


STALIN AND HITLER

BY LOUIS FISCHER




THIS book was written while the Russo-Finnish War was still in progress. The author is an American who lived for fourteen years in Russia, and was an outspoken friend of the Soviet Union. But a change, he says, came over the Kremlin Government in 1936. Stalin turned nationalist. And with the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August, 1939, he joined the camp of the aggressors. Poland and the Baltic States were the first victims. Finland surprised the whole world by her resistance.

This view is directly opposed to the arguments put forward by Mr. Pritt in *Light on Moscow* and *Must the War Spread?* The second of these came into Mr. Fischer's hands after the main part of his book was completed, and he added a chapter in direct reply to it.

Since then events have moved rapidly. The Finns have submitted to the Soviet demands. Germany has occupied Denmark and invaded Norway. But nothing has happened to invalidate the author's thesis, and the motives which would prompt Hitler to interfere in Scandinavia are already foreshadowed at the end of Chapter IV.

The caricatures on the cover are by JOSS of "The Star."



THE AUTHOR

Louis Fischer was a school teacher in Philadelphia immediately after the last war. In 1922, at the age of twenty-six, he set out on his first visit to Russia, and married a Latvian girl from Libau. For fourteen years he lived in Moscow and made a special study of Soviet policy. Then, in 1936, he went to Spain to follow the course of the Civil War at first hand. He is the author of: "Oil Imperialism," 1926, "The Soviets in World Affairs," 2 vols., 1930, "Why Recognise Russia?", 1931, "Machines and Men In Russia," 1932, "Soviet Journey," 1935, "The War in Spain," 1937, "Why Spain Fights on," 1937.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

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A PENGUIN SPECIAL

STALIN AND HITLER

The Reasons for and the Results of the
Nazi-Bolshevik Pact

BY
LOUIS FISCHER



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CHAPTER I

THE RUSSO-GERMAN ENTENTE

THERE is nothing unalterable in international politics. The relations between two countries reflect their economic and strategic needs, their comparative strength, their internal politics, and their ties with other nations. All these factors are variable; so also are the relations. Japan and Russia fought a war in 1904. They were allies in 1914. Italy and Germany were allies in 1914. They fought a war in 1915.

The international scene is a giant jigsaw puzzle. If one piece falls out of place, all the other pieces move. Until recently, Soviet Russia and Turkey co-operated intimately. Russia's new friendship with Germany drives Turkey away from Russia and closer to England and France. When Turkey cools to Russia she warms to Italy. When Italy is less pro-German she is more pro-Ally.

This European crazy quilt is the frame of the Russo-German pact signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. As long as England and France allowed Germany to win victories in Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, Hitler played up the Bolshevik menace in order to keep the Western powers and Russia apart. He did not want England, France and Russia to join forces because such a bloc could have checked German expansion. When Hitler, however, could squeeze no further concessions from Great Britain and France, when instead they began to obstruct him, he turned to Russia. Germany was ready for the pact.

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Similarly, the Soviet government had for years sought to win England and France for an anti-Nazi policy ; it had always dreaded a combination of England, France, and Germany which might be directed against Russia. But in the spring and summer of 1939 the mounting antagonism between the two Western powers and Germany ruled out such a combination. Russia's fear of Germany accordingly vanished. When that fear went out friendship could come in. Russia was ready for the pact.

Germany was ready. Russia was ready. They got together and signed.

NOT FOR RUSSIAN SELF-DEFENCE

The Russo-German pact was not concluded by Moscow for self-defence. The champions of the new Stalin-Hitler relationship contend that if the Kremlin had not concluded the treaty with Berlin, Germany could have invaded Poland and then marched straight into Soviet territory and engaged Russia in a war. The treaty, they say, saved Russia from attack. This argument has no validity. Suspecting Hitler's designs on Poland, England and France had promised Poland that if Hitler attacked it they would go to war against Germany. If Hitler had not taken this Allied pledge seriously he would simply have sent the Reichswehr into Poland and occupied the whole country. Why should he have shared Poland with Russia ? Why give up his anti-Bolshevik crusade which had been a useful weapon ? The reason is clear : Hitler was not so sure of a bloodless victory in Poland, like that which he had achieved over Czechoslovakia at Munich in September, 1938. He was not as confident as he was then of Chamberlain's readiness to appease and Daladier's willingness to surrender. He needed Moscow to frighten the Allies into withdrawing from

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their promise to Poland. And if war came, he did not want the Soviet Union to be his enemy. For these favours Hitler was willing to pay Stalin, and he did pay. But you do not pay a fellow because you are not going to hit him. Hitler did not intend to hit Stalin. No self-defence on Russia's part was therefore necessary.

Suppose that on September 17, 1939, when Polish military resistance to the German invasion collapsed, England and France had not been at war with Germany. Despite the pact with Moscow, the Reichswehr, if Hitler wished, could have continued into Russian territory. The pact, after all, is only a piece of paper, not a protection. Why did Germany not attack Russia last September? Because it had to turn around and face the Allied war machine in the west. Moscow foresaw this. It was Stalin's conviction that the Allies would fight, and not the fear that they would not, which brought about the Russo-German pact.

Assume, for a moment, that Stalin had believed in the summer of 1939 that the Allies would not fight. He would have had to say to himself: apparently Hitler thinks they will, otherwise he would not be talking to me to get me to scare them off. Moreover, Stalin could only have reasoned, if the West will not fight where am I? Hitler will sign a pact with me and break it as he has others and attack me. I cannot trust Hitler. I must stick to the Allies.

If Stalin had had any doubt about the Allies' determination to stop Hitler, his policy would have been to reinforce that determination. Russia would never have trusted itself alone with Germany in Eastern Europe except in the expectation that Germany would be occupied with a war in Western Europe. Stalin must have foreseen the coming of the struggle between the Allies and Germany.

Thus, as long as the Allies followed the weak policy of appeasement and surrender to Fascist aggressors, the

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Bolsheviks were pro-Ally. And the moment the Allies took a firm stand against a Fascist aggressor, the Bolsheviks made a pact with him. That is what is called dialectics.

There will be an endless debate on whether Stalin fooled Hitler or Hitler fooled Stalin. This debate is fruitless. Stalin and Hitler entered into their partnership for the mutual benefits they hoped to reap from it. Altruism cannot be expected of statesmen, and what looks like idealism in foreign policy is often merely a long view of selfish ends. If Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler were serving their countries' best interests, they were entitled to act as they did. This is the only criterion by which history will judge them.

But human beings make mistakes. Unless Stalin is invested with the infallibility which some Communists ascribe to him, and unless one says mystically with the naïve that a socialist state can do no wrong, it must be assumed that Stalin may have blundered. The Kaiser did not intend to ruin Germany when he went to war in 1914. He did ruin it. Neville Chamberlain thought that when he made a present to Germany of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland at Munich in September, 1938, he had established "peace for our time." Look at that peace now. Perhaps Stalin made a mistake.

Lenin, the founder of the Bolshevik revolution, committed errors and admitted them. In the spring of 1920 the Polish army, led by Marshal Pilsudski, invaded the Soviet Ukraine and captured Kiev, its capital. Very soon, however, the Red Army drove the Poles back into Poland. At this juncture, a violent controversy broke out in Moscow among Bolshevik leaders. The question was: Should the Soviet forces pursue the fleeing Polish troops and seize all of Poland? Lenin said yes. Stalin, who was even then high in Bolshevik councils (but not as high as was subsequently claimed for him) supported Lenin. Leon Trotsky had no

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enthusiasm for the venture. But its most outspoken opponent was Karl Radek, a brilliant Soviet publicist, himself a Pole, who argued that if the Russian troops remained poised on the Soviet frontier, the Polish workers and peasants, encouraged by the Red Army's proximity, would rise in a revolt against the bourgeois Pilsudski regime which the demoralized Polish soldiers could not crush. On the other hand, the penetration into Poland of the Russians, whom Poles traditionally hated, would kindle Polish nationalism and enable Pilsudski to rally his people and army. This was Radek's point of view and he presented it eloquently and heatedly. But Lenin rejected it. Lenin, in fact, quarrelled with Radek and broke off relations with him.

The Red Army did invade Poland. General Tukhachevsky, a Bolshevik military genius of twenty-seven, led the advance on Warsaw, while Budenny and Stalin guided a cavalry force towards Lvov. Then exactly what Karl Radek had prophesied happened. The Red Army was thrown back from the very gates of Warsaw, and the workers' and peasants' revolution which Lenin had expected did not materialize. Once, late at night, Lenin went to the telephone, called Radek and said: "You were right. I was wrong. Come and see me." Lenin subsequently told the whole story to Clara Zetkin, the veteran German Communist, who published it in Moscow. "Radek," Lenin said to her, "knows the situation in the West better than we do."

Lenin knew Europe well. He had lived there for years. Stalin has never lived outside of Russia. Perhaps Stalin erred again where he and Lenin erred before—on the question of Poland, and in the exaggerated hope of provoking a revolution in Finland as they had in Poland nineteen years ago.

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THE PACT : AN UNMIXED BOON FOR GERMANY

The only way to understand the Russo-German pact and its effects on world affairs therefore is to examine dispassionately what has already occurred. Hitler knew that Germany lost the first World War because it had to fight on two fronts. Every German military expert had prophesied that Germany would again be beaten if compelled to cope with the Anglo-French forces in the west and Russians in the east. The Kaiser could withstand this formidable Triple Entente for several years because he started the war with a well-fed, well-clothed, and satisfied nation, with tremendous reserves of raw materials and gold and with important allies. Hitler was less fortunately situated in 1939. And he was intent on avoiding the fate of the Kaiser. That is the chief reason why Germany concluded the pact with Soviet Russia.

The treaty has eliminated Russia as a potential pro-Ally belligerent. Germany, as a result, is engaged in a one-front war. In other circumstances Hitler might never have gone to war. The Nazi pact with the Bolsheviks makes all the vast difference to Germany between certain defeat and, as Berlin sees it, a chance of success. This advantage outweighs everything that Hitler has yielded to Stalin. The German public understands this, and although a pact with Soviet Russia may be repulsive to some Nazis the fact that Russia was out of the war conduced to more optimism in Germany and, therefore, to a better domestic morale.

Hitler was moved by a second consideration in negotiating the August, 1939, pact with the Kremlin. He hoped to receive Russian supplies which would facilitate the prosecution of the war. In this he is likely to meet considerable disappointment. Soviet materials cannot offset the stranglehold of the Allied blockade on Germany.

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Despite the inadequacy of reliable information about German internal conditions, it is established that Germany is already suffering from acute shortages of fats, copper, and petroleum—all indispensable to the conduct of a war. It was the scarcity of fats in 1917-18 which undermined Germany's resistance. Fats are not only necessary nourishment; they are the basic ingredient of soap—already doled out in a niggardly ration in Germany—and an element in the manufacture of some munitions. Russia, however, lacks sufficient fats and meat to feed its own population and is not likely soon to become an exporter of these commodities.

The Soviet Union produces only 62 per cent. of its requirements in copper. It imports the rest. Obviously, therefore, it cannot sell copper to Germany. Russia also imports lead, nickel, tin, antimony, tungsten, mercury, molybdenum, and other non-ferrous metals.

In 1938 Germany imported 4,396,434 tons of all kinds of oil. Of these Russia supplied only 33,154 tons. Approximately 80 per cent. of Germany's foreign purchases of petroleum come from North and South America. These are cut off by the blockade. Germany's war-time oil deficit is estimated at 10,000,000 tons. Russia is the world's second largest oil-producing nation, but home consumption has mounted with the domestic industrialization and motorization, and in 1939 its exports to all countries under contracts which continue to operate and which it must honour, amounted to not more than 1,231,000 tons. To be sure, Soviet petroleum production might be somewhat increased in consequence of a gigantic effort, and Stalin might try to economize at home in order to save Germany from defeat. The net result, however, would not be considerable and could not solve the problem of Germany's deficiency in motor spirits, machine oil and aviation petrol.

What Russia has in excess—grain, for instance—Germany still possesses in adequate quantities. But the

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Soviet Union has no copper, no iron, little cotton, no wool and no clothing to export to Germany. Stalin can sell to the Nazis great quantities of timber, manganese—a important ore used in the manufacture of steel—and limited shipments of flax. This will be a comfort to war-time Germany, but no salvation. Having gone into the problem themselves, the German authorities are no longer as optimistic as they were about the early prospect of important economic assistance from Russia.

Payments and transportation constitute further obstacles. During the war Germany will have to limit her exports when intensified fighting compels her to consume heavily at home. But payment for goods purchased abroad can only be made with exports or with gold, which, notoriously, Germany lacks. The Nazis, to be sure, are still in a position to ship dyes, chemicals and other home-made manufactured products to Russia. If Russian supplies are to become an important contribution to Germany at war, however, Moscow will have to give credits or loans to the Nazis, and it takes a great deal of imagination to see the Bolsheviks doing that with alacrity.

Transportation between Russia and Germany is an even greater hurdle to a heavy exchange of goods. Soviet oil and manganese normally are sent from Black Sea ports through the Mediterranean and up the Atlantic to Germany. This route is now closed by the British and French navies. Most Soviet goods will have to be transported to Germany by rail or up the Danube. Soviet, Polish and Roumanian railways over which these exports would have to move are deficient in track, rolling stock, train personnel and carrying capacity. The Danube River is closed by ice during a part of the winter and is not easily navigable at shallow points. Moreover, there is a shortage of barges and oil tankers in all the countries through which the Danube flows.

If Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany were given a

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two-years' period of peace in which to solve the problems of communications and to raise Soviet output, these two formidable land empires would form an economic alliance that might be a match for the Western democracies.' But at present England and France, with the access they have to their dominions and colonies and to the neutral and industrial wealth of the United States, are far stronger economically than Germany and Soviet Russia combined. The Soviet attack on Finland has further depleted Russia's supplies, dislocated Soviet economy and reduced to an even lower level Russia's capacity to sell to Germany. Nevertheless, any materials that Germany can get abroad are a blessing. If Moscow had joined the Western Powers it would not have exported to Germany. Now it does. That is Germany's gain.

What are the losses to Germany from the new arrangement with Russia? It is a mistake to say, as many persons have, that the disintegration of the anti-Comintern agreement is one of them. The Italian-German-Japanese triangle was based on the correct assumption that each act of aggression smoothed the path to the next act of aggression. Forged by Joachim von Ribbentrop, now Nazi Foreign Minister, this partnership of aggressors was aimed at the British and French empires. Its name suggested that it was hostile to Russia, but only those who wished to harbour that illusion were misled by the title. All three fascist countries expanded in area where British and French interests were primarily involved.

The aggressors proceeded on the principle that since their designs could only succeed in a disturbed world they must all co-operate to keep it disturbed. In ever accelerated tempo, one assault followed another. The pusillanimity of the British and French in China encouraged Mussolini to invade Abyssinia in 1935. The meekness of London and Paris in the face of the Italian attack on Ethiopia made it clear to Hitler that he could

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dare to remilitarize the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Both dictators now felt that they could undertake an adventure in the Mediterranean. They accordingly invaded Spain in the latter half of 1936. The supineness of the British and French Governments on the Spanish issue conduced to the brazenness of Hitler toward Czechoslovakia. As Mr. Anthony Eden, former British Foreign Minister, put it during a debate in the House of Commons on November 2, 1938, about the Munich Agreement regarding the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany: "It is my firm conviction that, had it been possible for His Majesty's Government to adopt a firmer attitude in respect of these Spanish problems in the early part of this year, the subsequent deterioration of the international situation which we all lament would not have taken place." Munich, in other words, was the child of Spain. Successful fascist violence bred fascist contempt for the democracies. This was the idea behind the anti-Comintern triangle. It worked in peace-time.

But war has changed all that. For Japan and Italy to support Germany now would require them to go to war, and that is costly and therefore unattractive. Japan rejected the Berlin proposal of a military alliance with Germany long before the Russo-German pact was signed. Italy has waged two wars recently, in Ethiopia and Spain, and is too exhausted and poor at present to afford a third. The Italian people, the Vatican, and the Royal Family are anti-German and anti-Nazi. This consideration militated in favour of Italian "non-belligerency." Moreover, Abyssinia is a hostage against Italy's participation on Germany's side, for the British Navy could easily close the Suez Canal and thus cut Italy off from her African empire. As long as Germany has not fully engaged the British and French armies and fleets, Italy, as well as Spain, cannot join Germany, for in that case they would be crushed by the armed forces of the Allies.

