminence, by his extensive and populous dominions, by a powerful military establishment, formed and disciplined on the European system, and commanded by French officers, and by the circumstance of his holding in possession the person of the Moghul-Emperor, Shah Allum, together with the cities of Delhi and Agra, the ancient seats of the Moghul sovereignty and greatness. Hence, as a feudatory of the

Mahratta empire, the measures of his policy were recommended by the supreme authority of the Peishwa, whilst, as a prince of Hindûstan, they were ratified by the express sanction of the Moghul emperor, whose name still received from the prejudices of his Mohammedan subjects, something of that homage which they had formerly paid to his power.

The concurrence of Scindiah, therefore, in Tippoo's scheme for the extermination of the English in Hindûstan, was eminently essential to its success: and Scindiah, wholly unaware that the ultimate object of that scheme was the entire subjugation of every Hindû state, was induced to assent to it, from his own jealousy of the English power; from his natural love of war, plunder, and devastation; but, above all, from the hope that Holkar, his principal rival in the Mahratta empire, might, from his warlike and

predatory disposition, be led to engage in a general contest against the English dominions, and thereby withdraw his views from the politics of the Peishwa's court.

The animosity thus raised amongst the Princes of Hindûstan against the British government, by the artful and malevolent policy of Tippoo, was inflamed by the zealous influence of the French officers, whom those princes retained in their service.

The policy of introducing French officers into the armies of the native states, with a view to influence their councils, and to instigate them against the English, was originally begun by the ancient government of France, and was encouraged by these states, for the purpose of improving their military discipline, skill, and efficiency. Accordingly, the French brigades, in the service of the Nizam, which have been already no-

ticed, were first formed in 1750, by the direction of the celebrated Dupliex, then Governor of Pondicherry; and this establishment was uniformly countenanced by all the subsequent governors of that settlement. After the Revolution in France, it was joined by several French adventurers, who had fled from the civil convulsion of their country, but who carried into India those principles and opinions by which that convulsion had been produced: and on *Piron*, one of these adventurers, the command of this establishment had devolved, soon after Tippoo had commenced his secret correspondence with it.

The French establishment in the service of Scindiah was formed in 1784, by De Boigne,* to whose military enterprise and

* This officer has returned to Europe with a princely fortune; has allied himself in marriage to one of the

skill, that prince is indebted for a considerable part of his dominions. As the reward of his eminent services Scindiah granted him a *Jâedâd*, which is an assignment of the revenues of certain districts in the provinces he had conquered, for the support of his army; together with a *Jâgheer*, which is an assignment of the revenues of a district during life, * for his personal use. In addition to the great power which he derived from these grants, he had the sole command of the conquered provinces of Delhi, Agra, and part of the Dû-ab, and, consequently,

noble families of France who emigrated during the revolution; but *who returned with him to Paris in 1802, where they have since resided together.*

* According to the practice of the Moghul constitution, *Jâgheers* were for the most part *personal grants during life*, but on particular occasions they were made *perpetual and hereditary*. Whether De Boigne's grant was *during life*, or in *perpetuity*, I am not informed.

held in his charge the capital of the Moghul empire, and the person of the unfortunate Emperor. He derived further authority from the circumstance of Scindiah having induced the Emperor to constitute the Peishwa his Vakeel-ul-Mûlk, or Regent of the Empire, and to appoint himself the Regent's deputy : so that, by this means, the affairs of the provinces actually conquered from the Moghul, were still administered in his name ; and De Boigne's army was called the "*Imperial Army*," and himself a subject and servant of the Emperor

Hence De Boigne, in fact, possessed much of the power and authority of a sovereign prince : and on his departure to Europe, in the beginning of 1798, the whole of that power and authority was transferred to Monsieur Perron, a French officer of ability, who had long served under him, and who, at this period of time, was actually carrying

on a correspondence with the government of the Isle of France, with a view to the adoption of measures for supplying the French military establishments in the service of the Indian princes, with additional officers of experience and skill. In his own army, which consisted of 40,000 disciplined natives, there were already 300 Europeans; but of these, 30 were British subjects, whom he was, therefore, so eagerly solicitous to dismiss, that he could not conceal his wishes from them.*

The French officers who commanded corps in the service of Holkar, and in the armies of some of the minor chieftains in

* See an account of the *Rise, Progress, and Termination of the Regular Corps, formed and commanded by Europeans, in the Service of the native Princes of India*; by L. F. SMITH, late a Major in the service of Scinḍiah, page 47. Printed in Calcutta, 1805,—and reprinted for Stockdale.

Northern Hindûstan, all evinced the same decided partiality for their countrymen. This partiality no doubt arose, in many instances, from their patriotic prejudices; but it was dexterously employed, by the government of France, as an instrument of policy, the most effectual that could be contrived, for establishing a decisive influence in the councils of the native princes; and for gradually building up a French territorial and military power, with the nominal sanction of the Moghul Emperor, within the limits of the Mahratta dominions, and under the ostensible authority of Scindiah and the Peishwa.

That France, under all her rulers for these last sixty years, entertained the desire of establishing a territorial sovereignty on the continent of India, and thus of striking a blow against England through her possessions in that country, is abundantly known.

The adventurous spirit of Buonaparte at first led him to conceive, the practicability of transporting his army from Egypt to India, and thereby of accomplishing these objects, by one grand effort of military power. But the more prudent and much surer means I have mentioned were never lost sight of: and, after the fall of Tippoo Suldaun, and surrender of the French army in Egypt, they were reverted to with redoubled solicitude.

Such then was the state of the native sovereignties of Hindûstan, in their relations to the British government, at the commencement of Lord Wellesley's administration, and such was the powerful influence which had been obtained over them by the systematic and artful policy of France. That this state of things was pregnant with most serious danger to the British government cannot be denied: and the Reviewer will acknowledge, that those dangers greatly

augmented the *evils* and *difficulties* which he *has admitted* to exist, in the system of connection between that government and its tributaries. He will likewise find, in the cursory view which has been taken of the external policy of Indian states, that the public principles and conduct of the native princes is no way incompatible with his own delineation of their character. He will observe, “ that their policy is *little better than barbarous; and that their concerns of peace and war are managed,*” if not always by *victorious assassins,* at least “ by *consummate traitors, by experienced robbers, and by diplomatists less skilful at making, than at breaking treaties.*”*

But to be a little more particular in an inquiry of so much importance, and to

* Edinburgh Review, Number 18, p. 396, before quoted.

support the opinion of the Reviewer by other authorities, I shall cite a few passages from two writers who had the best opportunities of observing the character and policy of the native governments of India, and who have been praised by all competent judges for the minute accuracy and justness of their observations,

The native governments of India are of three different kinds; the Mohammedan states, the Mahratta states, and the Hindû Rajahships, which were formerly tributary to the Moghul empire. Of the Mohammedan government the following general character is given by Mr. Scrafton. “ The
 “ government of the *mussulmans* borders
 “ so near on anarchy, you would wonder
 “ how it keeps together. Here every man
 “ maintains as many armed men as the
 “ state of his finances will admit, and *the*
 “ *degree of submission is proportioned to*

“ *the means of resistance. The grand*
 “ *mystery of their politics is to foment*
 “ *dissention. Whenever any subject be-*
 “ *comes formidable by his wealth, or*
 “ *power, they prefer the silent execution of*
 “ *assassination, to that of public justice,*
 “ *lest a criminal, publicly arraigned, should*
 “ *prove as a standard for the seditious to*
 “ *repair to loyalty and patriotism;—those*
 “ *virtuous incentives to great and noble*
 “ *actions are here unknown; and when*
 “ *they cease to fear, they cease to obey.”—*
 * * * * * “ *Money is here, if I*
 “ *may so express myself, the essence of*
 “ *power: the soldiers know no other attach-*
 “ *ment than their pay;—so that the richest*
 “ *state is always the strongest.”**

The Mahratta governments exhibit a totally distinct character from that of other

* See Scrafton’s Reflections on the Governments of Hindûstan. Printed for T. Cadell, London, 1770.

Hindû states. The warlike and predatory spirit which contributed to form them, and by which alone their independance has been maintained, has nearly banished from some of the finest provinces in the Deccan all manufactures, commerce, and even agriculture, which, in former ages, flourished there in the highest perfection: * so that those governments, from the very principle both of their origin and existence, are alike destructive to the well-being of their own subjects, and to the tranquillity of neighbouring powers.

* See an account of the ancient Hindû city of Bijanagur, in the 15th century of the christian æra, translated from the original Persic of Khoudemis. *Asiat. Reg.* vol. 2. *Miscellaneous Tracts*, p. 227.

The impartiality of this account cannot be questioned. It was written by a Mohammedan historian, who derived his information from the ambassador of Mirza Shahrockh, a Mohammedan prince.

Mr. Tone, who lived twenty - eight years in the Mahratta states, and who latterly commanded a regiment in the service of the Peishwa, observes, “ That the principles of government in those states discover a mode of *thinking, as well as of acting, totally different from the systems of European policy.* The most striking and peculiar feature in the Mahratta government,” says Mr. Tone, “ is, *that the empire is always considered as in a state of war.* This results from the fluctuating state of its internal polity; from the recent acquisitions in Hindûstan, *held only by the sword*; and from the necessity of compelling the payment of the revenue, *always paid with reluctance, and for the most, extorted by actual force.* But, independent of these causes, *war and plunder are, with the Mahrattas, a source of revenue*; and the different Chiefs of the empire make *annual campaigns* in

“ the few districts which have not yet been
 “ brought into a *state of actual servitude*.

“ These military excursions are denomi-
 “ nated *Mul-uk-Gherè*, a compound of two
 “ Persian words—*Mul-uk*, territory, and
 “ *Gherè*, to *take possession of*.—* * * * *

“ The conquered provinces in Hindûstan,
 “ thus exhausted by continual depredations,
 “ are no longer able to furnish a single
 “ rupee. The *entire wealth* of this once-
 “ rich country is buried in the private trea-
 “ suries of the different Mahratta Chiefs,
 “ and *lost to all the purposes of circulation*.

“ So great is the scarcity of specie in the
 “ upper provinces, that Scindiah has been
 “ obliged to *extort money from the*
 “ *Peishwa's government*, for the payment
 “ of his immense armies. * * * * *

“ Upon the whole, I believe there is not
 “ on record an example of any government
 “ so little calculated to give protection to
 “ the subject. The system of the Mah-

“ rattas is *formed of rapacity, corruption,*
 “ *and instability.* To this source is to be
 “ ascribed the accumulated misery of the
 “ people—*oppression, poverty, and famine,*
 “ which last appears the *appropriated curse*
 “ of this country. * * * * * In a state
 “ like this, the great spur to industry, that
 “ of security, is taken away. The farmer
 “ who cultivates his grounds this year, is
 “ by no means sure of possessing them the
 “ next; or, if he should, some large de-
 “ tachment of troops may be quartered in
 “ his neighbourhood; and a Mahratta army
 “ is more indefatigable and destructive than
 “ myriads of locusts. The property of
 “ friends or enemies falls equally a prey
 “ to their undistinguishing depredations.
 “ Hence it is, that no man raises more than
 “ barely serves him; and the produce of
 “ the year is just equivalent to its con-
 “ sumption. The consequence is, that, as
 “ there are no public granaries, the first

“ scarcity of rain, or too great a fall, pro-
 “ duces a famine; the inhabitants abandon
 “ their fields, and either fly to the coast, or
 “ to some other place, where the scarcity
 “ has prevailed less. This new accession
 “ produces a famine there, and the evil be-
 “ comes universal. It is at this period
 “ that the traveller beholds the greatest of
 “ all human miseries—hunger, nakedness,
 “ disease; and death; the streets strewn
 “ with carcasses, the highways with skele-
 “ tons, and every countenance the picture
 “ of misery, wretchedness, and despair.
 “ It is owing to the frequency of this
 “ dreadful calamity, that the Mahrattas are
 “ total strangers to charity; and possess an
 “ insensibility of heart with which other
 “ nations are unacquainted. * * * * *
 “ It is no uncommon circumstance for large
 “ cities, in time of famine, to lose three-
 “ fourths of their inhabitants. *Frequently*
 “ *whole districts are swept away,* and for

“ years remain a desert. * * * Thus, be-
 “ tween an indolence in the people, and
 “ a rapacity in the governments, famine
 “ is the prime curse of this country. Yet,
 “ incredible as it may seem, no provisions
 “ are ever made against it. But, that *the*
 “ *fault is not in the peasantry may be seen*
 “ *by turning to Bengal, which, enjoying a*
 “ *steady and permanent administration, has*
 “ *not seen a famine since the year 1770,*
 “ *although every other part of India has*
 “ *been frequently visited by it since that*
 “ *period.*” * Such is the picture drawn of
 the Mahratta governments by this sensible
 and intelligent writer, who lived under
 them for so many years.

The small Hindû Rajahships, or princi-
 palities, which still exist in different parts of

* Illustrations of some Institutions of the Mahratta
 People, by Wm. H. Tone, Esq. Asiatic Register, vol. 1.
 Miscellaneous Tracts, p. 121.

Hindûstan, though tainted with those vicious principles of policy which the Moghul government, but still more the Mussulman usurpations that rose on its ruins, diffused throughout the country; yet they nevertheless retain something of that mildness, simplicity, temperance, and moderation, which formed the characteristic features of the ancient Hindû states, before their subjection by the Mohammedan arms. The character of these governments is founded on the restrictive principles of their religious and civil institutions; and corresponds with the genius and manners of the Hindû people.

It is owing to their mixed system of theology and jurisprudence, interwoven as it is with all their customs, and with their whole domestic œconomy, that the Hindû race have been able to preserve so much of their original character of patience, tem-

perance, and forbearance, together with those industrious habits, and that love of the peaceful arts, which the Grecian historians first described, which our best modern travellers have confirmed, and which the personal knowledge of the highest authorities on this subject has verified. These qualities are, it is true, debased by their rooted avarice, and by that knavery and cunning which they betray in all their mercantile transactions; whilst some of their religious rites, and some of their occasional practices, seem to indicate a sanguinary and revengeful disposition. In spite, however, of these exceptions, the modern Hindûs, who form nine-tenths of the inhabitants of India, are unquestionably a peaceful and industrious people; susceptible of friendly attachment to those who respect their religious prejudices and ancient customs; and seldom roused into enmity, except when these rights, which they hold sacred, are infringed, or disregarded.

“ Whatever opinion,” says Sir William Jones, “ may be formed of Menu and his
 “ laws, in a country happily enlightened by
 “ sound philosophy and the only true reve-
 “ lation, *it must be remembered*, that those
 “ laws are *actually revered as the word of*
 “ the MOST HIGH, by nations of great im-
 “ portance to the political and commercial
 “ interests of Europe, and particularly by
 “ many millions of Hindûs, whose well-
 “ directed industry would add largely to the
 “ wealth of Britain, and *who ask no more*
 “ *in return than protection for their persons*
 “ *and places of abode, justice in their tem-*
 “ *poral concerns, indulgence to the preju-*
 “ *dices of their own religion, and the benefit*
 “ *of those laws which they have been*
 “ *taught to believe sacred, and which alone*
 “ *they can possibly comprehend.*” *

* See the Preface to the Ordinances of Menu, translated from the original Sanscrit by Sir William Jones.

Having thus endeavoured to give the reader a just notion of the different political circumstances, characters, principles, and views of the governments and nations to whom the policy of Lord Wellesley was applied; I shall now proceed to explain what that policy actually is; so that it may at once be seen, whether or not it is adapted to those governments and nations, and therefore calculated to diffuse amongst them “ *general benefit and satisfaction*, and to “ *strengthen the authority and influence* of “ the British nation in Hindûstan.”

The right of every state to provide for its own security, both by repelling actual dangers, and by adopting measures of prevention against those which it has good reason to apprehend, is derived from the law of nature, and recognized by the practice, as well as by the principles, of all civilized nations. The recognition of this

right implies, that the means by which it is to be enforced should be perfectly adapted to the nature of the existing and apprehended evils, and fully adequate to remove and to prevent them. The executive government, therefore, of every state is under the highest political obligation to observe and to judge when this right ought to be put in force, and to see that the means by which it is exercised are as effectual as the circumstances of the case will admit: for the employment of insufficient means, where the object is to secure the well-being and happiness, and it may be, the lives and property of many millions of people, would not only be irrational, but highly criminal.

This general and acknowledged right acquires additional authority when it is to be exercised within the limits, and under the circumstances, to which the *law of neighbourhood* extends. “This law,” says

Mr. Burke, “ is founded on the principle, that no use should be made of a man’s liberty of operating on his property, from whence a detriment may justly be apprehended by his neighbour :”—a principle no less true of nations in political society, than of individual men in civil life. It bestows on both an *obligation to know*, and a *right to prevent*, any damage or injury which either may have sufficient reason to fear, from the *general conduct*, the *particular actions*, or the *evident intentions*, of a neighbour. But the *right of vicinage*, though resting on the same general principle of equity, both in civil and in political society, is at the same time much stronger and more obligatory amongst nations than individuals;—not merely because a community is of more importance than a single person, but because there being amongst states no constituted judge, neighbours must themselves take cognizance of each others acts, and deter-

mine upon them, *vicini, vicinorum facta, presumuntur scire.**

Hence, if there be any where a nation, surrounded by neighbouring states which exist only under arbitrary and changeable institutions, totally distinct and opposite in their nature from all the acknowledged principles of moral and political science, and which are at the same time governed by men of a turbulent, restless, and mischievous disposition; *some* of whom make it the main spring of their policy to “*excite and foment disunion in all governments,*” with a view to profit by the disorder which it may create,—and *others* consider themselves “*always in a state of*

* *Vide Domat's Civil and Public Law; tom. I. liv. iii.*—from which Mr. Burke has taken the principles of his admirable and conclusive reasoning on this subject, in his *First Letter on a Regicide Peace.*

“ *war, because war is with them a source of revenue,*”—that nation has a clear and unquestionable right to take cognizance of *all* the actions of *such neighbours*, and to employ means of security against the accumulated injuries, which those actions conspire to produce, proportioned to the degree of danger; and adapted to restrain the destructive policy which assails her safety, as well as to fortify her own relative situation. If that nation, in addition to the general danger arising from such neighbours, should observe manifest indications of their forming an hostile combination against her, whilst she possessed satisfactory evidence of their being powerfully instigated to such hostility, by the *subjects* of a *great rival state, who commanded their armies, and domineered in their councils*;—and if, moreover, that great rival state was at the same moment waging against her, (though in another part of the world) *a war of the*

most inveterate malignity, and aiming at her destruction by every means which the most ingenious hatred could devise, or the most audacious enterprize employ,—then the rights of *security and of vicinage* become not merely a matter of political prudence, or expediency, but of absolute necessity. Hence the British government in India, which, at the commencement of Lord Wellesley's administration was precisely in this situation in respect to the neighbouring states, adapted the measures of its policy to the extraordinary circumstances of that situation, and to the peculiar character of those states.

That those measures were completely effectual for their primary purpose of averting the dangers that menaced the government, is proved by the fact of those dangers being removed: that they were also justified by their entire adaptation to the

genius and character of the surrounding states, will no less clearly appear.

The principle of *defensive subsidiary alliance*, upon which the foreign policy of Lord Wellesley's administration proceeded, and by which all its measures were therefore governed, had long before been acted on by the Company's governments in India, with the express approbation of the constituted authorities in England, and had proved the best and most effectual security of our Indian dominions, against the aggressive and predatory system of the native powers. In the administration of Lord Cornwallis this principle had been extended, by the conclusion of some treaties, which *promised* the most beneficial effects at the time, and which actually produced some partial and temporary good. But these treaties had all been frustrated in their operation, by the fluctuating and pernicious policy of the

native states; and by the principle on which they were grounded not being carried to that extent, which was necessary to repress that policy, and by which alone the dissolute and lawless spirit of those who acted on it could be effectually curbed.

Lord Cornwallis had also tried the experiment of introducing the principle of European alliances into Indian politics, by the conclusion of the triple alliance already mentioned between the British government, the Nizam, and the Peishwa. But the confessed and palpable inefficiency of that treaty whilst it existed in force, and the circumstance of its premature dissolution, by a war of aggression commenced against the Nizam by the Peishwa, at the head of the Mahratta states, furnishes the most irrefragable and satisfactory proof, of the total inapplicability of that principle to the genius, character, and circumstances of Indian states.

Lord Wellesley, therefore, with the experience before him, both of the acknowledged inefficiency of the subsisting treaties of defensive alliance, and of the total failure of the triple alliance formed by Lord Cornwallis, was called on to exercise the *rights of security and of vicinage*, under the critical circumstances which have been stated; and to provide means suited to the nature, and commensurate with the magnitude of the dangers that threatened his government, for repelling actual injuries, and for ensuring the safety of the British Indian empire, on the most enlarged view of its interests and dignity. He therefore resolved to modify and extend the *understood and established principle of subsidiary alliance*, and to frame upon it a regular system of defensive policy; which, by the preponderating protecting power of the British government, would effectually exclude the influence of France from the councils of the native states,

would preserve those states in their relative situations, and, by checking the ruling passion of their chiefs for war and plunder, would gradually establish general tranquillity, and thereby enable the peasantry of those distracted countries to cultivate their ancient habits of industry and peace.

Accordingly, after the destruction of the French party in the Nizam's dominions, and the subversion of the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, both of which received the most unqualified and universal approbation, Lord Wellesley turned his attention to the reformation of the defective system of connection between the British government and its tributaries, and to the improvement of its subsisting relations with the sovereign states of Hindûstan.

In order to accomplish these objects, it became necessary to form new compacts

with those tributaries, and to enter into fresh treaties of alliance with those states. In making these arrangements, the *long-established and approved principle* of subsidiary alliance was strictly adhered to, but it was modified by the *commutation of subsidy for territory*.

