

**ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS OF  
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A NATIONAL CULTURAL  
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PURISTIC ISLAM AND PANCASILA**

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## **ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS OF INSCRIPTION OF A NATIONAL CULTURAL IDEOLOGY IN SUHARTO'S ORBA REGIME : PURISTIC ISLAM AND PANCASILA**

**P**resident Suharto's regime<sup>1</sup> of the past nearly two and a half decades has been popularly characterised as the Pancasila regime. While to his predecessor, the nationalist revolutionary hero Sukarno goes the credit of inventing the state ideology of Pancasila,<sup>2</sup> to Suharto goes the credit of popularizing the ideology among the masses through various policy measures mainly in the field of politics, economy, and education.<sup>3</sup> In fact, from the 70's, the ideology seemed to assume broad overtones of a synonym for various socio-political phenomena and processes such as "stability", "secularism", "security", "economic development" and "modernisation".<sup>4</sup> The interpretative dimensions of the semiotics of the Pancasila concept have also empirical roots in some of the unprecedented achievements in the fields mentioned afore.<sup>5</sup> For all these achievements, critics apart, Suharto had come to be hailed as the "father of development" and the "father of progress". Even scholars such as Michael Leifer have spoken admiringly of Suharto's national commitment: "President Suharto has been in continuous political command in Indonesia ever since 11 March 1966 when he seized the reins of power from the incumbent Sukarno. He was then a Lieutenant General, little known outside of the Republic. With the support of the Armed Forces, he proceeded to transform the country's politics and priorities. No less a nationalist than his flamboyant predecessor, his vision of the future stood in striking

contrast. He explained, 'We shall only be able to play an effective role if we ourselves are possessed of a great national vitality?' To that end a debilitated international pariah of a state was set on a course of rational economic development and regional co-operation, with the result that a quarter of a century later Indonesia has become a candidate member of newly-industrialized countries".<sup>6</sup>

It is also recognised that Suharto and his colleagues had little option, but to stress order, stability and development, after nearly a decade and a half of Sukarno's rule which had left the country in economic and political shambles. Says Vatikiotis: "... Once in power, though, he set about restoring order and embarked on a realistic campaign to develop the economy. Sukarno left the country with a negative growth rate, 600 per cent inflation, no foreign reserves to speak of, a national debt of over \$ US 2 billion. It is scarcely surprising then that Suharto and his army colleagues could safely place economic above political development.

'Order, fostering stability, generating growth and development, these have been the buzz words of the Suharto years. Sukarno peppered his long emotional speeches with talk of maintaining the revolutionary spirit which helped achieve independence. Offered his people rhetoric instead of rice. Suharto and his men were pragmatists who quickly saw that solid political legitimacy could only be achieved by putting the country back on its feet".<sup>7</sup>

It is against this background of the nation-building exercises of Suharto's Orba regime, that the present paper attempts to explore certain specific areas of fundamental concern, which have hitherto not constituted the main focus of study in scholarly writings on Indonesia. Thus, in the present paper an attempt is made: (1) to delineate some crucial episodes which provide insights into the nature of the responses of the puristic Islam political parties<sup>8</sup> to Pancasila: here we shall be considering puristic Islam as represented

in collective organisations such as the *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU, Muslim Scholar's Party), the *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Parmusi or Indonesian Muslims' Party or the Modernist Muslims' Party), considered as the successor to the banned Masjumi (or the Modernist Islamic Party), and the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP or the United Development Party), which was constituted by the fusion of four Islamic parties in 1973, and (2) analyse the responses against the canvas of some of the diachronic and synchronic processes experienced in the broader Indonesian Society.

## 1

### **The Government call for the fusion of political parties, and the 1977 and 1982 general elections**

The successful holding and the results of the 1971 general elections was a winner for the government in more senses than one. Sekbar Golkar (Sekertariat Bersama Golongan Karya or Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups), which had been revitalised in the late 1960s,<sup>9</sup> more than in keeping with the expectations won 227 seats out of a total of 351 contestable seats in the national parliament: its share of valid votes cast had also been the highest, that is, 62.8%. The performance of the three other major political parties, the NU, the Parmusi, and the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* or *Indonesian Nationalist Party*) was as follows: 58 seats (18.67% of the total valid votes cast), 24 seats (5.36% of the total valid votes cast), and 20 seats (6.94% of the total valid votes cast) respectively. The remaining 22 seats of the total 351 were shared among the following four smaller parties: PSII (*Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia* or the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia) – 10; Parkindo (*Partai Kristen Indonesia* or the Party of Indonesian Protestants) – 7; Partai Catholic (or the Roman Catholic Party of Indonesia) – 3; and *Perti* (or the Islamic Education Movement) – 2. The *Partai Nurbe* (usually called the "Trotskyists" or the Proletarian Party), and the

IPKI (or the *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or the League for Upholding Indonesian Independence) came a cropper.<sup>10</sup> It must also be noted here that the Golkar's total parliamentary strength in the 460 member parliament, actually amounted to 336 (nearly 72%) – Golkar had won all the 9 seats in West Irian or Irian Jaya, where elections had been held by an indirect method, and it had also been the recipient of the 100 nominated seats, the nomination prerogative being exercised solely by the President (the prerogative was conferred by the 1969 Election Law).<sup>11</sup>

Another significant aspect of the Golkar's victory was that it seemed to enjoy substantial support in almost all the constituencies of the country, with rural areas displaying stronger support than the urban. Given that the populace of the country is mainly agrarian, the rural support for the Golkar enhanced its legitimacy as a national party.<sup>12</sup>

The victory of the Golkar, it may be noted here, had drawn its own share of criticisms soon after the elections, from leaders of some opposition parties such as the NU and the PNI, regarding unfair practices during the elections – they claimed that the Golkar's substantial victory had been achieved by intimidatory and pressure tactics adopted by the government and the military. While this allegation has been viewed as having some empirical basis,<sup>13</sup> it is nonetheless pointed out that there were many positive factors that had actually worked in Golkar's favour. For instance 94% of the organisation's 538 candidates were considered to have residential roots in the constituencies from which they stood, whereas, the other main parties could boast of such a representation in the range of 72% to 89%. Besides, the Golkar had also the largest number of degree holders among its contestants, considerable number of whom were professionals in law and medicine, and doctorates in various disciplines. The party had also displayed sharp political acumen in providing significant representation for women among its contestants,

in contrast to the other three major parties, viz., the NU, the PNI and the Parmusi: 44 out of a total of 121 women candidates were the Golkar nominees, while the NU, PNI and Parmusi could boast of only 7,17 and 11 respectively.<sup>14</sup>

All in all, whatever may have been some opposition leaders' allegations of unfair play during the elections, the crucial upshot of the Golkar's victory was that it not merely boosted the morale of Suharto's orba based on Pancasila ideology, but also lent legitimacy to the issues of stability, order, development, and modernisation that constituted the main electoral platform of the party.<sup>15</sup>

It is against this background of the new found self-confidence, that the Suharto's government decided to implement the already approved decision by the political parties to simplify the political party structure by reorganising the parties under two broad categories, namely, the spiritual group and the democratic group. Thus in January 1973, under the instructions of the government, the four Islamic parties, viz., the NU, the Parmusi, the PSII and the Perti were fused to form the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or the United Development Party. Similarly, the five other parties, viz., PNI, Parkindo, Partai Murba, Partai Catholic and IPKI merged to constitute the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (or the Democratic Party of Indonesia – PDI).<sup>16</sup>

