

THE CASE FOR
RESPONSIVE CO-OPERATION

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PREFACE

In issuing this pamphlet I have been actuated by impersonal considerations. If in the following pages I have referred to individuals, I have done so from the standpoint of a publicist's privilege. I am not concerned here with the gentlemen these pages refer to in my 'personal' capacity. As such no one who is dealt with in this pamphlet can have any justification for looking upon my criticisms as either 'inspired, or 'biased'.

This pamphlet deals only with what Indian politicians and members of the Congress have to do at this juncture for the furtherance of the country's needs. This brief *critique* is not intended for an examination of the Bureaucracy in and through the national evolution of the country. Hence none of the implications made here have any direct and immediate reference to our Bureaucracy, for several of whose members I have a warm admiration and regard.

I have issued this pamphlet with the object that it might be read by all those who evince interest in the present trend of Indian Politics. I have to hope that after reading these pages, they would be convinced about the contentions maintained in them. And when they are convinced, I request them to give a 'lead' to our Politics on the lines indicated here.

To focus public opinion on the present *Indian Situation*, several copies of this pamphlet are being widely distributed in all the political circles in India and England.

I would once again wish to state that I have written this pamphlet in keeping with the best traditions of the journalistic profession to which it is my privilege to belong.

14th December, 1925.

D. MADHAVA RAO

NOTE

Owing to the kind assistance of two of my esteemed friends I've been able to issue a second edition of this pamphlet, which has been brought up to date. I take this opportunity of conveying to them my best thanks for their generous help in my propaganda in behalf of the Responsive Co-operation Party.

D. MADHAVA RAO

Introductory.

To all intelligent observers of Indian politics it must be clear that by the time of the Cawnpore Congress the central creed of the Swarajya Party had been subjected to a complete orientation. And owing to the stress of circumstances operating on its central creed the Swarajya Party had to give up complete, consistent and continuous obstruction and in its place adhere to a policy of discriminatory obstruction. This policy of discriminatory obstruction had got itself linked with certain commitments, which went to insist on the Swarajists, willingness to avail themselves of the Legislatures for purposes of pushing through them certain measures in behalf of the nation's benefit. When such was the position which the Swarajists had come to occupy, it was quite in the fitness of things that office-acceptance as an item in the Party's programme should have been adopted by the Swarajists.

It was only for such an adoption that both Mr. Jayakar and Mr. Kelkar earnestly pleaded at the Cawnpore Congress. The sincerity, the weight of patriotic convictions, the absolute *bonafides* in Mr. Jayakar's dignified, convincing and eloquent advocacy were beyond all compare ; but they fell on deaf ears, irresolute temperaments, and mortgaged consciences. This resulted in a disaster ; and the pity of it is that it could have been averted if only the envisagement of political leadership by the Leader of the Swarajya Party had not got encrusted with the weight of a self-opinionated autocratic self-appraisalment. In sum, under the bidding of Pundit Motilaljee the Congress turned down the proposal mooted by Messrs. Jayakar and Kelkar. In this episode Pundit Motilaljee was supported by many persons who could be depicted as potty Hamlets and political fag-enders. These opposed the Maharashtren plea with many arguments that were nothing but a sort of a *rechauffe* of misapplied appositeness. But, however, the fact remains that the opposition in the Congress to the Jayakar-Kelkar proposition was as black and as sudden as a Killarney squall. Anyway that opposition has by now made it clear to all dispassionate and non-partisan students of Indian politics that it is a faithful reflection of the dwarfish thaumaturgy of the politician in the Motilal-Swarajist, whose rag and bobtail political ejaculations lack the virtue of the German *geduld*.

Thus when the political tomahawkers and the Sreemans within the fold of the Motilal-Swarajists turned down the Jayakar-Kelkar proposal, there

was no other course for the two Maharashtrian leaders and their followers but to withdraw themselves from the Swarajya Party and organise their own position. In this way the stunts and the high-falutin of the Leader of the Swarajya Party and the hoydenish blarney of the other Swarajist Natty Bumpo succeeded in bringing about the withdrawal of the Maharashtrian co-operation from the Swarajya Party. The Maharashtrian cessation is now a settled fact. And as marking a *felo de se* of the Swarajya Party it is no less a settled fact. In this *felo de se* which the Motilal-Swarajists have themselves wantonly perpetrated no true lover of either the Swarajya Party or of the country can rejoice in except self-elected stage-thunderers like Mr. Sreenivasa Iyengar who seem to *grouch* under its unreckoned ruin. But even these stage-thunderers cannot like a slow Lagoon snake crush and kill discerning public opinion. The discerning public do know that the Swarajists of this type have been playing the very old Harry with 'veiled threats', and that sooner or later their pretensions themselves would go flop in a decrescendo of unreality.

However that may be, the fact remains that the Motilal-Swarajists and the Responsivists are to-day separate from each other. And if this separation is regretted as an ugly form of political sloughing, the Responsivists are not to be blamed, for the events after January 6th 1926 show that the 'orthodox' Swarajists, like some Eumerides, are bent upon persecuting—if only they can—the Responsivists. But in spite of the vituperation of a section of the Press that has sworn to acquit itself as the mouth-piece of the Motilal-Swarajist-group, the Responsivists have been able to weather through the storm in virtue of the honesty of their professions and sobriety of their perspective. The Responsivists are growing stronger and stronger from day to day, because they have discerned the inevitable and have, therefore, been adopting themselves to the needs of the situation. The inevitable is that as things at present stand Indian politicians cannot afford to ignore the Legislatures, that direct-action in its broad commitments is impossible, and that constitutional agitation in and through the Councils alone helps us to plough the field for a coming political harvest. That this is the situation even Pundit Motilaljee has been forced to admit—silently, though not through verbal professions; and as such the original obstruction creed of the Swarajya Party has been now qualified into discriminatory obstruction; and therefore Pundit Motilaljee was forced to admit that for civil-disobedience they and the country were not yet prepared. In passing we may note how in the face of the weighty opinions of Mahatma Gandhi and Pundit Motilaljee on the civil-disobedience issue, Mr. Sreenivasa Iyengar has been asserting that they are ready for civil-disobedience; but Mr. Iyengar's heroics in its behalf, though innocuous, are somewhat slithery; and if he

would wish not to make himself the butt-end of everyman's ridicule this Madras gentleman would stop repeating, ad nauseum, these *ipse dixit*s, for not even his Sreemanship would give in our eyes a presentable colour to these jackdaw-grimaces of his. Coming to our point, we see that to-day the Motilal-Swarajists have come to adopt discriminatory obstruction. This fact itself is an eloquent testimony to the sanity that is behind the Kelkar-Jayakar propaganda. And as we know now the A.I.C.C. at Delhi has ratified it. But the A. I. C. C. has not taken care to so change some of the old fundamentals as to make them be in unison with its new objective, viz, discriminatory obstruction. The insistence of the old-day fundamentals in alliance with a changed central objective has become a ridiculous juxtaposition out of which some of the strangest anomalies are being perpetrated. That the policy of the Responsivists is in keeping with discriminatory obstruction and that the policy of the Swarajists now *is not* in keeping with discriminatory obstruction was pointed out by me in an article contributed to the *Daily Express*. To make the issues clear that article is reproduced here :—

As one who has been working on behalf of the Responsive Co-operation Party I feel it is not out of place for me to discuss the reflections that have been cast in the press on the Responsive Co-operators in connection with the latest Congress developments. The Swarajists and the press that has sworn to stand by them have applauded the decision of the 6th instant as momentous and unique. They have the fullest liberty to opine about the walkout in the above strain, which I believe, alone helps them to gauge "national crises" as happening twelve times within a just twelve-month round ! As it is, it is no one's business to quarrel with the Swarajist spokesmen simply on the score that they have been beating their drums a trifle too loudly ; but when once the Swarajist apologists take on themselves the unction of pronouncing the view that the Swarajist decision alone is sensible and that the non-Swarajist decisions are meaningless, it is the concern of the Responsivists to answer that challenge and justify their standpoint. Therefore I wish to point out how the Responsivist attitude is more rational and not self-contradictory than the Swarajists' stand as enunciated in the A.I.C. C. resolutions from Delhi.

Now to an examination of these :—

(1) Dr. Moonjee's amendment brought out the necessity for absolute consistency in the Congress attitude. It wanted the Swarajists either to practise continuous, consistent and persistent obstruction, which means "that all measures of the Government good, bad or indifferent are thrown out and no resolutions are moved or bills introduced or questions asked which may

have the effect of working the Legislatures to any purpose whatsoever other than that of exposing the bureaucratic soul of the Government in its nakedness and the budget will be thrown out and no seat on any of the Committees appointed by Legislatures or the Government is accepted", or, if that course is not found feasible, then drop out obstruction and adopt a policy of Responsive Co-operation which means "capturing the present machinery of the Government so far as may be possible under our present circumstances so that opportunities may be created for improving the material prosperity of the people, thus strengthening them in their resistance to the Government and for obstructing Government at every step in its attempt to thwart our progress towards Swaraj." The gist of Dr. Moonjee's amendment was clearly enunciated by Mr. B. Das in his amendment that "the policy of the Congressmen in the Assembly and Councils be one of opposition and not obstruction." But the A.I.C.C. has turned down both the amendments, and it has passed a resolution wherein the first three items emphasise obstruction and the remaining three items insist on the Swarajists making use of the Legislatures. Thus the resolution combines 'obstruction' and 'non-obstruction'. But "obstruction" and "non-obstruction" for one same party in a Legislature is different from "opposition" and "non-opposition". There is every sense in a party adopting in a Legislature an attitude of "opposition" and "non-opposition" as the occasion might demand. But "obstruction" and "non-obstruction" (non-obstruction is the same as "non opposition") is a thrice confounded hotch-potch of constitutional mimicry.

(2) If any issue is quite clear in the proceedings of the A.I.C.C. it is this: that the Swarajists under the astute guidance of Pundit Motilaljee will not tolerate even the plausibility of office-acceptance by the Congress legislators. The Swarajist opposition to office acceptance would be significant only when the Swarajists are determined on not bringing any legislative measures while in the Councils and are for creating deadlocks by opposing every measure, without any exception, that might be brought in the Councils. But by the saints in heaven, the present day objective of the Swarajists is not simply the creation of dead-locks, for according to the items, d, e, f of the A. I. C. C. resolution it is clear that the Swarajists do wish to push forward in the Councils some legislation that will go to secure the country's interests. What does this attitude amount to? I will explain its significance—at any rate as I understand it. The Swarajists wanted to wreck the Councils because they knew the Councils were sham Councils, mere empty puppet-shows of constitutional growth. Therefore the Swarajists wanted to demonstrate this fact that even when the Councils were wrecked by deadlocks the Government of the country would be carried on because the Government of the country was in reality being run as an autocratic bureaucracy and not as a constitutional representative mode of government. By

destroying the Councils the Swarajists wanted to demonstrate to the world at large the sham constitution that has been given to the people. Therefore the Reformed Councils were held by the Swarajists to be sham shows. If so the Swarajists might as well have left the Councils and touched them not even with their boot—as in the non-co-operation zenith of national self reliance. But to do so was dangerous, so said the Swarajist, for the reason that though the Councils were sham they were nevertheless the means through which some harm might come to the nation in case care was not taken to check that. Therefore the Swarajists said that to prevent that harm they had to go and destroy them. The Swarajists' original Swarajism was Council-destruction—to kill dyarchy. To-day that original Swarajism has passed through a beautiful orientation. In spite of this orientation the Swarajists talk in a political phraseology that was in vogue in 1922 and early in 1923-24 and which to-day is ante-diluvian. Owing to this fact the strangest anomalies are perpetrated by the Swarajists. I will now mention a few of them.

To-day the Swarajists feel that they cannot but reject the 1923 obstruction and cannot but adopt discriminatory wrecking. When once you start with discriminatory wrecking, its logical sequel cannot but be "opposition" and not "obstruction". In passing I might respectfully urge my readers just to reflect whether Mr. Patel has been helping in furthering the Swarajist objective, the creation of deadlocks, or in running on a Council which the Swarajists describe as a sham.

(3) If the Swarajist want to capture any post in the Council-machinery then their talk of consistent, continuous obstruction becomes impossible. The Swarajists to-day have given up their old consistent, continuous obstruction. The Swarajists do not now seek the complete wrecking of Councils they want to take part in some legislation (A. I. C. C. resolution). Thus far no one can have any quarrel with the Swarajists. But from now starts the trouble. When the Swarajists want to pass certain legislation they fail to see the inevitability of their resolve. When once you as an elected party in a Council wish to put your programme through, when your programme is made up of measures for legislation, how can you refuse to accept office? Does any party anywhere under a representative system of Government push through a constructive programme by remaining in the opposition? For instance, how can the Swarajists in the Madras Council carry out the constructive items in the Tamil Nadu Congress manifesto by not accepting office, which means by remaining in the opposition? Constructive programme for an elected party under parliamentary system of government by remaining in the opposition! Therefore what is all this talk of non-acceptance of office and at the same time attempts at legislation on behalf of the

national good? Is it not on the face of it absurd? Is it not all mere moonshine in spite of the legal and constitutional luminaries in the Swarajist ranks? Is the above ridiculous juxtaposition similar to the Americanisation of the Rugby Football game?