The prevailing defect in the former system of connection between the British government and its tributaries, and that which gave birth to many of its other evils, was a *divided government*. But by commuting the tribute which those vassal chiefs were, by their former compacts, bound to pay, for *adequate portions of territory*, that division in the government, so much and so justly complained of, has been completely abolished. The new arrangements, therefore, are equally beneficial to both parties. They have conferred on the tributaries many important advantages. The nature of their

obligations to the British government are now *clearly defined*. Instead of being bound to the payment of a tribute, which necessarily fluctuated according to the political contingencies of the empire, the full extent of their pecuniary engagements is now precisely fixed, by a permanent territorial cession. Whilst, on the other hand, the British government now commands its own means of security in those dependant states, without the necessity of having recourse to those frequent measures of constraint, in order to enforce payment of the arrears of tribute, which, being in their nature vexatious, were so much calculated to wound the feelings, and thereby to estrange the respect and confidence of the native chiefs. In those dependencies where the chiefs had been allowed to retain military establishments of their own, the new arrangements were productive of further mutual advantage to the contracting parties,

by the reduction of these establishments, which the Reviewer admits “ *to have been mutinous, ill paid, inefficient, and alarming to their own leaders,*” and which the whole evidence on this point now before the House of Commons, proves to have been sources of perpetual tumult and disorder, of danger to the internal governments, and of impoverishment the most distressing, and oppression the most cruel, to the ruined and miserable peasantry of those devoted states. The dissolution of such establishments, therefore, and the introduction of the Company’s disciplined native troops in their stead, could not fail to be reciprocally useful to the British government, and the chiefs of those states, as well as eminently conducive to the welfare, quiet, and happiness of their people: Whilst in the territories which have been ceded to the Company, in commutation of tribute, the introduction of the permanent

revenue settlement, of the whole code of civil regulations, and of the pure and uniform administration of justice according to the Hindû and Mohammedan laws, as established in the British provinces, is calculated not only to give entire satisfaction to the great bulk of the inhabitants of those territories, but likewise to inspire them with sentiments of attachment to that government, which has at once rescued them from such indescribable misery, and conferred on them such unexpected blessings. That extending to their territories the civil regulations, and the system of jurisprudence which has been established in the provinces of Bengal and Behar, will be felt by the people as real and substantial blessings,—must be at once admitted by every one who shall consider, that, under their native rulers, the fruits of their labour were exposed to continual public exaction, and private plunder, without the chance of obtaining a remission of the

one, or legal redress for the other; and that, under the British government, they were assured, from the known example of the neighbouring provinces, that the land-rents would be reduced to a moderate and fixed standard, and that both their property and their persons would be protected by the firm and due administration of their ancient laws.

Thus it appears, that the new arrangements which have been made with the tributaries of the British government are equally adapted to their characters and circumstances, and to the genius and disposition of their people; and that they are, therefore, “*likely to diffuse general satisfaction, as well as to strengthen the authority and influence of the British nation in Hindûstan.*”

These arrangements were extended to all

the British dependencies, except the Carnatic; which state, in consequence of particular circumstances which shall be hereafter related, became *legally forfeited* to the Company, and was, therefore, annexed to the British dominions, as an integral part of the empire.

The new treaties which were concluded with the sovereign princes of Hindûstan by Lord Wellesley's government, were all founded on the improved principle of defensive subsidiary alliance; which, by ceding territory in payment of subsidy, enabled the British government to afford effectual protection to those princes; and to secure them, as well from domestic faction, as from their constant predatory aggressions on each other, and from the intriguing influence of France, without subjecting the Company to the *uncertain payments of subsidy by the treasuries of Mohammedan or Mahratta*

courts, and without incurring the smallest expense to the Company.

It must be obvious from what has been already said of the nature, character, and habits of the Indian governments, and of the influence which France incessantly sought to obtain over them, that the preservation of such governments in their relative situations, and the complete exclusion of French influence from them, were essential to the general tranquillity of Hindûstan, and therefore, to the safety of the British dominions in that country. And it must be equally obvious, from the review which has been taken of those matters, that these objects could alone be secured, by protecting the least powerful of those governments from the violent and lawless ambition with which the others were animated.

The dissolution of the triple alliance

formed by Lord Cornwallis, by the unprovoked and sudden irruption of the Mahrattas into the Nizam's dominions, under the authority of the Peishwa, proved, that the peace of India, and the relative situation of its different states, could not be preserved on the principles of that treaty; that the power of the Nizam *could no longer exist without permanent foreign protection*; and that it would inevitably be subverted by the Mahrattas, unless the British government interfered, *in the most effectual manner*, to prevent it. As, therefore, the peace of India, and the consequent safety of some of the British provinces, in a certain degree, depended on the Mahrattas being prevented from annexing the Nizam's dominions to their own overgrown empire; and as it is evident, from the great disparity in the relative strength of these powers, combined with the known views and dispositions of the Mahrattas, as well as with

their subsequent conduct, that nothing could have deterred them from the execution of their project, but a British military force, *permanently stationed* in the Nizam's country, the policy of a treaty of defensive subsidiary alliance and protection with that prince, appears to have been strictly adapted to the nature of his government, and to the circumstances in which it was placed.

The situation of the Mahratta empire, on the other hand, affords a justification equally strong, of the treaty of defensive subsidiary alliance and protection which was concluded between the British government and the Peishwa.

It has been shewn, that the authority of the Peishwa was, at the period of time under review, subject to the rival influence of Scindiah and Holkar, who aimed at the prosecution of their own ambitious views,

under the ostensible sanction of the constituted head of the Mahratta empire. The influence of Scindiah, however, preponderated; and Holkar, in 1802, had recourse to arms, defeated the united forces of Scindiah and the Peishwa; took possession of the Peishwa's capital, from whence that prince fled to the British territories for protection; and finally elevated a creature of his own to the high office and dignities of the Peishwa. At this critical period all the parties engaged in these dissensions *actually solicited the interference* of the British government; and, as it was clearly the policy of the British government to prevent the authority of the Peishwa from being usurped by either of the rival chiefs, this appeal afforded the most favourable opportunity of renewing our alliance with the Peishwa, on a basis calculated to render it solid and lasting; and of offering, on the strength of that alliance, our *mediation* in the existing

differences. The treaty of Bassein was accordingly concluded, and the Peishwa restored to his authority, under the protection of the British power. That his authority can alone be supported by such protection from the violence of the contending chiefs is evident, from the bare facts which have been stated. That the preservation of his authority was necessary to the security of the British dominions, both as a check to the ambitious characters and views of Holkar and Scindiah, and as a balance against the combined power of Scindiah and the French establishment in Hindûstan,—will appear no less evident, when it is considered, that if the councils of the Peishwa were swayed by Holkar, the territories of our ally the Nizam, and the conquered provinces in the Mysore, would be plundered and laid waste, by the desperate depredations of that enterprising and dauntless spoiler ; and that, if the authority of the Peishwa was under

the influence of Scindiah and the French party, not only the British provinces in the Deccan, but those in Hindûstan, would be exposed to the restless and insatiable ambition of that prince, as well as to the known designs of Monsieur Perron, stimulated by the enmity, and supported by the promised co-operation, of France.

The wars which subsequently took place between the British government and those chiefs, have been attributed, by the perverted reason of some men, and by the simple ignorance of others, to the treaty of defensive alliance with the Peishwa. But in truth those wars, together with the negotiations that preceded, the successes that attended, and the consequences that followed them, supply the most decisive testimony of the wise policy of this treaty, which the human judgment can require in favour of any compact between two states, by shew-

ing, practically, the substantial benefits which both the contracting parties derived from it. On the one hand, it furnished the British government with additional means of detecting the hostile schemes of the confederated chieftains, and with great additional resources for prosecuting the war against them to a speedy and successful termination. On the other hand, it proved to the Peishwa the complete ability of his ally to protect his dominions and his dignities from the continual spoliations and insults of his rapacious and domineering feudatories, and, consequently, the complete security in which he might thenceforward enjoy the possession of his government, and thereby cultivate the best and lasting interests of himself and his people. The solid advantages which the treaty thus conferred on the Peishwa, he has himself acknowledged, with abundant expressions of satisfaction.

The aversion which other powers may be supposed to feel to a treaty *mutually beneficial and satisfactory* to the contracting parties, can never be used as an argument against its policy, unless the *just* rights and interests of such powers be affected by it. Now, in this case, we have the explicit declaration of the confederated chieftains, the most interested spectators of the treaty between the British government and the Peishwa, “ THAT IT CONTAINED NO STIPULATIONS INJURIOUS TO THEIR JUST RIGHTS —AND THAT THEY HAD, THEREFORE, NO OBJECTIONS TO OFFER AGAINST IT.”

As to the policy of this treaty, therefore, in regard to the neighbouring states, the true question is, whether greater danger was to be apprehended to the British interests from the power of the Mahratta chieftains, combined under the authority of the Peishwa, with the hostile views which it has

been stated they entertained, or from the increased dislike which those princes may be imagined to have felt for the British government, at having rescued the authority and dominions of the Peishwa from their gripe, and thereby put a stop to their unjust pretensions?—This question is at once satisfactorily answered by the fact, that our alliance with the Peishwa put us in possession of a *positive source of power*, which, without that alliance, would infallibly have been turned against us in war, and, through the intrigues of French emissaries, would always have been an object of serious alarm in peace. And this *positive source of power*, under the direction of the British government, instead of being at the absolute disposal of warlike and ambitious chiefs, must greatly counterbalance any augmented degree of dislike or jealousy in those chiefs, with which the alliance between that government and the Peishwa can be supposed to have inspired them.

Of the treaties of *alliance and protection* which have been concluded with Guikwar the Mahratta prince, with the Nabob of Surat, and with some minor Hindû chiefs in upper Hindûstan, it is only necessary to observe, that they are all founded on the same general principle of *ceding territory in payment of subsidy*; and that, as those chiefs are thereby effectually secured against the rapine and devastation with which they were *annually visited** by their more powerful neighbours, Holkar and Scindiah, “*who consider war as a source of revenue,*” † it is not possible to conceive, but that they feel their connection with the British government satisfactory to their minds, because it is palpably beneficial to their interests.

* Vide Toone’s Illustrations of the Institutions of the Mahratta People, before quoted.

† Ibid.

With respect to the wars which took place in India, under Lord Wellesley's administration, the Reviewer asserts roundly, "that they were kindled by the British cabinet in that country." This is one of those general assertions in which he so frequently indulges, and which therefore he no doubt thinks well adapted to convey information to the "*bulk of his readers,*" whose general ignorance of the affairs of India he so justly laments, and so strikingly describes. I trust, however, he will forgive me, for descending a little to particulars on this point,—*perspicuitatis gratiá*;—and for venturing to contradict his assertion, on the authority of persons, who, from local opportunities of knowing the origin of the wars in question, will be considered more satisfactory evidence than even the omniscience of a Reviewer.

In regard to the causes of the Mysore

war, I beg to place the written declarations of Tippoo Suldaun, the late sovereign of that country, against the assertions of the Reviewer,—in the letter of that prince to the representatives of the people, in the Isles of France and Reunion, written in the Persic language in his own hand, under his own signature, and dated from his capital of Seringapatam, the 2d of April, 1797. In this letter are the following passages:—

“ Happy moment, the time is come,
 “ when I can deposit in the bosom of my
 “ friends, the *hatred which I bear against*
 “ *the English*. If you will *assist me, in a*
 “ *short time*, not an *Englishman shall re-*
 “ *main in India*. You have the power and
 “ the means of effecting it, by your free
 “ negroes. With these new citizens (much
 “ dreaded by the English) joined to your
 “ troops of the line, we will *purge India*
 “ *of these villains*. *The springs which I*

“ *have touched have put all India in motion.*
 “ *My friends are ready to fall on the*
 “ *English. For every thing rely on my*
 “ *discretion.*”

“ As soon as the French army shall have
 “ embarked, *I engage* to march with my
 “ troops, which shall, in the first instance,
 “ consist of 30,000 cavalry, and 30,000
 “ infantry and artillery, well disciplined,
 “ with arms and ammunition, and every
 “ thing necessary *for the success of our en-*
 “ *terprize against the English.*”*

This letter was written at a period of time, when Tippoo was at perfect peace with the

* This letter, together with others, to the governor of the Isle of France, the executive directory of France, Zemaun Shah the king of Cabul, &c. all breathing the same sentiments of vengeance against the British government, and all announcing the same hostile design,—will be found translated in the first volume of the Asiatic Register.

British government. In conformity, therefore, with the established rules observed by nations under such circumstances, the Governor-general, (as soon as he was apprized of the hostile intentions, which, in the spirit of the sentiments contained in this letter, Tippoo had manifested towards the British government by various acts, and by great military preparations, of which the history is contained in the printed documents laid before Parliament relative to the war in Mysore,) formally demanded from that prince satisfaction and security for his direct and unprovoked violation of the subsisting treaties of peace between him and the British government. To this demand Tippoo returned only the most evasive and hypocritical answers, full of expressions of friendship for the English nation; but, at the same time, *not denying the fact* of his hostile intentions and preparations, in conjunction

with the Governor of the Isle of France, and with Zemaun Shah. *

The British government therefore had no option left, but either to wait until Tippoo should have completed all his preparations, and the expected French force from the Mauritius should have effected a junction with him, or to embrace the most favourable moment of seeking in arms for that satisfaction and security, which had been refused to its just demand. The result is well known: the dominions of Tippoo were invaded by a British army, who drove him within the walls of his capital; but still pertinaciously refusing all terms of accommodation, his capital was attacked; he

* See the Correspondence between Tippoo Sultaun and the Governor-general of Bengal.—Asiatic Register, Vol. I. State papers, p. 70, 71, 72, &c.

himself fell in its defence; and his whole country was subdued.

Thus it appears, on the express testimony of Tippoo Suldaun, that the Mysore war of 1799, was not, as the Reviewer asserts, “*Kindled by the English Cabinet,*” but *by that prince himself!* And the justice and necessity of that war is, by the same testimony, rendered strikingly manifest. The opinion of the Reviewer is also contrary to that of both Houses of Parliament. An unanimous vote of both houses (passed on the 4th October, 1799) declared the war against Tippoo to have been just and necessary.*

The various circumstances which gave rise to the war between the British go-

* See Asiatic Annual Register, 1799, Vol. 1. Proceedings in Parliament. p. 122, &c.

vernment and the Mahratta princes, Scindiah and Bhoonsla, are stated, with all the plainness and distinctness of truth, in the numerous public dispatches of the British residents at the courts of Scindiah and the Peishwa. * Those circumstances *all concur* to prove, that that war was “*kindled*” by Scindiah. But, as upon the Reviewer’s principle of “*NUMERUS auget suspicionem,*” his distrust of the fact may possibly increase in proportion to the number of proofs adduced in its support, I shall confine my refutation of his *assertion* to the *single* evidence of Scindiah himself.

It has been already mentioned, that Scindiah, as one of the parties engaged in the

* See these dispatches in the papers laid before the House of Commons, relative to the war with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; to be found in the Asiatic Register for 1804.—*State Papers, &c.*

convulsions at Poonah, in October 1802, had *earnestly solicited* the *active interference* of the British government; that the British government accordingly did interfere; and that the result was, the conclusion of the treaty, of Bassien, and the consequent re-establishment of the Peishwa in his authority. It has also been mentioned, that both Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had explicitly declared, that the treaty “*contained* “*no stipulations injurious to their JUST* “*RIGHTS; and that they, therefore, had no* “*objections to make to it.*” *

But though Scindiah found it impossible to object to a treaty, which, so far from trenching on any of the *just rights* and *pri-*

* This declaration was made to Colonel Collins, the British Resident at Scindiah's court, *by Scindiah himself*. Vide Col. Collin's public dispatches, Asiatic Register, Vol. 6.

vileges of any of the Mahratta feudatories, did, in fact, contain a distinct and positive stipulation to protect them, he, nevertheless, considered, that a time in which the British government was occupied in the execution of a measure adopted at his own *earnest solicitation*, presented too advantageous an opportunity to be omitted, for carrying into effect his long-meditated design on the Nizam's dominions, as well as his rapacious desire of ravaging and subduing the British provinces in Hindûstan.* Actuated by

* Such an instance of treachery may not obtain credit with certain gentlemen in parliament, whose anti-patriotic prejudices blind them to every thing that is bad in the characters of the princes of India, and to every thing that is good in the conduct of their countrymen, but it cannot possibly be doubted by the Reviewer, who himself declares, "that he can hardly believe a MAHRATTA " *would make such scruple of employing a dagger to effect the " important object of completely disjointing and confounding a " hostile army.*" Ed. R. No. 18, p. 399.

these motives, he reconciled his differences with his rival, Holkar, as soon as he found the British government engaged in the restoration of the Peishwa; and formed a confederacy with Bhoonsla, (in which Holkar *promised* to join) with a view to execute his hostile project in the most effectual manner. To strengthen this confederacy, he solicited the services of a few chiefs in Northern Hindûstan, of some influence, and of considerable military reputation. One of these chiefs, however, preferred the friendship of the English government to his; and, therefore, upon receiving two letters from Scindiah, one addressed to himself, the other to Gholaum Mohammed Khan, the Rohilla Chieftain, he transmitted them both to Mr. Leycester, the English Collector of Moradabad, by whom they were forwarded to Government. These letters are written in the Persic language; and in both the sentiments and language are nearly the same.

Their genuineness has never been questioned in India ; and all the other evidence on this important subject corroborate the information they contain.

I shall transcribe the letter addressed by Scindiah to Gholam Mohammed Khan, from the translation of the Persian Secretary to the Bengal Government.

“ As our magnanimity is ever disposed to
 “ perpetuate and strengthen the foundations
 “ of the dominion of rulers and chieftains,
 “ whose characters are distinguished by
 “ justice and good faith, the information of
 “ your exile from your native country has
 “ been a constant source of concern to me,
 “ and it was our wish and desire, that you
 “ should be restored to the possession of
 “ your hereditary dominions: but all things
 “ depend on their appointed season, and
 “ this desire has hitherto remained unac-

“ accomplished. Now, however, the deter-
“ mined resolution of extirpating that un-
“ principled race, the English, has been
“ adopted, from seeing their faithless con-
“ duct: and my army, with this intention,
“ advanced from Boorhanpoor towards the
“ place where that devoted band has taken
“ up its position. Accordingly, my victo-
“ rious troops, in number like ants and
“ locusts, that is to say, ten formidable bri-
“ gades, a train of artillery, consisting of
“ 500 guns, and 200,000 cavalry, are in
“ attendance. Please God, in a very short
“ period of time, the foundations of the
“ fortune of that unprincipled race, the
“ English, shall be overthrown, and they
“ shall be expelled from the Deccan, and
“ annihilated. Moreover, General Perron
“ has been directed to cross the Ganges,
“ with the brigade under his command,
“ and the cavalry in the service of the Sircar,
“ and with a body of Seiks, to take pos-

“ *session of all the territory occupied by*
 “ *the unprincipled race, the English, and*
 “ *not to leave a vestige of that tribe; whilst*
 “ *the cavalry of other formidable armies of*
 “ *the Sircar, stationed at different places,*
 “ *proceed from Culpee, and also from Bun-*
 “ *delkund, to invade the territory of the*
 “ *English on every side: And, taking ad-*
 “ *vantage of a favourable opportunity, an-*
 “ *nihilate the whole tribe, and to restore to*
 “ *their hereditary possessions all the chiefs*
 “ *of Hindûstan, who shall join the cause of*
 “ *the Sircar in eradicating the foundations*
 “ *of the unprincipled race.—Whereas, ad-*
 “ *verting to your ancient dominion, your*
 “ *restoration to your hereditary territory is*
 “ *an object in view, it is written with the*
 “ *pen of regard; that immediately on the*
 “ *receipt of this letter, you should proceed*
 “ *to assemble as many troops as possible,*
 “ *and to invade the territory of the English*
 “ *with the utmost expedition, and employ*

“ *your exertions in co-operating with General*
 “ *ral Perron, in offensive measures. General*
 “ *Perron has been written to on this subject.*
 “ *Do you act in conformity to his sugges-*
 “ *tions : Please God, all will be well ! It*
 “ *is incumbent on you, with the utmost*
 “ *firmness, to devote your mind to the ob-*
 “ *ject of co-operating with the Sircar, and*
 “ *to fulfil the obligations of attachment.*
 “ *My satisfaction, and your confirmation in*
 “ *your ancient dominions, will depend on*
 “ *the degree in which you conform to the*
 “ *above-written suggestions.*”

At the time this letter was communicated to the British government, the armies of Scindiah and Bhoonsla had formed a junction on the frontiers of the Nizam's dominions ; which dominions, the reader will bear in mind, the British government was bound by treaty to protect. These circumstances, combined with the repeated de-

clarations of Scindiah to the English resident at his camp, that *he had no cause of complaint either against the English or the Nizam*,* would have amply justified the English government, not merely in requiring the immediate separation of the confederate armies, but also in demanding from Scindiah an adequate security against those hostile intentions, of which his letter to Gholaum Mohammed had afforded positive proof. But the English government, from an evident desire to avoid war, *did not proceed to the full extent* of this, its most unquestionable right. The measures which were adopted, were entirely of a defensive nature; they plainly speak for themselves; and are, therefore, the best evidence of their own justification.

* See Col. Collins's public dispatches, in the papers relative to the Mahratta war, printed by the House of Commons.

An army of observation was ordered to advance towards the confederates, and to prevent their further progress on the frontier of our ally; whilst the resident at Scindiah's camp was directed to demand, on the part of the British government, *the separation of the combined Mahratta armies, and the return of each within the limits of their own respective countries*; and at the same time to declare, that at the same moment when this demand should be complied with, the British army of observation should *likewise retire within the British dominions in the Deccan*.