It needs to be noted here that such a major restructuring of the political parties (partisan politics apart), had been done in the broader context of the "order" and "stability" connotations of the Pancasila ideology. The more puristic Islamic parties, the NU and the Parmusi had endorsed and implemented it, being aware at one level that such a clubbing together may not augur well for the unity or the performance of the PPP.<sup>17</sup> The elections of 1977 were thus the first where in the newly fused blocks, the PPP and the PDI, competed for electoral supremacy along with the Golkar. It is interesting to note

in this connection that the PPP could succeed in its demand for retaining the Ka'abah (the black holy shrine of Mecca) as its election symbol, only after issuing a threat of boycotting the elections,<sup>18</sup> and had fought the elections by appealing to the primordial religious sentiments.<sup>19</sup> The election results' however, put the Golkar in the fore again, which obtained almost similar percentage of votes as in the preceding elections, viz., 62.11%, where as the PPP obtained 29.29%, and the PDI, 8.6%. The number of seats won by each of the political parties out of a total of 360 contestable seats (in the 460 parliament) was as follows: Golkar-232, that is a gain of 5 seats in comparison with the 227 seats it had got in the 1971 elections; the PPP obtained 99 seats, i.e., nearly 3 extra seats compared with the earlier elections. As we have noted earlier, in the 1971 elections the present four constituents of the PPP had each contested the elections independently, and the NU had led the other three Islamic parties by obtaining 58 seats, followed by the Parmusi with 24 seats. Whereas, the PSII had obtained 10 and the Perti 2. But now, in the 1977 elections, the four together had obtained 96, indicating no major shift in the voters' preferences for the larger Islamic entity. The newly constituted PDI (the entity constituted by the fusion of five parties) obtained 29 seats, i.e., one seat less than what the constituents when added-up got in 1971. (viz.,30).

The results of the 1982 elections, was almost a repetition of the preceding two elections, with Golkar emerging the major winner and increasing its share of votes by approximately 2% viz., 64.3%. The PPP and the PDI had obtained 27.8% and 7.9% respectively, indicating a marginal decrease in their share of votes compared with the 1977 elections.<sup>20</sup> In regard to the number of parliamentary seats won by them in a total of 364 contestable seats, it was as follows: Golkar-246, PPP-94, and the PDI-24.<sup>21</sup> It may be noted here that the number of contestable seats in a total of 460 seats had increased from 360 to 364. The additional 4 elected seats had been allotted to East Timor and these had been taken from the 25 seats allotted to

Golkar in the 100 nominated seats. The remaining 75 nominated seats earmarked for the armed forces remained untouched.

A crucial aspect of the Golkar's victory in this election was that it had not only won fourteen additional seats in the parliament, but could also boast of having representation in all the provinces. Besides it had been successful in defeating the PPP and the PDI in all the provinces except Aceh, which continued to remain the stronghold of the PPP. Further, Jakarta which had on the earlier two elections given the PPP the majority of the votes, now had placed Golkar in its place.<sup>22</sup> In this context what needs to be noted is also the fact that notwithstanding the Islamic parties' appeal to religious sentiments and covert and veiled criticisms of the government over the years, they had made little headway in winning over substantial sections of the population to their side.

## 2

### **Pancasila the only Ideology and the PPP**

The legitimacy of Suharto's regime having been reinforced and re-reinforced in the last three general elections – which had naturally imbued it with stronger confidence and reassurance – it now found the time ripe to issue the edict that Pancasila should constitute the *azas tunggal* (the sole principle of foundation) of all political parties. In August, 1982, soon after the elections, Suharto said that “All social-political forces, particularly the political parties should accept the state ideology as their *azas tunggal*”.<sup>23</sup> Two months later, however, he thought it fit to dispel any misapprehensions in religious organisations, by clarifying that they would continue to enjoy “rights and an honorable place in the Pancasila-based state”,<sup>24</sup> and that Pancasila had no claims for being a religion or a substitute of religion. Further, the government in order to provide legal legitimacy to the enunciated policy, decided to have the resolution on Pancasila

approved in the March 1983 general session of the Peoples' Consultative Assembly – thus in this session of the Assembly, the resolution on Pancasila as the sole ideological basis of all social and political organisations was approved and passed and attained the status of a law.<sup>25</sup>

While the adoption of Pancasila is one thing, and how the Islamic party, the PPP, came to terms with it is another. In what follows we shall consider certain episodes, which provide some significant insights into the responses of the latter to the former.

The first episode we shall consider here pertains to the interesting discussion that took place among the PPP delegates on some of the major implications of the adoption of Pancasila as the *azas tunggal* of the party, at the first national congress of the party held during 20-22, August, 1984 (i.e., after its formation in 1973) in Jakarta. It is significant to note here that the main agenda of the congress consisted of four items, of which the following two were considered the most important: (1) the formal ratification by the congress to include Pancasila as the *azas tunggal* of the party in its constitution and to restructure the party organisation from being ideologically oriented to a programme oriented one.<sup>26</sup> The other two items related to the implementation of the policy of complete merger of the constituent parties (which had continued to maintain their separate identities), and issues relating to the leadership structure and election of members to the new boards of the party.<sup>27</sup>

A substantial part of the congress session of three days witnessed an extensive discourse on the implications of the adoption of Pancasila by the party. The discourse mainly centered around two issues. viz., the appropriateness of Kaabah as the party and election symbol, and the degree of "openness" that the party should adopt in regard to the recruitment of members, programmes, action, etc.

We shall give here some interesting excerpts of the discourse that took place between the proponents who argued for the retention

of the Kaabah and caution in adopting universalistic criteria of recruitment of members, and those who opposed such policies. To quote Dijk: "One of the suggestions that came up in adjusting the symbol of the PPP to acceptance of the Pancasila as its only base was to add to it the star and the chain, depicting respectively, in the Indonesian coat of arms, belief in God and humanity. Fachrurazy, who was one to suggest so, also considered the star and the chain a good alternative for the PPP if the Kaabah symbol had to be replaced completely".<sup>28</sup>

But a delegate from Aceh, a region known for its conservative Islam, however, stressed the importance of continuing with Kaabah as the party's symbol – notwithstanding pressures – for he feared the emergence of unbridgeable fissures within the party if done otherwise. He also pointed out that, changing of the symbol or admission of "non-Muslims" to the party would infringe on the Islamic aspirations of its followers, which may in turn have deleterious effects on the party's fortunes in the coming elections. Such sentiments were reiterated by the deputy chairman of the provincial board of South Kalimantan, a region also known for Islamic conservatism. He held that acceptance of Pancasila as the *azas tunggal* of the party, did not necessitate a change in the symbol.<sup>29</sup>

Two other delegates from South Sumatra and Yogyakarta respectively, opposed to the above view, argued for a more flexible approach in regard to the Kaabah and membership questions. The delegate from South Sumatra argued that since "Islam itself knew no symbols", the replacement of the Kaabah symbol with something else, hardly posed any threat to the essence of Islam. He further pointed out that the Kaabah symbol was not a question of life and death, which necessitated an uncompromising attitude. The delegate from Yogyakarta also argued in a similar vein.<sup>30</sup>