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In the first fortnight of August, Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, personally informed Hitler at Berchtesgaden that Mussolini had no intention of going to war against England and France. It was accordingly the disinclination to be involved in a major conflict with the Western Powers that shattered the anti-Comintern family. It had nothing to do with the Russo-German pact.

By the terms of the Nazi-Bolshevik treaty, Germany gave Russia a large part of Poland of no great economic value and retired from certain possessions in the Baltic States, where it had no territory but where German immigrants had established cultural and business stakes. The Russian shadow has also lengthened over the Balkan peninsula. Yet when a nation gambles for its life as Germany is doing in this war, these are small considerations compared with the benevolent neutrality of a tremendous country like Russia. That neutrality enables Germany to concentrate all her energies in the west against England and France.

The recent arrangement between Germany and Russia has social implications also. The Bolshevization of Germany looms slightly larger as a prospect. But the chances of such a development have been greatly exaggerated. During the period of appeasement Hitler tried to frighten the Western democracies with the bogey of Bolshevism. He used to tell them that Nazi Germany was the bulwark against Bolshevism and that they therefore must help him and yield to him. Now some persons use the same weapon. Now they say that unless the Allies accept Germany's peace proposals, Germany will go Bolshevik. Tales of a "Bolshevik Germany" are often good Nazi propaganda designed to intimidate the West.

The present war, however, proves that England and France are more hostile to Nazi Germany than to Red Russia, for they went to war against Germany, not

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against Russia. Soviet Russia alone has been no menace to Europe. Russia and Germany together might constitute such a menace. But statesmen in London and Paris believe that since Germany is the stronger and nearer of the two, the threat is best counteracted by crushing Hitler. Germany could have a Communist revolution only in the event of a German defeat or as a desperate Nazi effort to stave off such a defeat. The Allies would then seek to check the upheaval. And it is typical of the Hitler regime that its leaders behave on the principle: "After Us the Deluge." What have Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Hess, Himmler, Ley, and the other Nazi leaders to lose from Bolshevization if they first lose their power and position? Many Nazi actions since the war started demonstrate that the present German Government is thinking only of the war and not of the fate of Germany after it. For the purposes of the war the pact with Russia has been an unmixed boon to the Hitler regime.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS

It is easy to understand why Germany wanted the *rapprochement* with Russia. What, however, is the explanation of Stalin's readiness to enter into an agreement with Germany? We judge a man by the friends he keeps, by his acts, and by his words. Nations, too, are judged according to these criteria. By all these standards, Soviet Russia's policy has undergone a violent change since the spring of 1939.

Formerly Russia wanted the friendship of Great Britain, France and the United States. Now its statesmen and newspapers attack those powers. At the same time they defend Nazi policies and practice. Soviet Russia had never occupied the territory of other nations after the fashion of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Since

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September, 1939, it has. The Bolsheviks had consistently condemned aggression and championed the rights of small countries. Stalin said several years ago: "We do not want a single patch of foreign territory but we will not give up an inch of our own." This had become a popular slogan in which the people really believed. To-day the Soviets are talking a very different language and also behaving differently. Moscow has abandoned every tradition of Soviet foreign policy and discarded the principles of Lenin, Chicherin, and Litvinov which once guided that policy. Bolshevik Russia has swapped streams. Soviet relations with the outside world divide into three parts: between November, 1917 and 1920, Russia was invaded; between 1921 and 1938 it was not invaded; in 1939 it invaded.

The first violent assault on the post-war Versailles *status quo* occurred in 1931, when Japan occupied Manchuria. Moscow's sympathies were with the Chinese. From that date until 1939, Moscow opposed every attempt to modify existing territorial conditions. The symbol of that opposition was the Soviet government's adherence to the League of Nations on September 18, 1934. The League of Nations was created to freeze the *status quo* and to provide an instrument for its peaceful adjustment when that suited the purpose of England and France. Stalin accepted membership in such an organization. Moscow joined eagerly when the League imposed sanctions on Italy after the invasion of Ethiopia. Abyssinia was a very indirect concern of Soviet Russia, but the Bolsheviks did not wish to see aggression approved and elevated into a principle. They saw their own safety in a punitive League of Nations which could teach transgressors a respect for international law. Soviet Russia's policy was peace, and "peace," as Litvinov first said, "is indivisible."

When the Nazis first came into office in January, 1933, Germany was weak, and her weakness compelled

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her to pursue a cautious and apparently friendly policy towards Russia and even towards Poland. Marshal Pilsudski actually contemplated offensive action against Germany, and Hitler, deeply impressed by Pilsudski's determination, gave his word of honour, embodied in a treaty of non-aggression, that Germany would respect Poland's frontiers for at least ten years. That was on January 26, 1934. (The decade had not yet expired on September 1, 1939, but that did not deter Hitler from striking at Poland. Signatures and promises have never prevented Hitler from discarding pacts that he wants to break.) In such a period of weakness Germany could not be very hostile to Russia, and the Bolsheviks accordingly checked their natural animosity towards the Nazis, especially since they were at the same time afraid of an attack in the Far East by Japan.

By 1935, however, Germany had begun to arm intensively, and Hitler struck the more defiant tone which expresses the character of Nazism. Stalin, consequently, thereupon launched his twin policies of collective security or diplomatic co-operation with the Western Democracies and popular front or Communist co-operation with the bourgeois parties of those Democracies.

The years 1936, 1937 and 1938 were the dark age of appeasement. The Democracies helped every aggressor to win victories over small and weak countries; they helped not a single victim of aggression. The Soviet government was the only effectively anti-fascist government in the world. It wished to bolster up the League of Nations and it helped China and Spain with arms. By so doing it was actually protecting the British and French empires. It was ready to do so because it regarded these ancient agglomerations as stabilizing influences. The British and French empires were sated, conservative, and unambitious, and therefore no threat to world peace or to Russia.

On the other hand, the Third International (Comintern)

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proclaimed that "Fascism is war." Events have demonstrated the truth of this thesis. The assumption of Soviet policy toward Spain and China was that Moscow would support them until the British and French finally woke up to a realization of where their real interests lay, and themselves took over the onerous burden of rescuing these states from the assaults of the rapacious imperialists who were members of the anti-Comintern group. Stalin did not wish repeated fascist victories to undermine the morale, stamina, and strategic positions of England and France, who were the natural allies of Russia against an expanding Germany and an expanding Japan. Moscow's anti-fascism was good power politics as well as congenial to the Soviet public.

The Western Powers nevertheless slept in naïve self-confidence. The Anglo-French policy of non-intervention in Spain, which favoured the oath-breaking General Franco, and the unnecessary capitulation to Hitler at Munich in September, 1938, buried many Soviet hopes. The Soviet leaders wondered if the West would ever rouse itself to resist fascist aggression. The Kremlin began to ask itself whether the progressive forces within democratic countries were worth-while effective allies.

Loyalist Spain, for instance, had rallied to its standard many friends in England, France, and America. They included, moving from left to right, the Communists, the socialists and Labour elements, almost all liberals, many conservative Protestants, some prominent Catholic scholars and laymen, and a large number of important conservative politicians. Yet these groups failed to budge any one of the three democratic governments a single inch in the direction of a more pro-Loyalist policy. Chamberlain and Daladier were firmly entrenched, and they persisted in yielding to the aggressors.

Moscow believed that the French and British governments wished to channel fascist expansion eastward towards Soviet territory. And yet Moscow continued

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to pay court to the Western Powers. Soviet aid to the Loyalists was prolonged until January, 1939, when Catalonia received Russian arms. Moscow desired to assist the Spanish Republic in the central Madrid zone even after the Catalan collapse, and promised the Loyalists funds for this purpose. Moscow foreign policy was still predicated on the possibility of collaboration with the Western Democracies in order to stem the fascist flood.

Then Hitler revolutionized European diplomatic relationships by sending the Reichswehr into Prague on March 15, 1939, and annexing the Czechoslovak rump—Bohemia and Slovakia. This was Europe's reveille. On that historic day, Neville Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons about Hitler's action. That statement, he admitted two days later in a speech at Birmingham, was "somewhat cool and objective" and had given rise to "misapprehension." "Some people," he added, "thought that because I spoke quietly, because I gave little expression to feeling, therefore my colleagues and I did not feel strongly on the subject. I hope to correct that mistake to-night." He did.

What had happened was a revolt in the British Conservative party against Chamberlain's "cool and objective" reaction to the murder of Czechoslovakia. The revolt forced Chamberlain to change his tone and tune. The British were alarmed. The people called for action. The French saw danger looming for themselves. Hitler was turning his army toward Poland. If Poland were lost, France would be the next victim. Chamberlain was prodded from behind to scrap appeasement. This was the development which Moscow had hoped for and worked towards through all the dreary years of appeasement.

The goal of Soviet Russia's Collective Security and Popular Front policies was a coalition between imperialists on the one hand and anti-fascists, democratic,

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League of Nations elements on the other hand, which would compel the Western governments to take a strong stand against aggression. This coalition had now come into being. Now at last the Soviet government did have powerful friends in England and France. Now at last public pressure from right and left were pushing the French and British governments into a policy of resistance to Germany. It was precisely at this moment of victory that Moscow contemplated dropping the Popular Front and Collective Security.

Just when appeasement was going out of the window, largely because of the stubborn efforts of those who had helped Loyalist Spain and urged good relations with Russia, Moscow weighed the desirability of changing its foreign political course.

Why?

The result of the new spirit in London and Paris was the British guarantee to Poland on March 31, 1939, to fight in case Germany assaulted Polish independence. That day is the historic dividing line in the post-war (pre-war) history of Europe. March 31 is really the beginning of the European war. "It must be admitted," Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Molotov said in Moscow on May 31, "that the mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland alters the European situation. . . . There are a number of signs that the democratic countries of Europe are coming to realize that the non-intervention policy has collapsed." Moscow saw that appeasement was dying. And the end of appeasement was the beginning of the Russo-German pact.

Moscow quickly understood that a stiffer policy in London and Paris towards Germany would alter Germany's views on Russia. This has invariably been so. In 1930, I published a two-volume history of Soviet foreign relations entitled *The Soviets in World Affairs* in which, apropos of the Genoa Conference in April, 1922, I wrote: "It is a formula which holds for all time that

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when Germany's Western horizon is dark she turns to the East for light. . . . Always, since the War, the attitude of Western powers towards Germany has determined her policy towards Soviet Russia." At that time the coldness and bitterness with which the British and French treated Germany led the German government to conclude the Rapallo treaty of intimate friendship with Russia which burst like a bombshell on the Genoa Conference. (Locarno, in 1925, was a Western attempt to reverse Rapallo, and Chicherin vigorously opposed it.) There is almost an exact parallel between the circumstances in which the Rapallo treaty was signed and those which preceded the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939. Hitler expected trouble in the West from the 1939 British and French guarantees to Poland. He drew nearer to Moscow.

When Stalin surveyed the world scene in the Spring of 1939 he saw Russia's international position improved. In the Far East, Japan was spending her energy on the war against China. United States hostility towards Japanese penetration in China remained unrelenting, and that hostility made it embarrassing for the Western European powers to combine with Japan. The Chinese continued to fight, and with the aid of Russian arms would go on doing so for some time. Moreover, several serious pitched battles between the Red Army and Japanese forces on the border between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria had hardly inspired Moscow with respect for the Japanese army. Stalin, therefore, was much less worried about an attack on Russia in the Far East. (Soviet troops marched into Poland on September 17, 1939, and Moscow and Tokio signed a truce in the Mongolian war on September 16, 1939.) He could now face the possibility of a disturbance in the general condition of Europe with greater equanimity and better chances of profit.

This made it all the more important for Germany to

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detach Russia from the Allies. Hitler applied himself with particular zest to this task as soon as the new trend in London and Paris to restrain Germany set him thinking of the inevitable alternative when Germany's contacts with the West become barren: better relations with Russia.

The away-from-appeasement tendency of the British and French thus offered Stalin a choice between the Allies and Germany. It was in this perspective that the Soviet government saw its negotiations with England and France in the Spring and Summer of 1939. Stalin could play off the Allies against Germany and Germany against the Allies and use this bargaining advantage to get more from the side with which he decided in the end to sign a treaty.

This was the first difficulty which beset the Anglo-Soviet negotiations when they began in Moscow in May, 1939. There were other difficulties. The British guarantees to Poland and Rumania were unprecedented steps. England had never given a guarantee to any East European power. British tradition opposed such commitments on the European Continent. Now the British were discarding ancient confirmed prejudices against involvement. They could only have done so for a very serious reason. Neville Chamberlain stated it to the House of Commons on October 3, 1939. "When we gave a guarantee to Poland," he said, "the matter was imminent." It looked to the British government that—or Poland had persuaded the British government that—Germany was on the eve of an invasion of Poland. In haste, accordingly, England promised Poland that if Germany attacked Poland, England would go to war against Germany.

These guarantees to Poland and Rumania were *ipso facto* guarantees of the Western frontier of Russia. For they meant that before Germany could reach and attack Russia, the Allies could be at war with Germany. Moscow should, therefore, have welcomed the guarantees

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if it was thinking merely of its own security. The fact is that two days after Germany opened hostilities against Poland, England and France declared war on Germany. It is of course possible to argue that Stalin could not have foreseen such action on the part of the British and French governments. But a statesman with the fate of a country in his hands has no right to be wrong. Despite the inglorious defeats and surrenders of Chamberlain and Daladier during the appeasement period, their countries are now engaged in a war against Germany. I think it is because Stalin expected this to happen that he felt safe to barter countries with Germany and engage in aggression.

Instead, therefore, of the Anglo-French guarantees facilitating friendly talks with the Russians, they handicapped them. The Russians could only have said to themselves: The Allies are already knee-deep in Eastern Europe; they made the mistake of guaranteeing Poland and Rumania without first consulting us and getting from us a *quid pro quo* for the protection we have received; if England and France now want our help they will have to pay dearly for it; we must try to wring the best possible offer from the Western powers; and if it is insufficient we can show it to the Germans who will then be inclined to give more.

It is conceivable that at this point the Bolsheviks outlined their objectives in case general war came. They wanted part of Poland, control in the Baltic area, and increased influence on the Balkan peninsula.

Towards this end, Prime Minister Molotov, in his negotiations with the British, demanded concessions from the four Baltic states—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania. England and France might have guaranteed the Baltic countries just as they had Poland and Rumania against an attack by Germany. But this did not satisfy Moscow. It asked more. Moscow wanted to be allowed to check "indirect aggression." That term

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—"indirect aggression" was a clever formula to conceal interference in Baltic affairs. The Bolsheviks declared that certain political changes within her small Baltic neighbours could become the preliminary to an invasion of Russia through the Baltic. For instance, a new Cabinet might take office in Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga or Kovno. Or a foreign minister might be appointed in one of these capitals. Moscow might regard these officials as pro-German or weaklings, and suspect that Germany intended to exploit them to attack Russia by first absorbing the Baltic countries. Such changes in personnel would accordingly become "indirect aggression," and Moscow wanted the right to take measures immediately to forestall the expected attack. Since the Bolsheviks would of course be the sole judges as to whether "indirect aggression" had occurred, they could march in and assume control of the four Baltic states whenever any political event there displeased the Kremlin.

It is obvious that the Bolsheviks were asking England to give them what they subsequently got from Germany. But it is also obvious from Finland's stubborn resistance to Russia's claims that the British government would have encountered extreme difficulty in persuading Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania to accept the grave infringement of their sovereignty which Moscow later imposed under the threat of force.

Thus the Anglo-Soviet conversations were ill-starred from their inception. One party, England, was minus its major trumps, the promises to Poland and Rumania. The second party, Russia, insisted on something which the first could not give.

