

A CRITIQUE OF DIFFERENCE

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PREFACE

The Reader in Indian Philosophy had occasion to study the *Bhedadhikkāra* as part of his work on post-Śaṅkara Advaita. Some of the lectures delivered by him in 1934 were based on this work. Though it owes a great deal to earlier Advaita dialecticians, the book is valuable as an independent and comparatively small treatise on the subject of difference. The style, however, is very obscure and the book would be unintelligible but for the valuable and lucid commentary of the author's pupil Nārāyaṇa Āśramin. It seemed a worth while task to provide in English, not a translation, but a free rendering which would incorporate a good part of the commentary, thus making the text a little more easy to understand. Mr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Research Student attached to this Department, was of great service in going through the rendering and suggesting several improvements tending to greater clarity. The Introduction, which is a brief outline of the argument of the book, is Mr. Mahadevan's work. It is hoped that students of advanced Advaita will find the presentation helpful.

INTRODUCTION

Nṛsiṃhāśramin (A.D. 1500), the author of the *Bhedadhikkāra*, was a pupil of Ġīrvāṇendra Sarasvatī and Jagannāthāśramin. He wrote many works such as *Advaita-dīpikā*, *Advaita-paṇca-ratna*, *Advaita-bodha-dīpikā*, *Advaita-vāda*, *Vācārambhaṇa*, *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, and commentaries on the *Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka* and *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, called respectively *Tattva-bodhinī* and *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśa*. The age in which Nṛsiṃhāśramin lived was one of keen criticism and intense controversy. The chief contestants who entered the lists were the dvaitin and the advaitin. The followers of Ānandatīrtha tried to establish the validity of absolute difference. Vyāsātīrtha in his *Bhedojjivana* sets forth the evidences for the five-fold difference. In the *Bheda-taraṅgiṇī* Raṅganātha criticises the view of non-difference and expounds the dualist point of view. The doctrine of non-difference comes to be criticised by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins as well. The *Bheda-samarthana*, whose author is not known, is written in defence of difference from the Viśiṣṭādvaita standpoint. The *Bhedadhikkāra-nyak-kāra*, the work of Nṛsiṃhadeva, is a criticism of Nṛsiṃhāśramin's *Bhedadhikkāra*. A perusal of these treatises will convince those, who condemn Indian thought on the count that it disregards logical reasoning and blindly follows authority, of the important part which argumentation plays in the setting forth of the various doctrines. The exponents of the three schools of Vedānta vie with one another in upholding through critical canons of reasoning that their respective positions are in accord with the letter and the spirit of Scripture.

In his *Bhedadhikkāra*,¹ Nṛsiṃhāśramin introduces no new line of argument. His skill lies in presenting the case for Advaita through a systematic criticism of 'difference'. The dialectic on difference is found in almost all the important treatises on Advaita. Maṇḍana was, perhaps, the earliest of Nṛsiṃhāśramin's fore-runners in refuting 'difference' through dialectical arguments; Śrī Harṣa and Citsukha came after Maṇḍana; Śrī Harṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* is a master-piece of dialectics, interested as it is in a criticism of non-advaitic systems through the refutation

1. Commentaries on the *Bhedadhikkāra* :

(1) *Bhedadhikkāra-satkriyā* by Nārāyaṇāśramin, pupil of Nṛsiṃhāśramin.

(2) *Bhedadhikkāra-vivṛti* by Kālahastīśa Yajvan, pupil of Raghunāthāśrama Yati.

of all definitions as such. In the second chapter of the *Tattva-pradīpikā* Citsukha criticises 'difference' through a demonstration of the unintelligibility of the definitions of the commonly recognised categories and of such means of valid knowledge as perception, inference etc. Though the seeds of the dialectic method are to be found in Śaṅkara, the development and the perfection of the method were achieved by his followers. The sustenance and growth of a system can be accomplished only through a criticism of rival theories. Hence the advaitins who came after Śaṅkara had to arm themselves with dialectic skill in order to save their system from the onslaughts of its opponents. Mere exposition of the siddhānta was not enough; they had to establish it through a criticism of the other views.

In handling the dialectic on difference Nṛsiṃhāśramin is only following in the footsteps of his predecessors, with some elaborations here and there. These dialecticians, however, do not deny the seeming differences that are perceived. What they do deny is their ultimate validity. Difference is born of avidyā; it does not constitute the nature of reality. The five differences of which the dvaitin speaks may be reduced to three, *viz.*, difference between jīva and Īśvara, difference among the jīvas, and difference between the intelligent and the inert. For these differences there is no evidence whatever. The apprehension of difference can in no way be demonstrated. And if difference be real, there would result invalidity for the scriptural declaration of non-difference.

None of the recognised means of valid knowledge gives us the cognition of the difference of jīva from the Lord. Perception which is dependent on sense-contact cannot be evidence for the difference of the jīva from the Lord, whom the senses cannot apprehend. Nor can the mind without the help of sense-contact apprehend difference; for it is not an independent means of valid knowledge. The mind, like time etc., is an auxiliary to pramāṇa, and is not itself a pramāṇa. As for the cognition of happiness etc., it is not the mind that is the instrument, since happiness etc. are manifested by the witness-intelligence, and not by the mind. Nor may it be said that concentration is unintelligible if the mind be not an instrument of cognition; for concentration is intelligible even otherwise, by the capacity of the self to generate cognition only in sequence. Further, if the mind were to perceive difference it ought to be in contact therewith. But, for the mind there is no contact with difference. Since the Lord is not capable of being perceived, the difference of which He is the counter-correlate is also not capable of being perceived. If difference is to be apprehended with anupalabdhi as auxiliary, the mind must have the non-cognition of what is competent to be cognised; but the Lord is not

capable of being cognised by the mind. Nor may it be said that because non-difference of the jīva from the Lord is not cognised, there results validity for difference; for non-difference, though existent, may remain unapprehended on account of the absence of the auxiliary, *viz.*, scriptural knowledge. Since Īśvaratva is super-sensuous, it may intelligibly be not cognised. Non-cognition of non-difference at the stage of ignorance is not a valid ground for denying the existence of non-difference. Since cognition does not exist pervasively, non-cognition is intelligible; even omniscience etc., though existent in the self, may yet not be present in that part which is defined as the jīva-self by the human body. The difference that is experienced relates to the jīva limited by conditions, and not to the unconditioned self. Hence perception is no evidence of difference in respect of the self which is unlimited by adjuncts like egoity.

Nor is inference evidence of the difference of the jīva from the Lord. Since the advaitin admits empirical difference due to nescience, inference in respect thereof is establishment of the established. Nor may it be said that inference establishes real difference unsublated by knowledge of the self as impartite etc.; for such difference is subject to dispute and is not established in the example of pot. What is experienced is only the difference of the jīva which is identified with egoity etc. Hence inference cannot establish difference unconditioned by adjuncts. Further, there is an extraneous adjunct, *viz.*, inertness or non-self-luminosity, in the examples of all inferences which aim at establishing the difference of the self. Hence inference is no evidence of absolute difference.

Since difference which is a product of māyā is established in experience, Scripture cannot have that as its purport. Everything that is expressed in words is not the purport of the words. If it were so, then even the singular number in 'wipe the cup' should be the purport, so that the other cups to be used in the sacrifice would be left uncleaned. Doubt as to the non-existence of difference is removed by perception; hence there is not the requirement of Scripture to establish difference. Nor may it be said that difference revealed by Scripture is real, while that made known by perception etc., is unreal, for there cannot be two differences in the jīva. Again, the opponent of Advaita, who holds perception to be as valid as Scripture and who urges that texts which teach non-difference can have no purport because of conflict with perceived difference, cannot consistently maintain that perceived difference is unreal while the difference taught by Scripture is real. Further, since there is no supreme human goal achieved by the knowledge of difference, that kind of knowledge cannot be the

purport of Scripture. Instead of teaching the reality of difference, Scripture condemns it in many places, as leading to evil and misery. As for the texts like "Two birds" etc., which seem to have difference for purport, they are intelligible even on the basis of assumptive difference. Texts which declare non-difference cannot have an assumptive non-difference for content, because non-difference is not phenomenal.

Presumption too is no evidence in respect of difference, since there is nothing which becomes unintelligible in the absence of real difference. The Lord cannot be different from the jīva, for if He were different, there would result non-self-hood for Him.

Among jīvas too there is not unconditioned difference. What we experience is difference as conditioned by such adjuncts as egoity, body, senses etc. Nor may it be asked how, if jīvas are non-different, there is not the recollection of the happiness etc. of one jīva by another jīva, since non-recollection is intelligible even because of difference in the adjunct, *viz.*, mind. In the final view, however, there being non-difference of Devadatta from Yajñadatta, the latter's experience itself belongs to the former. Nor is there the contingency of activity for Yajñadatta through Devadatta's body. Since the mental cognition etc., which generate Yajñadatta's cognition, are not present in Devadatta's body, there is no possibility of activity in Devadatta's body being caused by cognition of happiness in Yajñadatta. It cannot be said that, as there is recollection in spite of bodily differences between infancy, youth etc., even so there may be recollection as between Devadatta and Yajñadatta. Non-recollection of Yajñadatta's happiness etc., by Devadatta, is intelligible even because of the latter's mind being different from the former. That the bodies of infancy, youth etc. differ is not established. In truth it is the same body that passes through the various stages of infancy etc. There is no defect whatever in the view that because of difference in the determinant there is difference in the defined.

The jīva is not atomic, because it experiences simultaneously pain or pleasure present in different parts of the body. Nor is it pervasive, for there is the contingency of simultaneous enjoyment through all bodies. It cannot be of itself of an intermediate size, because of the contingency of its non-eternality. Hence, the jīva is only an adjunct-conditioned part of the universal self, Brahman. As difference is intelligible as conditioned by adjuncts, it serves no purpose to posit difference even in what is defined. That there is no evidence for unconditioned difference we have seen above. The experience of difference is authoritative up to the stage of sublation; and since it is sublated by the knowledge of non-difference, it cannot be absolutely real.

The unintelligibility of difference is next sought to be proved through a criticism of the concept of reciprocal non-existence. Any form of non-existence is impossible without a counter-correlate. For reciprocal non-existence what is the counter-correlate? Non-difference should be the counter-correlate, since that is what is opposed to difference; but pot etc. are the counter-correlates, according to the opponent; this cannot be, because non-difference is not pot etc. If pot were non-difference, pot and difference of pot could not reside in the same locus. Nor may it be said that *tādātmya*, not non-difference, is the counter-correlate of difference; for *tādātmya* is not other than the existence of pot. If *tādātmya* be defined as the content of the cognition of the non-existence of difference, there results reciprocal dependence, since identity and difference depend each for its cognition on the cognition of the other. Nor may it be said that as pot, which is the non-existence of the non-existence of pot, is cognised without the apprehension of non-existence, *tādātmya* too, the non-existence of difference, may be apprehended without the cognition of non-existence. For, in pot, there is a positive attribute, potness, while in the non-existence of difference there is no positive attribute. Nor is *tādātmya* also, like potness, the content of the indeterminate cognition of pot. There is indeterminate perception of pot-ness alone, not of *tādātmya* too.

Further, what is meant by the reciprocal non-existence of the *tādātmya* of pot? (1) It cannot be difference from the pot (*ghaṭa-bheda*), for since it exists even in the pot, the pot too would be different from itself. (2) Nor can the non-existence of the *tādātmya* of pot be the absolute non-existence of the *tādātmya* of pot (*ghaṭa-tādātmya-atyantābhāva*); for the absolute non-existence of the *tādātmya* of pot is not difference of pot, since *tādātmya*, like potness, is other than pot. And the difference of pot cannot have as counter-correlate something other than pot, *viz.*, the *tādātmya* of pot. The absolute non-existence of potness cannot be equated with difference of pot, for the same reason, that the same non-existence cannot have more than one counter-correlate. (3) Nor may it be said that the absolute non-existence of potness is itself the difference of pot, for while difference has one counter-correlate, pot, absolute non-existence has a different counter-correlate, potness. Non-existence of potness in cloth is not inconsistent with identity of pot with cloth. Further, pot cannot be the locus of its own non-existence just as non-existence cannot be the locus of its own non-existence. (4) Nor can reciprocal non-existence have for its counter-correlate the pot as qualified by potness. This non-existence cannot reside in the

same locus as pot or its identity. And counter-correlateness necessarily implies opposition.

There is no necessity to recognise reciprocal non-existence as a separate mode of non-existence. In the cognition of reciprocal non-existence, usually explained in the form "These two are different", difference is an attribute common to the two differents; and non-difference is the counter-correlate, not pot which is one of the differents. Other forms of non-existence like antecedent non-existence, which are recognised as different from absolute non-existence, are in the same condition as reciprocal non-existence. Since counter-correlate-ness is of the same nature in all non-existences, there is no need for varieties of non-existence.

Reciprocal non-existence is said to obtain between two things. If there be difference of pot from cloth, is that difference *A* the same as the counter-correlate? Or is there for difference *A* a second difference from the counter-correlate? It is not cloth itself; for this other difference from the counter-correlate cannot rest in itself. Otherwise it would have to be said that there is no difference between the cognition of difference *A* and the cognition that difference *A* is different from the counter-correlate. If we admit that there is for difference *A* a second difference *B* from the counter-correlate, we shall be involved in an infinite regress. And if difference *B* be not recognised, then just as there is non-difference between difference *A* and the counter-correlate, cloth, there may be non-difference between pot and cloth too.

The advaitin next proceeds to show that even the *cognition* of difference is unintelligible. The difference of pot from cloth is dependent on the cognition of the difference of cloth from pot and *vice versa*. Doubt or error as to the latter is an obstacle to the cognition of the former. When there is doubt or error as to the difference of cloth from pot, there is not ascertained the difference of pot from cloth. The general principle is that when the doubt or non-existence of anything is an obstacle to something else, the ascertainment of the existence of that thing is the cause of the latter. It may be said that doubt is not observed to be an obstacle in the case of inference. But there, doubt and ascertainment relate to the same *probandum*, while, here, doubt is as to the difference where pot is the *counter-correlate* and ascertainment is to be of the difference where pot is the *correlate*. Hence, while doubt may not be an obstacle to the inference of what is doubted, it is certainly experienced to be an obstacle to the knowledge of difference.