Therefore if you desire to wreck the Councils do so without reservations. Do not start with exceptions. Do not put forward your own men for the Presidential seats. If you want to wreck the Councils do not attempt to make any use of them. Do not then think of constructive programmes with reference to work in the Councils. If you think of these constructive programmes in such an implication then honestly do what you perceive must do, and call your course of action by an honest name. Do not take shelter under a maze of words, for that becomes mere political outrance. If, on the other hand, you wish to make use of the Councils for constructive programmes, then in right earnest enter them and in right earnest accept responsibility, that is cease to be in the opposition, accept office—with the right type of men.

These are the alternatives that cannot be mixed together. The members of the Responsive Co-operation Party feel that the present needs of the country under the now existing conditions have got to be served through the Councils, and they feel that certain measures have to be pushed through the Councils. And as such they see the inevitability of their having got to accept office. That is why they, who till now have worked in and with the Swarajya Party, have had to secede from the Swarajya Party, which does not see eye to eye with them with reference to the council-issue. The Responsivists are aware that beside the Councils there are other important avenues where national workers can labour. With reference to the Councils, the Responsivists do wish to make use of them for carrying on the constructive programmes and for this purpose they do wish to accept office.

In the light of these facts what is the justification for saying that the Responsivists are acting as a menace to the country's progress and that they are denationalised malcontents who are only enacting an ugly clog-dance before the Swarajists who are, after the walk-out, marching forward to the battle of national liberation? I hope the Swarajists will answer us. Of course now the Swarajists have the support of a press whose motto, more or less, has often been '*C'est plus commode aussiet moins compromettant*'. The Responsivists might succeed or might not. But this is certain that the Swarajya Party, under the guidance of its present leaders, even after the "walk-out", which is spoken of as marking the third stage in the national battle for freedom, will be achieving no more and no less than, what I call, the rearing of a civilization of amendments :—

From the above arguments one could see that if you want to put into operation the very resolution of the A. I. C. C. (Delhi) then office-acceptance has to be embarked upon. But the Motilal-Swarajists do not grant this. Their obstinacy is as black as Erebus, and in the face of such political mawkishness the Responsivists cannot but secede from the Swarajya Party and form themselves into a separate organisation. Owing to these reasons it is not possible for men like Mr. Jinnah to join the Congress. (This aspect of the question is explained in an article of mine here reproduced in the appendix.) Therefore why the non-Swarajist politicians are trying to form themselves into a separate party cannot be, and need not be, as the mystery of Ithyphallic gods. The formation of such a Party has been ridiculed by some journals with all the gusto of Artemus Ward's tiger; but then we know that these journals whack nationalism at decent and convenient intervals. Indeed these jibs thrown at the face of non-Swarajist politicians will soon swale off like thawing snow. And also it is certain that the statesmanship of the present inspirer of the Swarajya Party is operating within his Party itself in such a way that in it "the reciprocity of command and obedience has become a state of unstable vital equilibrium". Indeed the country will soon be tired, if already it is not, of the *panache* and the *assiette au beurre* resorted to by the Swarajists. That Party's days of wonderment, stir, and pother will soon be over. And once again honest men will agree with Aristotle that what makes a man a sophist is not his faculty, but his moral purpose.

In the meanwhile non-Swarajist politicians have to coalesce together, combine, organise, and push on their work. That such efforts would succeed we earnestly hope. In this connection it is my proud privilege to respectfully urge everyone to read these pages and if convinced about the central cause they plead for, then to do their every bit by the new Party of Responsivists. I feel that even in Madras this response would be coming and that with the help of such doughty fighters of the country's cause, like Sir A. P. Patro, it would come in rich abundance. Any way let the country know that though we are not Swarajists we are still the lovers of our motherland and the cherishers of her progress, and that men like Mr. Jayakar, Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Kelkar, Mr. Chintamani, Sir Patro, Pundit Malaviyaji, Dr. Besant, the Hon'ble Mr. Khaparde, Mr. Panikkar Mr. S. V. Ramaswamy Mudaliar, though not Swarajists are persons, among others, who have been pressing the day of India's high destiny, when enjoying full Dominion Status, she would once more be the queen of the earth.

The Case for Responsive Co-operation

The Swarajya Party's Objectives at its Inception.

In the political life of India the Swarajya Party ever since 1922 has occupied a place of pre-eminence ; and it is no exaggeration to state that till about September 1925 the Swarajya Party enjoyed in a very secure measure the ample confidence of nationalist India. Indeed, the prestige of the Party partook of such dimensions that it received at the hands of the British politicians such a deliberate and critical consideration as that up till now had not been bestowed by them on any group of Indian politicians. Both the apologists and the critics of the Party manifested a very lively interest, almost a considerable concern, in the progress that the Party was chalking out for itself from month to month. This amount of publicity that the Party came to enjoy might warrant the rather ungracious statement one could think of making, that the Swarajists were bent upon securing for themselves, by all the means they could command, a lime-light advertisement. But, however, lime-light was not what they most wished for, and to them lime-light advertisement must have seemed so contemptible that they could certainly loathe it. For, as apart from courting a fissure of political notoriety, the Swarajists, and especially their brilliant leader and inaugurator of their creed, were so conscious of the momentum of their political programme that they could not allow themselves to be lost in the vain flirtations of a mere passing publicity. To them politics meant no mere socio-intellectual fashion or even a Russian manifestation of patriotism, but assuredly the steadfast working out of a grim, concrete programme, especially in the face of a very ably directed ridicule ; so much so Desabandhu Das was not weary at any time of repeating, "To us politics is religion." And that concrete programme was equivalent to a realisation of *Swaraj* or Dominion Self-Government for India. Again that programme was to be looked upon as being made up of two distinct parts. The first of the two was to cover the story of the attempts of the Swarajists for smashing the Councils as remodelled by the Reform Act, making Government by Councils impossible, and thereby demonstrating to the public at large the 'unmistakable fact' that in India the Government is being carried on, not with the consent of the people as represented by their representative Legislatures, but with the means of governance that an autocracy employs. In that much of endeavour by the Swarajists would lie their scope of work in reference to the one half of the Party's programme. After fulfilling this much, the Swarajists were to set themselves to the task of making the administration of the country by the British officials impossible;

and such a fulfilment was to be engendered by the adoption of non-violent civil-disobedience. So, according to the programme of the Swarajya Party, the question of mass civil-disobedience was to come off only immediately after the Party had succeeded in smashing the Councils to pieces and paralyzing council—government. Of course the protagonists of the Swarajya Party were very earnest in impressing on their countrymen the fact that they too, the Swarajists, though differing from the No-changers, believed that the only means they had at their command for establishing *Swaraj* in India consisted in a resort to mass civil-disobedience; really they were very sure about it, nay, very earnest on that score; even while engaging themselves with attempts for wrecking the Councils, they would be doing all they could—so the Swarajists assured the country,—for bringing into fruition those issues by whose help only the campaign of mass civil-disobedience could at any time be practised. Thus, what the Swarajists wished to formulate with reference to their stand in Indian Politics was very clear: the Swarajists wanted *Swaraj*, or what is known as Dominion Self-government for India; they would endeavour to create in the country that atmosphere necessary for a thorough-going success of the campaign of mass civil-disobedience; they held steadfast to the belief that *Swaraj* could not be had from Great Britain for the mere asking of it, but had to be wrested from the unwilling hands of a trustee imposed on us; really the Swarajists were no believers in *constitutional agitation*, whose counter part was to be found in propaganda through Councils; they were for *direct action*; and as such they had to first wreck the council-machinery in the country, and after achieving that triumph of iconoclasm they were to shoulder themselves for the campaign of mass civil-disobedience. Therefore logically it had to follow from the above premise that when the Swarajists entered the Councils they could not there accept any posts of responsibility, that they had to entirely non-co-operate with the life in the Councils, and that in fact they had to offer complete, consistent, and systematic obstruction, so that by their destructive tactics council-work could be rendered impossible. But even for a moment it must not be forgotten that the Swarajists, who were no believers in *constitutional agitation* and who were the partisans of *direct action*, never said that the A to Z of their political programme consisted only, and only, in wrecking the Councils, for they took every occasion when they were called on to profess their faith to categorically tell the country that even when they should happen to be in the Councils their ultimate sanction would only rest in mass civil-disobedience.

Non-violent Mass Civil-disobedience the Swarajist objective: Examination of the issues involved: Mass Civil-disobedience or direct action not possible at present, and for long time to come, for both the Swarajists and the No-Changers.

If indeed mass civil-disobedience was to be at the final hour of reckoning the practical method of working out the Swarajists' programme, it is very natural to expect that the Swarajists are very much alive to the entire implications of *direct action*. Now, let us pause to consider in what light the Swarajists have been viewing the issue of mass civil-disobedience, both as a theoretical proposition as well as an item in the sphere of 'practical politics'. Just at the outset it might be necessary to reiterate the fact, although it is by now too well-known to need a repetition, that the very idea of mass civil-disobedience in India was given a tremendous impressionableness by the personality of Mahatma Gandhi. It was he who almost dragged that idea from the sphere of speculation to the level of 'practical politics'. But from the very outset Mahatma Gandhi did feel that civil-disobedience could be practised only when certain sets of conditions had been fulfilled by the very persons who were to partake in the campaign of civil resistance. So, as long as those sets of conditions remained unfulfilled by the would-be propagators of civil-disobedience, Mahatma Gandhi felt quite certain that that campaign would not succeed. Those sets of conditions had to be very consequential, and, even more so, when the movement of civil-disobedience was to be perfectly non-violent. Such a campaign, a mass civil-disobedience, and one that was to be perfectly non-violent, could not but insist certain obligations on those who stood out for its launching. These obligations were lucidly elucidated by Mahatma Gandhi in an article entitled "The Momentous Issue" (*Young India*, Nov. 1921) : "Complete civil-disobedience is rebellion without the element of violence in it. An out and out civil resister simply ignores the authority of the state. He becomes an outlaw claiming to disregard every unmoral state law. Thus, for instance, he may refuse to pay taxes, he may refuse to recognise the authority of the state in his daily intercourse. He may refuse to obey the law of trespass and claim to enter military barracks in order to speak to the soldiers, he may refuse to submit to limitations upon the manner of picketing and may picket within the proscribed area. In doing all this he never uses force and never resists force when it is used against him. In fact, he invites imprisonment and other uses of force against himself. This he does because and when he finds the bodily freedom he seemingly enjoys to be an intolerable burden. He argues to himself, that a state allows personal freedom only in so far as the citizen submits to its regulations. Submission to the state law is the price a citizen pays for his personal liberty. Submission, therefore, to a state wholly or largely unjust is an immoral barter for liberty. A citizen who thus realises the evil nature of a state is not satisfied to live on its sufferance. Thus considered civil resistance is a most powerful expression of a soul's anguish and an eloquent protest against the continuance of an evil state. Though, therefore, the All India Congress Committee has

authorised civil-disobedience by the Provincial Congress Committees on their own responsibility, I hope they will put due emphasis on the word 'responsibility' and not start civil-disobedience with a light heart. Every condition must be given its full effect. The mention of Hindu-Muslim Unity, non-violence, Swadeshi and removal of untouchability means that they have not yet become an integral part of our national life. If an individual or a mass have still misgivings about Hindu-Muslim Unity, if they have still any doubt about the necessity of non-violence for the attainment of our triple goal, if they have not yet enforced Swadeshi in its completeness, if the Hindus among the mass have still the poison of untouchability about them, that mass or that individual are not really for civil-disobedience". From such a categorically unequivocal statement about those factors to be deemed as perquisition on behalf of a campaign of mass civil-disobedience, even to Mahatmajee himself, and at a time when the people *en masse* in the country with utmost faith and fervour were gathering round the tenets of the Non-co-operation movement, the revelation did come that the country had not been prepared for sowing the seeds of mass civil-disobedience. In the light of that revelation Mahatma Gandhi unconditionally opined through the columns of *Young India* (January 26, 1922) that "the validity of the objection (to the launching of the mass movement) lies in the statement that the non-payment campaign will bring into the movement people who are not as yet saturated with the principle of non-violence". More than stating that much, Mahatma Gandhi was forced to confess on February 16, 1922 that ".....as it is, the Congress organisation is still imperfect and its instructions are still perfunctorily carried out, We have not established Congress Committees in every one of the villages. Where we have, they are not perfectly amenable to our instructions. We have not probably more than one crore of members on the roll. We are in the middle of February, yet not many have paid the annual four annas subscription for the current year. Volunteers are indifferently enrolled. They do not conform to all the conditions of their pledge. They do not even wear handspun and hand-woven khaddar. All the Hindu volunteers have not yet purged themselves of the sin of untouchability. All are not free from the taint of violence." If such words depict the vital complexes of the adherents of the Congress in 1922, we can only too easily remind ourselves that in 1925 those complexes have maintained their *status quo*; in fact more than that *status quo* remaining stable, those unhealthy phases in the Congress, which both Swarajists and No-changers have to look upon as the ugly distortions in the national movement in the form of a struggle, have, in the course of three years, gathered about them an unmistakable intensity. And at the present day none can dare gainsay the fact that there is a decided tension

