

A VIEW
OF THE
ENGLISH INTERESTS IN INDIA :
AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE
MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN THE
SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE PENINSULA,
DURING 1782, 1783, & 1784.

BY
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MADRAS :
PRINTED BY GANTZ BROTHERS,
AT THE ADELPHI PRESS, 175, MOUNT ROAD.
1867.

181

PONDICHERRY, *7th January 1785.*

MY LORD AND GENTLEMEN,

BEFORE I embark for Europe, allow me to express my best acknowledgments for the approbation with which you have distinguished me since I have had the honor to command the troops and garrisons south of the Coleroon. Permit me, farther, to obtrude on your Lordship and the Board, a brief relation of my proceedings in command of the Southern Forces, and of other particulars material to the welfare of your Southern Territories. Independently of an impulse to specify my conduct while entrusted with a public charge, I cannot think of leaving India without presenting to you, in one view, the merits of the Southern Army, the difficulties under which it laboured, and the services it has performed. At the same time I flatter myself that the circumstances under which I acted, enable me to form an unbiassed statement of resources in those countries as they exist, of embarrassments as they have been felt, and of transactions as they have been conducted, in hopes that by speedy measures of reform, that which is beneficial may be improved, and that which is amiss may be corrected.

Before I enter upon the narrative of proceedings that occurred during my command, I must call your attention to the local history of those countries, to the previous misfortunes that had almost entirely exhausted the resources, and ruined the inhabitants of every district south of the Coleroon. Your possessions in that quarter are of sufficient magnitude and value to call forth your most vigorous endeavours for their protection; but such was their condition when you assumed the Government, that, without your opportune attention they must inevitably have been severed from the English dominions.

In my opinion, those territories had not obtained their due share of estimation. Divided into various districts, held by different tenures,

and occupied by tribes at variance with each other, many parts of them remained uncultivated and almost unexplored until the assignment* of the Nabob of Arcot's revenues to the Company, invested you with the internal management of those countries. Preceding that period it was impracticable for the most enlightened of your servants to form a just appreciation of the benefits they afford.

From the river Coleroon, their northern boundary, which divides them from the Nabobship of Arcot, to Cape Comorin, the southern extremity of the Peninsula, is not less than three hundred miles, and from the sea, which forms their limits on the east, to the countries of Caroor and Dindigul, belonging to Tippoo Suldaun, and to the Rajahship of Travancore upon the west is, on an average, at least one hundred and fifty miles. Immemorial mismanagement and late disaster have hitherto rendered those countries unproductive, but under a system in any degree equitable, they would undoubtedly yield an annual revenue of one million sterling.

Of these, the Rajahship of Tanjore is the most fertile.† It is watered by a multiplicity of streams, which, by means of tanks and embankments, are diverted into every field. It annually affords two or three luxuriant crops of rice; the country is overstocked with sheep and cattle; the forests abound with valuable trees; and it formerly teemed with an industrious race, expert in agriculture and habituated to manufacture. Such are the natural benefits enjoyed by this territory, that no spot upon the globe is superior in productions for the use of man. You are well apprized, however, that from the establishment of the reigning family of the Mahratta race, in 1675, to the present period, there has been such a progressive diminution of cultivation, that the annual produce of late years is less by fifty per cent. than it was a century ago. As Europeans never interfered in the management of that country, and as it has been seldom ravaged or invaded, its decline must be attributed to the malversation of its Mahratta or Gentoo administration. But even in its deteriorated state it used to produce, before the late war, about seventy-five lakhs of cullums of rice, worth about eleven lakhs of Pagodas, or £440,000 sterling:

* The assignment was concluded in the end of the year 1782, between Mahomed Ally and Lord Macartney's Government; previously to that arrangement the Company's servants were not allowed to interfere in the territorial affairs of the Nabob.

† The country of Tanjore contained 5,753 towns and villages at the time when the Mahratta Government was established.

of this £160,000 was paid as tribute for your protection, agreeably to the stipulation of 1776, after the last siege of Tanjore, when the Rajah became a tributary of the Company. The difficulties that occurred in reducing that capital,* the strength of the works, and obstinacy of the defenders, evince its importance in a military view; neither do the inferior forts and the rivers, rice-fields, and embankments that intersect the country, afford less eminent advantages in moments of invasion.

The state of Trichinopoly, extending from the western limits of Tanjore along the Coleroon, which divides it from the Carnatic on the north, till it reaches Tippoo's dominions on the west, near Caroor and Dindigul, including a range of fifty miles by forty, is circumscribed on the south by the country of Tondiman, and by the woods of Nattam, inhabited by Collieries. Though less valuable than the country of Tanjore, the vicinity of the Coleroon still renders it extremely productive of rice. Under the Nabob Mahomed Ally's management the expenses of collection absorbed the quarter part of the revenue, which is at present let to a renter, under the assignment of the Nabob's revenues to the Company, for about ten lakhs of rupees. Yet, in prosperous times, it possesses the means of extended cultivation, and consequent increase of revenue. The size and situation of the city, the abundance of subsistence in the district, and the long residence of the Nabob Mahomed Ally's second son, the Ameer-ul-Omrah, at that place, have rendered it the favourite establishment of the Musselmen to the southward of the Coleroon. The two great Pagodas of Jumbakistna and Seringham, on the adjacent island of Seringham, command the veneration of Gentoos; while every spot on that island, on the opposite or northern side of the Coleroon, about Semicaveram and Volcondah, as well as on the plains of Trichinopoly, are renowned for the bloody contests of Chunda Sahib with Clive and Lawrence, and mark with classical reverence the scene of those achievements. But above all, it becomes important in a political and military view, as the strongest and most advanced garrison upon your frontiers towards the territories of Mysore, and the best position for cantoning your army in order to menace that power.

[The country of the Collieries, including the territories of Tondiman, Mellore, and Nattam, extends from the sea-coast to the confines of Madura, in a range of sixty miles by sixty-five. With the exception of some spots, which have accidentally been cultivated, it is

* Tanjore was supposed to contain 100,000 inhabitants previously to the destruction that followed Hyder's irruption.

overgrown with thickets, and inhabited by savage tribes. Before that country can be rendered valuable, the woods must be cleared, the strongholds occupied, and the Collieries compelled to relinquish their predatory habits; for in its present condition, fertile tracts are lost to cultivation, and the wild inhabitants, amounting to thirty or forty thousand men in arms, under different Chiefs, are ever ready to increase the public danger in moments of hostility.

The territory of Shevigunga, or the Little Marawar, stretches from the sea-coast on the east to the districts of Mellore and Madura on the west, and from the country of Tondiman and the Nattam Collieries upon the north, to the territories of the Great Marawar on the south, containing about fifty miles in length and forty miles in breadth. The soil, in general, is unfriendly to the growth of corn, though not quite destitute of running streams or artificial reservoirs, but the country is overgrown with thorns and bushes. The woods of Calicoil, nearly forty miles in circumference, are secured with barriers and other defences around the fort of Calicoil, which is situated in the centre of the thickets, and considered as a refuge from exaction or invasion. These woods and the surrounding country abound with sheep and cattle; the inhabitants are numerous, and can bring twelve thousand fighting men into the field, armed with swords, pikes, spears, and firelocks. Though less barbarous than the Collieries, their neighbours, yet arts and industry have made little progress among them. The country is capable of great improvement, but at present hardly yields more than five lakhs of Rupees to the Rajah, who pays 1,75,000 Rupees to the Nabob of Arcot. The Rajah is of the Taver family, and a descendant of the sovereigns of the Great Marawar, from which Shevigunga was separated at no very distant period. At the reduction of this territory, in 1773, by General Joseph Smith, the Rajah having been killed, his widow, then with child, and some of the leading people of the country, escaped to the Mysore dominions, and there lived under the protection of Hyder Ally, until the commencement of the late war. During that period the country was managed by a renter, and in quiet times the people acknowledged themselves to be tributaries of the Nabob Mahomed Ally; but while their woods and barriers are suffered to remain, their disaffection may be dreaded on the first prospect of their profiting by disturbance.

The Great Marawar, or Rajah of Ramnad, occupies a country fifty miles in length, by thirty miles in breadth, extending from the boun-

daries of Shevigunga and Mellore upon the north, to the sea upon the east and south, and to the confines of Tinnevely on the west. Nature has been little more propitious to this principality than to that of Shevigunga, yet arts and industry have made superior progress. The country is well peopled, the inhabitants civilized, the villages are full of weavers, who manufacture the cottons produced by the adjacent lands. The city of Ramnad, where the Rajah usually resides, is large and respectably fortified. The sea-coast is skirted with a track of open wood-land that shelters innumerable herds of cattle. The revenues are equal to five lakhs of rupees a year, and the tribute to the Nabob is 1,75,000 Rupees. The reduction of the country, in the year 1773, by General Joseph Smith, and a garrison of the Nabob's troops constantly stationed in the capital, have deprived the Native Prince even of personal freedom. He is still, however, venerated by Gentoos on account of his high descent, and as the guardian of the sacred waters and Pagoda of Ramisseram.

I come now to the state of Madura, bounded by Mellore on the east, by the Nattam Collieries on the north, by the country of Dindigul, belonging to Hyder, on the west, and by Tinnevely on the south. Its territory is not more than forty-five miles in length and thirty-five miles in breadth, and its annual revenue is diminished to £34,000.

When the Gentoo Rajah, Trimul Naique, reigned there in the last century, his territories extended over many parts of the southern countries. His treasures were great, and he has left monuments of magnificence hardly surpassed in any age or country. These proud buildings still remain, a melancholy contrast with present poverty and depopulation. The gallant resistance made by Mahomed Issof, when he disclaimed allegiance to the Nabob, proves that if the works were repaired, this place might be defended against the most powerful Indian enemy; while its vicinity to the country of Dindigul, belonging to Tippoo Sultaun, renders it a position of capital importance in the event of operations against that power.

The last, but not the least considerable of your southern territories is Tinnevely. It is a hundred and fifteen miles in length and seventy miles in breadth. A ridge of inaccessible mountains divides it on the north from the wild valleys of Watrap and Outumpollam, belonging to Tippoo Sultaun. It stretches to the confines of Madura and Ramnad on the north-east and east, reaches to the sea upon the south, and borders

on the west with the Rajahship of Travancore, both terminating near Cape Comorin. Nature has been bountiful to this province. Its surface is generally flat, from the sea-coast, till it approaches the mountains on its northern boundary. The rivers by which it is intersected ensure luxuriant crops of rice, and the driest parts yield cotton in abundance. The productions of the neighbouring island of Ceylon would flourish here, and thus render us the rivals of the Dutch in the cinnamon trade; but the peculiar tenure under which the country has been held, the convulsions it has endured from the first intrusions of the Musselmén in the course of this century, and the depravity of its rulers, have counteracted the benefits of nature.

Even when a Native Rajah governed Tinnevelly, the flat and open country only was reduced. This was let for specific sums to great renters, who were invested with despotic powers, and harassed the peaceful subjects; while various leaders, who possessed considerable territory, maintained armed forces, and withheld their stipulated tribute on the first appearance of disturbance. These Chiefs, as well as their subjects, are called Polygars; they amount, at present, to thirty-two, capable of bringing thirty thousand brave, though undisciplined, troops into the field. They have also fortified towns and strongholds in the mountains, whither they retire in cases of emergency.

Besides the territory that these Polygars possess under the range of hills that form the northern boundary of Tinnevelly, many of them hold ample tracts in the flat and cultivated country. Adverse to industry, they suffer their own possessions to remain waste, while they invade each other, and plunder their industrious neighbours. Such is the dread of these ravagers, that every district in the province has been forced to purchase their forbearance by enormous contributions. In this situation you have rather cause to wonder that your Superintendent, Mr. Irwin, should have been enabled to procure so large an increase of revenue, than that its produce should, in no recorded period, have borne any proportion to its natural advantages.

I have thus traced some hasty outlines of the Company's possessions south of the Coleroon. In extent they are nearly equal to the Carnatic; but in point of soil, water, situation, and capability of improvement, they surpass any district under your control.

The calamities with which the invasion of Hyder Ally, in 1781, overwhelmed the Carnatic, fell heavily upon the southern countries. No sooner had the multitudes under that ravager poured down from

the mountains of Mysore, than desolation extended across the Coleroon. Thousands of his plunderers overran the countries of Kivelore, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Madura. The ground was at that time covered with the most luxuriant crops, which were instantly swept off, and every water-dyke and embankment was destroyed. The inhabitants who escaped the sword sought shelter in the forts, where they added misery to distress, and perished in the streets. The whole country, laid waste by fire and sword, exhibited the sad reality of a general conflagration.

At length Hyder, having left nothing to destroy in the Carnatic, and regardless of our force, which, from the time of Colonel Baillie's defeat, had never ventured from its encampment near Madras, resolved to lead in person his victorious army to the southward. After remaining some weeks encamped within random shot of Tanjore, he proceeded to invest Trichinopoly, and threatened to fill up the ditch with his Moormen's slippers. The repeated checks sustained by the Company's troops in that quarter, the corps that Hyder had cut off, and the forts he had reduced, spread a general consternation. The important and defenceless garrison of Trichinopoly seemed ready to surrender, and in that event, the southern countries must have fallen before him, had not the repulse of Sir Eyre Coote's army against Chilumbrum elated Hyder with the hopes of defeating the only force that could endanger his conquest. This induced him to renounce more solid, though less brilliant prospects, and to fight the battle of the 1st July 1781, at Porto Novo.

Notwithstanding his ill-success in that engagement, and his personal absence from the southward, our affairs in that quarter still remained in great confusion. The Tanjore country was occupied by the enemy,* who secured its crops and cattle, repulsed the Company's troops at Tricatapooly, Patticottah, Trivellore, and confined them within the fort of Tanjore. There, the granaries were empty, the Rajah's subjects disaffected, and he himself accused of negotiating with Hyder, and of introducing arms clandestinely into his palace. He likewise suffered the whole crops of his country to be collected by the enemy, while he resisted every solicitation to fill his magazines and provide for impending events.

The defeat of Colonel Braithwaite in February 1782, and the loss of his detachment, would have proved a deadly blow but for the

* The fort and city of Tanjore only excepted.

active abilities and conciliating manners of Mr. Sullivan, to whom the safety of Tanjore and of all the southern countries was then justly ascribed. The subsequent capture of his successor, Colonel Horne, proceeding to the southward from the presidency with military supplies, added extremely to the distress and embarrassment experienced at Tanjore. In the provinces south of Tanjore and Trichinopoly, the prospect was not less alarming. The Great Marawar country was infested by a host of rebels under Maupely Taver, a relation of the reigning family, who overran the territory, occupied its best positions, and for many months invested the garrison of Ramnad.

The Little Marawar country was controlled by Perria and Chinna Moordeen, who, after the murder of the late Rajah, in 1773, fled to Hyder for protection, and returning at the time of his invasion, maintained the country under his authority, keeping the infant Rajah a State prisoner, and ravaging the territories of the Company and the Nabob.

The districts of Madura, Mellore, and Pallemery were so harassed with Collieries, Polygars, and the enemy, that your troops and subjects were often attacked within range of the forts, and the sentries fired at on the works. All the Polygars of Tinnevely were in rebellion, and closely connected with the Dutch Government at Colombo, from whence attempts were meditated, in conjunction with them and with Maupely Taver, to reduce those countries and the Marawar dominions. Near one hundred thousand Polygars and Collieries were in arms throughout the southern provinces, and being considered hostile to Government, looked to public confusion as their safeguard against punishment. Your southern force was inadequate to repress these outrages and to retrieve your affairs. The treasury was drained, the country depopulated, the revenues exacted by the enemy, the troops undisciplined, ill-paid, poorly fed, and unsuccessfully commanded.

The complicated dangers arising from this situation of your affairs induced you, in September 1782, to send a reinforcement of Europeans and artillery to the southward, under the command of Colonel Lang, and you were led to hope that this detachment, reinforced by the troops to be collected from every quarter of the south, might have materially promoted the views of Colonel Humberstone, then at Paniani, preparing to proceed against Palghautcherry, and to penetrate into Coimbatore, according to the plan suggested by Mr. Sullivan, approved of by your Lordship and the Board, and afterwards carried into execu-

tion by myself. But from a variety of circumstances, it happened that the operations of Colonel Lang were confined to the reduction of Caroor, Aravarcocorehy, and Dindigul. Being limited in his movements to those districts of the enemy and to the track between Negapatam, Tanjore, and Trichinopoly, the southern countries continued nearly in their former state of desolation. Many as the representations were that reached your Board on this subject, it would have been desirable for you, in person, to have beheld the miseries endured, the malversations committed, and the patience of your subjects under unsupportable grievances.