Nor may it be said that the cause of the cognition of difference is the ascertainment of the non-existence, in the counter-correlate,

of that which is the determinant of substrateness, *i.e.*, of the quality because of which the substrate is the substrate, *dharmitāvacchedaka*; for there is no determinative consideration that this alone is the cause of that cognition, and not the cognition of another difference. Further, it is itself dependent on difference. To know substrateness which is definable only as a quality present in the substrate but not elsewhere, there must be a knowledge of the difference of others. And to know the latter there must be a knowledge of the former. Thus there is circular reasoning. And there is also reciprocal dependence in this way. Since doubt as to the non-existence of counter-correlateness (cloth-ness) in the substrate (pot) is an obstacle to the ascertainment of substrate-ness (pot-ness), the ascertainment of substrate-ness (pot-ness) is itself caused by the ascertainment of the non-existence of counter-correlateness (cloth-ness) in the substrate (pot). And similarly, since even the cognition of counter-correlateness, whereby difference has to be cognised, is itself dependent on the cognition of difference, there is reciprocal dependence again. Difference appears as a relation, being expressed in the sixth case as "the cloth has difference from pot". This difference requires knowledge of difference. Hence there is self-dependence. If difference be a qualification, then, since even the cognition of the relation of the qualification and the qualified is dependent on that cognition of difference, and that again on another cognition of difference and so on, there results infinite regress. Nor can difference be the very nature of the thing; for difference is cognised not as identical with the thing, but only in the relation of qualification and qualified; and the defect to which this relation leads we have seen above. Further, if pot itself were difference, pot and cloth could not exist in the same locus, ground. Thus, on the view of the opponents of Advaita, the cognition of difference is difficult to explain.

According to the explanation afforded by Advaita, there is somehow a content for the cognition of difference. The counter-correlate of difference is not pot etc., but non-difference. The cognition 'this is not that' has for content the non-existence of the non-difference of these two, which is established by the opposition between the two things cognised as 'this' and 'that'. The denial of this non-difference is intelligible, for, non-difference is presented through reality which is expressed in all phenomenal forms as 'this is real, that is real'. Reality which is intelligence, is the material cause of all; and hence it naturally recurs in each form. This reality is itself the essential nature of pot etc.; and the essential nature itself is non-difference. The absolute non-existence of non-difference however is presented by nescience,

located in pot, cloth etc. And since difference is revealed by the witness, there is no dependence on the cognition of counter-correlateness. As for the *pramāṇas*, they bring about only the relation of difference to the substrate etc.

Thus through a criticism of difference, the doctrine of Advaita that the *jīva*, which is of the nature of reality, knowledge and happiness, is non-different from Brahman, is well established.

We have summarised above the arguments set forth by Nṛsiṃhāśramin in refutation of difference. He premises his inquiry by stating that there is no evidence for difference whether as between the *jīva* and *Īśvara*, or as among the *jīvas*, or as between the intelligent and the inert. The arguments which he advances for rejecting the difference between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* and difference among *jīvas* are direct and therefore interesting. But the third part of his programme is not directly fulfilled. He leaves the unintelligibility of difference between the intelligent and the inert to be drawn as a logical consequence from his criticism of the concept of reciprocal non-existence. Since the major portion of the latter half of the work is devoted to a criticism of the concept of non-existence, it is scholastic in character and hence seems to be uninteresting to modern students of philosophy. But in the polemical age in which Nṛsiṃhāśramin lived, such a line of argument was necessary. Those who inquire into the truth of the sacred teaching are either the preceptor and the pupil or disputants. For instructing the pupil, the preceptor adopts the direct method of expounding his system. But disputants who indulge in dialectics will have to use whatever missile they find in the armoury of their intellect. The principal opponents of Advaita were, in what may be called the scholastic period of Indian thought, the *Naiyāyika*, and the *dvaitin* who accepts most of the *Nyāya* categories. Hence the necessity for the *advaitin* to meet his adversaries on their own ground and prove them to be false.

Before we conclude this introduction, it may be worth while to compare Nṛsiṃhāśramin's arguments with those of Bradley. The Absolutist philosopher shows how qualities and relations are interdependent and how, even when taken together, have no intelligible meaning. Relation is impossible without terms, and how terms can be related is unintelligible. We are, says Bradley, led by a principle of fission which conducts us to no end. This is the fallacy to which we are led, according to Nṛsiṃhāśramin too, when we inquire into the intelligibility of the relation of difference that is asserted to obtain between any two things. Bradley's arguments are more direct than those of Nṛsiṃhāśramin, because the English philosopher was not caught up, when he was actually

writing his *Appearance and Reality*, in a whirl-wind of controversy. But even his argument he regards as not of very much use. For he writes, while bringing the chapter on *Relation and Quality* to a close: "It would be easy, and yet profitless, to spin out its (the chapter's) argument with ramifications and refinements". The conclusion, however, to which both an Absolutist like Bradley and an advaitin like Nṛsiṃhāśramin want their dialectic to lead is "that a relational way of thought—any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance, and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible."¹

1. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 33.

BHEDADHIKKĀRA¹

(1) Resplendent is the Light (lion)², which roams about P. 1
in the forest of the Vedānta³, resides in the cave of the blue
mountain (Nīlācala) and removes the obscuration of begin-
ningless māyā (the elephant)⁴.

(2) Are you not certainly Narasiṃha⁵? or am I not jīva P. 3
(nā)⁶? If not, O Lord of all, how is there (real) bondage
in me, non-different from you⁷? What? O Lord, who are
all pervasive, is there another jīva (nā) over and above me⁸?
Let such words of non-personal origin in the Upaniṣads, as P. 4

1. The argument in the present book is an elaboration of what is
briefly foreshadowed in the *Vivaraṇa*, pp. 258-259 and the *Vivaraṇaprameya-
saṅgraha*, pp. 242, 265; the reference in both cases is to the edition in the
Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

2. The light of Intelligence which is compared to a lion.

3. The Vedānta appears to be a tangled forest to those who are not
acquainted with it; or like a forest, it is vast and varied with many śākhās,
kāṇḍas, vallis, etc. That the Vedānta is the sole evidence for Brahman is
signified by the clause "which roams about" etc.

4. Reading the text as "adhvastamāyāvaraṇa-vāraṇam" the meaning is
"that which removes the obscuration of beginningless māyā". Reading the
text as "dhvastamāyāvaraṇavāraṇam" the meaning would be: (a) that
which removes the obscuration of māyā which is *unreal*, since, in truth,
intelligence cannot be either its locus or content, while no other locus or
content can be demonstrated; or (b) that which destroys the māyā which
can be compared to an elephant in rut, since it causes fear to the weak and
timid.

5. The very word 'Narasiṃha' is an apposition of jīva (nr) with
Brahman (the destroyer of humanness); it shows that jīva is non-different
from Brahman, just as Bhīmasena and Bhīma are one.

6. If the word "Narasiṃha" shows that jīva is non-different from
Brahman, then the author, settled to be a jīva by experience, must be non-
different therefrom.

7. If it be doubted there can be no non-difference of Brahman who
is pure from the jīva who is conditioned by bondage like agency, en-
joyership, etc., no; for bondage is adventitious, and is not absolutely real.

8. If it be objected that there can be no non-difference of Brahman,
which is one, and pervasive, from jīvas, which are many, no; the difference
of jīvas is due to external adjuncts. Bodies which are other than mine are
the instruments of enjoyment for me alone, because they are bodies, like this
body. The self of Caitra and the self of Maitra are not in reality mutually
different, because without the recollection of adjuncts difference is not
cognised, as for pot-ether, etc. These inferences disprove difference of
jīvas. Cf. *Vivaraṇaprameyasāṅgraha*, p. 265.

(that you are) Destroyer of the bondage located in the self, be meaningful! You are not jīva (nā)²; hence I am you alone; O Nṛhari, may I be merged in your self?³

P. 6 (3) Depending on the lotus-feet of the preceptor, which are of the essence of grace, are beautiful and abide in my heart, I do this work of condemning difference.

P. 7 The jīva cognised as "I", and as other than the internal organ, is not different from the Supreme, (a) because it is intelligent, or (b) because it is a substance, like Brahman. The probans is not ineffective; for in respect of the contrary conclusion, there are the defects, *viz.*, (1) the non-existence of the apprehension of difference, and (2) the invalidity of the scriptural declaration of non-difference.

P. 8 There is no difference between (A) jīva and Īśvara, (B) between jīva and the inert, or (C) among the jīvas; for there is no evidence and it does not stand to reason.

Objection.—There is (A) evidence, *viz.*, the perception "I am not Īśvara;" this is not sublated; nor is there the impossibility of the causes of this cognition.

P. 9 *Reply.*—The perception "I am not Īśvara" is not generated by senses like the sense of sight etc., for they are not capable of cognising the self. Nor is mind the instrument of perception, for it is only an auxiliary to other means of valid knowledge. The mind by itself is not an independent means of valid knowledge. Hence there being no cause for this perception, it is a delusion.

Objection.—The cognition of happiness etc. is not generated except by the mind alone; hence the mind may be the means of knowledge similarly in respect of difference too.

P. 10 *Reply.*—Difference being from Īśvara who is supersensuous, how can it be perceptual? Difference is reciprocal non-existence, and only that non-existence is perceptual whose counter-correlate is perceptual.

Objection.—Perceptibility of the counter-correlate is not the determinant of the perceptibility of non-existence. The

1. There is Scriptural evidence for non-difference and for the meaning of the word "Narasimha" given above. Cf. *Tāpaniya*.

2. Īśvara cannot be credited with jivatva simply because of his incarnations like Narasimha, etc. The incarnations are adventitious.

3. For, when you exist as Nṛsimha (destroyer of the bonds of men), it is not meet that I should be subject even to phenomenal bondage.

non-existence of pot-ness in the mind is not perceptible, though pot-ness is perceptible, while the non-existence of mind-ness in the pot is perceptible, though mind is imperceptible. Where the existence of a thing is opposed to non-cognition, there its non-existence is perceived. If the jīva were non-different from the Lord, as it is from itself, that non-difference should be perceived; since it is not, the difference is perceived.

Reply.—This difference is but due to extraneous adjuncts, P. 11 for difference from Īśvara is experienced only by that which is qualified by the body; hence the cognition of difference is not valid.

Objection.—The cognition “I” has the pure self for content; hence the difference made known thereby is not due to adjuncts. P. 12

Reply.—Not so. [I] The mind is not a means of valid knowledge. [II] It is not in contact with difference. [III] The mind has not for its auxiliary non-cognition of that which is capable of being cognised (even given favourable conditions). Therefore, this difference resides in adjuncts and is not the sphere of perceptual cognition. P. 13

[I.] The mind is not a pramāṇa, (1) because it is an auxiliary to pramāṇa, (2) because there is no content for it, and (3) because it is the locus, not the instrument, of valid knowledge etc.

(1) The mind is not a pramāṇa, since like time etc., it is an auxiliary to pramāṇa. The sense of sight etc., which are pramāṇas, are not auxiliaries to other pramāṇas. It may be said that in this case there is a sublator, viz., the contingency of the result (say, sound) of the aided pramāṇa (say, hearing) partaking of the general character (say, visibility) of the aiding pramāṇa (say, sight); but there is a similar contingency of the sublator in the present case too; in the cognition of colour etc., generated by sight etc., there is no experience of mentalness. There is no evidence for recognising as an option such an unexperienced generality. P. 14° P. 15

That the mind is not a pramāṇa is ascertained through unsublated inference. If the mind were the instrument in all cognitions, that would be the sole instrument in all cases, all others like sight being only auxiliaries thereto, like light.

(2) *Objection.*—The mind alone is the means of cognising happiness etc., because of elimination of the rest. Similarly,

- P. 16 because of the experience "With the mind I perceive this" and because of the unintelligibility otherwise of concentration, the mind is an instrument even in the cognition of the external.

Reply.—The empirical usage of happiness etc., is generated by the cognition of its own content, since it is empirical usage, like other admitted usage. Because of this inference,

- P. 17 that cognition is established; and because of parsimony it is one and constant. There is no conflict with the experience of origination and destruction in the case of the perception of misery etc.; for when misery etc. exist there is no independent experience of the origination and destruction of their cognition; experiences like that of the destruction of the *cognition* of misery, have for content only the destruction etc., of the content. Nor is it that there is no determining consideration; for, at the time of experiencing happiness etc., misery etc. should persist, should they exist, their cognition alone having been destroyed; and there is no evidence for
- P. 18 misery being eternal. If there be not admitted a single eternal intuition relating to the cognition etc., since the invariable apprehension of the cognition etc. by the mind is impossible, there would be at that stage the doubt "Is this now experienced by me or not?", "Do I (now) desire this or not?"; for there exists the causal aggregate of doubt, *viz.*, what is opposed to certitude as to what is to be apprehended. And therefore,
- P. 19 because of the eternality of the intuition, which is of misery etc., and is present in all three states, the mind is not the instrument in respect of that.

[This is the drift of the argument: if it were proved that happiness etc., are cognised through a sense-organ, the mind would have to be classed as such. But that is not proved; we hold on the contrary that the experience of happiness is one and eternal; and that the experience of origination etc. is really due to adjuncts. Nor is it that because of the experience of misery, which seems to terminate that of happiness, both experiences should be admitted to have origination and destruction; for, here, we say that the misery itself is originated or destroyed, not experience. Nor is it possible to hold the contrary view; for when there is experience of happiness, the form of experience persists, but not misery. And it cannot be held that like happiness, misery too is eternal and that its apparent impermanence belongs really to the adjuncts;

for there is no scriptural or other evidence of eternity, as in the case of happiness. Further, the admission of a single, eternal, witness-consciousness is necessary; for in the case of cognition, desire etc., immediately subsequent to them there is no doubt as to what was cognised or desired by oneself; this absence of doubt is due to certainty of what is apprehended; otherwise there being the causal aggregate for doubt, there should be doubt; if the certitude be due to the invariable functioning of the mind immediately after the cognition etc., there would be infinite regress of the mental cognition; and there would not be the generation of happiness, misery etc., by the cognition of the desired or the not desired. Nor are cognition etc. self-luminous, since by parsimony such luminosity need be assumed in the self alone. Further, the external senses do not function in dreams and the mind can do nothing without their help; and in the state of deep sleep there is the experience of happiness; the experiences pertaining to these states would not be possible but for an eternal consciousness of happiness etc.]