between the Hindus and the Mussalmans; and indeed no one now can see anywhere in the country even that atmosphere of composed differences towards a reconciliation the two communities were anxious to engender during the Cawnpore—Mosque episode. This communal uneasiness is very much alive, let us remember, even after the Unity Conference and the memorable moral inculcation instilled into the very core of the country's heart by Mahatma Gandhi's epoch-making fast. Necessarily one is warranted in drawing the conclusion that as a corollary to the presence of communal uneasiness the operation of the principle of absolute non-violence is rendered precarious. As though in keeping with the above two distressing facts the rigidity of untouchability is strengthening its hold on the view-point of the people. Of course we need not remind ourselves that one's allegiance to *khadi* has been open, step by step, to such ridiculous evasions that those who are 'bulking' large on it are thereby making themselves the laughing-stock of their observers. Such a consummation which 1925 is witnessing has goaded Mahatma Gandhi to the open confession that mass civil-disobedience cannot come under the domain of 'practical politics' for a long time to come. Even to the great inaugurator of the Non-co-operation movement and to the remarkable zealots of the No-change creed mass civil-disobedience is not possible within any measurable distance of time. But yet the present leader of the Swarajya Party, whose work now functions in a sphere totally removed from the one which forms the ground whereon to rear mass civil-disobedience, can bring himself to tell us, and that too in a tone of utmost confidence, that he would on any one fine morning—it may be to-morrow or a month hence,—launch on the country mass civil-disobedience and that it would almost automatically work its way up to the desired end. But such resorts to blatant sophistry do not deceive either the Pundit's friends or his critics. Such heroics as were indulged in by Pundit Motilalji a few weeks ago at Cawnpore will not be mistaken for anything more than a mere *Lapsus Lingual*. Not only the Pundit, but his other distinguished colleagues as well, would certainly feel all the better for just reminding themselves of these honest and most touching words. "God has warned me the third time that there is not as yet in India that truthful and non-violent atmosphere which and which alone can justify mass civil-disobedience which can be at all described as civil which means gentle, truthful, humble, knowing, wilful yet loving, never criminal and hateful." If even after such significant reminders with reference to the realities of our present standing, the protagonists of the Swarajya Party should continue to further indulge in that pleasant occupation of pronouncing threats with no obligation to have them executed, and to go on raising every now and then the slogan, that in the very near future they would be launching civil disobedience, one cannot help laughing them

out in the face and then dinning into their ears, "Have you got a real faith? Or is it merely a political aspiration? Is it merely that you wish to be free to oppress others as you are being oppressed?"

Since direct action is not feasible, constitutional agitation is the only alternative left for the Swarajists to pursue : The benefits accruing from constitutional agitation.

Thus, when it is conclusively proved that *direct action* is not feasible for the Swarajists to undertake the only other course left open for them to follow up, with a view to the attainment of Dominion Self-Government for India, would be that of *constitutional agitation*. That *constitutional agitation* is the only method of propaganda which Swarajists, or for that matter any other group of Indian politicians, could employ now appears to be quite fully known to the British statesmen and publicists, whose spokesman, Mr. B. C. Allen, suggested, *totidem verbis*, the above juxtaposition when he wrote, "There was a strong feeling among a considerable section of the English speaking Indians, whom, for want of a better term, he would call nationalist. But what was the size of that community? It was considerably less than 1 per cent. of the whole. Though they had an influence out of all proportion to their numbers, this influence did not penetrate far and did not persist for long in the dumb inarticulate masses . . . I do not dispute the power of the educated classes to stir up the masses. But the edifice of unrest could not endure because it was built upon sand. The grievances which agitated India did not really touch the great mass of the people. . . .". That means the British do appreciate the fact that to the English-educated Indian the only effective weapon in his political campaigns is *constitutional agitation*. Nevertheless that phrase, 'constitutional agitation,' has become the butt-end of ridicule of some Indian politicians; and these politicians have so far belittled the very notion of utility underlying that mode of propaganda that in their eyes its equivalent is conveyed by the phrase *political mendicancy*. But, however, the apologists of *constitutional agitation* need not feel shy of the sheer contempt that is being poured against them by a lively number of Indian politicians, because they could quote instances when national gains have accrued to India as a result of *constitutional agitation*. Of them we can record here a few. Even before the Home Rule campaign was undertaken by Dr. Besant Indian politicians were striving after representative institutions for India. In those thirty years *test questions of the right of the Indian nation against the arbitrariness of the Bureaucracy had been fought and won*: and consequently Indian politicians could proudly count upon the withdrawal of the Punjab Colonisation Bill, the annulling of the Partition of Bengal, the sobering down of the repulsive ordinances of the South African states against

Indian subjects of the crown, as triumphs mainly in behalf of *constitutional agitation*. Again, any dispassionate student of Indian constitutional development will admit that from time to time the judicial interpretation of Indian nationalist agitation has been undergoing a distinct orientation; and this statement is affirmed by the fact that while the Dt. Magistrate of Poona in taking proceedings against Lok. Tilak expressed himself in these words, "Mr. Tilak should consider himself very fortunate that the Government did not intend to proceed against him under the substantive section 124 A. Indian Penal Code", a Judge of His Majesty's Judicature in India brought himself to reflect in the course of his order on Mrs. Besant's petition that "It is difficult to see how any such movement (for Home-Rule) can be regarded as illegal *per se*. It lies entirely with the Sovereign, that is 'in the compendious phrase of Dr. Dicey, The King in Parliament, to establish any government he chooses for India or any other part of the British Empire. There can be nothing wrong, therefore, in a subject of the crown urging the desirability of a change in the machinery of the Government of India. Changes in the constitution of the Government do take place from time to time with the consent of the sanction of the Sovereign. In certain stages of the society reforms in the constitution of the Government are a biological, political necessity. To say that such questions are not open to public discussion, supposing the law is not violated in the manner and method adopted in such discussion, would be opposed to all sound maxims of constitutional law.'" Towards such an orientation the pressure of *constitutional agitation* must have contributed its own share. Again, can we fail to notice that the following pronouncement made in the columns of the *London Daily News*: "The one essential principle to be established is responsibility. The one blunder that would imperil the scheme is the refusal, for any reason or through any fear, of an adequate measure of responsibility to Indian representatives and legislative bodies. Now the main and governing fact of the problem as Mr. Asquith used to say, is that in the Imperial Commonwealth of to-morrow there must be room for a self-governing and responsible India. This is the place which the greatness of India involves, which the extraordinary loyalty of India has earned," marks the phase of the political consummation for whose realisation *constitutional agitation* has been directed? Well, even the Memorandum of the Nineteen did admit the great advance India has made in her march towards Dominion Home-Rule between the Charter Act, of 1833. and 1909. And has this progress not owed its success to the effectiveness of *constitutional agitation*? That Memorandum is an eloquent testimony to the fact that in the history of India, *constitutional agitation* has been effective and that in fact it alone has made it impossible for *Finality Johns* to stem the tide of India's political advance. Indeed, the endeavours of those Indian

politicians who have believed in the practice of *constitutional agitation* and have persistently striven in its behalf, have focussed in the minds of British statesmen a newer out-look with which they could see the problem India has been presenting to them,—an outlook that is conveyed in a pregnant passage by the brilliant Mr. S. K. Ratchliffe—"Here is, of course, an almost irresistible temptation to an all powerful Government having behind it an unbroken tradition of authority. There is something to be said for autocracy; there is, as the English-speaking world believes, everything to be said, when a certain stage has been reached, for Self-Government. But the system for which there is nothing at all to be said is a system possessing the appearance of autonomy with none of its reality."—If then India is yet to realise the reforms numbered 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13 (to mention a few) by the Memorandum of the Nineteen, it cannot be denied that since 1833 onwards India has been growing in political and constitutional stature, so much so that to-day she has been witnessing the progress of a constitutional experiment which is spoken of as being "such a success and so startling that, before a session was over the European members of the Assembly, official and non official, joined their Indian colleagues in requesting the Secretary of State and the British Cabinet to anticipate the decennial enquiry of 1929".

Constitutional agitation involves the Councils as our Modus operandi.

Of course in spite of the case that has been made out, briefly, for the result-yielding capacity of *constitutional agitation*, we are aware that there are in the country its many harsh critics; but that does not matter; only one is tempted to be put out with them when they take the extremely unreasonable attitude and begin opining that because India has still to realise a large modicum of political reforms adequate enough to give her a Dominion Status, *constitutional agitation* as the medium of our propaganda, is thrice damnably ineffective and one that is bound to cheat us, delude us, and yield us at the end the most barren fruit. If to the expression of such a view we take exception, we do so, not because we hold the stunt that every one should look at our politics from the stand-point which we adopt and that there can be no place for individuals to enjoy the privilege of their convictions, but only with this object that very often the critics of *constitutional agitation* are simply perverse in obstinately refusing to concede the facts of past history which are an eloquent testimony to what extent *constitutional agitation* has succeeded as a 'practical proposition'. Just at this juncture the point we would like to emphasise is that because India, owing to many causes, has discarded, and that too very rightly, *direct action*, by way of armed revolt, for winning her political ends, and has also

given up the other aspect of *direct action*, viz. mass civil-disobedience, the only possible alternative left for her to pursue in furtherance of her aims is *constitutional agitation*, which necessitates our employing the Councils as one of the fields where we are to labour. Thus, we are brought face to face with this situation, that in and through the Councils our nationalist politicians are to function for the attainment of their ends. And from this fact it inevitably follows that our nationalist politicians cannot afford to ignore the Councils as their *modus operandi*, for the very simple reason that the other alternative to such a *modus operandi*, viz. either armed revolt or mass civil-disobedience, cannot be adopted by them. In so far as the Swarajists believed at the very inception of their party that mass civil-disobedience was practicable, and in fact was a ready-made instrument in their hands which they could straightaway begin to make use of, they were logically correct in opining that they could get on jolly-well in their agitation for the political emancipation of the country without the medium of Councils; and it is but natural that when they felt they could afford to ignore the mediumship of the Councils they should think that not only could they ignore the Councils but even bear to smash them up and wreck them beyond any hope of repair. In other words, once the major premise of the Swarajists' mentality, viz that mass civil-disobedience, otherwise known as *direct action*, is practicable and that they could put it into execution, is granted, there can be no logical fallacy about the Swarajist intransigence. But the crucial fact about our conditions is that such a major premise is not a reality at all; and under such circumstances what are the Swarajists to do? To them *direct action* is not feasible, and it could merely be hugged to the bosom as an intellectual plausibility; and they have only another way by which they have to pursue their march; therefore they have either to court a mere groping in the dark, which will be ineffective in spite of all their mighty endeavours, in case they refuse to utilise the Councils and seek after *direct action*, or accept the Councils and out of their labours in them get at as much of gain as is possible under the circumstances. Like 'practical men' the Swarajists have had to be alive to the actual realities. They have been very much alive. The thanks of the country ought to be given to them ungrudgingly for the great deal of commonsense they have displayed in rejecting theories and impractical idealisms and for steering their course with prudence and for their best advantage. So, the correct attitude the country has to adopt with reference to the 'Shiftings' in the Swarajists' programme would be not to cry them down for their having gone back upon their first pledges of total, systematic, wrecking of the Councils, but to admire the rare insight with which they are able to grapple the actual exigencies of the hour. Indeed, no sane critic of Indian politics at the present day can refrain from expressing admiration at the high

statesmanship that is displayed by Pundit Motilalji when he declared, "Let us first be quite clear as to what the Swarajya Party stands for. It stands for its own programme and for nothing else. The Swarajists were described as non-co-operators, wreckers, obstructionists, and civil resisters, etc, but none of these words or expressions were comprehensive enough for their activities. The Swarajists were sometimes the one, sometimes the other, sometimes a combination of one or more and on certain occasions they were pure co-operators because they stood for their programme. The Swarajists' programme contained elements of construction as well as destruction. While you work outside the Council and in the country, you non-co-operate with the Government and in your constructive policy carry out constructive programme. You do not co-operate with the Government. But if you enter the Legislature and wish to carry on any constructive work, however small, it is not possible to do so without the co-operation of some parties or the Government". (9th of November, Gaiety Theatre, Bombay.) That speech gives us an indication of the innermost convictions at the present hour of the Swarajists; and there can be no doubt as to their essential implications, although the Swarajists for the sake of a political *amore proper* might not frankly admit them. To the Swarajists *direct action* is not possible; and when that is negatived, the total destruction of the Councils.—granting such an eventuality—would result in nothing other than a wanton hiatus yielding absolute barrenness; the Swarajists, therefore, as *total wreckers* can function into precious little; but all that they possibly could accomplish is to be the best patriots of the country, critics of the Government, who out of their co-operation with the machinery set up by the Government could accrue on behalf of the country as much of political and constitutional privileges as might be possible for them to get at. That is why from being pure non-co-operators and total wreckers, the Swarajists are to-day no more than the firmly determined political workers of the country, who have to mingle with the Government, come into contact with them, debate with them over the issues on hand, co-operate with them or criticise them as the particular occasion might demand, and thereby make the history of the country's constitutional progress.