The ravages of the enemy were by no means the greatest evils that those districts sustained. There were inherent and increasing causes of decline. The husbandmen were killed or driven off, the cattle became wild, cultivation was neglected, and the fields desolate; yet over this wilderness the Renter, the Amildar, the Monegar, the Tahsildar, and all the instruments of public exaction, tyrannized with unabating rigour. The forts, excepting Tanjore, were neglected and decaying; the military stores had been in a great measure expended or embezzled; and those that now remained were ill-constructed and worse arranged; the Military Storekeepers, Grainkeepers, Paymasters, and Commissaries, belonging to the Civil Service, were habituated to disavow any controlling power in the Commandant of the place, nor were the exhortations and example of Mr. Sullivan sufficient to correct the evil. Hence disorder arose in these departments. The civil and military, the King's and Company's officers, were at variance. The subjects of the Nabob were loud in their complaints against Europeans; while the Tanjoreans extended their aversion to all classes of our countrymen. The large arrears due to the troops, and other grievances, rendered it impracticable for officers to maintain discipline in their corps; as it required the utmost efforts to prevent mutiny among men, who, brave and faithful as they undoubtedly were, could hardly be blamed for clamour and complaint when reduced to procure subsistence by selling their own children!

The discordant powers of the Civil Servants in the different departments increased the evils already enumerated. Such was the measure of those evils, that the ablest persons despaired of retrieving your affairs, nor was it held practicable to maintain the southern army in the field, dispirited by defeat and destitute of resources.

Some preceding incidents, however, proved the insufficiency of

that defensive system under which the Carnatic war had been conducted, and indicated offensive operations as the only means of future prosperity. On this principle Colonel Humberstone had acted on the Malabar Coast. He obliged Tippoo Saib to march across the Peninsula, and to retire, with loss, from the engagement in November 1782, at Paniani. The subsequent success of General Mathews against Mangalore, Beddanore, and the principal forts of the adjacent countries, still farther evinced the wisdom of Mr. Sullivan's opinions and of Colonel Humberstone's operations. Tippoo was forced to march from Arcot to Beddanore; his father's death, in December 1782, having made him cross the Peninsula from Paniani to Arcot. This event relieved the Carnatic, and was the first circumstance during the war that gave a turn to our affairs, for the movements and counter-movements of the Carnatic army, and even the repeated defeats sustained by Hyder, had proved of little ultimate avail in the decision of the contest.

Fortunately for the English interests, your Lordship and the Board resolved, at this crisis, to direct the southern troops to make every effort against the enemy. The first object of my command was to augment our field force by battalions from Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Tinnevely. The zealous support of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin speedily enabled me to equip the army and to prosecute offensive operations.

The high sense I entertained of the treaty formed by Mr. Sullivan, under your Government, for the restoration of the ancient Gentoo family of Mysore, formerly deposed and still confined by Hyder, was only equalled by my attachment to the system of conciliating all classes of the natives. This was congenial with the spirit of Mr. Sullivan's negotiations, and was requisite to give effect to his enlightened views. In support of these ideas, the abilities and influence of the Brahmins rendered it essential to treat them with particular indulgence; and by similar indulgence the numerous Polygars of Dindigul were reconciled to our interests, as the supplies derived from those possessions, while under our government, have fully evinced.

The dependents of His Highness the Nabob felt themselves extremely humbled by the assignment of his territory to the Company; for eligible and indispensable as this measure appeared on principles of public necessity, yet it could not fail to deprive his adherents of their power and situation. As far as depended upon me, I endeavoured to convince them all that their wants should be relieved, their

rights protected, and their consequence maintained. They were pleased to credit my declarations, and by these means we restrained the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants and native soldiers, who are warmly attached to the Nabob, and were ready to burst forth in the most alarming disorders. I acted on the same principle towards the Rajah of Tanjore and the other Chiefs whose countries fell within the limits of my command, conscious that unbiassed justice and liberal concession should direct our conduct towards all Native Princes and their subjects.

My next endeavour was, in conjunction with Mr. Sullivan, to unite all descriptions of men in cordial exertions to retrieve the public interests, and to inure the troops to discipline and enterprize, without which they neither could be subsisted, nor could we hope for any reputable termination of our ill-fated contest. That these attempts have not proved entirely unproductive of important public benefits, has been repeatedly testified by your Board, in terms most flattering to myself.

By the 25th of May the army marched from Dindigul towards Daraporam, which fell to us on the 2nd of June. That valuable place affords ample supplies of grain and cattle, is capable of considerable defence, and is far advanced in the enemy's country, being equally distant from the two coasts. The position of an army there would always be of eminent advantage, but it was more peculiarly so when we reduced it, because Tippoo Sultaun had recovered Beddanore, taken General Mathews prisoner, and invested Mangalore. The southern army was not in sufficient strength to think of marching to Seringapatam, and was so far from being able to oppose the whole power of Tippoo Sultaun, that we could not even afford to garrison Darapooram, and were obliged to destroy the fortifications. Yet we might assuredly have reduced the rich tract that lies below the mountains of Mysore,* which would probably have forced Tippoo Sultaun to raise the siege of Mangalore, and march his main body against us; or if Tippoo had persisted against Mangalore, we should have amply subsisted the army, have reduced a valuable territory, and prepared for more important conquests.

General Stuart's† order of the 28th May, to join him with the

* Extending in length from Caroor to Coimbatore, and in breadth from the bottom of the hills to the confines of Madura and Trichinopoly, a country abounding in every kind of production for the support of armies, and which may be considered as a chain of magazines established by Tippoo Sultaun for the invasion of the southern provinces, in the same manner as the Barmaul country may be considered as affording him the means of invasion on the east.

† Vide letter to General Stuart of 10th June 1783.

utmost expedition at Cuddalore, obliged me to relinquish those advantages. You were pleased to think favourably of my precautions for the defence of Dindigul, which I garrisoned with the 6th Carnatic Battalion and a body of the Nabob's Independents. I likewise threw in some heavy guns and military stores, and directed that grain might be collected, wood prepared, and every effort made to ensure a desperate resistance. In obedience to your orders respecting the demolition of Caroor, mines were prepared and the works blown up. My instructions to the Southern Commandants respecting the distribution of their troops and preparations for defence, likewise received your commendation.

On our arrival at Trichinopoly, in June, the troops were supplied with grain, the gun carriages repaired, cattle collected for the army at Cuddalore, and boats prepared for crossing the Cauvery and Coleroon, which, with two intermediate streams, were then unfordable. At Munsurpet, on the northern bank of the Coleroon, I experienced one of those perplexing situations which too frequently occur in Indian service. General Stuart's orders were to march without delay to Cuddalore: the injunctions of your Board were no less pointed to re-cross the river and continue to the southward; but intelligence that Suffrein's squadron had anchored at Cuddalore, that a disembarkation of many thousand men was intended, and the English army harassed with the duty of the trenches, impelled me to hazard personal responsibility, and march towards General Stuart, for I was conscious that your intentions were directed to the public safety, which could have no existence if General Stuart's army was defeated. Colonel Forbes, who remained in command of the southern provinces, inspired every one around him with a full reliance on his zeal and military talents; and I shall ever gratefully acknowledge, that on the first communication of those proceedings, you were pleased to honour me with your approbation.

Upon my arrival within three forced marches of General Stuart's camp, a cessation of hostilities with the French was announced, and I returned towards the south. The same despatches intimated General Stuart's suspension, and that General Bruce commanded the Carnatic army. I wrote to General Bruce, offering to make an unexpected movement against the Fort of Salem, which secures the most important pass from the Carnatic into Mysore, and contained many months' provisions for an army, adding, that nothing would be requisite on the

part of General Bruce, but to send a force sufficient to garrison the place, until he could move thither with the troops from Cuddalore. The General finding it necessary to reject this proposal, I left him to struggle with his difficulties, and proceeded to Munsurpet. My intention was to move next day by Toriore, to restore your tributary, the Rheddey, to his paternal inheritance, and to advance against the forts and magazines of Settemungalum, Namcul, and Sunkerrydurgum on the north of the Coleroon, from thence to cross the river and besiege Erode, with a view of establishing a strong garrison at that place, and in order to prepare supplies for moving, when sufficiently reinforced, against Seringapatam. But these expectations were disappointed by your intimation of an armistice with Tippoo Sultaun.

During the course of these proceedings, your southern provinces remained in their former confusion. The Polygars, Collieries, and other tributaries, ever since the commencement of the war, had thrown off all appearance of allegiance. No civil arrangement could be attempted without a military force, and nothing less than the whole army seemed adequate to their reduction. While such a considerable portion of the southern provinces remained in defiance of the Company's Government, it was vain to think of supporting the current charges of the establishment, far less could we hope to reduce the arrears, and to prepare for important operations, in the probable event of a re-commencement of hostilities. It became indispensable, therefore, to restore the tranquillity of those provinces by vigorous military measures, as the only means to render them productive of revenue. You had been pleased to reinforce us with five hundred Europeans and two battalions of sepoys under Colonel Stuart immediately after the siege of Cuddalore; another detachment of equal strength marched towards us under Colonel Elphinstone. I meant to have joined those corps at Dindigul, in order to act against Tippoo, in case he should not accede to the terms proposed; but finding that the detachments could not reach Dindigul for many weeks, I resolved to employ the intermediate space in fulfilling the objects already stated. In compliance, therefore, with the requisitions of Mr. J. Sullivan,* I proceeded to Mellore, in order to awe the rebellious Collieries of that district. We left a strong body encamped there, and marched with the remaining troops on the 4th August to Shevigunga, about twenty miles east; from thence

* Resident of Tanjore and Superintendent of Assigned Revenues of Trichinopoly and Marawar.

the two Murdeens, who rule the Little Marawar, fled precipitately with their young Rajah to the woods of Calicoil, and collected there a force to the amount of 10,000 men, nor could they be prevailed on to return to their habitations and trust to my assurances.

Besides the immediate discharge of their arrears of tribute, I demanded from their deputies 90,000 rupees in compensation to the Company for the ravages they had committed, and concluded with declaring that if these conditions were not fulfilled, I should attack their woods, storm their fort, and drive them from the country. Notwithstanding the procrastinating spirit of Gentoos, they paid nearly 40,000 Rupees, and gave security for their remaining debt.

I felt a cordial satisfaction in contrasting the lenity and despatch of this transaction (for it was concluded in four days), with the circumstances of the expedition in 1773 against this very place. On that occasion the Rajah, trusting to the woods and barriers that surrounded the fort of Calicoil, and expecting to conclude the business by negotiation, conceived himself in security, when the place was surprised, and he was killed in the attack. I rejoiced to mitigate the vigorous treatment which the delinquency of the successor, or rather of his ministers merited, in consideration of the severities which the predecessor had experienced.

There next remained a more important undertaking. The numerous Polygars of Tinnevely, who had rebelled on the commencement of the war, committed daily ravages from Madura to Cape Comorin. They subdued forts and occupied districts belonging to the Circar, or held by a tenure different from their own. I had been repeatedly urged by Mr. Irwin, Superintendent of Madura and Tinnevely, to proceed against the Polygars, in order to restore tranquillity and recover the revenues. It was now, for the first time, in my power, to direct my operations towards that quarter, at a moment when the most powerful of the Polygars in confederacy against your Government, and in alliance with the Dutch, had assembled twelve or fourteen thousand men, and were actually besieging the fort of Chocumpetty, a Polygar place of some strength, below the hills that form the north-west boundary of the province.

When it was determined that we should march towards Tinnevely, during the interval requisite for Colonels Stuart and Elphinstone's detachments to reach Dindigul, my object was to strike an unexpected blow, and to intimidate the Polygars into submis-

sion. Of all the Tinnevelly Chiefs, the principal in power and delinquency, excepting Shevigherry, was Cataboma Naigue. He was personally engaged at the siege of Chocumpetty, from whence his fort of Panjalamecouchy, on the south-east quarter of Tinnevelly, is distant more than seventy miles. The usual route to Tinnevelly passes by Madura, and the Polygars, hearing of our movement towards Shevigunga, looked for us in that direction. To favour this opinion, I ordered provisions for the army to be prepared at Madura, kept my real intention perfectly concealed, and moved off with the force from Shevigunga, on the evening of 8th August, to Tropicetty, a place twenty miles distant on the southern border of the Mellore country. I there joined the remainder of the army, and leaving the 7th Battalion and some Irregulars to restrain the Collieries at Mellore, we proceeded next morning by Pallemery, Pandalgoody, and Naiglapore, and reached the fort of Panjalamecouchy on the fourth day, being one hundred miles from Shevigunga.*

As soon as the line approached the fort, a flag was sent, desiring the headmen to open their gates and hold a conference; they refused. The 18-pounders were therefore halted in the rear of an embankment, facing the north-east angle of the works; a hasty battery was constructed, and in three hours we were ready to open on the bastion. The works were manned with several thousand people, and every circumstance denoted an intention of resistance. It was material to storm without delay, in order to strike terror by despatch, and also lest Cataboma Naigue, with his confederate Chiefs, might hasten to obstruct our operations. We opened on the bastion, but finding ourselves retarded by its thickness, we resolved to breach the adjoining curtain, and to render the defences of the bastion untenable by the besieged. They kept up a constant and well-directed fire, and notwithstanding our utmost efforts, it was dark before a practicable breach was effected; the attack was therefore deferred until the moon should rise. The storming party consisted of two companies of Europeans, supported by the 13th and 24th Carnatic Battalions, and continued in the rear of the battery. The Cavalry, the 1st, and Light Infantry Battalions were posted at right angles with the other three salient angles of the fort, with detachments fronting each gateway, in order to prevent the besieged from receiving supplies or making their escape,

* Farenheit's Thermometer was frequently above 110 degrees during these marches.

while the other troops remained to defend the camp, which was within random shot.

Our next object was to remove a strong hedge fronting the breach and surrounding the whole fort, as is the practice in the Polygar system of defence. This dangerous service was effected with unusual skill by Ensign Cunningham, commanding the Pioneers, and about ten at night, with the advantage of bright moonshine, the storm commenced. Our troops, after they gained the summit of the breach, found no sufficient space to lodge themselves, and the interior wall having no slope or talus, they could not push forward from the summit as they advanced. The defenders were numerous, and opposed us so vigorously with pikes and musketry, that we were obliged at last to retire, and reached the battery with considerable slaughter on both sides. Immediate measures were taken to renew the charge, but the Polygars, disheartened with their loss, abandoned the place, and sallied forth at the eastern gate.

The corps posted round the works were so exhausted by the preceding marches, that many of the fugitives effected their escape; the rest were taken prisoners. The breach was covered with dead bodies, and the place contained a large assortment of guns, powder, shot, arms and other military stores, which were of course applied to the public service. 40,000 Star Pagodas were also found, and immediately distributed to the troops. Your Board was pleased to confirm this distribution on the footing of prize-money, than which no measure could more effectually tend to animate the army in our after-operations. Some other facts respecting these transactions, and the treaty between the Dutch Government of Colombo and Cataboma Naigue, (of which the original was taken in his fort,) were referred to in my letters of the 13th August, addressed to your Lordship and the Board.