The crux of the entire Russo-German situation is that the guarantee to Poland was the reverse of Munich. If the purpose of Munich was to direct German expansion eastward toward the Soviet Union, then the Anglo-French pledge to Poland was insane, certainly inconsistent. If in the Spring and Summer of 1939 the

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Allies had wished Germany to attack Russia they would have said : " This is fine. Hitler is preparing to invade Poland. Let him. Then he will wage war on Russia and we shall be secure." Instead they said, " If Hitler attacks Poland, we fight," and the present war is adequate proof that they meant it. To have allowed Czechoslovakia to collapse when they were not ready to go through with the policy of a free hand for Germany in the east was criminal. For it meant that Munich had no sense and that Czechoslovakia was lost for nothing.

In all the talks with Moscow, the British and French governments assured the Kremlin that they would not expect Russia to enter the war before they did.^o The Bolsheviks consequently decided that since the Allies would create a Western front to which Germany's strength and attention would be diverted, Russia had less to fear from the proximity of Germany in Poland.

On August 22, the day before the Russo-German pact was signed, Chamberlain wrote a letter to Hitler, now printed in the British " Blue Book " on the origins of the war, in which he said : " Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland . . . which they are determined to fulfil " ; and he cautioned Hitler that " it would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if success on any one of several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured." This warning was intended to deter Hitler. It told him that even if he crushed Poland—whose resistance the Western powers had always discounted—the war would go on. But the new British attitude reflected in Chamberlain's letter had reassured Moscow. Stalin felt that the time had come for him to reap the benefits of Anglo-German hostility.

The new Allied policy of firmness had a double motivation. First, Poland was the last pro-Ally satellite in

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Eastern Europe. Its disappearance would weaken the Western powers and finally convince Hitler of his invincibility. The Western powers would therefore be in greater danger themselves and it was better to fight Hitler now than later. For England and France the present war is a preventive war. Secondly, the annihilation of Poland would make Germany a neighbour of Russia. That might precipitate a war between them, but since Russia was weaker than Germany, contact would also present the prospect of that collaboration between them which the Western world had always dreaded.

The present war is the direct and logical consequence of the German attack on Poland. Moscow saw this coming. The British and French mishandled the whole problem of Polish defence. So did the Poles. But that does not alter the larger aspects of the relationship between the Allies and Russia and between Germany and Russia. Before March, 1939, the Soviet's government's only safe policy was to be pro-Ally. Later developments gave it an alternative. Allied hostility to Germany and the scrapping of Munich appeasement allowed Russia to be pro-German.

If Russia sided with the Allies, she would probably have been expected to participate in a war if one came, without however, obtaining the prizes she coveted in Poland and the Baltic. If, on the other hand, she sided with Germany, she hoped to be able to remain aloof from the major struggle, and yet gather booty outside her territory. This is just the way things happened later, and it was these considerations that disrupted the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, not petty questions of the rank of the British and French negotiators, the limited credentials Molotov complained they brought with them, and other diplomatic niceties.

Had Stalin been eager for an agreement with the Allies, only on better terms, he would have negotiated openly

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with Germany. That would have constituted pressure on London. But the talks with Germany were secret. Instead, the Russians negotiated openly with the western Allies. That enabled Stalin to get more from Hitler. The Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet negotiations were doomed from the start to failure. Not only William Strang, the second-rank official of the British Foreign Office, wasted his time in Moscow. His chief, Lord Halifax, would have wasted his time. Neville Chamberlain himself would have obtained nothing in the circumstances.

There would have been nothing wrong for Moscow and Berlin to negotiate an ordinary non-aggression treaty. There would have been no need for concealment. But Moscow did conceal its negotiations with Hitler. In his May 31 speech, Molotov referred only to Soviet-German pacts on commercial credits, and not until the Bolshevik-Nazi pact was ready to be signed did any official or unofficial word about it emanate from the Soviet Union. Indeed, whenever rumours about the negotiations came from Berlin, perhaps officially inspired, perhaps intended to frighten Chamberlain and Daladier back into appeasement, Moscow issued stout denials and then Berlin felt obliged to do likewise.

Secrecy is a vital element in diplomacy. It played a decisive role in the conclusion of the Rapallo treaty, too. The pourparlers which led to the Rapallo treaty were opened by the Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin, and his assistants Litvinov, Rakovsky, Joffe, Radek, and others when they arrived in Berlin in March, 1922. The Soviet delegates were prepared to sign the treaty in Berlin. But Germany hesitated because she expected to be in touch with the British and French statesmen in Genoa and to solve the reparations problem. In Genoa the Bolsheviks negotiated secretly with Lloyd George in the Villa d'Albertis while the Germans remained out in the cold. This is the essence of what happened,

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as I wrote it in *The Soviets in World Affairs*: "On April 13, the first day of the secret conclave in Lloyd George's villa, Rathenau (the German Foreign Minister) made three requests for an interview with the British Prime Minister; two were in writing, one by telephone. All were refused. Then Chancellor Wirth tried—but in vain. . . . On the third day of the Villa d'Albertis conversations, Maltzan (Rathenau's assistant) made an appointment to meet Rakovsky and Joffe at 10 a.m. in a Genoese café. The German skilfully sounded the Muscovites on the resumption of their Berlin treaty negotiations. Obviously, he said, there could be no question of German industrial assistance to Russia in case of an understanding with the Allies. Maltzan likewise pressed the point of certain political advantages. Rakovsky and Joffe replied that they attached great importance to co-operation with Germany, and that Russia was not at all averse to signing a treaty with Berlin. The Germans immediately reported this possibility to members of the British delegation.

"Saturday evening the atmosphere in the Hotel Eden (the German headquarters) was blacker than ever. For rumour had it that the negotiations in the Villa d'Albertis stood on the verge of successful conclusion. . . .

"At one in the morning—it was Easter Sunday—a telephone call from Joffe awakened Maltzan. Would not the Germans come to Hotel St. Margherite, the Russian headquarters in Rapallo, at eleven the next morning, Joffe asked, to resume the Berlin conversations? 'And what about the Villa d'Albertis negotiations?' Maltzan inquired. Those, came the reply across the wire, were proceeding satisfactorily, though no agreement had yet been reached. A recess had been declared over Easter Sunday and Monday. . . .

"At noon on Easter Sunday an automobile bearing Rathenau, Maltzan, and State Secretary von Simson drew up in front of the Hotel St. Margherite. . . . At

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6.30 p.m. Chicherin and Rathenau affixed their signatures to the historic document. . . .

"The negotiations in the Villa d'Albertis had gone awry. Debts, credits, and property formed the obstacles to an agreement. The Bolsheviks had, in fact, despaired of success from the very beginning, but contrived to create a contrary impression on the Germans, who were embittered and suspicious by reason of their mistreatment at Genoa.

"The Germans might have waited until the complete failure of the Russians in Lloyd George's villa was common property. The British and the French might have informed the Germans of the failure. As it happened, the Bolsheviks adroitly utilized the short moment between the interruption of their discussions with the Allies and the inevitable resumption of the Allies' contact with the Germans to lead the Germans to the ink-well and quill."

There is a striking resemblance between all this and the events of 1939.

On the see-saw of international diplomacy everybody prefers the fulcrum. Usually, England is there. During post-war years, when it was possible first to play off England against France, and then the Anglo-French against the Russians, Germany was there balancing both ends against the middle, where she stood enjoying herself. Finally, the British and French got tired of this game and pressed on their end. Germany slipped down the board towards the Allies. Stalin naturally, also, slipped down the board towards the fulcrum. He was pleased. He thought he could stay there. But the see-saw was no see-saw any more. Diplomacy had degenerated into war. The Allies and Germany were standing on the ground, rolling up their sleeves and making bellicose gestures. What could Stalin do? He might have separated the fighters and warned Hitler that if he didn't stop kicking up a row the three of them

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together would beat him up. Instead, Stalin egged Hitler on: "Go on, go on," he said, "give it to them. I'm with you." The British, French and Germans came to grips. First, Stalin looked around the playground and whipped a few Polish and Baltic kids. He had always wanted to do that, but never got a chance when the big fellows were looking.

One of the kids—Finn was his name—put up a fight. The whole thing threatened to become one big scrap.

CHAPTER II

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STALIN AND HITLER : WHERE DO THEY LEAD ?

MANY sensational statements have been made regarding the origins of the Nazi-Bolshevik pact of August 23, 1939. It has been asserted that preparations for it began years ago, and that the actual conversations opened in 1938. I have searched hard but have found no proof of German-Soviet pact negotiations before May, 1939. In December, 1938, talks on commercial credits took place between Moscow and Berlin, but both parties insisted that they were devoid of political significance, and they actually made no progress until months later when the diplomatic rapprochement was under way.

The first hint of the possibility of a Russo-German understanding was thrown out by Joseph Stalin. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, is authority for that. On August 31, 1939, Molotov reminded the Communist Congress in Moscow that on March 10, 1939 : "Comrade Stalin posed the question of good neighbourly relations without enmity between Germany and the Soviet Union. It can be seen now that the declarations of Comrade Stalin were, in general, correctly understood by Germany, and that Germany drew political conclusions from them." Here the Soviet delegates listening to Molotov laughed approvingly at Stalin's cleverness. Molotov continued : "The signature of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact testifies to the

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fact that the historic prophecy of Comrade Stalin has been brilliantly justified." ("Tremendous applause for Stalin," reads the official Soviet report.) Unsuspected by outsiders and without any announcement, Germany had acted on Stalin's suggestion. But it is possible that Stalin's intention in making it was to wean the Western Powers from appeasement.

Toward the end of April, 1939, as I then learned from good Soviet sources, Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister, told the German Ambassador in Moscow there was no use even trying to reach a commercial understanding while the press and spokesmen in one country regularly attacked the other. As late as January 30, 1939, Hitler had called the Soviet Union a "satanic apparition" and "a menace to the peace and civilization of the world." As late as March 10, Stalin had affirmed that "we are in favour of supporting peoples who are the victims of aggression and who are fighting for the independence of their countries." Soviet policy had not yet changed, and Litvinov was still its reflector.

On May 3, 1939, Litvinov was dismissed. His authority and work had been seriously circumscribed during the previous two years, and many of the ambassadors and ministers he had helped to appoint, as well as the majority of his assistants in the Foreign Office, including his personal secretary, had been arrested in the purge. He himself was retained, and that indicated to the outside world that the policies which it identified with Litvinov—collective security and the indivisibility of peace—were still in favour in the Kremlin. Litvinov's dismissal meant that these policies were discarded.

In the middle of May, Ribbentrop, the Nazi Foreign Minister and father of the so-called anti-Comintern pact, said to several highly placed visitors that the Comintern or Third International no longer played an important role in Soviet foreign policy and that closer relations with Moscow had now become possible and

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desirable. Rumour has it that the first steps toward the Soviet-German pact were made through the good offices of the one-eyed Czech General Sirovy who went to Moscow for that purpose. On May 28, Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, had an interview with Marshal Goering. The report of the meeting is printed in the British "Blue Book." Henderson wrote to Lord Halifax: "Goering said, since France and ourselves (England) could not, and Russia out of self-interest would not give them (the Poles) any effective military assistance, they would be taught a terrible lesson."

This reflected successful preliminary conversations subsequent to Litvinov's departure from the Foreign Commissariat. But the Germans hesitated; they still hoped to conclude a military alliance with Japan. The Russians, however, pressed the Germans and showed greater eagerness than Hitler to arrive at an understanding. The assurances which Berlin gave the Kremlin in June that it had no aggressive intentions against Russia were regarded as insufficient by the Soviet Government. In July, the pourparlers became more serious and intense. Between August 8 and August 14, the negotiators got down to brass tacks and discussed territorial adjustments and texts.

On August 16 Sir Nevile Henderson reported to Lord Halifax on an interview he had had that day with Baron von Weizsacker, the German Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs. "I was impressed," Henderson declared, "by one thing, namely, Baron von Weizsacker's detachment and calm. He seemed very confident, and professed to believe that Russian assistance to the Poles would not only be entirely negligible, but that the U.S.S.R. would even in the end join in sharing the Polish spoils. Nor did my insistence on the inevitability of British intervention seem to move him."

It is apparent from this statement that on August 16

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an agreement already existed between Russia and the Reich, and it is significant that it was the day before—on August 15—that the Kremlin, for the first time, asked the British and French representatives in Moscow for permission to march into Poland and Rumania. The Soviet spokesman said that they wished the Red Army “to make contacts with the Reichswehr”—an enigmatic formula which might cover the subsequent Nazi-Bolshevik partitioning of Poland—by advancing into eastern Galicia and into the Vilna corridor as far as Suwalki. The British and French replied that Poland and Rumania were sovereign states and would have to be approached directly. They promised nevertheless to consult the Poles. The talks were interrupted at this point for two hours. Then the Soviet representative returned and announced that the Soviet government refused to make a direct demarche; he added that if an immediate satisfactory reply from the British and French were not forthcoming he would consider that the negotiations were ended and that collaboration between the Allies and Russia had been rendered impossible.

At that moment the Russians already had German consent to march into Poland. They were asking the Allies to give the same permission to them although that was impossible. It is obvious why Moscow had not applied before August 15 for Polish consent to admit the Red Army. No non-Soviet Polish government could have lasted an hour after granting such consent. Poland could not admit Russian troops of its own free will because it was afraid that they would stay. Whether they came as saviours or invaders did not change anything in this respect.

In September, 1938, when the Russians contemplated giving military assistance to Czechoslovakia, they knew, and Litvinov told me in Geneva on September 16, 1938, that the Poles would not let the Red Army pass through.

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Warsaw had adopted the same attitude toward German troops. For instance in March, 1939, Hitler gave an audience at Berchtesgaden to Joseph Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, and proposed a joint German-Polish attack on Russia. Beck refused. Not that Beck was pro-Russian. But to get to Russia the Germans would have had to march through Poland—for the way through the Baltic states is too narrow—and the Polish government feared that if the Reichswehr once entered it would stay and permanently occupy the country. The entrance of the Red Army into Poland would have split Poland socially. It was politically impossible. Moscow was aware of this, and had always been aware of it, and therefore did not broach the subject until August 15 when its understanding with Germany was complete.

The Soviet Government could have helped Poland without sending in the Red Army. It could have sold arms to Poland, and this in fact is one of the things that was discussed between the Allied delegates and Soviet delegates in Moscow. It could have loaned part of its air force to Poland. Since aviation involves fewer men and would not therefore be the beginning of foreign occupation, it would not have met with the same objections in Warsaw as the presence of a million or more Communist infantrymen in the Polish provinces. As a matter of fact Poland informed the French government in August that they would welcome the aid of the Soviet air force. But Moscow was then far advanced in its successful pourparlers with Berlin.

The secret Bolshevik-Nazi understanding of August, 1939, allowed the Soviet government to establish itself in Esthonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia, and in Poland as far west as the Vistula which flows through Warsaw. Part of Warsaw was to be transferred to the Soviets. At that time no mention was made of Finland. Lithuania fell within the German sphere of influence and activity. In subsequent military conferences, how-

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ever, the Russians surrendered part of their Polish zone, including the section of Warsaw, and received in exchange Germany's consent to dominate Lithuania. Finland became the object of discussion and agreement between Russia and Germany several months later.

Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop himself made it clear that there was a pre-war arrangement between Moscow and Berlin regarding the partitioning of Poland. "When the German army advanced victoriously into Poland," he said in a much advertised speech at Danzig on October 24, 1939, "the English propaganda declared that the Russian army would certainly not participate in the measures against Poland. Instead, the Russian troops—after a very few days—moved forward on the entire front in Poland and occupied Polish territory up to the line of demarcation which we had previously agreed upon with the Russians."

Without a previous agreement for the partitioning of Poland, and without a far-flung accord about future friendly Russo-German collaboration, the Red Army would never have ventured forth from its fortifications on Soviet territory and entered Poland to face the advancing Reichswehr. On the basis of the Red Army's performance in Finland, we are entitled to say that Hitler could easily have prevented the Russian troops from occupying a piece of Poland. Actually, the Reichswehr not only welcomed the Red Army but retired in front of it from Polish territory which it had conquered in fighting with the Poles. It is inconceivable that Germany would have done this but for a complete understanding with Russia and but for the necessity of reserving all energy for a war with England and France in the West.