The necessity for constitutional agitation gives an orientation to the 1923 Swarajism of the Swarajya Party: Kelkar and Jayakar acknowledge the orientation and want the Swarajya Party to officially concede it: Pundit Motilal disowns any oriented Swarajism in 1925, and disowns in the face of facts.

Only in such a light have Messrs. Kelkar and Jayakar come to look upon themselves and the other Swarajists. These two distinguished politicians will not for a moment deny that even this day they are Swarajists,

But none the less they frankly admit that the Swarajism that to-day they *have had* to adopt is certainly not the same as that which they sought after in 1922 and 1923. To them the Swarajism of December 1923 and the Swarajism of October 1925 differ from each other by many unmistakable shades of difference. They want this difference should be frankly admitted by the Swarajya Party. They feel that it is neither honest nor prudent not to admit the changes that the months between December 1923 and October 1925 have brought about in the Swarajists' creed of Swarajism. Also they feel that should the Swarajists be so perverse as not to recognise the change that has come about in their central creed, their critics will not fail to catch that change. They go a step further to suggest that it is possible for the Swarajists themselves to grow so purblind and so self-opinionated as not to make them concede the fact of the said change. But is it possible, they ask that by the mere denial of the *change* by the Swarajists themselves, the intelligentsia of the country could be hoodwinked or made to swallow down the veracity embodied in their admissions? Messrs. Kelkar and Jayakar seem to be convinced that the Swarajists would not be losing anything by honestly taking stock of their present situation and by frankly recounting to the country both the debit and credit sides of their political ledger. Only for the adoption of such a course both Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar have been pleading. Their earnestness is highly commendable; and in its composition there appears no impropriety that needs must put out the high-swelled prestige of the great Swarajist leader from Allahabad. Really it is amazing to note that even such a *sauve* diplomat as Pundit Motilal should have grown so unreasonable and unjustifiably petulant at the unexceptionable standpoint of either Mr. Kelkar or Mr. Jayakar. Of course we are here in no way directly concerned with either an approval or a condemnation of the personal recriminations that some of the Swarajists, including their leader, have resorted to. We are here to state that the country is with Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar when they put up the demand that the Swarajya Party has to re-examine its fundamentals and announce such amendments to those fundamentals as they have been forced to adopt owing to the stress of events happening between December 1923 and October 1925. In insisting that the Swarajya Party, after taking a critical and intelligent retrospect, do make a careful and an unequivocal announcement about the present standing of the Party, Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar conduct themselves as honest well-wishers of the Party who are keen about facing facts squarely and steadily, but not as crazy fellows, who being very prone to wink at, and blink over, inconvenient realities, are so sophisticated as to imagine that with their expressions of a self-opinionated political priggishness they could silence the critical comments of the intelligent public. They know, as much as any dispassionate student of current Indian politics

that the Swarajism of this day is a re-oriented Swarajism, one that is distinctly different from that which flourished at the time of the Party's founding. Such an orientation need not be dubbed as *political shiftiness* deliberately undertaken and not forced into adoption by the stress of extraneous factors operating in its behalf. Indeed, let us be charitable enough not to lay the charge that the Swarajists have wantonly been going back on their declared first principles heralded forth as the items in the Party's ticket at the last general elections. The Swarajists have had to go further and further away from their chosen stand of council-destruction, and have had also to face newer moorings. And to such a pass they have been forced in spite of their best efforts to avoid these new uneasinesses. What else could they do when they have found that, in spite of all their strenuous endeavours in 5 out of 7 Provincial Councils council-wrecking has not been consummated? Moreover, in the Assembly they have witnessed their singular ineffectiveness in spite of the many attendant advantages they have enjoyed. And in the Assembly the Swarajists have been privileged to feel that even with their considerable numerical strength they are not strong enough to loathe the co-operation of their Non-Swarajist colleagues for the rejection of Budgets. When the Swarajists have had to hobnob with the Independents in such a comparatively simple affair as the throwing out of a Budget (of course rejection of Budgets must be deemed a *simple affair* in comparison with the complete wrecking of Councils) how could they feel with a clean conscience that their creed of Swarajism for Council purposes has yielded them a harvest quite up to their expectations? Even the great Pundit Motilalji, who it would seem is fast developing the picturesque dash of a political demagogue, has been forced to make a very significant admission about his own party in these words, which must have been uttered after cautious deliberation: "It is impossible for any Indian to entirely non-co-operate with the British Government. The poorest of the poor who goes to buy a pinch of salt in the bazaar and the richest of the rich who indulges in luxuries are co-operating with the Government at every moment of their existence. It was for this reason that, when the non-co-operation programme was adopted at the Special Congress at Calcutta and affirmed at Nagpur, the word Non-co-operation was modified by the adjective "progressive, . . .". So let us remember that non-co-operation has been a progressive non-co-operation and Swarajism has also been meant to be a progressive Swarajism. Their progressive Swarajism has been in the sense that any political agitation is *progressive* when it leaves behind, stage after stage, impractical unrealisable, vague, abstractions and comes to grip with stern possibilities. If in the above sense the Swarajism of the Swarajists in the Councils (—remember that till now the Swarajists have had no Swarajism outside

the Councils!) has been progressive, it is only an indication that the Swarajists are in the pink of political health with absolutely no morbidity in them. Indeed, we all have to congratulate the Swarajists that they have taken such good care to maintain the *progressiveness* of their Swarajism. Instead of feeling elated at such a healthy state of affairs, the Leader of the Swarajya Party wants to put on extremely odd petulant airs about him and with the breath of pevishness wishes to disown the *progressiveness* of the Party's Swarajism. Perhaps for the sake of prestige he feels that he ought not to admit that the Swarajism of the present hour is certainly different from that of the ancient original one; and that is why he categorically asserted in one of his fighting orations that they (the Swarajists) have not moved a whit further away from their original standing. But, alas, categorical assertions couched in all the pompous authority of the first person singular cannot be more convincing than cold indisputable facts. Do we not remember (1) how the Swarajists (of course for the conservation of the nation's best interests) co-operated with the Independents in the Tata affair. (2) how a solid majority in the C. P. Council was allowed to pass a discriminatory budget (See Mr. Lhokare's speech reported by the A. P. I. on November 18th, 1925). (3) how Pundit Motilalji accepted a place on the Skeen Committee, which is a nominated committee of the Government and whose recommendations can have no statutory binding on the Government for helping the cause of the country, and (4) how the Swarajists contested the Presidentship of the Assembly. Let us now pause and honestly consider whether by these above moves the Swarajists have not drifted away from the policy they chalked out at the time of their entry into the Councils. From every honest examination of these facts and the situations underlying them the admission must come that the Swarajists have *drifted*. In the face of the above mentioned moves it is apparent that the Swarajists have been obliged not to set out for any complete and absolute wrecking of the Councils. If the Swarajists wanted only to *wreck* the Councils and the Assembly, why should they have manifested such concern in the election of the Presidents, and of the Assembly President in particular? In explaining the support that the Swarajists gave to Mr. Patel, Pundit Motilalji informed us that because they, the Swarajists, could not be sure that a gentleman with a *jelly-fish temperament* (Mr. T. Rangachariar, M. L. A.) would conduct the 'deliberations' of the Assembly with that impartiality which alone could ensure success for the nationalist cause in the Assembly, the Swarajists had to pass over the Madras M. L. A., and yield their heartiest support to Mr. Patel, who with his unquestioned patriotism, would safeguard the nationalist interests and would not, at their cost, play into the hands of the country's opposition. From this admission

is it not clear that Pundit Motilalji and his following were keen on pushing through the Assembly the Nationalist, or, in other words, the Swarajist interest but not on wrecking the Assembly? If indeed the Swarajist objective had been mere wrecking it must not have mattered whether they had as the Assembly's President a gentleman with a *jelly fish temperament* or one who had a political back-bone. Since in the utilisation of the Councils and the Legislatures, and not in the wrecking of them, the Swarajists have come to see a fruitful avenue for their labours to be expended upon, the Swarajists naturally evinced the utmost concern in Mr. Patel's contest for the Presidential chair. That they have been wise in interesting themselves in the Presidential election is proved beyond doubt by the numerous comments that have been made over Mr. Patel's success and the defeat of the gentleman from Madras.

The Swarajism of 1925 is not for political negations like wrecking of the Councils, but for furthering the nation's interests: This Swarajism is conveyed by the phrase Responsive Co-operation: The phrase Responsive co-operation is defective, and in its place this phrase, the policy of National Seizin, can be adopted; the Policy of National Seizin explained.

Again, from the Swarajist's exploits recorded above, we can see through that of late the Swarajist's are for co operating with the Government if such co-operation yields them gains and benefits on behalf of the country. Let us illustrate this proposition from Pundit Motilalji's acceptance of a place on the Skeen Committee. In answering certain criticisms with reference to him on the said Committee Pundit Motilalji avowed that he is there because he feels that if he by his individual exertions is able to turn out one Indian soldier he would thereby be serving the nation's cause. His anxiety is certainly to safeguard the interests of the nation and further them. That is why it would appear he is loathe to resign from the Skeen Committee, and also why although he had promised several of the Swarajists friends that in case he found the pronouncement of Lord Birkenhead to be unsatisfactory, he would give up his place on the Committee. He still sticks on to it. He still sticks on to it because he feels that by retaining the membership he would be able to 'serve' the country.

Yes, these instances, conclusively prove that the Swarajism of the Swarajists just at present is not the Swarajism directed for either *direct action* or for wrecking the Council-machinery in the government of the country. It is the Swarajism that is meant for a patriotic, nationalistic, unsubservient co-operation with the established government, so that through such co-operation the country might gain the road, either stage by stage or by long leaps, that could take her nearer and nearer its objective, viz. Dominion Self-Government. In fact the Swarajists are to-day practising

a species of political propaganda that was christened long ago by the picturesque title of *Responsive co-operation*. To a set of people that phrase *Responsive co-operation*, contains an admirable precis of the Swarajist, present status quo; but, however, to another set of persons that phrase appears as misleading and as one that fails to correctly ear-mark the Swarajists' present mentality and output. This latter section ask: By *Responsive co-operation* is it not meant that we co-operate only when they, the Bureaucracy, respond to our co-operation? If that be so, how can there be any responsive co-operation when there is no response from the Bureaucracy? Therefore, is it not misleading to call us, the Swarajists, *Responsive co-operators*? On the other hand, the former section retorts, in defence of its use of the phrase, thus: Are we not co-operating with the Bureaucracy? Is not the intensity of our co-operation in direct ratio to the response we might be having from the Bureaucracy? Therefore cannot our present policy be described as one of *responsive co-operation*? Both these sections have, each on its side, some brilliant spokesmen. Pundit Motilalji and Mr. Jamnadas Mehta do feel bitter against all those who dub the Swarajists of this hour as *responsive co-operators*. And Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar cannot find any more correct phrase than that of *Responsive co-operation* with which they could justifiably name the present envisagement of the Swarajists. Between these there has been a frequent exchange of retorts, but we should think not one of them has been wholly happy in hitting off the correct *phrasing*. The situation into which the Swarajists have now been forced is this: that although there might or might not be much or any response from the Bureaucracy they have to work with them, co-operate with them, and in so doing wrest out of them as much as they possibly can in behalf of the country. Since the one clear issue, according to the Swarajists, (the present writer cannot share the Swarajists' contention without large modifications) is that Indian politicians are receiving from the Bureaucracy no response in answer to their willingness for co-operation with them, the present day Swarajists ought not to be described as *responsive co-operators*. Of course it will not be difficult for clear-sighted persons to discern how the present attitude of the Swarajists is shaping itself. It is apparent that the Swarajists now are willing to come near the Bureaucracy, move with them, take their share in a work which involves their contact with them, and during that sharing, wrest from their hands all that they possibly could; in short, the Swarajists are bent upon getting into contact with the Bureaucracy and thereafter *wresting* out of their unwilling hands anything, big or small, quite irrespective of the *response* they might or might not be getting. Such a policy is what is being adopted by the Swarajists at this day. The policy could most appropriately be termed *The Policy of National Seizin*, meaning thereby that it is one's policy to first get near the source from whence

one could wrest the ends one desires, get near it whether or not there is from it a persuasive inducement for nearer approaches, and then to wrest from it anything that is possible; and as such, this phrase, the *Policy of National Seizin*, never conveys the idea that its adherent's attitude is conditioned by the presence or absence of 'response' from the other side, and also it never insists the presence of 'response,' which to some people is a factor much open to debate. Therefore if the bitterness between Messrs. Jayakar and Kelkar and Pundit Motilalji is after all over the adoption of a phrase, then such a bitterness could be eliminated by the Swarajya Party employing this phrase. *The Policy of National Seizin*, to define its present tendencies and creed.