Having left Captain Jacobs with five companies of the 25th Battalion to garrison the place, I proceeded to Palamecottah, in order to inspect the state of that fort, and from thence by Shankernakoil to Shevigherry. It was hoped that the reduction of that stronghold, belonging to the most powerful of all the Polygars, in addition to the fall of Panjalamecourcehy, would intimidate the less considerable offenders, and convince the whole confederacy that their treatment would be proportioned to their misconduct. Besides, the outrages committed by the Shevigherry Chief were atrocious, and could not be

forgiven without a total surrender of your authority. He had barbarously murdered Captain Graham Campbell, and cut off a detachment under the command of that officer. On former occasions he had beat off considerable detachments, and avowedly protected your enemies, who thought themselves secure in the fort of Shevigherry. He had collected magazines sufficient to supply the Dutch force that was expected from Colombo, as well as to resist the most tedious blockade, for he did not conceive his fort could be stormed, and every circumstance in his conduct marked that he held himself beyond the reach of military power. On our arrival before the town of Shevigherry, he retired to the thickets, near four miles deep, in front of his Comby,* which it covers and defends. He manned the whole extent of a strong embankment that separates the wood and open country. He was joined by Cataboma Naigue, with other associated Polygars, and mustered eight thousand or nine thousand men in arms. In the present instance lenity would have been accounted imbecility, but the approach of Colonels Stuart and Elphinstone to Dindigul, and Tippoo Sultaun's refusal of the proposed accommodation, rendered me extremely anxious to finish this Polygar warfare, in order to proceed towards the enemies' frontiers. The Shevigherry Chief and his associates were therefore informed that I meant immediately to attack the place, unless they would constrain the head Polygars of Tinnevely, amounting to thirty-two chiefs, to liquidate all arrears and re-fund the amount of depredations committed since the commencement of the war, agreeably to authenticated vouchers in the different districts. It was farther intimated that if they, on the part of the confederacy, would engage to pay £120,000 in lieu of all demands, I would forward their proposal to the Superintendent of Revenue (Mr. Irwin), and on his acceptance, that the troops would be withdrawn; and that they would be recommended to forgiveness. They wished to confer with me, but refused to visit me in camp. As their distrust arose from various outrages committed against them by former commanders, instead of increasing their apprehensions by any appearance of distrust or resentment, I proposed to meet them alone and unattended at their own barrier, adding, that if any accident befel me, it would not pass unresented. The Shevigherry Chief, Cataboma Naigue, and the

* A stronghold in the mountains.

deposed Polygar of Chocumpetty, with a large retinue, met me in front of their embankment ; before they finished their explanations it was dark, and a musket inadvertently fired in the rear, alarmed our advanced picket, who thought it was aimed at me. To prevent the ill consequences of that mistake, I took leave of the Polygars, expressing my wish to hear of their acceding to the terms proposed. We refrained from hostility next day, but finding that they trifled with proposals, the line was ordered under arms on the morning following, and we made the distribution of attack. It proved as desperate as any contest in that species of Indian warfare, not only from the numbers and obstinacy of the Polygars, but from the peculiar circumstances which had acquired for this place the reputation of impregnability.

The attack commenced by the Europeans and four battalions of sepoy moving against the embankment which covers the wood. The Polygars, in full force, opposed us, but our troops remained with their firelocks shouldered, under a heavy fire, until they approached the embankment, there they gave a general discharge and rushed upon the enemy. By the vigour of this advance we got possession of the summit, the Polygars took post on the verge of the adjoining wood, and disputed every step with great loss on both sides.

After reconnoitering, we found that the Comby could not be approached in front. We proceeded, therefore, to cut a road through the impenetrable thickets for three miles, to the base of the hill that bounds the Comby on the west. The Pioneers, under Ensign Cunningham, laboured with indefatigable industry; Captain Gardiner of the 102nd, supported them with the Europeans, and Captain Blacker, with the 3rd and 24th Carnatic Battalions, advanced their field pieces as fast as the road was cleared. These were strengthened by troops in their rear, forming a communication with those in front. For this purpose two other battalions were posted within the wood, and as soon as we gained the embankment, the camp moved near it and concentrated our force.

We continued to cut our way under an unabating fire from eight thousand Polygars, who constantly pressed upon our advanced party, rushed upon the line of attack, piked the bullocks that were dragging the guns, and killed many of our people. But those attempts were repulsed by perseverance, and before sunset we had opened a passage

entirely to the mountain. It is extremely high, rocky, and in many places almost perpendicular. Having resolved to attack from this unexpected quarter, the troops undertook the service, and attained the summit. The Polygar parties posted to guard that eminence being routed, after much firing on all hands, we descended on the other side, and flanked the Comby.

The enemy seeing us masters of the mountain, retreated under cover of the night by paths inaccessible to regular troops, and we took possession of this wonderful recess. The particulars respecting ordnance, stores, and provisions found in the place, are stated in my letter of the 3rd September.

We left the 3rd and 9th Battalions to secure the magazines, and moved the army to Shevlepatore, within four marches of Madura, in order to awe the Northern Polygars of Tinnevely.

It was little more than a month since we had left Trichinopoly. Your authority was re-established throughout the whole track that we had traversed, extending more than three hundred miles; and besides the arrangement with the Shevigunga Rajah, we were masters of the two strongest places belonging to the Polygars. We remained some time in expectation of their proposing a general accommodation, but they knew that Tippoo still invested Mangalore, and that I must quickly join the force at Dindigul. This intelligence corroborated their spirit of procrastination. I therefore convened the Vakeels* whom the chief Polygars had sent to treat with me in camp, and directed them to inform their respective principals, that I should leave the province on the 21st September. I added, that if they did not return to their allegiance, I should make a vow to Siven, the Gentoo god, whose attribute is vengeance, to march back and spread destruction throughout every possession of the defaulting Polygars: this declaration alarmed the whole assembly. I wrote to Mr. Irwin, expressing my regret on leaving the province before any settlement was concluded with the Polygars. He forwarded to me the terms on which he thought it expedient to restore their forts to Cataboma Nague, and Shevigherry.

Vakeels from these chiefs waited on me at Trimungulam,† and stipulated in the name of their masters that they would pay thirty-

* Vakeels are Deputies, Agents, or Ambassadors.

† Trimungulam is fifteen miles south-west of Madura.

thousand chuckrums each, in lieu of all preceding claims. They likewise gave their bonds for fifteen thousand pagodas, or £6,000 each, in consideration of the restitution of their forts. I farther exacted obligations that the defences of Pandalamecourehy should be demolished, the guns, stores, and ammunition removed to Palamcottah, and that the road which we cleared to the Comby of Shevigherry should continue open; that the means of defence should be removed from the place, and that the Southern Commanders and the Company's troops should at all times be admitted within their forts and barriers. I concluded with injunctions to observe a more submissive conduct if they value their lives, property, or posterity. As soon as the restitution of the forts and prisoners* could possibly take place, the 3rd and 9th Battalions, under Captain Mackinnon, were directed to march from Shevigherry, and to join me at Dindigul, whither I proceeded by the route of Madura.

Your Lordship and the Board are not unacquainted with the unworthy practices by which the fertile province of Tinnevely has suffered since the disreputable expedition thither under Maphuze Cawn and Colonel Heron. Their defeat by the Nattum Collieries, near Madura, was not more distinguished than the principles on which that and subsequent armaments against the Polygars had been conducted.

Though clear statements and specific charges, leaving no retrospect of exaction, together with simplicity of arrangement and despatch in execution, are the great barriers against malversation, the opposite of such conduct constantly prevailed; nothing was definite, nothing was concluded; partial payments were received, past claims were left for future settlement. Many months were wasted on fitting out an expedition, and still more in performing slight services. During the whole period of protraction the Renter, the Amildar, the Phouzdar, and the European Commander were reaping the harvest of corruption, and sowing for an after-growth of pecculation. The Polygars are subtle and acute, they took advantage of so corrupt a system;—and notwithstanding their internal feuds, they united against a common invader. They administered to the avarice of their opponent by bribes, and to his passion for command by procrastination. Thus the province was impaired, its cultivation failed, its manu-

* Among the prisoners there was the daughter of Cataboma Naigue, who, as well as all the others, amounting to many hundreds, were treated with the utmost attention.

factures diminished; every new Collector and Commander entailed new evils, and taught the Polygars to consider their peishcush,* not as a just tribute to their Sovereign, but as a price to purchase the forbearance of oppressors.

The conduct of Mahomed Issoof Cawn deserves to be exempted from this general accusation. While he ruled those provinces, his whole administration denoted vigour and effect. His justice was unquestioned, his word unalterable; his measures were happily combined and firmly executed, the guilty had no refuge from punishment. His maxim was, "that the labourer and the manufacturer should be the favourite children of the Circar," because they afford strength and comfort to the public parent; but that the Polygar and the Colliery, though equally entitled to truth and justice, have no pretension to indulgence, because they are the worthless prodigals who waste their own means and ravage those of others. "Let them become Zemindars," said he, "and cultivate their own lands, instead of plundering their industrious neighbours, then they shall be cherished; but while their habit is idleness, and their business devastation, I will treat every one as a public enemy who wields a pike, or wears the turban of a Polygar." On comparing the state of that country with his conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom, vigour, and integrity were never more conspicuous in any person, of whatever climate or complexion.

On my arrival at Dindigul I transmitted to your Board an order of encampment, in two lines, containing one European and three sepoy brigades, besides four flank battalions that acted as a fifth brigade. Our artillery consisted of sixty-five pieces of cannon, with field ammunition and ten thousand battering shot; the Engineer's department was stored with besieging tools and other implements; the Pioneer corps was strengthened; our cavalry, excepting three troops, were natives and irregulars; they amounted to one thousand men, and served to flank the baggage on the line of march. The Commissary of Stores Department, including the conveyance of artillery, required a numerous retinue of draught and carriage cattle; these we had for several months used unremitting efforts to procure, and by the assistance of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Johnston, in addition to our own exertions, we assembled a greater number of bullocks than ever were attached to any English force in India.

* Peishcush is the sum paid by those who hold of a Superior.

The Agent victualler was obliged to convey arrack and provisions for two thousand Europeans ; but the business of the Grainkeeper was still more embarrassing, where 14,000 fighting men and many thousand public followers* were to be subsisted without money or other means of supply, except such magazines of the enemy's as we were enabled to reduce. It had been the usage of Indian commanders to levy duties on all articles bought or sold in the bazaar or market of the army. Under whatever sanction this custom took its rise, it is an odious tax upon the soldier for the benefit of his superior. I permitted no such practice.

Another material object was, the mode and order of marching. The practice on the coast has been to form the sepoy corps three deep, and the European two deep, and then to move by files with a strong advanced guard, and a still stronger rear guard, in order to cover the carts and other wheeled conveyances that follow the line. The baggage is then disposed of on the right or left flank, according to the nature of the ground over which the army is to pass, and covered by a strong force to repel the rapid charges of the enemy's cavalry. It is asserted that many benefits attend this mode in India, that if the line is attacked on either flank, it is enabled to form with much celerity by a simple movement of conversion, and that if a charge is made in front or rear, the corps have only to advance or counter-march and form a front to the attack. But a large army marching by files is many miles in length, consequently there is little communication between distant parts of the line ; neither can a commander observe the whole extent and know the state of different divisions. If in marching by files, a movement to the front or rear is necessary in line of battle or by corps, much time is lost in the manœuvre, and in the precautions requisite in the face of an enemy. The Carnatic army, adhering to this principle, have been cannonaded many hours before they could form the line for action.

To remedy these evils, I proposed to form the army into five divisions, and to dispose them in shape of a quincunx. The European brigade, being usually placed in the centre of the line, should form the centre division of the quincunx, with a sepoy brigade in front, another on the rear, and one on each flank ; the battering train and baggage

* The public followers consist of Lascars for the tents, Drivers of bullocks, Artificers, and Dooly men to carry the sick and wounded.

to move under cover of the division least likely to be charged, and the brigades to move, not by files, but in columns, and at such distances, that whenever it may be necessary to form the line to the front, flank, or rear, the centre brigade, and that which is to become the right and left wings, may occupy the whole intermediate space. Thus, if the line is attacked in front, the centre brigade and the two flank brigades immediately form a line to the front, and the advance and rear brigades take their stations either as a second line, as a baggage guard and reserve, or to extend the main line. If the line is attacked, or if it is meant to attack on the right or left flanks, the centre brigade with the front and rear brigades face to the right and left and form the line, while the two brigades, that were the flank divisions on the line of march, are posted as circumstances may require. Thus, in every possible point of attack, the line is quickly formed, the baggage protected, and the army prepared for action.

Your instructions of the 18th August directed me to remain on the frontiers, ready to act offensively in case of an infraction on the part of Tippoo Sultaun; and for this purpose the army moved to re-occupy Daraporam. We found that the magazines which we left there in June had been greatly consumed; but there still remained a fortnight's subsistence for the troops.

We had never deviated from the ultimate object of a movement to the capital of Mysore. Guns, shot, and stores had been collected from the southern garrisons, and numerous artificers were employed on our carriages and conveyance. The zeal of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Hippisley forwarded our views, and the Rajah of Travancore had been solicited for an advance of stores in the event of our moving against the southern possessions of Tippoo Sultaun. This could not fail to coincide with the wishes of the Rajah, which induced him to support Colonel Humberstone on the Malabar Coast during the preceding year, and to reinforce his army with several battalions. I also corresponded with the Zamorin, or ancient sovereign of Calicut, and the other Rajahs, on the Malabar side of the peninsula, who were disaffected to the Mysorean usurpation, and no circumstance was omitted that appeared conducive to the important operation which we had so earnestly at heart. But although the army had acquired strength and efficiency, yet we possessed not that fulness of equipment which cannot be accomplished with an empty treasury. Tanjore and Trichinopoly

still exhibited every symptom of decline; the Marawars and Tinnevely were new in their allegiance. Those countries, therefore, far from affording payments to the army, were not competent to defray the current charges of their garrisons.

The gentlemen who zealously supplied us with stores and conveyance, were obliged to employ their personal credit, trusting to the future solvency of Government. The native troops were twelve months in arrear; our ordnance, though numerous, was of inconvenient calibres; the carriages had suffered by continued marching. Gunny bags for carrying rice, copper hoops for powder barrels, cordage for dragging the guns across a country unexplored by armies, and various other articles in the Commissary of Stores' Department, were deficient indeed, when compared with the supplies that the Carnatic army daily received from the presidency; above all, the want of money rendered it impossible to pay the head bullock men, who had employed bullocks in the service for such a length of time, that their private funds were exhausted, and their faith in the Company impaired.

During former wars there ever had been frequent payments to the troops, with which they procured supplies from the traders and inhabitants, even in the enemy's country. Under these circumstances, the conveyance of many days' provision was not indispensably required, whereas the want of magazines and money left us no security of subsistence, except the grain we could carry or capture as we advanced. For this purpose statements were procured of the grain deposited within two hundred miles of our front or flank, and several hundred people were employed on that and other business of intelligence,* nor in the whole course of our movements did we fail in any calculation of supply.

The discretionary powers with which your Board invested me, rendered it my peculiar duty to consider the mode of warfare most likely to distress the enemy. The system of a war in India, which is to depend on field operations, must ever be exposed to disappointment. In the war of 1767, General J. Smith pursued Hyder's army in a series of rapid marches, in order to bring him to a decisive action; but Hyder, after leading him through the Mysore country in various directions, marched past our army to Madras,† and intimidated the Government into a disreputable treaty.

* Tappaloo.

† Before this event took place General J. Smith was called to the Presidency, and the army was commanded by Colonel Fitzgerald.

It was obvious that our circumstances did not admit of war on such conditions ; that strong forts must be reduced, territories possessed, their magazines and revenues rendered productive ; and that we must proceed by unexpected strides to such positions as might preserve a communication with our own provinces, and at the same time form regular stages towards the capital of Mysore. This implied that we were to act on the principles of a besieging army, to make lodgments as we advanced, and still to press forward ; to diminish the resources of the enemy, while we increased our own ; to oblige him either to suffer us to proceed unmolested in the prosecution of operations, of which the ultimate object was the overthrow of his government, or else to compel him, in the obstruction of these proceedings, to afford us the wished-for opportunity of a close engagement in the field. Such was the system on which I proposed to act, trusting that the inefficiency of the opposite, or field-system, as evinced in the conduct of the war of 1767, and in the late Carnatic war, would be held sufficient to induce a change of measures ; for an army constituted as Hyder's, with a superabundance of elephants, camels, bullocks, and cavalry, must out-march an army formed of infantry, like ours, unqualified by principle and formation to commit the devastation of a Mahratta or Mysorean army. Our field operations are neither alarming to the enemy, nor productive of advantage to our own cause, and our forces, constituted for field operations only, pass through a country and leave no vestige of their services.

On the 4th of October I represented our alarming situation in case Tippoo Suldaun should leave us long in a state of uncertainty, and added, that to remain upon the frontiers in expectation of events, would be impossible, for we could not hope to procure more than a month's provision within the district. That to fall back upon the Company's southern possessions would frustrate your intentions, and exhaust the produce of those countries ; besides, so large an army, unpaid and unemployed, is ever at the mercy of the first incident that may occasion discontent. These considerations induced me to solicit from your Lordship and the Board a latitude of purveyance, even in the enemy's country, in case his protractions should endanger the safety of the troops so critically situated.