After much evasive discussion and equivocation with the resident, in consequence of this demand, the confederates at last conveyed their final answer to General Wellesley, commander of the British army, in a letter from Bhoonsla. In this answer they *refuse to separate their armies*; but propose

to retire “*united*” to Boorhanpoor, a city belonging to Scindiah, on the *same day* on which the British army, after *separating into three divisions*, should have reached the stations of Bombay, Seringapatam, and Madras. The meaning and drift of this proposition of the confederate chieftains, will be more clearly understood, when it is known that Boorhanpoor, to which the Mahratta armies were to retire, “*united*,” was only distant *fifty-eight miles* from the position they then occupied; while, on the other hand, Bombay was distant *three hundred and twenty-one miles*, Seringapatam *five hundred and forty miles*, and Madras *one thousand and twenty-five miles*, from the position then occupied by the British army. So that the confederates consented to withdraw their “*united*” army *fifty-eight miles* from the frontier of the Nizam, on the condition that the British army would *separate*, and retire to stations *so distant*

from that frontier, as to *preclude the practicability of re-assembling for its protection*, until they should have had sufficient time to accomplish their *original purpose* of effecting a complete conquest of the Nizam's dominions.

Hence it is indisputable, that the Maharratta chieftains were irrevocably determined on war; and that the British government, therefore, had no other means left, either of maintaining its rights, or of securing its safety, but by that appeal to arms which necessity equally justified and enjoined. *Justum est bellum, quibus necessarium; et pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes.* *

The details of the war which followed, its comprehensive plan, its brilliant achieve-

* Livy, lib. 9.

ments, and its triumphant termination, have long been before the public, and need not, therefore, be dwelt on here. It is only necessary to observe, that in the same forbearing spirit with which it was commenced, many of its most important conquests were relinquished at the conclusion of peace, and none were retained, except those which were clearly essential to the effectual preservation of its main objects, the exclusion of French officers, and French influence, from Hindûstan, and the security of the British dominions in that country, against any hostile combination of the Mahratta chieftains which might in future be formed.

The origin of the rupture which broke out between the British government and Holkar, soon after the conclusion of this peace, affords as little ground for the Reviewers *assertion*, as that of the two wars, to which the reader's attention has just been called.

Though Holkar had made a reconciliation with Scindiah, and had even engaged with that prince to join the confederacy against the English, he nevertheless did not fulfil his engagement, or take any part in the war, which that confederacy occasioned. During the whole of that war, he was actively employed in augmenting his hordes of cavalry, which he at once exercised and maintained, by ravaging the districts belonging to Scindiah, in the province of Ajimêre, and by levying tribute from the small, but independant Hindû states in that part of Hindûstan. Those states, since the rise of the great Mahratta chieftains, had been subject annually to such exactions; but they were enforced by Holkar with a much more merciless rigour than the oppressed and suffering inhabitants had ever before endured. Reduced, therefore, to the most piteous indigence, and threatened with famine, the Rajahs of those states implored

the protection of the British government. That protection was accordingly extended to them, on the ground of humanity, fortified by the political consideration that we should thereby win the gratitude, and secure the attachment of a brave and hardy race, who, under the guidance of English skill, would form a powerful barrier, not only against the habitual encroachments of Holkar, but the probable irruptions of the princes of Cabul. On these principles, and with these views, treaties of defensive alliance were concluded with those states, towards the close of the first Mahratta war, when the north-west frontier of the British dominions in Hindûstan had consequently become established in their vicinity.

Under these circumstances, the interests of the British government required, that some fair and equitable arrangement should be made with Holkar, to induce him to

desist from his continual depredations, in those states, which on grounds so unexceptionable, it had engaged to defend.

At this period, no act of hostility whatever had taken place between Holkar and the British government: and though he may be supposed to have harboured some degree of disappointed pride, or of recollected resentment, at having been obliged to relinquish the authority of the Peishwa, which his jealousy of Scindiah, and his restless ambition had prompted him to usurp, yet he could not have felt any of that soreness and rancour which the smart of repeated defeats leaves imprinted on the mind. But Holkar's authority in his own state being founded on usurpation, he, like all other usurpers, considered that his power could alone be maintained by those means through which he had acquired it. A large army was necessary to the main-

tenance of his power: and his own country being destitute of all internal resources, the pillage of his weaker neighbours, and the fortune of war, were indispensably necessary to the support of that army.

Having by these means, however, established his authority over a formidable military state, the British government resolved to treat with him in the intended arrangement, as an entirely new power; so as to preserve peace, if possible, without recognizing his usurpation. Some advances made by his deposed brother,* were consequently rejected; and Lord Lake was directed to make a declaration, by letter, to Holkar, stating the friendly disposition of the British government towards him, and simply requesting him, as a preliminary to an amicable arrangement, to withdraw his army from the immediate

* Cashee Rao Holkar.

vicinity of the states in alliance with the English, as it was altogether incompatible with the relations of peace to keep so very formidable a force (150,000 *men*) on the confines of his neighbours.

Holkar's answer at once indicates his hostile intentions, and emphatically marks the complexional ambition and impetuosity of the man, united with the warlike attributes, and adventurous habits, of his nation.

“Friendship,” says he, “requires, that, keeping in your view the long-existing unanimity between me and the English, you act according to what my vakeels may represent to you; and your doing so will be fruitful of benefit and advantage. *If not, my country and my property are on the saddle of my horse, and, please God, to whatever side the reins of the horses of my brave warriors shall be*

“ turned, the whole of the country in that
 “ direction shall come into my possession.
 “ As you are wise and provident, you will
 “ consider the consequences of this affair,
 “ and employ yourself in settling the im-
 “ portant matters which will be explained
 “ by my *vakeels*, whom I now send.” *

The confidential persons whom Holkar deputed to Lord Lake with this letter, informed his Lordship, that they had no power or instructions to *conclude any agreement* with the English government; but that they were commissioned to make certain *demands*, as essential *preliminaries* to any *pacific settlement*. These demands were,—*first*, that “ Holkar should be allowed to collect the *chout*, according to

* See Holkar’s letter to Lord Lake, dated March 4th, 1804, in the papers printed by the House of Commons, relative to the war with that chieftain.—

“ the custom of his ancestors :”—that is, that he should be allowed to *exact, annually, from the small states in alliance with the British government, one-fourth of their whole revenues.*

Secondly, “ That certain ancient possessions of the Holkar family should be granted to him :”—that is, that certain districts, which some of his predecessors had frequently ravaged, but never subdued nor settled in, should be taken from their rightful owners, and hereditary chiefs, and bestowed on him.

And *thirdly, “ That the British government should guarantee to him the country he then possessed; and conclude a treaty with him on the same terms as that with Scindiah.”*

Lord Lake informed the *vakeels*, that the

first two *demands* were entirely inadmissible; *first*, because Holkar had no just claims on those states and districts; and, *secondly*, because the British government had engaged to protect them from all molestation: and that, as to the third demand, they were assured, that no interference whatever was intended in the affairs of their country; but that, before any negotiation for a treaty could be commenced, Holkar must withdraw his army from the frontier of the British allies, as an earnest of that friendly disposition which he professed. Upon this refusal of their *demands*, the vakeels plainly declared, that it would be good policy in the British government to grant them; for that Holkar had an immense army of 150,000 horse, and 40,000 foot; that he *had received the promise of the Rohillas, of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, (one of the allies of the English) and of several other Rajahs, to join his standard*; that the Rohillas had

offered to serve three years without pay, for the sake of plunder; and, finally, that he had it in his power completely to destroy the country, even in the event of a defeat.

Here the negotiation was broken off; and the vakeels returned to Holkar, with a letter from Lord Lake, stating the impracticability of complying with the demands he had made; but re-assuring him of the anxious desire of the British government to conclude a treaty with him on fair, equal, and reasonable terms, if, as a preliminary, he would consent to retire, with his formidable army, within the limits of his own dominions.*

On receiving this temperate letter, Holkar commenced his depredations on the territory

* See the Official Papers, relative to the war with Holkar, before quoted.

of our allies; and the war between him and the British government accordingly ensued.*

The less fortunate and less brilliant events of this contest have rendered it peculiarly obnoxious to the indiscriminate animadversions of vulgar politicians, who judge of the general merits of a war, from the particular instances of the good or ill success with which it has been attended, rather than from the policy on which it was undertaken, or from the final attainment of the main objects which that policy had in view. But the Reviewer forms his judgment by other tests, and by a far different process of reasoning. He knows it to be a material point in the justification of every war, to prove, that it is, *on the whole, calculated* to afford an effectual remedy for the evil which

* Ibid.

produced it. He cannot, but be satisfied therefore, with the fact, that the war, under our examination, has fully answered its legitimate purposes of effectually removing the danger, and redressing the injury, which had made it just and necessary, and of terminating in a secure peace.

The war with Holkar arose from a determination to defend our allies from being plundered, *yearly, of one-fourth of their property*, which was insultingly *demande*d, by the enemy, as the *price of peace*, and to maintain our national honour and good faith, which were identified with the protection of those allies, and which are the sure and lasting foundations of independence and of safety. The final result of the war has been the reduction of the desperate predatory hordes of Holkar; the consequent security of our allies; the preservation of our unblemished fame; and

the establishment of that general tranquillity which it was the instinctive propensity of his nature, the habitual practice of his life, the living principle of his policy, and the main source of his power, to disturb.

On the whole view, however, of this part of the subject, respecting the origin of the late wars in India, I apprehend the Reviewer will not be much satisfied with what has been said. The train of plain facts, and the dry evidence of Tippoo, Scindiah, and Holkar, which have been introduced as essential to the point at issue, are, indeed, likely to offend the delicate taste of the Reviewer, whose invincible repugnance to matters of detail I have before had occasion to remark; but they may, notwithstanding, serve to impress on the public mind, a strong conviction of the utter fallacy of his assertion—“*that the late wars in India were kindled by the British government.*”

The territory which has been acquired by those wars, and by the system of policy under review, is, no doubt, considerable: but if I have succeeded in proving, that those wars were founded in justice, expediency, and necessity, and that that policy is adapted to the peculiar character and circumstances of the states of India, as well as to the nature of their relations with the British government,—then, the extension of dominion, which is the unavoidable result of victorious war, and the acquisition of certain portions of territory, which constitute the security and permanency of the policy thus proved to be fundamentally right,—will authorize me to deduce the undeniable corollary, that our late extension of dominion in India, has multiplied the means, and strengthened the line of our general defence, not only by converting into powerful bulwarks of our security those territories which, in the hands of our warlike and

predatory neighbours, enabled them to *command* the most vulnerable parts of our empire; but also, by a great augmentation of our resources of every kind, within provinces, which we were *previously* bound to defend.

Having now tried the foreign policy of Lord Wellesley's administration, by the test of *its adaptation to the characters and circumstances of those governments and nations for whom it was framed*, it remains with the public to determine, *by that test*, whether it be calculated to *strengthen the authority and influence* of the British power in India, on the ground of *general satisfaction*.

The Reviewer has himself distinctly admitted, “ That the *British ascendancy will*,
 “ in its immediate operation, *be favourable*
 “ to the *lower classes* of the Asiatic (that
 “ is the Indian) population, and may, there-

fore; have some *claim on their gratitude*.
 “ But,” he adds, “ until these *lower classes*
 “ acquire much more of *character*, and of
 “ *political weight*, than they have at pre-
 “ sent, or are likely to have for centuries,
 “ any *reliance on their attachment* will
 “ inevitably end in more than disappoint-
 “ ment.”

It is indubitably true, that the natives of India have little *political weight*; nor is there, I conceive, the smallest ground to expect they will ever acquire more, even if the splendid project of the Reviewer were resorted to, “ of transfusing amongst them
 “ the *vis vivax* of *knowledge* and *virtue*,”
 by the sure means of “ *colonization*,” and
 “ *religious conversion* ;” * or, indeed, from

* Speculating on the best means of meliorating the state of society amongst the Hindûs, the Reviewer observes, “ that the most eligible course is, to transfuse through the

the adoption of any other project, derived

“ mass of the people, the *vis viva* of knowledge and virtue,
 “ which will far more quickly, and completely, bring to pass
 “ the desired improvement, than all the municipal regula-
 “ tions in the world.”—Now, as he does not tell us in
 what mode, or by what means, the *knowledge* and *virtues* of
 the *west* are to be thus transfused through the people of
 the *east*, we are left to conclude, that it is by *converting*
them to the religion of the church of England, and by *intro-*
ducing among them numerous English colonists to share in the
cultivation of their lands, which, he before so strenuously
 recommended, as the *speediest means of improving* their
 condition. It is, therefore, by these means, that he pro-
 poses to “CHEAT” the *Hindûs* out of their prejudices.
 “ Their prejudices,” says he, “ cannot be forced, but MAY BE
 “ CHEATED. The institution of *casts*, for example,
 “ which so preposterously graduates the whole *Hindû*
 “ community, could not perhaps be effectually destroyed by a
 “ series of merely political contrivances in some cen-
 “ turies; but when once a large quantity of knowledge and
 “ moral feeling can be communicated to those that grovel
 “ at the foot of the scale, their frightful and fantastic
 “ distinctions will quickly and silently disappear;—FOR A
 “ PEOPLE, WORTHY OF FREEDOM, CAN NEVER REMAIN

from the doctrines of the celebrated Academy of *Lagado* !*

But it is; at the same time, equally true, that the natives of India have; under the direction of English officers, in the course of several wars, displayed a *military character*, not only capable of the most arduous enterprizes, but susceptible of the

“ SLAVES !!! ”—SIR WILLIAM JONES, who knew something of the character and institutions of these people, thought differently. “ *The natives of India*,” says Sir William, “ MUST AND WILL BE GOVERNED BY ABSOLUTE POWER.” But what signifies human testimony, or human experience, to the lofty speculations of the Reviewer,

Who soars with Plato to th’ empyreal sphere,
To the first good, first perfect, and first fair ;
Or treads the mazy round his followers trod,
And *quitting sense*, calls imitating God.

* See an account of the speculative philosophers in this Academy, in a Voyage to *Laputa*, by the famous Lemuel Gulliver !

firmest attachment, and the most incorruptible fidelity. The implicit confidence which may be placed in *their attachment*, when their *religious prejudices, and ancient customs are respected*, has been proved in numberless instances, and is attested by this undeniable fact,—that chiefly through *their attachment*, and *their capacity for military service*, our Indian dominions have been acquired and maintained. But the Reviewer thinks it a matter of little importance to have strengthened and confirmed an attachment which had been thus tried. He conceives, that the policy in question “cannot possibly be right, as it is merely favourable to the lower classes,”—that is, to the great bulk of the people of India. Of what avail is it, he considers, to have a “claim on the gratitude” of forty or fifty millions of people; when we “cannot calculate on the affection of the native powers,”—on the affection of those states, “whose

“ *policy*” as he has before informed us,
 “ *is little better than barbarous, and whose*
 “ *concerns of war and peace are managed*
 “ *by victorious assassins, consummate trai-*
 “ *tors, and experienced robbers.*”

Yet the public will probably think with me, that the gratitude of an industrious race, who at once prove their own courage, and their attachment to us, by fighting our battles, is somewhat more valuable, and more to be relied on, than the “ *affection of states,*” so constituted, and so governed. It may be thought, that a policy which is adapted to repress, in the rulers of those states, their barbarous habits of assassination, perpetual warfare, and plunder, though not likely to gain their “ *affection,*” will gradually improve the state of manners amongst them, and by preserving general tranquillity, induce them to seek their own permanent interests, in

cultivating the arts of peace. It may be thought no very cogent reason against this policy, that it *may* excite discontent or enmity amongst those “ *victorious assassins,*” and “ *experienced robbers,*” whose practices it is designed to prevent. It may be thought neither very unwise, nor very unjust, in this case, to have considered our own safety, and the general interests of Hindûstan, rather than the feelings of those by whom that safety and those interests were endangered. In fine, it may be thought, that the practices of such men are more dangerous than their enmity; and that the same power which suppressed the one, can effectually guard the other.

But the Reviewer supposes, that this policy will “ excite the enmity of whatever is “ wealthy, noble, powerful, and warlike.”

Whether a policy which *protects property,*

and *restrains robbery*, be likely to provoke the hostility of the *wealthy*,—let the wealthy determine. That the pride of the *nobles* should be armed against the system which, on the essential *condition* of the *allegiance* of *some*, and the *acquiescence* of *others*, secures to all, the undisturbed possession of their ancient dignities, titles, and inheritances, and which defends them from the degrading usurpations of low, obscure, and desperate adventurers, will not be credited by any one who considers, that as the gratification of that passion arises from the respect which is paid to its chief objects, so the power which secures these objects must naturally create sentiments of esteem and attachment in those minds, in which that passion predominates. And, as to the “*powerful and warlike*,” who are all included in those states, so strongly characterised by the Reviewer, and already so often mentioned,—though they may feel

discontented, for a time, at being constrained to desist from their accustomed habit of living by the plunder of their neighbours, yet the very necessity which this imposes on them, of supporting themselves by peaceful means, will beget an attention to the occupations of agriculture and commerce, in the industrious pursuit of which the recollection of their unjust grievance will be gradually lost and forgotten.

The Reviewer, however, imagines the dislike and disaffection of the natives of India to the British government to be so general, as well as so strong, “ that if any untoward accident conveyed a French army thither, they might reckon on as many friends as we had allies, and increase their own retinue by the whole number of our dependants.”

That one or two of the native chiefs, and

their adherents, may be disposed to favour the French, I readily admit; but there certainly does not exist in India any general partiality to that nation. Allowing, however, this supposed partiality to be as general as the Reviewer conceives; still he will not contend, that it has so strong an influence on the minds of the natives as that which belonged to their ancient attachment to the Moghul Emperor before the fall of his power. Yet, when the English were opposed to the Moghul Emperor in the field, before their government had acquired that power and stability which men's interests, if not any sentiment of attachment, always lead them to support; 'even then, it appears from history, so far from the English standard being deserted by the natives in our service, or our cause being abandoned by any of our adherents, or allies, that the whole people of Hindûstan, forcibly struck with the contrast between the respect paid

to their persons and property by our army, and the oppression and plunder to which they were exposed by the army of the Emperor, loaded him with imprecations, and prayed for victory to the English. Let us hear, on this head, the words of a native historian, who was a Mohammedan, and a subject of the Moghul Emperor, who was himself a witness of what he relates, and who is equally distinguished for his accuracy, his impartiality, and his talents.*

* *Gholaum Hussain Khan*, the historian here mentioned, was personally known to Sir William Jones, Lord Teignmouth, and other members of the Asiatic Society. His work, written in the Persic, and intitled *Sêir Mû-tûkkaren*, that is, *a View of Modern Times*, comprises a history of Hindûstan from the death of Aurungzebe to A. D. 1781, together with an account of the English conquests, and an examination of the English government and policy in Bengal. This examination, I translated some years ago, and published in the 4th vol. of the Asiatic Register. The freedom with which he comments

“ At the time,” says he, “ when the
 “ Shah-Zada-Aaly Goher, who is now Em-
 “ peror, under the name of Shah Allum,
 “ was carrying on war against the English
 “ nation, in the plains of Azimâbâd, it was
 “ made known, that the Emperor designed
 “ to march thither in person. On the
 “ communication of this intelligence, there
 “ was not a single inhabitant who did not
 “ pray for victory and prosperity to him, on
 “ account of the good government that
 “ was formerly enjoyed under that prince’s
 “ family. Although the inhabitants had

on the gross errors of our policy at that period of time,
 as well as on the depravity and abasement of the native
 governments, the corruption of the judicial authorities
 throughout the country, and the consequent dereliction of
 all civil order and subordination, affords the most incon-
 testible proof of his impartiality and independence.
 There is a copy of the original work now in the Com-
 pany’s library, at the India-house, and another in the pos-
 session of the Royal Society.

“ received no benefits from him, they
“ seemed, nevertheless, to have but one
“ heart, and one voice, on the occasion.
“ But when he arrived amongst them, and
“ they experienced from his profligate
“ officers, and disorderly troops, the most
“ shameless acts of extortion and oppres-
“ sion; whilst, on the other hand, they
“ observed the good conduct and strict
“ discipline of the English army, the of-
“ ficers of which did not suffer a blade of
“ grass to be spoiled, and no kind of injury
“ or molestation to be done to the feeblest
“ peasant;—then, indeed, the sentiments of
“ the people changed, and the loyalty which
“ they once bore the Emperor was trans-
“ ferred to the English. So that, when
“ Shah Allum made his second and third
“ expeditions into those parts, they loaded
“ him with imprecations, and prayed for
“ victory to the English. Yet now, (that is
“ in 1776) the high opinion they enter-

“ tained of the English is likewise changed,
 “ BECAUSE THEY CONCEIVE that these our
 “ new rulers, are totally indifferent to the
 “ *interests and happiness of the people of*
 “ *Hindūstan*, AND SUFFER THEM TO BE
 “ PLUNDERED AND OPPRESSED BY THE NA-
 “ WABS, THE OMRAHS, AND THEIR DEPEN-
 “ DANTS.”*

From this passage the public will learn, that the English, even when opposed to the Moghul emperor, received the *spontaneous homage* of the natives of India. And hence it will appear neither singular, nor surprising, that an English Governor-general

* The reader will observe, that the historian here reproaches the English government in the name of the *people of Hindūstan*, for suffering the Nabobs to practice *those very oppressions* which the Reviewer and other persons in *this country*, no doubt, *on better information, and from being more alive to the real interests of those people*, have blamed Lord Wellesley for interfering to prevent.

who so largely extended amongst them the acknowledged benefits which the English government, its protection, and its influence confer, should have called forth from their gratitude those complimentary addresses, which are so conformable to the character of their minds, as well as to the genius of their language.