On Examination it will be found that the Swarajists in 1925 are practising a career which is conveyed, by the phrase :

The Policy of National Seizin

Now, we have come to this standpoint : that the Swarajists of 1925 have given up *direct action*, have discarded the total wrecking of the Councils and have been putting into practice the policy of National Seizin ; or, in other words, the Swarajists status quo of 1925 emphatically proves that the Swarajists have not endeavoured even their little bit towards *direct action*, because, perhaps, it has been, even to them, conclusively proved that *direct action* is beyond the reach of the Swarajists as they stand at present, (2) that the Swarajists have failed in the campaign of Council-destruction, (3) that Swarajists have been forced, while in the Councils, to partake of their deliberations, because by the impracticability of *direct action*, on the one hand, and their failure in wrecking the Councils, on the other, the Swarajists have been denied the use of the country at large as a field over which they could labour and thus they have been forced to use the Councils as the only remaining places where they could possibly work and (4) that after they have set about making use of the Councils, the Swarajists have been, on many 'consequential' occasions, co-operating with the Government. This much has been conceded by one of the most patriotic of Indian nationalists and a prominent leader of the Swarajists. Writes Mr. Kelkar: "In April last there was the Satara Provincial Conference, and the main resolution at the conference was that in order to remove the lull in the country the Congress should immediately adopt the Swarajya Party programme with such modifications in the same as may be necessary to enable various political parties to join the Congress, as at the time of the Amritsar Congress, and thus to present an united front to the Government both inside and outside the Councils. Many words in the above resolution are very significant. The resolution was drafted and moved by myself and was

accepted by the Conference almost unanimously. In my speech I made clear the following points (1) The mere going on of the Swarajya Party with its present programme was useless (2) It was necessary that the Congress should take up the political programme of the Swarajya Party and thus put an end to the sectional organisation of the Swarajya Party (3) That the Congress surely would not accept the Swarajya party programme exactly as it is (4) A change in this programme is, therefore, absolutely imperative. (5) The change must be made so as to make it acceptable even to some people outside the Swarajya Party. (6) In fact, the model for a change was definitely suggested, namely, the Amritsar Congress Programme. (7) Amritsar Congress Programme necessarily meant working the reforms and fighting for the rest. (8) This programme necessarily implied acceptance of office under the Reforms. (9) The change in the Swarajya Party's programme was desired to rally round at least those people who were in the Congress up to Amritsar. (10) Surely these people would not accept the present Swarajya Party's programme without a change (11) The threads of political work were to be taken up as they were left at Amritsar or even Lucknow." (The Sunday Advocate, November 8th, 1925). That is how Mr. Kelkar would view the here-after-ought-to-be's of the Swarajya Party. That Mr. Kelkar has been substantially correct in his analysis of the *general situation* will be conceded by all those who have closely watched the political history of India in the past six years. Anyway, we are here concerned to repeat that to-day the Swarajists have been forced to discard their first pledges and have been compelled in actual practice though not through verbal professions to *take up the threads of political work left off at Amritsar or even at Lucknow*. In such an admission by any Swarajist there can be nothing derogatory or a lapse of prestige ; on the other hand, a frankness of that sort would surely call forth the warm approbation of the discerning public. Moreover, one cannot understand how any Swarajist could be deemed the less patriotic only because of such an admission. If, after all, the Swarajists have to-day turned out to be *Conditional co-operators*, that they are because their patriotism at its purest has guided them to adopt such a 'compromise'. So, one can hardly understand the 'figgetty' super-sensitiveness Pundit Motilalji is evincing whenever he has to admit, in the face of indisputable facts, the fundamental conclusions in Mr. Kelkar's analysis. Is it that Pundit Motilalji will not admit the realities only for this reason that Mr. Kelkar has admitted them and that it is in his *dharma* to say *No* to the *Yes* that others say and vice versa ? We hope not that Pundit Motilalji has come to such a pass of political decrepitude that his political virility and clarity of vision must with the advance of years forsake him. Then why show such unreasonable authoritativeness, why browbeat others, why make out flimsy cases out of the most strained interpretations, and why remain so

obdurate as not to admit the authentic and recorded notes of a past history ? *Carpe diem* ? To frankly announce the status quo of the present Swarajists' stand and express whither their angle of vision is being directed, does Pundit Motilalji need the help of a moral fillip ? Here it is—if he wants one—in Mahatma Gandhi's expression about the Swarajists' position ; "He (Mahatma Gandhi) suggested whether the time had not yet come for the Party to reconsider its policy in regard to the non-acceptance of Minister-ships. His advice to Pundit Motilalji to accept a seat on the Sken Committee is in consonance with Mahatmaji's view, consistently expressed by him, that the Councils should be used for intensive prosecution of the constructive programme, and that it is on Gandhiji's advice that the Juhu manifesto was issued in 1924, defining the Swarajist formula, of uniform and consistent obstruction, as one of resistance to the bureaucracy in all its attempts to strengthen its hold, and of constructive activity within the legislatures in national interests, and further that it is on the strength of the Juhu manifesto, based on Gandhiji's advice, that the Assembly Swarajya Party revised its rules as to permit Swarajists to accept seats on the Select Committees and contest elective posts" : (Free Press of India, Bombay November 15, 1925.) Since the above version of Mahatma Gandhiji's sanction on behalf of the *progressiveness* of the Swarajists' Swarajism has not up till now been authoritatively contradicted, we take it that Mahatma Gandhiji's considered opinion is that Swarajists now in the Councils ought to practise the policy of *National Seizin*. Of course, no one will daresay that in expressing himself in the above fashion, Mahatma Gandhi is not being actuated by the concern for the country's best interests or that he is pulling the Swarajists by their legs. By that advice Mahatma Gandhi means well by the Swarajya Party, and a considerable opinion in the country is clearly for standing by Mahatma Gandhi's considered opinions.

Messrs. Kelkar's and Jayakar's emphasis of the 1925 Swarajism has the approval of a large section of public opinion : Pundit Motilalji must not forget this fact.

In the light of this fact at least we should expect Pundit Motilalji to concede that if he is convinced of one view with regard to his Party's present stand and its future inclinations—as how they should be, there is a considerable section of public opinion, every bit equal to his own in prestige and maturity of wisdom, that is opposed to his view. Of course we are certain that this much he would unfailingly concede ; if however he should not, he will then have to pay, sooner or later, the price for the manifestation of such unreasonableness. In saying this much we are not to be understood as though we are throwing out in Pundit Motilalji's face a threat—far from it. We state our conviction with the full feeling that Pundit Motilalji deserves

our warmest regards for the high statesmanship he is so capable of using in political manoeuvres ; and therefore, we only wish to bring to his notice this simple fact, that if he is imagining that the section of opinion in the country that is opposed to his interpretation of the Swarajists' attitude in the immediate past, and now, is simply the reflexion of the opinions of only two individuals—solitary fellows—Mr. Kelkar and Mr. Jayakar—whom he can afford to ignore, the Pundit is quite mistaken, because the opinions that Mr. Kelkar and Jayakar are voicing forth are not *merely* their personal view but those that are representative of an immense consensus of public opinion. Pundit Motilalji ought to fully appreciate that both Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar in the *attitude* that they are now advocating have behind them that amount of public response and sympathy which no sane man can fail to notice as being immensely consequential. As the Leader of the Party it is open to Pundit Motilalji to take any steps he might think of in the interests of 'party discipline' against those two members of his Party ; and with that issue we are not concerned ; but certainly we will be within our province if we should remark that even in the face of a vote of censure that the Swarajya Party under the 'autocratic' bidding of its Leader might pass against Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar, a responsible section of public opinion in the country will certainly think it as its duty to extend its support to those two Maharashtra Leaders and to the plea that they are advocating. Under such circumstances, it is true that both Mr. Kelkar and Mr. Jayakar cannot feel that they would be the poorer for any break off from Pundit Motilalji that they might be put to ; and, on the other hand, also it is equally true, that Pundit Motilalji as a political functionary will not be a completely *dead factor* on account of the withdrawal of the co-operation of those two distinguished Maharashtras. Anyway, if such 'uneasiness' should come to pass, then, we all would have to regret what in common parlance is known as the rift in the lute ; but that consideration ought not to be so consequential as to prevent one's loyalty to a conviction being ungrudgingly tendered ; and thus, should Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar feel that their loyalty to their honest convictions demands of them a severance from Pundit Motilalji and his 'Moghul' methods, they have to break away from Pundit Motilalji. Let not personal loyalties weigh down the greater obligations that the *cause* of our country demands of every honest political worker. But will it be that Messrs. Jayakar and Kelkar, with their considerable following, will have to drop out of the company of Pundit Motilalji and his friends ? Can we not expect that after all that great man, Pundit Motilalji, who courted poverty at the country's call for the sake of the country, will begin to act with 'sweet reasonableness', especially because fairplay and straightforward *deal* demand that 'sweet reasonableness' ? Is it too much to expect that Pundit Motilalji will frankly acknowledge that in the wake of the changed conditions the

Swarajism of the Swarajya Party has had to be modified and that in the future the Party will have to practise just that policy which Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar have in mind when they name it as *Responsive co-operation*? As the situation stands to-day the only course of action for the Swarajya Party to follow, as indeed in practice they have been forced to, is to endeavour to get distinct working majorities in the Councils, accept political offices, and through them serve the interests of the country, and also in addition to this much, agitate for the many other political concessions they (The Swarajists) are bent upon having. Why should not Pundit Motilalji openly declare that acceptance of office under certain conditions is to be the policy of the Swarajists after the next general elections?

Acceptance of office under certain conditions must form an item of the Swarajya Party's programme after 1926 election :

We cannot see any awkwardness in such an avowal of policy. Perhaps the reason urged against such a declaration being made is that if the Swarajists should admit the acceptance of office as one of the items in their programme the public would begin to lose its confidence in the Party, and would begin to suspect that the Party's *morale* has degenerated, and that, consequently, the Swarajya Party would suffer in the estimation of the public, which would cease to bestow on it that support it has till now shown. In other words, it comes to this : that the Swarajists wish to placate public opinion by 'cooked up' professions that they know they cannot practise, have not been practising, and would like not to practise. Can such a support be worth anything, and is it so much worth that one should woo it and win it at any cost whatever, be it even at that of irretrievable sophistries and the most blatant bluster? Certainly not. Besides, the above argument against office acceptance being made a part of the Swarajya Party's programme ought not to be taken in without putting it to a critical test. When generalities are shorn off, as a plain statement of simple facts, that argument conveys this idea : that in case the Swarajists accept Ministerships and such like offices the country *will not* have its confidence in them. From this admission cannot it follow that when, say, persons like Mr. Jinnah, Pundit Motilalji, Mr. Kelkar, Mr. Jayakar, Mr. Goswamy, Mr. Sreenivasa Iyengar, Pundit Jawharlal, Pundit Malaviyaji, Lala Lajput Rai, Mr. Khare, Mr. Seshagiri Iyer—are Ministers and Executive Councillors they cease to be nationalists, cease to remember the interests of the country, become fawning toadies, and lose the sense of *service* on behalf of the country that they have cultivated by years and years of devoted sacrifice? To believe so is to pass for one who has taken good-bye of one's wits. With such people, as mentioned above, the *corruption* that office is said to profusely breed

will not be able to corrode into their vitals. These are men who are made up of such stuff that even when placed on the elevated pedestal of office they cannot forswear their patriotism. And let us remember that in the country there are scores and scores of such men,—there are, in spite of the vast brood of self-seeking 'place hunters,' who in the scheme of things appear to be as inevitable as the presence of evil. If however, the Swarajist 'leaders' should feel—there is no need for such an early apprehension—that the country would not trust them or their *bona fides* simply because they happen to have accepted the responsibility of offices under the Government, then they can do nothing better than not even to look at the face of such a country. What we have to insist upon for the notice of Pundit Motilalji in particular is that there is no need for the Swarajists to experience such a political sensitiveness as the one detailed above. But if in spite of such assurances, the Swarajists under Pundit Motilalji's guidance feel shy of accepting office or even to make office-acceptance an item in the programme of the Party, we can only answer that we cannot but regret such self-willed intransigence. Perhaps we could bemoan their lot thus—'Tis true 'tis pity, and pity 'tis 'tis true.—But, once again, let us put to them seriously what they think would happen should the Swarajists, after seeking elections to the Councils, after entering them, and after finding that they cannot wreck them, refuse to accept office but none-the-less merely stick on to them? Of course the inevitable will happen, and the inevitable is that the Councils will not consist entirely of Swarajists but will have among its members, Swarajists, a goodly number of Liberals, and Independents also (just examine the recent 'returns' to the Council of State.) who, in the face of the Swarajist non-participation, will coalesce together, accept responsibility and somehow *pull on*; and if in any Council the Swarajists should be in a wrecking minority (the probabilities of distinct Swarajist majorities flourishing in the Councils are examined later on; the present writer thinks that the Swarajists obtaining 'distinct majorities' in the Councils is more a plausibility than a probability.) then the coalition of the Independent and Liberal members will tend to seriously jeopardise the Swarajists' central-moves. Or in other words, the situation in the Bombay Legislative Council for the past year and odd will repeat itself. And let us remember that the situation in the Bombay Council is no trifling affair over which we could wink at and afford to be merry, but one which is fraught with grave consequences which cannot be lost sight of by wary nationalists. For emphasising the gravity of such situations we have the strong case that the Members of the Bombay Council have made out. In the course of the representation of the Bombay Council Swarajists to the Central Executive of the Party, it is recorded: "From our experience of the Bombay Legislative Council and of the Bombay Govern-

ment we are of opinion that the time has come when the Swarajya Party should change its present policy to that of Responsive co-operation, lift up the ban against the acceptance of ministerships, and leave the matter to the discretion of the Swarajist members of the Council of the province concerned. The Bombay Government has made it impregnable with the aid of certain reactionary elements in the Council and, through the transferred departments, it has been enacting measures and taking other steps of a very retrograde character so as to stir up more and more discord and antipathies, which are serious impediments to the cause of Swaraj. We are convinced that the proper remedy for all these maladies is for Swarajists to accept office and carry on the struggle for Swaraj with their aid, thereby preventing unholy combinations between Government and the reactionary elements in the country. Signed by J. C. Swaminarayan, D. N. Patel, L. B. Bhopatkar, M. M. Mheta, M. K. Dixit, B. R. Nanai, R. G. Soman, D. P. Desai, V. N. Jog, W. S. Mukdam, H. Narielwala, P. G. S. Joshi, G. I. Patel, Punjabhai Thakersi, C. M. Saptreshi, M. B. Powar, H. B. Shirdasani, Venkat Rao Surve, M. B. Velkar, B. G. Pahalajani, H. D. Saheba....." Such situations infuse in us many misgivings; and as the *Bombay Chronicle* pointed out in the course of a leading article of that Paper, it must have been a very trying time that the Bombay Council Swarajists had when they were forced to observe a self-inflicted innocuous imbecility as their answer to a most provoking retrogression set a-going in their very faces. Indeed, such situations are prone to become almost common in case the Swarajists after entering the Councils resort once again to their original policy of attempts at dead-locks, wreckings, and 'negations.' And let it be known that such imbecile, perfunctory, and fly-on-the-wheel-flutter-making dead-locks in the Councils will not even by a least bit carry forward the Swarajists' ultimate ends or their immediate objectives.