In October the army marched towards Pulney, about thirty miles south of Darapooram, in order to put the Renter of Diindigul's family in possession of their inheritance, or petty Rajahship of Pulney. They

assured me of grain and cattle at that place ; and this was the last resource we had to expect without advancing into the enemy's country, or falling back on the southern provinces. Most fortunately, while impressed with the approach of these impending difficulties, an official letter from Messrs. Frith and Paterson, members of the Residency of Tellicherry, informed me of a re-commencement of hostility on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, against Mangalore. I consequently held myself bound by your instructions of the 18th August, to take immediate measures to resent the infraction.

On the 18th October it became my duty to inform your Board of the embarrassments under which we laboured, and to intimate my intention of moving in full force to the westward. The immediate object of this movement was the relief of Mangalore : the ultimate object was the reduction of Hyder's family, or at least the attainment of a respectable accommodation. Our expectation of relieving Mangalore by an actual appearance before the place, was exceedingly remote, for we had not less than five hundred miles of an enemy's country to traverse. There appeared but two practicable movements of sufficient moment to make Tippoo raise the siege of Mangalore. The one was to move by Coimbatore, Settemungalum, and the pass of Gudgereddy, which leads up the ghauts or mountains on which the kingdom of Mysore is elevated, directly to the Mysore fort and Seringapatam ; the other was to move against Palghautcherry.

I have already stated my design of moving to Tippoo's capital, with views of forming a permanent establishment. For this purpose an intermediate place of strength and resources was required, to serve as a magazine of stores and provisions for the prosecution of our undertaking, or to secure a retreat, if necessary ; neither Coimbatore, though the capital of a rich Rajahship, nor Settemungalum, nor Ardenelli, which are the principal forts in the direct road from Darapooram to the city of Seringapatam, were of sufficient strength to justify our trusting any of them as our main deposit. For the unexpected loss of such a magazine, while the army might be several hundred miles advanced in an enemy's country, surrounded by a formidable force, might have subjected us to disasters of which the English armies defeated and taken prisoners during the war were melancholy remembrances.

Palghautcherry* held forth every advantage ; it was a place of the

* Palghautcherry was completely re-built by Hyder, since the war of 1767 with the English, and was furnished with all the advantages of European construction and defence.

first strength in India ; while its territory afforded a superabundance of provisions. The mountains that bound the pass which it commands, are strengthened by thick forests and surrounding woods, and the intersections of the Ponany river, through deep rice grounds, all concurred to enable a small body of infantry to defend the territory against any number of horse. It commanded, farther, the only practicable communication between the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and promised us possession of all the countries from Trichinopoly by Darapooram, in a reach of more than two hundred miles. It opened the means of supply from Travancore, Cochin, and other places on the Malabar coast. It afforded confidence to the Zamorin and other disaffected Rajahs, from Cochin to Goa, who were struggling to shake off the yoke of Hyder. It left us at liberty to disguise our movements, and to proceed either by the route of Coimbatore and Gudgereddy, or by Calicut on the Malabar coast, and the pass of Damalcherry, to the siege of Seringapatam. It was, besides, of such intrinsic consequence to the Mysore Government, that the reduction of it could not fail to weigh essentially in the negotiations for peace, then said to be in agitation, and promised to make Tippoo Sultaun raise the siege of Mangalore, in order to oppose our farther progress.

We marched from Pulney in October, reduced the forts of Cumalum, Chucklygerry, and Annamally, and passed through a rich country abounding with dry grain, cattle, wood, and rice fields. At Poliatchy the ground attains its highest elevation, and the streams run east and west to the Coromandel and Malabar seas. During our whole march through this part of the country, the flank brigade, under Captain Maitland, moved constantly in front, occupied positions, and secured provisions for the army.

From Annamally our progress became truly laborious ; we had to force our way through a forest twenty miles in depth, extending thirty miles across the pass of Palghaut. Our object was to reach Calingoody, a post on the western side of the forest, within fifteen miles of Palghautcherry. The frequent ravines required to be filled up before it was possible to drag the guns across them ; innumerable large trees, which obstructed the passage, required to be cut down and drawn out of the intended track, and then the whole road was then to be formed before the carriages could pass. The brigades were distributed to succeed each other at intervals, preceded by pioneers, in order to clear

what the advanced body had opened, for the guns and stores that were to move under cover of the rear division.

While we were thus engaged, an unremitting rain, extremely unusual at that season, commenced. The ravines were filled with water, the paths became slippery, the bullocks lost their footing, and the troops were obliged to drag the guns and carriages across the whole forest. I forced on with the advance to Calingoody, in order to make the necessary arrangements with the people of the Zamorin, who had prepared for the future subsistence of the army. The disposition of the inhabitants towards us, and their means of supply, exceeded our most sanguine expectations. The Zamorin's vakeel informed the Brahmins that we were friends to their cause, and eager to deliver them from the yoke of Hyder; that we only wished to receive the public proportion of grain, but none from individuals, and that any person belonging to the camp who should attempt to plunder, would be hanged in front of the lines. On hearing these declarations they testified the strongest satisfaction, and their confidence increased when they found that the first offenders were executed. The rains continued fourteen days without intermission, the passage through the forest became daily more distressful, and the troops were exposed, in their whole progress, without the possibility of pitching tents or of affording them either cover or convenience.

Calingoody is fifteen miles from Palghautcherry, and the road lies entirely through rice grounds, with intersecting ridges covered with cocoa and other trees; the water and embankments necessary for the cultivation of rice render it difficult for guns to pass, and impracticable for cavalry to act. As soon as a sufficient force got through the wood, the advance corps moved to the bank of the Ponany river, within random shot of the works of Palghautcherry. There we took a secure position, and prepared to attack the place. My Brahmin Hircarrahs* had executed a model of the fort in clay, a work at which they are extremely dexterous, and on all hands we had received accounts of it that appeared exaggerated; but on a near inspection, my admiration of its strength was mingled with serious apprehensions that much time might be wasted on its reduction.

On the 4th of November the main body of the troops, not including the rear division, arrived at our position on the river, which we crossed next day, and encamped about two miles east from the fort across the

* Hircarrahs are people who give intelligence, shew roads, &c.

great road that leads from Coimbatore. The Engineer's stores arrived, and a post for them was established, where all the preparations for a siege were collected. As our next object was to circumscribe the besieged and accelerate our approaches, with this view we occupied the pettah, or open town, on the east and north faces of the fort; and on each of these faces we carried forward an attack. During the whole period of our approaches, and in the construction of our trenches, parallels, and batteries, the besieged kept a continued fire on our covering and working parties. The battering train and stores, under cover of the 4th brigade, reached our encampment on the 9th, after a succession of toils that would appear incredible if recited in detail.

Apprehending much delay from the strength of the defences and the obstinacy of the defenders, especially if they should force us to approach by sap to the crest of the glacis, and to proceed from thence by regular gradations across the ditch, we resolved, at a seasonable opportunity, to attempt the gateway. We found it so strongly flanked and fortified, that it appeared almost secure from any attack; however, having no drawbridge, we founded our hopes of accelerating the siege on this circumstance. We did not permit any heavy metal whatever to be fired till the 13th, when we opened with twelve guns and four howitzers from two batteries, at four hundred yards distance from the east and north faces of the fort, and before sunset the defences were so much damaged, that the fire of the besieged considerably abated. The fortunate circumstances attending our attack, and the surrender of the place during the night, are explained in my letter of the 15th November.

On the surrender of Palghautcherry, I appointed Captain Dewar, one of your ablest officers, to command there, and the 19th Battalion, with a few Europeans and some Irregulars to garrison the place. The heir apparent of the Zamorin left his retirement in the woods, and remained with me during the siege. In answer to his urgent solicitations that I should restore him to the dominions of which Hyder had deprived his family, I declared that in the event of our moving by Calicut, I hoped to effect his re-establishment there; and that, in the meanwhile, he should be re-instated in the territory of Palghaut, an ancient dependency of the Zamorins, requiring only from him that he should furnish grain for the army while in that vicinity, without any other obligation, until the termination of the war, or until your Government should make some regular agreement with him. To estab-

lish more fully the Zamorin's authority, and to afford him the necessary support in his present situation, a large body of Brahmin hircarrahs, who had constantly remained with me in camp, were employed, and proved not only of material service in the business of intelligence, but of material influence in conciliating the Gentoos. Accompanied by them we frequently rode through the adjacent villages, assembled the head people, and assured them of protection.

During these proceedings I maintained a correspondence with Brigadier-General Macleod, Colonel Campbell, and the Residency of Tellicherry, intimating my intention of approaching that coast, and assuring General Macleod of my earnest wish to co-operate with him in every measure that could tend to advance us in full force against Seringapatam. Having heard that there was abundance of battering guns and military stores at Tellicherry, I wrote for such supplies as could be spared, offering to move down to Ponany or Calicut, and to proceed to Seringapatam either by the pass of Damalcherry, through the country of our friends the Nairs, or else to return from Ponany or Calicut to Palghautcherry, and from thence by Coimbatore, as he might judge most eligible.

The Admiral, Sir Edward Hughes; being then at Tellicherry with the squadron, I intreated him to send a vessel with stores to Ponany; and to guard against disappointment, despatched messengers to Cochin, to secure an ample supply at that place. General Macleod, with his distinguished liberality of character, assured me that he would unite in prosecuting the movement to Seringapatam, without taking any advantage of his seniority, and without interfering in the command of the southern army in the event of my moving towards him. Finding, however, that his army could not be put in motion in less than two months for want of bullocks and conveyance, that no substantial stock of military means could be expected at Tellicherry, and that we should meet with extreme obstruction in our progress through the deep and intersected routes leading from Palghautcherry to Calicut, we resolved to rely on Cochin for supplies, and to prosecute our measures by Coimbatore, still preserving the utmost union of operation with the Malabar Army.

We arrived before Coimbatore on the 26th November, having been annoyed with rockets on the march, by a very large body of horse. Finding that there was no glacis, we proceeded immediately to erect a battery, but before we had effected a breach, the Killadar* surrendered.

* Commandant of the Fort.

We treated him and his garrison with the utmost kindness, as we had done those of Darapooram and Palghautcherry. A great quantity of ammunition, stores, and grain, were found in the fort, and the adjacent grounds were covered with abundant crops. The possession of this town, being the capital of the greatest ancient Rajahship in the country, promised eminent advantage; for, although not remarkable for its military strength, it is held in higher estimation than any other place belonging to the Mysoreans in the Payen ghaut, or country below the mountains.

We now arrive at the most interesting moment of the war. The garrison of Mangalore, under its inestimable Commander Colonel Campbell, had made a defence that has been seldom equalled and never surpassed. With a handful of men, worn out by fatigue and famine, he resisted for many months a formidable army under Tippoo Suldaun. The whole power of that Prince, assisted by the science of his French auxiliaries, could not force a breach that had long been open; and he was repulsed in every attempt to carry it by storm. Tippoo's army, particularly the cavalry, had suffered greatly by a perseverance in the siege during the whole period of the rainy season. The interior affairs of his dominions, unsettled since the recent accession, were in extreme confusion. His failure against Mangalore had encouraged the Coorga Rajah, a powerful chief under the mountains that separate the Malabar country from Mysore, to assert independency by arms; every other ancient Rajah on the Malabar coast, from Goa to Cochin, was eager to repel the tyranny of the Mysore Government, to which the whole of that extensive coast no longer owned subjection.

General Macleod, at the head of the Malabar forces, strong in Europeans, artillery, and native corps, supported these Rajahs, and laboured with his usual energy to complete the system that he had materially promoted. There was likewise a force acting under General Jones, against the Cuddapah country, or northern possession of Tippoo Suldaun, where his power was ill-established; and the army under my direction was, perhaps, the strongest force belonging to Europeans that had ever been employed in India.

The countries we had reduced extended two hundred miles in length from the districts of Trichinopoly on the east, to Ramgarry, thirty miles west of Palghautcherry, afforded provisions for one hundred thousand men, and an annual revenue of £600,000, while every necessary arrangement had been made for the regular collection of these resources.

The fort and pass of Palghautcherry secured our western flank, and the intermediate position of General Macleod's army, between that place and Tippoo's main army at Mangalore, together with the singular combination of ravines, rivers, and embankments that intersect the Malabar countries, and the mountains that divide them from Mysore, the passes through which were occupied by our friends the disaffected Rajahs, rendered it almost impracticable for Tippoo to move in that direction against our new acquisitions. To attack them by a movement through the passes of the ghauts on the eastern flank towards Salem and Erode, supposed a circuit of five or six hundred miles from the position of Tippoo's army before Mangalore ; his movements, therefore, against these acquisitions, could only be attempted by the central passes from Mysore at Gudgereddy, which is not fifty miles from Coimbatore. The possession of that pass assured us an immediate access to the capital of Tippoo's kingdom, commanding a communication with our new acquisitions and with the Company's southern provinces. Besides, as far as the system of defending front, flanks, and rear can ever be extended from the position of an army to the topographical circumstances of a country, it would enable us to secure these territories from any considerable irruptions. At this period, too, the chumba, or great crop throughout the country was upon the ground, and, independently of the magazines in our front, promised ample provisions.

The Coorga Rajah had repeatedly promised us supplies from his country, extending within thirty miles of Seringapatam. These assurances were confirmed by the Zamorin, who had abundantly furnished us with grain at Palghautcherry ; he likewise engaged for the assistance of all the Malabar chiefs commanding the ghauts, or mountains that bound Mysore upon the west. They were not only willing to provide for us during the siege, but to form magazines for us in strong positions among the mountains, and to join us with twenty or thirty thousand Nairs, if required.

Mahomed Ally and some other distinguished leaders had been executed in the camp of Tippoo, for exciting disaffection. A recent conspiracy had occurred in Seringapatam, menacing the exclusion of Tippoo's family, the releasement of the English prisoners, and the re-establishment of the ancient Rana, or Gentoo Sovereign of Mysore. The Gentoo or Canara race, forming the great mass of inhabitants in Mysore, had unequivocal proofs of my earnest zeal to support their in-

terests and favourite family. In short, every circumstance seemed to mark this interesting moment as the crisis of the war.

The troops were immediately provided with ten days' grain ; the carriages were repaired, the departments arranged, and the army prepared to march. My design against the forts and magazines of Settimungalum* and Ardenelli was communicated to your Board ; from thence it was my intention to push forward to the city of Seringapatam with the utmost rapidity that could be united with precaution. Exulting in the bright perspective that lay before us, we felt a painful eagerness for the moment of departure, but our expectations of restoring the English name and consequence in India were of short duration.

Your Lordship and the Board had judged it expedient to delegate your powers of negotiation to Commissioners, who were to treat of peace at the durbar of Tippoo Sultaun. Invested with full authority by your Board to give what instructions they thought proper to all troops of the English employed against the Mysoreans, they proceeded to the camp of Mudeen Ul Deen Cawn, near Arnee, in the Carnatic. Between that place and Atcherrywaukum they received intelligence, that in consequence of information from the Residency of Tellicherry, intimating to me a renewal of hostility on the part of Tippoo Sultaun against Mangalore, the army under my command had moved into the enemy's country, and had reduced Palghautcherry. After many compliments to my own conduct and exertions, they directed me forthwith to restore all posts, forts, and countries recently reduced, and to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the 26th of the preceding July. This letter reached me on the 28th November, two days before my intended march towards Gudgereddy and Seringapatam.

Neither feeling myself at liberty to disregard an order so peremptorily conveyed, nor to fulfil the utmost extent of its literal signification, I stated to them the benefits of our position, and the menacing appearance on the Malabar coast ; transmitting at the same time similar communications to your Board, and intimating my intention of remaining at Coimbatore, until I should be further instructed. My Aide-de-Camp, Captain Moody, with the same view, proceeded to Madras, and was fully qualified, by knowledge and ability, to explain our situation, and to prove that a movement to Seringapatam would endanger the throne of Hyder.

* Settimungalum is situated on the banks of the Cauvery below the pass of Gudgereddy. Ardenelli stands on the top of the ghauts on the elevated flat or table-land of Mysore.