The Reviewer may contrive to disbelieve such things, and still affect to think—“ that our late Indian government, *expended its strength in levying homage:*” but I shall leave the public to judge between him and *Gholaum Hussain*, with this single remark,—that the observance of that known rule, on which the credit and reputation of an historian depends, is no way necessary to the fame of a Reviewer.

From the different concessions made by the Reviewer, and from the elucidations I

have given of them, combined with the view I have taken of all the most material circumstances connected with this discussion, it appears clearly evident, that the *general and permanent interests* of the people of India, have been *promoted and secured* by the policy in question; and that none have suffered by it, but those whose system of government was in hostility, not only to those interests, but to all social order, to all moral improvement, and to national safety. Views of *general expediency*, therefore, and not of *expediency in particular instances*, have been the grand guides of this policy. It was formed from a wide survey of all the general circumstances and combinations of circumstances, growing out of the moral and political state of the nations of India. Grounded on the most enlarged principles of public utility, and adapted, in its operation, to advance the prosperity and happiness of

those nations, in common with our own interests, with which they are in truth inseparably interwoven, it is plain, that the rectitude of this policy is *general*, and does not rest on the mere consideration of any *particular* case. In the general circumstances of Hindûstan, its adoption could at *no time* have been *wrong*; but it was imperiously called for, at the *particular period of time* under review, by that state necessity which imposes on every government the obligation of securing its own safety.

The Reviewer has mentioned the case of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and it may serve to illustrate this argument. The measure of the abolition is acknowledged to be founded on principles of humanity and justice, and to be guided by views of general utility; but its *immediate adoption* was powerfully enforced by the two great rival

statesmen* of this country, on the ground of a *particular political expediency*, which rendered it essential to the safety of our West India Islands, and which, therefore, superceded every consideration of the partial, or temporary injury, which individual interests might thereby sustain. †

* The incidental mention of these two great men, at a period so frequent with the calamities of Europe, is calculated to awaken the strongest sentiments of regret. Every man who can appreciate the value of commanding talents in such terrible times, must, I conceive, feel the loss of MR. PITT and MR. FOX, with all that calm sorrow which a public calamity can inspire. But I, who owed a personal obligation to MR. FOX, may be permitted, without the charge of affectation, to speak of *him* in a more particular manner, and to say, in the words of the poet,

Ahi orbo mondo ingrato,
 Gran cagion hai di dover pianger meco ;
 Che quel ben ch'era in te perduto 'hai seco !

† It is not irrelevant to remark here, that Lord Wellesley, in common with those illustrious statesmen, whom

In the same manner, the system of our late Indian government being, as I have shewn, founded on principles of general and permanent utility, it follows, in the *first place*, that its adoption, at *any time*, must have produced *general good*; and, in the *second place*, that the *particular circumstances* which, on the ground of *political expediency*, made it *necessary for the security* of our own dominions, justified any partial wrong which its operation *might* have occasioned, as general prosperity must always be preferred to particular interest.

Three more general objections to Lord Wellesley's system of policy remain to be noticed; which, though made by persons, whom I rate much below the Reviewer in point of talents, do yet attract attention to

I have mentioned, was *always* one of the most strenuous and ardent advocates for the IMMEDIATE abolition of that base and abominable traffic.

their opinions, from the public situations in which fortune has chanced to place them.*

The *first* of these objections is, *that the new subsidiary treaties which have been contracted with the native princes, were contrary to their wishes, and must, therefore, have been concluded, on their part, under constraint.*

The only question here is, whether those treaties were contrary, or conformable, to the inclinations of those princes with whom they were contracted. Now there are but

* I here allude to the author of a certain publication, intituled “The *Draft* of a *proposed* Letter from the “Court of Directors to the Government of Bengal.”—In this publication may be seen, “strong assertions without proof, declamation without argument, and violent censures without dignity or moderation; but neither correctness in the composition, nor judgment in the design.”

three tests by which the *inclinations* of men can be ascertained ; namely, their *declarations*, their *actions*, and their *interests*. In this case, the native princes, at the time they executed the treaties, *declared*, in the most explicit and positive terms, their free and entire consent to all the stipulations which these treaties contained.* After the treaties were carried into effect, the *actions* of those princes proved the truth of their *declarations* ; for they strictly, and *voluntarily*, fulfilled their engagements, as far as could be expected from the peculiar character and condition of their respective governments : And that these treaties were highly calculated to promote the *interests* of the native princes, has been already proved in the course of this discussion. Hence the *de-*

* See the public letters of the different residents who negotiated and concluded these treaties, on the part of the British government, in the India Papers, printed by order of the House of Commons, 1806.

clarations, the *actions*, and the *interests* of those princes, concur to shew, that the treaties in question were *perfectly conformable* to their *inclinations*, and were consequently executed by them, with their unconstrained consent.

If then the native princes executed the treaties of subsidiary alliance with their own free will, no subsequent repentance on their part (had such been the case) can be urged as an argument against the justice of those treaties.

Treaties between nations, like all other covenants, are designed to fix and bind the *intention* of the contracting parties, to do those things which they have mutually agreed and voluntarily consented to. They proceed on the principle, that, as the minds of men are naturally mutable and fickle, it is essential to the good order of civil society

to bind them to the performance of their promises to each other, by written obligations, executed with their own free will. Every covenant is a tangible pledge of the faith of the parties, to fulfil those intentions which induced them to contract it; and its main purpose is, to bind those who, from whatever cause, might afterwards be disposed to change their intentions, and retract their promises.

If, therefore, the repentance of one of the parties to a covenant, which that party had voluntarily executed, were admitted as any evidence of its injustice, it must be manifest that no covenant whatever could possibly be just. So that any argument, adduced to prove that the late subsidiary treaties concluded by our Indian government, were unjust, on the ground of an alleged *reluctance*, or *repentance*, shewn by the native princes *subsequent* to the execution of these

treaties, is wholly untenable, and must be rejected, as palpably fallacious.

The *second objection* which has been made to Lord Wellesley's foreign policy, is, *that it has a tendency to excite the JEALOUSY of the native states of Hindûstan, and that it is therefore UNWISE.*

In the view which has been taken of the characters and circumstances of those states, the strong jealousy of the British government, which has long prevailed amongst them, was fully admitted and described. That the policy in question has any peculiar tendency to increase this jealousy, I see no substantial reason to suppose; but I have shewn, that it has very much augmented our means of repressing those evil effects, which it is in the nature of all jealousy to produce.

A jealousy of power is a feeling inherent in the human mind. And hence the jealousy which a great state always excites amongst its neighbours, is co-existent with its power, and can only be extinguished with it.

To urge that a system of policy, which is adapted to repel the dangers arising from a jealousy which it is impossible to suppress, is, notwithstanding, likely to increase it, and to conclude that such policy is, therefore, *unwise*, may be very convincing logic among the statesmen of Leadenhall Street; but less *philosophical* and *refined* politicians may, possibly, contend, from the sheer stubbornness of common sense and experience, that it is safer to provide ourselves with the most effectual means of defence against dangers which actually exist and threaten us, than to leave ourselves exposed to these dangers, lest the very measures which we

adopt for our security *might* aggravate that jealousy from which the dangers sprung.

Those who may think and reason in this manner will recollect, that the point which they here maintain is defensible on the same general principle as that famous and wise measure of national policy, called the Navigation Act, which laid the foundation of that triumphant superiority of naval power, on which the security, the greatness, and the glory of England so materially depend. This measure, at the time of its enactment, was directly calculated to excite the jealousy of all the other maritime nations of Europe; and even to impair the commerce of Holland, then at its utmost height. It actually did produce a considerable degree of jealousy amongst these nations; and from the time of Cromwell, until the present day, it has been the theme of many an angry declamation, by our rivals and enemies on the

continent, and, occasionally, of much disapprobation and common-place sophistry among the lower order of our domestic politicians. But the act has been uniformly supported, on the ground of its being eminently conducive, if not absolutely necessary, to our *defence*, by all the greatest statesmen, legislators, and political philosophers, who have flourished in England during that long period of time.

“ Some of the regulations of this famous
 “ act,” says ADAM SMITH, “ may have
 “ proceeded from *national animosity*. They
 “ are as *wise*, however, as if they had all
 “ been dictated by the *most deliberate wis-*
 “ *dom*. *National animosity*, at that *parti-*
 “ *cular time*, aimed at the very *same object*,
 “ which the *most deliberate wisdom would*
 “ *have recommended*, the *diminution* of the
 “ naval power of Holland, the *only naval*
 “ *power* which could endanger the *security*

“ of England.” Then, after shewing that the Navigation Act is *not favourable* to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it, he concludes with this observation, “ that as *de-*
“ *fence* is of *much more importance than*
“ *opulence*, this act is, perhaps, the *wisest*
“ of all the commercial regulations of
“ England.” *

If then the navigation act has been allowed, by all the highest authorities in England, and has been actually proved, by the experience of one hundred and fifty years, to be a measure fraught with the most deliberate wisdom, notwithstanding the circumstances of its *exciting the jealousy of neighbouring nations*, of its *directly tending to diminish the naval power of one rival state*, and of its checking the growth of

* Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 194-5.

that opulence which arises from foreign trade,—the reader will agree, that *the single circumstance of an additional jealousy,* amongst the native powers in India, which Lord Wellesley's policy is alleged to have *a tendency to create,* can form no just objection to it, and that, therefore, the inference drawn from this objection, that his Lordship's policy is *unwise,* completely falls to the ground.

The *third* objection to Lord Wellesley's system of foreign policy, is, *that it is directly contrary to the solemn declaration of the legislature, "that to pursue schemes of conquest, and extension of territory, in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation."*

This declaratory law originated in a resolution of the House of Commons, which passed in the year 1782. This resolution

being generally approved of, under the circumstances in which our Indian dominions were then placed, it was introduced into the India Act of 1784, and finally into the Act of 1793.

The strict construction of the *declaration* here quoted, has been frequently discussed in parliament, and the prevailing opinion which resulted from those discussions was, —that the intention of the legislature was *not to prohibit absolutely*, either war, or extension of dominion in India, as circumstances might arise which would render war inevitable, and an extension of dominion essential to our security; but that the real intention of the legislature was, to restrain the governments in India both from making war, and from extending our dominions, except in cases of *imperious necessity*, and thereby to shew the *independant states* of Hindûstan, that they had nothing

to apprehend from the policy of England, *provided they themselves acted on similar principles of moderation.* This interpretation of the intentions of the legislature is conformable, not only to the spirit, but to the very words of the *declaration.*

The declaration states it to be “contrary
 “to the wish and policy of this country
 “to *pursue schemes of conquest* in India.”
 Now, to *pursue a scheme of conquest*, is *systematically to wage war, for the sake of conquest, or to form and pursue a regular plan for conquering* other nations, with *no other object* but to acquire possession of their dominions. The other member of the sentence in the *declaration* may be stated thus:—“And also, that it is contrary to the
 “policy, &c. of the country to *pursue*
 “*schemes of extension of dominion.*” The plain meaning of which is, that we *are not* to adopt and carry on schemes, or designs,

in India, *for the mere purpose of enlarging our dominion.*

This appears, beyond all dispute, to be the *literal* sense of the *declaration*. If we look at the spirit of it, as conveyed in the words which have been quoted, the meaning is equally clear. The legislature, disapproving of former wars and transactions in India, *declare*, “ We think it repugnant to
 “ the honour, and to the true policy of
 “ England, to allow such proceedings to
 “ continue, and consequently to suffer, in
 “ future, the pursuit of conquest, and the
 “ extension of dominion, or any war to be
 “ made, or any territory to be acquired,
 “ unless evidently necessary for our defence,
 “ and for the maintenance of our national
 “ honour and security.”

If this be not the true spirit of the declaration, and the true intention of the legis-

lature, how are we to account for both Houses of Parliament having SANCTIONED, with their UNANIMOUS APPROBATION, *wars* which took place, and *acquisitions of territory* which have been made, in India, *subsequent* to the passing of the act in question?

The war which occurred with Tippoo Sultaan, and the consequent extension of territory which was made under the administration of Lord Cornwallis, so far from being considered by Parliament to be *any violation of the rule* which Parliament had prescribed, that Lord Cornwallis received the UNANIMOUS THANKS of both Houses.

The war with Tippoo Sultaan in 1799, which terminated in the *conquest* of Mysore, and in the *annexation* of that country to the *British dominions*, was not deemed inconsistent with the declaration in question,

for it likewise received the UNANIMOUS APPROBATION * of both Houses of Parliament.

* I shall insert in this place the votes passed on the subject of this war, as affording the best testimony of the high sense which was entertained of its justice and glory, by parliament, and by the Company.

Votes of Parliament passed October 4th, 1799. Vide Asiatic Annual Register, Vol. 1, page 127.

Resolved, *nem. dis. nem. con.* That the thanks of this House be given to the Right Honourable Richard Lord Wellesley, Earl of Mornington, in the kingdom of Ireland, and Governor-general of the British possessions in the East Indies, for the *wisdom, decision, and energy* with which he discharged the arduous duties of his station, from the time of his taking upon him the said government, to the *glorious* termination of the late war by the capture of Seringapatam; during which period, by opposing to the *perfidy* of the late Sultaun of Mysore an *uniform moderation, dignity, and firmness*, and by counteracting, with *equal promptitude and ability*, the *dangerous intrigues and projects* of the FRENCH, particularly by destroying their power and influence in the Deccan, he prepared the way for the *rapid and brilliant* operations carried on under his super-

In the year 1789, Lord Cornwallis obtained from the Nizam the cession of the Guntoor *Sircar*, which was a *considerable accession of territory* to the British dominions; but it was approved of, under the

intendance and direction, the result of which has finally disappointed all the designs of our enemies in that quarter, and has established, on a basis of permanent security, the tranquillity and prosperity of the British empire in India.

Votes of the Company passed November 13th, 1799.
Vide Asiatic Annual Register, page 189.

Resolved, That the thanks of this Court be given to the Earl of Mornington, for the *wisdom, energy, and decision*, displayed by him in the discharge of the arduous duty of Governor-general, from the period of his arrival in India, until the *glorious and happy* termination of the late war in that country; by which the power of the Sultaun of Mysore, and *influence* of the *French* in India, have been crushed: events which promise to establish, on a firm basis, the tranquillity and security of the British dominions in India.

particular circumstances of the case, both by the Court of Directors and the Board of Control.

In 1795, under the administration of Lord Teignmouth, the large, populous, and valuable province of Benares was, by a cession obtained from the Rajah, *annexed* to the British dominions in Hindûstan.

All these *acquisitions of territory*, and *extension of dominion*, received the *sanction of Parliament*, as the following extracts from the Act of the 28th of July, 1800, [39th and 40th George III. *cap.* 79.] will satisfactorily prove.

CLAUSE 1. “Whereas the territorial possessions of the
 “ United Company of Merchants of England, trading to
 “ the East Indies, in the peninsula (that is the continent
 “ generally) of India, *have become so much extended*, as to
 “ require regulations to be made for the due government
 “ of the same.

“ And whereas *the province of Benares* has been ceded
 “ *to the United Company*, and has been annexed to the presi-
 “ dency of Fort William, in Bengal, since the establish-
 “ ment of the supreme Court of Judicature at Fort
 “ William; and it is expedient that the same should be
 “ subject to the jurisdiction of the said court, in like
 “ manner as the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and
 “ Orissa; and that the said province, and *all other pro-*
 “ *vinces which may hereafter be annexed to the said pre-*
 “ *sidency*, should be subject to such regulations as the
 “ Governor-general and Council of Fort William afore-
 “ said have framed, or may frame, for the better admi-
 “ nistration of justice amongst the native inhabitants,
 “ and others within the same respectively: be it there-
 “ fore further enacted, from and after the 1st of March,
 “ 1801, the power and authority of the said supreme
 “ Court of Judicature, in and for the said presidency of
 “ Fort William as aforesaid, as now and by virtue of this
 “ act established, and all such regulations as have been,
 “ and may be hereafter, according to the powers and
 “ authorities, and subject to the provisions and restric-
 “ tions before enacted, framed, and provided, shall *extend*
 “ *to and over* the said province of Benares, and *to and over*
 “ *all the factories, districts, and places, which now are, or*
 “ *hereafter shall be made subordinate thereto*, and *to and over*
 “ *all such provinces and districts, as may at any time here-*

“ *after be annexed and made subject to the said presidency of Fort William.*”

Hence it is incontrovertible, that so far from Parliament considering an *extension of dominion* to be *absolutely illegal*, and *contrary to the declaratory clause* in the Acts of 1784 and 1793, that this Act not only *sanctions the extension of dominion* which had actually taken place between the years 1784 and 1800, but expressly supposes the case, *that other provinces and districts may hereafter be annexed and made subject to Bengal*, and provides for the good government of such *new acquisitions*.

The objection, therefore, which has been made to Lord Wellesley's policy, on the ground of its being a violation of the declaratory law against *schemes of conquest*, and *extension of dominion*, in India, must rest on this assumption; either that the ac-

quisitions of territory which were obtained, under that policy, resulted from *schemes of conquest*, or, that it was the intention of Parliament *absolutely* to forbid *all wars whatever*, in India, however just and necessary they might be in their principles, and all *extension of dominion whatever*, however essential it might be, either for the purposes of indemnity, or of security, either as a reparation for the injuries we were continually sustaining from our warlike and predatory neighbours, or as a means of effectually providing for the stability and safety of our empire in Hindûstan. With regard to the *first part* of this assumption, I trust I have already proved, to the satisfaction of the reader, that the *extension of dominion* which was made under Lord Wellesley's administration, was either the unavoidable consequence of successful wars, wantonly provoked by our neighbours, or arising from measures which were indispensably neces-

sary, not merely to repel immediate dangers, but to preserve the very existence of our power. As to the *second part* of the assumption, I have shewn it to be no less contrary to the literal interpretation of the words, than to the spirit of the *declaration*, and to be completely at variance with the practice of the administrations of Lord Cornwallis, and of Lord Teignmouth, with the prevailing opinion in Parliament, with the unanimous votes of the Lords and Commons, and with the positive enactment of the Legislature.

To assume then, that the declaration in question meant to forbid wars *absolutely*, or, if driven by irresistible necessity into defensive wars, that we should relinquish *all* the conquests which our superiority had acquired, would manifestly be a gross libel on the wisdom of Parliament. It would be to charge Parliament with a total inability to

understand and interpret its own Acts; and with having made a *solemn declaration*, not only repugnant to the true policy and honour of England, but to the uniform practice of those nations, most famed in history for justice and moderation, and to the common sense and common feeling of mankind. In fine, it would be to charge Parliament with having prescribed a line of policy to our government in India, which, surrounded as it is with powerful neighbours, who make “WAR A SOURCE OF REVENUE,” would expose it to the perpetual commission of fresh aggressions and insults from them, and, by such egregious folly and pusillanimity, to the ridicule and contempt of the world at large.

That the authors of the objections which have thus been replied to, do not themselves consider it right to give up the acquisitions of territory which have been made, under Lord Wellesley's administration, admits not

of the smallest doubt; for these persons have, for these two years back, had a decided lead in the councils of the India Company; and, notwithstanding their denunciation of Lord Wellesley's policy, it does not appear that they have yet indicated any desire, much less made any proposal, to his Majesty's ministers, for relinquishing those possessions, which they have told the public it is so injurious to the interests of the Company to maintain. The public will know how to estimate the opinions of men, whose writings, and whose conduct exhibit such a flagrant inconsistency; and to the public, therefore, I am content to leave them.

The inconsistencies of the Reviewer are of another sort; and to them I gladly return. They are only the harmless irregularities of genius,—the innoxious oscillations of a vigorous, but unsettled mind.

Animated, rather than perplexed, by their frequency, I have traced them through all the comments which he has made on the *general policy* of Lord Wellesley's administration; and I shall now, I trust with equal success, exhibit them to the reader, in his strictures on the *late transactions in the Carnatic*.

The measure of annexing that province to the British dominions in Coromandel, is selected by the Reviewer as the most striking example of the justness of his general remarks on the system of policy which he condemns. But, if I have succeeded in satisfying the reader, that those remarks are fundamentally erroneous, it is clear, that the principles on which that particular measure rests, are much more calculated to illustrate their fallacy, than to justify or support them. Seeing, no doubt, how little suited those principles were to his purpose, he

leaves his readers in total ignorance of them, and proceeds, with his usual love of generalities, and detestation of details, to state, with a convenient brevity, some of the circumstances more immediately connected with the measure in question; in which, however, he has the rare merit of incorporating truth with fiction, in that bland assimilation to which a creative genius, like his, alone is equal. That I may not deprive him of any part of this merit, or in any manner disturb the harmony of the composition, I shall cite his statement in his own words; marking what *is true* from what *is fictitious*, by typographical distinctions. The reader will, therefore, take notice, that the pure FICTION is invested in the dignity of SMALL CAPITALS, and the *true* and *falsemixed*, in *italics*; while the plain truth, as it is said of old to require no ornament, appears in common letters.

“ Mohammed Alli,” says the Reviewer,
 “ the old Nabob of the Carnatic, and his
 “ son, Omdut-ul-Omrah, both lived, reign-
 “ ed, and died, in the closest ostensible alli-
 “ ance with Great Britain. Previously,
 “ however, to the death of the latter, the
 “ archives of the house of Mysore, which
 “ were laid open to us by the fall of Se-
 “ ringpatam, had discovered a secret and
 “ somewhat mysterious correspondence
 “ to have at one period subsisted be-
 “ tween Tippoo and the two Nabobs already
 “ mentioned.