The psychology behind the 'political moves' in Northern India : communal tension : its implications in general and with reference to the Swarajya Party.

That thus the situation is bound to be is inferred not only from the data that experiences of Council-work and insight into Swarajists 'shiftings' furnish us with, but also from a shrewd anticipation of the future trend of our political forces. Taking stock of the present political conditions, and to it adding on our intelligent calculations of the future, we could arrive at this conclusion, that in the Punjab, U. P., Behar, C. P. and Bombay Provincial Legislatures and in the Assembly, the 1936 elections will find a lesser number of Swarajists than that of at present. Of course we cannot be dogmatic about such a conclusion; and all that we can say is that our

forecast has been made after a most careful examination and with perfect bonafides. In explaining how such a forecast is arrived at we will have to avoid evasions and fine society proprieties and blurt forth naked truths as they are, however unpalatable their taste may be for the political palate of some worthies. For one thing the socio-political situation in Northern India is getting to take a turn towards some unknown precipice beyond whose depths lie social ruin and waste and wreckage. This socio-political situation is popularly known by the phrase *the Hindu-Muslim tension*. In this tension unfortunately there have been fused bitterness that is inherent in all problems of social unsettlement and the 'engineerable' distrust that is always a con-committant of the reawakenings of political groups. The social unsettlement in Northern India is further intensely coloured by the most easily inflammable religious passions. And such an unsettlement is becoming the unique possession of both the Hindus and the Mussalmans since the beginning of this year. When such is the mental equilibrium of the two great communities in Northern India, attempts have been made to divert the newly acquired susceptibilities of both communities into channels where *politics* happen the be-all and end-all of life*. Therefore both the Hindus and Mussulmans in Northern India have been made to feel that their importance in the country is not due so much to the fact that they are the citizens of one great country, common to them, as to this fact, that is apt to be forgotten, now and again, by them, that they are the inheritors of immense political rights which they cannot allow, as was allowed for some time in the past, to be wrested away from them for being commingled in the name of the common 'good' of their 'common' country. Thus to-day in Northern India neither the Hindus nor the Mussalmans appreciate their standing in the country as *Indians*—in the sense they are citizens, neighbours, of one same country,—but, on the other hand, they are intensely conscious that they are either Hindus which means they are *not Mussalmans* or Mussalmans which means they are *not Hindus*. In engendering such a consciousness of communal entity, but not a cosmopolitan patriotic one, the 'leaders' of both the communities have taken a great leap; and rightly or wrongly, the *Hindu Mahasabha* is functioning, and functioning vigorously too. Its protagonists are certainly *communal* patriots. (no use of white-washing facts.) who, because they are at present strong, feel that their strength gives them the *great opportunity* for rendering 'great' services on behalf of the 'great' Hindu community. Of such stuff the mentality of these protagonists of the *Hindu Mahasabha* is made of. And in direct antithesis to such a mentality is that of the *pukka* Swarajist to whom an Indian is not

* Refer to Lalaji's closing address at Bombay Mahasabha Session dated 8th December 1925.

any the more consequential simply because he is either a *pronounced* Hindu or a *pronounced* Mussalman. Certainly it must be said to the credit of the Swarajists that neither *provincialism* nor *communal hiatus* is allowed to enter into their outlook on the present political situation in the country. Just for this reason the Swarajists have not that hold on the imagination of the people as the protagonists of the *Hindu Mahasabha* wield. And owing to this reason there are bound to come about great consequences which *will* mark off the Swarajists' position from that of the *Hindu Mahasabha's* and off in such a way that the superiority of the status that the *Hindu Mahasabha* is enjoying, or is bound to enjoy in the near future, is emphasised beyond all doubt.

The significance of such a situation for our purpose on hand is seen in these ways: That the *Hindu Mahasabha* has a political faith which is certainly not identical with that of the Swarajya Party, that the *Mahasabha* as a 'political organisation' retains a stronger hold on the people in Northern India than what the Swarajya Party claims, that it is likely, nay almost certain, that the *Mahasabha* will set up its own candidates for the Provincial Councils and the Assembly during the next general elections, and that if the *Mahasabha* contests the elections, it is certain, 9 to 10, the *Mahasabha* candidates will win even as against the candidates set up by the Swarajya Party. If: then, the *Mahasabha* men are seen getting into the Councils, it is very likely that the Mussalman patriots, who now might be so patriotic as to lend their support to the Swarajya Party as one that is standing for such political enlightenment as the advancement of national, but not sectional, interests, will feel it their imperative duty to stand by the interests of their community and answer the 'Hindu Challenge;' and since such a challenge could not adequately be offered by them unless they get on to a wholly Muslim group and discard a party like the Swarajya Party, which is so cosmopolitan as not to be able to engender that vitality with which one could answer challenge to challenge and which comes into life only by narrow individualism or sectionalism and not by cosmopolitanism, it is natural to anticipate that the Mussalman patriots would be withdrawing their support to the Swarajya Party for enlisting it elsewhere. Then, being bereft of the Mussalman support, the Swarajya Party would stand almost impotent in the face of two powerful sectionists.

On such lines one should expect the 'political moves' in Northern India to be conducted in the immediate future. (The present writer firmly believes it will be so) Hence let not the leader's of the Swarajya Party feel too sure of the Party's continuous pre-eminence. Indeed from now hard times are ahead for the Party, and as such it is not in the least prudent that the Leader of the Party should by his unreasonable and doctrinaire conduct wear away, even so early, the sympathies of those men who in virtue of their status and past contribution do count at all times in our politics.

Moreover Pundit Motilalji ought to be aware that the day as arrived when the Swarajya Party can no longer capture the 'political' and 'party' loyalties of 'practical' politicians by merely placating before them idealistic shimmerings of national vitality. In those days when the whole Non-Co-operation spirit had possessed the nation with the grip of some strange and unaccountable magic, it was possible that even 'practical' politicians could so far lose themselves in the depths of a nationalist protest against the trapping of both an alien culture and an alien system of rule by Government, that they could forget their own methods of work, could have no memory of their past achievements, and could bring themselves to forswear the very creeds of their tradition-old political religion. Then perhaps it was a 'paying' proposition for a party to have the following of distinguished, matured, and highly 'practical' politicians on a programme which began and ended with 'wreckings' and such other iconoclasms. But to-day when the magic spell has been withdrawn these very sober, 'practical'—politicians are beginning to wonder at themselves, especially how they could have been swept off their legs, as in fact they had been, and are now in no mood to accept programmes like obstruction, non-co-operation, and in fact all 'things' that tend for a colossal vapourings of political nihilism. That is why the Swarajya Party is now 'finding' that it would attract towards its ranks more and more politicians in proportion to the emphasis it would be laying on those constructive items that could be incorporated in its programme, like acceptance of office, seizing of posts, and agitation for 'more and more.'

The chances for a Non-Swarajist and Swarajist coalition: advantages to the Swarajya Party from such a coalition.

Therefore it is really high time the Leader of the Swarajya Party decides to hold fast no longer to the creed of total obstruction and non-acceptance of office, but to strive to have the Party's programme so charged that it becomes a policy of *National Seizin*. Such a lead is necessary in the light of the events that have happened about us. And that lead will be bound to have the unstinted support from the public who stand by 'tangibility' and not by the misty will-o-wisps of politics. Also it will immediately result in creating a political situation that would serve as a most happy augury for our future political progress. That situation is no more than that when once the Swarajists drop out *obstruction* and *wrecking*, then, the Independents, of the type of Mr. Jinnah, would readily coalesce with them and give their support, which must certainly any day be very considerable, to the aims of their combined programme. Such an independent—Swarajist combination will form perhaps the most powerful political phalanx that nationalist India up till now has put forward on her behalf in her constitutional struggles with the Bureaucracy. Certainly it must be a very happy day when this Independent-

Swarajist phalanx is formed, because that phalanx alone can procure to the country the one distinct help in our scheme of Swaraj, viz. *Indianisation* of services. (In this connection we would like to make clear that by *Swaraj* we mean two distinct gains for the country. The administration of the country by a Civil Service that will be responsible to the 'representative' Legislatures which alone rule, and should rule, the country, (2) and *Indianisation* of services—of course *Indianisation* meaning not the total and complete boycott of British and other non-Indian elements.) Coming back to our 'point,' one half of our conception of *Swaraj* would be rendered feasible by the Independent-Swarajist combination entering into the Councils and filling up the 'Minister-ships' and other posts of patronage. Also, this combination could intensely carry on a constitutional agitation for the attainment of the other half in our scheme of *Swaraj*.

But yet Swarajists of the type of Pundit Motilalji persist obstinately to stick on to a political intransigence.

When the future in our politics has to be viewed in the way indicated above, we find that some 'worthy' Swarajists talking of things in such a fashion that assures none, either with conviction or a fore seeing political intelligence. These 'worthies' have got into the thick of a vogue which insists that a 'politician' has perforce to bask out at all times in the lime-light and that while so basking he has perforce to indulge in wordy rigmarole and high-sounding abstractions. Of course it is none of our concern if of their own choosing some of the Swarajists like to get themselves initiated into all the rites of that vogue; but it is certainly our business to tell them that when they begin imagining that simply because they have aped on the mannerisms of that fashion, they have a right to speak authoritatively and that what they speak in authoritative tones the discerning public has to swallow implicitly and without questioning the why and the wherefore of their opinions, they are unreasonable and that they are asking at our hands for just the thing we cannot, like honest men, give up, viz., the individual's right to discriminate and to possess his convictions. To what we are referring, perhaps, the astute readers of this pamphlet will readily guess anyway; let us quote a few sentences from the speeches delivered by some of the prominent Swarajist 'leaders'. To begin with: ".....They must refuse to take office till the Government *came down*. If the best men in the country accepted offices, it meant that the bureaucracy were perpetually enthroned and that the best men in the country were supporting a system which had to be ended. Without self-reliance we shall never get Swaraj." (The italics are ours). Let us examine those statements; till the Government came down, said the speaker, but he refrained from telling his audience what he meant by "till the Government came down," and he did not take on himself the trouble of explaining to his audience how it was possible for them *now* to make the Government come

down. Said the speaker, "the bureaucracy were perpetually enthroned." Does the speaker refer here to the Ministers as the Bureaucracy, or to the Executive Councillors, or to any Indian who is employed in our Public Services? Or does he mean that since he is against the Bureaucracy, and since Indians once they enter the Public Services they *become* the bureaucracy, he does not want at all any *Indianisation* of Services? "Supporting a system which has to be ended." How, by what means? Perhaps by talking aloud in the above strain on public platforms and at the same time vigorously practising law at a High-Court set up by the same system 'which has to be ended'? Something this, something that, in fact any hotch-potch of words to be thrown out, this much appears to be the substantial propaganda that is being carried on by some of the Swarajist 'leaders' who are said to be absolutely opposed to the adoption of a *progressive* Swarajism referred to in the foregoing pages. O *Enfant trowes* of our politics!