During the succeeding interval, every moment was employed in adding to the fulness of our equipment. Rochin Cawn,* the commander of Tippoo's army in the country of Coimbatore, was informed that I would observe the cessation till farther orders. Captain Maitland, with the flank brigade, proceeded to Dindigul and Tanjore, in order to bring supplies of stores from the southern garrisons. Mr. Digby, Paymaster in camp, whose zeal and public talents have, on all occasions, been conspicuous, went to procure money at Tinnevely, and to concert with Mr. Irwin, Superintendent there, a permanent mode of remittance and supply: and as soon as this reinforcement should be ready to move towards us, it was my intention to fall back and cover the junction. In the meantime, the 3rd Brigade was detached by Palghautcherry to Cochin, where the Governor had prepared for us a considerable stock of arrack, stores, and ammunition; while the main body of the army remained at Coimbatore, ready to oppose the enemy. But these, and all similar arrangements, were rendered abortive by your Minutes of Consultation dated 5th December, directing me to fulfil the order of unqualified restitution enjoined by your deputies as the preliminaries of negotiation with Tippoo Sul-taun. These papers reached me about the middle of December, and a few days afterwards I received from the Commissioners another letter, repeating their instructions.

We had entirely consumed the grain in Coimbatore, and all that was ripe in the adjacent fields. We were not at liberty to move in our intended course, nor to look for new supplies, which would have been deemed an infraction of the cessation, we had therefore to return to Palghautcherry, where the troops received grain to subsist them as far as Trichinopoly and Madura, a distance of two hundred miles. On the 28th December the army advanced towards the southern countries; and at the same time three battalions under Captain Wheeler were detached to escort the stores from Cochin, with directions to evacuate Palghautcherry and to join us by the route of Annamally and Pulney, close to the mountains. On our second march, we were visited by the Reverend Mr. Swartz, whom your Lordship and the Board requested to proceed to Seringapatam as a faithful interpreter between Tippoo and the Commissioners. The knowledge and integrity of this irreproachable missionary have retrieved the character of Europeans from imputations of general depravity. A respectable escort attended him

* Habits of intercourse took place between Rochin Cawn's camp and ours, of which there had been no example between contending armies in India.

to the nearest encampment of the enemy ; but he was stopped at Settimgalum, and returned to Tanjore. I rejoice, however, that he undertook the business, for his journal, which has been before your Board, evinces that the southern army acted towards our enemies with a mildness seldom experienced by friends in moments of pacification. From him, also, you learned that this conduct operated on the minds of the inhabitants, who declared that we afforded them more secure protection than the commanders of their own troops.

The army had now been fed for many months entirely at the expense of the enemy, and directions were given that all grain found in the country should be served out to the troops in lieu of batta,* thereby saving to the Company an advance of nearly £500 per day for the whole time the army was so subsisted, and leaving the troops to make their after-claims, in case they should expect that grain, on the footing of capture.†

On the 4th January 1784, the army arrived at Ayryacotta. Colonel Stuart, with the main division, proceeded to Caroor, on the borders of the Trichinopoly country ; Colonel Forbes, with a strong force, remained in the districts of Daraporam and Dindigul ; and Colonel Kelly, with another division, advanced to Covanoor, on the borders of Madura and the Marawas. This distribution was intended to relieve your provinces from the burden of subsisting too large a proportion of troops ; at the same time the divisions were so stationed as to overawe every district to the southward, and to form the army on the shortest notice in the event of a renewal of the war against Tippoo Sultaun. I proceeded with the Covanoor division, as the most central situation to the southward.

These arrangements were hardly finished, when I received your orders to re-assemble the army,‡ and to prepare for a re-commencement of hostility. You likewise directed me to retain possession of Palghautcherry, in case by any accident it should not have been restored. I instantly issued orders to all the garrisons and stations to augment our equipment ; wrote to Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hippisley, and the other gentlemen in the Civil Departments, entreating them to procure bullocks, gunny bags, and money for the pressing exigencies of the

* Batta is the extra sum allowed to troops over and above their pay in lieu of subsistence while in the field.

† Some other armies had charged the Company with the batta due to every soldier in the field, notwithstanding the captured grain was sufficient for the maintenance of the troops. Thus the amount of grain found was diverted from public saving to the benefit of individuals. If I had permitted this practice, the Company would have lost £200,000.

‡ January 24, 1784.

army; and farther made a circuit of the southern countries to accelerate these preparations. From Ramnad I went to Tinnevely to forward the business of money and conveyance collecting for us there by Mr. Irwin; and from thence I wrote to the Zamorin, exhorting him to retain Palghautcherry, which he had occupied after it was abandoned by Captain Wheeler. Captain Agnew was soon after dispatched with a party of Sepoys to solicit four battalions from the Rajah of Travancore, who very graciously complied with my request; and by means of that assistance Captain Agnew would no doubt have enabled the Zamorin to maintain the place, but before his arrival the Zamorin* and his adherents, despairing of support, had abandoned the place, and retired to their recesses in the mountains.

On the north-east border of the Tinnevely country I received a letter from the Commissioners, dated 11th February, near Mangalore, written in terms that fully marked the enmity of Tippoo, and convinced me that a rupture was unavoidable; and this opinion was confirmed by a detail of particulars in a letter from General Macleod. No time was therefore to be lost in ordering the stores to join Colonel Stuart's division near Caroor, and we marched the same night to Madura.

On my arrival at Covanoor,† I found that fanams‡ amounting to a lakh of pagodas, had reached camp from Tanjore. The impatience of the troops for this supply was proportioned to the severity of their distress; excepting the prize-money at Palghautcherry, and the working money to the parties employed on extra labour, no sums had been issued to the army during our whole progress in crossing and re-crossing India. Unfortunately the coin in which this payment was received became a more copious source of discontent than all the hardships they had endured. The star pagoda§ is understood to be the only legal tender of your Presidency. It is not coined to the southward, but its place had usually been supplied by the Porto Novo pagoda, which is less valuable by ten per cent. The Rajah of Tanjore has not exercised the right of coining pagodas, and of late has paid the tribute in fanams. The Dutch coinage at Negapatam formerly amounted to four or five

* The Zamorin and his followers of the Nair caste are rigid Gentoos, and venerate the Bramins. Tippoo's soldiers, therefore, daily exposed the heads of many Bramins in sight of the Fort. It is asserted that the Zamorin, rather than witness such enormities, chose to abandon Palghautcherry.

† Colonel Kelly's division was stationed there. It is on the confines of the Marawa country, less than twenty miles from Madura.

‡ Fanams are a small coin of different value composed of silver and copper.

§ The star pagoda is worth eight shillings.

lakhs of pagodas annually, but this has been discontinued since we got possession of that city. As there is no gold coinage in any other place to the southward, nor any regular circulation of rupees, the whole currency of those provinces, excepting the pagodas that happen to be in use, consists of fanams; of these, every district coins a different sort, and no comparative rate has ever been established between the star pagodas and these inferior coins, their value fluctuates according to the relative demand, and the coinage of one province is seldom or never at par in another.

Whenever it is known that a large issue of fanams is at hand, the Shroffs, Soucars, and Dubashes purchase all the pagodas they can procure. Thus the fanams are kept at a high price, till the disbursement has taken place, and the rate is fixed at the current exchange for the day. But no sooner has this fluctuating coin been circulated, than the pagodas come forth, and in forty-eight hours the holders of fanams suffer a depreciation of six, eight, or ten per cent.

Still more oppressive is this medium of public payment when the fanams are issued in a province to which they do not properly belong; for the Tanjore fanam has no regular currency in any other province. This applies to all coins of that description fabricated in Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinnevely, Ramnad, and Shevagunga.

The commercial evils arising from this debasement and diversity of coin are not less considerable. A merchant cannot make a remittance to any place north of the Coleroon, without much labour and expense in buying up pagodas, or else by an unreasonable premium to Soucars. The money remitted to the Army from Tanjore, was issued in Tanjore fanams at the rate of $22\frac{1}{2}$ per star pagoda; but when the Sepoys received this money in distant encampments, they found that twenty-four or twenty-five fanams were required for a pagoda there; nor could they in many instances, without enormous loss, procure the necessaries of life for those uncurrent fanams.

To prevent as much as possible the troops from suffering by a loss upon exchange, which in common justice should fall upon the public, it was proposed to Mr. Sullivan, and immediately acceded to by him, that the Paymaster should carry the difference to the account of the Company. It was therefore directed that the Officers commanding divisions of the army should form a Board to ascertain the loss sustained by each battalion, and Mr. Digby, Paymaster in camp, was instructed to give credit to the corps for the amount of loss incurred, agree-

ably to the general statement transmitted to me by the above-mentioned Board.

It appeared requisite to be minute in this recapitulation in order to impress the necessity of reform in the southern payments. This will be effected by ordering a large coinage of pagodas, and by establishing a tariff, or proportional value, between the pagodas and fanams, in the same manner as in England twenty-one shillings are at all times equivalent to a guinea.

My next object was to concert measures with Mr. Sullivan for the safety of the southern countries, while the army should, for the third time, advance into the enemy's dominions. With this view I proceeded to Tanjore, and from thence by Trichinopoly joined the main division at Caroor. You had been pleased to reinforce us from the Presidency with the 98th Regiment, a party of European Artillerymen, and some heavy ordnance. Other guns we received from Tanjore, and the exertions of Mr. Sullivan procured us many articles in which we had been before deficient.

During my late progress through the southern countries, Mr. Digby called forth every exertion of his personal credit, and in addition to conveyance for the whole ordnance, ammunition, and stores of the army, he had actually provided carriage complete for 300,000 seers of rice, which, at the rate of one seer per day each for 15,000 men, amounted to twenty days' provisions for the whole force, independently of other conveyance, amounting to ten days more. The main body of the army was assembled at Caroor, excepting the division with Colonel Forbes, which remained in force at Daraporam, ready to join at the shortest notice. Nothing farther was wanting but specific orders from your Lordship and the Board, or from the Commissioners, to re-commence hostility.

I had still a plan of operations in view that promised to lead us to the capital of Mysore, by a route not less favourable than that which we had been directed to relinquish, in case it should have been judged necessary to renew the war. This event became extremely probable from the recent conduct of our adversaries. Previously to my arrival at Caroor, a foraging party had been attacked, and an European officer, who fell into the enemy's hands, was closely confined at San-karydurgum. The 2nd Battalion had been advanced from General Jones' force to the northward, and was entirely cut to pieces by Tippoo's troops near Cumalum; while Tippoo himself, finding that the

Southern Army was ordered to abandon his country, and that no other force could venture to oppose him, persisted in his investment of Mangalore, and compelled that distinguished garrison at last to yield to the necessity of famine, and surrender the place.*

Notwithstanding the flagrant treachery by which Mangalore was lost, and the deliberate massacre of General Mathews,† with many other captive English officers, the Treaty of Peace was mutually signed on the 11th of February, and exchanged between the Commissioners and Tippoo Sultaun. The treaty specified the enlargement of the Bushwana, or Amildar of Palghautcherry, who had been detained in order to give evidence concerning the murder of a party of Europeans taken prisoners near Palghaut, at the time that Colonel Humberton's army was before that place. He was sent with an escort to the camp of Nawas Begg, and from thence returned me his thanks for the good treatment he experienced. This was the only subject of Tippoo's who had not been immediately released, although nearly 10,000 prisoners had been taken by us during the operations of the Southern Army. The Commissioners also directed to restore the forts and countries of Caroor and Daraporam, but to retain possession of Dindigul, and to station a strong force there until the English prisoners should be actually enlarged.

I lost no time in evacuating the specified countries; and on the 1st of April Colonel Forbes' division moved to Dindigul, and Colonel Stuart fell back from Caroor upon the province of Trichinopoly, with instructions to deposit all the stores and heavy ordnance of the army in that garrison. While we remained at Dindigul the troops in that quarter suffered a continuation of fatigue, and were obliged to march seventy miles to the head of the Outumpollum valley, to receive the grain necessary for their current subsistence.

In obedience to your orders desiring my opinion on the most advantageous mode of reforming and arranging the southern forces, I had the honour, on the 26th of April, to express my sentiments on that important subject, and suggested that the vicinity of Trichinopoly was the most eligible position for a cantonment, where a strong force, complete in every circumstance of field equipment, should at all times be stationed. That the great deposit of military stores and provisions should be formed there, with the field and battering train,

* Colonel Campbell marched off with his few remaining troops to Tellicherry, agreeably to the stipulation with Tippoo, and died soon after, worn out with fatigue.

† This party was put to death by the express order of Tippoo Sultaun.

pioneers, and main body of the southern artillery. That the Commandants of corps should be charged with the carriage of their battalion tents, stores, and ammunition, as well as rice, if requisite, at the usual rates specified in the Company's regulations. It was also suggested, that whenever military aid should be found necessary for the interior business of the country, the Civil Chiefs, Residents and Superintendents, should address their applications, not to the subordinate officers casually employed in the different districts, but to the Southern Commander, in order that the requisition might be complied with from the main station or cantonment of the southern forces. By these means the troops would be preserved in a constant state of discipline, the jarrings incident to the detail of subordinate interference between civil and military would be avoided, and every corps would have a rotation of detachment duty. An immediate reduction of peons, tynauts, and other irregulars was also recommended, to the amount of 10,000 men, from whence a monthly saving of 25 or 30,000 pagodas would ensue. I flattered myself that the adoption of arrangements proposed in that letter would have removed the deficiencies under which the southern forces labour, and that, in the event of hostility in that part of India, they would have added such vigour to your operations as would have precluded a renewal of those calamities which occurred during the late Carnatic war.

By the end of May, it became impracticable to subsist so large a force in the Dindigul country. A strong garrison was therefore left in that fortress, and the division was withdrawn towards Madura, where the Europeans and some native corps were cantoned. As soon as the review of battalions was finished, which had engaged me for several months, three battalions were detached under Captain Wheeler to the Tinnevely country; and at the same time it became necessary for me to move thither in person, in order to arrange a permanency of payment and supply for the troops in that province. Some occurrences which happened there respecting the Polygars, Catabomi Naigue, and Shevigherry, were immediately communicated to your President, and evinced the refractory disposition of that race. From Tinnevely I proceeded by Negapatam and Tanjore to Trichinopoly, in order to provide by personal endeavours for the distress of the troops.

It now remained for me to undergo a duty more painful than all the embarrassments hitherto experienced. Your Lordship and the Board found it requisite to order a reduction of many thousand independents

and other southern Irregulars who had been raised by His Highness the Nabob Mahomed Ally. During the whole period of misfortunes to the southward they still bore the rigour of distress with a resignation unknown to Europeans. Among these men there were the most respectable soldiers of the East; some of them had followed their fathers into the Carnatic in the days of Doost Ally and Anwaradeen Cawn; others had been in the service since the days of Chanda Saheb and the deposed Ranee, or Gentoo queen of Trichinopoly; many of them had continued, since the campaigns of Lawrence, Clive, and Issoff Cawn, in a constant series of military duty. To these wretched adherents, an average of twelve months' pay was due. The misfortunes of the times rendered it impossible to discharge those claims, for the regular corps of the army were not less in arrears. Under such circumstances, to turn them adrift to misery, while the country was in a state that could afford them no relief, would have distressed the most unfeeling mind. They assailed me daily with their sufferings, and the only expedient adopted was that promised to combine the duties of obedience with the obligations of humanity, by directing the Officers commanding the corps of those Irregulars, to furnish me with rolls containing the names of each black officer and sepoy under their command, specifying the length of service and arrears of pay, in order that each of them might receive a certificate of his demand on the Company, to be counter-signed by the officer, and by the Commandant of the garrison, with which the corps corresponded; at the same time desiring a particular recommendation of every individual who had any pretensions to indulgence.

This being finished, our next object was to disband the raw and undeserving rabble, who had been collected during the distracted period of the southern affairs. They were ordered to receive on the first of each succeeding month, thirty days' subsistence in grain, to be continued until their arrears should be discharged. The ancient and respectable part of those corps were to be continued on the rolls, until we should be able to procure some adequate provision for so deserving a class of public servants. In neither instance, however, did my endeavours prove effectual. The latter class of venerable veterans remains unprovided for, and the monthly issuing of grain depending on your renters and civil servants, it was not within the limits of my power to enforce performance. So much was it neglected by the renter of Trichinopoly, that after I left the south, these unfortunate victims,

impelled by hunger, were driven to such excess in their endeavours to procure relief, as obliged the military commandant to repress them by force of arms.