Molotov boasted in a speech in Moscow on October 31, 1939, that the territory in Poland "that has passed to us has an area of 196,000 square kilometres and a population of about 13,000,000, of whom more than 7,000,000

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are Ukrainians and more than 3,000,000 White Russians, more than 1,000,000 Poles, and more than 1,000,000 Jews."

The Soviet booty in the Baltic states consisted of :

1. In Esthonia, by virtue of the Russo-Esthonian treaty of September 28, 1939, the right to maintain naval bases and aerodromes on lease terms at reasonable prices on the Islands of Osel and Dagoe at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga, and in the town of Paldiski (Baltiski Port) near Tallinn, as well as two Soviet air ports in the interior of Esthonia. The total Red Army garrison in Esthonia numbers approximately 25,000 men.

2. In Latvia, by the Soviet-Latvian mutual assistance treaty of October 5, 1939, permission to establish naval bases at Libau and Windau, to build several aerodromes, to erect artillery batteries along the Latvian coast and to maintain troops within the country.

3. In Lithuania, by the terms of the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty, signed on October 12, 1939, in considerable secrecy, provision for Red garrisons at several important strategic junctions, and at Vilna, the capital.

But do the new Soviet acquisitions in Poland and the naval bases and garrisons in the Baltic states make Russia stronger? Does the Finnish adventure promise any real gain? Modern aggression is not usually a good investment. Italy has so far got nothing out of Ethiopia except headaches, expenses, and bananas. Italy's invasion of Spain has to date yielded her no profit. Both wars have ruined Italy's foreign policy and weakened her economy. Japan is bogged down in China, there are domestic difficulties in Japan as a result, and Tokyo has lost the major part of its influence

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in European affairs. Germany's "victory" in Czechoslovakia has landed her in the present disastrous war. For many centuries, colonial and other conquests were achieved with relative ease and then paid dividends. But in these days aggression quickly reacts against the aggressor.

Moreover, for Russia, a common frontier with Germany is a discomfort and might in time become a disaster. The treaty of Versailles was, in this respect, a blessing to Soviet Russia because it set up an independent Poland. Conceived to make it difficult for Germany to move westward, Poland actually barred Germany's road to the East. The Russo-German pact and its aftermath have cleared that road. The present situation is a liability to Russia. With Germany as her immediate neighbour, Russia must either be an ally of Germany or seek allies against Germany. She will be dragged into all kinds of dangerous foreign entanglements. Isolationism is impossible. Neutrality has become impossible for Soviet Russia.

The Baltic States were buffers against foreign attacks on Russia. Between 1920 and 1939 Soviet Russia enjoyed peace. During those nineteen years Germany, England and France were not engaged in war and were, therefore, free if they wished to move their armed forces against the Soviet Union. But they did not do so, although at certain times in that period Russia was extremely weak. In 1919 Germany volunteered to march into Russia to crush the Soviet regime. The German military declared that with some Allied help they could smash Bolshevism. Marshal Foch demurred. He rejected this proposal because he did not wish Germany to recuperate in Russia. If the Germans could subjugate Russia and exploit its vast economic resources they would become powerful enough to turn round and again strike at the Western Powers.

This prospect is a permanent nightmare to England

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and France. After the present war the Allies, if they win, would be as averse to a German invasion of Russia as they were in 1919, and for the same reason. If Hitler wins the war with England and France it can only be at the end of a most exhausting struggle in which Germany, as well as the Allies, of course, will have been seriously debilitated. During and after the European war, therefore, Russia would be exposed to no greater risk of a Western invasion than it has been since 1920.

The non-Soviet world has never excelled in love or affection for Soviet Russia. Usually, on the contrary, the Soviet Government has encountered much animosity in the conduct of its foreign politics and business. Yet the current war between Germany and the Allies proves that contradictions and differences among the capitalist powers have more explosive possibilities than the contradictions and differences between the capitalist world and the Soviets. The Bolsheviks, especially since 1927, have frequently, for internal political reasons, exaggerated the danger of foreign assaults.

Tsarist Russia had all of Poland and the entire territory of the Baltic States, yet fell an easy prey to German military strength. If Germany ever comes back and is ever in a position to turn round and attack Russia, the vengeance would be fiercer just because the exigencies of the present war forced Germany to abandon her positions in the Baltic. Those positions would then give little comfort to Russia. If the Western Powers ever wished to attack, Russia would be at a disadvantage because she would be without the protection of the Baltic buffers.

The Soviet regime had never put its trust in mere territory or naval bases. Russia's recent territorial acquisitions may prove to be a boomerang. For Russia's acts have multiplied the number of her enemies many times and reduced the number of her foreign friends to the lowest possible minimum. The bulk of the work-

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ing classes of Scandinavia and the Baltic countries and of England, France and North and South America has been antagonized. A peaceful and stable Soviet Union (that is after 1920) was not attacked. An expanding Russia might be. I think Stalin's policy toward Germany has been bad for Russia, bad for the Soviet Government, bad for socialism, and for the world revolution. Russia's new foreign policy is storing up fuel for a future war. It is bad power politics.

The success of Moscow's twin policies of collective security and popular front between 1935 and 1939 can be measured by the vehemence and venom of the reaction against Moscow to-day. Litvinov's speeches at Geneva, Moscow's peace proposals, and Russia's help to China and Spain temporarily neutralized considerable world hatred of Soviet Russia. Stalin's invasion of Finland has opened the floodgates of anti-Soviet vituperation and hostility. At Minneapolis on December 29, 1939, ex-President Herbert Hoover said in a speech, "Civilization struck a new low with the Communist attack on peaceful Finland." Actually it was not a new low, but another low, as low as China, Spain, Albania, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

When one compares the widespread indignation against the Soviet offensive in Finland with the indifference of many of the same people toward the equally outrageous Fascist invasion of Spain, it becomes clear that political sympathies and economic prejudices frequently determine moral attitudes. American relief agencies have sent large sums of money to Finland since the war started. But between 1936 and 1939 a million people were killed in the war in Spain. For thirty-three months a nation of 25,000,000 was ploughed up by war. Cities, towns and villages were shattered by Fascist bombs. Millions starved. Disease raged among them. The Hoovers then did nothing for Spain, and the American Red Cross sent a few thousand dollars.

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I think Finland should get help from American relief funds. It should get more help. But some self-righteous poses do not inspire respect. Probably not a few of the cheques for Finland are bigger because it is Russia that has attacked. This charity is not unmixed with politics. If the world had been humane to Spain, Finland might never have been invaded.

A number of Americans have even suggested that the United States should withdraw its recognition of the Soviet Government on account of the Russian invasion of Finland. The diplomatic relations between states are not based upon mutual approval of their acts at home or abroad. If we maintained contacts only with the Governments whose policies found favour with the American people, we might have no diplomatic service at all. And there would also be fewer diplomats in Washington. Diplomacy is not friendship; it is business.

The League of Nations never even deliberated upon Germany's seizure of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel. It merely passed an academic resolution against Japan for its war on China and then did nothing about it. Likewise, it censured Italy for violating the independence and integrity of Abyssinia and lukewarmly applied sanctions to Italy for a time. But it never expelled these aggressors. It did, however, expel the Soviet Government. Stalin should have reckoned with the unfriendly attitude which he knew existed against the Soviet Union. Those who believe that the Soviet war with Finland could provide the capitalist nations with an excuse or opportunity for an attack on Russia must agree that Stalin should, therefore, have kept the peace, since such a joint assault would certainly mean defeat for Russia. Stalin, always circumspect, boasted that he would not pull anybody else's chestnuts from the fire. But you can burn your fingers on your own chestnuts.

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If the Soviet Government had remained neutral in the war between the West and Germany, it would have been in no danger, because Germany would be pre-occupied in the West, while France and England were anxious to keep on good terms with Moscow. Even after the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact and after the Soviet-German partition of Poland, a very definite tendency made itself felt in London and in Paris not to give free rein to anti-Bolshevik sentiments. The press in both countries received unofficial intimations of the desirability to soft-pedal unfavourable reports and views about Russia.

British statesmen attempted to put the best possible interpretation upon Soviet acts. Thus Prime Minister Chamberlain asserted on November 9, 1939, that the pact between Germany and the Soviet Union "has brought only humiliation and loss for Germany." This was untrue. But it is interesting that he said it. Similarly, Winston Churchill delivered a broadcast speech on October 1, 1939, which contained an apology for Russia's recent experiments in expansion. A prominent member of the British Cabinet told me in London in October, 1939, that England could not help Finland. He hoped that there would be an amicable arrangement between Moscow and Helsinki. Officials of the British Foreign Office at the same time volunteered the opinion that the Finnish stubbornness in the negotiations with Moscow merely represented an attempt to get better terms.

No one thought the Finns would fight. And no one urged the Finns to fight. When the Finns did make a stand against their big eastern neighbour, sentiment, of course, began to play its role in politics. The resistance of Finland gave the Allies an opening to weaken Germany by weakening Russia. The Kremlin should have foreseen this and should have known that its acts would inflame the always latent hatred for Russia.

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If, as the European War crystallized, the Soviet Government had said, "A plague on both your houses. The Allies are imperialists. We dislike the Nazis. We will have nothing to do with either," its moral position would have been unassailable and all its international interests safeguarded. It is the profit taken by a state resting on a non-profit theory of society which is so objectionable. Once upon a time the Bolsheviks denounced foreign governments for engaging in imperialist enterprises. There is no difference in principle between the British tenure of Gibraltar and Russian occupation of the Esthonian islands or the existence of a Soviet military aerodrome one mile from Vilna. To accept the theory that the Baltic States might have been used as springboards for an attack on Russia and therefore had to be swallowed by Russia would mean to imperil the life of every small nation. Germany could contend that Holland and Belgium were a danger to her security because they might be occupied by an enemy and then used as a base for an attack. England could argue in the same way. If they acted on that assumption it would be the end of Holland and Belgium. Small nations perform an excellent service in keeping big countries apart and thereby lessening the likelihood of war.

To maintain, as Moscow has, that an independent Finland is a menace because Leningrad is within the range of its artillery makes a case against the existence of every weak and small country. Thus German cities are within the range of Hungarian air fields; Germany presumably should, therefore, annex Hungary. Germany could seize Yugoslavia and thereby threaten Italy. Italy consequently should occupy Yugoslavia. On this false principle the world would be projected into anarchy and endless conflict. On the same basis, since at some undetermined date the United States might be attacked from Canada or even from Europe, it ought to annex

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everything within the flying radius of bombing planes of the future. Soviet explanations of the attack on Finland do not bear analysis.

If Russia had to attack Finland lest Finland some day be used for an attack on Russia, why all the lame excuses about Finnish aggression and Finland being a semi-fascist state? To apologize for the Russian war on Finland by saying that Finland is semi-fascist makes it more difficult to explain Moscow's alleged desire (see Voroshilov's interview in *Izvestia* after the signature of the Russo-German pact and Molotov's speech of August 31) to fight for Poland, which was certainly more reactionary than Finland. If you wage war on semi-fascists why not on fascists? Russia has set up a puppet Soviet regime in Finland and is trying to destroy the established national government. Is that not exactly what Hitler and Mussolini did in Spain? Mr. Joseph Barnes, until recently the *New York Herald Tribune* correspondent in Moscow and Berlin, wrote in the December 1, 1939, issue of that paper that Finland "is a cohesive democratic state, with a long national tradition. It is not fascist, even in the elastic Soviet use of that word."

We are told that collectivized agriculture, as introduced by the Bolsheviks into the new Russian section of Poland, is better for the peasant than oppression by the reactionary Polish landlords. I am prepared to agree. Although I read with scepticism the dithyrambic greetings sent from the new Soviet provinces to "Father Comrade Stalin" and the ecstatic reports in the Moscow press about the reception given by the Poles and Ukrainians to the Russians, it is, nevertheless, true that a Soviet occupation will be preferable to many inhabitants. This, however, is the typical justification used by the capitalist imperialist. The fellah is also better off because England controls Egypt. Mussolini's claim that he would improve conditions in Abyssinia did not

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make us defenders of his war of conquest. Mexico and Central America might benefit economically by incorporation in the United States. That is no good reason why the incorporation should take place.

There are those who say that Russia was not an aggressor in Poland because she merely took back districts which had once belonged to her. Some queer conclusions follow: Germany would be entitled to take back Alsace and Lorraine, England could seize parts of France, and France could occupy some of the American Southern States. Spain could lay claim to Cuba, and the Dutch could ask for New York. Sweden could incorporate Leningrad and the British could reconvert Virginia into a crown colony. Indeed Hitler employs this very "logic." In his New Year proclamation on December 30, 1939, he spoke of Bohemia and Moravia as "the age-old German territories." He presumably seized them, in other words, because centuries ago they had been part of Germany. If any strong nation could with impunity restore to itself what it once owned, the world would become an insane asylum, or rather, more of an insane asylum than it already is.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN?

How profound is the change that has occurred in Soviet policy? Is it mere opportunism stimulated by a unique chance to aggrandize, or does it reflect, and deepen, a new Soviet attitude towards world problems and towards political issues in general? This may be judged, in part, by the language which Moscow now uses. *Pravda*, the most influential official Moscow newspaper, charged some weeks ago that Colonel Beck, the former Polish Prime Minister, had "made provocative speeches before the war between Poland and Germany and as a result of this—provoked a war

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with Germany." Poor Nazis! But for Beck's words it would never have occurred to them to attack Poland. *Pravda* compared Beck with the Finnish Foreign Minister Erkkö and accused him, too, of making provocative speeches. At that time Finland, the big bully, was preparing, according to the Soviet press, to attack little defenceless Russia. That is just what Germany said about Poland. In Nazi newspapers the German attack on Poland was never called an invasion but a "counter-attack." The war on Finland, however, is a brutal unwarranted assault on a small nation which I cannot distinguish from the fascist invasions of Ethiopia, Spain, China, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Stalin said on March 10, 1939, "We are in favour of supporting peoples who are fighting for the independence of their countries. One word suffices as rebuttal: Finland.

On May 31 Molotov said: "How do we define our tasks in the present international situation? We consider that they are in line with the interests of non-aggressor countries. They consist in checking the further development of aggression." Five months later, on October 31, Molotov said: "Such concepts as 'aggression' and 'aggressor' have acquired a new concrete connotation." "To-day," he suggested, "Germany is in the position of a state that is striving for peace while England and France . . . are opposed to the conclusion of peace." "You see," he added, "the roles are changing." They are indeed. Russia is in a different role. Russia has become an aggressor and sees the world from a new perspective.

It is certainly natural for people to want to know what will happen. It is equally certain that nobody knows what will happen. Neither Hitler, nor Stalin, nor Chamberlain, nor Daladier knows what will happen. They can only know what they expect to do or want to do. But whether they do it, and its success if they try,

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depends on the other fellow, and so the whole outcome is unpredictable. The safest procedure is to draw a line between the past and present and prolong it a short half-inch to get some indication of the general trend. The future is the child, sometimes premature, of the past and the present.

Mr. Molotov, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Soviet government, recently revealed that during the important negotiations with Turkey in the autumn of 1939, Moscow proposed to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Turkey. A mutual assistance pact means that if one party is attacked the other is obliged to come to its aid. But, says Molotov, the Soviet government stipulated "that such a pact could not induce it to actions which might draw it into an armed conflict with Germany." Moscow, in other words, does not want anything to cloud its friendship with Germany.

There were years in which Soviet publications had standing orders not to criticise United States policy adversely. To-day the press often has harsh words for America. Molotov declared recently: "The decision of the American government to lift the embargo on arms to belligerent countries raises certain misgivings." Why? "It can scarcely be doubted," he ventured, "that the effect of the decision will be to aggravate and protract" the war. Now American arms will go only to the Allies, not to Germany. If that protracts the war, it means that Russia had expected Germany to win in a short war.

Instead of sparing the United States, and England, and France, as they formerly did, the Soviet organs of publicity are at present, as Mr. G. E. R. Gedye says in a dispatch from Moscow to the *New York Times* of November 19, 1939, "obliged to handle with kid gloves all the fascist-ruled states they naturally detest—Japan, Italy, Franco Spain, Germany herself—while official hostility is reserved for those with whom the Soviet

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
people are surprised that they are supposed to have a quarrel—the Western Democracies and the United States.” This reflects the Kremlin’s policy.