From them let us pass on. We should once again impress on the Swarajists that by their entering the Councils and by accepting office they would be ridding themselves of all those concomitants of their original programme which, since they have failed to be effective, are to-day certainly atrabilarian superfluities that serve no useful end but could function as mere pin-pricks—all the more obnoxious since they are so tiny in the sting. Unless and until the Swarajists discard these superfluities, the Independent and the other Party-men, who are also as much nationalists as the Swarajists will be forced to keep themselves far removed from them; and thereby the chances of the Swarajists' omniscience getting ridiculously impotent are made all the more secure. And of course we know from what has been stated in the above pages, that without the warm support of the Non-Swarajist Nationalist groups in the Councils the Swarajists can achieve *their* precious little. That such a position for the Swarajists, while they are in the Councils, would be the most unenviable one from any stand-point who dare deny? That some such pass is in store for the Swarajists in the Council of State looks likely from the election returns to that assembly. (In Bombay, Non-Swarajist candidates have had a bumper-success. In Madras the defeat of Mr. K. V. Rangaswamy Iyengar, one of those who have every claim on the gratitude of all Nationalists, is highly significant of the 'currents' now *popular*) But, however, let us not despair. Let us trust that Pundit Motilalji will rise equal to the occasion and adjust his 'moves' to suit the changed environment. And it seems impossible to imagine even that one so level-headed, astute, and critical as Pundit Motilalji, could become deaf to intellectual coherence and argument, and so perverse as to refuse to see in the clear glass of disinterested, dispassionate, non-partisan, public criticism, as the one undertaken in this pamphlet, his own distortions assumed only of late. Certainly Pundit Motilalji will get back to his usual

sobriety, let us hope, and will continue to retain it so firmly as to make himself the political Solomon in India of our times. Whatever responsible gossip might say to the contrary, the present writer has still so high a regard for the statesman-ship of Pundit Motilalji that he cannot bring himself to believe that the Pundit is growing so senile as to imagine that any cock's crowing from the Mount Sinai is the voice of the Prophet. Surely Pundit Motilalji will yield to our 'measures of sweet reasonableness.' And when once identity of interests in methods of propaganda is established by such spokesmen of Indian political thought like Pundit Motilalji, Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Kelkar, Mr. Vyasa Rao, Mr. Jayakar, Lala Lajput Rai, Dr. Besant, and Rt. Hon'ble S. Sastri, the Indian nationalist will feel he has grown stronger and manlier; and because he is stronger and manlier he need not be either peevish or cowardly; and that he need not in a cowardly way make it his business to call the British Bureaucracy by names, simply because he is so cowardly and weak as not to be able to do anything better. Indeed, then, Indian nationalists can rise to such a height as to be able to join Mahatma Gandhi in his words: "My faith in human nature is irrepressible and even under the circumstances of a most diverse character, I have found Englishmen amenable to reason and persuasion, and as they always wish to appear to be just even when they are in reality unjust, it is easier to shame them than others into doing the right thing."

To such proposals as referred above Pundit Motilalji answers: an examination of the Pundit's contentions.

At this stage we have to pause to consider how Pundit Motilalji as the Leader of the Party (and remember 'leadership' as understood in the connotations of Prussian militarism as the very breath of the Pundit's life.) has been answering the various proposals put before him. An examination of his 'replies' betrays one of Pundit Motilalji's temperamental susceptibilities, that he cannot bring himself to a situation when anyone differing from him could do so or state the 'different point of view' in a tone other than what good school-boys assume when approaching their awe-inspiring teacher. Perhaps that is the reason why in almost all his *fighting speeches* as the *Leader* has come to designate them, Pundit Motilalji could not but put in an uncalled for heat. Of course we all know, just as certainly as does the Pundit, that passion is no equivalent of reason, and also that autocracy is not leadership; and that such is the wretched ingratitude of men that we cannot make personal sacrifices a passport for using a dictatorial, hectoring tone. Therefore we think that it would be quite prudent for all those who consider themselves as the leading lights of Indian politics not to mistake personal recriminations for rhetorical brilliance. If we have here touched upon this aspect, with much delicacy, it is only to convey to Pundit Motilalji what an unstatesmanlike impression his speech at Chanda

(Reported on the 18th November 1925) has made on us. But perhaps in extenuation of the unfortunate tone in which Pundit Motilalji pitched that speech, one could say it was not half so bad as what the address of welcome (at Chanda) to the Pundit contained in 'choice' sentences like this one: "Of late there has been a rift in the lute, evinced by the standard of revolt raised by some of the leaders of your party, and the recent apostacy of some of the prominent Swarajists has brought home to you the necessity of purging your party of such place-hunters, and, you have, therefore, started this campaign of infusing new life and vigour into the drooping spirit of the organisation."—We are heartily sick of these low-souled personal bickerings irrespective of wherefrom they come—from a Mahmud Ali or a Lajput Rai or a Pundit Motilal or a Kelkar or a Jamnadas Dwarakdas or a Dr. Besant.

Now, to take up Pundit Motilalji's arguments in answer to the 'critical' suggestions thrown forward for the consideration of himself and his Party Pundit Motilalji's reply to the 'reforms' urged by Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar is that the Swarajya Party sees no need for lifting its ban on the Swarajist's acceptance of office. On this issue we have his considered opinion in these words. "The offers of Councillorships and Ministerships to the Swarajists were nothing more or less than offers of bribes, and it was insulting to the revered memory of Lokamanya to associate his phrase with such dirty work. They were out to fight the Government, and the speaker could not conceive how anyone accepting favours from the Government could possibly oppose it, as it was his duty to do." (The speech at Chanda. November 14, 1925) Such a categorical statement does indicate the actual stand that Pundit Motilalji intends taking up in answer to the propaganda that a large section of the Swarajists and other non-party politicians and publicists, like the present writer, have set about to carry on with the view that the Congress through the Swarajya Party do decide at Cawnpore that acceptance of office in Provincial Councils, under certain conditions, must form an item in the Party's programme. The above quoted statement leaves no doubt in our minds that Pundit Motilalji has once for all decided that the Swarajya Party's ban on acceptance of office in Councils ought not to be revoked. And that being so, it is very natural to expect that Pundit Motilalji will bring all the weight of his influence, which even to-day is fairly considerable, at Cawnpore to prevent the Congress from acceding to this *new move* urged by us. Indeed, it seems as though he has come to look upon this 'move' as a sort of personal affront against the *rationale* in his leadership of the Swarajya Party; and in fact he has grown, so it would seem, so touchy about these post-Patel-Tambe-flushed divarications that he wants to sheerly kill them at Cawnpore; and he intends killing them so completely that there can not be the least ghost of a chance for their revival to vitality.

In order to make that 'killing' so 'complete' the Pundit wishes to arm himself not only with the influence he is able to command but also with the sanction of authority. And that is why the Pundit has made this reference, ". . . and it was insulting to the revered memory of the Lokamanya to associate his phrase (*Responsive co-operation*) with such dirty work." But little did the Pundit imagine when he spoke in that strain that there are certain shrewd people who can carry 'warfare into the enemy's own citadel' and also who can 'controvert' the very authority on which one might have taken his stand for attacking the opponent. Pundit Motilalji forgot Mr. Jinnah, who no doubt 'ordinarily' can stand the jibe popular in the Assembly—Jinnah who never reads, but who in this instance reads up even dusty newspaper-files. For the benefit of us all, including Pundit Motilalji, Mr. Jinnah quotes the Lokamanya's own words on the issue we have now on hand: "It goes without saying that, if you are loyal subjects of the British Nation, every Act that is passed by the Parliament is binding upon us, and we are prepared to carry out its (Reform Act's) provisions loyally; but we must always be demanding more". Be it remembered, assures Mr. Jinnah, that Lokamanya Tilak spoke out that sentence in a speech he made not merely in his individual capacity but on behalf of himself, his Home-Rule League, and the people of India. Evidently the Pundit's reference, "insulting to the memory of Lokamanya" must be taken by us not too seriously, and at best, only as a rhetorical flourish.

Reasons for the Cawnpore Congress bestowing its best consideration on the Kelkar—Jayakar propaganda.

Anyway, this much is certain : that at Cawnpore Pundit Motilalji will surely oppose the Kelkar—Jayakar propaganda. We must be prepared for a most strenuous and very influential opposition from that quarter. But, however, even the weight of the Pundit's 'standing' and 'influence', cannot wrest from the Kelkar-Jayakar 'move' the sobriety, the justice, the appositeness that are behind it. Pundit Motilalji might opine that even at this stage the Swarajists ought not to accept office; but that does not mean that there is no responsible section of Indian politicians which differs from Pundit Motilalji; many Swarajists themselves feel that both the interests of the country and of the Swarajya Party itself require that at present it must be open to the Swarajists to accept office, under certain conditions, so that by such a course of action the formation of "unholy combinations" from which the national interests are receiving immense injury, might be prevented. This opinion is being voiced forth in many parts of India; we have already read what some of the Swarajists in the Bombay Legislative Council have expressed on this matter; and now let us heed to what a very brilliant Indian politician has to state: "The Bombay Swarajists' appeal is of special inter-

est to Madras where the conditions are if anything, far less auspicious. They are for Provincial Autonomy in the matter of Minister-ships and since the conditions including the number of Swarajists relatively to the total strength of the council are many, different in each Presidency, such autonomy is essential if the Bombay impasse is to be avoided. The Bombay Government has made itself impregnable with the aid of certain reactionary elements and through the transferred departments it has been enacting retrograde measures and promoting internal discord."

The *Swarajya* contests the statement that the 'morale of the Swarajya Party has gone though the prestige remains'. It forgets that the Swarajya Party is to-day reproducing the N. C. O. history of the Congress itself. When Das started Swarajism it was derided as heresy; an infinitude of majorities in the Congress voted against it everywhere; and yet it was the Congress that lost ground rapidly! Similarly after the open defection of the C.P. and the Maharatta leaders, it can no longer have the same moral appeal to the people as though the defections had not occurred. When leaders doubt, a large number of people will, of course, flout. It is no use saying that they have agreed to obey the mandate of the majority. Of what worth is that mechanical obedience in flagrant violation of conviction? How can Yakub Hassan or Jayakar defend Swarajism or persuade people to join its ranks without bringing ridicule on themselves? The brains are out and the heart has ceased to beat. Carry the corpse in your Swarajist procession, People will melt away at the sickening sight". (*The Hindu* Saturday November 14, 1925) Opinions as the one quoted above prove that the 'move' made by Messrs Kelkar and Jayakar ought not to be looked upon by Pandit Motilalji as a 'solitary' protest against his leadership engineered by a 'small' and 'mischievous' clique of schemers. This aspect of our case we wish to bring before the Cawnpore Congress. The Congress ought to appreciate, and we trust that it will, the real significance of the Kelkar-Jayakar 'plea', that it is a 'representative' expression of what a responsible section of the country's political opinion is thinking out about the country's political future. We do hope that those who have watched the events of the past twenty-six months will agree with the main contentions of this pamphlet, and when once they are convinced of the 'case' made out here—(1) that the Swarajist must either not enter the councils at all, but prepare their 'field' for *direct action* outside the Councils, viz in the country at large, (2) or when once they are convinced that *direct action* for them is not feasible, they must enter the Councils, (3) and after entering them they should discard talk of total Council-destruction for the reason that (a) total Council-destruction cannot be a realisable fact (b) and even if total Council-destruction be a realisable fact that in itself will not further their cause, as mere Council-destruction without the sanction of *direct-action* will not end in making the

established Government in the country impossible. (4) and, therefore, in the Councils they should by accepting office, under specific conditions, put into practice the policy of *National Seizn*, (5) and side by side keep on *agitating* for more reforms—we expect they will give their verdict in favour of the Neo-Swarajism advocated by Messrs. Kelkar and Jayakar. Of course we do appreciate that the protagonists of the Motilal-school will strenuously prevent the passing of such a verdict. And in doing so they will, no doubt, urge before the Congress this fact, that in 1923 elections they had not 'time' enough to prepare their constituencies, and consequently they were not in absolute majorities in the Councils, and that if the Congress should back them up now they *would* secure 'perfect' majorities in 1926 elections; and that when once they obtain those majorities they *would* certainly carry on total, consistent, systematic, obstruction leading to irreparable 'destruction' which would completely smash up the 'Reforms.' But in our turn we wish to urge that the Congress, before giving its final verdict would bear in mind the following four 'considerations' (1) That the talk of the Swarajists gathering about *absolute* and *complete* majorities requisite enough for complete Council-destruction can never practically come about. As our constituencies stand, it is not always 'causes' and 'party—principles' that sway them more than 'personal factors'. (See the Council of State elections, for example, in Madras, where a person who stands least in the political estimation of the Country tops the list in an election which attracted the 'briskest' political propaganda both through the Press and the Platform). So, this condition, viz, "if we are returned with absolute majorities", can always be only a hypothetical premissis in the Swarajist syllogism, which, therefore in a 'practical consideration' ought be negated; (2) even granting that the Swarajists enter the Councils with absolute majorities, total obstruction, by itself, without *direct act on* flourishing outside the Councils, will not get us *Swaraj*, which is said would be ours the moment we succeed in making the established Government in the country through the Bureaucracy *impossible*; (3) the Swarajists *in the Councils* will not be able to prepare the 'ground for *direct action outside the Councils*. And in the Councils too they will not be able to bring about complete Council-destruction; (4) that the absence of *direct action*, and negation of *Constitutional agitation* in the shape of creating Council dead-locks, will result in a mere political *nihilism*, whose impassivity as a potent means of gaining us *Swaraj* will become so sickening that the country cannot tolerate such nausea in our national life.