The issue of transformation of the PPP from an ascriptive based one (i.e. the membership restricted only to Muslims) to one

based on universalistic criteria of membership (i.e., open to one and all, irrespective of religious faith or other ascriptive identity), also found the leadership divided between those who opposed such a change and others who favoured the change. Some of the more articulate members of the former camp gave varied reasons against change. For instance, one of them pointed out that the time was not yet ripe for such a move, since the project on the complete merger of the constituent parties of the PPP had yet to see the light of day. Further he said that since a section of the party still cherished "Islamic aspirations", any change in regard to membership criteria, may give rise to serious conflicts within the party. Some others pleaded for nurturing Islamic interests. Besides, a PPP member of the parliament drew attention to the fact that the "social origin" of the party was Islamic, and hence the party had an obligation to protect the interests of the Islamic community.<sup>31</sup>

The proponents of change, on the other hand, also had a number of arguments to offer in favour of change. For instance, a member of this camp argued that throwing open the doors of the party to all Indonesians, irrespective of their religious identity was the logical outcome of the acceptance of Pancasila ideology. Besides, he stressed the advantages of an open membership policy – those sections of the Islamic community who had kept out of the PPP, may now be inclined to join it, which would strengthen its support base.<sup>32</sup>

After the discussions pertaining to the implication of adopting the new structural policy, the national congress, as expected adopted Pancasila as the *azas tunggal* of the party. To lend legal credibility to the resolution, it was incorporated in the party's constitution. The congress also decided to retain Kaabah as the party symbol, but the decision regarding its retention as the election symbol, was left to the party's central board in whose jurisdiction it lay.<sup>33</sup>

The conclusion of the national congress, however, did not mean an end to the polemic regarding either Kaabah or the

membership issue. In fact, after a gap of just three months after the congress, the party witnessed serious conflict among its leadership over the two issues. One major controversy related to some prominent PPP parliamentarians, who had gone public by issuing controversial press statements over the two issues. They had stated that after the national congress, the PPP could no more claim to be an Islamic party, and hence the party should replace the Kaabah with another election symbol.<sup>34</sup>

Further, one of the above pro-change parliamentarians had demanded that since the PPP had become an "open party" with the acceptance of Pancasila, it should open its gates of membership to one and all, irrespective of religious affiliation (in the past, as we had noted earlier, its membership had been limited to Muslims). He criticised those who paid only lip-service to Pancasila for tactical reasons, while continuing to propagate the Islamic character of the party : the PPP, he demanded, should demonstrate the proof of its commitment by replacing the Kaabah symbol with either the symbol of star and chain, or of rice and cotton plants. Besides, he pointed out that such changes would augur well for the party in any future elections.<sup>35</sup> Such open and blunt criticisms by the pro-changers aroused the anger of certain sections of the top PPP leadership: the latter accused the former of arbitrary behaviour and trying to impose their views on other PPP members of the parliament.<sup>36</sup>

These top leaders also stated that the critics had disobeyed the party's discipline rules, which forbid individual members to take decisions on matters which fell within the jurisdiction of the apex body of the party, viz., the Central Board of the party. But the recalcitrant members, notwithstanding censures, continued their tirade against the functioning of the party. In fact, by November, the matter had taken such a serious turn, that some influential leaders were considering recalling the pro-change critics from the Parliament. But this threat, instead of subduing the latter, provoked a more

virulent tirade from them. One of the pro-change critics, for instance, stated that he would make ceaseless efforts to persuade the Central Board to declare the PPP to be no longer an Islamic party. Viewing the conflict in the party as an ideological one, he even went to the extent of requesting the government to deny permission to the local branches of the party to organise local congresses, since many of the local leaders still believed the PPP to be an Islamic party. He also demanded the resignation of the Chairman, Naro, for getting angry with Sundarji, the leader of the PPP in the parliament, during a meeting of the party's Central Board. In this meeting, Sundarji had bluntly pointed out that the national congress of the PPP was a failure, since the party still clung to the Kaabah as the election symbol of the party.<sup>37</sup>

The Chairman, however, except for a few occasional outbursts, had kept his cool even in the face of demands for his resignation. He kept reiterating that the issue whether the PPP was still an Islamic party or not, or that of the change of the election symbol would be decided later, after due care and consideration.

But such assurance by the Chairman, did not see an end to the biting criticisms of the pro-change critics. One of the latter even went to the extent of mentioning that the members of the Parliament had wider responsibilities than those to their own party and that they were not mere robots to be pushed around. He became increasingly intransigent day by day, and even decided to form a team to improve the functioning of the party: he held that the national congress had taken decisions in contradiction to the prevailing laws of the country and had initiated "theocratism" in the national body politic. He also talked about three forms of intellectual subversion, viz., Liberalism, Communism, and striving after theocracy. He contended that the purpose of all the three ideologies, was to create a rift between the Armed Forces and the people, and the PPP could not remain neutral to the activities of the Muslim fundamentalist members. He

demanded that an extraordinary meeting of the party be held to purge the party of members who defied the "mission" of the orba. He pointed an accusing finger at the Chairman Naro, for having selected many such betrayers of the orba to be members of the Central Board of the party. According to him, the solution to all the problems that bedevilled the party lay in the reconstitution of the Central Board, with he himself as the Chairman, and Achda (another dissident friend) as the Secretary. The former claimed that his opinions were based on his experiences during his recent tour of north Sumatra and East Java, where the party branches had been steeped in conflicts: according to him, many PPP local leaders in these areas had supported his candidature for Chairmanship and his agenda of change.<sup>38</sup>

The top leadership of the party responded to the scorching criticisms of the pro-changers by expelling two of the most vocal critiques from the party and initiating action to replace them in the Parliament. Their efforts, however, bore little fruit, as the government raised objections to the replacement on procedural and "legal" grounds.<sup>39</sup>

The above episode brings out in a telling fashion: (1) the PPP's unanimous acceptance of Pancasila as its sole ideological base, and (2) the implications of the adoption of the ideology to the party's much bandied about Islamic credentials. In a fundamental sense, by accepting Pancasila, an ideology of "secular" and "modern" credentials, and the metaphor of Suharto's orba, the PPP had to come to terms with its very longstanding Islamic identity.

It is significant to note in this context that the PPP had to also change its Kaabah symbol in the ensuing year, after its first national congress. The occasion was the discussion that followed the introduction of the Elections Bill in the 1985 session of the parliament, when the government requested that all the three parties,

viz. The Golkar, the PDI and the PPP to replace their party's symbols with those with Pancasila overtones. The PPP agreed to comply with the request.<sup>40</sup>

### 3

## **Islam and Pancasila: In Public Celebrations, and in Peasanterens and Madrasahs**

Having agreed to comply with the government's request to change the party's symbol, the PPP replaced the Kaabah with an un-Islamic star, copied from the government's official Pancasila emblem. Besides the PPP also witnessed a substantial erosion of its support base, when the NU, soon after the National Congress of 1984, decided to withdraw from the PPP (with the government's approval) and remain a non-political organisation devoting itself to educational and cultural activities. Accompanying the NU's decision to withdraw, was the injunction it imposed on its leaders that they should desist from holding any position in any political party. Notwithstanding these professed policies, some of its leaders engaged in political cabling in various covert ways to de-throne Naro from the Chairmanship of the PPP. That the NU leaders, however, were unsuccessful in their mission is another question.<sup>41</sup>

There were also certain public occasions, when the NU leaders after the party's withdrawal from the PPP, had to provide new interpretations of Islam to its cadres, who all along had been fed with the notion that Islam was a comprehensive political and religious ideology. The following illustration pertaining to the observations of two prominent NU religious leaders, regarding the nature of relationship between Islam and Pancasila, provide some interesting insights into the political pragmatism of the leadership of the organisation.