The Soviet government has made a great play of the significance of its friendship with Germany. Molotov stated on August 31: “It would be difficult to underestimate the international importance of the Soviet-German treaty. It is a date of historic importance. It marked a turning-point in the history of Europe and not only of Europe.” The treaty could have been so important only if it enabled Germany to take Poland without a war or if Germany won the war. Moscow must have foreseen and welcomed both these eventualities. The German press likewise hailed the pact as a milestone. The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, for example, called it “an important active contribution to the future new order in Europe.”

Stalin was present at the signing of the Russo-German pact. It was the first time that he had attended the signing of a diplomatic document. Since he never does anything without an eye to its political effect, this was a demonstration. It told the world to attach special significance to the treaty. The photographs of the ceremony also tell a story. Stalin looks as if he had performed a trick and was pleased. Molotov too seems to be cynically delighted, and Ribbentrop beams. Stalin’s face is more telling than a dozen secret clauses.

The Russo-German pact does not merely record Russia’s intention not to fight on the side of the Allies and the resolve of both signatories to refrain from attacking each other. It goes much farther. The Soviet government, by the text of the treaty, undertakes not to help any victim of German aggression or any country which is helping a victim of German aggression. Stalin has adopted the policy of “non-intervention,” which as he saw in Spain, favours the aggressor.

But that is not all. Germany and Russia are to



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remain "in continuous touch with each other for consultation and in order to inform each other regarding questions which concern their mutual interest." This has often served as the veiled formula for an alliance. Moreover, "neither of the two contracting parties will participate in any grouping of powers which is directly or indirectly directed against the other part of this agreement." That immediately and obviously killed the Franco-Soviet agreement. Strictly interpreted, Russia cannot be a member of any future League of Nations while the pact is valid, which is for ten years at least.

"The pact comes into force immediately on its signing." This is not the usual procedure. Nations generally wait until the instrument is ratified. Ratification, the document prescribed, was to take place "within the shortest possible time." Both governments were apparently in a hurry. Germany was poised for an attack on Poland. It started eight days later. Not only the text of the agreement, but the time chosen and the circumstances surrounding it warrant fully the suspicion that this is more than an ordinary non-aggression pact. As Molotov put it on August 31 : "The enemies of the pact are the enemies of the Soviet Union and of Germany." The Soviet-German pact then is the keystone of Soviet foreign policy.

Of course Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia may quarrel. All countries that are friends to-day may quarrel to-morrow. That is what makes international politics so entrancing and irritating. Even France and England quarrelled after they had won the war of 1914-18, by common effort, and the present war is probably due, more than anything else, to the divergence of British and French foreign policies that began to manifest itself in 1919. Nations fight and make up, and fall into and out of one another's arms. The marriage between Stalin and Hitler was not made in

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Heaven. But for the present, Moscow and Berlin are seeking to avoid any acts which displease the other.

Each likewise takes up the cudgels for the other, and one defends what the other does. Thus, the Bolsheviks do not merely justify their own deeds in Poland; they also throw a favourable light on what Germany is doing there. The Moscow *Izvestia*, on October 9, 1939, for instance, stated that "the government of the Soviet Union and the government of Germany undertook the task of establishing peace and order on the territory of the former Poland and to give to peoples inhabiting that territory a peaceful existence which would correspond to their national characteristics." Is this not a good deal to expect from Hitler in view of his record on national minorities? The Nazi conception of the way to treat Poland was enunciated by Dr. Robert Ley, one of the foremost German leaders, in a speech in the conquered Polish city of Lodz: "The German race, that is our faith," he said. "It has higher rights than all others." The German Governor of Poland, Arthur Greiser, has announced that his regime will be "hard but just," and his Warsaw paper warned that there must be no "sentimental fraternization" between Germans and Poles. In view of this well-known Nazi approach to non-Germans everywhere, it is novel and instructive to find *Izvestia* uniting Soviet and Nazi conduct in Poland under a single formula. Moscow's own words thus suggest the existence of a Soviet-Nazi entente.

When Stalin celebrated his sixtieth birthday, he received letters of congratulation from Hitler, Ribbentrop, and others. Thanking Ribbentrop, Stalin telegraphed: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and of the Soviet Union, cemented in blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm." Stalin expected the Soviet-Nazi relationship to be "lasting and firm," and Ribbentrop, speaking for Germany, declared in his speech of October 24, that "Germany and Soviet Russia are

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determined to develop ever further their friendly and neighbourly relations." That makes it unanimous.

Molotov explained to the Supreme Soviet Council on August 31, 1931, that "When the German government expressed its desire to improve political relations, the Soviet government had no reason to refuse. That is how the question arose of concluding the non-aggression pact." That stands every former Soviet principle on its head. The Soviet government had always been opposed to bilateral pacts of non-aggression unless they contained an escape clause—which the Russo-German pact does not—providing that in case one of the signatories committed an act of aggression the other was free from the pact. Without this escape clause, bilateral pacts of non-aggression give freedom of action to the aggressor. If, for instance, Hitler, having decided to invade one country, signed non-aggression pacts like the Ribbentrop-Molotov document with all other countries, then nobody could assist the victim of aggression. The Soviet government had, therefore, repeated for years that bilateral treaties led to war.

Stalin's alternative had been collective security, that is, a united front of peaceful nations against the aggressors. Hitler, on the other hand, had always pleaded the desirability of bilateral agreements. Stalin accordingly has swung over to the Hitler idea. Judged on the basis of his own former arguments in favour of collective security, Stalin stands condemned as having contributed to the outbreak of the present war by concluding his pact with Hitler.

THE NEW POLICY OF FOREIGN COMMUNISTS

If any further proof of a sharp alteration in Stalin's foreign policy were sought, it could be found in the new strategy of foreign Communist parties. Russia and France signed a treaty of friendly assistance in Paris on

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May 2, 1935. Accordingly Pierre Laval, the reactionary Premier of France, came to Moscow, and on May 15 he and Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov issued a joint communiqué which read in part: "M. Stalin understands and fully approves the national defence policy of France in keeping her armed forces at the level required for security." This was an intimation to the French Communists to drop their opposition to French military budgets. They had previously voted against the building of the Maginot Line, and against all military credits. But it would have been illogical for the French Communists to endeavour to keep France weak when France was an ally of Communist Russia. Acting on Stalin's hint, the French Communists changed their line.

Thereafter, and until the signing of the Russo-German pact, the Communists in democratic countries tried to co-operate with bourgeois parties. They did not advocate working for world revolution. They preached an alliance with democracy. They fought for the democratic regime in Spain. They served many liberal causes with devotion and good effect.

What has happened now? The French Communists, who began to support French military preparations when Stalin signed a pact with Laval, began to oppose them when Stalin signed a pact with Hitler. After the outbreak of the war between England and France and Germany, Harry Pollitt, the secretary and leader of the British Communist Party, published a penny pamphlet entitled "How to Win the War." The war, he wrote, is of course an imperialist war, nevertheless, "the present rulers of Britain and France" are "actually for the first time challenging the Nazi aggression which has brought Europe into crisis after crisis for the last three years." Therefore, Pollitt continued, "the British workers are in this war to defeat Hitler." The British working class, he continued, "will do everything it can to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, but only by

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the defeat and destruction of Hitler and the Nazi rule from which the German people have been suffering for six years." The British Communist leader flayed those radicals who might wish to remain aloof from the anti-Nazi conflict. He wrote: "To stand aside from this conflict, to contribute only revolutionary-sounding phrases while the fascist beasts ride roughshod over Europe, would be a betrayal of everything our forebears have fought to achieve in the course of long years of struggle against capitalism."

In the middle of September, 1939, however, new instructions reached the British Communist Party and other Communist parties. Harry Pollitt's pamphlet was accordingly withdrawn from circulation by the British Communists. The Communists now commenced to contradict everything they had said in the Popular Front period and even what they had said after the signing of the Russo-German pact. They now condemn the war against the Nazis, and urge a cessation of hostilities. This is just what Hitler is doing. The fact that Hitler asks for peace is a sure sign that he needs it, perhaps in order to perfect Germany's economic collaboration with Russia.

To-day the Communists are agitating against the war against Hitler (while approving Russia's war on Finland). They have reverted to world-revolutionary phrases. This can only be designed to undermine the war spirit in England and France. In England their propaganda is unrestricted by official interference. The Communists there enjoy democratic rights, conduct meetings, and publish their newspapers and pamphlets. In France, Communists are suppressed, but conduct their work nevertheless, whereas in Germany the Gestapo, or secret police, has reduced the effectiveness of German Communist anti-Hitler agitation to an insignificant minimum. Moreover, I am not at all sure that Communists in Germany will not conduct patriotic German

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propaganda, for is not Germany fighting Great Britain, which has suddenly become Russia's Public Enemy No. 1 (this honour was once held by France, later by Germany and Japan), and are not Germany and the Socialist fatherland warm friends? Many German Communists have been released from Soviet jails since the war and are returning to Germany under a promise of immunity. The Communist Party of the United States has discontinued its boycott of German goods.

The Communists are still boycotting Japan. There is as yet no agreement between Moscow and Japan on China, and the united front between the Chinese Communists and Chiang Kai-shek remains in existence. But if the new world-revolutionary tactics should require the Chinese Communists to desert Chiang Kai-shek and entrench themselves in provinces contiguous to Siberia—where Moscow could then establish a protectorate over them—Chiang Kai-shek would be weakened, and the occupation of a large zone in China by Japanese imperialism would be facilitated.

Thus, world revolution, which sounds so radical, has reactionary implications. Hitler and the Japanese militarists could benefit by it. That is dialectical, too. There is nothing in common between the Socialist world revolution and Russia's recent conquistadorial acts, which have alienated the working classes of Western countries and left many people confused and dismayed. The cause of world labour is not identical with that of Russian territory. The methods of conquest employed by Moscow and the lies about "Finnish aggression" are counter-revolutionary in their effect. The photograph which Stalin took with Ribbentrop when the Soviet-German pact was signed is the finest counter-revolutionary propaganda. If Stalin had been thinking of the world revolution or of the work of the foreign Communist parties, he would not have posed for his picture with a leading Nazi. He did not have to do it.

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Nevertheless, the Communist parties of the world are following Moscow's lead. If a single Communist or Soviet sympathizer had, before August 23, 1939, advocated a Soviet pact with Nazi Germany, I would pay more respect to their defence of it to-day. But they urged the opposite, a peace front embracing Russia, England and France—and anyone who suggested the remote possibility of an understanding between Stalin and Hitler was branded as a reactionary and a fool. If the Communists had said: The way to foster world revolution is to rebuff England and France and come to an arrangement with Hitler to partition Poland and give Moscow control over the Baltic States, then there would be more validity in their present contention that Stalin's recent acts are designed to spread Communism in Europe.

As a matter of fact the Soviet-Nazi relationship has caused foreign Communists unending embarrassment. First they said the news of the pact was untrue. When it turned out to be true they swallowed it. Then they said it would contain an escape clause. When they saw it had no escape clause they gave it their blessing nevertheless. Then they insisted that: "The Russian pact with Germany was all the more reason why France and Great Britain should conclude a pact with Russia on their side." These are the words which Gabriel Peri, the brilliant foreign editor of the Paris Communist *L'Humanité* and parliamentarian, uttered in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies (*New York Times*, August 26, 1939).

Gabriel Peri did not know at the time what Molotov knew and what Molotov revealed in his October 31 speech, namely that "the non-aggression pact concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany bound us to maintain neutrality in case of Germany's participating in war." In other words, Moscow could not sign a pact with England and France.

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But when Peri and others learned this they defended the pact anyway. In consequence of a wooden discipline, which is a tribute to their faith but not to their intelligence, the Communists have got themselves into numerous contradictions simply because they are following automatically in Moscow's footsteps.

Foreign Communists did not always behave in this manner. Among many letters which Georgi Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Minister, wrote to me while he was in office, is one dated February 14, 1930, in which he said in part—I quote exactly as he wrote it in English—“Our Politbureau is not a dictator of the Komintern. The fact that our party is stronger and richer than the others is also a reason for much *opposition* among the fraternal parties against ours. There was always an immense amount of manœuvring when our delegation in the Komintern had had some aim in view and sometimes it was unsuccessful. The prestige of the delegation is great, but not absolute. The Soviet government joined the Kellogg pact, and the Komintern opposed the Kellogg pact: complete difference.” (Chicherin was referring to the delegation which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent to the meetings of the Third International, or Comintern.) Since then, however, the role of the Comintern has been completely altered.

If Stalin had been thinking of the world revolution he would not have compromised Communism by a pact with the Nazis. He would have sat still and watched in splendid isolation waiting for an opportunity which the war might present to spread Socialism. There would have been no danger to the Soviet Union in that event. Instead he has blunted the instrument of revolution by deepening and increasing the anti-Soviet sentiments of the working classes and by isolating foreign Communists from the sympathies of those working classes.

The sum total of it all is this: If Stalin believed that his pact with Hitler would discourage France and

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England and induce them to remain passive after Hitler had invaded Poland, then he was prepared to be the assistant executioner and partitioner of an independent country. If he hoped to encourage Germany and thereby provoke a war which would weaken Germany and all capitalist states and thus hasten the world revolution, then the crime is heinous. A world revolution born in dishonesty and of deliberately induced mass-murder cannot be creative or welcome to decent humanity. If Stalin expected Hitler to win and became his ally for that reason, he stands condemned as a traitor to Soviet Russia's past and to European civilization. These are the three alternative interpretations of Stalin's act. I have searched my brain, as well as the brains of some who try to see the Russo-German pact in a more favourable light, but I have found no fourth alternative.

CHAPTER III

WHY DID STALIN DO IT?

LIFE in Soviet Russia had to become very different before Moscow could clasp the hand of Nazi Germany and engage in expansion. The drastic modification in the Kremlin's attitude towards the outside world did not spring full-blown from the brow of Stalin. It is not the casual whim of one individual. Foreign policy is a mirror of domestic conditions, and the new Soviet foreign policy can only be understood against the background of Soviet internal developments.

For the Soviet government to swap streams two things had to synchronize: A change in the world situation and a change within the Soviet Union. The change in the world situation was the approach of the present European war. The change within the Soviet Union was the startling metamorphosis of Soviet conditions. This metamorphosis is a clue to the Russo-German pact and to the entire altered relationship between Germany and Russia.

The year 1936 represents a divide in the history of the Bolshevik Revolution. The roots of the rapprochement with the Nazis go back to that year. I trace the new pact with Germany to a divorce between the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people; it became noticeable in 1936.

Up till about 1933 the Soviet regime was laying the industrial foundation of a new Russia, for which the population paid in the form of reduced consumption

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and harder work. Some did so grumblingly, many patiently. In 1934 and 1935 and in the first half of 1936 life became a bit easier. More goods could be bought in shops. But then the rising curve of consumption began to flatten out.

The supply of consumers' commodities in the Soviet Union is to-day woefully inadequate, and while food is generally plentiful, butter and milk and even articles like cabbage, a staple of Russian diet, are often unobtainable. (Russia is now importing food from the Baltic countries.) In the field of goods for the public's daily use, little progress has been made in the last three years. The deficiency is in part due to military preparations. But it is more adequately explained by the purges and several inherent Soviet economic weaknesses.

Even when he has the money the Soviet citizen faces a knotty problem when he tries to purchase most articles of clothing, especially trousers—and there is no socialism without trousers—or writing paper, or kitchen utensils, or kerosene for cooking, or a thousand and one items of common consumption. On December 2, 1939, the *New York Times* carried a report from Moscow about “the famine in consumers' goods” and the “complaints by the Moscow public.” Another despatch to the *New York Times* of December 17 from Moscow states that “butter is virtually unobtainable in Moscow . . . in some districts, milk is also scarce . . . popular Russian canned goods are procurable only with great difficulty, except tinned crab, which is too expensive for most pockets. Some prices are rising faster than the usual seasonal advances. Soviet newspapers refuse to accept subscriptions for the next twelve months on the ground that price of paper is likely to rise shortly. Only three-month subscriptions are accepted. . . . The price of vodka has been increased 50 per cent. . . . The object of this, economic experts believe, is to reduce the amount of currency in circulation . . . but as long as the State

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can provide sufficient vodka it is sure of a ready sale, particularly in a general shortage of consumers' goods."