“ This correspondence the Bengal go-
 “ vernment IMMEDIATELY PRONOUNCED to
 “ be of a nature the most perfidious and
 “ hostile to the English nation. Now let
 “ us accept the facts as they are given us;
 “ and, although a candid examination of the
 “ papers in question will leave us much
 “ more than doubtful respecting the fact of

“ the persons accused, let them be supposed
 “ guilty. What was, on this emergency,
 “ the conduct of our government? We
 “ mean as to its general features only, for
 “ otherwise our strictures would never end.
 “ The detection of the clandestine corres-
 “ pondence was, *for whatever reasons*, not
 “ announced till Omdut-ul-Omrah, who
 “ could best explain his own conduct in
 “ prosecuting it, had actually expired, and
 “ till his *only son*, Hussein Alli, was brought
 “ forward as the undoubted heir to the
 “ vacant musnud. The British government
 “ now struck in with their proofs and their
 “ vouchers; they commented, with *great*
 “ *severity*, on the characters of the two last
 “ Nabobs; they denounced those PRINCES,
 “ as having invariably nourished a spirit of
 “ secret but active enmity towards the
 “ English: for overt-acts of such enmity,
 “ they quoted their *tardiness in furnishing*
 “ *with supplies* the British force, which *had*

“ *been employed in the Carnatic ; and thus*
 “ *referred the evils that had long been pre-*
 “ *valent in that country, to a secret defec-*
 “ *tion from the British alliance, although*
 “ *from that alliance itself those evils had*
 “ *evidently flowed : next they denounced the*
 “ *young PRINCE himself, as a public enemy,*
 “ *because, through public enemies alone he*
 “ *claimed the succession ; and, lastly, they*
 “ *proceeded to the necessary work of ef-*
 “ *fectually securing the British interests at*
 “ *this tremendous crisis. They declared*
 “ *themselves under an imperious obligation*
 “ *to appropriate to themselves the whole of*
 “ *the Carnatic, leaving, however, the grand-*
 “ *son of Mohammed Alli the nominal so-*
 “ *vereign of his paternal dominions, and*
 “ *the undisputed nabobship of his own*
 “ *garders. Hussein Alli, probably not be-*
 “ *lieving these menaces, (which even now*
 “ *appear to us hardly credible) refused, for*
 “ *two or three days, to acquiesce in the*

“ arrangement proposed to him. In conse-
 “ quence of this obstinacy, in which a little
 “ of the old leaven of hereditary wo forth-
 “ with perceived, this unfortunate PRINCE
 “ was entirely set aside, and his cousin
 “ elevated in his room to the shadow of a
 “ throne.”

Then, after a reflection to which I shall
 hereafter advert, the Reviewer concludes his
 statement in the following words ;

“ We have only one further observation
 “ to offer on this affair ; we mean, that it
 “ was begun, continued, and concluded, with
 “ a rapidity, which is observable in all the
 “ foreign transactions of the Bengal go-
 “ vernment, during the period under our
 “ review, and which is a common jeature of
 “ despotism. THE ASCERTAINING OF A
 “ VILLAGE BOUNDARY COULD HARDLY COST
 “ LESS TIME THAN WAS BESTOWED ON THE

“ USURPATION OF THE CARNATIC. When
 “ the charges against the deceased Nabob
 “ were first developed to the guardians of
 “ *his son*, these personages *pressed only for*
 “ *a full investigation of the matter*, and
 “ pledged themselves, if they were allowed
 “ a short time for the purpose, to vindicate
 “ the innocence of their late sovereign.
 “ The reader will, perhaps, have guessed,
 “ that this request, with which mere de-
 “ cency would have enjoined a compliance,
 “ was rejected; but, we believe, he will
 “ not easily guess the reason assigned for
 “ its rejection. It amounted to this, *that*
 “ *independant states cannot pretend to erect*
 “ *themselves into a tribunal of judicature*
 “ *over each other; that, therefore, the*
 “ *British government would not undertake,*
 “ *formally, to make themselves judges of*
 “ *the late Nabobs of the Carnatic; that*
 “ *they would only act for the best, and*

“ *throw themselves on the opinion of the world.*”

From this statement, the “ *bulk of his readers*” would hardly suppose, that the Nabob of the Carnatic was one of those tributaries, whom he had before informed them, the British government had long held in a “ *state of political vassalage;*” towards whom “ *it required patience to maintain an uniform tone of conciliation;*” because, even in “ *pressing upon them measures of evident necessity,* they were as *hard to persuade,* as they were *easy to compel;*” whose states were a prey “ *to all the complicated miseries* resulting from a *divided government;*” the “ *very nature of whose connection with the Company rendered the government in India obnoxious to peculiar difficulties;*” and whose *general conduct,* under *that connection,* together with *those difficulties,* had, for a long series

of years “ formed a constant subject of
 “ complaint in the *dispatches* addressed by
 “ the *governors* of our Indian provinces to
 “ their *employers* in *England*.

Yet the fact is, that the Nabob of the Carnatic, whom the Reviewer elevates to the dignity of a sovereign prince, was of all those “ *political vassals*,” at once the most completely subject to the British government, and the most unwilling to fulfil the obligations of his subjection ; whilst the internal affairs of the province committed to his administration, were reduced, in a great measure, by his refractory disposition, and gross mismanagement, to a much more ruinous condition than those of any of our other dependencies.

These circumstances render it necessary to explain to the reader, the real nature of a Nabob’s office and dignities, and the means

by which Mohammed Alli Wallajah, the old Nabob of the Carnatic, obtained that office, and those dignities ; so that a correct notion may be formed of the title and privileges which he actually possessed, and of the relation which subsisted between him and the British government.

The office and title of Nabob both originated in the institutions of the Moghul empire. According to those institutions, each Sûbah, or province of the empire, was placed under the government of a Sûbahdar, or Sipâhsillâr, who was the immediate representative of the emperor ; and who received, along with his appointment, written instructions, prescribing to him the several duties of his office, laying down the general maxims by which his conduct should be regulated in the performance of those duties, and enjoining him, in positive and distinct terms, *not to consider himself as perma-*

nently fixed in his office, but to hold himself, and his family, at all times, in perfect readiness to be removed, on the shortest summons from the emperor.* This office was the supreme head, not only of the military, but of the judicial and all the civil authorities in the province, *except the revenue department*, which was *wholly* committed to the management of an officer, called the Diwân, whose office and authority were *entirely distinct* from those of the Sûbahdar, and accountable only to the Vizier, or first minister of the empire.

* *Ajron Akbari*, or the Institutes of Akbar, and the *Akbar-namah*, or the History of Akbar. Both these works were written by Abû Fazil, the minister of that celebrated prince. A translation of the former work, by Mr. Gladwin, has been long before the public; and though confessedly defective in some interesting parts, is, on the whole, a valuable production. The English reader will find the written instructions to the Sûbahdars in Vol. 1, of this translation.

On some occasions, a Sûbahdar, by special favour, was intrusted with the government of more than one Sûbah; in which case he had the privilege of appointing, subject to the approbation, and final confirmation, of the emperor, a deputy to represent him, in those parts of the country subject to his authority, which were at an inconvenient distance from the seat of government. This deputy received from the Sûbahdar, a copy of the same instructions which had been delivered to himself by the Emperor; so that the duties of this officer, and the nature of his office, were precisely the same as those of his immediate superior. A deputy so appointed, was called a *Náib*, the plural of which word, is written *Náwáb*, corrupted by the English to *Nabob*. But *Náwáb*, is likewise an hereditary title of honour, which was always conferred on the Sûbahdars, frequently on a *Náib*, and sometimes on the *Emirs*, or nobles of the empire,

as the reward of eminent public service, or as a signal mark of royal favour. The dignity of *Nâwâb* however, was never bestowed on a Sûltaan, or Prince of the empire, because it would have been a degradation of his superior rank, and could not have been expressed along with his other titles, without a solecism in language. The titles of Sûltaan and of *Nâwâb*, therefore, were never united in the same person ; and, though upon the fall of the Moghul empire, the *Nâwâbs*, who governed provinces, assumed the authority of independant Princes, yet the Mussulman natives of Hindûstan never considered them in any other light, than as the representatives of the sovereign court of Delhi, which was the fountain both of their power and their rank.

With regard to the Nabobs of the Carnatic, they, most unquestionably, were not invested with any peculiar privileges. They

were originally the deputies of the Sûbahdars of the Deccan; and were, consequently, liable to be *recalled from their government, at the shortest notice, whenever that officer shall judge fit.* And the means by which Mohammed Alli was placed in the office of Nabob, and through which he obtained the instrument of his appointment from the court of Delhi, were certainly not calculated to render him less dependant than his predecessors.

Mohammed Alli was the second son of Anwar-ud-Dein Khan, a military officer in the service of the Sûbahdar of the Deccan, who had been appointed to command in the Carnatic, during the minority of Seid Mohammed, a youth who was destined for the Nabobship of that province. That youth was assassinated in the presence of *Anwar*, to whose special care he had been entrusted; but who, in consequence of this event, pre-

vailed on the Sûbahdar to continue him in the government of the Carnatic. This arrangement, on account of the circumstance from which it arose, was highly repugnant to the wishes of the people, and, consequently, produced a very general discontent, which the family and adherents of the deceased Nabob naturally exerted all their influence to foment.

The French, who, at this period of time, had acquired great power in the Peninsula, and who aimed at the exclusive sovereignty of the Deccan, considered the civil commotions in the Carnatic, and the death of the Nizam Assof Jâh, (the Sûbahdar of the Deccan) as a favourable conjuncture for interposing their authority, and advancing their ambitious views. With this design, they supported the pretensions of a rival claimant to the Nabobship, and commenced hostilities against Anwar-ud-Dein, who fell

in the first engagement that took place between them. His eldest son was taken prisoner; but his second son, Mohamamed Alli, effected his escape: and it was soon after announced, that he had procured from the Subahdar of the Deccan, previous to his father's death, a reversion to the subordinate government of the Carnatic, in preference to his elder brother. His pretensions, however, to this office were wholly unsupported, either by any respect paid to the memory of his father, by any degree of personal reputation, by any pecuniary resources, or by any military adherents; whilst they were opposed by all classes of Musulmans in the province, with a very general and decided disapprobation.

In this situation of the Carnatic, the English government at Madras, adopted the policy, which necessity indeed prescribed, of resisting the further progress of the

French power. A war accordingly ensued, which, after being contested with great obstinacy, terminated in leaving the English masters of the Carnatic. During this war, Mohammed Alli first introduced himself to our notice; he solicited our alliance; he accompanied our army; and contributed the aid of his local knowledge, and his advice. The conquests which resulted from the defeat of the French were made in the name of the Company; and in the forts and towns which surrendered to our arms, the flag of England was regularly displayed. After the conclusion of peace, Mohammed Alli requested, as a *matter of favour*, that the flag of the Sircar might be hoisted in some of the small forts in the interior of the country, in order to convince the people of the friendship which subsisted between him and the English, and of the reliance which he could place on their protection. He was then invested in the office of Nabob,

to which the sanction of the Moghul's name was obtained through the influence of the British government; and the administration of the civil affairs of the Carnatic was committed to his charge. Thus the dependance of the Nabob of the Carnatic on the Sûbahdar of the Deccan, and on the court of Delhi, was transferred to the English, who acquired the country by their arms, and preserved it by their protection; and who, therefore, possessed the *power* and the *right* to govern it, according to any form which might appear most conducive to their own interests, and their own views of policy.

Unfortunately for the prosperity of the Carnatic, and the benefit of England, the policy adopted by the government of Madras, at that period of time, was not formed on the wisest principles. In the arrangement which was made with the

Nabob, a fatal error was committed, from which much of those evils sprung, that involved both him and the Company in those pecuniary embarrassments, which are not yet finally adjusted, and that so long exhibited, throughout the province, a scene of corruption, oppression, distress, and distraction, which no mind can fully conceive, and no pen adequately describe. The uncontrolled management of the revenues was, at the solicitation of the Nabob, placed in his hands; though in the Moghul constitution, by which he held his office, it was a settled maxim, as well as the invariable practice, to give that office no power whatever over the revenues of the state, nor to suffer it, in any manner, to interfere with them. Accordingly, remonstrances against this part of the arrangement were made by all the subordinate native authorities in the revenue department, as well as by the Tullookdars, or principal renters of the

land ; but the British government, little acquainted at that time, with the language and customs of the people, and wholly inexperienced in those complicated regulations and details, of which the revenue system of India is composed, shrunk from the responsibility of so great a trust. It was therefore consigned to the Nabob ; but on this express condition, *that it should revert to the Company, in the event of any failure on his part, of his engagement to pay monthly, to the Company, a specific sum of money for the support of their establishment, and for the liquidation of the expenses which had been incurred during the war.*

Thus, though the revenues of the Carnatic were surrendered to the Nabob, the British government, by annexing to the surrender the revertable condition here mentioned, clearly retained the right of resuming that authority over the country

which they had acquired and established by their arms, should the agreement contracted with the Nabob be broken by him.

Nor was this right in any manner remitted by the treaty of Paris, to which the advocates of the Nabob's sovereignty have so ignorantly appealed. By that treaty, France acknowledged the right of England to all the conquests which she had made in India during the preceding war; and, in the *eleventh article*, Mohammed Alli is expressly recognized as *lawful Nabob of Arcot*,* and *guaranteed in all the rights of THAT OFFICE*. This brings us back, therefore, to the question of what the *rights of that office were*? And that has been already answered by the explanation which I have given of the nature of the *Nabob's office*, on the authority of the Institutes of Akbar. So that the

* The name of the city in which the Nabobs of the Carnatic formerly resided.

treaty of Paris, which has been absurdly supposed to acknowledge the Nabob as the independent sovereign of the Carnatic, does, in fact, merely guarantee to him the possession of that office, of which the very name signifies delegation and dependance; and in which, as he was placed and maintained by the British government, under the sanction of the Moghul, it reserved the right, both by the Moghul constitution, and by natural law, of removing him again from that office, should he be guilty of such infidelity or misconduct in the discharge of its duties as proved dangerous, or even injurious, to the general interests of the state.

This paramount right over the Carnatic, which was originally acquired by our arms, was strengthened and confirmed by the practice of our government in all its subsequent transactions. The political affairs of the province were entirely administered by

our government. We possessed, exclusively, the power of the sword, and the Nabob could not, without the assistance of our troops, even quell those domestic commotions which his own tyranny and extortion, in the collection of the revenues, so frequently excited. In war the Nabob was *called on*, as possessing the revenues, to defray its expenses; and *directed* to contribute his aid in supplying our army with provisions, and in every other practicable mode to facilitate its operations. And, at all times, he was strictly debarred from holding any correspondence with any foreign power, without the *knowledge* and *sanction* of the British government.

These rights of supremacy, exercised over the Nabob, sufficiently attest his complete subordination and subjection. But the different arrangements and compacts which were made with him since the treaty of

Paris, will still more strikingly illustrate the nature of the relations between him and the British government.

Having failed in that material part of his first engagement with the Company, whereby he was bound to liquidate the debt they had incurred by that war which had established him in his office, he was called on by the government of Madras, in 1763, for some more substantial and tangible security than the obligation of a simple agreement. It was, therefore, proposed to him to assign to the Company, by way of jagheer, the four districts contiguous to the seat of our government at Madras. To this proposition he at first expressed a dissent; and wished to annex to his compliance some conditions on the part of the Company. But the English Governor plainly told him, "*That it did not become a man, who owed to the Company the situation he enjoyed,*

“ *to make any conditions under such cir-*
 “ *cumstances; that they did not take any*
 “ *thing from him, for that they, in fact,*
 “ *were the givers, and he the receiver.*” *

The proposed assignment was accordingly carried into effect; and that portion of territory was appropriated to the British government, which is designated in our maps under the appellation of *Jagheer*.

From that period of time until the commencement of Lord Macartney's administration, the affairs of the Carnatic did not undergo any material change. The gross misconduct of the Nabob, and his officers, in the management of the revenues, the pernicious operation of the double government, the fluctuating and indecisive policy of the Company, and the dreadful ravages of

* Governor (afterwards Lord) Pigot's letter to the Nabob Mohammed Alli, August 13th, 1763.

Hyder Ally, had reduced that populous and once flourishing country to a state of the most afflicting impoverishment.

Lord Macartney, with that penetrating sagacity, and quick judgment, which distinguished his character, soon discovered that the prime source of all the grievances under which the country so severely suffered, arose in our having committed to the Nabob the uncontrolled management of the revenues. He, therefore, submitted to the Nabob a proposition for an assignment to the British government of the *whole revenues* of the Carnatic, to be held during the war which then existed, and until the whole of his debt to the Company should have been liquidated. In this proposal the Nabob acquiesced; the assignment was accordingly made, and the collection of the revenues placed under the superintendance of English commissioners. It is not necessary in this

place, to relate the temporary circumstances connected with that measure; but it will be satisfactory to look at the general principles, and views of policy, by which Lord Macartney was led to adopt it.

That nobleman's character for disinterestedness, rectitude, and moderation, stands no less high in the estimation of the public, than his talents as a statesman; and his opinion, therefore, as to the policy best adapted for the government of the Carnatic, cannot fail to have due weight in this discussion.

In his Lordship's official dispatches to the Court of Directors, he observes, " The first
 " **thing that struck me, as defective in your**
 " **system, was, *the nature of the Company's***
 " *connection with the Nabob, by which the*
 " *resources of a province, garrisoned and*
 " *defended by our forces in peace and war,*

“ were altogether in the control of his
 “ Highness, under a simple and insecure
 “ engagement of reimbursing, by instal-
 “ ments, the current charges of a certain
 “ proportion of those forces. This stipu-
 “ lation, even in peace, was, from *constant*
 “ *failure, and backwardness in the Nabob, a*
 “ source of *perpetual alarm* to Govern-
 “ ment, which *often found itself absolutely*
 “ *unable to provide for the payment of the*
 “ *troops when it became due.* But if such
 “ are the inconveniencies of this system, in
 “ time of peace, how totally unprovided,
 “ weak, and defenceless, must be your situ-
 “ ation under it in time of war, and parti-
 “ cularly in the event of an invasion of the
 “ country from whence this scanty resource
 “ is to come? When Hyder Alli entered
 “ the Carnatic in July, 1780, *there was an*
 “ *instant stop to all payments from the*
 “ *Nabob, upon a plea of absolute inability.*
 “ Your army, at the *very moment* that its

“ *expenses were doubled, lost even its usual*
 “ *supply, and the whole charges of the war,*
 “ *ordinary and extraordinary, and even the*
 “ *daily sustenance of the troops, were thrown*
 “ *upon you : in this dreadful exigency was*
 “ *obtained that assignment, without which*
 “ *all your revenues and credit must have*
 “ *been inevitably sunk to no purpose.*

“ In my letter of the 1st December, I
 “ declared my opinion, *that from the mo-*
 “ *ment you should surrender that assignment*
 “ *you would cease to be a nation on the*
 “ *coast of Coromandel. I now repeat to*
 “ *you the same opinion.*” *

In a subsequent dispatch he says, “ It

* A letter from Lord Macartney to the Secret Committee, 24th January, 1804. See *Papers relating to the affairs of the Carnatic, printed by order of the House of Commons*, 1803.

“ appears, by the different calculations we
 “ have sent you, that with all the advan-
 “ tages of peace, and *all the revenue of the*
 “ *Carnatic, under the most productive ma-*
 “ *nagement, you will scarcely be able to*
 “ provide for the relief of your own bur-
 “ thens, and the heavy debts of the Nabob.

“ *To revert, under such circumstances, to*
 “ *the system which existed in the Carnatic,*
 “ *before the war, would, in my humble opi-*
 “ *nion, be to expose your possessions to the*
 “ *most dangerous risk. The clearest de-*
 “ *monstrations have been adduced, to prove*
 “ *the absolute inefficacy of that system;*
 “ *and the Nabob's interest and safety are*
 “ *equally concerned with your own in its*
 “ *speedy amendment. The assignment of*
 “ *the country has placed in your hands the*
 “ means of correcting it for a time; but
 “ there is no provision yet formed beyond
 “ the period of that assignment; *and I feel*

“ *the most painful anxiety for the conse-*
 “ *quences of surrendering the revenues*
 “ *again to that mismanagement and confu-*
 “ *sion from whence they have been so hap-*
 “ *pily rescued.*

“ A statement of collections delivered by
 “ the Committee of Revenue, is the most
 “ satisfactory evidence I can afford you of
 “ the advantages already derived from the
 “ assignment. A clear revenue of about
 “ 28 lacs of pagodas have been drawn from
 “ a country, *which, before the assignment,*
 “ *yielded no relief to the pressing exigencies*
 “ *of the war.*”*

Again he presses on the attention of the Directors, the *absolute necessity* of retaining possession of the revenues. “ From

* See the Papers relating to the affairs of the Carnatic, *before referred to.*

“ the statements,” says he, “ now enclosed,
 “ you must perceive, at once, *how impossible*
 “ *it will be for you to exist in the Carnatic,*
 “ *if you surrender the assignment.* With
 “ every attention to the management of the
 “ revenue, on its present advantageous foot-
 “ ing, your relief from this source will not
 “ be very material for the next three years ;
 “ afterwards, indeed, if the peace of the
 “ country be not disturbed, a rapid progress
 “ may be made in the discharge of the
 “ Company’s, and the Nabob’s, incum-
 “ brances ; but, *without the assignment, I*
 “ *see not a ray of hope for the preservation*
 “ *of the Company, or the security of the*
 “ *Nabob. * * * * ** *The cala-*
 “ *mities of the Carnatic cannot be healed,*
 “ *but by a PERMANENT SYSTEM of mild and*
 “ *indulgent measures.* By easing the
 “ country of an immense load of expence,
 “ *You have acquired the means of adopting*

“ *such a system, and pursuing it with suc-*
 “ *cess ; BUT IT NEVER WILL, NOR CAN BE*
 “ *EFFECTED, UNDER ANY OTHER MANAGE-*
 “ *MENT.*”

Yet, in the very face of these opinions, and of the vast body of incontrovertible evidence on which they were founded, the Court of Directors, in the plenitude of their dull imbecility, surrendered back to the Nabob, the whole revenues of the Carnatic, and thereby replunged the country into that complicated distress and misery, from which the wisdom and energy of Lord Macartney had so happily relieved it.