The public occasion was a summit mosque school prayer meeting, held in 1986, at a large mosque-cum-religious boarding school, affiliated to the NU (as many such schools are) in a village near Pare.

Pare, is a country-town located in east central Java. It may be noted here that such prayer meetings were held by NU once in four months, and the place where it was held rotating among different regions of the country. Such congregations were substantially large, with five to six thousand participants of both the sexes. During these occasions, the participants engaged in varied activities, from praying and listening to sermons of the national religious leaders to feasting and socialising.<sup>42</sup>

On the above mentioned congregation in Pare, there were two religious leaders. One, the regional head of the NU, who had recently resigned from the national parliament, and another the preacher of the village mosque, who addressed the audience. The address of both the leaders mainly dealt with the relation of Islam as a "religion" to Pancasila as a "philosophy". As already noted, such an explanation had become necessary especially after the withdrawal of the NU from the PPP and the organisation declaring itself as a mere cultural organisation. Adding to these leaders' discomfiture was also the fact that the followers had been fed with visions of the dawning of a golden era for Islam after independence. The explanation of the two religious leaders ran as follows: "The ex-MP traced in words of one syllable the twists and turns of Nahdatul Ulama's history to show that the new a political policy was really not a surrender to power but a return to the organisation's original ideals. The religious teacher filled his speech with references to the Quran and Hadith to show that the new policy was not in conflict with Islamic orthodoxy, but a natural extension of it. Islam is a religion that comes from God, they both said, Pancasila is a philosophy that comes from man. Different sorts of thing, they can't possibly be in conflict. The Prophet is the

head of the national community. Differently led toward different ends, the two communities are not opposed".<sup>43</sup>

Now we shall consider another example from the Pare scene, pertaining to the "graduation" ceremony of a rural Muslim institution for the teaching of English, started by a reformist Muslim, educated both in Islamic religion and English language. More specifically, this example will provide some insights into the response of Muslim reformist sections of the society to the "progress", "modernisation", and "development" symbology of Pancasila.

The school authorities had preferred not to use the usual nomenclature for a graduation ceremony, viz., *perpighahan* (or separation), instead they called it *halal bihalal*, an Arabic term which roughly meant "mutual forgiveness of sins". The ceremony opened with religious incantations, first, a prayer in Arabic, followed by a collective recitation of the *Fatiha* (i.e. the preamble to the Quran, resembling somewhat the prayer to the Lord in Christianity). Then came three chantings of a very lengthy Quranic passage: "... first in Arabic, by a heavily shawled girl, then in Indonesian, by a boy in the standard black overseas cap, white shirt, and black trousers, and then in English, by yet another boy similarly dressed but with white tennis shoes and a garish tie. Three welcoming addresses, also religious in content, by a representative of the graduating class and of each of the classes already graduated, again one in Arabic, one in Indonesian, and one in English, with appropriate dress and speech styles concluded this phase of things".<sup>44</sup>

Then came the student performances, first by small boys, aged between seven and eight years old. It was a mime show with the children's faces made-up white, whose object as deconstructed by Geertz was, "Some sort of a mute salute to the speaking, or near-speaking, of English, a supposition confirmed when the next act came on: a half dozen older boys, of perhaps nineteen or twenty, also mimes, and of extraordinary skill".<sup>45</sup>

This group (i.e., those who were nineteen or twenty) called themselves (in English), "The Street Boys". The main figure was a young man whose face was made-up white, wearing Western-hat and dark-glasses and dressed in "hyper-urban", "Jakarta-hustler-style". After some time, the lead man and others of his troupe burst-out into a parody song in English, which they repeated a number of times, "in a hilarious series of mockeries of popular song styles – the Indonesian ones called *dangdut* and *kroncong*; Bob Dylan, Hard Rock, Country..."<sup>46</sup> The performance ended with a funny mime of a student trying to read English from a book.

But what followed was the most extraordinary and telling, from an Islamic purist point of view, To quote Geertz: "Three young women in extremely garish, wildly clashing, mod-singer dress, with very short skirts and very stuffed brassiers, heavy make-up, flamboyant costume jewellery, and again dark glasses (they were so outlandish, I thought, at first that they were crossdressed men) came on and performed a rock-singing parody, complete with exaggerated bump and grind movements and wild yeh-yeh cries".<sup>47</sup>

The above graduation ceremony reflects the new expressions of the reformist Islamic sect's accommodation to the Pancasila symbology of "progress" and "modernisation". Learning English is not merely an avenue of "development" and "progress", but also of "modernity" and mobility. In short, Islam seems to be moving, if hesitantly, but surely, to metamorphosise itself into a Pancasila identity, the national-cultural identity of the orba. The Pancasila ideology, symbolising the three prominent aspects of change, seems to have also transformed the traditional Islamic schools of learning, the peasanterans and madrahahs into a certain secular mould. A crucial illustration of this is the induction of varied courses of study (in these schools), ranging from physics, biology, economics, etc., on the one hand, to vocational courses in areas such as ceramics, leather-work, sewing, automotive repair, electronics, carpentry, and computer operations.<sup>48</sup>

This was in accordance with the 1975 curriculum agreement for both secular schools (where hours of religious study were reduced) and madrasahs: i.e., a 70/30 ratio of secular/religious studies. According to Thomas: "This range of academic and vocational specialisation represents a marked departure from the form of Islamic schooling in previous decades of the 20th century".<sup>49</sup> In the 1980's the curriculum in the Islamic schools underwent a further process of secularisation, all under the guidance of the Muslim dominated Ministry of Religion.<sup>50</sup>

Another interesting aspect of the above Islamic education scene was that a large majority of the puristic Islam followers themselves seemed to prefer secular education schools to Islamic school: "Over the past 43 years, too, the secular schools supervised by the Ministry of Education have been attended by far more students than have the Muslim institutions under the Ministry of Religion. For example, in 1977-78 over 23 million students were enrolled in secular elementary and secondary schools (public and private) and 7.28 million in Muslim schools. As these figures suggest (76% secular, 24% Islamic), the public has generally considered secular schools of greater worth than Muslim institutions. For example, in a 1965 survey of Muslim West Java villager's opinion of schools, secular schools consistently were ranked higher than Muslim institutions".<sup>51</sup>

An explanation of the increasing preferential orientation of the puristic Islamic followers to secular education is not far to seek. Such a preference seemed to be based on their perceptions of the advantages these secular schools offered in contrast to Islamic schools, in terms of employment opportunities in a growing economy, access to prestigious higher secular educational institutions in disciplines such as engineering, medicine and law, and higher military academy institutions, which in turn offered social mobility in varied spheres of the society.<sup>52</sup> In summary, Thomas observes that

throughout the twentieth century, Islamic schools were gradually transformed into a secular mould, and that their focus shifted from turning out "good" people (i.e., good Muslims who were learned in Islamic teachings and practised them) to turning-out those with a modern science view of the world and skilled in vocational pursuits.<sup>53</sup> These trends in the Islamic educational system intensified in the 80's, thus reflecting the enveloping nature of the Pancasila ideology, which was making inroads, even into the conservative Islamic collective consciousness.