(3-a). As for the experience "I perceive this with the mind", that is explicable by the mind, which is the material cause of cognition etc., being also the efficient cause of the super-imposition of cognition etc., on the self; the mind's material causality is established by the text "Desire, resolve, etc. . . . are the mind alone"¹; that the mind is the cogniser, not the instrument of cognition, is established in such usage as "our minds know this".

(3-b). Concentration is explicable even otherwise, by the capacity of the self to generate cognition only in sequence; P. 20 this capacity is admitted even by the adversary to explain a continuous stream of cognition, where the causal aggregates for the second and subsequent cognitions also exist at the time of the first cognition.

Further it will be stated that the experience "I" is the content of the internal organ; hence cognition etc., experienced in the form "I know", are but *attributes* thereof and the mind is not an *instrument* in respect of them.

[II.] The mind is not in contact with difference. Conjunction, inherence and identity are impossible as modes of contact and no other mode of contact is known. No sense cognises P. 21

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I, v, 3.

what is not in contact; for, in the case of all generated perceptions, there must be sense-contact with both the qualification and what is qualified, so that it cannot be said that contact with the qualification is not necessary and that difference is only a qualification; if contact with qualification were not necessary, then because of contact with the hill it would be possible to have the perception 'the hill has fire' even though there is no sense-contact with fire. Nor for difference is there cognition by the contact known as *viśeṣaṇatā*¹; for, if mere *viśeṣaṇatā* were the contact, there should be cognition of the non-existence of a pot even in a place hidden by a wall etc. Nor is it that the contact of the locus and sense-organ is also the cause; for, if the contact of the locus and the sense-organ were also the cause, in the view of the Logician, there is the contingency of the non-perception of the non-existence of sound. According to the Logician, the cognition of the non-existence of sound is perceptual; but as, in his view, the sense of hearing, which is the ear-defined ether, is itself the locus of the non-existence of sound, there can be no *contact* with the locus. Thus it would result that

P. 22 the non-existence of sound is not perceived. Nor is it that there is sense-contact with the non-existence which is the qualification of that locus, where the existence of the counter-correlate would be in conflict with the non-cognition; for, the cognition which is opposed to the non-cognition, is it occasional or constant? Occasional cognition is possible of pot etc., even in a place that is now hidden; hence even there non-existence should be perceived; constant cognition is impossible even in the case of sound etc., constantly present in the hearing etc., because of the lack of the necessary auxiliaries.

And there is no authority for *viśeṣaṇatā* being a mode of sense-contact, since cognition of non-existence is intelligible even though non-cognition.² Though cognition is not the cause of this, it does not thereby become perceptual; for even inference according to the adversary is not cognition-caused, being caused by *parāmarśa* which is of the nature of recollection;

1. The relation known as *viśeṣaṇatā* is thus explained: when in a locus there is the non-existence of an object then for the non-existence of that object there is said to be the relation known as *viśeṣaṇatā*. Since in air there is no colour, for it there is the *viśeṣaṇatā* relation, *viz.*, relation with the non-existence of colour.

2. *I.e.* a distinct *pramāṇa* of that name.

the non-perceptual character of non-cognition is similarly possible. As for the functioning of the sense-organ to some extent, that is exhausted even with the cognition of the locus. Nor is there prolixity in assuming another pramāṇa; for non-cognition as the cause has to be recognised even by you in respect of the cognition of non-existence; you have further to assume of viśeṣaṇatā that it is a mode of sense-contact and that it is a cause of cognition. And it cannot be said that in the cognition of inherence, that (viśeṣaṇatā) is settled to be the mode of contact, since conjunction (saṃyoga) is not possible for what is not a substance, and inherence is possible for inherence, only in the substance where it inheres, not in the sense-organ. For, samavāya itself is not admitted; much less is it admitted that viśeṣaṇatā is the mode of contact. P. 24

[This is the critique of samavāya¹: this is said to exist as between quality and the possessor of the quality, part and whole, etc. Now, if the terms of these pairs be wholly different, then there would be no appositional usage, like "the cloth is white", "the ear-ring is gold". Further if samavāya being unrelated to the relata could cause cognition of one relatum as qualified by the other, that would be undue extension; if some relation be admitted, there is infinite regress. We shall refute the notion of a relation *sui generis*; anyhow, if such a relation could in some cases determine a cognition of the qualified, that itself may determine such cognition even in the case of substance and quality, and it is not possible to assume samavāya. Further, if samavāya be one, there would be non-difference of the inherence of colour and cognition, from the inherence residing in air, pot etc.; hence there is the contingency of such cognitions as "air has colour, the pot cognises". And if in air etc., there be the inherence of colour etc., it is absurd to say colour etc., are yet non-existent; for it is self-contradictory to admit a relation determining the existence of that (colour etc.) and yet deny the existence of colour etc. To assume a multiplicity of samavāyas is not possible. Similarly, even if there be absolute non-difference, say between clay and pot, there is the unintelligibility of the cognition of apposition comprehending two non-synonymous terms; there is also the unintelligibility of the causal and other such relations. Therefore the relation between part and whole etc., is only identity (tādātmya)].

1. Cf. *Tattvapradīpikā*, pp. 198—205.

- 25 And *tādātmya* does not require some other mode of sense-contact, since it is revealed by the witness-consciousness. And since with the self which is partless by nature, conjunction is impossible, there is no sense-contact for difference; for conjunction and its absence are impossible in what is one and the same. The cognition of both even in the tree etc., in the form "At the top there is conjunction of the tree with the monkey, not at the foot," is certainly due to adjuncts (the top and the foot). Even in the view of the adversary it is not possible for what is non-different from that to be also different from that. In our position conjunction exists in localities which are distinguished assumptively; what exists thus in an assumptive locus cannot be the cause of valid knowledge.¹
- P. 26

- And in one and the same thing there cannot be both existence and non-existence through a distinction in the determinant. For "being the top" etc., cannot be determinants, the nature of which comprises non-existence where that (conjunction) does not exist, unless there is difference of loci where conjunction exists and where it does not exist; and this difference is ruled out by the premised non-difference; as for existing in the locus of that (conjunction) this is common even to knowability etc. Nor can there be conjunction pervasive of the whole, for it is contradicted by experience and is impossible; if that were so, sound etc. would be cognised everywhere, for the conjunction of the ear with ether would pervade the entire ether, which is all-pervasive. Therefore there is no conjunction of the mind with difference.
- P. 27

- [III.] Nor has the mind for its auxiliary the non-cognition of what is capable of being cognised; for *Īśvara*, who is the counter-correlate of the difference alleged to be perceived, is not capable of being perceived; it is indeed the non-cognition of what is capable of being perceived that constitutes non-cognition of the capable; for then alone is possible the non-cognition contemporaneous with all other causes of cognition except the counter-correlate and what is pervaded by that.
- P. 28

1. Though we admit that there is difference of localities caused by adjuncts in the partless self and that conjunction exists in such localities which are distinguished assumptively, this conjunction cannot be the cause of valid knowledge. Just as inference of the fire from vapour is not valid, even so the contact of mind which depends on an illusory distinction of localities and is itself therefore illusory, cannot be the cause of valid knowledge.

The cognition "There is no mentalness in the pot" is not perception any more than "There is no primal atomicity in the pot." There is not indeed this experience at the stage when the difference of mind from pot is not recollected. For this same reason the non-existence of potness etc., in what is supersensuous, is not perceptible. And at the stage of the cognition of difference in the form "I am not Īśvara" there is not the necessary apparatus for cognising Īśvara, since the mind etc., then existent, are incapable of that. P. 29

Now, non-cognition of the capable is thus explained: where the existence of a thing is opposed to non-cognition, etc. This is unsound. The existence of the counter-correlate in some place or other is not pervaded by the cognition of it somewhere else; hence its existence should be stated to be pervaded by cognition in the place where it is non-existent; and this is not possible; for, if in the locus of non-existence, there exist the being qualified by the counter-correlate, the valid cognition of non-existence would be unintelligible. It may be said that disputed existence is what is here opposed to cognition, not actual existence; but even what is disputed should be either existence or non-existence. If it be existence, we have the same difficulty as before. If it be said that though non-existent there it is existent elsewhere, then, only in that other place does it conflict with non-cognition, not in the locus of non-existence. P. 30 If because of conflict with non-cognition in some one place, non-existence be demonstrated elsewhere, even the non-existence of potness etc., in what is supersensuous, would be perceptible. Being qualified by the counter-correlate in the locus of non-existence, even because of non-existence there, does not conflict with non-cognition; it does not exist in that locus; for, though there be cognition of the non-existence of qualifiedness, the non-existent as such can demonstrate nothing.

Objection.—Where by the supposition of existence it is possible to deduce non-existence of non-cognition, that is to say, existence of cognition, there non-existence of the thing is perceived.

Reply.—No, for through the unreal supposititious qualifiedness it is not possible to deduce anything else. From the mere qualifiedness by the counter-correlate somewhere, it is impossible to deduce the cognition of that in the locus of non-existence; further, since by the person apprehending non- P. 31

existence, there is not apprehended qualifiedness by the counter-correlate in other places, there is no conflict of the non-apprehension thereof with the existence of the thing in those places. Further, it is admitted by the adversary that the capacity for a hypothetical deduction is not an attribute or the form of the thing known, but is either a pervasion present in

- P. 32 it or the cognition thereof; and since there is no pervasion demonstrated by the unreal, its cognition alone should be said to be this capacity; and thus the cognition of non-existence being invariably preceded by cognition of non-concomitance, there is in respect of non-existence, as in respect of the fire on the hill, inferential knowledge alone, not perception. Even thus, the non-existence of sound etc., which are capable of being perceived, would be perceptible, but not the non-existence of the super-sensuous, *e.g.*, of mentalness etc., in the pot; for in the case of that whose existence is hypothetical, there being the deduction even of atomicity which is its pervader (in the same way as cognition is a pervader), there is no conflict of that existence with non-cognition. Further, in the absence of the necessary auxiliaries such as some one's statement that a person is born to a brahmin father of a brahmin mother, brahminhood etc., though existent, would not be cognised; similarly, the non-cognition of non-difference from Brahman is intelligible even without the non-existence of that non-difference; as for the worldly statement in the other case, here too, the need for some other auxiliary is validly known from such texts as "The person who has a preceptor, knows,"¹ "(The self) is to be heard,"² etc.

- P. 34 *Objection.*—The mind does not need any other auxiliary in the case of the jīva's non-difference from itself; there should be no such need even in the case of the non-difference from Brahman.

Reply.—No. Jīva-hood etc., being capable of being known by the mind alone, the non-difference qualified thereby is also capable of being cognised by that alone; but the capacity to be the self of all etc., cannot be cognised by that mind; hence its requirement of another auxiliary in respect of the non-difference of the self from Brahman is intelligible; otherwise,

1. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, xiv, 2.

2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II, iv, 5.

since non-difference like the unseen potency in the jīva is not cognised, that too, *i.e.*, non-difference of the jīva from itself as qualified by the unseen potency would not exist; then, the jīva, as different from the locus of demerit etc., would be eternally released. Further by such passages from the traditional codes as "Being deprived of their knowledge by māyā,"¹ "Knowledge is obscured by ignorance, thereby are creatures deluded."² "He is non-different, and difference is the product of ignorance" P. 35 and such scriptural passages as "They are heavily obscured by nīhāra and come to be designated as jīvas", "They are deluded indeed by falsehood"³ there is understood obscuration by ignorance; hence the non-cognition of the non-difference of the jīva from Brahman does not conflict with its existence. P. 36

Further, the mind is not competent to comprehend the non-difference of the jīva from Brahman, because of such scriptural texts as "That which is not thought by the mind"⁴; but Brahman is known through the Veda alone, as seen from the scriptural texts, "But that person propounded in the Upaniṣads,"⁵ etc., "That whose state is declared by all the Vedas"⁶; hence, not because of non-cognition by the mind is there the establishment of the non-existence of that non-difference, any more than of religious duty etc.

Further, you say that because of the non-cognition of non-difference etc., as qualified by Īśvaratva, there is difference; what is this Īśvaratva? It is not a jāti, for Īśvara is unique and there is no jāti in respect of what is unique. P. 37

Objection.—There are people called "lords" in ordinary experience; surely the lordship which is common to them is a jāti.

Reply.—No; for at different times it exists in different people; hence it exists in intelligence as such; consequently, it is of the nature of the self, and difference of it from the self is unintelligible; and in the case of the lords in ordinary experience there is the contingency of the non-experience of difference from the Lord. Nor does lordship consist in

1. *Gītā*, VII, 15.

2. *Gītā*, V, 15.

3. *Chān. Up.*, VIII, iii, 2.

4. *Kena. Up.*, 5.

5. *Brh. Up.*, III, ix, 26.

6. *Kaṭha. Up.*, II, 15.

creatorship of the binary atom etc.; for what is qualified by this, being super-sensuous, non-difference therefrom though existent may intelligibly be not cognised. Nor is it possession of eternal knowledge, for, the eternality of knowledge, like one's own eternality, is incapable of being perceived. Nor is it omniscience, for the possession of knowledge about all things is experienced even in the *jīva*, *e.g.*, the cognition that everything is knowable.

P. 38 *Objection.*—Eternal omniscience is not experienced in the *jīva*.

Reply.—No; for when there is the delusion of eternality in respect of the *jīva*'s knowledge, even omniscience as qualified by that eternality is experienced in the self; hence there is no non-cognition of non-difference from what is qualified by that. And since in the system of the adversary, the very existence of cognition and its object is the relation between them, all cognition has certainly everything for content; hence at the stage of this certitude, because of the non-existence of non-cognition, there should be no apprehension of difference; but this apprehension exists even then; for it is then that a man is said to have the cognition "I am not the Lord."

Further, cognition does not exist pervasively; hence non-cognition is intelligible, even because of omniscience etc., though existent in the self, yet not being present in that part which is defined as the *jīva*-self by the human body; hence the apprehension of difference in the locus of that non-cognition is not possible; truly because topness is not experienced as defined by baseness, valid knowledge of difference is not possible in respect of that which is the locus of both these determinants; for, as in the case of the bare non-difference of the tree, so in the case of bare non-difference of the self, there is no non-cognition.