To these painful incidents were added the claims and distresses of the army encamped near Trichinopoly.* The troops were accustomed to endure twelve or fourteen months' arrears with unexampled forbearance, and the public followers, attendants on the army, had long been strangers to any coin. When to this was added a failure of their daily allowance of grain in lieu of batta, their case would have been truly desperate, had not Tondiman advanced a month's provision for their relief. Such were the abuses of the renter at Trichinopoly, that in a favourable season the place was menaced by famine. His disinclination to have a division stationed in the district suggested this mode of effecting their removal. But by this machination any troops less patient than ours would have been excited to revolt, and the Fort of Trichinopoly would have fallen to Tippoo, if he had thought proper to invest it at that moment.

So urgent was our distress that I found myself obliged, without any previous communication, to disperse the troops in quest of subsistence; the 78th to Tanjore, the Hanoverians towards Tripatore, a large body of sepoys towards Madura, and other battalions to Mellore and the Marawas. At the same time the 101st, and soon after the 98th, were ordered to the Presidency, to embark from thence for Bengal, on their way to Europe.

Your Lordship and the Board were fully impressed with the necessity of reducing the public followers and field establishment of the army, in order to lighten the burthen of expenditure and to liquidate part of those arrears already incurred; but the protraction of the treaty with Tippoo induced your Board to defer that measure until the mutual restitution of Amboor and Dindigul should be effected. That event at last took place, while his cruel massacre was strong in every memory, while his insulting treatment of those whom he released excited general indignation, and while his detention of

* Such were the embarrassments and distress under which the different Presidencies laboured, that notwithstanding these incidents, the Treaty of Peace with Tippoo Sultaun was generally considered as a measure eligible and necessary for the English in terests in India. It is also a prevalent opinion that if the negotiations had not been conducted under some unfavourable circumstances, the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Sir George Staunton were peculiarly adapted to procure the most honourable and beneficial terms.

two hundred English prisoners* seemed to preclude all pacific expectations

I hastened to Fort Saint George to lay before your Right Honourable President a faithful statement of your southern affairs; of our proceedings and expenditure; to explain the meritorious conduct of the troops in that quarter, and the eminent exertions made by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin at the head of the Civil department; to prove that even their abilities had not been able entirely to correct the mismanagement existing in the southern system; and to point out resources for the speedy liquidation of the army arrears. It was my intention from thence to have embarked with my own Regiment for Bengal, where I should have been senior Officer of the King's service, and second in command on that establishment; but I could not think of withdrawing from the southern station while any thing remained for me to represent in behalf of your southern forces.

Permit me now, my Lord and Gentlemen, to offer my best apologies for the tediousness of this recapitulation. It exhibits various incidents in their rise, progress, and completion. In this view it may prove not altogether uninteresting to that class of public servants, who wish to derive after-information from past transactions. At all events, I presume it has sufficiently evinced that our endeavours having proved less permanently advantageous than might have been expected, arose from the circumstances under which we acted, and can neither be attributed to me nor to the army I commanded.

It is fully known to your Board, that the system of conciliation to which Mr. Sullivan and myself had rigidly adhered,† does not accord with the opinions of any considerable portion of either service. Various circumstances of contention had, for many years, excited enmity between the Civil and Military. These habits of disunion were greatly strengthened during the government of Sir Thomas Rumbold, when the pretensions of your subordinate chiefs were either established or confirmed. By the regulations to which I allude, the commandant of a garrison or province came under the detail command of the civil

* He had them circumcised and enrolled in his service.

† Notwithstanding the dissensions that raged among all ranks of Europeans in India, I had the good fortune to avoid every species of discussion; having neither exhibited a charge, nor been the subject of a complaint from any person in the country.

chief. The chief received reports and parols, kept the keys of the garrison, and had directions of stores, magazines, and defences in the fort. Hence it happened, during the late war, that the command was not delegated to the military officer until the enemy were in motion against the place. Then it was only so delegated that the chief might provide for his own safety, and throw the odium of surrender on the commander. Thus, instead of a regular military control, a systematic animosity prevailed. The magazines were left without grain, the garrisons without stores, and the country so destitute of preparation, that on the irruption of Hyder Ali, the forts in the Carnatic fell an easy prey to the invader. These irritations were too frequently increased by military vehemence on the one hand, and by assumptions of the civil service on the other.

As the natives of Hindoostan have little respect for any but the military character, the Civil Servants, in order to acquire consequence, have usually assumed a superiority over the military. Thus the Chief or Resident was frequently held forth as the Phouzdar or General of the province, who was prevented by greater objects from taking the field, but whose mandates the soldiery were bound to obey. The recent contests between Government and the Military commanders, together with the unusual proportion of King's Officers lately employed in India, have unavoidably thrown into circulation a greater mass of opinions adverse to the civil service, and given a greater currency to military pretensions than could be expected from the officers of your own establishment. To these irritating circumstances has been added the extreme pressure of personal distress in a pernicious climate, where there is perpetual hostility and continued fatigue.

During the late war many officers were obliged to sell their furniture and wearing apparel, in order to procure a scanty subsistence; while others could not possibly find means of appearing as became their station. If a pittance of their arrears was to be advanced, it often came attended with circumstances so singularly disreputable, that nothing short of penury could justify the offer or acceptance. If in Company's bonds, they were hardly negotiable; if in Bengal bills, the holders of them lost thirty, forty, or fifty per cent.; and if the payment took place in an out-garrison, the discretion or caprice of the Paymaster alone determined the mode of payment. Needy officers, at the mercy of such a superior, have frequently submitted to receive a month's arrears in rice, teas, wines,

and other merchandize.* When these and similar incidents recur to your remembrance ; when you recollect how patiently your troops have suffered, and how bravely they have fought, I am persuaded you will admit that their present discontents are not ill-founded, and that their grievances call loudly for redress.

It is by the good order and efficiency of the military constitution alone, that the English dominions in the East can be preserved. This is requisite, not merely to repel invasion, but for the current business of your possessions, which you have never yet been able to conduct without military power. If, therefore, an habitual intervention of the military in details of civil management, justifies the appellation of Military government, there is no country on earth so peculiarly entitled to that designation as the English settlements in India. Besides, as no country can be more habituated to convulsions, wars, and revolutions, it follows that the public endeavours should be strenuously directed to obtain perfection on the military system.

When we compare the discipline of your troops, and the constitution of your armies with those of other European powers in India, the superiority is evidently with the English : but when we look back to the days of Clive and Lawrence, to the smallness of their force, and the magnitude of their achievements, we must confess that more recent occurrences have exhibited a mortifying contrast. The history of many years past is filled with the details of our impolicy. The best regiments of cavalry upon the coast were driven from the Nabob's service to the enemy. Garrisons were left destitute of military stores and provision ; shameful aggressions were committed against every native power ; † unjust wars were unskilfully conducted ; there were neither preparations, concert, nor precaution : forts fell at the first summons ; detachments were cut off ; armies were captured ; countries depopulated ; a ruinous contest‡ was concluded by a degrading pacification, only to make way for still more humiliating events. The troops were starving ; the treasury empty ; all credit gone, and all ranks dissatisfied. The empire of opinion by which we governed India, was thrown away ;

* The distresses of the country, the want of money, and the calamities of war, rendered it impracticable for the Board of Madras to prevent these evils ; on the contrary, the important operations effected by that Government, under the pressure of such embarrassments, is one of the strongest testimonies that can be adduced in proof of their talents, fortitude, and exertion.

† No faith in our Treaties. ‡ War of 1767 with Hyder.

and there remained a manifest impossibility of maintaining the territorial empire, in its wasted and distracted condition.

These form but an incomplete enumeration of circumstances that mark the hasty progress of our decline. The Arabs have fallen ; the Moors have degenerated ; the Portuguese have decayed ; the Dutch have dwindled, and the French are bereft of territory. All of them have been great, and powerful, and conquerors in India ; all of them have paid the forfeit of misconduct. The English having attained a loftiness of situation in the East beyond the most aspiring fancy of their rivals, are now precipitating from their elevation. Thus they are leaving a monitory example to all future innovations, that no energy of former achievement, or extent of actual power, can support a Government while wasting with internal principles of dissolution.

If we are to look for a renovation of the English interests in India, it must arise from such exertions as those of your Right Honourable President.

The difficulties with which you have successfully contended, the counteraction you have experienced, and your ability under most perplexing circumstances, yield a well-grounded expectation that in the prosecution of a general and digested reform, your labours would be crowned with the utmost brilliancy of success.

Of all the objects within your Presidency, the improvement of your military system is the most urgent and the least difficult. The discipline and manœuvres of the European and Sepoy infantry, as well as of your artillery and the few cavalry in your service, are founded on the best models of Europe. It is asserted that before the war, their appearance would have done credit to any service, while their gallantry and endurance form a subject of historical applause.

The officers on the coast are habituated to act in emergencies, with a facility that few subordinate officers in Europe ever have a prospect of acquiring. Before an officer attains the rank of Captain, he must unavoidably have been often charged with the command of parties on distant marches, in the conveyance of stores, in the guard of posts and strongholds, in the business of collection and menacing of refractory Polygars, together with every other series of duty which can occur. From hence it will be found, that there are few services indeed where so many men possess the practical requisites of an officer. How strongly have zeal, knowledge, and ability been exemplified during the late contest by those who command your sepoy battalions. With

what address did they soothe the sufferings of their soldiers, relieve their wants, and restrain the well-grounded clamours of men, whom the public necessities had left in extremity of distress! These considerations suggest the benefit of restraining indiscriminate admission into the service, and of selecting a succession of deserving officers for the command of all your corps.

The higher orders of your service, no doubt, possess in a still stronger degree the practical advantages now described. But as the military rise in India is by rotation without purchase, it is scarcely possible to become a field officer in less than twenty years. Few constitutions are equal in *that* climate to so long a series of fatigue. Besides, your field officers, in general, command the considerable garrisons. As they regimentally belong to the four battalions of your two regiments of European infantry, these corps are frequently left to the junior Captains, who are solicitous of procuring appointments to the Sepoys, and take little interest in the discipline of the Europeans. But may not the command of an European corps be rendered permanent and advantageous, like those in England? May not the condition of veteran officers be relieved by the establishment of half-pay, and the permission to sell their commissions? By these means, those who are disqualified for zealous execution of their duty, might retire with a provision for their after-days, and give opportunities of advancement to others more earnest in pursuit of military reputation.

The growing strength and discipline of your enemies, and our late disasters, point out the wisdom of Sir Eyre Coote's requisitions for an increase of Europeans to form the central strength of your armies. He maintained that at least 10,000 Europeans should be constantly complete for service in the three Presidencies. An objection has arisen from the quick mortality, occasioning a burdensome demand for new supplies of men; but this may be, in a great measure, remedied by salutary preparations for the reception of the recruits from Europe; by stationing them in healthy quarters, enforcing regularity, and restraining the sale of arrack and other pernicious liquors.

With regard to your Sepoys, the public should be watchful of their discipline, and liberal to confirm their attachment. It is by their good conduct that your settlements have hitherto been preserved, and to them you are to trust for after-stability. That they are partial to your service, is evinced by recent experience. Let them receive the common justice due to every soldier; let them be regularly

paid, and enabled to maintain their families; let the wise institution of admitting the children of wounded or deserving Sepoys, to be enrolled and to draw pay from the battalions, be continued, and the black officers treated with indulgence and respect. It is further requisite that the mode of issuing pay be so amended as to remove any possible imputation of fraudulent exactions committed against the Sepoys by usurious advances of money in the moments of distress, by undue stoppages for articles which either have not been furnished or are overcharged, and by other unjustifiable practices. In that case I will venture to pronounce, that while their expertness in manœuvre, the interior economy of the battalions, and the conduct of their officers, continue to inspire them with a sense of superiority, no probable events can shake their adherence.

As the European officers on the coast are not generally conversant with the country languages, every one aspiring to the command or adjutancy of a sepoy corps should be directed first to learn the Moorish or Malabar dialect.

Although I cannot persuade myself that it is judicious to admit Pariahs, or outcasts into battalions, with men of reputable castes, yet assuredly the mixture of Moormen, Rajhpoots, Gentoos and Malabars in the same corps, is extremely beneficial, for it stimulates by emulation, and restrains all dangerous confederacies which cannot escape the jealousy of contending sects. I have also recommended the corps of Topasses, or descendants of Europeans, who retain the characteristic qualities of their progenitors. They form a check upon the other native troops, and are more easily maintained in movements of difficulty, for they eat any food like Europeans. That corps would also become a nursery for hundreds of children who are lost to the community.

The expenses attending your cavalry, have deprived you of that essential constituent of an army. Indeed, the strange impolicy which drove four well-appointed regiments from the Nabob's service to that of Hyder, has left you with scarce a sufficiency of horse to form a grand guard in front of your main army. All parties admit the necessity of augmenting that branch of your establishment, especially as your enemy* can bring more than 60,000 horsemen into the field.† But the extravagant rate at which your troop-horses are

* Tippoo Sultaun.

† The Mahrattas can bring 100,000 and the Nizam 60,000 horse into the field.

purchased, the still more extravagant price at which they are maintained, the unreasonable pay of your troopers, and the lavish allowances to cavalry officers, render it almost chimerical to suggest the means of new-modelling that service.

Notwithstanding these objections, I had prepared a plan which, if it had been my lot to remain in India, I should have submitted to your consideration, for raising 5,000 horse at a moderate rate. The troopers to receive only a small proportion of pay more than the infantry, and the horses to be fed at a very reduced allowance, without any farther contract, contingency, or extra charge. Thus the expense of a cavalry establishment would be brought within the limits of the coast finances. Neither would any engagements, on the part of Government have been required, except that the officer charged with the execution should be established in one of the great northern stations, and that the Nizam and other country powers should admit his agents to purchase horses freely throughout their territories. Lastly, that Government should order all renters and collectors of revenue, throughout the Company's and Nabob's possessions, not to charge more than eight shillings, or one pagoda, per one hundred measures for all the gram* furnished to the cavalry. This would allow to each horse more than three measures per day, at the rate of one pagoda per month.

The artillery has become a main arm of military operations in the system of Indian warfare, and has maintained a reputation hardly surpassed in any service. I shall, therefore, only observe that the augmentation of so ponderous a machinery is attended with unsupportable expenditure, and obstructs those sudden and unexpected movements, by which the great events in India have been achieved. But whether it is to be continued on an extended or contracted scale, the department of stores, artificers, and conveyance, forming the great appendage of the artillery, calls aloud for reformation.

I have already suggested the necessity of equipping every corps with a sufficiency of artificers and conveyance, for the repairs and movement of its own baggage, stores, and ammunition. Thus they will be at all times ready for emergencies, and the store department will be relieved from a considerable embarrassment; for it is at present lumbered with musket ammunition, and various other articles belonging to the battalions.

* A kind of pulse on which horses are fed in India.

The numerous body of lascars, artificers, and other public followers attached to that department, constitute the next object of consideration. They should assuredly be regimented, or formed into corps, under the command of European officers, responsible for their conduct, proficiency, and regular receipt of pay. From the want of such a regulation during the late distresses, all regular disbursements to the troops were impeded, and the public followers were often shamefully neglected. Much benefit would also be derived from separating the complement belonging to the field and battering train, and from establishing in each cantonment a Commissary of Stores, with the full equipment of every article necessary to enable the division to which he belongs, to move on the shortest notice, without reference to the storekeepers of garrisons, who are not sufficiently under military control to be entrusted with military preparations.

It is further extremely requisite that your establishment of Pioneers should be increased, not only for the sake of expertness and dispatch in the preparations of a siege, but to facilitate the rapid movements of your armies. Hyder seldom maintained less than five thousand Commooty men, or pioneers, who preceded his line, cleared the roads, and enabled him to move with a celerity seldom equalled by Europeans.

The abuses and deficiencies in your bullock department,* have long been the subject of complaint. When Sir Eyre Coote, in 1782, required 30,000 bullocks to enable the Carnatic army to move with effect, the total number actually serving with it did not, I believe, exceed 9,000; nor has that army ever since been able to procure a complement for distant operations. To this cause has been chiefly attributed the failure of the Carnatic war. Indeed, the evil in question seems almost beyond a remedy; for the principal black men, who used to engage their bullocks in your service, after spending their stock and straining their credit on the public faith, have been suffered to run muster upon muster in arrears. At last, with more than twelve months' unliquidated balance due to them, having lost many hundreds of their cattle through fatigue and sickness, they are turned adrift from the service with their few remaining oxen, without settlement and without security.