#### 4

### **PPP, Pancasila, Aceh, and the 1987 General Elections**

In more senses than one, the 1987 elections proved to be a test-case of the potency of Pancasila vis-a-vis Islam, when for the first time the PPP witnessed a substantial erosion of its vote banks. The most significant case was of Aceh (a North Sumatran Province), the stronghold of traditional Islam, which in all the previous elections had voted overwhelmingly for the PPP, now gave the same to Golkar.<sup>54</sup>

A comparison of the 1982 and 1987 elections shows that the PPP's vote base had fallen from 27.8% in the former to 16.0% in the latter. That is, nearly a loss of 12% of the votes in the 1987 elections. Whereas, Golkar's percentage of votes polled went up from 64.3 in 1982 to 73.2 in 1987.<sup>55</sup>

The impressive gain of Golkar in contrast to the substantial loss of the PPP has been mainly attributed to the NU factor: a majority of the departing votes of the PPP hailed from the NU and voted for the Golkar. Little says: "Analysis of the 1987 elections data shows that PPP support dropped in 24 of the 27 districts... The difference in PPP's fall in regions where NU historically has been strong and in

areas where other Islamic parties have been more prominent are not great, though NU provinces did tend to be hit slightly harder. Because of the number involved, however, the cumulative effect is that nearly all of the loss is attributable to NU defections".<sup>56</sup>

Another significant regional dimension of the PPP's loss was that there was a serious erosion of its Islamic vote base in the three provinces of Java, viz., East Java, Central Java and West Java, where the NU in 1971 had obtained 89.6%, 80.6% and 63.3% of the total Islamic vote, respectively. In fact, East Java (the largest Indonesian province), which was considered to command nearly 25% of the PPP's voters' base, and NU's heartland, accounted for nearly 32%, of its decline.<sup>57</sup>

The NU which left the PPP in 1984, after having found itself at loggerheads with the PPP's Chairman John Naro of MI, as pointed out earlier, found the time ripe just before the 1987 elections to turn the tables on the Chairman. Thus it launched an informal campaign tour, telling its supporters, "a vote for PPP is not required, for Golkar not prohibited, for PDI not a crime".<sup>58</sup>

The NU supporters understood the message, fell in line and voted for Golkar. Given the NU's animosity towards the PPP, the latter's defeat was the former's triumph. The NU had killed two birds at one stroke – the PPP's loss was a lesson to Naro, and support for Golkar meant ingratiating itself to Suharto's orba. But support for Golkar also held deeper consequences for Islam – a deeper inscribing of the Pancasila ideology in the collective consciousness of the puristic Islam followers. Hermeneutically, factional and pragmatic politics could lead to a path, where the previous foundation of an ethnic identity could gradually loose its tenor and texture in favour of a new one. Or the outward shell-cast may remain, with the kernel in metamorphosis.

The following case of Aceh brings out the above point in an even sharper relief. The 1987 elections saw Aceh voting

predominantly for Golkar, with its all-time favourite, the PPP, sliding to a second position, and the final tally in regard to the percentage of votes won, by the three competing parties ran as follows : Golkar – 51.8%, PPP – 42.8%, and PDI – 5.4%. Important also was the fact that seven of the ten districts of the Aceh province (as against three in 1982), and 77 of the 137 sub-districts gave the Golkar, a majority, and in almost every sub-district, the party had captured a significant proportion of the votes.<sup>59</sup>

## 5

### **Towards an Analysis: Aspects of Social Transformation of Puristic Islam in its Encounter with Pancasila, and Some Exercises in Nation-building in Suharto's Orba**

The foregoing narrative of certain critical events, viz., (1) the formation of the PPP, and the outcome of the 1977 and 1982 elections; (2) the acceptance of the Pancasila ideology by the PPP's national congress in 1984, and the crucial debate that followed among the party's leaders on the implications of the acceptance of the ideology, and the later decision regarding the replacement of the party's Kaabah symbol with just a star; (3) the new interpretations of Islam offered by the Islamic religious leaders on public platforms regarding the acceptance of the Pancasila ideology, the new modes of celebration of certain annual events by some schools set in the backdrop of the more conservative Islamic community in the east-central part of Java, the adoption of a secular curricula by the former Islamic schools of learning such as *peasanterans*, necessitated by the demand made by increasing sections of the Puristic Islam's followers themselves; and finally (4) the outcome of the 1987 elections in general and in Aceh in particular, provide certain significant insights into the response of Islam to Pancasila on the one hand, and the process of nation-building in a developing plural society on the other.

Broadly, the tenor of Islam's response reflects an accommodative spirit, keeping, of course, in line with the strategy of pragmatic politics that the leaders thought best to follow. The rebellion of the late 50's where in, a number of prominent Masjumi leaders had been involved, and later had been witnesses to the banning of the party by Sukarno's regime, the 1965 coup and the massacre that followed, and the dramatic finale to the post-coup events resulting in the dethronement of Sukarno (the great revolutionary hero and the heart-throb of the masses), to mention just a few examples, had been telling lessons to the followers of Puristic Islam – as to other sections of the society – the fate that awaited, if not in "harmony". Such crucial events seemed to have also etched certain deep impressions in the collective consciousness of the Islamic community, which now had to choose the best of the two alternatives: defiance and annihilation or accommodation and pragmatic politics for survival, with the hope that some day Allah would set things right and restore Islam to its original pre-eminent place and glory.

Further, certain divisive forces had been at work in regard to the two major Islamic parties, the NU and the MI, preventing the emergence of an United Islamic front which could have proved to be a power to reckon with vis-a-vis the Pancasila regime. First, the pervasive factional conflicts among the leadership of the two parties, for the exercise of power and influence, had not merely eroded the power of the parties, but also created a poor image of disunity and squabbling leaders among their respective followers. Second, within the PPP, the two parties, were invariably at loggerheads with each other, as each tried for a position of dominance within the party's power-structure. Third, the earlier ideological divisions between the two, i.e., the conservatism of the NU versus the reformist orientation of the MI, continued within the PPP, with little effort to accommodate or transform themselves in the context of a new Islamic political scenario. Last, but not least, given the majority of the PPP's

leadership's proclivity for opportunistic politics, they allowed the New Order to meddle in its affairs as it offered them an opportunity to get more proximate to the powers that be, which in turn enhanced their power and influence in their own party.