There has always been considerable popular feeling among women against the sale by the Soviet government of vodka, the weakest variety of which contains 40 per cent. alcohol. But as long as citizens cannot spend their money on other commodities, because there are not enough other commodities, the Bolsheviks go on the assumption that it is necessary to maintain the government monopoly production and sale of vodka.

The objective proof of the Soviet goods shortage is the long queues outside town and village shops, and speculation. Speculators are apprehended and tried in open court, and their sentences are officially announced. The speculator has special connections with a store manager or an official. He buys at one price and sells furtively at a higher price. But if there were an ample volume of commodities nobody would buy at the higher price.

Moreover, the turnover of factory directors and Soviet business executives is enormous. They are charged in Soviet publications with mismanagement, inefficiency, under-production, and wilful sabotage. The press often reports their demotion or dismissal or arrest. Young men with little experience—their names can be read in the Russian dailies—take their places. Things do not proceed smoothly. They are arrested. Younger men with less experience are put in their stead. They fail. They are ousted. These events, which can be followed in the Soviet morning papers, convince the public that something is wrong. Industry is not producing enough. The inability to buy necessities is a grave disappointment to the Soviet population, which had hoped that some day, after twenty or more fatiguing years of Soviet economy, life would grow comfortable and easy.

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THE SOVIET TRIALS AND PURGES

Simultaneously, another great yearning of the Soviet nation was shattered—the yearning for liberty. The Stalin Constitution of 1936 was sincerely intended as a charter of freedom. The enemies of the Bolshevik regime—the kulaks, capitalists, old-style conservative intellectuals—had been eradicated. The loyal folk that remained could be granted more civil rights. That was the conception of the Constitution, and its promulgation produced joy throughout the land.

The subsequent dejection has been not less intense. For almost immediately, restrictions on individuals were drawn tighter, restraint increased, arrests multiplied. The terror that had been directed chiefly against anti-Soviet elements who hated the regime was now aimed at Communists who had made the regime. In 1936, for the first time, commenced the wholesale arrest and execution of Communists for political reasons. Trials were held not only in Moscow under the limelight. Every city and small town had its trials. The purge extended to every nook of the vast continent which is Russia. Foreign Communists, especially Polish and German refugees, were caught in the huge dragnet.

The basic problem raised by the Constitution was the future of the G.P.U. Civil rights, habeas corpus, and all democratic liberties are illusory while a secret police operates with special powers to arrest without proper judicial warrant and to exile and execute without public trial. The Kremlin realized this, and as a preliminary to the issuance of the Constitution, took measures to curtail the prerogatives of the G.P.U. These measures and their success demonstrated that the G.P.U. was not an independent, omnipotent state within a state but subject to the higher authority of Stalin and his associates.

Then came a reversal and setback. In August, 1936,

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Kamenev and Zinoviev, Lenin's friends, with Stalin members of the triumvirate which ruled after Lenin died, were tried and later executed. The trial of Piatakov, Radek, and others followed in January, 1937, and in June, 1937, Tukhachevsky and a large group of top-rank Red Army commanders were shot. Many of them were anti-Stalin, though he was the one subject they strangely avoided in their confessions and public statements at the Moscow trials—and some probably had conspired against Stalin. Soviet Russia got a more draconic dictatorship when it was ready for democracy because, for one thing, investigations revealed that the country was not as unanimous about the genius and achievements of Stalin as the press seemed to indicate.

The terror of the G.P.U. was now unleashed against all former oppositionists who had or had not recanted, and against numerous others who had never been connected with any opposition. Big figures toppled into prisons and oblivion. To have made revolutionary history, to have carried out the Five-Year Plan was no security. Innumerable persons, including Communists, who had personal contacts with foreigners or foreign countries suffered. Soviet citizens were warned unofficially not to correspond with their relatives abroad, and foreigners in Russia were cut off from most of their contacts with Soviet circles. A great nation-wide spy hunt was launched.

I believe, after careful consideration, that it is a conservative estimate to suggest that several hundred thousand Soviet men and women disappeared as a result of the purges. Some were shot, some incarcerated, some exiled to frozen and desert wastes. My estimate is based on a knowledge of how the Soviet purge operates. For instance, when Yagoda was dismissed as chief of the G.P.U. there was a clean sweep in all the departments of the G.P.U. in Moscow and other cities and towns.

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The G.P.U. representative in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) was removed. So were G.P.U. officials in other foreign countries. It was not merely Yagoda who was being destroyed; the whole apparatus which he had set up in untold centres throughout the Soviet Union had to be "cleansed," for that was the source of his power and authority.

The little fellows have always followed their chiefs into the discard. Wives are usually exiled with purged husbands. When Marshal Tukhachevsky and his generals were executed, thousands of Red Army officers suspected of loyalty to them were arrested. When Bukharin, the editor of *Izvestia*, was arrested the entire editorial staff disappeared. In all branches of the government and industry a purge meant police measures against groups, rarely against individuals only. Since the number of prominent Soviet leaders purged runs into thousands, the total number of sufferers is legion.

Many people were purged without ever a mention of the fact in the press. Thus Valeri Mezhlauk, assistant Prime Minister of the Soviet government and chief of the State Planning Commission, a man of great culture and industrial genius who had visited America several times and negotiated with Henry Ford and Owen D. Young, simply disappeared from sight as though dropped into a void, and has not been heard of for several years.

The same applies to Kossior, one of the ten members of the Politbureau, the highest authority in the Soviet Union, to Ossinsky, to dozens of other members of the Central Committee of the Party, and to untold hosts of other highly placed commissars.

Normally Soviet executions in Moscow are not announced unless the victims have been sentenced in public trials. For a while, however, the Soviet provincial press did publish a partial list of executions. Thus between May and December, 1937, a few Soviet provincial newspapers which I have myself checked

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reported the execution of 1,313 persons and the arrest of hundreds of others. But the more sensational and important the news, the less likely a Soviet newspaper is to print it, and stray items on executions in Soviet publications are merely a pale reflection of the veritable holocaust that has swept the country since 1936.

These people were shot and otherwise purged because they allegedly departed from the official party line, because their ideas were not quite Bolshevik, or because they had sympathies with fascism. Their relatives and friends must have read with considerable surprise and bitterness an editorial in the *Izvestia* of October 9, 1939, supporting Hitler's policy and saying: "Every man is free to express his relationship to this or that ideology and has the right to defend or reject it, but it is senseless and stupid cruelty to destroy people because somebody does not like their views and philosophy of life. That sets us back to the dark days of the Middle Ages when costly religious wars were waged in order to annihilate heretics and infidels. But history has demonstrated that such ideological and religious crusades merely led to the extermination of whole generations and to the cultural eclipse of nations. It is impossible to destroy an ideology or philosophy of life by fire and sword. One can respect or hate Hitlerism as one can respect and hate any other system of political thought. That is a matter of taste." If only the Bolsheviks had showed the same tolerance in the purges!

A deadly fear was injected into those who remained. The purges were regrettable not merely from the human point of view and because industry lagged while good industrialists languished in gaol. They demoralized the population. The country, for instance, had been taught that Yagoda, the chairman of the G.P.U., was "the flaming sword of the revolution." He was one of the guiding lights of the Soviet government. He had staged the trials of Kamenev and Zinoviev, and of Piatakov,

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Radek and the others. But then he himself sat in the dock as an "enemy of the people," and he was executed as an agent of foreign governments. Could he have staged the trials to harm the revolution? Doubts harassed many citizens.

Yagoda was succeeded by Yezhov, and Yezhov in turn became "the flaming sword of the revolution." His picture was displayed in countless offices, factories, and homes. Then he, too, disappeared in disgrace. Whom could one trust? Whom could one follow?

In 1936 the Soviet government created the rank of marshal and elevated five men to that rank: Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky, Yegorov, Blücher, and Budenny. Children and adults treasured a widely circulated photograph of these heroes of the country. Before long Tukhachevsky was executed for having allegedly wanted a pact with the Nazis, and the children had to cut his face out of the photograph. Then Yegorov had to be excised. And finally Blücher. To-day two remain.

Thousands of writers, journalists, Communist officials, party speakers, Bolshevik provincial leaders, and leaders of the youth movement were arrested because, according to the published version, they had been uncovered as anti-Soviet. Then how could the ordinary citizen know whether the man whose article he was reading to-day, whose speech he was listening to, whose advice he was executing, might not be annihilated to-morrow as a foe of the Soviet state?

The purges produced a crisis of faith. Since everybody was a potential spy and traitor everybody distrusted everybody else. This was ruinous to economic activity. Persons in industry knew that promotion brought greater responsibility and greater danger. Some therefore preferred to remain in small jobs. I knew of the case of an engineer who chose to be a taxi driver to escape the constant strain of important work in which he might make a mistake that would be interpreted as due to evil

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political intent. Everybody hesitated to talk on serious subjects or to associate with any but a few intimates. There was a premium on frivolity and personal disloyalty. Communists started saying "they" instead of "we" in referring to the regime.

The mass took refuge in indifference and passivity. The Communist party ceased to count and became a rubber stamp. This made it easy for the leadership to do as it pleased. The people did not have to be considered. It did not have to be prepared for future measures. Steps taken by the government did not have to be explained to it. The Russo-German pact was divulged to an unsuspecting and I am sure horrified Soviet public without preparation or justification.

The Russo-German pact was not the first instance of crude disregard of Bolshevik tradition and Soviet culture. In 1936, having established himself as undisputed dictator, Stalin began making political mistakes. He had accused others of being "dizzy with success." Now he seemed to suffer from the same giddiness. I will limit myself to two mistaken innovations which illustrate the ideological gulf that has developed between top layer and people. On May 26, 1936, the Soviet government published the draft of an anti-abortion law. Previously abortions had been legal and numerous, and the Bolsheviks, with their usual pendulumism, now swung to the other extreme and wished to proscribe them altogether. But they said to the country: Here is the draft, shoot at it. Do you like it or not? Tell us frankly; this is a democracy.

This provoked a nation-wide discussion. Resolutions were published in the press. Women and men wrote letters to the newspapers explaining that under the difficult Soviet housing and living conditions the new provision would work impossible hardships. Overwhelmingly the sentiment, as shown by public statements, was against the draft. Then, after the open debate had

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raged over the whole country for a month, the government on June 27, 1936, republished the draft as the law, making one or two very minor changes. Independently of the merits or demerits of this piece of legislation—and they are not now germane to my argument—the behaviour of the government testified to its contempt and disrespect of the will and wish of the population. It was a slap in the face for the public. It was a political blunder. Citizens shrank back into their unpolitical corners, humiliated and disconsolate.

Again in 1936 the leadership intensified propaganda, first launched cautiously in 1935, to inculcate patriotism and Russian nationalism. Now half the residents of the Soviet Union are not Russians at all, but Ukrainians, Georgians, Turks, Armenians, Mongols, Uzbeks, Tartars, Mordvinians, Chuvashes, and so forth, on down a list of about two hundred nationalities. The bulk of the population had never had any patriotism for Tsarist Russia and had never been taught any Russian nationalism or even Soviet nationalism by the revolution. The intelligent Soviet man or woman who believes in socialism is a patriot of the doctrine, and attributes the achievements of the Soviet regime to it, rather than to the fact that Russians are applying it on Russian soil. He or she will usually tell you that it is a pity socialism was first tried in Russia, for its chances of success would have been greater in Germany or England or America, which are more civilized and more advanced industrially. The teaching of Lenin was internationalism, and it was accepted by millions of Soviet citizens. I should say that Loyalist Spain, for instance, meant more to Soviet citizens than most events of the last few years inside or outside Russia.

Nevertheless, and in defiance of this spirit, Soviet leaders attempted to inoculate the people with Russian nationalism. Pre-revolutionary Russian history was rewritten to make it palatable to a new generation, and the

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works of Professor Pokrovsky, a friend of Lenin, the famous Communist historian of Tsarism, were discarded. Peter the Great, reviled for his cruelty by all who read, was refurbished for modern consumption. A whole galaxy of Tsarist notables appeared from the dustbin of the past, into which a proper assessment of their reactionary deeds had consigned them. Figures like Alexander Nevsky were brought forward out of the mist of the Tsarist Middle Ages and popularized in the films. Art, literature and politics received a deepening Russian tinge. "Shors," the latest talkie produced by Dovzhenko, celebrated Soviet Ukrainian director, makes a typical Ukrainian exclaim on his deathbed, "Farewell, Russia and the Ukraine." It is altogether unnatural and un-Soviet for him to say "Farewell, Russia," but it is in tune with the latest Russian patriotism.

Startling official manifestations of Russification appeared for the first time in Soviet history. Soviet policy toward national minorities had always been above criticism by reason of its political wisdom and effectiveness. Racial conflicts were eliminated or reduced to infinitesimal dimensions. As part of this general trend, anti-Semitism became a waning, disappearing phenomenon frowned on and punished by the authorities. The struggle in society, Bolshevism taught, was between classes, not between religions or races or colours.

One of the most attractive features of Soviet endeavour to liberate backward minorities was the introduction of the Latin alphabet among Eastern ethnic groups whose complicated cursive Arabic and other scripts retarded their cultural progress, created a small intellectual aristocracy, and made for a high percentage of illiteracy. Latinization, which Lenin in 1922 had termed "the great revolution of the East," gave a tremendous fillip to popular education, brought Asiatic races closer to Western culture, and documented a decided rupture

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with the Tsarist policy of oppressing and Russifying non-Russian populations.

But in 1937 an officially inspired movement away from Latinization set in, and to-day most of the forty odd nationalities which had adopted the Latin alphabet have decided to drop it or are about to do so and—this is truly amazing—to substitute the Russian Cyrillic alphabet. The Kabardinians of the North Caucasus led the procession in 1936. *Pravda*, of October 14, 1939, reported “a meeting of the intelligentsia of the city of Tashkent,” in Central Asia, which unanimously adopted a resolution asking “the party and Government of Uzbekistan to hasten the transfer to an alphabet based on Russian script.” The purpose of this change is “to bring still nearer the cultural wealth of the great Russian people to the peoples of Uzbekistan and considerably to facilitate the study of the great Russian language.”

The intelligentsia of Tashkent can rest assured that when they demand what Moscow wants to give they will certainly get it. But it is a sharp departure from Soviet practice and principles. And what is this business of the “great Russian nation” and the “great Russian language”? Why are they greater than the Ukrainian or Mongol or Turkish? Such terminology was unknown in the Bolshevik past. The Soviet press—see, for instance, *Pravda* of September 22, 1939, and *Izvestia* of the same date—refer to “the millions of our brother Ukrainians and brother Belorussians of the same blood as ours” who have been taken over in Poland by the Soviet regime. “Ours” here must refer to Russian, and not to the Turkomans near Persia or Buryats near China. In other words, the Bolsheviks are beginning to identify the Soviet regime with Russian blood. Anyway, emphasis on blood is much too reminiscent of the Nazis.

This cultural reaction illumines Molotov's reference on May 31, 1939, to Czechoslovakia as the “large Slav

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nation." It was the first time a Soviet leader had used "Slav" in such a connection. The political climate in Moscow has grown different. Russianism and Slavism can breathe in it again. Russian expansion and Russian aggression flourish in that atmosphere.

Cultural retrogression, economic stagnation and political blunders are all interlaced in the pattern of a dictatorship that has become personal. Stalin has sought to eliminate his opponents and every independent source of authority and popularity within the country. He is all-powerful. Yet in his might he is a failure, for socialism is a will-o'-the-wisp. Stalin cannot solve the problems of his country. He seizes other countries. In the same predicament Hitler and Mussolini behaved in the same way. A dictator thinks he must have triumphs, and when they elude him at home he seeks them abroad.