It was not by such means that the English faith and character became respectable in this country. There was a period, no farther

* The great mass of army conveyance in India is performed by bullocks.

back than the days of General Lawrence, when the natives of Hindo-
stan held the engagements of an Englishman to be unalterable; they
represented him with all the attributes of prowess in war, and of justice
in peace. Thus, confidence and veneration were so mingled in their
estimation of him, that their sensations of security were stronger under
an English authority, than under the best of their Native Princes.
In those days the purse of the individual was ever open to the public
exigency, for every individual confided in the faith and credit of the
public. Such were the steps by which the English rose to elevation
in India.

The next material object is the department of Engineers, includ-
ing not only preparations for besieging, but the defensive condition
of your forts. You have a respectable corps of Engineers, under an
officer distinguished for his talents of arrangement. A survey and
report of the actual state and deficiencies of provisions, ammunition,
and other military stores, would enable you to ascertain the specific
complement that should at all times be preserved in every garrison of
Coromandel.

The inspection and descriptive report of all the southern garrisons,
which are the most important on your coast, have long ago been com-
pleted; for, as soon as the army returned from the enemy's country,
I requested Captain Byres* to undertake a survey of Tanjore, Trichi-
nopoly, Madura, Palamcottah, and Ramnad. This he executed with
the utmost ability, and accompanied it with a statement, expressed in
accurate and comprehensive terms. There remains little, therefore,
except to bestow a similar attention on the other forts, and, above all,
most rigidly to enforce obedience to such orders for replenishing the
magazines and augmenting the complement of stores, as your Engi-
neers and a Committee of Inspection may suggest. But vain will
these measures prove, unless the stores, magazines, and fortifications,
be subjected to severe and periodical examinations; and unless the
Commandant of the place be enabled to enforce your instructions.
On the other hand, if the military storekeepers and civil managers
be suffered to disregard all orders of the Commandant, in the direc-
tion of the magazines and preparations for defence, assuredly the res-
ponsibility in moments of attack should likewise be transferred to
them, that there might be some restraint, at least, on their negligence
or indiscretion.

* Chief Engineer to the southward.

The late degrading scenes of surrender without resistance, at Arcot, Cuddalore, Permaul, and almost every other place* where the enemy made any vigorous attack, have suggested an economical expedient of destroying many inferior garrisons throughout the country. But your Board will recollect, that everything was venal on the coast for years before Hyder ventured an invasion. That he had secretly purchased the Killadarships of Arnee, Gingee, Carnatic Gur, Thiagar, and various other posts of strength. These he filled with emissaries of his own, who, on his first approach, secured the European officer, if there was one, and surrendered; for those important places were entirely garrisoned by undisciplined dependants of the Nabob. But unless these or similar posts are re-occupied, filled with supplies, and defended by regulars, there can be no security of communication and subsistence; much less can offensive measures be effected from the Carnatic into the enemy's country. It will further be found almost impossible to re-people the Carnatic without forts and strongholds, for the inhabitants fly from situations that afford no protection against predatory cavalry.

Besides replenishing these inferior forts, the country cannot be secure without better regulation in your considerable garrisons, and a distribution of your remaining force into three great frontier cantonments. The main, or central one, in the Carnatic, somewhere between Arcot and Vellore; the second, or southern one, near Trichinopoly; and the third at Ellore, or in some other northern position. The last would enable you to act in defence of the Circars, in conjunction with the Nizam, or against Tippoo's northern possessions of Cuddapah and Kurnool, as circumstances may require. Were the main body of your forces thus established, in a connected range upon the enemy's frontiers, the movements of the Carnatic army would no longer continue circumscribed and inefficient as they have been; neither would Tippoo dare to penetrate into your possessions, lest you should retaliate with superior facility against his own.

But we cannot look for any permanent arrangement in the present indefinite state of military command, while the power that should direct, and the power that should obey, are at open variance; while the subordinates are at the mercy of contradictory orders from contending authorities, nothing but counteraction can ensue. The inferior officer looks not to his commander for preferment, nor cares

* Vellore and Wandewash were the only exceptions.

for his displeasure, provided his acquiescence with the civil interest can procure him an appointment.

The condition of the Commander is still more humiliating. Without weight to resist the encroachments of the civil service, his opposition only exposes his weakness, and his compliance infallibly forfeits the confidence of the army. He is, besides, involved in odious discussions, and being overwhelmed with committee business, a very small portion of his thoughts is bestowed upon the duties of his station. Hence, for years past, there have been no regular reviews; no inspection of the troops on the part of the Commander-in-Chief; no enforcement of the established regulations of the coast service; and so little encouragement of parade duty, that the discipline of the army rests solely, at this moment, on the meritorious attention of subordinate officers.

There appears but one remedy for these inveterate evils. While the powers of a Governor and those of a Commander-in-Chief rest upon a different basis, the passion for superiority will occasion violent and dangerous collision. The mass of the civil service range under the banners of the Governor; the body of the army espouse the cause of their General. The first are able and united, the others are superior in vehemence and number. The discontented of the civil service make common cause with the military; the obsequious of the military take shelter under the wing of civil patronage. Hence, a general ferment is excited. The civil service prosecute their measures with methodical assiduity; the military indulge in clamorous excess. The grounds of discontent are communicated to the numerous attendants who surround all Europeans; from these they spread through other classes of the natives, and extending over the peninsula, involve every Englishman in the hatred and contempt of all India. The Asiatics cannot enter into European distinctions of participated power: while they behold Generals seizing Governors, and Governors arresting Generals, they necessarily think ill of either situation.

So indispensable in all Eastern government is power undisputed, and control without counteraction, that we cannot hope to see a period put to these calamities until authority shall issue from one source, and flow in one equal, undivided stream. Were this the case, were the powers of Governor and Commander-in-Chief united in the same person, still subjecting all public acts of Government to the voice of a council or committee, the civil and the military would forego their animosities; and instead of regarding each other as contending squadrons,

they would feel themselves confederate forces, acting under the same leader. No longer would the deliberative plans for the conduct of a war be thwarted by reluctant execution or actual disobedience, nor the most alluring hopes of decisive enterprize be stifled by the sparing hand that should support them. Neither can it be conceived that, from this amendment, any disadvantages would result to the military. At present they have the mortification to behold their leader without power, influence, or respect ; in the other case, he would possess them all. Were the same person Governor and Commander-in-Chief, the officer next in seniority would naturally be entrusted with the general conduct of the army, and enjoy consideration due to the second in command of a great military establishment. Thus the ungovernable feuds of party would be checked, and there would be some prospect that the public welfare might engage the undisturbed attention of those to whom it was entrusted,

With regard to your civil service, it possesses many advantages. The young gentlemen sent out in the capacity are, in general, well educated ; and, on their arrival at the Presidency, are admitted to assist in the business of the different offices, including nearly the whole detail of public proceedings that can occur in any government. In fact, such has been the salutary operations of these initiations, that your Presidency alone has produced more men of extended capacity in business, than could probably be found collectively in all the public offices of London. These acquirements are extended, as the individual advances in the service. He is successively employed as Paymaster and Storekeeper of a garrison ; Paymaster and Commissary of an army ; Resident with a country prince ; Superintendent and Collector of a province ; or chief of a subordinate settlement in the regular gradation towards Council and Committee. In each of these employments the current transactions are more weighty, the responsibility more immediately personal, and the duty more comprehensive than usually fall to the lot of any unexalted individual in England. It is in your power to direct towards important public purposes those useful qualifications, and to do away any existing imperfections.

Once more allow me to repeat the assertion, that no civil servant whatever, entrusted with the charge of military stores in a garrison, nor anyone holding an appointment with an army, should ever be suffered to consider himself as independent of the Commandant. While sanction is given to so unwarrantable an assumption, nothing but negligence

and discord can take place; for experience ascertains that the main contentions in India have arisen from the collision of interfering pretensions. These cannot exist where the mutual relations of obedience and command are pointedly defined. Every officer obeys, with satisfaction, the orders of your Board, as the ruling power of the country; but very few will submit, without reluctance, to the mandates of subordinates. When military men, therefore, have had transactions only with the Board, your intentions have been cheerfully fulfilled, whereas, in all instances of inferior interference, ruinous dissensions have been generated. Let me add, that the strong enforcement of obedience by military trial, renders them more prompt and useful instruments of public duty, than those of the other service, who are under no control, and who, by hazarding an eventual, but improbable dismission, may commit repeated acts of disobedience with impunity.

Thus far my observations have immediately referred to abuses in your military system. But what avails the improvement of that system, which is only useful to protect your possessions, if waste and devastation are suffered to render them hardly worth protecting, and unequal to support the force on which their safety must depend. I have already stated that the ravages of the enemy are by no means the greatest evils of which those countries have complained. You have seen misery in its worst aspect, the misery of famine, within the bound-hedge of Madras; you have seen, under your own walls, the infant dying for want on the breast of its mother; the old and the young, the parents and the children, mingling their last groans and expiring in your kennels; you have seen whole families of spectres in human shape, digging into the entrails of a dead carrion; and, when these means have failed, surrendering themselves with a truly Asiatic apathy to the wild dogs and vultures that waited to devour their carcasses. You have seen, for months together, hundreds of dead bodies daily covering your streets, with circumstances of horror too shocking to enumerate. Nor is it within the bound-hedge of Madras only that the internal wasting of the country can be traced; during twenty-seven months of continued movement through a large extent of your dominions, the duties of my station familiarized me with the whole gradation of territorial abuses. They are not less palpable and distressful than those with which you yourselves are personally acquainted.

It has been already stated, that the ravages of the enemy are by no means the greatest evils of which those countries have complained.

While the territorial management of the countries now assigned to the Company remained with the Nabob, the oppressive practices undoubtedly prevailed, that multiply exaction through every Eastern government. Indefinite claims and arbitrary impositions fell heavy upon the Polygars and other tributaries. The head Renters and Amildars of districts, as well as all inferior instruments of collection, were impelled to harass the inhabitants, not only to satisfy their own rapaciousness, but to feed the avarice of their superiors, for they knew that the only tenure by which they held their appointments was the frequent repetition of a bribe. The finances of the Durbar were involved by an unmethodized expenditure, and wasted on worthless Europeans at home and abroad. At length the disbursements essential to the current business of the country were totally obstructed, and the urgent claims of powerful individuals introduced the destructive practice of granting tunkaws, or assignments, on particular districts; in consequence of which the holder of the tunkaw considered himself to be vested with the power of collecting the amount of his assignment, within a certain space and period, by the most outrageous means. A band of ill-regulated soldiery and burdensome retainers consumed the produce of the country, and disturbed the labours of the farmer and manufacturer. These causes of defalcation in the Nabob's resources, at a moment when the exigencies of the late war demanded the utmost energy, afforded the strong argument of urgent necessity for transferring his territory and revenues to the uses and direction of the Company. But the truth and justice of these arguments can remain no longer than that necessity on which they rest; neither should it be forgotten that, during the government of the Nabob, no European whatever, excepting those in his service, was permitted to have any interference in the country. The English, therefore, were exempted from the odium of personal interference, or rather the rod of Moorish despotism was contrasted with the milder attributes supposed to characterize an English administration.

The case, however, is widely different, since the Company assumed the sovereignty. The transfer of authority from the established ruler to an alien power, no doubt filled the natives with distrust, in lieu of which your Committee of Assigned Revenue have, by their eminent exertions, substituted confidence and security. They have abolished the destructive grants of tunkaws and other abuses in the management of the country; they have exhibited great ability as well as un-

blemished integrity; and they have rendered the revenues extremely productive in most unprosperous times. It was not, however, possible for them entirely to repress the misconduct of inferior instruments* who are eager to perpetuate oppression and to enforce unusual measures by unprecedented means. The situation of the country rendered it necessary to continue the practice of renting extensive districts to the highest bidder; although every precaution was adopted to prevent the abuse of power, still the collections could not be enforced unless an unrestrained authority were vested in the renter. His object too frequently is, to ransack and embezzle, that he may go off at last enriched with the spoils of his province. The fact is, that in every part of India where the renters are established, not only the ryot and the husbandman, but the manufacturer, the artificer, and every other Indian inhabitant, is wholly at the mercy of those ministers of public exaction.

The established practice throughout this part of the Peninsula has for ages been, to allow the farmer one-half of the produce of his crop for the maintenance of his family, and the re-cultivation of the land; while the other is appropriated to the Circar. In the richest soils, under the cowl of Hyder, producing three annual crops, it is hardly known that less than forty per cent. of the crop produced has been allotted to the husbandman. Yet renters on the coast have not scrupled to imprison reputable farmers, and to inflict on them extreme severities of punishment, for refusing to accept of sixteen in the hundred, as the proportion out of which they were to maintain a family, to furnish stock and implements of husbandry, cattle, seed, and all expenses incident to the cultivation of their lands. But should the unfortunate ryot be forced to submit to such conditions, he has still a long list of cruel impositions to endure. He must labour week after week at the repair of water-courses, tanks, and embankments of rivers. His cattle, sheep, and every other portion of his property is at the disposal of the renter, and his life might pay the forfeit of refusal. Should he presume to reap his harvest when ripe, without a mandate from the renter, whose peons, conicopolies, and retainers attend on the occasion; nothing short of bodily torture and a confiscation of the little that is left him, could expiate the offence. Would he sell any part of his scanty portion, he cannot be permitted while the Circar has any to dispose of; would he convey anything to a

* The black agents who manage the whole detail of collection in the different districts.

distant market, he is stopped at every village by the collectors of Sunkum or Gabella, who exact a duty for every article exported, imported, or disposed of. So unsupportable is this evil, that between Negapatam and Palghautcherry, not more than three hundred miles, there are about thirty places of collection, or, in other words, a tax is levied every ten miles upon the produce of the country; thus manufacture and commerce are exposed to disasters hardly less severe than those which have occasioned the decline of cultivation.

But these form only a small proportion of the powers with which the renter is invested. He may sink or raise the exchange of specie at his own discretion; he may prevent the sale of grain, or sell it at the most exorbitant rates; thus, at any time he may, and frequently does, occasion general famine. Besides maintaining a useless rabble, whom he employs under the appellation of peons, at the public expense, he may require any military force he finds necessary for the business of oppression, and few inferior officers would have weight enough to justify their refusal of such aid. Should any one, however, dispute those powers, should the military officers refuse to prostitute military service to the distress of wretched individuals, or should the Civil Superintendent remonstrate against such abuse, nothing could be more pleasing to the renter; he derives, from thence, innumerable arguments for non-performance of engagements, and for a long list of defalcations. But there are still some other not less extraordinary constituents in the complex endowments of a renter. He unites, in his own person, all the branches of judicial or civil authority, and if he happens to be a Bramin, he may also be termed the representative of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. I will not enlarge on the consequences of thus huddling into the person of one wretched mercenary all those powers that ought to constitute the dignity and lustre of supreme executive authority.

At the same time it is but justice to remark that those observations cannot be, with truth, confined to the countries under renters appointed by the Company. The interior management and economy of Tanjore, in despite of the representations of Mr. Sullivan and the exhortations of Mr. Swartz, is still more wretched. So wanton and iniquitous is the sway of despotism there, that the goods of the merchant, or carrier, are frequently seized by order of the Durbar. If an individual native is incautious enough to display his wealth, the Rajah's ministers seldom rest till he is caught and plundered. Whips, scourges, thumb-screws, and other instruments of Indian torture, are daily applied to the

unhappy subjects in every outcherry, or court of justice, throughout the country. Every one, therefore, who possesses either gold or jewels, buries them in some secure spot, and entrusts the secret only to the most confidential of his family. Hence, almost the whole specie of the country is diverted from the purposes of circulation ; and an enormous annual loss of treasure is thus occasioned by the frequent removal and extinction of families in that distracted territory. By these means the most fertile, and once the most populous spot upon the globe, is already marked with the distinguishing features of a desert.

If I am rightly informed, a survey of the Circars, a northern territory of Coromandel, would also exhibit a melancholy picture. Neither war nor convulsions have afflicted those districts for many years, since they have been under the territorial administration of the Company, or of Zemindars dependant upon that authority. The desolation must, therefore, be still more unequivocally imputed to internal mismanagement.