P. 39 *Objection.*—There (in the tree) there is experienced the existence of both determinants in one locus; not so here.

Reply.—Since the self is pervasive and since there are no sub-classes of it, there cannot in reality be any distinction of the *jīva* from the supreme self; hence the different determinants have all the same locus. Even when this reasoning has not been apprehended and there is a doubt that the two selves are different, there is no possibility of the non-cognition of what is capable, for the reasons already stated; hence, no more than

difference of oneself from what is qualified by pervasiveness, can the difference from Īśvara be possibly apprehended. [Pervasiveness consists in the relation of conjunction, inherence etc., with *all* corporeal objects; this is incapable of being perceived; hence there is not perceived in the self non-difference qualified by that pervasiveness; yet we do not derive from this the non-pervasiveness of the self, pervasiveness being an admitted attribute of the self.]

Further, it is in the *jīva* experienced as limited, in the form "I am here", that difference is experienced in the form "I am not the Lord"; and limitation is not possible for the self not conditioned by adjuncts. For, if the self be atomic, there is the contingency of non-experience of pleasure etc., pervading the whole body; and there is the contingency of the non-cognition of simultaneous effort in two different parts of the body; and if a medium size were natural to the self, there is the contingency of non-eternality etc.; and if it were infinite in size, then, as in the case of ether, there would be no others of the same class as itself; hence the self is one alone; limitation is solely due to extraneous adjuncts as in the case of pot-ether; hence the difference present therein is also due to adjuncts; hence it is neither absolutely real nor unconditioned. P. 40

Further, egoity is not-self, since it is an object of cognition, like the pot. Nor is the *probans* ineffective; for, on grounds of parsimony, "being the object of cognition" is itself pervaded by not-self-hood, not "not being the locus of cognition"; for, the latter as involving a negation is more cumbersome. Because of the presence of the *probans* in the subject, a cogniser is presumptively implied; hence the establishment of a self, which is over and above egoity. And this is the manifest of happiness etc.; it is itself the previously mentioned self-luminous, eternal experiencer; hence it is not the object of cognition. Hence it is only the not-self, qualified by egoity, that is cognised as different. Therefore, the perception "I am not the Lord" is not an evidence of difference in respect of the unconditioned *jīva*. P. 41 P. 42

INFERENCE.

Inference too is not evidence of the difference of the *jīva* from the Supreme.

Difference is not the sphere of inference, because [I] it is the establishment of the established, [II] there is non-esta-

establishment of pervadedness, [III] there is sublation and [IV] inertness is an extraneous adjunct affecting the inference.

P. 43 [I.] "The jiva is either the counter-correlate of difference which is an attribute of Brahman, or the possessor of difference whose counter-correlate is Brahman, because of being a substance, or because of non-omniscience, like a pot". This inference is not valid, since it is establishment of the established; for even by us there is admitted empirical difference due to nescience.

Objection.—The *probandum* is "the possessor of difference not sublated by one's own knowledge (and hence not the product of nescience)"; and therefore since difference not sublated by knowledge is absolutely real, there is no establishment of the established.

Reply.—No; even unreal difference is not sublated by the knowledge of the jiva as agent etc., any more than by knowledge of the pot.

[II.] *Objection.*—What is intended here is non-sublation by knowledge of the self as impartite etc.

Reply.—No; for the *probandum* is not established in the case of the illustration, the pot; further, the pervasion is non-established, *viz.*, that whatever is a substance or is non-omniscient possesses difference unsublatable by knowledge of the self, since this is just what is in dispute. For the same reason there is refuted the *probandum* "possesses absolutely real difference".

P. 44 *Objection.*—There is established difference unconditioned by adjuncts, since this exists even in the illustration; and when in the jiva there is established difference unconditioned by adjuncts, there is established difference only of the pure, not of that which is conditioned by nescience; hence it is not removable by knowledge; consequently the difference is real.

[III.] *Reply.*—No. The difference "I am not the Lord" is conditioned by adjuncts; there is not experienced the difference of the jiva who is not identified with egoity; hence the inference is sublated.

Objection.—Now, Brahman possesses difference which has the jiva for counter-correlate and is non-sublatable by the knowledge of the substrate, since it is a substance or since it

is not a transmigrator, like a pot; thence, difference, being non-sublatable by the knowledge of the substrate, Brahman, is real.

Reply.—No; the difference which has the jīva for counter-correlate is one, whether existing in Brahman or in the pot etc.; the pot too is its own substrate and it is certainly admitted to be not sublatable by the knowledge of pot etc.; hence the inference is an establishment of the established. P. 45

Objection.—Non-sublation by knowledge of all substrates whatever is what is meant to be the qualification of the difference.

Reply.—No, for this does not exist in the illustration; the pot is not admitted to possess difference not sublatable by the knowledge of Brahman.

Objection.—There is not the said defect, if the qualification be expressed as “non-sublatable by knowledge of itself”.

Reply.—No; in the case of Brahman that is denoted by such words as “Brahman”, as being qualified by some attribute, viz., being the denotation of such words, there is non-sublatability of difference by the knowledge of that Brahman; but its reality is not established, since that difference may be empirical and illusory. And where the word “Brahman” refers to the Brahman that is the purport of the Vedānta, there is sublation of the inference by the knowledge that apprehends the substrate, inasmuch as this apprehends Brahman as having no qualifications and no difference; there is also the non-establishment of the *probans*, such as being a substance, since this Brahman has no attributes at all. P. 46

[IV.] And inertness is the extraneous adjunct affecting the *probans* in any such inference; and that is non-self-luminosity, while self-luminosity of the self is established by Scripture and reasoning; hence there is neither non-establishment of that adjunct nor the pervasion of the *probans* (i.e., pervasion of the subject in that part of which is pervaded by the *probans*).

And all the aforesaid *probans* are ineffective, since all distinctions of usage, empirical and scriptural, are intelligible even on the basis of assumptive difference. There is also what is to be stated presently, sublation by Scripture. Therefore inference is no evidence for difference. P. 47

A CRITIQUE OF DIFFERENCE SCRIPTURE.

Similarly, Scripture too is not evidence for difference.

- P. 48 Scripture does not have difference for its sphere, since [I] it is established by other means of knowledge, [II] it is illusory, [III] it is unfruitful, and [IV] it is in conflict with other scriptural texts.

The cognition of difference "I am not the Lord" exists even for those who are devoid of the recollection of scriptural texts. But, since, in the manner stated, there is not as its auxiliary the non-cognition of the competent, it is a product of *māyā*, like the difference between prototype and reflection, and is established by the witness alone. Therefore, there is no purport for Scripture in respect of what is established in experience; for even in the absence of Scripture, there is removed the doubt of the non-existence of that difference, which (doubt) is prompted by the non-existence of evidence. Nor is there a rule that a cognition, merely because of being generated by Scripture, is its purport; for the cognition of a sense is intelligible through the significant capacity of words, even though there be no purport in respect of them; otherwise there is the contingency of purport even in respect of the singular number, when it is said "Wipe the cup", though what is really meant is the wiping of all the sixteen cups.

Objection.—Why should not the reverse be true that it is the difference established by Scripture which is re-stated by perception etc.?

Reply.—No; when for a certain thing the doubt of its non-existence is removed in dependence on a certain means of valid knowledge, that thing is the object of that means of knowledge; and non-existence in the case of difference is removed even by perception which does not depend on anything else, and by inference proceeding on the strength of pervasion; it is not established by Scripture which is dependent on many things and is slow, not being direct like perception etc.; hence the scriptural statement of difference is a restatement.

- P. 50 *Objection.*—The difference that is the sphere of Scripture is real and not in the sphere of perception etc.

Reply.—No; the existence of a two-fold difference in the *jīva*, one real and the other illusory, is sublated.

Objection.—The meaning of Scripture is the reality even of this single difference.

Reply.—No; for the cognition of its reality exists even for the vulgar having no knowledge of Scripture. But while we say that that reality relates to intelligence which is the substrate, it is said by you to belong to the difference itself. In either case, what is the work of Scripture?

Objection.—On the strength of Scripture we assume that there is a real content for the perception of difference; hence Scripture is not futile.

Reply.—No; for, to the adversary, perception etc. too are intrinsically valid, even like Scripture; and like pot etc., they are unsublated, so long as there is empirical usage. P. 51

[II.] For the same reason there is refuted the contention that Scripture refutes the illusoriness upheld by the advaitin as his final position; for this much of refutation is established for the adversary even by perception, which is of equal authority with Scripture; otherwise your mention of the sublation of non-dual texts by perception etc. would certainly be irreconcilable; therefore Scripture has no purport in respect of what is established by perception etc.

Further, the difference cognised in the denotation of "I" is, in the manner stated, due to adjuncts and consequently illusory; hence not in respect of that is there purport for Scripture which makes known the real. Nor is there anything which, though due to adjuncts, is real; for, reality consisting in the prompting of successful activity, does not conflict with illusoriness, and hence cannot be the sense of Scripture. Further, in what is unconditioned and non-dual, unsublated difference therefrom is impossible. P. 52

[III.] And since there is no unlimited human goal achieved by the knowledge of difference, it is not possible for that knowledge to be generated by Scripture having that for purport. On the contrary, in "He who makes a difference therein, for him there is fear",¹ and "From death to death he goes, who sees difference here, as it were",² it is declared of the knowledge of difference that it is the cause of evil.

1. *Tait. Up.*, II, vii, 1.

2. *Kaṭha*, IV, 10.

- P. 53 [IV.] And because difference is condemned in such text: as "Then, those other kings who know it as different from that, they attain perishable worlds (enjoyments)"¹ and "Then, he who contemplates the divinity (Brahman) as another, in the form 'That is different (from me), I am different (from it)', he does not know any more than a beast",² Scripture has no purport in respect of that (difference). And because there is declared non-existence of such difference, as is not known already, is unsublated and is fruitful, by the text "Other than that there is no seer, other than that there is no hearer",³ "There is no difference here whatsoever",⁴ etc., difference is neither real nor the meaning of Scripture.
- P. 54

Objection.—This text negates difference only in respect of the Lord, meaning that there is no other Lord.

Reply.—No; for what is denied is only such difference as is common to *all* seers—whether jīva or Īśvara; and the negation of a different hearer etc., is not possible elsewhere, abandoning the jīva who is well-known to be hearer etc.; further, after denying difference, non-difference is declared in "This is thy self, the internal ruler, immortal."⁵ And since there is no contingency of the plurality of Īśvaras, there is no negation thereof.

- P. 55 Further, the text "Two birds,"⁶ etc., does not have for purport the difference of jīva from Īśvara. It is thus: that text, in the words "One of the two eats of the sweet fruit (the fruit of karma)", restates the jīva who is qualified by identification with egoity, and in the words "The other without eating, merely shines" it distinguishes that very self from that (egoity) and shows it to be the non-enjoyer. And the re-statement of the qualified jīva is only to show the non-enjoyer-ship of that same self, when distinguished from egoity. When this is the case, conflict with experience is remedied. Otherwise, for the text which begins with "On the knowledge of what, O revered one, is all this known",⁷ for the negation of

1. *Chān. Up.*, VII, xxv, 2.

2. *Brh. Up.*, I, iv, 10.

3. *Brh. Up.*, III, vii, 23.

4. *Nṛsīṃhottaratāpinyupaniṣad*, 8.

5. *Brh. Up.*, III, vii, 3.

6. *Mund. Up.*, III, i, 1.

7. *Mund. Up.*, I, i, 1.

the talk of difference in "Give up all other talk"¹, for the prior text "Brahman alone is all this"² and for the concluding text "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself"³ there would be sublation; there would also be conflict with such texts as that of the *Paṅgi-rahasya-brāhmaṇa*: "One of the two eats of the sweet fruit—this is the intellect; the other without eating merely shines; *i.e.*, the other without eating merely looks on—this is the knower." P. 56

Objection.—Since there is declaration of difference at release in the text: "He enjoys all desires *along with* Brahman"⁴ difference is real.

Reply.—No; for, the meaning of that is the only the simultaneous enjoyment of all bliss, while being of the form of Brahman; in release there is no possibility of any other enjoyment. Otherwise, on the principle that what is conjoined with the word "along with" is non-principal there would result subsidiariness and enjoyment for Brahman. This has been said in the *Skānda*: "He, the person released while embodied, enjoys, O Gods, all desires non-successively, being of the form of the Brahman that is known; of this there is no doubt." P. 57

Objection.—The scriptural declaration of such relations between *jīva* and Brahman as that between the seer and what is to be seen, has difference for content.

Reply.—No, since these are intelligible even on the basis of assumptive difference. And the texts about such difference can yet be authoritative because that which is their purport, *viz.*, Brahman, is real.

Objection.—It is only the declaration of non-difference that has assumptive non-difference for content.

Reply.—No; for there is no possibility of a merely apparent or an empirical non-difference in conflict with the experienced difference; hence for those unacquainted with Scripture there is no knowledge of non-difference; hence in respect of illusoriness which is to be known solely by that Scripture, there is the contingency of its non-authoritativeness. P. 58

1. *Munḍ. Up.*, II, ii, 5.

2. *Munḍ. Up.*, II, ii, 11.

3. *Munḍ. Up.*, II, ii, 9.

4. *Tait. Up.*, II, i, 1.

Objection.—Scripture has no purport in respect of that illusoriness.

Reply.—No; for purport is necessary in respect of this which is unknown otherwise and is besides an instrument to the human goal.

Objection.—Let the non-dual texts have some other purport or have contemplation for purport.

Reply.—No, because of the contingency of the abandonment of the declared and the assumption of the undeclared; further, there is the futility of the justification of non-difference, through every thing being known by the knowledge of the one, the origination of name (and form) through empirical usage, the illustration of clay etc., the entry of the supreme self and so on; and there would be no teaching of non-difference through texts having this in their initial passages; therefore, because of having no scope elsewhere and because of having that non-difference for purport, the non-dual text is strong.

PRESUMPTION.