**When the formation of a New Party becomes a necessity:
The Structure and aims of the New Party.**

If in spite of these cogent arguments in favour of a *policy of National Seizn* being adopted by the Congress through the Swarajists in the Councils,

the Congress turns it down and gives its weight to the recalcitrant attitudes assumed by Pundit Motilalji, then for all those who would swear by the policy of National Seizin there can be no other course than to withdraw from the Congress, and thereafter form themselves into a separate party.

Now let us turn to consider the formation of such a party. The central programme of this Party must be formed by the principles inherent in a *policy of National Seizin*. Its sphere of work must be confined to the Councils, and outside the Councils. (a) In the Councils the members of the Party must accept office; secure for the Party a distinct working majority; when any new measure of those members of the Party who form the Government comes up for consideration, the entire Party must vote in its favour; when any member of the Government who is not a member of the Party brings forward any Bill, and if on its merits the Party were to decide against it, the entire Party including those members who are actually holding office must turn it down; whenever the Council passes a vote of censure against any member of the Party who happens to be an office-holder, then the Party must retire from the Councils, and seek re-election on the issue involved. (b) Outside the Councils, the Party ought to form its own constituencies. First of all the Party ought to make such constituencies, like the Senates, Corporations, Municipalities, chambers of Commerce, their own, and then only the other 'general constituencies' must be worked upon by the Party. A constituency whose members form not 'the masses' but the 'intelligentsia' of the country ought to be securely laid hold of by the Party. The Party ought to have its own Press for purposes of propaganda. It must be so arranged that the members of the Party will be having informal discussions with either their constituencies or with such representatives as the constituencies might elect. A vigorous propaganda carried on by the publication and distribution of pamphlets in the vernaculars should be launched upon in those constituencies where the 'masses' are met with. To wean the affections of these masses the Party must open up in every district a department entitled, 'The Amelioration Department', and the men in charge of these departments must study, from season to season the particular needs of each *taluk* and then must offer assistance so that those needs are satisfied. In this manner the sympathy and the imagination of the masses must be ensured on behalf of the Party. (c) 'The Party must form a 'touring committee,' whose members must be as far as possible people who have made for themselves distinguished reputations in some field or other; and these members should, as often as possible, tour round the whole country, deliver speeches at important cities and district head-quarters. (d) In England the Party ought to open up a Bureau of Information, which, through pamphlets, should educate the public opinion there on the 'Indian situation' and of the Party's endeavour. Perferferably this Bureau ought

to have a *Weekly* as its official organ. (e) The Party should gather about as much finances as it possibly could. (f) To ensure its resources, the Party must set out to bring to its fold the members of the landed aristocracy. The Party must endeavour to retain as its members many, many, Goswamys, Darbhingas, Burdwans, Wadias Sarabhais, Kolapurs, Muhammadabads, Tiwanas. The Party must attempt with great astuteness the enlistment in its ranks of the numerous Zamindars in India.

In passing, we would like to anticipate a criticism that might be urged against the creation of a new party. One such criticism would be that there is no need for another party when its avowed principles are guaranteed by the Liberal Party that is already in existence. In answering such a criticism, one has to state that to-day the Liberal Party has become so paralytic that for all 'practical purposes' it can certainly be counted as being *dead*. In the country to-day there are a few Liberals—but there is *no* Liberal Party. Hence the need for the creation of a new party in our definition.

To form such a Party, on the lines indicated above, cannot be beyond the scope of men like Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Kelkar, Mr. Jayakar, Mr. Khaparde, Pundit Malaviyaji, Lala Lajput Rai, Dr. Besant, Sir P. Thakurdas, Maharaja of Darbhanga, Lord Sinha, Mr. B. C. Pal, Mr. Chakravorthy, Lala Harikrishenlal, Sir T. Saprú, Mr. J. B. Petit, and the Raja of Jeyapore and especially when these men combine together. And when once the Party is formed, and under such auspices, it will be bound to function vigorously. Of course the protagonists of the Party will have to secede from the Congress—or at any rate the Party can have no official relationship with the Congress after Pundit Motilalji, with his 'present' views, assumes the *dictatorship* thereof. But this divorce cannot be helped; and no one need very much regret that he is parting from the Congress, which, after forty years of political life, stands—or is about to stand—in the hands of the Motilal School Swarajists an institution esteemable for the hallowed memories it holds, but with little of a sustained energy with which it could *intensify an individual* issue and work it up to an assured success. No doubt, even at the present hour, the Congress does stand for some of the finest ambitions of political India, but these only when they are infused with will-o-wisp idealisms over which either our political expediency or political exigency can have no grip whatever. Also, *now*, the need of the country is not for the seeking of the Spirit but towards a very concrete visualisation of the country's constitutional proprieties. And if in the furtherance of this need both the Congress, as apart from the Swarajya Party, and the Swarajya Party itself, at Cawnpore, would still stick on to methods of mere bluff and bluster, it is time, then, that every honest politician, who believes in a 'straight deal' and not in sophistries, turns his face against the Congress. That there are such honest politicians both in the

Congress and outside as well is firmly believed by the present writer. And with such a faith he respectfully commends this pamphlet for a careful and earnest consideration at the hands of those who would be deciding the 'issues' at Cawnpore.

If this pamphlet succeeds in convincing its readers that the present state of our country, and its present and immediate needs, require (1) that the Congress through the Swarajya Party should carry on *constitutional agitation*, meaning thereby that the Swarajya Party should enter the Councils, accept office, carry on the Government, and side by side agitate for further measures of responsibility, (2) that the Swarajists in Council should put into practice not 'Council-destruction and 'non-acceptance of office' but the policy which up till now has been styled as *Responsive co-operation*, but which with more correctness ought to be called the *Policy of National Seizin*, (3) and that in case the Congress, through the Swarajya Party, sticks on to the original programme of the Party, a new Party must be formed in the country to defeat the aims of the Congress and then to execute the *Policy of National Seizin*, the present writer would be more than amply compensated for the trouble he has undertaken—as a labour of love—in issuing this pamphlet.

Appendix I

Lala Lajput Rai's References to the Protagonists of a New Party.

Lala Lajput Rai is undoubtedly a much esteemed patriot. His services in behalf of our national interests have been gratefully acknowledged. His words have a claim on our earnest attention. Indeed few would grudge him the honour that the country has been showing him. And surely it cannot but be painful for any-one to differ from him. If now I have undertaken to write this article it is because I feel that some one of us must bring to his notice that he is beginning to jeopardise the high-level of our public life by writing about other public men in a sickening fashion. I am referring to his article in *The People—The Camouflage of a New Party*. However exalted his status in our public life may be, Lala Lajput Rai has surely no political absolution for committing breaches of decency and decorum as pertaining to public activities. In that article which is purpurated to be an attack on Mr. Jinnah's methods he has done nothing more than calling Mr. Jinnah some unsavoury names. Here is the opening sentence of the article : "I have read the criticisms of the Congress resolution made by sundry politicians like Mr. Jinnah from Bombay and that ex-judge from Madras who revels in inactivity and occupies himself with the highly innocuous business of criticising others". In the opinion of Lala Lajput Rai Mr. Jinnah may be a sundry politician. But we do not think so. We wonder who else in his eyes is a major politician other than, of course, himself ? However, in the course of the same article Lala Lajput Rai writes, "at present he (Mr. Jinnah) is like a rudderless ship and has done more to make the position hopeless than any other single public man in the country". If it is so, may we ask how a sundry politician could be able to bring about such a grave impasse in our public life ? A politician who is capable of so much influence might be mischievous but he cannot be one occupying a position as a sundry politician. As regards Mr. Seshagiri Iyer we are afraid Lala Lajput Rai knows very little of his activities. We are sure Lalji would be interested to know that Mr. Seshagiri Iyer has had many years of public life in the city before his elevation to the Bench ; even after retirement he did come out with distinction as a nominated member of the Assembly. And for the past three years he has been engaging himself in social and educational work. He has been conducting himself in such a way that to-day in Madras he happens to be one of those few men in public

life who enjoy the confidence of both brahmin and non-brahmin politicians. We do know Lalji was not aware of these facts. But then hasty generalisations regarding personalities is no virtue in any decent public worker.

Moreover in the article under consideration strangely enough Lalji has shown a remarkable paucity of argument or conviction. He has not been able to point out why he has come to think that Mr. Jinnah's plea and endeavour for a New Party are both irrational and superfluous. It is evident that this paucity has put him to a position of discomfiture, and from that irksome posture he has chosen to make up for a want of rationale in his attack on Mr. Jinnah's political campaign by his ample display of what are come to be 'respectful' invectives. When Mr. Jinnah is endeavouring to form a New Party Lalji opines that Mr. Jinnah is only 'humbugging'. He does not seem to have paused and considered for what end Mr. Jinnah should be humbugging. Surely it is not for any office, and we hope Lalji is well aware that if only Mr. Jinnah wanted a job on scores of occasions he could have got it. Mr. Jinnah could be said to be humbugging only in case we are sure that while convinced that a New Party could only be a joke and a fraud at the same time he has been pleading for its creation. We can assure Lalji that Mr. Jinnah entertains no such two opinions on the same issue. The trouble about Mr. Jinnah for persons of Lalji's ilk is that he is of opinion that the Congress which now means the Swarajya Party is a huge joke. That opinion arises out of a correct and unvarnished analysis. Let us examine the issues a little more carefully. The Congress at Cawnpore has reiterated its conviction that now civil-disobedience is impracticable ; and in fact Lala Lajput Rai wants that Congressmen should not even speak about civil-disobedience, ad nauseam. 2) When civil-disobedience has been scored out of their programme, the Congressmen now want to make use of the Councils. They want to enter them. They do not want to discard the Councils. 3) So, when the Congressmen have no avenue for their work other than the Councils cannot it be said that they are out for practising constitutional agitation ? In fact to-day the Congress which is dominated by the Swarajists has swept off the 'boycotts' and the 'constructive' programme of the N. C. O. movement, which is being adhered to by the faithful members of the Spinners' Association. In this connection let it be borne in mind that the Swarajists have been doing precious little in behalf of the 'constructive programme' and have been concentrating all their attention and capacities for work on the Legislatures ; and so in sober fact any talk of the 'constructive programme' by the Swarajists is all tall-talk. Well, the months that are ahead will prove this fact. What does it all mean ? Is it not clear that at present the Congress is pursuing that

self-same path that it had been following ever since its birth till the day of its capture by Mahatma Gandhi ? But however the Congress worthies would not like to own this fact. Their professions are indeed bewildering. In one breath they emphatically pronounce the futurity of *direct action*, in another they assert their eagerness to capture the Councils, and almost immediately they flourish forth their contempt for all the other political parties that are frankly envisaging constitutional agitation. In other words, the practice of the Congress is one and its professions altogether different. This is the huge joke which Mr. Jinnah has not failed to notice and would want every honest man to notice also.

Thus it could be easily seen why men like Mr. Jinnah decline to join the Congress. If we have understood Mr. Jinnah aright his objections for joining the Congress are two 1) he would not countenance a game of bare faced duplicity by which you do a certain thing and call it by a wholly misleading name. He would not acquiesce in so much of a political sophistication, not to speak of sophistry ; 2) to-day the Congress has chosen to concentrate its attention within the sphere of the Councils. If its efforts are to function into any tangible result it must act up and not count upon negotiations. When once the Congress has thought of the Councils and has entered them then it must try to work out the 'reforms'—whatever be their present worth. Instead of admitting such a procedure, the Congress wishes to mix matters up and still bank upon the old stunt of 'wrecking'. Those that believe in the Councils and working the 'reforms' for what they are worth cannot join hands with those who would not refrain from saying that they are for wrecking the very Councils. Has the Congress laid down that it has definitely given up the programme of 'wrecking' ? If it has not done so how could it expect men of other persuasions to join it ? Therefore those that would not and cannot join the Congress have got to take care of themselves. Hence Mr. Jinnah is keen about the formation of a New Party. Under these circumstances what is the impropriety in Mr. Jinnah's labouring for the formation of another party ?

The other charge of Lala Lajput Rai against Mr. Jinnah, that he ought to join the Liberal Party in case he cannot join the Congress, is easily answered. It is almost an open secret that to-day there are some Liberals but the Liberal Party itself is effete and almost extinct. Therefore Mr. Jinnah sees no good of pouring new wine into an old bottle. Hence his concern for a New Party. In this connection one would wish to commend to Lalji's attention the fact that many Liberals themselves are prepared to join a Party like the one Mr. Jinnah has in view and are even willing to give up the nomenclature of their own party.

In the light of the above exposition I trust our countrymen would see the rationale in Mr. Jinnah's endeavours for a New Party. I take this opportunity of respectfully urging on our patriots in South India the desirability of their lending their support to the propaganda Mr. Jinnah is keen about. Of course the differences on the communal question could be squared up by mutual forbearance and good-will. Is it too much to hope that all sincere and progressive nationalists—be they now in the Ministerial Party or in the United Nationalist Party or outside of any Party—would unite and respond to Mr. Jinnah's invitation? Hope as we may for the best, just at present the odds against such a fusion seem to be a bit formidable, especially in the face of the mud-slinging by the tall-poppies and the Sreemans of the Congress assemblage, whose rank and file now seem to be avowing that Great is Diana of the Ephesians, but greater still is Lalji as the newest god in the Swarajist pantheon.

MALATI-LATA: LYRICS

BY

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