When we recollect the original object of the English settlements in India, the benefits of a commercial intercourse with its once industrious coasts, we find that it has long ago been overwhelmed beneath a mass of territorial concerns, assumptions of sovereignty, and wanton extension of dominions which our situation renders us unfit to govern. Few of those who are employed in the Company's service will submit to the tedious drudgery of mercantile proceedings; they aspire to fortune through the more magnifying medium of contracts, paymasterships, residencies, and chiefships. The native merchants, Armenians and others, who conducted the trading business of your coast, have suffered so severely during the late distresses, as well as by the abolition of all confidence and public credit, that they have removed to some less precarious situation, or else remain inactive in the hopes of better times. Neither would the present condition of the coast admit of any immediate means of re-establishment from commercial exertions ; for the staple articles of your commerce are the produce of your lands, and the labours of the manufacturer. I have already traced the decay and approaching extirpation of that useful class of subjects.* What, then, is

* These observations concerning the decline of trade, and the extirpation of manufacturers, must not be considered as entirely applicable to every spot upon the coast.

There are many villages to the southward, and also to the northward, where there still remains a sufficiency of weavers to form an investment if properly managed, and I have been assured, on good authority, that the French and Danes have lately contrived to export considerable cargoes of coast goods.

to constitute the object of exportation? What is to yield the means of circulation, credit, and resource? From the southward you have at present no investment; in the Carnatic you have no remains of former industry; in the Circars, hitherto undisturbed by any foreign enemy, I understand you find it difficult to load one annual ship for Europe. If the train of this induction be not false, what hopes can you entertain of lightening the public embarrassments, while every resource in your Government is wasted?

Your predecessors left the country expiring under a complication of calamities. That your wisdom and exertions should have found means to prolong its existence under such a crisis, exceeded the expectations of your most sanguine friends, and excites the admiration of your bitterest opponents. You have already applied the firm hand of undeviating retrenchment to every branch of the public expenditure; and labouring under unparalleled impediments, you have persevered with a vigour and integrity, of which there was no example in the East. By this conduct you may justly assume the merit of preserving the Carnatic, oppressed with the formidable invasion of native and European powers, and the more mortal wounds inflicted by the governments that preceded yours. But meritorious as retrenchment undoubtedly is, you feel the inefficiency of that alone to restore the public vigour. How are you to liquidate the fifty lacs of pagodas due by your Presidency for services actually performed or value received? from that sum, when audited, you cannot possibly make any diminution; to attempt such a measure would forfeit the whole integrity of Government, or at least would be declaring the Indian public insolvent, and compelling their lawful creditors into a disreputable composition. You have already heard the clamours excited by supposed injustice in the prosecution of economical reform. Too severe a retrospect is always odious, and seldom beneficial; and in the present instance would prove destructive of equity and public faith. Perhaps it may be better to look forward, and instead of invalidating established claims for past services, to take care that every future charge shall accord with that just proportion, which should ever exist between the disbursements and resources of the treasury.

Your debts, on their present footing, are destructive of all public welfare. With a wise and permanent management, one year's revenue* of your country ought to equal their whole amount. Under

* About fifty lakhs of pagodas, or £ 2,000,000.

any well-established system of public credit, so inconsiderable a proportional sum, at the close of a calamitous war, would hardly cause a perceptible inconvenience. But consider to whom and in what manner this amount is due : it has been incurred in a series of five years of protracted and growing arrears, in all the fractions of pay, batta, extra charges, and allowances to civilians, contractors, soldiers, sepoys, officers, camp followers, and all descriptions of men connected with the peace or war establishment. If the unfortunate individual, urged by severe necessity, though he must not hope for money, should demand a certified statement, he is harassed with a long and fruitless attendance; the auditor disputes his vouchers, and contests his claims. If at length the certificate should be granted, it remains an useless docket, on the credit of which he can neither purchase, nor procure one single article of life. Your Government has exhibited a political phenomenon unprecedented in the annals of mankind; a State or public, indebted almost to every individual in its service, and yet the functions of authority continuing unimpeded by any serious commotion. Several circumstances, however, have sufficiently denoted the hazard of such a situation.

When the embarrassments resulting from a treasury exhausted, a country desolate, and a credit ruined in the prosecution of a destructive war, impelled you to direct that all allowances of batta should cease, at a period when the arrears of the army and distresses of the country rendered that indulgence, or more properly, that right of the army, peculiarly indispensable, the remonstrances and vigorous measures adopted by the military, evinced the public danger of uniting the individuals of a community against the Government. There is but one alternative, you must either liquidate the arrears due to your establishment, or you must risk the loss of India. If Europe and Bengal unwisely should withhold their aid, that liquidation cannot possibly take place, but by the re-establishment of your own credit and finance; these, as well as commerce, are the offspring of cultivation and manufacture, which can exist only by industry and population. Your endeavours to re-establish that natural relation of things have already crowned the measures of your administration; and when carried to their full completion will add to the merit of having preserved the Carnatic from destruction, the distinguished character of having restored it to prosperity.

It would ill-become me, in addressing the Government of an exten-

sive country to enlarge on the detail of means by which this restoration may be effected. Permit me, however, to suggest, that the legislative, judicial, and executive regulations, necessary to the prosperity of an Indian Government, are neither complicated nor refined. There is one *maxim* peculiarly applicable to that country,—that there is no evil more dreaded than innovation, nor any duty more sacred with the natives than custom. Let this truth, then, be the unalterable beacon and directory in all plans of renovation respecting India, where the continued repeals and fluctuations incident to European establishments, excite the utmost dread and detestation.

The mode of restoring prosperity to your territories is, in my opinion, extremely simple. These countries experienced the refinements of civil polity and regulation, suited to their condition, ages before they ever heard the name of European. You have only to restore the general form and tenor of the Indian jurisprudence; and where that system, overrating the pretensions of superior castes, tends to the violation of natural law and public welfare, there the rigour of Gentoo enactments should be mitigated without destroying the established order and gradations of the country. Protect the poor from the oppression of the great; restrain the despotic violence of the native leaders; and let every one within the limits of the English influence feel that he is safe in his property, his person, and his life. If this were actually the fact, the husbandman, the labourer, the manufacturer, and the merchant, would very soon fly from every corner of Hindustan to take shelter under a Government that respected the sacred rights and established institutions of their ancestors, while it afforded personal security and independence, the offspring of an English polity.

The country still abounds so much with sheep and cattle, that the full complement for all the purposes of labour and subsistence would soon be re-produced; the towns and villages would be re-peopled, and the fields re-cultivated with a rapidity unknown in other climates. Such is the natural fertility of those countries, and so strong their propensity to reproduction, that the quick renewal of abundance, industry, and commerce, is the necessary consequence of security; which implies the protection of every one in the possession of his own, by restraining all from the forcible or fraudulent appropriation of that which is another's. Neither is the celebrated Dr. Smith's remark less worthy of observance, that it is the height of impertinence, even for any public body, to interfere in the private concerns of individuals. How much more

pernicious must the pressure of that system be, which delegates to every subordinate instrument of public authority that privilege of individual interference, not for public welfare, but for selfish purposes, at the expense of the property and labours of the subject?

While the Company holds the territorial management of the country, it is to be dreaded that this happy renovation cannot be accomplished; because your civil servants, by the constitution of your establishment, are under no restraint but those of their own sentiments. Every one knows that orders are nugatory where you cannot punish disobedience; and the severest denunciation of your displeasure against a civil servant, only dismisses him from a service, which the very act that incurs your censure probably enables and inclines him to relinquish. The expedient of military interference in the business of interior management is still a more egregious violation of all good policy and public trust; for though military men are far more proper to be charged with specific orders than civilians, because they are answerable for disobedience with their lives, yet the exertion of the military arm in the detail of civil regulation implies a total abrogation of all civil rights, and declares aloud that no power prevails but that of force.

You have already found that, ruinous as both these modes undoubtedly are, they seem mild and reputable, in comparison with the only other means of management that it has hitherto been found practicable to adopt with success in any part of India—the delegation of territorial authority to native agents and black renters, who have no tie whatever of character, permanency, or situation, to restrain them from the commission of outrages too atrocious for any European imagination to suggest. What then remains but to perform an act of equal policy and justice? To redeem the English name from the general imputation under which it labours of violating the rights and honour of our best adherents, of coveting the possession of friend and foe, and of a total incapacity, from situation and constant change of system, to manage what we so unjustifiably acquire? Disprove the allegation. Restore the country and the sovereignty to its rightful owner, the Nabob; emancipate the Rajah of Tanjore and all other Rajahs, Princes, and Zemindars belonging to your coast, from the vexatious interference of the civil, and from the rough assumptions of the military power; employ the former in the proper duties of their station, in the business of office and investment, and, in pursuance of your favourite system of retrenchment, reduce their numbers to the proportional diminution of demand

for their services. Would they acquire fortune, let them look for it, not in the spoils of districts, but in the prosecution of commercial operation. As for the latter, confine them to their garrisons, stations, and cantonments; suffer them not to be scattered through the country, and remind them that their business is not usury and exaction, but discipline and war. To give effect and popularity to this salutary alteration, their professional emoluments ought to be sufficient, without any aid from indirect acquirement.

Should the Nabob, the Rajahs, or the Zemindars, take advantage of your indulgences, and endeavour to withhold their stipulated payments, shew them that lenity and justice are neither the offspring of indolence nor weakness, but, on the first symptoms of their persistence in such delays, march a body of troops to enforce your orders, make them pay the expenses of the expedition, and teach them that you will not suffer misconduct to pass unpunished. You have likewise to restrain every class of Europeans, the merchant only excepted, from mingling with the natives; for when they are familiarized with our practices, they cease to respect our virtues in the just abhorrence of our crimes. Above all, let it never be forgotten, that in the present state of national depravity, wherever a latitude of power is lodged, whether in civil or military hands, the eye of justice must be more piercing, and her sword more severely pointed against delinquency, before you can hope to restrain the repetition of abuse.

The restitution of the revenues and sovereignty to the Nabob will no doubt be opposed, on the former grounds of unwise and prodigal administration; but this evil may be remedied. You will also recollect, that the waste and prodigality of the Durbar arose from the rapaciousness of Europeans, who never ceased to prey upon the Nabob; but misfortune has fallen heavy on the hoary head of Mahomed Ally, the picture of European treachery is drawn in colours too strong to be ever effaced from his remembrance. At any rate, let him be removed from the Presidency, the chief seat of intrigue and corruption, and Europeans; let him be re-established in the ancient capital of his Government; let that capital be restored to its former splendour. He will there be rescued from the ruinous intercourse of powerful and designing adventurers, and the country will rejoice that there is again a rightful sovereign.

But it will be asked, how shall you restrain the Nabob's Government from the detail of individual oppressions, arbitrary exactions, and frequent violations of the rights of property and persons incident to

all Asiatic institutions. To these, let me answer, that the protection of the country, and an adequate appropriation of the revenues for the support of your establishment remaining in your hands, it becomes you to preserve a controlling authority sufficient to restrain abuse. The annual amount of sums due, services to be performed, rents to be paid to the Circar, and gross produce of every village or mugamun on the coast, have been accurately recorded for ages in the cutcherries or public courts of the districts. Should a manager or renter exact more than the stipulated or wonted sum, refer to these records as the common and statute law of the country in all cases of revenue; if the means of private admonition to the Durbar should fail, let your Board or Government be the tribunal before which the cause is cognizable in the last resort; for, it is presumed, no inferior jurisdiction could give sentence between the Nabob and his subjects. Should any servant of the Circar attempt to seize the property or restrain the person of an inhabitant, let the injured party, if all inferior means of justice fail, have ultimate recourse to the same superior and controlling power. Let the rulers and the ruled feel, that under the sanction of an English Government, the poor as well as the rich are entitled to protection. It will throw a shade over any casual failures if you curb oppression, and cause the pure streams of English justice to unite with Indian jurisprudence, and both to flow in the channels of sacred immemorial usage.

It must be confessed that the power to restrain, implies also the power to commit abuse; and if such ministers of public vengeance as involved the Carnatic in the war with Hyder, were again to constitute the Government, it would be fruitless to suggest a thought of reformation. But this letter is addressed to a Board distinguished by rigorous and persevering integrity. We all know that your minds cannot be swayed by any improper consideration; and that the animosity of party, though it may distract, has not been able to prevent your earnest endeavours for the public welfare. It may farther be presumed that the attention of the nation is so awake to the state of India, that the succession to the government in the different Presidencies will henceforth be composed of able and upright men, or else, that all expectation of preserving these settlements will for ever be relinquished.

It is a truth palpable to every mind at all acquainted with political economy, that no country whatever is more favourably situated for the support of public credit, and extensive circulation, than India. The mass of treasure has been so widely diffused, the avowed possession of private property so insecure, and the mode of pecuniary transac-

tions so disadvantageous, that any Government, on whose integrity and stability the natives durst rely, might form the greatest bank of deposit on the globe. To the influence derivable from such an institution, would be added the benefits of circulating bank or public securities in lieu of specie. Those benefits are proportioned to the extent of country in which such notes or securities can have currency; to the quantity that may be safely issued, and to the probable length of time that they may remain in circulation, as well as to the gain derivable from the intermediate application of money, when not needed in the bank. The profit on bills of exchange, discounting bills, granting cash accounts, and other operations of banking companies, are also considerable. In all these particulars, India possesses peculiar advantages. The range of circulation is more extensive; the probable period of the notes returning into bank more distant; the rate of money higher; the transactions more numerous, and the profits on each transaction greater than in any other country. Had such an establishment of government security existed six years ago, your Presidency could not have fallen into the state of degradation which it has experienced, nor would it have been oppressed with a mass of paltry debts, whose amount, in their present state, may possibly overthrow the government; but which, with the aid of such a bank, could not, for a moment, have obstructed the career of public service. In that event Hyder, so far from ravaging your country and menacing you within the walls of Madras, would have been quickly driven from the Carnatic and from his own dominions. Such an establishment would attach all classes by the ties of private benefit. It would subject to your influence every Prince in India, by enabling you to supply his wants or to support his adversaries, according as his conduct merited your friendship or resentment. If similar proceedings have exalted the Seets and other private soucars throughout Hindustan to a weight and influence little short of princely power, what might we not expect from the operation of such a machinery in the hands of a Government whose wisdom, justice, and stability, should entitle it to public confidence.

If it were possible to suppose that these suggestions should ever grow into effect, we should no longer dread the courts of India meditating our expulsion; for the adoption of these suggestions implies such vigour or interior management, such increasing opulence, such strictness in the detail expenditure, such respectability of warlike preparation, and so direct a course of liberal policy towards all the

country powers, as would either remove their enmity, or else evince their incapacity to subvert a fabric built upon so secure a basis.

I have now, my Lord and Gentlemen, laid before you the condition of your southern provinces, and the tenor of public proceedings since you honoured me with that command. After having fairly stated the embarrassments under which we laboured, and the means employed to overcome them, I have dwelt with pleasure and acknowledgment on the exertions of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin at the head of your southern revenues; as well as of Mr. Digby and Mr. Hippesley, in other departments of civil service. I have repeated the sentiments of obligation due to Colonel Stuart, Colonel Forbes, and the other senior officers of the army, for the strenuous support I received from them. It has also been my particular endeavour to impress your minds with a strong and lasting sense of the merits of your southern troops, and I shall feel the highest satisfaction if my representations shall procure for them any portion of your indulgence, due by indisputable claims.

With regard to the observations subsequent to the narrative of those proceedings in which the southern army was engaged, they refer to the causes which occasioned the decline of our affairs upon the coast, and to the conduct that appears best suited to prevent a repetition of similar disasters. These considerations, and the motives which have induced me to submit my opinion to your Honourable Board, will, I trust, incline you to receive them with indulgence, as the well-intended suggestions of one whose zeal to promote the public service exceeds either his abilities or opportunities of information on this complicated and important subject. Few persons, however, have enjoyed more favourable occasions of inquiry into the local circumstances of those territories. I am conscious, too, that prejudice and partiality have had no influence on my mind. It only remains that I should apologize for the tediousness of this address, and repeat my warmest acknowledgments for the very flattering marks of public confidence which you were pleased to repose in me. Most cordially do I wish, as the best expression of my gratitude, that the vigour, ability, and integrity of your conduct may procure to you the distinguished honour of retrieving the English interests in the East.

I shall now take my leave of your Lordship and the Board, and bid adieu to the subject of India

I have the honour to be,

My Lord and Gentlemen,

Your most obedient and very faithful servant,

W. FULLARTON.