- P. 59** For this same reason, presumption too is not evidence in respect of difference; for there is not anything which is unintelligible in the absence of real difference. Further, if the Lord were different from the jiva, there would result non-self-hood for the Lord; for, in the case of what is not manifest in the experience "I", there is non-self-hood, as for pot etc.
- P. 60** Even in the system of the adversary, self-hood is the determinant of inherent causality in respect of happiness; and this determinant cannot abide in what is not the locus of that happiness.

C

- Similarly, jīvas do not differ even among themselves. It is thus: the substrate of qualification by Devadatta's experience as "I", which is not the counter-correlate of destruction, is not different, except as conditioned by adjuncts (*viz.*, the body and the senses), from the substrate of qualification by Yajñadatta's experience as "I", which is other than what is constituted out of the elementals; for, while being other than the aggregate of cause and effect (*i.e.*, the body and the senses), it is the substrate of qualification by the experience as "I"; or, because it is not the content of cognition not existing in oneself; like Yajñadatta (*i.e.* except as conditioned by adjuncts

such as the body and the senses there is no difference among jivas). The qualification "not existing in oneself" is not futile, since it helps in the apprehension of the pervasion. [A qualification should normally be put in only to ward off inconstancy of the *probans*; but sometimes it serves another purpose; e.g., the sense of sight is of the nature of fire, since among the five beginning with colour, it apprehends colour alone; here, the qualification "among the five beginning with colour" seems to be superfluous; but it is not really so; for, inasmuch as the sense of sight apprehends not colour alone, but also the generality and the non-existence of colour, no pervasion would be apprehended between the sense of sight and what apprehends colour alone; in order to assist the apprehension of pervasion, the aforesaid qualification is necessary; similarly in the present instance, no pervasion would be apprehended if the *probans* were "because of not being the content of cognition"; for, there is nothing which is not the content of some cognition; hence the qualification "not existing in oneself".] Since for all those who believe in the existence of a self, the self is established as other than the two-fold aggregate of the body and the organs, there is no non-establishment of the *probans* in the subject. Though the self is an object of the cognitive psychosis relating to itself, yet it is so only in so far as that psychosis is super-imposed on the self; hence in our final position, there is no non-establishment of the second *probans*.

Objection.—There is an external adjunct, *viz.* not being the locus of the non-existence of Yajñadatta's happiness etc., or being the locus of his happiness etc.

Reply.—No; for in the case of his self during the time of sleep or in so far as it is not defined by his body, this suggested adjunct does not pervade the *probandum*; for, though presumably the possessor of unconditioned difference, it is not then the locus of happiness or the non-locus of the non-existence of happiness. P. 63

Objection.—An adjunct does not cease to be such, merely because there is no concomitance with the *probandum* under certain conditions.

Reply.—No; if the adjunct be not admitted to be present under the same conditions as those defining the presence of the *probandum*, then, the supposed adjunct may exist even when

the *probandum* is present in the subject; and thus it is no obstacle to our inference.

Objection.—Not being the locus of Devadatta's happiness etc., is the adjunct.

Reply.—No; for this is present even in pot etc. And since happiness etc. exist non-pervasively, this adjunct is consistent even with the presence of the *probandum* in the subject.

Objection.—There is inconstancy of the *probans* to the *probandum* in the case of Brahman and of Viṣṇumitra etc.

Reply.—No; for these are of the same class as the subject, the existence of the *probandum* there too being the subject of doubt and inquiry. Further, the first *probans*—being the content of the experience "I"—does not apply to Brahman. By co-presence and co-absence it is settled that the experience "I" relates to egoity; and it is inapplicable to Brahman which is non-egoity. Nor is there any evidence for the existence of egoity in the case of Brahman; as for the use of the word "I" in some cases, as in the words of the Lord in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, that is secondary or figurative.

Objection.—There is sublation.

Reply.—No; for, unconditioned difference of selves is not cognised by perception. Nor is there any *probans* in respect of it.

Objection.—There is this *probans*, the distinction among selves, as recollecting only certain experiences of happiness etc., belonging to themselves, and not recollecting similar experiences belonging to others.

Reply.—No; for this distinction will be presently explained otherwise. Nor is there sublation by Scripture; for, nowhere in Scripture is there seen a difference for the self except in so far as qualified by the internal organ.

Objection.—But there is distinction between the bound and the released, between those who are eligible for certain rites and those who are ineligible.

Reply.—These are intelligible even through differences among what are qualified by the internal organ etc.

Objection.—Now, Devadatta's self possesses unconditioned difference whose counter-correlate is Yajñadatta's self, since he does not recollect the latter's misery, like what is admitted, say, a pot, which does not have this recollection, and is certainly

different; otherwise, there is destruction of the *probans*, viz., non-recollection.

Reply.—The *probans* is ineffective, since it is intelligible P. 66 even through difference conditioned by an adjunct.

Objection.—No; for, over and above the differences of the adjuncts, there is not experienced, nor is there possible any difference conditioned by the adjuncts. [For, what is this conditioning? The difference itself may be originated by the adjunct or made known thereby; or, the relation to difference may be dependent on the adjunct. None of these alternatives is intelligible. It is not originated, since difference is beginningless; and when there is non-difference validly cognised in the recognitive experience "This is that itself", difference is impossible as originated by adjuncts. As for being made known by adjuncts, if this knowledge is valid, it necessarily follows that its content, real difference, exists in the self; hence is established what is acceptable to me; and there is the contingency for you of real difference even in ether etc.; if, on the contrary, it be delusive, because of the non-existence in the self of difference which is the content of a delusion, there would not be possible the distinction based thereon; not otherwise is it possible for that cognition to be delusive. Nor the third alternative; for the very existence of difference is its relation, and since its existence is beginningless its relation cannot be dependent on adjuncts.]

Reply.—No; if there be no difference conditioned by adjuncts, for whom is recollection deduced? For, in my final P. 67 view, there being non-difference of Devadatta from Yajñadatta, the latter's experience itself belongs to the former. This which you deduce as an unacceptable consequence of the rejection of conditioned difference, is certainly acceptable to me. Nor is there recollection for the body.

Objection.—Since Devadatta, according to you, can have Yajñadatta's experience, because of the cognition of the happiness etc., present in Yajñadatta, there may be activity even through Devadatta's body.

Reply.—No; for in the activity of that body, the cause is such cognition as inheres in that part of the self which is defined by that body; for, no activity is seen in a dead body. Nor is cognition defined by Yajñadatta's body present in that part of the self which is defined by Devadatta's body. Nor is

cognition pervasively present, according to the opponent's school.

Objection.—Because of the non-existence of conjunction with a mind, there is no effort etc., in a dead body.

Reply.—No; for in the case of a self defined by a dead body, that conjunction with a mind exists elsewhere; so that it cannot be said that there is no conjunction at all of the self with a mind.

Objection.—What we mean is that in the part of the self so defined there is no conjunction with mind.

P. 68

Reply.—Even so, the mental conjunction etc., which generate Yajñadatta's cognition are non-existent in Devadatta's body; and that mental conjunction causes activity only in respect of what is the sphere of the cognition generated by itself; and cognition does not have for its sphere the attributes of a self defined by a body that is not proximate to the mind that originates the cognition; therefore there is no possibility of activity in Devadatta's body being caused by cognition of happiness in Yajñadatta.

Objection.—Just as there is recollection in spite of bodily differences between infancy, youth etc., even so let it be as between Devadatta and Yajñadatta.

Reply.—This is refuted for the same reason; for it is settled that when something is experienced by a particular mind, by that mind alone is there the recollection thereof; hence there is no undue extension.

P. 69

Objection.—Now, since there is no evidence of a single mind persisting in all births, how is it possible for one who is just born to remember what was experienced in a previous birth?

Reply.—This is no objection, for, there is no evidence even as to the mind being different in different births. When there is doubt, let us, on the strength of recollection, assume that it is one, since there is proximity in assuming difference of selves; and the oneness of mind is established by Scripture which declares transmigration of the self, only as surrounded by the assemblage of instruments. In truth, however, the

P. 70

bodies of infancy, youth etc., are not different; for (1) there is recognition of those as one; (2) while there continues the unseen potency which originates the body in this life, the

destruction of that body is impossible; (3) there is no other cause of its destruction; (4) since there is not such functioning of the parents etc., as is settled in the case of the first body, brahminhood etc. would not be originated for the second and subsequent bodies, and consequently distinction of caste, family, clan etc., would be impossible; (5) difference in size, which seems all that one can be certain of, is indeterminable; it is present in the body as defined by small things like the tip of a finger and by big things like the heart, in the same way as the difference in size of a cloth when folded up or spread out, or in the same way as one and the same pillar is broad at the base and narrow at the top; hence this difference is not invariably attended by difference in the loci, *i.e.*, in the bodies. Therefore, even in the way set out by the opponents, there is not on the acceptance of the view of a single self, the contingency of one jiva's recollection of another's experiences.

P. 71

In truth, however, there is no defect whatever in the view that because of difference in the determinant there is difference in the defined; for, in the case of ether, which is defined by things big and small, pot etc., and is the locus of different numbers of things, ten or twenty, there is experienced difference in what it is and what it does; for, if ether as such were the organ of hearing, there is the contingency of the hearing of all sounds everywhere, inasmuch as there is present even the particular unseen potency, as seen from the apprehension of what is of that class, *i.e.*, of other sounds; further, if cognition of sound has to be accomplished invariably through an unseen potency, its non-cognition would be possible even when sound exists, and hence the experience of the non-existence of sound would be impossible; nor may it be said that conjunction with the physical sense-organ is the cause of perception, since such conjunction is not seen in the case of the orb of the eye, there being sight even of distant things which are not directly in conjunction with the physical eye; therefore, the ether is capable of hearing, only as differentiated by the determinant, *viz.*, conjunction with an ear-cavity. Further, if between the loci of conjunction and its absence there were no difference conditioned by the adjuncts, then, since "baseness" and "topness" have both invariably a locus common to both (*i.e.*, the tree), there would not be the experience of one alone (say, conjunction) as defined by one determinant (say, topness). And this difference of the defined is not real, since there is

P. 72

P. 73

P. 74 recognition of the unsublated single underlying nature whereon difference is experienced. As for superimposed difference, that does not exist at all for the opponent. Hence the funeral rites have certainly been performed for all empirical usage. In our final view there is no undue extension because of the acceptance of the internal organ itself as the material cause of happiness etc.

For the same reason, even "being a thing" etc., are not capable of proving difference; and of all *probans* in respect of difference there is sublation by such scriptural texts as "Other than this there is no seer",¹ "The one god,"² etc., by the statement of Yājñavalkya "Just as the one ether becomes differentiated in pot etc., similarly even the one self is manifold, like the sun in receptacles of water", and by such statements of the *Bhārata* etc., as "He is the inner self of me, of you, and of all others who are called embodied ones; he is the witness of all; he is not to be apprehended by anyone in any particular place".

P. 75 Further, the *jīva* is not atomic, because of the contingency of the non-experience of happiness etc., pervading the whole body; and there would not be simultaneous cognition of sandal etc., in two different parts of the body. Nor is it pervasive; for if pervasive, like ether etc., sub-classes would be unintelligible; hence there is the contingency of simultaneous enjoyment through all bodies.

Objection.—There is enjoyment for a particular self in that body alone which is created by its own unseen potency.

Reply.—No. The rule indeed is that unseen potency generates enjoyment in its own locus alone; but there is no rule that even the product of the unseen potency produces its own effect only in the locus of the unseen potency. For, just as by Devadatta's bodily activity there is conjunction etc., with another self, enjoyment too produced by unseen potency is possible in another self through Devadatta's bodily activity. This is as in the case of a house etc., acquired through Devadatta's effort; for in that house it is possible even for some one else to have the enjoyment due to his own unseen potency. Even if the rule be admitted that there is enjoyment only in a body produced by one's own unseen potency, there is the contin-

1. *Brh. Up.*, III, vii, 24.

2. *Svet. Up.*, VI, 11.

gence of enjoyment even in a dead body. For just as because of conjunction with the mind occurring in one place, the heart, there are simultaneously ten efforts made as defined by the ten fingers, just as because of the unseen potency present in the self as defined by a human body there is enjoyment elsewhere, in heaven etc., that enjoyment is possible even in a dead body. Further, the bodies and the lives of sons etc., are dependent on the unseen potency belonging to the parents etc. And as to the self, which differs with each body, being pervasive, there is no evidence; for, only its finitude is established in such unsublated experience as "I am in this abode alone, cognising". As for *probans* like "since it is a substance which is always devoid of touch, like ether", these cannot establish pervasiveness, since they are sublated by perception. Further, in the system of the opponent, there is no conjunction between the self which is pervasive and ether which is also pervasive; yet sound is produced in ether as consequent on the unseen potency present in the self; similarly, elsewhere too, unseen potency can produce other effects by its own might, even without being related to the locus of the effect. As for the mention in the sacred teaching of a single self animating a host of bodies, that, in conformity with the perceptually established finitude, has to be understood to have some other purport, in the same way as non-dual texts are interpreted in the system of the opponent. Therefore, since atomicity and pervasiveness are impossible in the case of the *jīva*, since if it were of itself of an intermediate size non-eternality would result, the *jīva* is only an adjunct-conditioned part of the universal self, Brahman; its being such a part is established by Scripture, traditional codes etc. Hence there is no difference even among the *jīvas*.

P. 77

P. 78

Objection.—Where an established means of knowledge does not obtain, there should indeed be postulated some other means of valid knowledge; but difference which is established in experience should not be abandoned.

Reply.—This too is refuted for the same reason. For when there is conflict with Scripture, and when there exists ignorance which is settled to be capable of bringing about difference even in the non-different, the postulation of some other means of knowledge to establish difference is improper. As for the experience, its authoritativeness is intelligible up to the stage of sublation, even like the cognition of the non-diffe-

P. 79

rence of the self from the body. Therefore there is no evidence for difference.

P. 80 Further, the difference between the jīva and the Lord is neither disjunction (vibhāga) nor separateness (prthaktva); for the perception of these is dependent on the perception of both substrates, while of one substrate, the Lord, there can be no perception. And it has been said that over and above perception there is no evidence whatever for difference. Nor does difference consist in distinction of characteristics¹, for the possession of divergent characteristics is possible even in what is one and the same; as for the possession of opposed characteristics, that is dependent on the existence and apprehension of another difference. Knowledge of opposition is dependent on knowledge of difference, while the latter is dependent on the former, thus involving reciprocal dependence. And in respect of the difference from Brahman of the self, which is other than egoity, there is no evidence. It has been said that egoity is not the self. Therefore, difference should be said to be reciprocal non-existence or the very nature of things. Of these, reciprocal non-existence is impossible, for there is no possibility of the counter-correlate or the evidence in respect of that.