From far and near I watched this evolution of the Soviet Revolution with mounting concern. I aired my doubts to Russian, Spanish and other friends. I never wrote or uttered a word of justification of the Soviet trials and purges from 1936 on. I ceased writing about Soviet internal affairs. While Moscow helped Spain, and while the Soviet Government was an active factor for world peace, I did not wish to attack the Soviet Union. I had hoped that Spain might save Europe from the present war. It could have, if all the elements now backing Finland had helped struggling democratic Spain against foreign aggression. I had hoped that in Spain Russia would be saved from further reaction. During 1937 and 1938 I often said to Dr. Juan Negrin, the Loyalist Prime Minister, that the Spanish republic had a service to perform to Russia which was greater perhaps than the services Russia was performing for Spain. The Bolshevik ebb might have been reversed in Spain. Instead, Soviet Russia was probably lost there.

Fascism is the universal enemy of peace and decency.

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The Soviet Government opposed fascism. I refrained from throwing stones at the Soviet Government. British and French sins of appeasement which led to this war won Moscow many friends who never approved of the Kremlin dictatorship. Was I, an old friend, to become a public enemy? Spain and China were dear to millions outside their frontiers. These millions had a kindlier feeling for the Soviet Union. I imposed silence on myself. Then Stalin signed his pact with Hitler on August 23, 1939. When it came I recognized it immediately as the ugly fruit of the preceding years of un-Bolshevik acts within Russia and of the chasm between the will of the leaders and the spirit of the people. I did not have to wait for the invasion of Finland.

Because Spain was so important to the progressive democratic world I believe it necessary to record that, with one exception, all the leading Soviet officials sent to Spain to help the Loyalists were executed or arrested after their return to Russia. Their names are:

General Goriev, the saviour of Madrid—executed.

General Grishin, the first Soviet military chief of staff, who arrived in Madrid on October, 1936, a man of sixty, able, revered by the Spaniards—arrested. He was followed by General Grigorovitch, who left Spain in the first half of 1938 to assume a high army post in the Soviet Far East. As Grigory M. Stern, his real name, he is now reported to be in command of a sector of the Finnish-Soviet front. He is the one exception.

General Maximov, Stern's successor in Spain, who helped direct the victorious Ebro offensive in the summer of 1938—arrested.

Marcel Rosenberg, first Soviet ambassador to Loyalist Spain—arrested.

Gaikis, his successor—arrested.

Stashevsky, the Soviet trade representative, an old Polish revolutionist, who not only arranged the Spanish

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purchases of Russian arms, but was Negrin's friendly adviser on many economic problems—arrested.

Antonov-Avseyenko, Soviet consul-general in Catalonia, who led the assault on the Winter Palace in Petrograd in 1917—arrested.

Michail Koltsov, *Pravda* correspondent in Spain throughout the war, who had reported personally to Stalin and Voroshilov on Spanish conditions and on the behaviour of Russians in Spain—arrested.

General Uritzky, in charge in the Moscow War Office of arms shipments to the Loyalists—arrested.

No outsider knows what happened to most of these men after their imprisonment.

This purge of men to whom Republican Spain owes a debt for big services was no more serious and costly, however, than the destruction of other rich Soviet military and civilian talent on a much larger scale. Thousands of fine young Soviet men are now paying for it in the Finnish war. But individuals do not count where only one individual counts.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA, GERMANY AND FINLAND

STALIN's purges are coming home to roost in the Finnish war. No government can kill and lock up many thousands of able executives and army officers without suffering the consequences.

It is not unlikely that Russia expected Finland to submit peacefully to pressure. When the Finns failed to bow to Moscow's dictates, Stalin could not back out. He had to fight. But the fight found the army and the country unprepared. It had not expected war over Finland.

This is one explanation of the absence of "Blitz" in the Russian war on Finland. Then, too, the terrain of lakes, rivers, forests, swamps and hills offers formidable obstacles to the Soviet military machine. Sub-zero weather would handicap the best army that had to go out into the open to attack.

An offensive is always more expensive in lives and equipment than defence. The Red Army took the offensive under difficult climatic and topographical conditions. Unhappy experiences were to be expected.

The fighting between Russia and Finland has occurred on two main fronts. The northern Arctic sector and the central "Wasp Waist"-line represent a war of movement. That puts a strain on the Soviets' inadequate transportation facilities and on their thin lines of communication. Russia is backward in railways, canals, telephones and telegraphs. The Red Army can therefore be cut off from its bases and harassed in other ways

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by skilful Finnish guerilla skiing parties. The second front is the Mannerheim Line in the southern Isthmus of Karelia. Here the Russians are well supplied with arms and materials because they are in constant touch with the big industrial city of Leningrad. But the Finns are more or less comfortably ensconced in the concrete and steel fortifications of the Mannerheim Line, which can stand a lot of pounding.

In winter the northern day offers only two or three hours of good light, and even during part of that brief opportunity for flying, air forces may be grounded by intense cold or blizzards and whirling snow. Soviet aviation has therefore not contributed very materially to the prosecution of the Finnish war.

These are the technical and military difficulties of the Russian armed forces. But they are richly supplemented by political factors, chiefly the purges.

Here is a page from the Calendar of the Soviet Purge : On May 11, 1937, Marshal Tukhachevsky, commander of the Red Army and Assistant Minister of War, was demoted and transferred from Moscow to a relatively minor post in the Volga region. On June 10, he was brought back to Moscow and tried in secret. On June 12, he was shot, together with nine other of the most important generals in the Red Army. That in itself was an event of prime importance to the future fighting capacity of the Red Army.

But there was this in addition. On May 11, the very day Tukhachevsky was transferred to the Volga, a Soviet government decree reintroduced political commissars into the army. Now, the institution of political commissars had been abolished long ago. During the Soviet civil war in 1917-20, the Bolsheviks were compelled to create a new army quickly. But they did not have enough officers. So they took Tsarist officers and other military experts who had professional training. The specialists, however, were politically unreliable and could not be

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trusted to stay loyal to the Soviet government. An ex-Tsarist officer might lead his men into a trap or surrender to the enemy.

Lenin and Trotsky accordingly invented the system of political commissars. The commissar was attached to the officer to watch him and also to teach the soldiers Communism. That worked during the first phase of the revolution. But when peace intervened, the commissars themselves took courses in the military academies and became professional soldiers. Also, young men who had matured since the revolution and who were good Communists attended military school. These people then combined in themselves military knowledge and political loyalty. The need for the commissar was gone. Commissars were consequently abolished.

But when Stalin decided to "liquidate" Tukhachevsky he reintroduced the commissars. The commissar, as *Pravda* said on April 11, 1938, "is the eyes and ears of the Communist party in the ranks of the army." Apparently, Tukhachevsky had so many followers in the army that Stalin no longer trusted the officers and put in commissars to watch them.

Now this army is fighting Finland. The Red officers have undoubtedly resented the presence of these "eyes and ears" that spy on them. Orders given by the officer must be approved by the commissar. That creates friction. It is an unhealthy state for an army at war.

A war, however, must have glamour or the warrant of self-defence. The Bolsheviks can scarcely give the war in Finland either. The Bolsheviks are good propagandists and it is unwise to underestimate the effect of their preachings on minds made uncritical by a specific type of education. But the best propaganda for a regime is plenty, political security, and peace. All these the Soviet citizen lacks. The average citizen-soldier, therefore, will take with a grain of salt official assertions that

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Finland attacked Russia or that Finland was to be the spearhead of a capitalist attack—he has heard Moscow cry “Wolf, wolf” too often. The Soviet mass cannot have much stomach for territorial expansion. The teaching of Lenin is not altogether forgotten.

Stalin’s purge and these politico-psychological circumstances are Finland’s allies. With all their heroism, the Finns alone would not have held the Russians so successfully.

The more the Soviet nation pays for this adventure against Finland the less intelligible the whole thing becomes. The Red Army is said to have marched into Finland because Leningrad was supposed to be under the constant threat of Finnish artillery. But Leningrad has been in that position for nineteen years and nothing bad has happened to it.

I lived in Soviet Russia for fourteen years and never once read in any Soviet publication or heard from any Soviet official that Leningrad was menaced by Finnish artillery. Moreover, in the treaty signed in Moscow on December 2, 1939, between the Soviet government and the so-called “Finnish People’s Government” of Otto Kuusinen, the latter ceded to Russia not only the territory in the Karelian Isthmus, from which presumably Leningrad might be shelled, but also considerable stretches of land far away from Leningrad on the Arctic Ocean, as well as Hango and numerous islands in the Gulf of Finland. Stalin was not content with the Finnish territory which, according to him, menaced Leningrad, he wants all of Finland’s strategic points. He would paralyze Finland’s national defence and put her at the complete mercy of Russia. It has very little to do with the safety of Leningrad.

The defenders of Soviet action against Finland declare that although the Kuusinen treaty transferred to Russia 3,970 square kilometres of Soviet territory, Stalin gave Kuusinen 70,000 square kilometres of Soviet territory.

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But a million square kilometres in the Sahara desert is not worth one square kilometre at Gibraltar. The 3,970 square kilometres which Kuusinen signed over to Stalin contain the Mannerheim Line and most of Finland's vital fortifications. Without them, Finland would be helpless against her Eastern neighbour.

Of course, Kuusinen might just as well give Morocco to Stalin. He has no Finnish territory except a thin strip held by the Russian army. His treaty with Stalin is worthless except as an indication of what Stalin aspired to obtain from Helsinki. But if, as Communists contend, what Stalin had proposed to the Helsinki government in November was so fair and acceptable to Finland, why did he not make the offer five years ago or one year ago? Moscow waited until the European war started, until everybody was busy elsewhere, and then hoped that the threat of war would compel the Finns to give up their independence.

When the Stalin-Kuusinen treaty was concluded, the Kuusinen government issued a public declaration from Moscow, in which it said: "Our state is not a state of the Soviet type because the Soviet order cannot be established by the efforts of the government alone without the consent of the entire people, in particular, of the peasantry." In other words, Kuusinen has no right to decide what kind of a regime shall be maintained inside Finland, but he is entitled to hand Russia vast chunks of important Finnish soil. *The Communist Internationale*, organ of the Comintern, disclaims Moscow's intention of Sovietizing Finland. Moscow's only aim, it asserts, is to "free Finland from a gang of oppressors and imperialist warmongers, and to safeguard Finnish democratic development." One might suggest to Stalin that democracy begins at home. Be that as it may; but if the Soviet government can take it upon itself to free Finland from imperialists, then it might some day presume to do the same for, or rather against, Sweden

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or Norway or Persia or Turkey or Rumania. That would make trouble for Russia and for the world. Besides, *Izvestia*, the official organ of the Soviet government, declared in a celebrated editorial on October 9, 1939, that "to start a war in order to 'destroy Hitlerism' is to commit a criminal folly in politics." But surely if you must not go to war to destroy Hitlerism, then you should not go to war against a small country whose regime is not as fascist and imperialistic as Hitler's.

The Soviet invasion of Finland, as it turns out, is bad for Stalin. He is employing and destroying too much of his man power, energy and material. It is, therefore, bad for Hitler. For Hitler would prefer not to have Russia wasting herself on Finland.

After the check administered to the Russians by the Finns, there must be many Nazis and Germans now saying: "Is it with this hollow giant that you have linked our future in this fateful hour?" But Hitler must stick to Stalin while Germany is engaged in the Western war. Germany definitely stopped Italian aeroplanes in transit to Finland. On January 3, the entire Nazi press, obviously under orders, reproduced an article from the Moscow Red Army daily, *Red Star*, declaring that the "Allies induced Finland to attack the Soviet Union." Hitler manifests his sympathy for Stalin in this and other ways.

But the Stalin-Hitler collaboration on Finland may go further than newspaper editorials and blocking the passage of munitions to the Finns. In consequence of its staunch resistance, other nations have been encouraged to help Finland. Sweden and Norway know that a Russian victory in Finland would be a blow to their security, for Russia would become their neighbour. They have therefore given assistance to the Finns since the war started; assistance has taken the form of money for refugees, war equipment, and trained soldiers who, however, leave their uniforms at home and enter Finland

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as "civilian volunteers." France and England have likewise shipped aeroplanes and other munitions to Finland through Sweden and Norway.

This is an upsetting phenomenon for Hitler. If the Allies establish a strong military foothold for themselves in the Scandinavian peninsula, and if the Scandinavians are daring enough to defy Germany and let the Allies do this, the result may be disastrous for the Nazis. Germany obtains 49 per cent. of her iron ore from Sweden. If this were cut off, Germany could not continue the war. The Allies would like to cut it off. The Finnish war may give them an opportunity of doing so.

As much to help Finland as to prevent this catastrophe, Germany could easily feel compelled to take a hand in the Soviet-Finnish conflict, of course on the side of Russia against Finland, the Allies, Sweden and Norway.

International affairs have their own laws of dynamics. Partnerships entered into for limited objectives grow under the pressure of incalculable events. I think the Soviet-German entente had a broad enough purpose when it was first conceived last spring. But subsequent developments are enlarging its scope. The Finnish war makes Stalin more dependent on Hitler and makes Hitler more dependent on Stalin. They need one another in Scandinavia. They may need one another in other theatres. If they fight together they may be defeated together. Stalin's defeat in the Northern war would be a setback for Hitler, and Hitler's defeat in the Western war could have sad repercussions on Stalin's fortunes.

Many authorities in London and Paris see this truth, and they would now welcome a merging of the two European wars.

And it was so unnecessary for Stalin to get the Soviet Union into this mess.

CHAPTER V

MR. PRITT PASSES BY

I HAD completed the foregoing manuscript when a strange book was brought to my attention. It is called *Must the War Spread*, by D. N. Pritt, K.C., M.P. I know Mr. Pritt and have had numerous cordial and interesting meetings with him and his wife. We have seen eye to eye on many political questions. But I think most of his arguments in this book are wrong, and his main thesis is not proved.

Mr. Pritt's idea is that the British and French governments deliberately intend that the present European war be "spread or switched to the U.S.S.R." "Switched" means that the Allies will stop fighting Germany and agree with Hitler or his successors to attack Russia together.

I can see no evidence of any important tendency in England or France to make peace with Hitler. Mr. Pritt presents no such evidence. If the Allies had wanted peace with Hitler why did they go to war in September, 1939? Since then, it seems to me, there is rather more Anglo-French determination than less to continue the struggle.

What has happened between the declaration of war and to-day? There is a general realization that the war will be expensive and costly. But the British and French governments knew this before they started, and shortly after war commenced the British government announced that it was preparing for a three years' contest. I think that so far the course of the war has favoured the Allies, for they are better armed and mobilised now than they were in September, 1939.

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The other major development is Russia's invasion of Poland, the Baltic states and Finland. Because Germany's war in the west made this Russian expansion possible it would be the logic of those who agree with Mr. Pritt that the Allies propose to excuse Germany from the war and let Germany attack Russia. Then Soviet encroachments would end. Just how would this be arranged? The British and French governments would say to Hitler: We are all worried about Russia. Let us stop this fighting among ourselves, and you march on the U.S.S.R. We will lift the blockade. We will not move against you anywhere. In fact, if you need it we may help you with some credits or materials. Hitler, it is assumed, would assent. But having assented, what guarantee would the Allies have that he would indeed fight Russia? He would be more likely to take advantage of the lifting of the blockade and the cessation of hostilities to deepen German economic and political collaboration with the Soviet Union. The Allies would then have enabled Hitler and Stalin to work harmoniously in peace and prepare, if they wished, to turn on the West whenever they thought they were ready. A peace with Hitler now would be the doom of the West, and I think western statesmen know it.

If the Allies had desired to "switch" the war towards Russia they could have tried to do it before they themselves got involved. They could have offered Hitler a Polish "Munich." They could have thought that this would pave the way to a German assault on Russia. They did not do this—for good reason. For what reason? A Polish "Munich" would have given Germany Poland, a pact with Russia and peace to assimilate Poland and expand Soviet-German trade. The disappearance of Poland, whether by another appeasement manoeuvre or by war, unavoidably raised the question of a new German relationship with Russia. In the case of appeasement at the expense of Poland,

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Stalin would have had no choice but to come to an agreement with Hitler or fight Hitler unaided. And he would of course have come to an agreement with him. Russia is too weak. In the case of war, the Allies could expect the Soviet government to be on their side or benevolently neutral (and safe). They did not reckon with Stalin's unbolshevik appetite for foreign soil. But even if they had, their course would have been no different. Poland was Europe's key to war or peace. The moment Hitler turned the key war was inevitable immediately or later under improved conditions for Germany. That is why I believe the Allies cannot without endangering their very existence make peace with Hitler or with any German regime that would be strong enough to fight.