Besides much of the sting of the Islamic critics had been blunted, by the successes of the twenty-five years of the orba regime, in varied areas such as economic development, education, poverty alleviation and family planning. These successes had won appreciation not merely in the domestic domain (of course, grudgingly, from the critics), but also from various quarters of the world. Consider, for instance, Vatikiotis's assessment of the success of the orba's development policies: "Arguably, memories of the repression and carnage of 1966 have faded in the light of the New Order's successful strategy of national development. The programme of national development or pembangunan nasional, became a slogan with a mesmerizing effect on Indonesians and outsiders alike. There was a reason for this. Within a decade of his coming to power, Indonesia stabilized, joined the exclusive ranks of oil-producing states and was using the revenue from oil to implement an extraordinary programme of development. It was a turnaround too remarkable by Third World standards to argue with. Indonesia, the nightmare of US foreign policy analysts in the 1960s, suddenly became burning proof that not all regimes born out of the barrel of a gun are bad".<sup>60</sup>

The orba regime's programme of economic development had made the country take huge strides in industrial growth; for instance, while in 1970, manufacturing accounted for just 8 percent of the GDP vis-a-vis agriculture's 45 percent contribution, by 1990, the former's share of the GDP had shot-up to 19 percent.<sup>61</sup> Such a substantial growth in the manufacturing sector, in areas such as textiles, plywood, garments, plastic and rubber-based products, had helped to boost the export of non-oil goods, which was expected to

constitute nearly 73% of the export earnings.<sup>62</sup> In 1990, non-oil exports had notched up to nearly 15.2 billion.<sup>63</sup> What is remarkable is that the country sustained substantial export growth, even during the worst periods of international recession.<sup>64</sup> The agrarian sector too had shown exceptional progress. Production of rice, the main staple food of the Indonesians, had marked such high rates of growth that it was considered an astonishing achievement compared with other parts of Asia over the past two decades. That is, between 1960 and 1989, "per capita production of rice and other food crops increased from 95 kg per capita to 142 kg per capita.<sup>65</sup> By the mid – 1980's, Indonesia had achieved self-sufficiency in rice, a highly creditable feat, especially when viewed against its record of being the world's largest rice importer in the 1970's".<sup>66</sup>

Indonesia, under the orba, also made rapid strides in areas such as reduction of poverty, educational and health facilities. The poverty level which was 60% in 1970 fell to 15% in 1990.<sup>67</sup> Primary school enrolment had risen to 83% in 1987, considered "one of the highest enrolment rates in the developing world".<sup>68</sup> Vatikiotis remarks : "Indonesia under Suharto has been held up as something of a model of Third World Development. A net show of growth, comparatively little social unrest, and the absence of tanks in the streets is enough to qualify for laurels in many regions of the world. In Indonesia's case, state-managed economic development since the 1970's has, against considerable odds, steadily improved the welfare of the majority of Indonesian people".<sup>69</sup>

In fact, many observers seemed to concur with the view that the orba's achievements in the economic sphere mitigated the drawbacks in the political and other spheres of the society.<sup>70</sup> The remarkable performance in the former and considerable measure of political stability had attracted a large number of foreign investors to the country, giving further boost to its economic performance. For example, while in 1967, Japan opted for just two investment projects

costing around \$US 6.7 million, two years later it invested in 15 additional projects, rising the total invested amount to \$US 132.3 million.<sup>71</sup> Another note-worthy feather in the orba's cap was its ground-breaking programme of population control: it mobilised village level voluntary organisations in various nooks and corners of the country to persuade women to adopt family planning programmes. Consequently, 18.5 million women were considered to have accepted the government sponsored birth control. The validity of this was to a certain measure borne out by the studies conducted by the University of Indonesia, which indicated a decline in the number of children borne by a female, and by the turn of the century, she was expected to bear less than three children.<sup>72</sup>

It is against this Pancasila leit-motif of nearly two and a half decades of substantial progress in the sphere of economic development, political stability, and considerable success in poverty alleviation and family planning programme, etc., that the Indonesian society witnessed certain deeper stirrings in the aspirations and the value orientation of its people. A dramatic instance of such a transformation was the increasing demand by even the Puristic Islam followers for their wards to be educated in secular schools, since the latter had come to assume crucial importance as the main avenue of economic and social mobility. In other words, education in secular schools in contradistinction to Islamic schools, not merely provided access to prestigious higher educational institutions and professional courses such as medicine, engineering and defence, but also to employment opportunities in a liberal economy, and prestigious and tenurial jobs in the government's vast bureaucracy. Besides, such employment, also meant access to new Western life-style commanding prestige and status in the society – as we have noted earlier under the new wave of Westernisation, ability to speak English (under the Dutch, it was the ability to speak Dutch), pop-music, Western attire such as jeans and mini-skirts had come to assume higher status connotations. Another telling instance of such

transformation in the aspirations of the Islamic followers, was the Islamic Aceh's voting behaviour in the 1987 elections: the Golkar, the most vociferous adherent of the Pancasila ideology and the development / modernisation programme of the orba, had for the first time emerged the biggest winner capturing nearly 51 percent of the votes in the 1987 elections. Liddle<sup>73</sup> has attributed the Golkar's success in Aceh, mainly to the party's "campaign war-chest", and the effective campaigning strategy of certain influential central government officials. But it seems to me, however, that the more important factor than the "campaign war-chest" in the Golkar's success, was the significant transformation in the cognitive universe of the Acehnese during the (nearly) two decades of the orba regime. Such a view would necessitate a focus more on the men behind the campaign and what they represented, and the impact of the development ideology propagated by the orba for nearly two decades on the collective consciousness – cultural values of the Acehnese.

Ibrahim Hasan, an Acehnese himself, and one of the crucial men behind the "campaign war-chest" in Aceh, symbolised the changing aspirations of the Acehnese. He had been appointed as the Governor of Aceh, just eight months before the elections. He was considered a suave, westernised, Syracuse-trained professional economist, who had spent most of his career in Jakarta, the capital and the symbol of "modernity" and "sophisticated life-style". Before his posting in Aceh, he had held important Positions, as Rector of the local Aceh University, and as the head of the state agricultural marketing board, the Bulog.

Hasan travelled the length and breadth of Aceh before and during the campaign, visiting and speaking to scores of Acehnese in their own tongue about the benefits of development and modernisation that Golkar stood for, and that a vote for the party did not mean a loss of their Acehnese identity.<sup>74</sup> Hasan was a metaphor

for the changing aspirations and the new cultural values of the Acehnese, increasing sections of whom aspired for the mobility and "modernity" (the new cultural symbol) represented by him. Another crucial evidence for the transformation in their aspirations, may be noted in their increasing preference for "secular" education (as opposed to religious), white-collar employment, urban residence and life-style.<sup>75</sup>

In other words, Golkar's victory in the traditional Islamic Aceh, provides another acid-test of the orba regime's success in transforming certain aspects of the cultural ideology of the society. The development / modernisation dimensions of the Pancasila ideology have, over a period of time, made inroads into the deeper layers of the social-consciousness of the Acehnese people. Material prosperity that the ideology of development envisaged, and the status, cultural and power symbols of white-collar employment and "modernisation" (inclusive of Westernisation), seemed to have gradually enveloped the Acehnese too, who did not want to be left out in the race: Ibrahim Hasan and other Acehnese who enjoyed similar status and power had come to constitute the new mega-symbols of Acehnese identity. They also symbolised that "development" and "modernisation" need pose no threat to Acehnese identity, but indeed act as new instruments in the assertion of their identity.

The pragmatism of "accommodation politics" seems to be another variable of the same game. What needs to be recognised, however, is also the other side of the coin.