[I.] In the system of the opponent, pot etc. is not the counter-correlate; for what is opposed to difference is non-difference; and since this is not pot etc., the pot etc. is not the counter-correlate.

Objection.—Pot etc. is itself non-difference.

P. 81. *Reply.*—No; for then, in the locus of that pot, there cannot be the difference of that pot; and this is unacceptable to you.

Objection.—The counter-correlate of difference is not non-difference, but tādātmya, identity in essence.

Reply.—No. This identity in essence is not other than the existence of the pot, since there is no evidence for it. The cognition "pot" is no evidence for it, since this does not have for content anything other than pot, potness and the qualification of the former by the latter. Nor is it the content of the cognition "The pot is non-different from the pot", for the content of this is the non-existence of difference.

1. Cf. *Tattvapradīpikā*, P. 175.

Objection.—That itself is identity in essence.

Reply.—Then since difference and identity depend each for its cognition on the cognition of the other, neither would be experienced.

Objection.—The pot which is the non-existence of the non-existence of pot is cognised without the apprehension of non-existence; similarly, even *tādātmya*, the non-existence of difference, may be cognised without the apprehension of non-existence.

Reply.—No; for in pot, there is a positive attribute, potness; but there is no such positive attribute in the non-existence of difference.

Objection.—Let there be some attribute there too.

P. 82

Reply.—No; for it is not established by the cognition “non-different”, whose content is the non-existence of difference; and there is not seen any other cognition which has that attribute for content.

Objection.—Let identity in essence be the content of even the pot-cognition, since there is no sublation.

Reply.—No. The pot-cognition is generated by the memory of potness, which is the mode of that cognition; in this, identity cannot also figure as a mode. For, what figures thus must be that of which there is an independent indeterminate perception (in the sense in which such perception is understood by the Logicians); and indeterminate perception is impossible in respect of an adventitious attribute dependent on extraneous adjuncts. Granted the possibility of such an indeterminate perception the cognition generated thereby would have a form similar to that of the pot-cognition generated by recollection of potness; and this cannot have for content anything more than the pot-cognition. Further, when there is a cognition of difference, “This is not a pot”, it is dependent on the cognition of pot generated by the recollection of potness; and if the pot-cognition had identity for content, it would follow that even the cognition of difference dependent thereon would not have for content the non-existence of that identity; that is absurd.

P. 83

Objection.—Identity in essence is also, like potness, an undefined attribute, which is the content of the indeterminate cognition of pot etc.; hence in the perception of pot, that too is cognised as a mode,

Reply.—This is refuted for the same reason. Further, in knowledge through words, there is cognised only what is brought to mind by the words; hence when there is verbal knowledge of pot, there is cognition of the particular pot alone as qualified by potness, not of the identity in essence; therefore, when it is said “this is not a pot”, difference from pot cannot be cognised, since its counter-correlate, identity with pot, is not cognised. Again, if there be recognised an undefined (*i.e.*, universal) attribute over and above generality, since all empirical usage based on difference, as of pillar from pot, is intelligible even with this attribute, there is the contingency of the non-existence of generality, there being no need to assume this. If, however, this attribute be said to be not one in all particulars in the same way as generality is one, then it would be different for each product; there would be no evidence for its existence prior to the product and hence it should be said to be produced; hence it could not exist in qualities etc., which are not the loci of produced attributes; and there being no identity in them there could not be difference which has that as counter-correlate. Further, the reciprocal non-existence of the identity of the pot, is it difference from the pot or the absolute non-existence of that identity? If the first, since according to you it exists even in the pot, the pot too would be different from itself; if the second, the absolute non-existence of an identity other than the pot would not be difference of the pot, since like non-existence of the cloth, it has a different counter-correlate;

P. 84 for this identity, which is an undefined attribute over and above the pot, is in the same position as potness in being different from pot. And the difference of one thing cannot have something else as counter-correlate.

Objection.—The absolute non-existence of potness is itself the difference of pot.

Reply.—That is refuted for the same reason, *viz.*, that difference has one counter-correlate while absolute non-existence has a different counter-correlate. Further, it is admitted that non-existence is not the locus of another non-existence opposed to itself; for if this other non-existence, non-non-p, is different from non-p, there is infinite regress; if there be no difference, there is identity and there can be no relation of support and supported; thus non-existence of pot is not the locus of the non-existence of the non-existence of pot; similarly,

an existent, because of the contradiction, is not the locus of its own non-existence; thus, potness is the non-locus of its own non-existence; hence potness is not the support of difference from pot, since this difference is said to be the absolute non-existence of potness; what is different from pot, say, a cloth, is the support of the difference from pot; since potness is not the support of such difference, it is not different from pot; hence it follows that it (potness) is the support of potness, which is absurd.

Objection.—As between contraries, it is location in the same place that is in conflict, not the relation of support and supported.

Reply.—No; for it is settled that in the case of non-existence there is not even that relation of support and supported; for, in the interests of parsimony it has to be recognised that a non-existence is not the support of another non-existence. Similarly, in the case of an existent too, which is of the nature of the non-existence of that non-existence, it should be admitted that it is not the support of another non-existence.

P. 85

Further, in the case of the surface of the ground, capable of being the support of non-existence, when there is the quality of supporting the pot, the non-support of the pot's non-existence is due only to this, *viz.*, being the support of pot, which pot is not capable of being the locus of that (non-existence of pot).

Objection.—In that case, there would not be the cognition "In the pot there is no pot."

Reply.—No; there is certainly no pot in the pot. But the cognition of pot in such a case may be invalid only to the extent of pot being the support; hence the said cognition may validly occur, just like the cognition of the non-existence of pot where the pot does not exist; in the latter case, there is invalidity in so far as the non-existence of the pot is taken to be the support of the cognition, though the cognition of non-existence is valid. Or the cognition may be intelligible in one of two ways; potness is the content of the pot-cognition; and in potness there is no pot, just as in whiteness there is no cloth; or in pot there is not some other pot. As for the cognition "There is no pot on the ground" that relates only to non-existence of pot since there is no sublation as in the above case.

P. 86 *Objection.*—In that case, let there be pot in pot.

Reply.—Just as non-existence is not located in the non-existence of pot, in the pot too, though there be the non-existence of its non-existence, it is intelligible that it is not the locus of pot. For, the affirmation of one through the negation of the other follows only in respect of that which cannot be the locus of both.

Further, if difference of pot be equivalent to absolute non-existence of potness there would be no difference between the two cognitions "There is no potness here" and "There is not a pot".

P. 87 Again, though the absolute non-existence of potness may have the cloth as locus, it is not opposed to such identity of the pot as may qualify the cloth as substrate; how, then, can there be the difference of the one from the other? For, their difference is only that which is opposed to the non-difference defined by both of them. And it is not as though such non-difference is not known at all; for in the system of the opponent, it is hypothetically postulated.

Again, even where there is non-existence of being the top of the tree, there is non-difference from the tree that is the locus of that topness. Similarly, even the non-existence of potness is intelligible, because of non-difference from the locus; hence that difference is not in conflict with the hypothetically assumed non-difference; and the very texts which declare that kind of difference are evidence for non-difference from the locus of potness, clothness, etc. Therefore in no way is difference established.

Objection.—Reciprocal non-existence has certainly for its counter-correlate the pot as qualified by potness. Nor may it be said that, because of opposition, reciprocal non-existence cannot be in the same locus as the counter-correlate, though difference, which is said to be such non-existence, should be in the same locus as the counter-correlate; for, reciprocal non-existence, unlike other forms of non-existence, does not conflict with the counter-correlate. Nor may it be said that there is no difference between this and other forms of non-existence since there is no difference of the counter-correlate or its determinant (*e.g.*, pot or potness); for, this difference is intelligible as in the case of antecedent non-existence etc., which are different, though having the same counter-correlate as other forms of

non-existence; otherwise there would be no distinction between the cognitions "The ground is not the pot" and "There is no pot on the ground".

Reply.—No. The content of the cognition "The ground is not the pot" is the negation which is opposed to the non-difference of pot from the ground. If this non-difference be nothing other than the pot qualified by potness, then, that reciprocal non-existence should certainly be said to be opposed to this pot. How, then, can it be in the same locus as the counter-correlate? And if there be no opposition, the cognition of opposition to the non-difference would be sublated.

P. 89

Objection.—The opposition is not cognised.

Reply.—Then, difference need not be refuted by us at all; for, what is not in conflict with the valid knowledge of non-difference is not a hindrance to us.

Objection.—There is opposition, certainly, between difference and non-difference, since each is of the nature of the absence of the other. The pot, however, though a counter-correlate, is not of the nature of the absence of reciprocal non-existence. And being the counter-correlate is a particular relation *sui generis*.

Reply.—That is not so. For, over and above the existence of the pot there is not a non-difference, which is of the nature of the absence of difference. And if existence itself constitutes the relation of being a counter-correlate, then the pot may be the counter-correlate even of a difference having the pot itself for locus.

Objection.—The opposition between existence and non-existence is not because of their own nature; but it is caused by some relation imposed on them. For instance, even where a pot exists in the relation of conjunction, it is non-existent in the relation of inherence. And in the case of reciprocal non-existence, the cognised opposition is due to the imposition of the relation of non-difference itself.

P. 90

Reply.—That too is not so; for, there is not a non-difference over and above the existence of the counter-correlate; and the latter is not of the nature of a conjunction. Nor is potness the non-difference; for it is different from pot and it cannot be of the nature of that (as non-difference is); further, there is no evidence for potness being a mode of conjunction; for, even when there is the imposition "The ground is the pot", the latter

- P. 91** is a mode of cognition of the former and hence is not a conjunction, since conjunction is that which is cognised neither as the subject (*viśeṣya*) nor as the predicate (*prakāra*). Further, in this way, for the cognition "The ground is not the pot" the content may be non-existence in the relation of inherence, as distinguished from conjunction; since thus it is reduced to a form of absolute non-existence, where is the room for reciprocal non-existence?

Objection.—In the case of reciprocal non-existence, the conflict is only with what determines "being the counter-correlate", not with the counter-correlate itself.

Reply.—No; for this cannot be the meaning of negation, without transgressing the bounds of non-existence; for in other forms of non-existence, the negation relates to the counter-correlate; and here, if opposition to that be given up, what results should not be classified as non-existence at all.

Objection.—The difference from known modes of non-existence is due to a difference in the cognition; hence this is not a defect.

- P. 92** *Reply.*—No; for, in the cognitions "The ground is not pot" and "There is no pot on the ground", there is no difference whatever in the sense of the negation, other than that of the relation between the ground and the pot. Since potness is the determinant of counter-correlateness in both cases, there is not even thus the difference claimed by you; for in both cases there is admitted the cognition of the ground not having potness.

Objection.—There is difference, in that reciprocal non-existence is cognised here, in "The ground is not pot".

Reply.—No; for, in the cognition "This is not that", it is not cognised that non-existence is qualified as reciprocal non-existence; hence that is not the meaning of the negation; the content of the cognition "This is not that" is explained in the form "These two are different; between these two there is no non-difference".

- P. 93** *Objection.*—There too reciprocal non-existence is cognised.
Reply.—No, for the cognition "They are different" like the cognition "They are disjoined" has for content a single difference located in both and hence does not have for content what is desired by you.¹ Similar is the case even for the

1. Thus difference becomes an attribute common to both correlate and counter-correlate; and on this there are the well-known difficulties as to

cognition "Between these two there is no non-difference"; it has for content only a single relation common to both relata.

Further, the cognition of difference has for its content the non-existence of non-difference, consisting in a sundering, but not what is affected by you, *viz.*, the non-existence of pot etc. Therefore, between the cognitions "This is not that" and "This is not here" difference is intelligible on the basis of the difference of counter-correlates, as stated by us, not on the basis of having the same counter-correlate as stated by you.

Objection.—Reciprocal non-existence is some undefined attribute present in non-existence and is the content of the cognition thereof.

Reply.—No; for the objection has been stated to recognising an undefined attribute. If because of our cognition we are to recognise new categories, then even similarity etc., would have to be so recognised.

Objection.—Since these—similarity etc.—can be shown to be included in the settled scheme of categories, the assumption of other categories is unintelligible. P. 94

Reply.—That applies equally in the present case of difference. Further, the cognition of negation, which is of a single form, does not have for content the being qualified by two attributes, non-existence and reciprocal non-existence; hence there is no evidence for the latter being a mode of non-existence. Nor is there anything other than the cognition "This is not that" which can establish its being of the nature of non-existence; as for the cognition of difference, since difference and reciprocal non-existence are synonymous, that too has this undefined attribute for content; hence it cannot go further and establish the character of non-existence for it.

Objection.—The content of that cognition is the character of reciprocal non-existence, consisting in non-existence present in the locus of the counter-correlate.

Reply.—No; for though in the cognition "The ground is not the pot", and not in the cognition "There is no pot", there is experience of non-existence as present in the locus of the counter-correlate, there is no such experience in "The pot is

whether it is of the nature of the relata or different from them; in the former case, there can be no difference at all; in the latter, there is infinite regress.

not ground", since there is no experience of pot being the locus, as there is of the ground being the locus, in the other cognition; hence there is the contingency of the cognition of reciprocal non-existence even where there is not the said experience. Further, the suggested content is impossible in the case of "The ground is not the self" since neither in your system nor in mine is there a locus for the omnipresent self.

Objection.—Because of the cognition "Now there is the self" time is the locus of the self.

Reply.—Then, even the absolute non-existence of that self certainly exists in that time, since time is admitted by the opponents to be the support of all. Further, in the case of what is non-corporeal and pervasive, non-existence at any time or place may be predicated with as much truth as existence. And since the suggested characteristic is thus present even in the cognition of absolute non-existence it cannot serve to distinguish the cognition of reciprocal non-existence.