The evils which Lord Macartney predicted, if the revenues should be again relinquished, were unfortunately soon realized. In the course of two years after the surrender of the assignment, though a period of

undisturbed peace, throughout all India, the embarrassments of the Madras government became so insupportable, that its ordinary operations could no longer be carried on. Alarmed at the perilous predicament in which they had involved themselves, the Court of Directors dispatched *positive orders* to the governor of that settlement, to *make* a formal treaty with the Nabob; and to *insist, as an indispensable stipulation*, that he should pay 10 lacs, and 50,000 pagodas annually, for the support of the military peace establishment of the Carnatic, and 12 lacs of pagodas, annually, in liquidation of his debts.

When the basis of the proposed treaty was submitted to the Nabob, he stated his inability to pay the sum demanded for the peace establishment; but, after some delay, declared, “ that he could pay *nine lacs* of “ pagodas annually on that account, and

“ *have sufficient surplus to make himself and his family happy and comfortable.*” *

The Madras government consented to this small remission of the sum which it had been instructed to demand; and, with the additional stipulation, that the Nabob should pay *four-fifths of the gross revenues of the Carnatic* to the Company, in *time of war*, together with a *considerable part of all the contingent expenses* which might be incurred, the treaty was concluded.

Yet, though this contract was made on the Nabob's *own terms*, he failed in the fulfilment of its principal stipulation within eighteen months after it was executed, partly from disinclination, and partly from

* See a letter from Sir Archibald Campbell to the Secret Committee of the Directors, 24th February, 1787. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 2.

inability.* So that, when the war with Tippoo Suldaun broke out, in 1790, Lord Cornwallis found it necessary to revert to the measure of Lord Macartney, and *to re-assume the whole revenues of the Carnatic.*

The opinions entertained by both these distinguished statesmen, respecting the necessity of a radical reformation in the government of the Carnatic, entirely concur. After the assumption of the revenues, Lord Cornwallis examined the whole system of our connection with the Nabob, with a view to the adoption of some plan of permanent reform. But he found, on deliberation, that he could not venture to rely on the success of any plan which was not formed on the basis of *a complete surrender, on the part of the Nabob, of the whole management of the*

* See Sir Archibald Campbell's letter to the Court of Directors, 5th August, 1788. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 2.

country to the English government, and of allotting to the Nabob, out of its revenues, a liberal salary, for the maintenance of his family, and the support of his dignity. Such an arrangement, he was aware, “ might furnish topics for popular declamations in England, and might possibly engage the nation, on mistaken ideas of humanity, to support the present system of cruelty and oppression.” “ But,” says his Lordship, “ whilst I feel conscious that I am endeavouring to promote the happiness of mankind, and the good of my country, I shall give very little weight to such considerations; and I should conceive, that I had not performed the duty of the high and responsible office in which you did me the honour to place me, if I did not declare, that the present mixed government cannot prosper, even in the best hands in which your part of it can be placed; and that, unless some such plan

“ as that which I have proposed, should be
 “ adopted, the inhabitants of the Carnatic
 “ must continue to be wretched; the Nabob
 “ must remain an indigent bankrupt; and
 “ the country an useless and expensive bur-
 “ then to the Company and the nation.” *

But, by the time the contest with Tippoo terminated, Lord Cornwallis discovered, that there was no chance of being able to prevail on the Nabob, to agree to an arrangement of this nature; and, without his voluntary acquiescence, his Lordship did not, at that period, and under the circumstances which then existed, think it justifiable to carry it into execution.† It was,

* A letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Court of Directors, 10th August, 1790. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 2.

† Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Court of Directors, 9th July, 1792. *Carnatic Papers*, *ibid supra*.

however, indispensable to form a new agreement with him, before the land rents, and the devoted peasantry of the Carnatic, should be again yielded up to those improvident and rapacious hands in which they had so long suffered such grievous dilapidation and distress.

A negotiation was accordingly opened with the Nabob, and a treaty soon afterwards concluded; whereby a considerable abatement was made in the annual sum, agreed to be paid to the Company by the former treaty of 1787; and whereby, among other things, it was stipulated, *First*, that the payment to the Company, of the annual sum agreed on, should be made by regular monthly instalments. *Second*, that in the event of those instalments falling into arrear from the Nabob's *inability* to make them good, the Company should have a right to *assume* certain districts in the Carnatic, named and

marked out, within *fifteen days* after the failure in the Nabob's payments, to be *held in the entire possession* of the Company, and *the land-rents, or revenues, to be collected by their officers*, until such payments should be completed. *Third*, that as those districts constituted the Company's security for the punctual payment of the Nabob's instalments, the *Nabob agreed, that he would not grant tunkhas, or assignments, ON ANY ACCOUNT, on the revenues thereof*. *Fourth*, that for the security of the Carnatic, *all forts should be garrisoned by the Company's troops*, and that, in the event of war, the *Company should assume full and entire authority over the whole affairs of the Carnatic*, excepting the Jagheers belonging to the family of the Nabob, which, *on condition of the fidelity* of those who possessed them, should be continued to them. *Fifth*, that the Nabob *should not enter into ANY NEGOTIATION, or political correspondence, with any*

*European or native power, without the consent of the Company. And, Sixth, that Omdut-ul-Omrah, the son and presumptive heir of the Nabob Mohammed Alli, should succeed to the dignity and privileges of his father, on the terms of this treaty.**

Upon the execution of this treaty, the civil government of the Carnatic was again placed under the management and control of the Nabob: and, as by this new contract he had obtained the indulgent relinquishment of a considerable portion of the annual tribute, he was bound to pay the Company under the former treaty; and as he had also obtained the important benefit of securing his son's succession to the Nabobship, a favourable opportunity was afforded

* See a Treaty between the Company and the Nabob Mohammed Alli, dated 12th July, 1792, commonly called Lord Cornwallis's Treaty. Asiatic Register, Vol. 4, State Papers, p. 115.

him of at once reforming the enormous and acknowledged abuses of his administration, and of proving the sincerity of those eternal professions of fidelity to the English, which he had so long been in the habit of making, without having ever fulfilled.

From this brief survey of our principal political transactions in the Carnatic, up to the conclusion of the treaty of 1792; and from the explanation which has been given of the nature of the Nabob's title and office, as well as of the original, the progress, and the constitution of the *double government* which was established in that province, the following facts appear to be fully substantiated:

First. The Nabob had not the smallest pretensions of any sort, either to the title and dignity of a prince, or to the sovereignty of the Carnatic; he was merely the

governor of that province, possessing the title of a nobleman of the Moghul empire, but subject to the Power by whom he had been placed in his government.

Second. He received his government from the English, who had acquired the indefesible right of disposing of it, from their having conquered the Carnatic from the French, and who appointed the Nabob to govern it, under the sanction of the Moghul Emperor, and according to the forms of the Moghul constitution.

Third. The English, confiding in the Nabob's attachment to them, gave up to to his uncontrolled management, but on a revertable condition, the whole revenues of the province ; thereby uniting, in the same person, the office of Nabob and that of Diwan, which, according to a fixed maxim, as well as to the undeviating practice of the

Moghul constitution, had always been kept separate and distinct.

Fourth. The English, at the same time, retained in their own hands, the entire *political and military power* of the state, and debarred the Nabob, under positive restrictions, from any negotiation, or *any political intercourse or correspondence with any foreign nation, whether Indian or European.*

Fifth. The Nabob, by his original engagement with the English, was bound to supply, from the revenues of the province, an annual sum sufficient to defray the whole expence of their establishment.

Sixth. The Nabob having *invariable failed* in this obligation, and having by the grossest mismanagement, and the most grinding oppression, in the administration of

his government, dilapidated the revenues, and beggared the people, the English during two wars, revoked the authority over the revenues with which they had intrusted him, and placed them under the management of their own officers.

Seventh. At the termination of those wars, that authority was restored to the Nabob; but regular compacts were contracted with him, whereby the English government, by a *positive stipulation*, retained the right of *re-assuming* the *whole Carnatic in the event of any future war*, and whereby the Nabob bound himself, to *pay to the English government a fixed annual sum, to appropriate certain districts, as a security for the payment of that sum, to grant no assignment on these districts, and to hold no negotiation whatever, nor any political correspondence with any foreign state.*

These facts shew the complete power and sovereignty possessed by the English in the Carnatic, ever since the origin of their connection with the Nabob; and, likewise, the complete subjection of the Nabob to that sovereignty, and his entire dependance on its power. It is impossible, therefore, to recognize the Nabob in any other capacity than that of the *chief CIVIL magistrate* of a province, *subject to the supreme authority and dominion* of the English government.

The English hold the Carnatic by the right of conquest; whilst all the authority which the Nabob possessed was derived from that conquest, and conferred on him by the English, under the sanction of the Moghul; so that, by the very tenure of his authority, he was bound to exercise it, subject to the regulations of the Moghul constitution, and to the stipulations of positive compacts.

By the Moghul constitution, he was liable to be recalled from his government, at the pleasure of the sovereign power from whom he received, and under whose dominion he held, it.* By the obligations of his compact with us, he was subject to have that compact annulled, upon any violation of any of its stipulations; and, in such case, the English were justified in reverting to that original right, on which their connection with the Nabob was clearly founded, of placing the Carnatic under any form or constitution of government which they should consider best adapted to promote the general interests and happiness of its people.

Under the operation of the treaty of 1792, the Nabob was amenable to the esta-

* The Ayeen Akbarry, on the Institutes of the Emperor Akbar, before referred to under the article, *Instructions to the Subahdars.*

blished ordinances of public law, by which the parties to all covenants of that description must necessarily be regulated. Now, according to these ordinances, the violation of *any one article*, or of *any one clause*, in *any treaty*, cancels the whole, because every thing comprehended in the *same treaty*, is of the *same nature* and *forte* as a *mutual promise*, unless there be a positive and express-exception to the contrary. *Si pars una fedus violaverit, poterit altera à federe discedere: nam capita federis singula conditionis vim habent.* *

The application of these rules to the case in question will shew, that the treaty of 1792 was *completely dissolved* by the conduct both of the Nabob Mohammed Alli, and of his son, and successor, Omdut-ul-

* Vide Grotius de Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. ii, cap. 15, § 15. *Editio secundo amandatiæ Amsterdami.*

Omrah, long before the circumstances of their treachery were brought to light.

The reader will bear in mind, that the Nabob was bound, by a *special clause* in the treaty of 1792, *not to grant any assignments, on ANY ACCOUNT, on the revenues of those districts which were appropriated to secure to the Company, the regular monthly payments of his stipulated tribute.* But the Nabob Mohammed Alli, who had long practised the pernicious custom of granting such assignments in all parts of the Carnatic, was little restrained by the obligation which he had contracted, and appears not only to have continued the practice generally, after the conclusion of the treaty, but in direct violation of this positive stipulation, to have actually mortgaged the very districts which formed the Company's security for the punctuality of his payments.

The fact of the Nabob having granted assignments, or mortgages, on those districts, was a matter of perfect notoriety at Madras, in the beginning of 1794; but after the commencement of Lord Hobart's administration, it was fully detected and exposed. That noble Lord investigated the matter with the most scrupulous diligence, and has publicly recorded, in the proceedings of his government, an account of the manner in which the Nabob granted those assignments, with a circumstantial minuteness of detail, which, were the allegation unsupported by any other testimony, carries with it the most unquestionable evidence of its truth. * These public records likewise exhibit a most calamitous and afflicting picture of the accumulated miseries which the practice of

* See Lord Hobart's Minutes in Council, 24th October, and 24th November, 1795. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 2, p. 99—107.

mortgaging the land-rents, or revenues, intailed upon the plundered and famished peasantry.

Possessed of this information, Lord Hobart made an explicit communication of it to the Nabob Mohammed Alli; and, at the same time, represented to him, that by his infraction of one of the main stipulations of the existing treaty, he had cancelled the whole; but that the British government, in consideration of the intimate connection which had so long subsisted between him and the Company, would not require any other satisfaction, than such a modification of the treaty of 1792, as should abolish the baneful system of raising money by assignments on the revenues, and place under their own management, a permanent territorial security, proportioned to the amount of the annual sum, which he was already bound to pay.

Before any decisive answer was received to this representation, the Nabob Mohammed Alli died: and a proposition for the same modification of the treaty, on the same grounds, was then submitted to his successor Omdut-ul-Omrah. - But, after a long consideration, the Omdut declared, that he could not recede in the smallest degree from the strict letter of the existing treaty: grounding this resolution on a testamentary injunction, real or pretended, from his father.

Yet, notwithstanding this pertinacious rejection of a proposal so moderate, under the aggravating circumstances of the case, the British government pursued the mild policy of postponing the exercise of its rights, until some more favourable time, rather than enforce them by compulsory means.*

* A difference of opinion did indeed exist on this point, between Lord Hobart, and the Governor-general, Sir

The administration of the Nabob, therefore, continued to be conducted on the same profligate principles, and in the same defiance of the obligation of his covenant, by which the sources of the prosperity of the Carnatic were at once drained and corrupted, and by which his whole government was rendered obnoxious to an entire abolition.

In this state of things, Lord Wellesley arrived at Madras, in 1798; and, *in conformity with his instructions from the Court of Directors*,* urged, to the Nabob, the necessity of framing such a modification of

John Shore, now Lord Teignmouth, to which it is foreign to the purpose of this discussion to advert. But they both agree in the RIGHT of the government to annual the treaty. See *Carnatic Papers*, No. 2, p. 88.

* See Extract from a general letter of the Court of Directors, to Fort St. George, in the political department. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 1, p. 293.

the treaty of 1712, as should place the *Company's interests*, and the *security of the country*, beyond the reach of those mischievous practices of his government, by which he had *violated that treaty*, and, therefore, *rendered it liable to be dissolved*, and by which his own welfare, as well as that of the suffering people of the Carnatic, would inevitably be destroyed.

The Nabob, expressed his satisfaction at the manner in which the orders of the Directors had been executed by Lord Wellesley; but still persisted in his refusal to comply with them. He, however, *distinctly admitted* to the Governor-general, *that he had been in the practice of raising money, annually, by granting assignments of the revenues of those districts which form the security of his payments to the Company.**

* The Nabob's *acknowledgment* of his having granted assignments, or, as he terms it, ORDERS on the districts, is

But as Lord Wellesley's instructions, did not authorize him, to employ any other means, than those of persuasion to obtain the object in view, he postponed all further discussion of the subject, with the Nabob, until he should receive fresh orders from England.

contained in the following paragraph of a letter from *him*, to Lord Wellesley, dated the 8th of May, 1798. He says—" Having also *complained*, that under the pre-
 " sent arrangement of my monthly payments, I was com-
 " pelled, at a particular period of every year, to *raise money*,
 " for the payment of the Company's subsidy, which
 " money was REPAID *from my countries* (that is *districts*)
 " in the following manner, *viz.* Supposing a kist of a lac
 " of pagodas was to be paid, we received 60,000 from
 " the country, and *borrow* the remaining 40,000, from
 " some person, and give him AN ORDER ON THAT
 " COUNTRY, for that amount, which he receives."

The letter from which this extract is taken, forms an enclosure to a letter from the Governor-general, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, *dated 1st of October, 1798.*

In the mean time, the war with Tippoo Sultaun commenced: and the British government, by an article in the treaty of 1792, was authorized, in such an event, to assume the revenues of the Carnatic, and to hold them during the continuance of hostilities. But the Governor-general, instead of exercising that right, embraced this opportunity of again exhorting the Nabob to consent to a radical and permanent reform in the whole system of the Carnatic government, and submitted to him a regular plan, on which he proposed to effect it.

The leading objects of this plan were, *First*, the complete adjustment of every branch of the Nabob's affairs, as connected with the Company. *Secondly*, that the new arrangement should be so framed, as to provide the best practicable security against future change. And, *Thirdly*, that the respec-

tive rights of the Company, and of the Nabob, should be so distinctly separate, and clearly defined, *as that no part of the Carnatic should in future remain, or fall under a divided government.**

A reference to the detailed plan will shew, that these important objects were principally sought to be obtained by commuting the annual subsidy, which the Nabob was bound to pay for a *portion* of territory, the revenues of which should be exactly equal to that subsidy; by leaving the remainder of the Carnatic, subject to the single government of the Nabob; and by exonerating him entirely from his monthly payments to the Company.

* See the whole detail of this plan, in the Governor-general's letter to the Nabob of the Carnatic, dated April 24th, 1799. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 1, p. 204.

Yet, even to this fair and moderate arrangement for the reform of a system of government, which he admitted to be bad, the Nabob most peremptorily refused to accede, on the ground formerly alleged of a testamentary injunction from his father, never to depart from the strict letter of the treaty of 1792, nor to agree to any modification of it whatever. And, though in his former communication with the Governor-general, he had *distinctly acknowledged, his having granted assignments*, which was a direct violation of a positive clause in that treaty; he now denied, and attempted to dissemble that fact,* and to claim his right

* See the Nabob's letter to the Governor-general, dated 13th May, 1799. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 1, p. 214, 15, 16.

After denying the fact positively, he proceeds to give an account of the manner in which the payments are made from the districts that are pledged to the Company,

to the conditions of a covenant which he had repeatedly broken, and which, therefore, according to the general principles of

and which, says he, are *ordinarily said to give rise to the assignments in question.* “As my monthly kists require to be paid regularly, and as the expense and danger of the remittance of money in specie, from a distant country to the presidency, are great, *my managers*, for the amount of their respective payments, procure *bills from the sircars*, for the sums remitted, and *these bills are purchased of native bankers*, who may have money unemployed at Madras; they are taken without reference to me, or to any one connected with my Durbar: they are paid *in specie or grain*, and never superinduce an agreement of any sort to which I am a party, directly or collaterally. The transaction ends as it originated—*with the managers and the sircars.*”

Let the reader compare this explanation with the statement contained in Lord Hobart's minute in council, before referred to, and he will at once perceive the shallow artifice with which the Nabob has endeavoured to disguise a truth, that he had before admitted himself, by pretending that the native bankers took bills only on the revenues for the money advanced. See Lord Hobart's Minute, Appendix, A.

public law, already stated, was liable to be dissolved at the pleasure of the other party.

At the very moment, too, that the Nabob thus declared, in effect, his unalterable determination, never to concur in any measure for reforming the government of the Carnatic, and refused all satisfaction to the British government for his *continued violation* of a treaty, to which he had professed such sanctimonious adherence, he had failed in a temporary engagement, for supplying a small sum of money to support the exigences of the war; and suffered his managers, in every district, to oppose every possible obstacle to the passage of supplies for the English army in the field, in defiance of the repeated remonstrances made to him by the Governor-general on the subject.

Under these circumstances, the capture of Seringapatam, and the fall of Tippoo, put

the British government in possession of the records of that prince; amongst which were discovered, that correspondence between him and the nabobs of the Carnatic, which the Reviewer admits to be of a *secret and mysterious* nature.

The British government, however, *did not*, as the Reviewer has untruly asserted, IMMEDIATELY PRONOUNCE *this correspondence to be perfidious, and hostile to the English nation*. On the contrary, the Governor-general proceeded to investigate the matter with the most scrupulous and deliberate caution. He laid before the Governor in Council, at Madras, all the original documents, with translations annexed, together with a report along with them by the Persian translator; and he directed, that a secret commission should be instituted, for the purpose of ascertaining, by local enquiries, and the examination of persons who

were concerned in the correspondence, the real nature, and extent of the connection which appeared to have subsisted between the Nabobs of the Carnatic and Tippoo Sultaun.

At the same time, he communicated to his Majesty's ministers, and to the Court of Directors, the substance of the detected correspondence, his own opinion upon it, and the measures which he had, in consequence, thought it advisable to adopt.

It was highly material, in a question of such magnitude, to have his own judgment confirmed by the sanction of the constituted authorities in England; and he therefore resolved to take no definitive step, in regard to the Nabob, nor even to announce to him the discovery which had been made, until he should receive their answer; *unless any contingency should occur which might render it*

indispensably necessary to the tranquillity of the Carnatic, to have recourse to some decisive measure.

The circumstance of the Nabob's dangerous illness, which soon afterwards happened, presented a contingency of this nature. The Governor-general, on receiving official intelligence of that circumstance, issued instructions to the Governor of Madras, for the guidance of his conduct in the event of the Nabob's death.*

In these instructions the Governor-general directed—"That, in the event of the Nabob's death, Lord Clive should, in the first instance, offer the vacant office to Alli Hussein, the Nabob's reputed son, on the condition of a total

* See an official letter from the Governor-general to Lord Clive, dated 26th March, 1800. *Carnatic Papers*, No. 1, p. 59.

relinquishment of the Nabob's civil authority in the Carnatic, and of his receiving from the British government a provision of reasonable liberality: that if Alli Hussein should refuse, or delay to subscribe to this condition, the option of the succession should be given, on the same terms, to Azeem-ul-Dowlah, the legitimate son of the late Ameer-ul-Omrah, and nephew of Omdut-ul-Omrah: but that if both of these persons should refuse the dignity of Nabob, on such conditions, the government of Madras should proceed immediately to establish the authority of the British government over all the civil affairs of the Carnatic, and to suspend all negotiations respecting the succession to the Nabob's title and dignities, until the receipt of further instructions from the Governor-general in council."

These instructions appear to have been framed from considerations of expediency,

contingent on the Nabob's death; which would have fully justified the British government in adopting the measure recommended, without any other evidence against the Nabob, than that which appeared on the face of the correspondence in question, superadded to his previous violations of the treaty of 1792, and to his contumacious refusal to give any satisfaction whatever, for those repeated and avowed infractions of that covenant.