If Russia had signed with the two Allies the war might have been avoided. Hitler might never have dared to engage all three. If Russia had remained truly neutral Hitler's prospects would have been reduced and the war shortened. Instead, Stalin chose to absorb foreign countries at a time when Soviet Russia's security was greater than at any time since it was born.

Now as to "spreading" the war. This will depend on how much help Russia can grant or will grant Germany. If Russian assistance becomes an important element in Germany's war strength and puts an extra tax on the Allies they will naturally endeavour to cut off that assistance or immunise it. This has nothing to do with my wishes in the matter. I saw too much of the horrors of war in Spain to want war to spread anywhere and the Soviet generation which would have to fight is the generation that I saw grow to manhood in the fourteen years I spent in Russia. (Red Army casualties in Finland stir a graphic picture in my mind of fine young men, like those who paraded through the Red Square on so many occasions, going to their cold death and losing limbs and eyes for no good cause.)

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My subjective reactions, however, do not count. The Allies are waging war on Germany and are intent on depriving Germany of the means of protracting the struggle. Russia can prevent the spread of war by dropping Germany. I give the British and French governments credit for at least enough sense to avoid taking on another enemy if that is possible. But the Allies might feel that to strengthen the Finns, Swedes and Norwegians is to weaken Stalin and therefore Hitler. In that event, the war would of course spread. As long as Russia engages in aggression it courts danger.

Mr. Pritt's logic is most peculiar. He devotes his first 166 pages to an "account of the nature of great powers, their relations with small states, and their relation to the Soviet Union," and he affirms that this account "would, it seems, lead to only one conclusion, at any rate so far as concerns Britain, namely, that any impartial observer would have *expected* the government of this country to be actually or potentially the enemy and not the friend of the U.S.S.R., the friend and not the enemy of Hitler. . . ." Now obviously, the British government is not quite the friend of Hitler. It is conducting a war against Hitler. It is not fighting a war against Russia. Does Mr. Pritt conclude from this that his account and his deductions from it are wrong? No, he says England will have to become the friend of Hitler, and the enemy of Russia. Life will have to conform to Mr. Pritt's analysis.

Therefore, Mr. Pritt makes the "inference" that the British government will "switch" the war to Russia. The evidence? The "evidence" is a conversation between Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson before the war started and which is capable of an interpretation quite different from Mr. Pritt's, a passage in a book on the Danubian basin, a letter to the *Times*, a letter to the *Daily Telegraph*, an article by Dorothy Thompson, a comment by one M.P., and some excerpts from the

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Daily Mail, the *Methodist Recorder*, Hearst's *New York Journal and American*, Mr. Walter Lippmann, Mr. O. G. Villard, Colonel Lindbergh, and the Swedish *Goeteborgs Handels Tidning*. That is all. But this last paper merely said: "Hitlerism and Bolshevism are the offspring of the same idea." The *Methodist Recorder* wants Nazism overthrown first. Villard wants the war to end without condition; he wants no war against Germany or Russia. The letter to the *Times* urges the German people to sweep out the Nazis and unite with the rest of Europe "for the defence of European civilization." But even if all these voices and many more demanded an immediate "switching" of the war from Germany to Russia I would still not think that the war will be so switched. Mr. Pritt is a great barrister. He must know that if he sought to prove a case in court with such "evidence" he would lose. He quotes, for instance, three sentences from Dorothy Thompson's explanation of the Russo-British negotiations in 1939. And then he remarks: "This throws a new light on the rejection of Soviet help" by England. Now Miss Thompson is a very good journalist and often writes like an oracle, but Mr. Pritt need not accept her utterances as though she were speaking for the British government. The press is quite important. But one can prove almost anything by collecting cuttings from a sufficiently wide range of newspapers. Mr. Pritt's thesis must be weak indeed if it has to be constructed on such stray and flimsy data.

Mr. Pritt declares that the Chamberlain-Daladier policy of non-intervention in Spain was a defence of capitalist class interests. Mr. Pritt did not like this policy. I did not like it. Most pro-Loyalists hoped that Chamberlain would awake to the necessity of protecting Britain's national and imperial interests. Now he is doing that in the war with Germany. He could not be safeguarding class interests because Mr. Pritt says Germany is also a capitalist country. So capitalist

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country is fighting capitalist country as often before in history. Yeats-Brown, according to Mr. Pritt, is still an appeaser and would have peace with Hitler. But Chamberlain, who I imagine is more important in British political life than Yeats-Brown and Walter Lippmann, is leading the war on Germany—from which I think I am entitled to surmise that something has happened in Mr. Chamberlain or to Mr. Chamberlain since he sacrificed democracy in Spain.

This is where one is warranted in putting a clear question to Mr. Pritt. Does he want Hitler or Hitlerism destroyed? He does not say yes in this book. He does not even mention the desirability of defeating German fascism. Well, I am convinced that a Nazi defeat is necessary and would be a severe blow to fascism in all countries.

My own attitude towards the European War is this:

Allied spokesmen aver that they went to war for a principle; they are out to crush Hitlerism. Lord Lothian, the British ambassador to the United States, said at Chicago on January 4, 1940, that this war is "one more of those tremendous struggles between freedom and tyranny which have been the central theme of history." And Mr. Anthony Eden went to Egypt recently on behalf of King George to tell Australian and New Zealand troops that theirs was "the cause of right and justice." They were "defending liberty against its oppressors," Eden stated. This represents a welcome though very belated avowal of hostility towards a regime which from its very inception persecuted churches, dissident political groups and national minorities and quickly exterminated every vestige of German democracy.

Long after the Nazi tyranny had showed its bloodiest colours, British politicians and aristocrats continued to maintain cordial personal relations with Hitler and his aides. Nor can it be overlooked that during all the years of appeasement the present Allies helped every

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tyrannical aggressor achieve his goal and helped not a single victim of aggression. That is recorded history.

If the British had wished to defend democracy they might have done so long ago when Hitler was weak. They could have done it at that time without a war. Instead they nursed Hitler to greatness, and now they must pay the penalty. The British and French appeasers had plenty of warning. Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden and my own humble self, along with hundred of others who knew Europe, prophesied that every surrender to Fascist aggressors would only make them more arrogant and self-confident.

The British and French seek to excuse their supine submission to the Fascist aggressors on the grounds that they were militarily unprepared. But when they wanted to finish with torpedoings by Italian submarines in the Mediterranean in 1937, they found the strength. Moreover, the surrender of the Sudetenland took place in September, 1938. Six months later, on March 31, 1939, the British Government guaranteed Poland's independence and said it would go to war against Germany if Germany attacked Poland. What had occurred in those six months between Munich and the guarantee to Poland? Was it that England was better prepared for war? Then why had not those six months of preparation which stiffened England's back begun in 1932 or 1935 or 1936? As late as March 7, 1938, Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, expressed his "earnest hope of the success of our efforts towards European appeasement to be followed in due course by disarmament." If these efforts fail and only then apparently "we shall not hesitate to revise our (rearmament) programme or rate of acceleration." Meanwhile, he declared, "It would be disastrous for Great Britain to devote all her resources to rearmament." Even after Munich, when London and Paris certainly should have been able to read the handwriting on the

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wall, Mr. Eden complained on October 15, 1938, that "the rearmament industry in this country and in France are being operated on a peace-time basis." It was never a matter of strength. The British and French were stronger than Mussolini in 1935 and 1936. They did not want to stop him. They were, or could have made themselves, stronger than Hitler at any time during his triumphant march of conquest. If the Allies had been actuated by a love of democracy and the desire to save weak states from submergence they would have behaved very differently from the way they did during the eight years of appeasement.

What has happened now? Why this war? The Allies are engaged in a preventive war of self-defence. They thought throughout appeasement that they could tame the tigers by feeding them with raw meat. They believed that the aggressors would become sated or that it was possible to direct Fascist expansion away from the British and French empires. Finally, much too late, they understood that they themselves were menaced. Daladier has made it crystal clear in a number of public statements since September 2 that if France had not gone to war at this stage she would have become "a France isolated, without allies, without support, soon itself submitted to frightful assault." When the Allies realized that they were next they discovered a most active interest in democracy and freedom; they suddenly saw Hitlerism in its true light; and they guaranteed Poland, which was much less progressive than Czechoslovakia and Spain.

The Allies did not go to war to fight Hitlerism, but to crush a Germany which aimed at European domination at the expense of the British and French Empires. That is the primary Allied war aim. They are pledged to defeat Germany. But when Germany is a Fascist country, and aggressive because it is Fascist, the defeat of Germany is, *ipso facto*, a defeat for fascism whether or not Chamberlain and Daladier intended it as such.

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The force of complicated circumstances had driven British and French reactionaries into a struggle which, in effect, is anti-Fascist.

The British and French Empires were built on plunder and oppression. In the course of centuries, however, Great Britain and France have become the treasure-houses of certain cultural values and certain political principles. These principles are not perfect. Democracy is far from perfect. But it is infinitely better than any dictatorship I know. The world is not divided into white and black. There is no white; unfortunately there is a lot of black. If you insist on white and will support none other, you can sit in your ivory tower until doomsday waiting for it to arrive. The choice is between democratic grey and totalitarian black. The greatest peace aim is to banish the black and simultaneously make the grey whiter. The true democrat will fight on the foreign front against Fascism and on the domestic front and in the dominions and India against reaction.

This is my attitude, and I think it ought to be Mr. Pritt's attitude. It was Harry Pollitt's attitude. It could have been the attitude of all good Communists but for the Bolshevik pact with Hitler and the Soviet conquests in Poland and the Baltic States.

Mr. Pritt's method in dealing with specific phases of the international situation is that of the astute barrister. He has appointed himself counsel for Russia, so to speak, and prosecuting attorney against Finland. He therefore adduces all the arguments in favour of the Soviet Government and presents a tremendous roster of Finland's sins and British sins, too. His is the one-sided story of the pleader.

Many of Mr. Pritt's statements have already been answered in the body of my book. Finland is not nearly as reactionary as he paints it. There is no mention of its co-operatives and its advanced social legislation. I am sure Mr. Pritt could make out a worse case against the internal regimes of Hungary,

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Rumania, Turkey, Persia, China and, last but not least, Germany. Why did Stalin choose Finland instead of Germany for attack? The reply has nothing to do with whether Finland is democratic or semi-Fascist. This consideration did not influence Moscow's decision in the slightest. The Soviet Government has helped numerous reactionary foreign governments when that suited its purposes.

Mr. Pritt says that what Russia "demanded" from Finland was "reasonable." Then why did we hear nothing of these terms years ago, when they were presumably equally "reasonable"? Mr. Pritt cannot understand why the Finns did not accede to Moscow's demands. But does he understand why Russia made them at this time? Obviously because this was the time when, in Stalin's view, the Finns would have to yield. Why? Because Finland would have greater difficulty getting help from the major European Powers involved in the Western war. Germany was out, and the Allies were far and needed Scandinavian co-operation which would not have been so easy to get. Not only did Stalin know that no one was egging Finland on to attack Russia; he knew that no one could quickly come to Finland's aid if he attacked.

Mr. Pritt makes much of an incident that occurred just before the Russians invaded Finland. Finnish guns, according to Moscow, fired into Soviet territory and killed several Russian soldiers. Is there any proof? Japanese troops landed in the Soviet Far East in 1918 because a Japanese merchant was said to have been murdered. And did not the whole Chinese War start in 1937 over such an "incident"? We always know the worth of these "incidents." But, says Mr. Pritt, "it must be remembered that prestige counts for a good deal in some countries, and that if the U.S.S.R. were to ignore or submit to a frontier incident it would make it far more difficult for her to achieve any diplomatic success in negotiations with any other States."

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Well might the Soviet peoples exclaim : " Save us from our friends."

Mr. Pritt thinks that, except Hango, Moscow was asking for " nothing of importance to Finland—unless the suggestions in the Finnish White Paper that it includes the Mannerheim Line is correct ; on the facts as at present known, this does not seem to be the case." Let Mr. Pritt take in his hands the *Moscow News* of December 4, 1939, an English-language paper published in the Soviet capital, and turn to the map on page two. There he will see that the territory ceded to Russia by Mr. Kuusinen includes Koivisto, a key fortress of the Mannerheim Line, and also other segments of the same system of fortification. Surely Stalin would not take more from the safe, unaggressive " people's " government of Kuusinen than from the Finland of Mannerheim.

For me the most interesting passage in Mr. Pritt's book is one which demonstrates he was aware that Russia had insisted on the surrender of the Mannerheim line and other strategic points, insisted on this not merely in the negotiations with Finland in October–November, 1939, but in the Moscow talks with Britain in the summer of 1939. Clearly basing himself on the inside information of a gifted Soviet diplomat, Mr. Pritt writes :

" Finally, the U.S.S.R. would know quite clearly that if Russia were involved in a war with Germany one of two things was bound to happen : either the Finnish army under Mannerheim would, as they did in 1918, invite the German forces to enter Finland, or else the German forces, without waiting for the formality of invitation, would occupy Finland as a preliminary to an attack on Russia.

" In order to prevent this it was essential, if the U.S.S.R. was to be able to join any mutual assistance pact aimed at Germany, that she should control strategic positions in Finland as well as in the smaller Baltic States to prevent these countries being used by Germany for an attack upon Russia. Unless she controlled these

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positions it would be impossible for her to play any decisive part in an anti-aggression front against Germany.

"It is known, of course, that these were the demands made by the Russian Government on the Finnish Government at the time of the Russian-Finnish negotiations. It may be assumed, although it cannot yet be definitely known, that they were also the demands which the Soviet Government were putting forward in the summer and urging the British to get the Finns to accept. They could not very well ask less, and it is unlikely that they asked more."

This lets the cat out of the bag. Mr. Pritt tells us what might have happened if Russia had joined the Allies against Germany. But the same thing would not have happened if Russia had remained neutral. Would Germany have been foolish and strong enough to attack Finland and then a pacific Russia while engaged in the western war with England and France? Not likely. Why should any one suppose that a Finland at peace would have invited Germany to occupy it as a preliminary to an attack on non-aggressive Russia?

Moreover, Mr. Pritt informs us that Stalin wanted England to induce Finland in the summer of 1939 to give Russia everything and no less than Moscow demanded of the Finns in the autumn. That included all of Finland's vital national defences. No wonder the British refused, and no wonder the Finns refused. If the Finns had then acceded to British pressure, Finland would have become a Russian vassal and a base for an attack on Germany. Hitler would have regarded this as a threat and might have marched in before England could help Finland. If the Russians had rushed to the assistance of Finland that country would have been turned into a battlefield. In these paragraphs Mr. Pritt has thus revealed one of the reasons for the failure of the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet talks in Moscow during June-July-August, 1939.

Mr. Pritt declares that Russia placed her demands on

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Finland before the British representative and made their acceptance the price of adhering to the non-aggression alliance. These Finnish sacrifices were necessary, according to Mr. Pritt, so that Russia could the better cope with a German attack to which she would be exposed if she joined the non-aggressors. But, Russia did not join the non-aggression alliance. She joined Germany, and Germany retired from the Baltic area. Then why did Russia in October–November, 1939, need those same Finnish positions which she asked for so as to be able to ward off a German assault? The answer is that she did not need them, and she demanded them from Finland because she thought she could get them. Russia's aim in Finland was not self-defence. It was aggrandisement.

I could continue to deal with more of Mr. Pritt's mistakes of fact and interpretation. But enough has been said here to show that his basic contentions in favour of the new Soviet foreign policy are not well supported. It is not Mr. Pritt's fault. Anybody would experience difficulty in defending Stalin's pact with the Nazis and Russia's conquests of foreign territory. Soviet foreign policy is indefensible, and I hope it does not get the millions of innocent Soviet citizens into too much trouble. They have already paid dearly enough for the Kremlin's ambitions in Finland.

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