Objection.—To be reciprocal non-existence is an attribute that is present in non-existence in the same locus as the counter-correlate, and is pervaded by the character of non-existence.¹

Reply.—This too cannot be said; for if this attribute is said to be undefined, that possibility has been refuted. If it be defined in the form stated above, that form is non-existent in the cognition "This is not that"; for, as said above, that cognition is really of the form of a single non-existence of non-difference present in both the correlate and the counter-correlate. Further, there is no evidence for apprehending here the pervasion by the character of non-existence, that is to say, the presence of a particular form of non-existence; for the cognition caused by the bare meaning of the negative particle cannot establish this.

Objection.—The difference of reciprocal non-existence from absolute non-existence consists in the former being non-existence not present in the counter-correlate.

Reply.—No; for, this characteristic has been stated to exist even in absolute non-existence, since a pot, it was said, cannot be the locus of its own absolute non-existence; further, in the difference of pot etc., from time etc., this characteristic is not present, since the difference must be in the counter-

1. This is a definition offered by another set of opponents.

correlate, time, the support of all; again, in the cognition, "there is no non-difference between pot and cloth", there is experienced, in respect of both, only a single difference consisting in the non-existence of non-difference. Therefore, in no way is there intelligible a difference in cognition between the two forms of non-existence.

Objection.—Since even where there is a pot on the ground there is the cognition "The ground is not the pot", there is difference between the two non-existences. P. 97

Reply.—This too is refuted for the same reason; for, on your view that the counter-correlate is the same in both cases, this other cognition too has the form "The ground has the non-existence of pot"; hence there is the contingency of its non-origination, as of the cognition "The ground has no pot", in that case where the pot is actually present. For, in the absence of a difference in the counter-correlate, a difference in the cognition of non-existence is impossible;¹ for, in the case of what is in relation to another, a difference in it is impossible without a difference in what is related to it.

Objection.—What about other forms of non-existence like antecedent non-existence, which are recognised as different from absolute non-existence?

Reply.—They are in the same case as reciprocal non-existence.

Objection.—Now, the respective cognitions of non-existence are different, because of the difference in what is hypothetically assumed and denied in each case; thus, in absolute non-existence, the assumption is of the form "If the pot existed, it would be perceived"; in reciprocal non-existence, it is of the form "If the pot were non-different, it would be perceived".

Reply.—Not so. Cognition of non-existence may arise through perception, inference and so on, but the non-existence does not thereby become different; similarly, here too, difference, merely because of what originates the cognition, is unintelligible without a difference in the object of cognition. Further, the cognitions are said to be different because of their P. 98

1. *Tattvaṣṭadīpikā*, p. 171: *pratīyogī-bhedā-bhāvād anyonyā-bhāva-saṃsargā-bhāvayor bhedā-bhāva-prasaṅgāt*.

being originated by different assumptions. But how can this be apprehended in the absence of the apprehension of difference among cognitions, consisting in their having different non-existences for content? For, if we did not know of the non-existences being different, we would not make different assumptions to exhibit them. Thus there is reciprocal dependence. Again, there is no evidence for the existence of hypothetical assumption as the cause of the cognition of non-existence, when there exist the (other) causes of that cognition, *viz.*, the apprehension of the locus, the recollection of the counter-correlate, the non-cognition of the latter and so on; hence the existence of the difference in assumptions is not established by co-presence and co-absence. Nor does it follow by presumption; for, difference in the cognition of non-existence is not possible in the absence of difference in the objects of cognition; hence the former is not established through difference in the assumption. Further, a hypothetical assumption is impossible in the absence of some defect (at least such defect as the desire to establish the inference as free from sublation); for, in the case of all originated assumption, a defect is the cause; otherwise, what is accepted by all, *viz.*, the extrinsic nature of invalidity (and the assumptive cognition is admittedly invalid) would be unintelligible.

P. 99

Objection.—Desire itself may be the defect here.

Reply.—No; for, this desire has to be brought into being by knowledge of what is desired, here, the substrate; and this knowledge is not possible prior to the hypothetical assumption; but the knowledge of the substrate which is in the form of the assumption is, according to you, to be accomplished by the desire; thus there is reciprocal dependence.

Objection.—Desire may be caused by some other cognition and may in its turn cause the present assumption.

Reply.—No; for desire caused by cognition qualified by some one thing cannot be the cause of cognition qualified by a different thing.

Objection.—Desire relating to a generality, *e.g.*, "On the ground in general, let there be the cognition of pot" may be the cause of the hypothetical assumption; thus we avoid the difficulty of desire and the assumption relating to different particulars.

Reply.—No; for, the relation between pot and the ground has been apprehended in some particular place, as in the absence of such apprehension there cannot be the assumption about ground in general. Now, if desire is to cause hypothetical assumption, it may cause it in regard to the very place where the connection was cognised; but it cannot be the cause of the abandoning of that place and the hypothetical assumption in regard to another place.

Further, potness is not the counter-correlate of the difference; the hypothetical assumption of this is not the cause of the cognition of difference. P, 100

Objection.—Let the assumption be of “pot” as qualified by “potness”.

Reply.—We are dealing with the reciprocal non-existence of pot and the ground, even where pot is present on the ground; and in this case there can be no *assumption* of the pot. Further it has been said that “potness” is not a mode of conjunction, for it is not known to be such, while it is known to be the *mode* of the cognition of pot. Therefore there is not the possibility of potness being hypothetically assumed in the ground as a mode of conjunction of the pot. Again, the desire for hypothetical assumption is impossible, in the absence of cognition of its being instrumental to what is desired.

Objection.—At that rate, there will nowhere be any hypothetical assumption.

Reply.—Its non-existence is acceptable to us except where it is prompted by such sacred teaching as that relating to the contemplation of the mind as Brahman.¹ As for the words of deceitful people etc., these utterances are possible like the utterances of parrots, persons in sleep and so on, even without the knowledge of the hypothetically assumed connection; for, they merely put words together; even should some intention be read into their words, it may be their desire to cause in others the wrong knowledge which will lead them to activity etc.

Further, for this difference *A*, what is the difference from the counter-correlate? It is not itself, for this other difference from the counter-correlate cannot rest in itself; to say that it is itself the difference is to say that there is non-difference of that difference from itself; and non-difference is P. 101

1. *Chând. Up.*, III, xviii, 1.

not a relation such that difference *A* can be the substrate and difference *B* the attribute; hence it follows that there is no difference between the cognition of difference *A* and the cognition that difference *A* is different (from the counter-correlate); for, the non-difference of these two is cognised even by the cognition of difference; it is the very nature of difference *A*, so that it cannot be claimed that the second cognition makes known a previously non-cognised relation of non-difference. Further if there has to be any relation of a qualification and what is qualified thereby [the former being the difference from the counter-correlate and the latter difference *A*] that would not be possible in the case of what is one and the same.

Objection.—Let it then be that for difference *A* there is a second difference from the counter-correlate.

Reply.—On what basis is this further difference to be made intelligible? Difference *A* resides in a particular locus, say, pot, while the second difference—*B*—resides in difference *A*; but merely because of this difference of loci, a difference in the differences does not become intelligible, for there must be difference of the counter-correlate; and that is the same in both cases, say, cloth. Or let it even be that differences differ because of difference in the loci. Now, difference *B*, whose counter-correlate is the cloth, is said to reside in difference *A*; there is no sublation in considering this difference to reside in the cloth itself; nor is there any determining consideration why it should be said to reside only in difference *A*; thus in cloth we have at the same time two differences, *vis.*, difference from pot and difference *B*. And at this rate, in cloth we shall have in the same way as difference *B*, a third difference—*C*—too; otherwise, of difference *B* there would be no difference from pot.

Objection.—No; difference *A* is different from pot; and since difference *B* exists in difference *A*, because of the latter, difference *B* may also differ from pot.

Reply.—No; for, though difference *B* resides in difference *A*, the latter does not reside in the former; and so long as this is not possible, we cannot establish difference of pot etc., from difference *B* except through a third difference *C*.

Objection.—In the case of “knowability” etc., we find that they exist in themselves, as well as in others; for “know-

ability" is knowable just as things are knowable; why may not "difference" be in like case?

Reply.—No. It has been said that there is not a single category like knowability; the knowability of things is different from the knowability of knowability; for, knowability means nothing more than being the content of valid knowledge; and this, which is a relation *sui generis*, exists whenever there is knowledge, and is manifold; hence there is no question of reciprocal dependence.

Further, if there were no third difference, but the two were dependent each on the other, it would follow that in respect of the difference that is a qualification, the other would be both what is qualified thereby and a qualification thereof; otherwise, there could not be the cognition, these two—difference *A* and difference *B*—are different; between what are opposed as qualification and the qualified, non-difference is not possible. But if you would admit non-difference even as between what are thus opposed, what is the matter with scripturally declared non-difference? Why should you not admit that? P. 103

Now, this difference *C* too resides in the first, because of non-sublation and the absence of any determining consideration. And in order to secure the difference of this from the first, a fourth difference residing in all the others will have to be admitted; and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus for each there would be an infinite series of differences unsupported by proper evidence; similarly of the reciprocal differences among them.

Objection.—In order to avoid this infinite regress etc., we say in the case of the difference-of-pot, which resides in the cloth, that its very existence is its difference-from-pot and that there is not any other difference; similarly difference from difference is the pot itself.

Reply.—Then, similarly, since the very existence of cloth is capable of being the content of the cognition that it is different (on the assumption that existence itself is the content of the cognition of difference), it would follow on grounds of parsimony that the existence of cloth is itself the difference-of-pot etc., and that there is no need to assume a reciprocal non-existence. If the very existence of difference be the content

of such cognition as "difference is not the pot," the cognition of difference, in the case of cloth etc., is also intelligible even on the basis of the existence of cloth; why then the assumption of reciprocal non-existence?

Objection.—Now, the existence of reciprocal non-existence results subsequently to the establishment of pot, cloth etc. being the objects of the cognition of difference. How, then, can there be the denial of the assumption of that by this?

Reply.—Even at the time of the cognition that cloth is different from pot, there is cognised the difference of cloth and pot from difference; otherwise those two could not be cognised respectively as the qualified and the qualification in respect of that difference, in the form "The cloth is different from pot." Hence their very existence is settled in that case to be object of the cognition of difference. Hence the assumption of reciprocal non-existence is needless.

Further, in the case of pot as the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence, since there is not non-existence having this non-existence as counter-correlate, the object of the cognition of difference is the existence of the pot itself; this is settled even without resorting to a reciprocal non-existence; hence it is intelligible to assume this existence as the object of all cognition of difference. Hence the assumption of reciprocal non-existence would be needless.

P. 104

Nor can existence itself be the content of that cognition of difference; for just as what is opposed to the pot is the absolute non-existence of the pot, what is opposed to the non-difference of difference is the absolute non-existence of non-difference. Nor is it possible for pot etc., to be that non-existence; for, in the case of pot etc., having the same locus (say, the ground) as difference, it is not intelligible that they are the absolute non-existence of non-difference, which is the very existence of difference.

If now it be said that in difference *A* there is not a difference *B* and so on, even thus, since there can be no difference between difference-of-pot and difference-of-cloth, their mere existence is not inconsistent with their non-difference; hence the contingency of the oneness of all difference; and the acceptance of such difference does not serve to avoid intermixture and confusion among things.

Again, wherein is this difference located as the substrate? As for the cognition of difference, that occurs even in what is admitted to be counter-correlate; hence that is no guide.

Objection.—Let it be located wherever it is cognised.

Reply.—This is as good as saying “Let it be wherever it is” and is no answer to the question “Where is it?”

P. 105

Objection.—“Difference-of-pot” is cognised as related to cloth etc.; and this cognition is ascertained to be valid; hence there is no uncertainty as to where this difference resides.

Reply.—A relation is cognised even as between “pot” and “difference-of-pot” and this cognised relation is unsublated; for existence is itself the relation, and there is no cognition sublating the pot or the difference.

Objection.—But the cognition “pot is different from pot” is sublating.

Reply.—Let the sublating cognition be invalid, since it conflicts with what necessarily follows from the nature of difference; or at best there can be no decision as to which is invalid. And in the cloth there is no special relation to justify us in saying that the difference resides in that alone.

Objection.—The existence of the cloth is itself such a relation *sui generis*.

Reply.—Is it the case then that difference-from-pot does not reside in wall etc., inasmuch as these do not have the aforesaid relation *sui generis*?

Objection.—No, the said difference exists there too.

Reply.—Then, the qualifiedness which is the content of the cognition of difference is not a single recurrent form, being of the form of the existence of cloth, existence of wall and so on; by similarity, the existence of pot too may be such a relation; what, then, is there to prevent difference-from-pot from residing in pot?

P. 106

Objection.—Now, even in the pot, the conjunction of difference is cognised only in the form of the existence of cloth. How, then, can the cognition of the existence of pot as the cognition of difference be unsublated?

Reply.—Not so, since that cognition of difference does not have the form of cloth etc.

Objection.—Then, the conjunction of difference consists in some nature other than that of pot; such nature is recurrent among cloth, wall etc., which are different from pot.

Reply.—No. If this otherness be a qualification *per accidens*, then pot itself may be what is so qualified *per accidens*; for anything whatever can be qualified *per accidens* by what is other than that thing, even as a house by what is other than a house, say, a crow; and thus, we have the old difficulty that the pot is itself the locus of difference-from-pot. If, on the other hand, otherness be a *proprium*, this difference which is the *proprium*, is it identical with the difference that is in relation, that is to say, the difference-from-pot, or is not identical? Not the first, since the *proprium*, i.e., otherness, cannot itself be the conjunction of difference; for this cannot be its own determinant, because of the contingency of self-dependence. Further, if this otherness be identical with difference-from-pot, since the latter is cognised even in the pot, the former too should be cognised even in the pot; but of this there is sublation; hence, the suggested qualification serves no purpose.

Objection.—Let the qualification, otherness, be other than the difference-from-pot.