The opening up of the invulnerable Acehnese provides certain insights into not merely the transformative dimensions of a conservative society and culture, but also of the epistemology of the process of evolving a national identity in a plural society. The Acehnese's increasing pre-disposition to be "also in the race" for mobility and prosperity, forebode the emergence of a new syncretic

cultural form, whose matrix would be constituted by the Islamic, the Acehnese and Western cultural attributes, which in certain aspects seem similar to the performances that constituted the "graduation" ceremony of the rural Muslim school for the teaching of English, situated in Pare in east-central Java, mentioned earlier. Parellely, the transforming mobility aspirations in the backdrop of Pancasila leit-motif of development and modernisation, held prospects for a certain measure of cultural homogenisation of the society: the new cultural symbols of status and prestige assisting in the orba's endeavour of constituting an overarching Indonesian national identity. This, however, is not to claim that the pluralistic character of the Indonesian society would get completely obliterated and replaced by a homogeneous cultural identity. Nonetheless, it may be asked whether blunted cleavages could coexist with an overarching cultural and national identity. The empirical evidence suggests the "structuration"<sup>76</sup> of the Indonesian society along those lines. It is also an envisaging of an Indonesian being constituted by a series of concentric identities, which become expressive in different circumstances and contexts.

On the political front, orba's nation-building exercise reflects a combination of attributes: consociational democratic exercise,<sup>77</sup> certain measure of dictatorship, manipulative politics, and a substantial commitment to improve the well-being of the people and the nation.

It needs to be recognised, nonetheless, that within a certain measure of consociational politics, the primordial group, the abangan,<sup>78</sup> constituting nearly fifty per cent of the country's population, enjoyed considerable political pre-eminence, in comparison to numerically smaller groups such as the Puristic Islam followers, Chinese confucianists, and the Christians. In fact the orba's political calculations in rejuvenating the Golkar before the 1971 elections, seemed to have been based on the logic of mobilising

the abangan as the main prop of the organisation. That the new regime's political acumen and logic was not amiss, was proved time and again, in every general election that was conducted after the 70's, when the Golkar kept stomping to victory.

Broadly the political scene till the mid – 1990's seemed a continuation of the preceding decades, as witnessed in the substantial Golkar victory in the elections held on 9th June, 1992. Golkar obtained 68% of the popular vote (5% less compared with the previous election), the PPP secured 17%, an increase of mere 1% compared with its previous performance. The PDI, however, had shown significant improvement in its share of votes from 11% in 1987 to 15% in the 1992 elections. The election was completed without any major trouble, and was hailed as "most trouble-free election" in the country's history, and that there was less overt intervention by the armed forces in favour of Golkar than in previous elections.<sup>79</sup> March 1993, witnessed the election of Suharto as the President for the sixth consecutive term, by the Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR).

The economy in the 1990's seemed to be doing considerably well, notwithstanding the restrictive domestic policies and a sluggish global economy : "... The economy continued to slow down; most estimates put growth at around 5.5% down from 6.8% in 1991 and 7% the year before. The slow-down has been largely government induced; monetary and fiscal policy have remained very tight in a bid to rein in the inflationary surge of 1990-91. In tight domestic conditions and with the global economy still sluggish, a growth rate of 5.5% is quite respectable. Other encouraging developments were the unexpectedly good rice harvest, which eliminated the anticipated need to import rice over the next fiscal year, and the continued strong growth of exports. Despite the lowering of oil prices, Indonesia increased its trade surplus in 1992. This reflects the continued buoyancy of non-oil exports, which grew at an impressive 21% rate.

This is a very encouraging result for those who have been promoting economic liberalisation over the last several years".<sup>80</sup>

In sum, the sociological vision that is conjured up of Indonesia's Puristic Islam in its varied encounters with the rubric of Pancasila – as stability, security, economic and social development, modernisation and progress – is one of the former in metamorphosis, gradually, but surely being enveloped by the overarching syncretic national-cultural identity fostered by the latter.<sup>81</sup> In other words, Islam seen in pragmatic politics, in new interpretations, in the idioms of new aspirations and mobility prospects, is a religion which is witnessing a substantial change in its texture and tenor, expressive of the softening of the edges of its ideological fervour and substance. Such an opening up also forebodes well for a certain measure of mutualibility and cross-cultural interactions between the transforming Puristic Islam and the other.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. After the unsuccessful coup attempt by some sections of the military on 30th September, 1965, some top brass of the military thought it fit to depose the then President Sukarno, and install a military backed regime headed by general Suharto, in March 1966. Suharto had played a crucial role in the quelling of the coup, and was confirmed formally as President, in March 1968. See Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1993: 1-2.
2. Bernhard, Daham, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1969 : 336-50. Pancasila constitutes the five basic principles on which the Indonesian state is based: viz., Belief in God, Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Democracy and Social Justice. Also see by the same author, "The Parties, the Masses and the Elections", in Oey, Hong Lee (ed.), *Indonesia : After the 1971 Elections*, London: Oxford University Press, 1974 : 1-3.
3. See Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*, 106-107. We may note here that Suharto's regime was also popularly referred to as the Orba (or the new order), in contradistinction to the preceding regime of Sukarno, which was called the Orla (or the old order) regime. These two terms were supposed to symbolise the contrast between the two regimes in terms of the stability, security, economic development, etc., of the former, versus the instability, insecurity, economic, stagnation, etc., of the latter.
4. Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*, and Hong Lee (ed.), *Op.Cit.*

5. R. William, Liddle, "Indonesia in 1987: The New Order at the Height of its Power", *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXVIII, No.2, February 1988, pp.180-191; David, Mc Kendrick, "Indonesia in 1991: Growth, Privilege and Rules", *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXXII, No.2, February, 1992, pp. 103-110; Andrew, Mac Intyre, "Indonesia in 1991: Coming to Terms with the Outside World", *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXXIII, No.2, February, 1993, pp.204-210; Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*
6. Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*, p.IX.
7. *Ibid.*, p.33.
8. R. William, Liddle, *Op.Cit.*, p.181.
9. Actually, Golkar was first established by the army in 1964, as an umbrella organisation for anti-communist cadres drawn from various functional groups. It was not a very effective political organisation until Suharto's government decided to hold the general elections in 1971, in keeping with the "democratic principle" underlying the Pancasila ideology. Thus in 1969, under the instruction and guidelines issued by the government, the 201 "functional groups" – ranging from those of the taxi drivers to those of women and youth were re-structured and re-vitalised in preparation for the impending elections. It was decided to retain the original categorisation of Golkar as a "functional group", instead of being nomenclatured as a political party. See in this connection Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*, pp.94-95, and Leo, Suryadinata, *Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1982, pp.12-13. Here I have referred to Golkar as a political party, since it shared a number of attributes with other political parties, and was a major actor in the political landscape of the

country'since 1971, notwithstanding its nomenclature as a functional group, which anyway was dictated by the political expediency of its creators.