These considerations of expediency embraced the combined interests of the Company, and of the inhabitants of the Carnatic. A formidable rebellion existed at that time in the conquered provinces of Mysore; and several parts of the English possessions in Coromandel and Malabar were disturbed by the restless predatory spirit of disaffected chieftains; some of them actually in arms, and others only

waiting a favourable opportunity to prosecute their accustomed system of rapine and plunder.

Such an opportunity would infallibly have been presented to them, in the wide-spreading family discord, which a disputed succession to the Nabobship was expected to produce. The circumstance of the Nabob having no legitimate son, together with the various prevailing interests in his family, left no doubt, that the succession would be contested with all the bitterness and fierceness of those domestic feuds, which predominate amongst the mussulmans, and which have contributed to give a character of barbarism to the most civilized periods of their history. Such a contest could alone be prevented by the prompt and decisive interposition of the British government ; and that interposition, therefore, was obviously essential to the tranquillity of the Carnatic.

Hence, then, it was the true policy of the British government, in the event of the Nabob's death, to interpose its paramount authority, for the preservation of the public peace; and in doing this, to assume its original right of sovereignty over the Carnatic, which had clearly reverted to it, by the Nabob's violations of the treaty of 1792, and by the consequent right which it acquired, of abrogating that instrument, whenever it should appear expedient. Motives of misplaced lenity had too long induced the British government to forbear the exercise of those rights, and to allow the civil authorities of the Carnatic to be ruled by a faithless and worthless family, whose administration was marked with the most incorrigible profligacy and corruption; and was as abhorrent to the feelings of the people, as it had proved destructive to the interests of the state.

It would, therefore, have been a criminal dereliction of duty in the British government, to have suffered that system of administration, *under all the circumstances of the case*, to pass into the hands of another Nabob of the same family ; who must, from the very nature of his system of government, have pursued the same vicious and ruinous course.

But the Reviewer will probably contend, that a right acquired by the Nabob's violations of his covenant, could not be extended to his successor.

He will, however, recollect, that the principles of the law of *forfeiture* do extend, in the fullest manner, to heirs and successors.

It is one of the first maxims of general equity, that an heir, or successor, from the very circumstance of his possessing the inhe-

ritance, is not only bound for the engagements of the person to whom he succeeds, but *cannot be discharged from the obligation to repair the damage which the deceased may have occasioned by his crimes or offences*; neither under the pretext, that he derives no benefit from these crimes, or offences, *nor because there may have been no accusation, or condemnation, against the deceased*. For, though the offence, or injury, committed by the deceased, were of such a nature *as never to have yielded any positive profit to himself*, yet the heir, or successor, as he reaps advantages by the inheritance, is bound for the reparation of the damages occasioned by the offence of the person to whose possessions he succeeds.*

* These maxims are sanctioned by their adoption into the great civil code of Europe, which, by way of distinction, has been justly called, *Ratio Scripta*; for it contains all those rules of natural reason and equity, which govern the actions of mankind.

Hence, then, the person who might have succeeded to the Nabobship, on the death of Omdut-ul-Omrah, was bound to make a reparation to the British government, for the offences committed by that Nabob; not merely proportioned to the extent, but adapted to the peculiar nature of the injury which these offences had occasioned. I have already shewn, that the injury extended to the whole people of the Carnatic, whose prosperity it destroyed, and whose comfort and happiness it invaded; and that the nature of it was such, as to render no reparation of any utility, or avail, but that of delivering the country from that baneful system of government, which it had been found utterly impracticable to correct. The Governor-general therefore was, on these grounds, justified in instructing the government of Madras, to demand from the person who should succeed Omdut-ul-Omrah, the surrender of the civil authority of the Car-

natic, as the only reparation adequate to the offences which that Nabob had committed.

At the time the instructions were issued to the government of Madras, these offences were greatly aggravated by the bare facts which appear on the face of the secret correspondence already mentioned.

This correspondence consists of letters, which passed between Tippoo Sultaun, the Nabobs Mohammed Alli, and Omdut-ul-Omrah, and the accredited ambassadors of Tippoo Sultaun, during their residence at Madras, with the two sons of that prince, who had been delivered up as hostages to the British government, for the performance of the stipulations of the treaty of peace, concluded at Seringapatam, in 1792. These letters are written with a studied ambiguity of expression, which, in itself, excites suspicion; and in that figurative style, which

is so well calculated for the purposes of deception. Their real object, therefore, can only be ascertained by a construction of the doubtful phrases, upon which a difference of opinion may fairly exist, and which, however sound and just, cannot, from its nature, amount to any thing more than presumptive proof. But, without entering into any interpretation of these phrases, the letters contain some plain facts, which admit of no equivocation, and which are abundantly sufficient to criminate the Nabobs, in a positive breach of the most important stipulations of their covenant with the British government.

The letters shew, first, that a *secret and confidential* intercourse was maintained, for *upwards of two years*, between the Nabobs and Tippoo's *accredited ministers*; and a correspondence of the same nature, carried on between the Nabobs and Tippoo himself,

chiefly through those ministers, but, occasionally, by direct letters from Tippoo to the Nabobs, and from Omdut-ul-Omrah to Tippoo.

Second. That the Nabob Mohammed Alli appointed those accredited ministers to meet his son, the Omdut-ul-Omrah, in a mosque, or place of worship, which they accordingly did; and where the Omdut-ul-Omrah, after questioning the ministers with a marked particularity, as to their having “FULL POWERS TO NEGOTIATE,” he told them, “that his father had made it a
 “testamentary injunction to his children,
 “taking God and the holy prophet to witness!
 “to pray night and day for Tippoo
 “Sultaun, and to *consider the prosperity and
 “welfare of that sovereign, as inseparably
 “connected with their own.*”

Third. That, on a subsequent day, the Om-

dut-ul-Omrah met the ambassadors, by appointment, privately, in a garden, where he made use of some *particular expressions* of his attachment, which he required them, upon oath, not to commit to writing; but to defer the communication of those expressions, until they should return to the presence of his Majesty Tippoo Sultaun.

Fourth. That for the more effectual preservation of this secrecy, which was so solemnly enjoined, and so strictly observed, throughout this negotiation, a cypher appeared to have been established, and actually employed; for amongst the letters in question, a *key to a cypher was discovered*.

Fifth. That a meeting of Mussulmans had been assembled, by the ambassadors, at a mosque, *contiguous to the Nabob's house*, near Madras; which meeting was attended by the sons of the Nabob Mohammed Alli,

and at which one of the ambassadors delivered an exhortation, calling on all true Mohammedans to join the standard of his master, Tippoo Sultaun, in a *holy war against all those who dissented from the doctrines of the Koran.*

Sixth. That the Omdut-ul-Omrah, in a letter to one of Tippoo's public ministers, requests him to convey to the Sultaun, in the words of a poet, this sentiment regarding him: "in the preservation of Tippoo's person consists the permanency of the faith; and *let him not remain, who wishes not his preservation.*"*

These facts, taken together, amount to a

* The secret correspondence, from which these facts are taken, has been long before the public; and will be found in the *4th volume of the Asiatic Register, State Papers;* p. 134 to 146.

clear, irrefragable proof, that the Nabobs Mohammed Alli, and Omdut-ul-Omrah, did, without the consent of the British government, *enter into, and carry on, for some years, a NEGOTIATION with a foreign prince, through the accredited ministers of that prince, for some purpose, or purposes, of a nature so secret, and consequently of an importance so great, as to render it necessary, in the opinion of the parties concerned, to adopt the politic precaution of employing a cypher, in the communication of their real sentiments and views, and to induce the Nabobs to be so scrupulously careful, as not to impart to the accredited ministers, with whom they were treating, the object of their wishes, until they had previously adjured them not to commit it to writing.* I therefore ask, whether this proceeding, on the part of the Nabobs, was not a treacherous, and positive violation both of the spirit and letter of the

following clause in their compact with the British government ?

“ *The said Nabob agrees, that he will not*
 “ *enter INTO ANY NEGOTIATION, or political*
 “ *correspondence with any European, or*
 “ *NATIVE POWER, WITHOUT THE CONSENT*
 “ *of the Company.*”

If the reader be satisfied, that a secret negotiation, manifestly for important purposes, maintained by the Nabobs with Tip-poo Sultaun, through his accredited ministers, amounted to a positive infraction of the letter and spirit of this clause, and that the facts which have been exhibited from the correspondence in question, are sufficient evidence of the existence of that negotiation, he will readily allow, that combining this additional breach of covenant, on the part of the Nabob, with his former acknowledged violation of another essential part of it,

with his obstinate refusal of all satisfaction for that violation, and with the considerations of expediency which have been mentioned, as contingent on the Nabob's death, the Governor-general was called on, by every rule of sound policy, and authorised by the general principles of the law of forfeiture, which have been laid down, to annul the treaty of 1792, without farther enquiry, if that event took place, and to demand from the Nabob's successor, that reparation, by which it has been shewn the rights of the British government, and the permanent interests of the people of the Carnatic, could be alone secured.

The orders, however, which were designed to provide for the contingency of the Nabob's death, were never put in force. His life was prolonged for another year: and, in the course of that time, the Governor-general received the report of those

local enquiries, and personal examinations, which he had instituted for the purpose of obtaining the fullest possible information respecting the *secret correspondence* between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun.

The principal matter contained in this Report, is the minutes of the oral evidence taken before the Commissioners of Enquiry. The persons who delivered this evidence, were those very accredited ministers of Tippoo Sultaun, through whom the secret negotiation in question was conducted. Though their evidence does not develop the mystery, nor give any satisfactory elucidation of the ambiguous expressions in the correspondence, it is nevertheless of importance, as affording decisive proof of the authenticity of the documents, of which the correspondence is composed, and as corroborating the facts arising from them, which have been already stated.

The confessed inconsistencies in some of the answers of one of the ambassadors, and the manifest prevarication of the other, combined with their obvious and immovable resolution not to divulge any part of that information which the Nabob had adjured them to hold secret, with the equivocal nature of the documents, with the use of certain marked metaphorical phrases, which were evidently framed for the purpose of conveying a hidden meaning, and with the well-known rooted antipathy of Tippoo to the English name,—altogether furnish a strong presumption, that the real object of the negotiation was the formation of some plan of conspiracy against the British government in the Carnatic. Yet, as I wish to rest the merits of this question entirely on indisputable facts, I shall not incumber the discussion, nor perplex the reader with any conjectural comments on this part of the evidence.

It is sufficient to state, that the important facts of the *secret meeting*, at the mosque, between Omdut-ul-Omrah and the ambassadors, of the subsequent *meeting* them in the garden, of the establishment of the cypher, and of the religious meeting, at which the sons of the Nabob attended, are all fully confirmed by the evidence of Alli Reza Khan, the ambassador whose answers are the most consistent, and the *two first facts* are admitted by the other ambassador.

Of the cypher Alli Reza distinctly declares, “ That it was instituted by the Nabob Wallajah, *for purposes of secret communication*, and the original, he believed, was written in pencil by Khadar Newaz Khan, (*the Nabob’s confidential adviser in all political affairs*) or some other person about the Nabob Wallajah ; that it was delivered to him, and the other ambassador, Gholaum Alli, by Khadar

“ Nawaz Khan, who told them, that it had
 “ been composed for communication with
 “ Tippoo and the Nabobs Wallajah and
 “ Omdut-ul-Omrah ; that a copy of it was
 “ given to Tippoo Sultaun, and the original
 “ brought back to Madras.”

But the only explanation which could be drawn from either of the ambassadors, with respect to the real object of their secret meetings with Omdut-ul-Omrah, and to the real use for which the cypher was intended, was, that they both related to a proposition of marriage between a son of Tippoo Sul-taun and a daughter of the Nabob :—an explanation obviously untrue ; and if it were true, in no way calculated to justify the conduct of the Nabobs in keeping it a secret from the British government. One of the ambassadors expressly states, “ *That the*
 “ *Nabob Wallajah considered Lord Corn-*
 “ *wallis’s LEAVE TO BE NECESSARY to the*

“ *marriage* ;” but, at the same time, he concealed it from his Lordship with the most impenetrable secrecy.

If it were credible that a negotiation, which lasted for three years, and which was conducted with such extraordinary and scrupulous secrecy, should have no other object than a matrimonial connection, it is undeniable that that connection was considered by the parties concerned as a matter of great importance ; and that the Nabob, therefore, was bound, by the obligation of his covenant, not to have carried on such a negotiation without the knowledge of the British government. The very circumstance of their adopting such unusual, and, for any innocent purpose, such unnecessary means of concealment, betrays a manifest consciousness of guilt, and is in itself the strongest possible proof, that the Nabobs were aware

of its being a direct violation of their covenant with us.

The plea that secrecy is essential to that peculiar delicacy which is observed in matrimonial affairs amongst Mussulmans, is untrue, as it regards their customs in relation to marriage, and is in itself utterly preposterous. No person of common sense, either in England or in India, can seriously believe, that the Nabob of the Carnatic, and Tippoo Suldaun, would think it requisite, from pure motives of delicacy, to *establish a cypher*, and to *inforce an oath of secrecy on accredited public ministers*, for the *single purpose* of conducting a correspondence relative to a marriage. If, therefore, a marriage can be imagined to have been the real object of the negotiation; the secrecy with which it was maintained, must have been adopted from considerations of policy, and not from feelings of delicacy, which are neither inspired

by their religion, conformable to their customs, nor consonant to the peculiar characters of the men.

As a palliation, if not a defence, of the Nabob's conduct in this negotiation, it has been urged, that a friendly correspondence between him and Tippoo was encouraged by Lord Cornwallis. But did his Lordship recommend the use of a cypher, in this friendly intercourse, as the readiest means of facilitating and promoting it? Or did he wish the Nabob's friendly communications to the Sultaun to be of that delicate and curious nature which made it impossible to commit them to writing, or even to impart them to the accredited ministers of that prince, without the previous precaution of an oath of secrecy?

A reference, however, to the public documents which have been printed by order

of the House of Commons, will shew the sort of correspondence between the Nabob and Tippoo, which Lord Cornwallis encouraged, and which was carried on under the sanction of the Madras government, during the very same period of time with the *secret* negotiation. To enable the reader to judge of the difference, both in style and sentiment, between the avowed and the secret letters written by the Nabob to Tippoo, I shall cite two, from Omdut-ul-Omrah, composed on the *same occasion*—the nuptials of Tippoo's sons.

A Letter from the Nawab Omdut-ul-Omrah to Tippoo Sultaun, SENT WITH THE APPROBATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

“ I have received your letter, informing
 “ me of the celebration of the weddings of
 “ Abdul Kalick and Mohammed Moez-ud-
 “ Deen, together with a dress and jewels,

“ and am made happy beyond measure
 “ with this agreable intelligence. May
 “ the Almighty render this event happy
 “ and propitious to you.” *

*A secret Letter from Omdut-ul-Omrah addressed
 to Gholaum Alli Khan, Tippoo's confidential Mi-
 nister.*

“ Good faith is the law for Syeds. I
 “ complain of frequent neglects: let me be
 “ sometimes called to remembrance. At
 “ all events the intelligence of the marriage
 “ of the princes has rejoiced me. The pre-
 “ sents usual on such occasions from my
 “ father will be sent. Repeat the following
 “ couplet on my part to Tippoo Sultaun.

“ *In the preservation of thy person is the perpetual permanence*
 “ *of the faith,*
 “ *Let him not remain who wishes not thy preservation.*” †

* See Carnatic Papers, No. 1. p. 272.

† This is the verse before quoted, in substance.

“ Make my complaints to his Highness
 “ of his not writing to me. If permission
 “ be required for stating those complaints,
 “ you will obtain it. To the princes, re-
 “ spect : to Reza Alli Khan, compliment.”

No man, I should suppose, will venture to assert, that the last of these letters was written with no other view than that of complying with the wishes of Lord Cornwallis.

On the whole, the facts which are substantiated by the written and oral evidence in this case, plainly prove, that the Nabob was guilty of a perfidious breach of his covenant ; and connecting this, therefore, with the circumstances of his continued and avowed violation of that covenant in another essential article, of his pertinacious rejection of repeated proposals made to him on the part of the Company, for an amica-

ble adjustment of their differences, and for a radical reform in the government of the Carnatic, and finally, of the policy of delivering the country from that abominable system of extortion, rapacity, and cruelty, which ruined the interests and endangered the safety of the state, whilst it impoverished and corrupted the people,—all these bearing on each other, and considered in one view, will demonstrate the wisdom and justice of the British government, in dissolving a violated, and, therefore, an useless compact, and in assuming, on the principles of the law of forfeiture, its original right of undivided sovereignty over the province of the Carnatic.

It only remains to notice the manner in which that right was put in force.

As soon as Lord Wellesley had received from the President of the board of control,

and from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, their *entire concurrence* in his sentiments upon the secret correspondence which has been examined, and their *approbation* of his intentions with respect to the arrangement which he designed to adopt for the future government of the Carnatic, he instructed the Governor of Madras, in a letter dated the 28th of May, 1801, to communicate to the Nabob the discovery which had been made of his negotiation with Tippoo, together with the proofs of his treachery, to represent to him the condition, in which he had thereby placed himself in relation to the Company, and to stipulate with him for the peaceful resignation of the civil authorities of the country, receiving for himself, and the different branches of his family, annual stipends proportioned to their respective ranks.

The state of the Nabob's health, however precluded the possibility, (according to the opinion of his own physician,*) of making any communication to him of the intentions of government, without greatly agitating his mind, and putting his life in immediate danger.

In this state of things, those intrigues and cabals, respecting the succession to the Nabobship, which I have already noticed, were revived with increased eagerness and acrimony; the tranquillity of the Nabob's house was disturbed; and, at last, a party of armed men was secretly introduced into it, by Hassam-ul-Mûlk, the Nabob's brother.

These circumstances rendered it necessary for the government of Madras to interpose

* See the affidavit of M. Fitzgerald, physician to the late Nabob of the Carnatic. *Asiatic Register*, Vol. 4th, State Papers, p. 171.

its authority, in order to secure the Nabob's family, from the bloodshed and depredation with which they were threatened; and accordingly, with the concurrence of the Nabob, a small body of troops was stationed at his place of residence.

This measure served effectually to repress the violences, which were expected, and to preserve the public peace from that disturbance which such occurrences could not have failed to produce; so that, upon the death of the Nabob, which happened the following week, no outrage whatever took place.

The family feuds, however, though suppressed, were still unextinguished; and this circumstance, combined with a spirit of insurrection which prevailed in some of the districts of the Carnatic, and which had

been produced by the unappeasable rapacity of the Nabob's administration, made it expedient to lose no time, in carrying into effect the resolutions of the Governor-general in Council, for the settlement of the country. Accordingly, two confidential persons, justly distinguished for their abilities, and their knowledge in the languages and institutions of India, were deputed to the Nabob's family, for the purpose of ascertaining whether he had left any will, or made any arrangement, for a successor.

These deputies were informed, that an authentic will had been left by Omdut-ul-Omrah, nominating his *reputed* son, Alli Hussein, to succeed him in the Nabobship.

Several conferences were subsequently held, between the deputies, Alli Hussien, and

the principal officers of the late Nabob, at which the circumstances and proofs of Omdut-ul-Omrah's violation of the treaty of 1792, the consequent abrogation of that instrument, the forfeiture of all his authority in the Carnatic, and the right acquired by the British government, to demand, from his heir and successor, a proportionate reparation, were all, in the fullest manner, unfolded and explained.

A plan of settlement was then offered to the acceptance of Alli Hussien, grounded on his relinquishment of the revenues, and civil authorities of the Carnatic; and exactly corresponding with the one formerly suggested by lord Cornwallis, to the court of Directors, as the only possible means of rescuing the Nabob's affairs from utter ruin, of securing the permanent interest of the Carnatic, and of delivering its inhabitants from "*a system of cruelty and oppression,*"

which had reduced them to a state of the most deplorable wretchedness.*

With this plan, Alli Hussein at first expressed himself perfectly satisfied ; but after a further consultation with the officers of the Nabob, who called themselves his guardians, he peremptorily rejected it, in spite of all the persuasive arguments, and earnest expostulations with which Lord Clive endeavoured to dissuade him from so imprudent a determination.

In this case, as the British Government had resolved not to recede, in any manner, from a plan which it had formed with so much deliberation, and, as considerations of policy rendered it expedient to gratify the pride of the house of Mohammed

* See Lord Cornwallis's letters to the Court of Directors, before quoted. Carnatic Papers.—No. II. p. 84 and 85.

Alli, by preserving the rank and dignity of Nabob in the family, it was deemed advisable to offer the proposed settlement to the acceptance of Azem-ul-Dowlah, the legitimate son of the late Ameer-ul-Omrah, and grandson of Mohammed Alli. The offer was accepted by him, and that arrangement was accordingly carried into execution, which has placed the Carnatic under the same system of government as that which had long before been established in Bengal, and which experience has proved to be so eminently beneficial to the prosperity of that province.

This statement of undeniable facts, relating to the assumption of the Carnatic, sufficiently exposes the specious fallacies of the Reviewer's strictures on that measure. But one thing I omitted to mention in its proper place, for the purpose of answering the observations which the Reviewer, with an

air of triumph, has thought fit to make upon it.

When the charges against the late Nabob, together with all the proofs in support of them, were exhibited to the guardians of Alli Hussein, the Reviewer says, "*They pressed for a full investigation of the matter, and pledged themselves to refute them;*" but he candidly conceals this most material fact, that these *very persons, before they made this request, had explicitly, and unequivocally, declared, "That they were toially ignorant of the secret negotiation, in which their late master was engaged, and of every circumstance whatever, said to be in any manner connected with it."* It was, therefore, palpably impossible that these persons could have vindicated their late master from the charge of having conducted such a negotiation, or even invalidate any part of the evidence, by which it was supported.

It is manifest, that the request was only made with a view to gain time, in the hopes of effecting some arrangement more *favourable* to their personal interests, than the one proposed to the acceptance of Alli Hussein.