Reply.—This too is different from pot. As the *proprium* of its conjunction with pot there ought to be some determinant. Is it that same otherness or the first difference or a third difference? If it be the same, there is the contingency of the afore-said self-dependence. If it be the original difference, then there would be reciprocal dependence, in that the original difference is dependent on the otherness and the otherness on that difference. On the third alternative of a third difference, for that too another difference will have to be assumed as a qualification for that relation; and for this still another difference must be assumed and so on *ad infinitum*¹ without justification. And this being the case, since for the first difference—*A*—there is no conjunction with anything, there is no conjunction either for the conjunctions dependent on that first difference. Hence, all would be but unrelated. Hence the cognition qualified by difference would be delusive in every case, as in the case of the difference of pot from pot; or there would be valid knowledge in this case too.

P. 107

1. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 169: bheda-bhedinoś ca bhede 'navasthā.

Further, since all these differences (*i.e.*, reciprocal non-existences) are beginningless and eternal, there is no distinction of prior and posterior, so that there is not even the determining consideration that the earlier difference is the relatum and the later the relation. Nor can all differences be the relations in respect of any one of them, for what is determined cannot be a determinant, with the result that for the relations among those other differences which are said to be relations, there would be no determinant. Nor are infinite differences as thus assumed experienced by any one.

Hereby is refuted the view that the absolute non-existence of potness or what is qualified by that (say, the ground) is the conjunction of its locus with difference; for, there are similar defects on this view. For, what is the locus of the absolute non-existence of pot? It is not uniform; sometimes it is ground, sometimes cloth and so on. If you say that its locus is what is different from pot, thus there is reciprocal dependence. If you say the locus is what is devoid of potness, there is self-dependence, for being devoid of potness is the same as being the locus of the absolute non-existence of potness; if "being devoid" is assumed to be a different kind of non-existence, what is that located in? As the qualification of its locus a different *abhāva* should be assumed and so on *ad infinitum*.

[Next he proceeds to show that even the cognition of difference is unintelligible.]

Further, there is the general principle that when the doubt or non-existence of anything is an obstacle to something else, the ascertainment of the existence of that thing is the cause of the latter. Thus, for instance, doubt as to the existence of pervasion or the non-existence of that pervasion is an obstacle to inferential knowledge; the ascertainment of the pervasion, therefore, is the cause of inferential knowledge. Similarly, when there is doubt or the ascertainment of non-existence in respect of the difference of that (pot) from this (ground), there is no ascertainment of the difference of this (ground) from that (pot); the doubt or non-existence as to that is the obstacle to this ascertainment; this is accepted by all. Therefore, the ascertainment of the difference of that (pot) from this (ground) is the cause of the ascertainment of the difference of this (ground) from that (pot). Similarly, for the

ascertainment of the difference of this (ground) from that (pot); thus there is reciprocal dependence.

Objection.—Doubt is not always an obstacle to ascertainment; for instance, the doubt as to the existence of fire leads to the ascertainment of its existence; hence the rule stated by you cannot be admitted.

Reply.—Doubt is not an obstacle, where it relates to what is to be apprehended, the *probandum*, fire in the above case. But here, the doubt and the ascertainment relate to different things. The difference wherein pot is the locus is not in your view identical with the difference wherein pot is counter-correlate; and doubt relates to one of these, while ascertainment relates to the other; hence the doubt cannot but be an obstacle. Further, for the cognition "This is not that", difference, whose counter-correlate is "this" and locus is "that", cannot be the content, since there is no sense-contact with "that"; therefore, doubt as to the former is not doubt as to the latter; hence it is intelligible that the former is an obstacle to the apprehension of the latter. Again, when there is the doubt "Is this that or not?", invariably there is not seen the knowledge "That is different from this"; thus it is a matter of experience that the doubt is an obstacle to the knowledge of difference.

P. 109

Objection.—The cause of that cognition of difference is something else, *viz.*, the ascertainment of the non-existence, in the counter-correlate, of that which is the determinant of substrateness, *i.e.*, of the quality because of which the substrate is the substrate; thus pot is known to be different from cloth, for, in cloth, there is ascertained the non-existence of potness, which is the determinant of substrateness, where pot is the substrate of difference.

Reply.—No; for there is no determinative consideration that this alone is the cause of that cognition, not what we have urged above, *viz.*, the cognition of another difference. For, though in respect of the base of one tree, there is ascertainment of the non-existence of topness, when there is delusion of the non-difference of this tree with the base, from another tree with a top, because of the non-ascertainment of the difference of the two trees, there is not seen cognition of difference, whose counter-correlate is the tree with the base, even though there exists that knowledge, *viz.*, that in the counter-correlate there

is not topness, *i.e.*, the determinant of substrateness. Therefore what is urged by you cannot be the cause of the cognition of difference. If the ascertainment of non-difference is an obstacle to the cognition of difference, a doubt about difference is also an obstacle; hence even the cognition of difference (as between correlate *A* and counter-correlate *B*) should be said to be the cause of the cognition of difference between correlate *B* and counter-correlate *A*.

Further, even the cognition of the absolute non-existence of the determinant of substrateness is not possible in the absence of the cognition of difference from the locus of that substrateness, *i.e.*, the substrate; for potness etc. have to be established in dependence on this cognition of difference. This is how. The determinant of substrateness in "The pot is different from cloth" is potness; this should be known before difference from cloth etc. is known; but potness cannot be defined in any other way except as a quality which, while not present in anything other than pot, is present in all pots; hence in order to know potness as not existing in what is other than pot, cloth and the like should already be known to be different from pot; thus we go round in a circle. P. 110

Again, when there is doubt etc., as to the determinant of counter-correlateness not existing in the substrate of the difference, there is no ascertainment of the fact that in the counter-correlate there does not exist the determinant of substrateness. Hence it should be said of the ascertainment of the non-existence of substrateness in the counter-correlate that its cause is the ascertainment of the non-existence of counter-correlateness in the substrate. Similarly, this latter ascertainment is not possible without the former; thus, there is reciprocal dependence; hence no non-existence can be established, and no difference as dependent thereon.

Objection.—Now, let there not be admitted any such rule; when there is no obstacle, even without the cognition of the difference of the counter-correlate from this substrate, it may be possible to have cognition of the difference of this substrate from the counter-correlate; the former cognition need be the cause only where doubt etc. act as obstacles to the latter cognition. Hence there is no reciprocal dependence.

Reply.—That is not so; if this were so, it would follow that even knowledge of pervasion etc. is not the cause of

inferential knowledge, it being required only where there is an obstacle to inference, in the shape of doubt etc. This is unacceptable to the adversary. Further, wherever doubt etc., about a particular content, is an obstacle (and it is admitted by you that it may be an obstacle in some cases), in all such cases there is also non-existence of ascertainment; and in the absence

P. 111 of any determining consideration, this non-existence of ascertainment should also be admitted to be the obstacle; hence the non-ascertainment of the difference where *A* is the substrate is an obstacle to all ascertainment of difference where *A* is the counter-correlate; hence in all cases the ascertainment of the former is the cause of the ascertainment of the latter; hence reciprocal dependence cannot be avoided.

Similarly, since even the cognition of counter-correlateness etc., whereby difference has to be cognised, is itself dependent on the cognition of difference, there is again reciprocal dependence. It is thus: difference is the difference of a counter-correlate; in respect of this, therefore, there must be as the cause, the cognition of counter-correlateness, which is the qualification; further, in respect of counter-correlates remote in place and time, there can be no cognition through sense-contact, in the view of the opponents (the Naiyāyikas); hence, the only mode of contact is *jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*,¹ and, for this, there must be prior cognition of counter-correlateness, which becomes thus the cause of the cognition of difference. But since this counter-correlateness is not cognised when there is not the cognition of the counter-correlate as different, the cognition of difference is the cause of the former; thus there is reciprocal dependence.

Objection.—If thus you make out the non-existence of all settled causes, how do you account for the product, the cognition of difference?

Reply.—We say that it is but the product of *māyā*, like the chariot etc., cognised in dreams. Further, in "The cloth has difference from pot", there appears the sense of possession, *i.e.*, that the cloth is possessed of difference from pot; in "difference-of-pot" there appears the sense of the possessive case; both these appearances, which are appearances of relation,

1. *I.e.*, that mode of super-normal, sense-contact which is effected by cognitional association, as between the sense of smell and the odour of what is only seen.

are dependent on the cognition of difference between the relata; for when this is not cognised, the non-cognition of that relation is invariable. P. 112

Objection.—What is needed is only the existence of real difference between the relata, not the cognition of the difference.

Reply.—No; for, even where there is no real difference, when there is cognition of difference, as between a prototype and a reflection, relation is cognised; and even where difference exists, when it is not cognised, as between twins, relation is not cognised; in the latter case, there is no defect over and above the non-cognition of difference; any defects which may be pointed out, like similarity, will be found to reduce themselves to that.

Similarly, even the cognition of the relation of the qualification and the qualified is dependent on that cognition of difference; otherwise, one and the same would have to appear in two contrary modes—as qualification and as qualified; and this is impossible. And thus, since even for this cognition of difference another cognition of difference is to be sought as the cause, and for that cognition of difference still another cognition of difference should be sought, there is infinite regress. Enough of this business of kneading the kneaded (flogging a dead horse)!

Hereby is refuted even the view that difference is the existent itself, not something over and above that; for, difference is cognised not as identical with the existent, but only in the relation of qualification and qualified; and the defect in that has been stated.

Further, what is cognised by the term “difference” is only the sense of the words “what is opposed to non-difference”; hence the existence of pot etc. cannot itself be difference; for, in the case of non-difference of cloth, which is but the nature of cloth, and what is said to be opposed to that, the existence of pot, there is location in the same place, as when pot is located in cloth located on the ground; there is also the relation of substrate and qualification, as when we say that the cloth is qualified by the existence of pot; these would be impossible if the existence of pot were itself difference, *i.e.*, what is opposed to non-difference. Nor for the opponent (the Prā- P. 113

bhākara) is there any other difference, established by the existence of pot, cloth etc.

Further, difference which has a counter-correlate cannot
P. 114 intelligibly be identified with existence, which is not dependent on a counter-correlate. And if existence be itself difference the usage "difference-of-pot", wherein is cognised between them the relation of qualification and qualified, would be unintelligible. Therefore, on the view of the opponents the cognition of difference is certainly contentless.

In the siddhānta, however, that cognition has somehow a content. It is thus. The cognition "This is not that" has for content the non-existence of the non-difference of these two, which is established by the apposition between the two substances cognised as "this" and "that"; for the counter-correlate of the meaning of the negative particle is the non-difference which is the sense of apposition that stands in relation to the negative particle. And the non-difference of those two is possible. There does exist in respect of pot, cloth
P. 115 etc., the experience of the constant recurrence of reality, in the form "This is real, that is real" etc. And this substrate of pot etc. is the intelligence which is of the nature of the self and is established by Scripture in the words "The self alone is all this".¹ Nor may it be said that the content of the cognition "is real" is reality, not the self. For, the scripture "Reality alone, dear one, this was in the beginning"² establishes reality as of the nature of intelligence; this knowledge is not sublated by anything else; and there is no evidence for any reality other than this. And since this is established by Scripture to be the material cause of pot etc., its being the content of the cognition "is real", as recurrent in pot etc., is intelligible.

Objection.—Reality in the sense of "being real" is the signification of the suffix (-tā). How can that be identical with "the real (sat)" which is the signification of the stem? Everywhere, indeed, the sense of the suffix is admitted to be different from that of the stem. Here, the material cause of all is "The real (sat)." What is cognised as recurrent in all is "Reality (sattā)." The two should not be identified.

Reply.—This is no objection; for the use of a suffix is intelligible in some cases to signify even the denotation of the

1. *Chān. Up.* VII, xxv, 2.

2. *Chān. Up.* VI, ii, 1.

stem. Otherwise, in the views of the opponents, knowability would not be a knowable; and even reality would not be of the nature of the real. Hence it is that there is refuted the view that the real is only that which is qualified by reality; for, reality not being qualified by reality would be other than the real; and if it be other than the real, there is the contingency of its unreality. That has been said in the *Vārtika*: "The sense of the suffix does not exist as over and above the stem-sense in *sattā* (reality); therefore, the *taddhita*-suffix existing here has the same denotation as the stem." And this reality is itself the essential nature of pot etc., for nothing other than reality can be the nature of what is cognised as "real". And essential nature itself is non-difference (as admitted even by the opponents). Thus, in the case of the entire universe its being of the nature of the self is alone its non-difference. And thus, the absolute non-existence of non-difference, exhibited in relation to pot, cloth etc., is established by nescience, located in pot, cloth etc.,¹ and is cognised in the form "The pot is not cloth", like the difference between *jīva* and *Īśvara* or like that between the prototype face and the reflection. And that itself is cognised in the form, "Cloth is different from pot" like the separation located in both in the form "This is separated from that." This being the case, there does not result even the defect consequent on the rule "When doubt and the cognition of non-existence are obstacles" etc., for, in our view, there is no doubt as to difference etc., other than the doubt as to what is to be apprehended. [For, we are dealing throughout with difference as opposed to non-difference, not with difference as having pot for correlate or counter-correlate. There is difference in the latter case between what is to be apprehended and what apprehends, but not in the former.]

And since difference, according to us, is revealed by the witness, there is no dependence on the cognition of counter-correlateness etc. Nor is there undue extension in that then it should be eternally manifested by the witness; for it has to be exhibited in relation to the existence of the substrate and the counter-correlate, and in respect of the cognition of the substrate etc., there is need for the functioning of the *pramāṇas*, the bare witness being insufficient. Hence it is that in the

1. It is not, as in the view of the opponents, located in pot alone or cloth alone, while having the other as counter-correlate.

cognition of different things together, that difference too is presented along with the differents, instead of the differents being presented earlier, as should be the case, if the cognition of the counter-correlates preceded that of difference.

Therefore the view of those who know the final position of Scriptures from texts like "That thou art", that the jīva, who is of the nature of reality, knowledge and happiness, is Brahman, is well established.

Let be the question of there being other proofs of the non-difference among all things; the proof of difference is itself sufficient to establish this non-difference.

P. 119 This which has come into my heart from the revered preceptor and has thence issued forth, whether it is worthy or unworthy, let those judge who are capable of it; there are some who throw away as worthless, in the belief that it is a garland of (cheap) crystal, even a (precious) garland of indranila gems, blue as the winter sky.

Here ends the *Bhedadhikkāra* written by Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni, the knower of the Vedānta-siddhānta, the disciple of the revered and supreme ascetic, Jagannātha Āśramin.

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