10. Leo, Suryadinata, *Ibid.*, p.16 and p.76; also see Masashi, Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971*, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, New York, 1972, No.56, p.42.
11. See Masashi, Nishihara, *Op.Cit.*, p.5 and p.42; of the 100 nominated seats, 75 were earmarked for the military, and the remaining 25 for civilians. See also Leo, Suryadinata. *Ibid.*, p.7.
12. Masashi, Nishihara, *Op.Cit.*, p.52. A further reinforcing factor of legitimacy for the Golkar was the fact that the 1971 elections recorded a high voter turn-out, and the valid votes cast were to the tune of nearly 94.02%. This percentage was considered to be 6% higher than the votes cast in the first 1955 parliamentary elections; see Masashi, Nishihara, *Op.Cit.*
13. Masashi, Nishihara, *Op.Cit.*, p.44.
14. Masashi, Nishihara, *Op.Cit.*, p.31-32.
15. Masashi, Nishihara, *Op.Cit.*, p.35.
16. Leo, Suryadinata, *Op.Cit.*, pp.21-23, and Oey Hong Lee, *Op.Cit.*, pp.8-9.
17. Leo, Suryadinata, *Op.Cit.*, pp.21-23, p.28.
18. Leo, Suryadinata, *Op.Cit.*, p.31.
19. Leo, Suryadinata, *Op.Cit.*, p.29.
20. Leo, Suryadinata, *Op.Cit.*, p.56.
21. Leo, Suryadinata, *Op.Cit.*, p.56. It may be noted here that the number of contestable seats (in a total of 460 seats), had increased from 360 to 364. The additional four elected seats

had been allotted to East, Timor, and these had been taken from the 25 seats allotted to the civilian category in the 100 nominated seats. See Suryadinata. *Op.Cit.*, p.56.

22. Leo, Suryadinata, *Op.Cit.*, p.57.
23. Sjafruddin, Prawarinegara. "Pancasila as the sole Foundation". *Indonesia*, No.38, October, 1984, p.74.
24. Sjafruddin, Prawarinegara. *Ibid.*
25. *Facts on File*, Vol.43, No.2207, March, 1983, p.194.
26. Cees, Van, Dijk, "Survey of Political Developments in Indonesia in the Second Half of 1984: the National Congress of the PPP and Pancasila Principle", *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, Vol.19, No.1, Winter, 1985, p.185.
27. *Ibid.*, pp.177-202. The party's top leadership position of Chairman and President were held during this period by J. Naro (PMI) and K.H.Idham Chalid (NU) respectively.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, pp.189-90
35. *Ibid.*, p.192.
36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*, p.193
38. *Ibid.*, pp.192-193.
39. *Ibid.*, pp.196-201.
40. Jean Van de, Kok and Michael, Van Langenberg, "Political Developments in Indonesia in the First Half of 1987: Electoral Politics and Comment", *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, Vol.22, No.1, Winter 1988, p.173.
41. William, Liddle, *Op.Cit.*, p.184.
42. Clifford, Geertz, " 'Popular Art' and the Javanese Tradition", *Indonesia*, No.50, October (25th Anniversary Edition), 1990, p.84.
43. *Ibid.*, pp.84-85.
44. *Ibid.*, p.86.
45. *Ibid.*, p.87
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. K.Murray, Thomas, "The Islamic Revival and Indonesian Education", *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXVIII, No.9. September, 1988, p.905.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*, p.906.
51. *Ibid.*, p.902.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*, p.903.

54. William, Liddle, *Op.Cit.*, pp.182-185.
55. *Ibid.*, p.182.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*, p.183.
58. *Ibid.*, p.184.
59. *Ibid.* p.185.
60. Michael., R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*, p.34.
61. *Ibid.*, p.41.
62. *Asia Week*, May 19, 1993, p.26.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Hall, Hitt, "The Economy: Paying the Dues", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22nd April, 1993, p.44; also see Shaini, Aznam, "Trading to Success", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22nd April, 1993, p.42.
65. Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*, p.35.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Asia Week*, May 19th, 1993, p.26.
68. Michael, R.J., Vatikiotis, *Op.Cit.*, p.35.
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Ibid.*, p.37.
71. *Ibid.*, p.35.
72. *Ibid.*, p.36.
73. William, R., Liddle, *Op.Cit.*, p.185.

74. Dwight, Y., King, and M.Ryaas, Rasjid, "The Golkar Landslide in the 1987 Indonesian Elections: the case of Aceh", *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXVIII, No.9, September, 1988, pp.916-925.
75. William, R., Liddle, *Op.Cit.*, p.186.
76. Anthony, Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, Macmillan : London and Basingstoke, 1979 (reprinted in 1982, 1983).
77. Lijphart introduced the concept of "consociational democracy" to "interpret the co-operative governmental formations in plural developed societies such as Austria, Switzerland and Holland, and developing plural societies such as Malaysia. See Arend, Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies : A Comparative Exploration*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1977.
78. Geertz, in his classic study, *The Religion of Java*, viewed the abangan as one of the three subvariants that constituted the Javanese syncretic religious system – the other two being the Santri and the Prijaji. This Javanese syncretism, according to him, is made up of animistic, Hinduistic and Islamic elements, and is the "Island's true folk tradition". In the case of the abangan, there is greater emphasis on the animistic features i.e., beliefs and practices associated with spirits, magic, sorcery etc., than the other two subvariants (viz. Hinduistic and Islamic) of the syncretic system. He says that the former "broadly related to the peasant element in the population". The other two subvariants, viz., the Santri where the stress is more on the Islamic elements and the Prijaji where the stress is more on the Hinduistic elements, were broadly viewed as relating to the trading / elite and the white-collar elite of the Javanese society respectively. See Clifford, Geertz, *The Religion of*

*Java*, Chicago and London : The University of Chicago Press, 1976 (originally published in 1960, The Free Press), pp.5-6.

79. Andrew, Mac, Intyre, "Indonesia in 1992: Coming to Terms with the Outside World", *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXXIII, No.2, February 1993, p.209.
80. *Ibid.*, p.207.
81. William, H., Frederick, "Rhoma Irama and the Dangdut Style: Aspects of Contemporary Indonesian Popular Culture", *Indonesia*, No.34, October, 1982, pp.103-130. Rhoma Irama, one of the most popular musicians in contemporary Indonesia, was considered to combine the indigenous Dangdut style of music and the Western rock style, in his music compositions. Another mega-symbol of the emerging new syncretic popular culture amidst the conservative Islamic community, was B.J. Habibie, the high profile, Germany trained brilliant aviation engineer, who is the Minister for Research and Technology, and also the head of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, founded in 1990. See *Asia Week*, May 19, 1993, p.28.

## **A note about the author**

Dr. Chitra Sivakumar is the Professor and Director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Madras. She completed her undergraduate degree from Maharani's College, Mysore. She went on to complete her Masters and Ph.D. in Sociology in the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University. She has been a member of the faculty in the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras, since 1977. Prior to coming to join the University of Madras, she taught in Delhi University. She has also been visiting Professor at DePaul University, Chicago. Dr. Chitra Sivakumar has been researching and writing on the Sri Lankan ethnic problem, Religion and politics in Indonesia and also Hinduism in South and Southeast Asia. Aside from these areas, she is a pioneer in educational Sociology in India and has published extensive research work on Student Politics. She has, in collaboration with S.S. Sivakumar, also published pioneering research on the regional social history of northern Tamilnadu. Dr. Chitra Sivakumar has a large number of refereed publications in national and international professional journals, as well as two books to her credit.