The Reviewer, who holds a positive breach of covenant, on the part of the Nabob, to be nothing more than “*a minute flaw* ;” in his habitual “obedience to the British government,” naturally enough considers it wrong, not to have complied with the wishes of Alli Hussein’s guardians, and affects to be mightily astonished at the reason assigned for the refusal.

The reason given was, that the British government could not undertake *formally* to sit in judgment on the conduct of the late Nabob, but that they would act on the established principles of general equity, and public law, and throw themselves on the opinion of the world.

Now, between parties who had no constituted judge to whom they could appeal, and by whom their cause of difference could be tried, what other course could have been pursued,—what other mode adopted, of obtaining justice, and of asserting their violated right. ? If the British Government had complied with the wishes of the late Nabob's officers, and had erected itself into a tribunal of judicature, it must, necessarily, have been at once the accuser and the judge: and the Reviewer would then have been the first to exclaim against such a flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of all legal procedure.

To what end then, do the Reviewer's observations on this point tend ? Would he have had the British Government institute an enquiry, in order to see by what sort of inventive logic the late Nabob would be defended, against the allegation of a breach of

covenant, by persons who, at the same time, declared their entire ignorance, not only of the general matter of charge exhibited against him, but of every fact and circumstance connected with it? Does he imagine that any good could possibly have arisen from such an inquiry? Does he imagine, that it would have conciliated the affections, and won the attachment of that Mussulman family?

“ He knows him not ;—

“ The genius of the Moors is mutiny ;

“ Prompt to rebel on every weak pretence ;

“ Blustering when courted, crouching when oppressed ;

“ Restless in change, and perjured to a proverb.”*

But the Reviewer entertains a far different opinion of the Mussulman character ; and considers the late Nabob of the Carnatic, as eminently entitled to compassion and forgiveness, however great might have been his offence. “ For,” says he, “ had the punish-

* Dryden's Don Sebastian.

“ ment been awarded to the reputed delin-
 “ quent himself, and that not on suspicion,
 “ but on *conviction of enmity*, not timorous,
 “ and reserved, but *open and frontless*;—
 “ which, had it overtaken him, after *repeated*
 “ *sins* against *rpeated lenity*, and after he
 “ had NOTORIOUSLY SWORN, LIKE TIPPOO,
 “ TO ANNIHILATE THE ENGLISH NAME in
 “ the east;—which, even under these cir-
 “ cumstances, would have been considered,
 “ by every good mind, AS A TREMENDOUS
 “ SACRIFICE TO THE VENGEANCE OF IN-
 “ SULTED JUSTICE!!”

This opinion, which, to use a phrase of
 Shakspeare's, “ is solely singular for its sin-
 “ gleness,” is above all comment. Every one
 can tell, whether it be a TREMENDOUS
 SACRIFICE to justice, to deprive an *open*
enemy of those weapons with which *he*
had sworn to annihilate us.

Yet such strictures as these, on the whole, supported by the general reputation of the work in which they appeared, have not been without effect in contributing to spread the popular delusion respecting the late transactions in the Carnatic;—partly, from the most profound ignorance of the subject, partly from the misrepresentations of faction, and partly from the notion, prevalent in all times, that the powerful, even when they have received an injury, are considered the aggressors, because the authority is in their hands.*

That great measure of policy and justice, as well as the whole of Lord Wellesley's foreign system, will, I hope, be somewhat better understood, from these observations

* Nam in omni certamine, qui opulentior est, etiam si accipit injuriam quia plus potest, facere videtur.—*Sallust. Bell. Jugarth.*—*Cap. 10—p. 99.*

which have been made, by way of reply, to the strictures of the Reviewer. In the whole range of civil history, it will be difficult to find any scheme of policy better calculated for duration, than the one which has been here reviewed; because it rests on a broad and solid basis, and is fitted to the characters and circumstances of the states on whom it operates.

The great prevailing defect in the foreign policy of almost all governments, is the want of any settled principles, or connected plan of proceeding. Too much regard is always paid to particular interests and passions; and far too little to those views of general utility, which can alone give weight and permanency to any great public measure. Hence temporary expedients, and undefined projects, usually regulate the foreign affairs of nations.

But, in the policy of Lord Wellesley's administration, we see a system formed on fixed and comprehensive principles:—happily adapted to the peculiar characters, the anomalous polities, and the conflicting interests of Indian powers; and laying the foundations of our own security in that country, in the advancement of the prosperity and happiness of the natives at large, and in the prevention of those continual wars of rapine, which had stunted the growth of their industry, and often extended the despair of famine over a land teeming with the bounties of nature. Under the guardian influence of this system of practical wisdom and beneficence, the people of India, subject to the native governments, will be relieved from many of the evils by which they were so cruelly oppressed; in the unmolested exercise of the arts of peace, they will find a resource against the impolicy of their rulers; and, in the increase of their agriculture, ma-

manufactures, and internal commerce, their real wealth will be gradually augmented, their general condition will be improved, and the whole face of the country will assume an aspect of comfort and contentment.

The thanks and gratitude of his country, therefore, are justly due to the author of this system, which has conferred so many substantial blessings, on so many millions of people, living under the protection of England, and by which the durable glory of the nation has, consequently, been so highly advanced. Of him I will say, in the words of an illustrious orator, statesman, and philosopher—“ That it will be a distinction
 “ honourable to the age, that the rescue of
 “ the greatest number of the human race,
 “ that ever were so grievously oppressed,
 “ from the greatest tyranny that was ever
 “ exercised, has fallen to the lot of abilities

“ and dispositions equal to the task ; that it
“ has fallen to one who has the enlarge-
“ ment to comprehend, the spirit to under-
“ take, and the eloquence to support so
“ great a system of hazardous benevolence.
“ He has put to hazard his ease, his secu-
“ rity, his interest, his power, for the be-
“ nefit of the people of India. He is tra-
“ duced and abused for his supposed ambi-
“ tious motives.—He will remember that
“ obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the
“ composition of all true glory : he will
“ remember that it was not only in the
“ Roman customs, but it is in the nature and
“ constitution of things, that calumny and
“ abuse are essential parts of triumph.”

APPENDIX.

(A.)

*Lord Hobart's Minute in Council, at Fort
St. George, the 24th October, 1795.*

THE proposed arrangements which have been brought into discussion since the death of his Highness the Nabob Walajah, make it necessary for me to advert, with more minuteness than has been usual upon the Public Records, to the system on which the administration of his revenue has been conducted, because it manifestly shews the necessity of that change which it is my object to accomplish, both in respect to the

country itself, which, though under the immediate controul of his Highness, it is the duty of this government, in a general point of view, to cherish and protect; and in respect to the security which has been pledged to the Company for the support of their military establishment, and for the discharge of the consolidated debts guaranteed by parliament to the private creditors of his Highness the Nabob. I shall, therefore, in this minute, lay before the board the information which I have collected, and the consequent observations which have occurred to me, upon the usurious loans which it has long been the practice (principally among the European gentlemen of the presidency) to make to the Durbar, for mortgages upon the different provinces of the Carnatic; and here I may be allowed to express my belief, that though the Honourable Court of Directors have been extremely pointed in their orders and observations

against this practice, the continuance of it has been owing, in some measure, to the want of that candid exposition of the fact, which it is my intention to make.

The southern districts of the Nabob's country, and Tinnevelly in particular, as being the most distant from the presidency, have been the theatre in which these scenes have been chiefly exhibited ; but it is notorious that similar practices have been introduced, and are now actually in use, in Nellore, Arcot, and Trichinopoly.

The transaction commences at Madras, where the kists of his Highness are payable, and is opened by an agreement between the Nabob and some one of the principal houses of business, or even some of the Company's servants, for the payment of a certain sum into the treasury, on account of his Highness's public engagements. The advancers

of this money, knowing, from experience, that a simple mortgage would be insufficient security, unless the means of reimbursing themselves should be placed in their own hands, find it necessary not only that a person of their own nomination should be appointed to the management of the mortgaged province, but that there should be a vigilant superintendance, and a powerful support of the concern, upon the spot; hence the expediency of a connection between them and the military commanding officer in the district: he also finds it advantageous to embark in the speculation; because he thereby adds considerable weight to his own interest, and because it facilitates the means of raising money to carry on his part of the concern. From this connection, both parties derive ample security for their money, by the absolute power of the one in command upon the spot, and by the weighty influence of the other in command

of monied interest at Madras. This outline is filled up by a further connection with the person who appears to receive the appointment of aumildar, or manager, from the Nabob: hence it is either stipulated that a person chosen by the money lenders at Madras shall be nominated to manage the district, or where men of rank may have already been appointed as foudars by his Highness, the same effect is produced by a communication between him, the commanding officer, and the money lenders, previous to the agreement for a loan at the Durbar. The combination is, in this latter case, completed by the appointment of a tehsaldar on the part of the money lenders, and thenceforward produces an uniform, consistent, and connected operation. His Highness having by this arrangement obtained his principal object, provision for the payment of his kist, without any immediate disbursement from himself, delivers his peo-

ple, and his province, up to the controul and power of the manager, evidently without regard to their situation; because, as his terms with the money lenders necessarily provide for the removal of all restraint from the governing power, so he must expect that the manager, who can have no interest in the future prosperity of the country, will have recourse to every means by which he may hope to bear himself and his connections harmless, and that within the shortest time possible.

The interest allowed by the sirkar varies in different places, and depends not a little upon the influence which the lender may happen to have at the Durbar: at a medium, however, it may be stated at 4 per cent. per month, besides the pay of all the servants employed by the junto in receiving the revenue. This last charge is always a fixed sum at the expence of the Nabob, con-

siderably above the actual expence incurred by the tehsaldar, and the difference is considered amongst the customary advantages of the concern. The manager arrived within his district, immediately assembles his under managers, aumildars, and renters, and then ensues the second part of this oppressive system:—The tehsaldar is importunate, and the manager must find means of satisfying his demands:—subordinate soukars, native as well as European, are called upon for assistance.—The soukar makes his advance; and, in the first instance, the Aumildar, or renter of the districts, assigned over as security for such advance, grants his bond until other securities shall be forthcoming: these are either the bonds of the inhabitants, or grain. In time, about three-fourths of the sum are secured to the soukar, by grain made over to him, and placed under charge of his servants; and for the other one-fourth, the bonds of the inhabitants are

made over for that part of the revenue, payable by them to the Sircar, in ready money, upon the cultivation of doy grain, &c. Those are frequently forced from them at the commencement of the season, which, consequently, compels them to anticipate the crops, and pay interest upon money before it be due from them.

At this period of the transaction, the Soukar sends his servants and peons into the country, with an order from the Nabob's manager to the guards placed therein, to afford every assistance, (as it is generally called) but, in fact, to obey them implicitly in collecting the amount of the bonds from the inhabitants. Anxiety to secure so precarious a property, naturally leads the Soukar to adopt such measures as power enables him, and the custom of the country authorizes. Then follows this process : if the ryot is dilatory in the discharge of his bond,

he is confined without victuals, beaten with rods, and compelled to pay batta to those very peons and guards who are the means of his confinement and punishment. In this manner, I am credibly informed, that an inhabitant, who grants his bond for 100 chuckrums (nearly 40 pagodas) is compelled, before he is released from the consequences, to pay from 110 to 115 chuckrums, according to circumstances. If his credit, or his other means, is exhausted, which is too often the case, he must necessarily dispose of some part of his stock, which consists of cattle and seed grain.

The first part of the system which I have stated, describes the original cause at the fountain-head: the second comprises the detail, which springs out of it; in both the considerations of the means which are immediately employed, and of the effect which it may produce upon the future revenue, is

abandoned ; and, while the grand mover of these effects is at a distance from the scene, and the subordinate instrument is hardened by practice, conscience is lulled to rest by the delusive opiate of interest upon interest.

Thus far I have traced the progress of a loan secured upon the bonds of the inhabitants : it will not be less principal for me to pursue it to the disposal of the paddy.

The first endeavour of those who are engaged in a concern of this nature is, to enhance the price of grain by artificial means, lest the ordinary price of that article, the sole substance of the natives, should fail to answer the large advance of money, and the exorbitant advantage expected upon it by the Soukar. The means of effecting this purpose is easy ; for the necessitous condition of the ryots compels them to dispose of their grain as soon as it

comes into their possession, in order to satisfy the urgent demands upon them, which I have already described: the purchasers of this grain monopolize it until the demand, which increases with the consumption, advances the price: if, towards the expiration of the season, any part of the grain should yet remain on hand, the expedient is, to divide the whole quantity, in whatever condition it may be, among the inhabitants, and to force it upon them by guddyum. This guddyum, it appears, compels the people (in general the manufacturers) to receive grain at a valuation considerably above the market price; and it would seem to be of ancient establishment and current practice; for in the agreement which I was successful in negotiating with his late Highness the Nabob Walajah, for placing a portion of the Tinnevelly weavers under the immediate superintendance of the Company's resident, his Highness has expressly

reserved, nor could he be prevailed upon to relinquish, the right of his Sirkar to exercise this guddyum.

The inferior servants of the Sirkar, whose duty should be to watch of the public interests, are placed under the arbitrary controul of the money lenders, without whose permission not an anna can be expended, nor a measure of grain issued, except by stealth : indeed, I understand, that upon the arrival of a Soukar, or his representative, in a mortgaged district, the usual custom is, to notify his authority throughout the villages, and to prohibit the expenditure of grain or money but by his orders : this prohibition extends to the ordinary charges of pagodas, maniums, and sibbeendy ; and when an order is granted from the Sudder Cutcherry for any of these purposes, the persons receiving the sunnud must wait at the Cutcherry of the money lender for a confirmation of his right.

Instead of receiving relief by tukavy (or advances for cultivation) at the proper season, by which to replace their cattle, and to provide seed for extending their cultivation, the inhabitants are often obliged to sacrifice both to their own immediate wants, and the rapacity of the Soukar; of course no system of regulation can prevail, and every hope of improvement must be relinquished. Some of the means for enhancing the price of grain I have already related, but the subject is exhaustless. The Poligars have been prevented by the manager of Tinnevely from selling, within the Sirkar lands, the grain which is allowed them for dash cavellry, (or watching fees;) and I should hesitate to advance, if I was not supported by the authority of public record, that, during a late scarcity of grain in the southern provinces, Extabar Khan, the Nabob's manager, had the hardiness to write a public complaint to the Company's collector, against

the Poligars, for selling grain to the inhabitants; nor was the evil removed without the interposition of this government, who, by sending vessels loaded with grain, induced the monopolizers, from regard to their own interests, to restore the usual supplies to the market: yet did the Company not escape the effects of this monopoly, for they were reduced to the necessity of purchasing grain at the price to which the monopolizers had raised it, for the subsistence of those troops who were stationed there for the protection of his Highness's territories.

After this exposition, no comment can be required to shew, that this species of government, if it deserves the name of government, contains the most grievous oppression of the people, the certain impoverishment of the country, and, consequently, the inevitable decay of revenue; but it will be useful to shew the particular manner in

which it affects the resources of his Highness the Nawaub.

It is estimated, and, I believe, not with exaggeration, that the province of Tinnevely alone, is annually mortgaged upon the terms I have described, to the amount of 3,00,000 pagodas; and calculating the period for which interest is paid upon the whole sum, at six months, the amount of interest, at 4 per cent. per month, is 72,000

The charges paid by the Sirkar for the sibbundy of the money lenders, during that period, cannot amount to less than — — — 3,000

The amount of loss, therefore, to the Sirkar, on this transaction, is, ———
pagodas — — — 75,000
—————

That an individual gentleman should, in less than three years, amass a fortune of more than £50,000, would be a matter of

wonder, if this statement did not at the same time afford a solution of the difficulty, and a proof of its own correctness.

But the scene is not closed here: besides the dealings of the principal Soukars with the head manager, there are subordinate transactions of a similar nature among the inferior officers, and those who possess but smaller means for usurious practices, amounting in all, perhaps, from fifty thousand to a lack of pagodas. This brings an additional expence upon the Sirkar, because interest is allowed on all advances made by the renters, on pressing occasions, before the kists are due; and, on the other hand, the inhabitants are not exempt from a part of this expence, which is imposed upon them by fine, forfeiture, or guddyum, in order that he may be enabled to make the advance, upon which he receives interest.

As the manager is under engagements to pay the fullest computed value of the district, he is justified, according to the custom of the country, in availing himself of every possible resource. A proportion of the church allowances is withheld; the pay of all descriptions of servants is kept in long arrear, and, in particular, the Sibbendy Sepoys: a small advance, indeed, is sometimes made for subsistence; but their principal resource (and it is not unproductive) is in the Batta, which they receive, by acknowledged practice, while doing the duty of sezawuls, and in the dexterous management of the power which that service gives them, to extort presents for their forbearance. The manager, knows, from experience, that in the event of the assuming the country, the English government will be induced, either from motives of humanity, to attend to the calls of these unhappy people, or, from motives of policy, to satisfy

the clamours of a mutinous and undisciplined rabble. Thus, at the very time when the exigencies of government became most pressing, a part of their resources, which ought to be immediate, is appropriated to the liquidation of arrears.

If this is a true history of the present management, it may be asked, why an immediate and large defalcation of the revenue does not follow ; for the operation of such system as I have described, tends directly to the point of ruin ? Nothing less than the hand of arbitrary power could avert it, even for a time. In proportion as the means of cultivation decrease, the price of grain is enhanced ; and it is a notorious, but inhuman maxim of Eastern finances, that a year of scarcity is more productive than a year of plenty to the Sirkar ; because, as a given number of months can only consume a proportionable quantity of grain, the imme-

diate advantage or disadvantage of government arises from the price at which that given quantity is sold.—In years of plenty, the superfluous grain is, in a great measure, useless, owing to the partial and difficult means of exportation;—in years of scarcity, the same given quantity is required for the subsistence of the people; and, as the demand is greater than the supply, an increase of the price is produced by the usual effects of a competition in the market.

Though the dealings of Soukars, in the collection of revenue, are not of recent establishment, yet the terms of loans have never been carried to so usurious an extent as since the practice has been introduced among Europeans: and though the inevitable effects of it may be protracted by the harsh expedients of an arbitrary government, yet no man, who reflects upon such a system, can doubt, that the resources of the

country have been undermined ; that the wealth of the people is exhausted ; and that a principle of decline has been established, which is now precipitating the Carnatic, with accumulated weight and rapidity, to destruction. Impressed as I am with a serious conviction of this truth, I cannot but look with extreme anxiety to the nature of the security provided by the treaty of 1792, for those resources on which the British interest, on the coast of Coromandel, materially depend ; I cannot but see, that the present system of collecting the revenues of the Carnatic manifestly invalidates that security ; and that, whenever a failure may happen in the payment of his Highness's kists, we shall in vain have recourse to it for the recovery of the defalcation. As those payments, though avowedly moderate in their extent, are now kept up by the extraordinary means which I have described, so it is reasonable to suppose, that a failure,

whenever it may happen, will arise from the total impoverishment of the people. In taking possession of a district, under such circumstances, for the amount of a kist, which will then have fallen in arrear, we shall, instead of finding the immediate means of reimbursement, become charged with an exhausted country, requiring all the liberal assistance, and fostering attention, of a lenient and indulgent government. It is not only that our means will be curtailed, at our greatest need, but that humanity and policy will call upon us for advances of money, at a time when our expenses will be most burthensome. This is an embarrassment from which the known resources of this government are unequal to extricate us; and it is a dilemma, unprovided for by the treaty of 1792; for the objects of that treaty are, the payment of a debt guaranteed by parliament, which we are not at liberty to postpone; and the discharge of military pay,

which cannot be interrupted without danger to the state.

To avert the consequences of an evil, big with such eminent danger, is an object that merits the most serious as well as the most unwearied attention of this government: and it is a matter of very great mortification to me, that seeing the progress of this calamity, and anticipating as I do its pestiferous effects, I am compelled to acknowledge, that the means of arresting its course is extremely difficult.

The prohibitory orders hitherto published, have all failed of their object, because the evasion of them is easy to Europeans, through the agency of their native servants, and because the enormous profits, which arise from those usurious loans, hold out an irresistible temptation to adventurers. To prohibit the intercourse of Europeans at the

Durbar is ineffectual;—other channels of communication are open; and the superintendant of a usurious loan, at Palamcotah, conveys his demands to the ears of the Nabob with no less certainty than he who lives in the precincts of Chepauk: as long, therefore, as his Highness shall be so regardless of his own true interests, as to deliver up his provinces, and his people, to public depredation, so long will there be found men who, in the pursuit of extravagant advantages, will overleap the bounds of discretion, and of moral obligation.

So desperate a malady requires a remedy that shall reach its source; and I have no hesitation in stating my opinion, that there is no mode of eradicating the disease but by removing the original cause, and placing those districts which are pledged for the security of his kists beyond the reach of his Highness's management. The disposition

which his Highness has already evinced to suppose such an arrangement, leaves me in no doubt of the real cause. It is not possible to calculate the extent and variety of interests which are involved in this one pursuit; and though they are subdivided in every direction of the Carnatic; yet, at the call of danger, they all rally round a common centre. The great houses of business, who are the principal money lenders at the Durbar, borrow from individuals, who, though not absolutely engaged in the loan itself, are partakers of the speculation in a remote degree, and feel, with no less sensibility than their principals, the approach of danger: similarity of interest makes it a common cause; and the great body of influence which is condensed upon this principle, is uniformly exerted to support his Highness the Nabob in an inflexible resistance against a melioration of system, and to oppose a reformation which I consider essential to the national welfare.

In the proposition which I have made to his Highness the Nabob, I am aware that I have offered great concessions on the part of the Company ; but, with the impression of the evils I have stated strongly on my mind, I could not but consider the object I had in view above every idea of a pecuniary nature, even if the system of the Nabob's government was not in itself calculated completely to annihilate every source of revenue.

(Signed) HOBART.

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